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Supreme Court judgments decided 1983 – 20 December 2024. Later judgments are not yet included.

• basic structure doctrine
• anticipatory bail
• right to privacy
• Article 21
• legitimate expectation

Recent judgments

Decision dates shown here are day-precision where the judgment's own text states a date the extractor is confident in, and year only otherwise -- never a fabricated day. See the editorial policy for how dates are extracted.

• Pandurang Vithal Kevne v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Anr. 20 December 2024 · J.K. Maheshwari and Rajesh Bindal (author) [2024] 12 S.C.R. 2113 : 2024 INSC 1051 Show the holding

  Headnote — Supreme Court Reports (editorial summary, not part of the judgment)

  Issue for consideration

  Whether the High Court rightly disallowed Petitioner’s application for condonation of delay and rejected the second review petition in light of Petitioner’s repeated and frivolous litigation.

  Held

  Condemnation of unscrupulous litigation – Jumping from one forum to another despite the issue being well-settled through reasoned orders – A stark example of blatant misuse and abuse of the judicial process – Forum shopping by filing repetitive and meritless pleas in Supreme Court and High Court – Repetitive and meritless pleas deliberately delays proceedings – Wastes the court’s valuable time and resources and hinders efficient addressal of genuine and timely claims:

  The Petitioner repeatedly filed numerous meritless petitions, appeals and motions in multiple legal and administrative forums, even though his grievances had been well-settled through reasoned orders – The right to access the courts is a cornerstone of democracy, however, the right is not absolute and must be exercised responsibly – The Petitioner’s relentless and frivolous litigation spree has wasted the Court’s valuable time and resources, and is one of the reasons which results in choking the dockets in courts – Litigants engaging in forum shopping deliberately delay proceedings, eroding the very foundation of the legal system. [Paras 2-3, 17-18]

  cost on Petitioner a clear message to others for not daring to play with the Judicial System – Duty of Courts to curb such type of litigation:

  Condemning litigants who use the justice system for their benefit and attempt to pollute the streams of justice, this Court discussed raising deterrence against such frivolous pleas by imposing costs on the litigating parties – Based on previous well-reasoned orders of the Bombay High Court and the Supreme Court, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed as the Supreme Court found no merit in the Petition – Therefore, the application for condonation of delay was also dismissed – A cost of ₹1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) was imposed on the Petitioner to give a clear message to unscrupulous litigants who are polluting the stream of justice and putting hurdles in its dispensation to others – It is the duty of the Courts at different levels to curb such type of litigation that chokes the justice system resulting in delays in decision of other cases. [Paras 19-23]

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• Giriyappa & Anr. v. Kamalamma & Ors. 20 December 2024 · J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan [2024] 12 S.C.R. 2095 : 2024 INSC 1043 Show the holding

  Headnote — Supreme Court Reports (editorial summary, not part of the judgment)

  Issue for consideration

  When can the protection u/s.53A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 be granted in a suit filed for declaration of title and recovery of possession.

  Held

  Transfer of Property Act 1882 – s.53A – Protection of s.53A is available subject to certain prerequisites – s.53A is an exception to the provisions which require a contract to be in writing and registered and which bar proof of such contract by any other evidence – Exception must be strictly construed – High Court committed no error in impugned judgment and order – SLP dismissed:

  Respondents (original plaintiffs) filed a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession – Petitioners (original defendants) contended that the Respondents executed a sale agreement dated 25-11-1968 in their favour and since then the Petitioners came to be in possession of the land – Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the Respondents – Regular First Appeal filed by Petitioners dismissed – High Court in impugned judgment and order dismissed Second Appeal, observing that the protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 (“TP Act”) does not arise as defendant has failed to prove that plaintiff has executed the Sale Agreement – No error committed by High Court in impugned judgment and order – SLP dismissed. [Paras 8, 9, 15]

  Protection under Section 53A-Prerequisites of:

  1. Protection under Section 53A is available subject to prerequisites: (a) there is a contract in writing by the transferor for transfer for consideration of any immovable property signed by him or on his behalf, from which the terms necessary to

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• Shambhu Debnath v. The State of Bihar & Ors. 20 December 2024 · Vikram Nath (author) and Prasanna B. Varale [2024] 12 S.C.R. 2083 : 2024 INSC 1032 Show the holding

  Headnote — Supreme Court Reports (editorial summary, not part of the judgment)

  Issue for consideration

  Whether the High Court erred in granting anticipatory bail to accused persons despite specific allegations of heinous crime u/s.302 of Penal Code, 1860 and chargesheet on record that established the allegations made u/s.302 of Penal Code, 1860 are true.

  Held

  Complainant saw victim ablaze and filed FIR – Complainant submitted a written application as he saw that the body of his 20 year old nephew, was ablaze the fire – On being asked, the injured nephew named the accused persons – FIR registered: Factors for consideration for anticipatory bail – Courts must evaluate the nature and gravity of the offense, the role of the accused, and the facts of the case – Failure to take into account heinous nature of crime – The High Court, failed to account for specific averments against the accused in the FIR and the findings in the chargesheet that the allegations made u/s.302 of Penal Code, 1860 are true – This mechanical and cryptic approach is not sustainable:

  The High Court erred in granting anticipatory bail to Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 in a case involving a heinous offense u/s.302 of Penal Code, 1860 – Specific averments were made in the FIR of the heinous nature of crime i.e., setting the deceased on fire with an intention to kill, and the chargesheet stated that the allegations have been found true against all the accused persons of such a heinous offence – Despite this, the High Court granted relief in a cryptic and mechanical manner – Grant of anticipatory bail in such serious offenses requires careful consideration of the materials on record, the gravity of the offense, and the role of the

  Consequence of non-appearance by accused persons – Despite service of notice, accused persons had initially failed to put in appearance – Subsequently, after putting appearance and seeking liberty to file counter affidavit, the accused persons instructed the counsels not to appear – The Supreme Court issued non-bailable warrant to accused persons to be produced before court on the next date:

  Despite service of notice, the accused persons had initially failed to put in appearance – Eventually, the accused persons did put in appearance and sought time to file counter-affidavit – However, the accused persons have instructed their counsel not to appear on their behalf anymore – Therefore, it is appropriate to issue direction for non-bailable warrants to ensure that they are taken into custody and be produced before this Court on the next date – Such non-bailable warrants were issued only for the purpose of appearance since the respondents were evading to enter appearance before the Supreme Court. [Paras 8, 11]

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• Dwarika Prasad (D) Thr. LRs. v. Prithvi Raj Singh 20 December 2024 · Vikram Nath (author) and Prasanna B. Varale [2024] 12 S.C.R. 2075 : 2024 INSC 1030 Show the holding

  Headnote — Supreme Court Reports (editorial summary, not part of the judgment)

  Issue for consideration

  Whether a separate application for condonation of delay is mandatory in cases where sufficient justification was provided while seeking restoration against ex-parte decree.

  Held

  Requirement of filing separate application for condonation of delay while seeking restoration of ex-parte decree – Not mandatory:

  Requiring a party to mandatorily file an application for condonation of delay u/s.5 of the Limitation Act, to seek restoration of ex-parte decree under Or.IX R.13 and Section 151 CPC, is a hyper technical view – Endorsing such a view would effectively mean ignoring the purpose of judicial procedure – The procedure cannot stand in the way of achieving just and fair outcome. [Para 12]

  A Party cannot suffer due to negligent or fault committed by the Counsel:

  In the present case, the Appellant was not made aware of the ex-parte decree by his previous counsel – It is only after the appointment of the new counsel, the appellant got to know about the ex- parte decree – A party cannot suffer due to negligent or fault committed by their counsel. [Paras 9, 10]

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• China Development Bank v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. & Ors. 20 December 2024 · Abhay S Oka (author) and Pankaj Mithal [2024] 12 S.C.R. 2043 : 2024 INSC 1029 Show the holding

  Headnote — Supreme Court Reports (editorial summary, not part of the judgment)

  Issue for consideration

  Whether the appellants can be classified as ‘Financial Creditors’ within the meaning of s.5(7) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

  Held

  Not sustainable – When clause (i) of s.5(8) is applicable, it is not necessary that the Financial Creditor actually tenders any amount to the Corporate Debtor – DoH is a Document creating hypothecation – Only the title of a document cannot be a decisive factor in deciding the nature of the document or the transactions affected by the document – Only because the title of the document contains the word hypothecation, it cannot be concluded that guarantee is not a part of this document – Appellants are Secured Lenders within the meaning of the Master Security Trustee Agreement-MSTA – Two RCom entities-RCom and RTL, are the obligors being the borrowers of the appellants – Parties to DoH are Security Trustees acting on behalf of the appellants, the Corporate Debtor who is not the borrower of the appellants and the other three Reliance entities – Corporate Debtor undertook to discharge the liability of the RCom and RTL, the borrowers of the appellants – RCom and RTL are third parties as far as Corporate Debtor is concerned – Furthermore, s.7(1) provides that Financial Creditor can initiate CIRP against the Corporate Debtor when there is a default on the part of the Corporate Debtor – Moment it is established that the financial debt is owed to any person, he/she becomes a Financial Creditor – On facts, the appellant has a claim – No requirement incorporated in the definition of ‘financial debt’ u/s.5(8) that a debt becomes financial debt only when default occurs – U/s.5(7) any person to whom financial debt is owed becomes a Financial Creditor even if there is no default in payment of debt – Thus, for submitting the claim by a Financial Creditor, no requirement of actual default – Impugned order of the NCLAT quashed and set aside and that of the NCLT restored. [Paras 48, 49, 52, 53, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 66, 68]

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• NOIDA Toll Bridge Company Ltd. v. Federation of NOIDA Residents Welfare Association and Others 20 December 2024 · Surya Kant (author) and Ujjal Bhuyan [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1997 : 2024 INSC 1027 Show the holding

  Headnote — Supreme Court Reports (editorial summary, not part of the judgment)

  Issue for consideration

  The issue concerned a challenge to collection and levying of toll, as legitimised by provisions enumerated in Agreement dated 12.11.1997 (Concession Agreement), executed between Appellant-NOIDA Toll Bridge Company Limited (NTBCL), the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) and the Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited (IL&FS); The Concession Agreement conferred upon NTBCL the rights necessary for implementation of the Delhi NOIDA Bridge Project or the Delhi-NOIDA Direct Flyway (DND Flyway/Project) and, in connection thereto, the collection and levying of toll; In a writ petition purportedly filed in public interest by Respondent No.1-Association established to espouse the cause of NOIDA residents before the public authorities, the High Court vide the impugned judgment directed NTBCL to cease the imposition of user fees or toll upon commuters using the DND Flyway. In the instant appeal filed by NTBCL, inter alia the following issues arose for consideration, namely, (i) Whether the Writ Petition purportedly filed in public interest was maintainable before the High Court; (ii) Whether the non-floating of tenders was justified in the instant case; (iii) Whether the power to levy fees could be delegated to the Appellant and if so, whether it was a case of excessive delegation; and (iv) Whether Art.14 of the Concession Agreement read with the formula used therein was opposed to public policy.

  Held

  petition filed by Respondent No. 1, which had the requisite locus standi – The writ petition filed in public interest was maintainable – PIL:

  While public interest litigation serves as an effective tool for addressing the grievances of the public, it must be carefully scrutinised to prevent misuse or abuse by those with ulterior motives – Courts must look beyond the surface to assess whether the litigation has been genuinely initiated in the interest of the public or as a result of mischief – The essence of PIL lies in its aim to remedy genuine public wrongs or injuries rather than being driven by personal vendetta or malice – On facts, Respondent No. 1 is a Society duly registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, with the primary objective of promoting the welfare of NOIDA residents – The society acts as a bridge between the residents and public authorities, catering to the former’s needs for essential civic amenities – Given this object, it is clear that Respondent No. 1 approached the High Court in good faith, with a view to safeguard the interests of NOIDA residents, who had been subjected to the levy of toll at the DND Flyway under the guise of user fees by NTBCL-Appellant – Consequently, there is no merit in NTBCL’s contention that Respondent No. 1 lacked locus standi in approaching the High Court. [Paras 12, 14, 15]

  Constitution of India – Art.226 – Toll charged to users of DND Flyway – Respondent No. 1 filed Writ Petition in High Court seeking direction to discontinue the toll – On facts, continuing cause of action – No delay or laches in filing the writ petition – Doctrine of Delay and Laches:

  The contention regarding delay and laches in filing the writ petition is wholly misconceived and misdirected for the reason that, writ proceedings u/Art.32 or 226 are not guided by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, but instead, by the Doctrine of Delay and Laches – It is ubiquitous that the doctrine of delay and laches cannot be applied stricto senso to writ petitions invoking public interest jurisdiction unless the court is satisfied that the party has not approached it with clean hands – While delay is a material factor there is no fixed period of limitation for invoking jurisdiction u/Art.226 and each case should be considered on its own facts and circumstances, thus allowing for a more liberal approach when applying this doctrine – The doctrine is not a rigid rule but is rather a practice that is founded on exercise of sound judicial discretion – Also, cause of action in the circumstances of the case

  Constitution of India – Art.226 – Toll charged to users of DND Flyway – Contract involving a State instrumentality – Scope of judicial intervention:

  1. Judicial review, being a dynamic process as opposed to static, has experienced a significant shift in terms of the degree of judicial interference in contractual disputes, especially when one of the parties involved is the State or its instrumentalities – This is because when contractual power is exercised for public purposes, the State and its instrumentalities bear the responsibility to act fairly, without arbitrariness or caprice – In such situations, where State action is challenged as arbitrary or capricious, courts are justified in intervening through judicial review to determine whether the State has adhered to the principles embodied in Art.14 of the Constitution of India, which mandates fairness and non-arbitrariness in State actions – Considering that the Concession Agreement involves not only entities like IL&FS and NTBCL but also a Public Authority such as NOIDA, it is evident that the Concession Agreement, though commercial in nature, is subject to judicial scrutiny – This is particularly true given the public interest concerns raised by Respondent No. 1, while challenging the fairness and legality of the toll collection and overall execution of the Agreement – The involvement of a public authority necessitates cognizance to ensure that the Agreement upholds constitutional principles – In such scenarios, it becomes the solemn duty of the judiciary, entrusted under the Constitution as an independent arbiter, to intervene and protect the interests of the public at large. [Paras 26, 27]

  Contract – Award of contract for development and construction of DND Flyway project to NTBCL – Challenged, for not following any formal tender procedure – Contract awarded to NTBCL through the Concession Agreement by State authorities and NOIDA was unfair, unjust and inconsistent with Constitutional norms:

  1. NTBCL entered into an agreement with NOIDA to undertake a project that involved an overwhelming public element, comprising of public funds and public assets – When such a project is undertaken by the State in partnership with a private entity, the element of public interest necessitates strict adherence to Constitutional obligations – The State is obligated to ensure that its actions remain free from any arbitrariness or capriciousness, particularly when public welfare is at stake. [Para 31]

  Delegated Legislation – Scope of – Toll charged to users of DND Flyway – Concession Agreement, executed between NTBCL, NOIDA and IL&FS sub-delegated the power to levy and collect user fees to NTBCL – Delegation of power to levy user fees and its validity – NOIDA exceeded its authority by delegating the power to levy fees or impose tolls to NTBCL, rendering such delegation invalid – NOIDA (Levy of Infrastructure Fee) Regulations, 1998 – Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 – s.6A r/w s.19:

  1. A plain reading of Section 6A of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 makes it unequivocally clear that the ‘Authority’ is empowered to delegate the power to collect taxes or fees levied by it – However, under no circumstances does Section 6A authorize the delegation of the power to levy taxes or fees – Similarly, s.19(2)(e) of the 1976 Act enables NOIDA to frame Regulations governing the levy of taxes or fees – This provision, however, cannot be interpreted as empowering NOIDA to delegate the power of levying taxes or fees through an agreement under s.6A of the Act. [Para 46]

  Contract – DND Flyway project – Terms opposed to public policy – 'Total Cost of the Project' and its calculation methodology – Dissonance between Art.14 of the Concession Agreement read with the formula vis-à-vis public policy - Doctrine of Severability – Invocation of:

  Contracts loaded with terms which are so unfair and unreasonable, that they truly baffle this Court, are undoubtedly opposed to public policy and must be adjudged void – The Court is always cautious when determining if a particular contract or action is opposed to public policy, but in doing so, it cannot shirk from its duty and approve helplessly the interpretation of a Statute or a document or of an action which is certain to subvert the societal goals and endanger the public good – To do so, the Court may invoke the Doctrine of Severability and sever the incurable parts of the contract from the whole – The Court can do so only when the rest of the contract can breathe and survive without the aid of its void covenants – The Court must ask itself whether the parties would have agreed to the valid terms of the agreement if they knew that the invalid terms would be removed – In the instant case, the High Court held that Art.14 of the Concession Agreement was perpetual in nature and it entitled NTBCL to recover user fees/ toll indefinitely – Such a clause, therefore, being opposed to public policy was unjust and arbitrary and liable to be severed from the Concession Agreement – There is no error in the analysis undertaken by the High Court – It is evident that, despite approval from various authorities, the formula used was far from

  No person or entity can be allowed to make an undue and unjust profit from public property, at the cost of the public at large – Since NTBCL has recovered the costs of the project and substantial profits thereon by virtue of imposition of user fees/tolls and given the existing position of law, there is no error in the High Court’s judgment and its directions in restraining the imposition and collection of user fees/tolls. [Paras 85, 88]

  Interpretation of Statutes – Taxing Statutes – Interpretation thereof:

  Taxing statutes, being penal in nature, must be construed strictly – The power to levy a tax or fee cannot be inferred by implication but must be expressly conferred by Statute – Under our Constitutional framework, no private entity can be granted the authority to levy taxes or fees, for such powers are exclusively vested in public authorities. [Para 49]

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• Bijoy Kumar Moni v. Paresh Manna & Anr. 20 December 2024 · J.B. Pardiwala (author) and R. Mahadevan [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1946 : 2024 INSC 1024 Show the holding

  Headnote — Supreme Court Reports (editorial summary, not part of the judgment)

  Issue for consideration

  The dishonoured cheque in question was signed by respondent- accused, in his capacity as Director and Authorised Signatory of the Company Shilabati Hospital Pvt. Ltd., on the account maintained by the Company with Standard Chartered Bank. By the impugned order, the High Court acquitted respondent-accused of offence punishable u/s.138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 holding that in absence of the company being arraigned as an accused, the complaint against the respondent-accused was not maintainable; whether the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned order is the question for determination.

  Held

  Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138, 139 and 141 – Dishonour of Cheque – Cheque issued on behalf of company by its authorised signatory – Whether prosecution could not proceed against such authorised signatory, unless the company was arraigned as an accused – Whether prosecution could proceed against the accused in his personal capacity – Whether benefit of exception embodied in doctrine of lex non cogit ad impossibilia could be extended to the complainant:

  1. Although it can be understood that the complainant had no occasion to believe that the cheque was drawn upon the bank account of Shilabati Hospital as the debt was one which was taken by the accused in his personal capacity, yet a bare perusal of the cheque shows that the cheque was signed by the accused in the capacity of the Director of the Shilabati Hospital Pvt. Ltd. as the same bears both the stamp of the director as well as the hospital – In case of a cheque issued on behalf of a company by its authorised signatory, prosecution cannot proceed against the such authorised signatory or other post-holders of the company as described under *Author

  Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138 – Penal provision – Has to be strictly construed:

  Section 138 of the NI Act being penal in nature has to be strictly construed and advertence to the object behind its enactment can only be made to supplement the language employed in the text of the statute and not to supplant it or render it overly broad and susceptible to misuse. [Para 68]

  Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138 and 141 – Scope – Liability and vicarious liability:

  It is only the drawer of the cheque who can be held liable under Section 138 – Section 141 is an exception to this scheme of the NI Act and provides for vicarious liability of persons other than the drawer of the cheque in cases where the drawer of the cheque under Section 138 is a corporate person. [Para 39]

  Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.7 and 138 – Expression “on an account maintained by him with a banker” used in s.138 – Meaning of:

  The expression describes the relationship between the account holder and the banker – This relationship is fundamental to the application of Section 138 – The act of maintaining an account is exclusively tied to the account holder and does not extend to any third party whom the account holder may authorize to manage the account on its behalf – Therefore, any delegation of authority to manage the account does not alter the intrinsic relationship existing between the account holder and the banker as envisaged under the NI Act. [Para 45]

  Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.7, 138 and 141 – Whether authorized signatory of a company falls within the ambit of the expression “drawer”:

  Corporate persons like companies, which are mere legal entities and have no soul, mind or limb to work physically, discharge their functions through some human agency recognised under the law to work – Therefore, if some function is discharged by

  Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Cheque drawn upon a joint account – Liability upon account holders of a joint account – Discussed:

  A company vis-à-vis its authorised signatory stands on a completely different footing as compared to account holders of a joint account – In the former, it is only the company which holds an account with the banker, whereas in the latter, each joint account holder can be said to hold an account with the banker – Thus, while in the case of a cheque drawn on the account of the company the authorised signatory cannot be held to be the drawer, in the case of a cheque drawn upon a joint account, each account holder affixing his signature to the cheque may be said to have drawn such a cheque. [Para 47]

  Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138 – “any debt or other liability” appearing in s.138 of the Act – Scope of:

  Section 138 of the NI Act does not envisage that only those cases where a cheque issued towards the discharge of the personal liability of the drawer towards the payee gets dishonoured would come within the ambit of the provision – The expression “of any debt or other liability” appearing in Section 138 when read with the Explanation to the provision is wide enough to bring any debt or liability which is legally enforceable within its fold – Thus, the requirement under the provision is that the debt or any other liability has to be legally enforceable and the emphasis is not on the existence of such debt or other liability between the drawer and the payee – Even those cases where a person assumes the

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• Abdul Rejak Laskar v. Mafizur Rahman & Ors. 20 December 2024 · J.B. Pardiwala (author) and R. Mahadevan [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1911 : 2024 INSC 1023 Show the holding

  Headnote — Supreme Court Reports (editorial summary, not part of the judgment)

  Issue for consideration

  The High Court held that the s.154(1)(e) of the the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 bars the civil court from exercising its jurisdiction; whether the High Court committed any error in taking view that the suit filed by the appellant herein was barred u/s.154(1)(e) of the Regulation, 1886.

  Held

  The jurisdiction of the civil court u/s.154(1)(e) would be barred only if an imperfect partition suit is otherwise maintainable u/s.97 – To maintain a suit for imperfect partition u/s.97, the appellant has to fulfill two conditions stipulated therein – a) First, the person seeking partition should be in actual possession of the property in respect of which he seeks partition, and; b) Secondly, the co-sharers may not be ready and willing to give their consent and if the person seeking partition is not in actual possession then no other remedy is available to him except to go before the civil court and seek partition on the basis of his own title as a co-owner – A reference in this connection may be made to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Musstt. Rukeya Banu & Ors. v. Musstt. Nazira Banu & Ors. where it was pointed out that a partition, whether perfect or imperfect, of revenue-paying properties must be made by the Revenue authorities – This follows from a conjoint reading of Sections 96 and 154(1)(e) of the Regulation, 1886 respectively – However, the jurisdiction of the civil court to determine the right of the parties to the property in dispute as well as shares to which they are entitled has not been taken away by the Regulation in question, and it is for the civil court to decide whether the property is or is not liable to partition – The same view applies to other clauses of Section 154 – The parties to a suit are entitled to obtain a declaration from the civil court that they have got the right to obtain from the revenue authorities a separation and allotment of their shares in the estate according to their proportionate rights – It is the civil court which will decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to seek partition and to what extent – If it is found by the court that revenue paying properties have to be partitioned among the parties, the court may declare the share of each of the parties and leave them to go to the revenue authorities for making the necessary performance – Further in various decisions of Gauhati High Court, it is clarified that the bar created by s.154(1) does not preclude suits based on title to the property from being within the jurisdiction of civil courts – The impugned judgment of the High Court is accordingly set aside for not being sustainable in law. [Paras 52, 53-57]

  Partition – Perfect or imperfect:

  Partition is either perfect or imperfect – Perfect partition means division of a revenue paying estate into two or more such

  Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 – Chapter VI, s.100 – Perfect partition and imperfect partition:

  Chapter VI of the Regulation, 1886 deals with the procedure for carrying out “perfect partition” and “imperfect partition” of a revenue paying estate on the basis of an application made before the Deputy Commissioner – Section 100 of the Regulation, 1886, however, provides that when there is objection as regards the question of title, the Deputy Commissioner will stay his hand in the matter and such objection would be determined by a civil court of competent jurisdiction. [Para 24]

  Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.4 – When CPC is in conflict with Special or Local law:

  The plain reading of the said provision would indicate that when anything in the CPC is in conflict with anything in the special or local law or with any special jurisdiction or power conferred or in the special form of procedure prescribed by or under any other law, the Code will not (in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary) prevail so as to override such inconsistent provisions – When there is no conflict between the special or local law and the Code, the Code will apply. [Para 34]

  Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.9 – Jurisdiction of Civil Court:

  Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 provides that whenever a question arises before the civil court whether its jurisdiction is excluded expressly or by necessary implication, the Court naturally feels inclined to consider whether the remedy afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by any special statute is sufficient or adequate – In cases where exclusion of the civil court's jurisdiction is expressly provided for, the consideration as to the scheme of the statute in question and the adequacy or sufficiency of the remedy provided for by it may be relevant but cannot be decisive – Where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication such consideration would be very important

  Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.54 – Partition of estate or separation of share:

  The plain reading of the s.54 would indicate that the same deals with a case in which a civil court can pass a decree but cannot itself execute it – The execution has to be effected by the Collector – Civil courts have under this Section, jurisdiction to try and decide suits for partition or separate possession of share of estates assessed to payment of revenue to Government but have no power to execute decree passed in such suits – The decree that may be passed by the civil court would declare the rights of the several parties interested in the property, but the decree should direct the actual partition to be made by the Collector or any officer subordinate to him authorized on that behalf. [Para 35]

  Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XX, Rule 18 – Decree in suit for partition of property or separate possession of a share:

  The said rule allows the court to determine the rights of parties with respect to land in the civil court and to pass a preliminary decree, decree in the rights of several parties interested in the property – When actual partition is to be effected, in pursuance of the declaration of the rights of the parties in land, the civil court has to refer the matter to the Collector or any officer subordinate to him authorized to act on behalf of the Collector – Sub-rule (1) refers to partition decrees relating to a “estate assessed to Government revenue” referred to in Section 54 of the Code, while sub-rule (2) deals with partition decrees relating to any other immovable property or movable property. [Paras 38, 39]

  Suit – Partition – Types of decrees issued by the Court:

  In a suit for partition, the court may issue three types of decrees to put the issue to rest: preliminary decree, composite decree (partly preliminary & partly final), and final decree – The purpose of a suit for partition or separation of a share is two-fold: a) First, declaration of plaintiff's share in the suit properties under the preliminary decree, and; b) Secondly, division of his share by metes and bounds which would take place under the final decree. [Para 40]

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Where to start

• VINEET NARAIN AND ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. Supreme Court of India · 1997

  Editor's note Struck down the government's “Single Directive”, which required prior sanction before the CBI could investigate certain senior officers.

• ANURADHA BHASIN v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Supreme Court of India · 10 January 2020

  Editor's note Held that orders restricting movement under section 144 CrPC and suspending internet services under the Suspension Rules must be published, and that such restrictions must be necessary and proportionate.

• JUSTICE K.S. PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) &ANOTHER v. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS Supreme Court of India · 2015

  Editor's note Referred the correctness of its own earlier rulings on the right to privacy in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh to a Bench of appropriate strength, without itself deciding the question.

• GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI v. UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER Supreme Court of India · 04 July 2018

  Editor's note Held that Delhi's Lieutenant Governor is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers on matters within the Delhi Legislative Assembly's power, and may refer a decision to the President only in exceptional circumstances, not routinely.

• SWISS RIBBONS PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Supreme Court of India · 25 January 2019

  Editor's note Upheld the constitutional validity of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, including its distinct treatment of financial and operational creditors.

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23,405

Date range

1983–2024

Latest judgment

20 Dec 2024

30,108 documents harvested, 23,405 published, 6,703 withheld. Nothing is published by default: a document has to be positively cleared by the redaction gate before it can appear here. How that works →

Who it is for

One corpus, read differently depending on who is reading it: practising advocates get the case record and full-text search by keyword; law students and judiciary aspirants get a citation-first way to read a judgment; general readers get a plain, unpaywalled way to read what a court actually said. Nothing here is behind a paywall and nothing here requires a login.

Contains information from the Indian High Court / Supreme Court Judgments dataset, licensed under CC-BY-4.0. See About for the project, sourcing and method in full.

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