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legislature wanted to make every one out of a group or a class of persons liable it used clear language expressing the intention; and that the phrase “any one” has not been used in any other statute in this country to express “every one”. It will be unreasonable, in our opinion, to attach too much weight to this circumstance; and as for the reasons mentioned above, we think the phrase “any one of the Directors” is capable of meaning “every one of the Directors”, the fact that in other statutes, different words were used to express a similar meaning is not of any significance.

38. We have, on all these considerations come to the conclusion that the words “any one of the Directors” has been used in Section 76 to mean “every one of the Directors”, and that the contrary interpretation given by the High Court is not correct.” (emphasis supplied)

120. It could thus be seen that though it was sought to be argued before the Court that since the rule of strict interpretation of penal statutes in favour of the accused has to be adopted and that the word “any” was suffixed by the word “one”, it has to be given restricted meaning; the Court in Lala Karam Chand Thapar case [Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar, (1962) 1 SCR 9 : AIR 1961 SC 838] came to the conclusion that the words “any one of the Directors” used in Section 76 of the Mines Act, 1952 would mean “every one of the Directors”. It is further to be noted that the word “any” in the said case was suffixed by the word “one”, still the Court held that the words “any one” would mean “all” and not “one”. It is to be noted that in the present case, the legislature has not employed the word “one” after the word “any”. It is settled law that it has to be construed that every single word employed or not employed by the legislature has a purpose behind it.

121. On the very date on which the judgment in Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar [Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar, (1962) 1 SCR 9 : AIR 1961 SC 838] was pronounced, the same Constitution Bench also pronounced the judgment in Banwarilal Agarwalla [Banwarilal Agarwalla v.

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State of Bihar, (1962) 1 SCR 33 : AIR 1961 SC 849], wherein the Constitution Bench observed thus : (Banwarilal Agarwalla case [Banwarilal Agarwalla v. State of Bihar, (1962) 1 SCR 33 : AIR 1961 SC 849], AIR p. 850, para 3) “3. The first contention is based on an assumption that the word “any one” in Section 76 means only “one of the Directors, and only one of the shareholders”. This question as regards the interpretation of the word “any one” in Section 76 was raised in Criminal Appeals Nos. 98 to 106 of 1959 (Chief Inspector of Mines [Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar, (1962) 1 SCR 9 : AIR 1961 SC 838], etc.) and it has been decided there that the word “any one” should be interpreted there as “every one”. Thus under Section 76 every one of the shareholders of a private company owning the mine, and every one of the Directors of a public company owning the mine is liable to prosecution. No question of violation of Article 14 therefore arises.” (emphasis supplied)

122. Another Constitution Bench of this Court in Tej Kiran Jain [Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy, (1970) 2 SCC 272] was considering the provisions of Article 105 of the Constitution of India and, particularly, the immunity as available to the Member of Parliament “in respect of anything said … in Parliament”. The Constitution Bench observed thus : (SCC p. 274, para 8) “8. In our judgment it is not possible to read the provisions of the article in the way suggested. The article means what it says in language which could not be plainer. The article confers immunity inter alia in respect of “anything said … in Parliament”. The word “anything” is of the widest import and is equivalent to “everything”. The only limitation arises from the words “in Parliament” which means during the sitting of Parliament and in the course of the business of Parliament. We are concerned only with speeches in Lok Sabha. Once it was proved that Parliament was sitting and its business was being transacted, anything said during the course of that business was immune from proceedings in any Court this immunity is not only complete but is as it should be. It is of the essence of parliamentary system of

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Government that people’s representatives should be free to express themselves without fear of legal consequences. What they say is only subject to the discipline of the rules of Parliament, the good sense of the members and the control of proceedings by the Speaker. The Courts have no say in the matter and should really have none.” (emphasis supplied)

123. This Court held in Tej Kiran Jain case [Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy, (1970) 2 SCC 272] that the word “anything” is of the widest import and is equivalent to “everything”. The only limitation arises from the words “in Parliament” which means during the sitting of Parliament and in the course of the business of Parliament. It held that, once it was proved that Parliament was sitting and its business was being transacted, anything said during the course of that business was immune from proceedings in any court.

124. This Court, in LDA [LDA v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243], was considering clause (o) of Section 2(1) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which defines “service”, wherein the word “any” again fell for consideration. This Court observed thus : (SCC p. 255, para 4) “4. … The words “any” and “potential” are significant. Both are of wide amplitude. The word “any” dictionarily means “one or some or all”. In Black’s Law Dictionary it is explained thus, ‘word “any” has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate “all” or “every” as well as “some” or “one” and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject-matter of the statute’. The use of the word “any” in the context it has been used in clause (o) indicates that it has been used in wider sense extending from one to all.”

125. This Court held in LDA case [LDA v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243] that the word “any” is of wide amplitude. It means “one or some or all”. Referring to Black’s Law Dictionary, the Court observed that the word “any” has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate “all” or “every” as well as “some” or “one”. However, the meaning which is to be given to it would depend upon the context and the subject-matter of

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the statute.

126. In K.P. Mohammed Salim [K.P. Mohammed Salim v. CIT, (2008) 11 SCC 573], this Court was considering the power of the Director General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner to transfer any case from one or more assessing officers subordinate to him to any other assessing officer or assessing officers. This Court observed thus : (SCC p. 578, para 17) “17. The word “any” must be read in the context of the statute and for the said purpose, it may in a situation of this nature, means all. The principles of purposive construction for the said purpose may be resorted to. (See New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia, (2008) 3 SCC 279 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 850] .) Thus, in the context of a statute, the word “any” may be read as all in the context of the Income Tax Act for which the power of transfer has been conferred upon the authorities specified under Section 127.” (emphasis supplied)

127. The Court in K.P. Mohammed Salim [K.P. Mohammed Salim v. CIT, (2008) 11 SCC 573] again reiterated that the word “any” must be read in the context of the statute. The Court also applied the principles of purposive construction to the term “any” to mean “all”.

128. In Raj Kumar Shivhare [Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2010) 4 SCC 772 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 712], an argument was sought to be advanced that since Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 uses the words “any decision or order”, only appeals from final order could be filed. Rejecting the said contention, this Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 779-80, paras 19-20 & 26) “19. The word “any” in this context would mean “all”. We are of this opinion in view of the fact that this section confers a right of appeal on any person aggrieved. A right of appeal, it is well settled, is a creature of statute. It is

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never an inherent right, like that of filing a suit. A right of filing a suit, unless it is barred by statute, as it is barred here under Section 34 of FEMA, is an inherent right (see Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code) but a right of appeal is always conferred by a statute. While conferring such right a statute may impose restrictions, like limitation or pre-deposit of penalty or it may limit the area of appeal to questions of law or sometime to substantial questions of law. Whenever such limitations are imposed, they are to be strictly followed. But in a case where there is no limitation on the nature of order or decision to be appealed against, as in this case, the right of appeal cannot be further curtailed by this Court on the basis of an interpretative exercise.

20. Under Section 35 of FEMA, the legislature has conferred a right of appeal to a person aggrieved from “any” “order” or “decision” of the Appellate Tribunal. Of course such appeal will have to be on a question of law. In this context the word “any” would mean “all”. ***

26. In the instant case also when a right is conferred on a person aggrieved to file appeal from “any” order or decision of the Tribunal, there is no reason, in the absence of a contrary statutory intent, to give it a restricted meaning. Therefore, in our judgment in Section 35 of FEMA, any “order” or “decision” of the Appellate Tribunal would mean all decisions or orders of the Appellate Tribunal and all such decisions or orders are, subject to limitation, appealable to the High Court on a question of law.” (emphasis supplied)

129. While holding that the word “any” in the context would mean “all”, this Court in Raj Kumar Shivhare [Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2010) 4 SCC 772 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 712] observed that a right of appeal is always conferred by a statute. It has been held that, while conferring such right, a statute may impose restrictions, like limitation or pre-deposit of penalty or it may limit the area of appeal to questions of law

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or sometime to substantial questions of law. It has been held that whenever such limitations are imposed, they are to be strictly followed. It has been held that in a case where there is no limitation, the right of appeal cannot be curtailed by this Court on the basis of an interpretative exercise.

130. Shri P. Chidambaram, learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment of this Court in Union of India v. A.B. Shah [Union of India v. A.B. Shah, (1996) 8 SCC 540 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 688]. In the said case, the High Court was considering an appeal preferred by the Union of India wherein it had challenged the acquittal of the accused by the learned trial court, which was confirmed in appeal by the High Court. The learned trial court and the High Court had held that the complaint filed was beyond limitation. This Court reversed the judgments of the learned trial court and the High Court.

131. This Court while interpreting the expression “at any time” observed thus : (A.B. Shah case [Union of India v. A.B. Shah, (1996) 8 SCC 540 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 688], SCC p. 546, para 12) “12. If we look into Conditions 3 and 6 with the object and purpose of the Act in mind, it has to be held that these conditions are not only relatable to what was required at the commencement of depillaring process, but the unstowing for the required length must exist always. The expression “at any time” finding place in Condition 6 has to mean, in the context in which it has been used, “at any point of time”, the effect of which is that the required length must be maintained all the time. The accomplishment of object of the Act, one of which is safety in the mines, requires taking of such a view, especially in the backdrop of repeated mine disasters which have been taking, off and on, heavy toll of lives of the miners. It may be pointed out that the word “any” has a diversity of meaning and in Black›s Law Dictionary it has been stated that this word may be employed to indicate “all” or “every”, and its meaning will depend “upon the context and subject-matter of the statute”. A reference to what has been stated in Stroud’s Judicial

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Dictionary, Vol. I, is revealing inasmuch as the import of the word “any” has been explained from pp. 145 to 153 of the 4th Edn., a perusal of which shows it has different connotations depending primarily on the subject-matter of the statute and the context of its use. A Bench of this Court in LDA v. M.K. Gupta [LDA v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243], gave a very wide meaning to this word finding place in Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 defining “service”. (See para 4)” (emphasis supplied)

132. Shri Chidambaram rightly argued that the word “any” will have to be construed in its context, taking into consideration the scheme and the purpose of the enactment. There can be no quarrel with regard to the said proposition. Right from the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar [Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar, (1962) 1 SCR 9 : AIR 1961 SC 838], the position is clear. What is the meaning which the legislature intended to give to a particular statutory provision has to be decided by the Court on a consideration of the context in which the word(s) appear(s) and in particular, the scheme and object of the legislation.”

87Copy pinpoint87. From the perusal of the various judgments, which have been referred to in detail by the Constitution Bench, it will be clear that the words “all” or “any” will have to be construed in their context taking into consideration the scheme and purpose of the enactment. What is the meaning which the legislature intended to give to a particular statutory provision has to be decided by the Court on a consideration of the context in which the word(s) appear(s) and in particular, the scheme and object of the legislation. We have no hesitation to hold that the word “all” used in clause 5.15 of the Bidding Guidelines, read with the legislative policy for which the Electricity Act was enacted and read with Section 86(1)(b) of the Electricity Act, will have to be construed to be the one including “any”. As such, the contention in that regard is to be rejected.

88Copy pinpoint88. In any case, applying the principle of literal interpretation, the evaluation committee/BEC would be entitled to reject only such of the price bids if it finds that the rates quoted by the bidders are not

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aligned to the prevailing market prices. It does not stipulate rejection of all the bids in the bidding process. For example, if in a bidding process, which is in accordance with the Bidding Guidelines and is transparent, 5 bidders emerged. Out of the said bidders, the rates quoted by only 3 bidders are market aligned and the rates quoted by rest of the 2 bidders are not market aligned. In accordance with the Bidding Guidelines, the BEC would be entitled to recommend acceptance of the bids of the first 3 bidders and reject the bids of rest of the 2 bidders whose quoted rates/prices are not found to be market aligned. We, therefore, reject the contention in this behalf.

89Copy pinpoint89. We further find that the Court, while interpreting a particular provision, will have to apply the principles of purposive construction. The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Vivek Narayan Sharma (supra) after surveying various judgments on the issue has held thus: “148. It is thus clear that it is a settled principle that the modern approach of interpretation is a pragmatic one, and not pedantic. An interpretation which advances the purpose of the Act and which ensures its smooth and harmonious working must be chosen and the other which leads to absurdity, or confusion, or friction, or contradiction and conflict between its various provisions, or undermines, or tends to defeat or destroy the basic scheme and purpose of the enactment must be eschewed. The primary and foremost task of the Court in interpreting a statute is to gather the intention of the legislature, actual or imputed. Having ascertained the intention, it is the duty of the Court to strive to so interpret the statute as to promote or advance the object and purpose of the enactment. For this purpose, where necessary, the Court may even depart from the rule that plain words should be interpreted according to their plain meaning. There need be no meek and mute submission to the plainness of the language. To avoid patent injustice, anomaly or absurdity or to avoid invalidation of a law, the court would be justified in departing from the so-called golden rule of construction so as to give effect to the object and purpose of the enactment. Ascertainment of legislative intent is the basic rule of statutory construction.”

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90Copy pinpoint90. It could thus be seen that it is a settled principle that the modern approach of interpretation is a pragmatic one, and not pedantic. An interpretation which advances the purpose of the Act and which ensures its smooth and harmonious working must be chosen and the other which leads to absurdity, or confusion, or friction, or contradiction and conflict between its various provisions, or undermines, or tends to defeat or destroy the basic scheme and purpose of the enactment must be eschewed.

91Copy pinpoint91. If the contention that clause 5.15 of the Bidding Guidelines will come into play, which permits the Evaluation Committee to reject “all” price bids and not “any” one of them is accepted, it will lead to nothing else than resulting in absurdity. Suppose, if L-1 bidder quotes Rs.3 per unit and L-5 bidder quotes Rs.7 per unit, requirement to reject the bid of L-1 bidder, whose bid is found market aligned along with that of L-5 bidder, which is not market aligned, would lead to an anomalous situation. Could the consumer be deprived of the electricity to be procured from L-1 at a market aligned price only because some of the bidders have quoted much higher prices and are not market aligned. In our view, such an interpretation would result in defeating one of the main objects of the enactment, i.e., protection of the consumer.

92Copy pinpoint92. It is needless to state that this Court, time and again, in various judgments including the one in the case of GMR Warora Energy Limited (supra) has recognised the requirement of balancing the consumers’ interest with that of the interest of the generators. It will not be permissible to take a lopsided view only to protect the interest of the generators ignoring the consumers’ interest and public interest.

93Copy pinpoint93. We find that the High Court was not justified in entertaining the petition. The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of PTC India Limited (supra) has held that the Electricity Act is an exhaustive code on all matters concerning electricity. Under the Electricity Act, all issues dealing with electricity have to be considered by the authorities constituted under the said Act. As held by the Constitution Bench of this Court, the State Electricity Commission and the learned APTEL have ample powers to adjudicate in the matters with regard to electricity. Not only that, these Tribunals are tribunals consisting of experts having vast experience in the field of electricity. As such, we

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find that the High Court erred in directly entertaining the writ petition when the respondent No.¹, i.e., the writ petitioner before the High Court had an adequate alternate remedy of approaching the State Electricity Commission.

94Copy pinpoint94. This Court in the case of Reliance Infrastructure Limited v. State of Maharashtra and others11 has held that while exercising its power of judicial review, the Court can step in where a case of manifest unreasonableness or arbitrariness is made out.

95Copy pinpoint95. In the present case, there is not even an allegation with regard to that effect. In such circumstances, recourse to a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the availability of efficacious alternate remedy under a statute, which is a complete code in itself, in our view, was not justified.

96Copy pinpoint96. No doubt that availability of an alternate remedy is not a complete bar in the exercise of the power of judicial review by the High Courts. But, recourse to such a remedy would be permissible only if extraordinary and exceptional circumstances are made out. A reference in this respect could be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others12 and South Indian Bank Ltd. and others v. Naveen Mathew Philip and another13.

97Copy pinpoint97. We may gainfully refer to the observation of this Court in the case of Radha Krishan Industries (supra), wherein this Court has laid down certain principles after referring to the earlier judgments: “24. The High Court has dealt with the maintainability of the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Relying on the decision of this Court in CCT v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd. [CCT v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd., (2020) 19 SCC 681 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 440], the High Court noted that although it can entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, it must not do so when the

11 [2019] 1 SCR 886 : (2019) 3 SCC 352=2019 INSC 63 12 [2021] 3 SCR 406 : (2021) 6 SCC 771=2021 INSC 266 13 [2023] 4 SCR 18 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 435 =2023 INSC 379

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aggrieved person has an effective alternate remedy available in law. However, certain exceptions to this “rule of alternate remedy” include where, the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the law or acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; or has resorted to invoke provisions, which are repealed; or where an order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Applying this formulation, the High Court noted that the appellant has an alternate remedy available under the GST Act and thus, the petition was not maintainable.

25. In this background, it becomes necessary for this Court, to dwell on the “rule of alternate remedy” and its judicial exposition. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1], a two- Judge Bench of this Court after reviewing the case law on this point, noted : (SCC pp. 9-10, paras 14-15) “14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for “any other purpose”.

15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or

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the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.” (emphasis supplied)

26. Following the dictum of this Court in Whirlpool [Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1], in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107], this Court noted that : (Harbanslal Sahnia case [Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107], SCC p. 110, para 7) “7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies : (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1] .) The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the appellants’ dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.” (emphasis supplied)

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27. The principles of law which emerge are that: 27.¹. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well. 27.². The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where : (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged. 27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law. 27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion. 27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.

28. These principles have been consistently upheld by this Court in Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad [Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad, (2003) 5 SCC 399], Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot [Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706] and Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India [Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 632] among other decisions.”

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98Copy pinpoint98. This Court has clearly held that when a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

99Copy pinpoint99. Recently, this Court in the case of M/s South Indian Bank Ltd. & Ors. (supra) has also taken a similar view.

100Copy pinpoint100. There is another ground on which the High Court ought to have refused to entertain the petition. The bid of L-7 bidder was returned and the Bid Bond bank guarantee was also directed not to be extended vide the communication dated 6th January 2015. The judgment and order passed by this Court, on which reliance is placed by respondent No.¹, is also delivered on 25th April 2018. However, the respondent No.¹ did not take any steps from 6th January 2015 and in any case, from 25th April 2018 till 14th December 2020, on which date the petition came to be filed before the High Court. No doubt that the petition need not be dismissed solely on the ground of delay and laches. However, if petitioner approaches the Court with delay, he has to satisfy the Court about the justification for delay in approaching the Court belatedly. In our considered view, the High Court ought not to have entertained the petition also on the ground of delay and laches.

101Copy pinpoint101. In any case, we find that the High Court was not justified in issuing the mandamus in the nature which it has issued. This Court in the case of Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. and others14 has observed thus: “7. The law relating to award of a contract by the State, its corporations and bodies acting as instrumentalities and agencies of the Government has been settled by the decision of this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [(1979) 3 SCC 489], Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 568], CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. [(1985) 1 SCC 260 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 75], Tata Cellular v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 651], Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra [(1997) 1 SCC 134] and Raunaq International

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Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. [(1999) 1 SCC 492] The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process the court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should intervene.”

102Copy pinpoint102. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision, considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. It has been held that the State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It has further been held that the State can enter into negotiations

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Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v. MB Power (Madhya Pradesh) Limited & Ors.

before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. It has further been held that, price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It has been held that the State may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. However, the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. It has further been held that even when some defect has been found in the decision- making process, the court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should intervene.

103Copy pinpoint103. As has been held by this Court in the case of Tata Cellular (supra), the Court is not only concerned with the merits of the decision but also with the decision-making process. Unless the Court finds that the decision-making process is vitiated by arbitrariness, mala fides, irrationality, it will not be permissible for the Court to interfere with the same.

104Copy pinpoint104. In the present case, the decision-making process, as adopted by the BEC was totally in conformity with the principles laid down by this Court from time to time. The BEC after considering the competitive rates offered in the bidding process in various States came to a conclusion that the rates quoted by SKS Power (L-5 bidder) were not market aligned. The said decision has been approved by the State Commission. Since the decision-making process adopted by the BEC, which has been approved by the State Commission, was in accordance with the law laid down by this Court, the same ought not to have been interfered with by the learned APTEL.

105Copy pinpoint105. In any case, the High Court, by the impugned judgment and order, could not have issued a mandamus to the instrumentalities of the State to enter into a contract, which was totally harmful to the public

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interest. Inasmuch as, if the power/electricity is to be procured by the procurers at the rates quoted by the respondent No.1-MB Power, which is even higher than the rates quoted by the SKS Power (L-5 bidder), then the State would have been required to bear financial burden in thousands of crore rupees, which would have, in turn, passed on to the consumers. As such, we are of the considered view that the mandamus issued by the Court is issued by failing to take into consideration the larger consumers’ interest and the consequential public interest. We are, therefore, of the view that the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is not sustainable in law and deserves to be quashed and set aside.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6503 OF 2022 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6502 OF 2022

106Copy pinpoint106. The appeals are, therefore, allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur dated 20th September 2021 in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14815 of 2020 is quashed and set aside. The respondent No.1-M.B. Power (Madhya Pradesh) Limited is directed to pay costs, quantified at Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakh) in each case to the appellants.

107Copy pinpoint107. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4612 OF 2023

108Copy pinpoint108. Since we have already set aside the judgment and order of the High Court dated 20th September 2021 in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.14815 of 2020 and the order impugned in the present appeal is based on the said order of the High Court dated 20th September 2021, the present appeal is also allowed. The judgment and order of the learned APTEL dated 1st June 2023 is quashed and set aside.

109Copy pinpoint109. Since we have saddled the costs in Civil Appeal Nos. 6503 of 2022 and 6502 of 2022, there shall be no order as to costs in the present appeal.

110Copy pinpoint110. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case: Appeals allowed.