ORISSA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION v. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI Table of Contents* A. Background .............................................................................. 4 i. Factual background ............................................................. 4 B ii. The impugned judgment .................................................. 10 B. Submissions ............................................................................. 12 C. Issues ....................................................................................... 17 D. Analysis ................................................................................... 19 C i. An overview of the proceedings arising from the abolition of the Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal and the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal .................... 19 a. The abolition of the MPAT ........................................... 19 D b. The abolition of the TNAT ........................................... 21 ii. The Writ Petitions instituted before the Orissa High Court were maintainable ........................................... 23 iii. Article 323-A does not preclude the Union E Government from abolishing SATs .................................... 25 iv. Applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act ........................................................................................... 32 a. There is no bar to the applicability of Section 21 of F the General Clauses Act to the administrative order establishing the OAT ........................................... 33 b. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is otherwise applicable to the Administrative Tribunals G Act ................................................................................ 37 v. The notification dated 2 August 2019 is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution ............................................. 47 *Ed. Note : Pagination in the Table of Contents is as per the original judgment. H

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A a. The notification dated 2 August 2019 is not absurd or based on irrelevant or extraneous considerations ......... 47 b. The principles of natural justice have not been violated ......................................................................... 56 B vi. The Union Government did not become functus officio after establishing the OAT .................................................. 58 vii. The notification dated 2 August 2019 is valid despite not being expressed in the name of the President of C India ........................................................................................ 61 viii. The abolition of the OAT is not violative of the fundamental right of access to justice ............................... 67 ix. The State Government did not take advantage of its own D wrong ....................................................................................... 70 x. The failure of the Union Government to conduct a judicial impact assessment before abolishing the OAT does not vitiate its decision to abolish the OAT ............. 71 E xi. Miscellaneous contentions .................................................. 74 E. Findings and conclusion ....................................................... 75

1Copy pinpoint1. IA No. 52385 of 2022 (application for intervention by Mr C Ravichandran Iyer) is allowed. F A. Background i. Factual background

2Copy pinpoint2. This appeal arises from a judgment of the Orissa High Court dated 7 June 2021 in a batch of writ petitions challenging the abolition of G the Odisha Administrative Tribunal.1 Before setting out the facts which gave rise to the issues in this appeal, it is necessary to understand the context in which they arose.

3Copy pinpoint3. Parliament inserted Part XIV-A of the Constitution of India by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act 1976. Part XIV-A con- H 1 “OAT”

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sists of two articles, Articles 323A and 323B. Article 323A empowers A Parliament to provide for the adjudication of certain disputes by admin- istrative tribunals. Disputes concerning the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connec- tion with the affairs of the Union or of any State or local or other author- ity within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of B India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government, may be adjudicated by administrative tribunals. Article 323B empowers the legislatures of states to provide for the adjudication of certain dis- putes (enumerated in clause 2 of Article 323B) by tribunals.

4Copy pinpoint4. In pursuance of the power conferred upon it by Article 323A(1), Parliament enacted the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985.2 The State- C ments of Objects and Reasons of this legislation records that it was enacted in order to give effect to Article 323A, and also because: “a large number of cases relating to service matters are pending before the various courts. It is expected that the setting up of such Administrative Tribunals to deal exclusively with service D matters would go a long way in not only reducing the burden of the various courts and thereby giving them more time to deal with other cases expeditiously but would also provide to the persons covered by the Administrative Tribunals speedy relief in respect of their grievances.” E

5Copy pinpoint5. Section 4(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act provides that the Central Government shall establish an administrative tribunal known as the “Central Administrative Tribunal”3 to adjudicate disputes concerning the recruitment and conditions of service of persons in connection with posts under the Union or All-India Service,4 including disputes with respect F to remuneration, pension, tenure, leave, and disciplinary matters.5 In terms of Section 4(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, the Central Government may establish an administrative tribunal for a particular state, upon receiving a request in this regard from the concerned State Government. Once created, the state administrative G tribunal6 is charged with exercising exclusive jurisdiction over disputes 2 “Administrative Tribunals Act” 3 “CAT” 4 Section 14 read with Section 3(q), Administrative Tribunals Act 5 Section 3(q), Administrative Tribunals Act 6 “SAT” H

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A concerning the recruitment and conditions of service of persons in connection with posts under the concerned state or any civil service of that state,7 including disputes with respect to remuneration, pension, tenure, leave, and disciplinary matters.8

6Copy pinpoint6. The SAT is prohibited from exercising jurisdiction, authority, or power over a matter which the CAT’s jurisdiction extends.9 While Section 4(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act governs the establishment of SATs, there is no corresponding provision which stipulates the procedure to be followed to discontinue or abolish them. In terms of Section 29 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, suits or other proceedings pending before courts or other authorities which would have been within the jurisdiction of the SAT if the cause of action in such suit or proceeding had arisen after the establishment of the SAT, stand transferred to the SAT on the date of its establishment. In other words, cases pending before other fora (including cases pending before the High Court of the relevant state but excluding those pending before the Supreme Court) stand transferred to the SAT upon its establishment. Following the enactment of the Administrative Tribunals Act, various states including Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra requested the Central Government to establish an SAT, and the Central Government issued notifications establishing them. Odisha was one amongst these states. Upon receiving a request from the State of Odisha, the Central Government established the OAT on 4 July 1986 by issuing Notification No. GSR 934(E), which was published in the Gazette of India. The OAT commenced functioning soon thereafter.

7Copy pinpoint7. At this time, Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act was still in force. Section 28 excluded the jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court or the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court in relation to matters over which the CAT and the SAT exercised jurisdiction. Section 28 was enacted pursuant to the enabling provision in Article 323-A of the Constitution, namely clause 2(d) of Article 323-A. Clause 2(d) G provided that Parliament may exclude the jurisdiction of all courts, except of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution with respect to disputes which administrative tribunals were empowered to adjudicate 7 Section 15 read with Section 3(q), Administrative Tribunals Act 8 Section 3(q), Administrative Tribunals Act 9 H Section 15(4), Administrative Tribunals Act

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under clause 1 of Article 323-A. The effect of Section 28 of the A Administrative Tribunals Act, therefore, was that appeals from the OAT lay directly to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. However, this changed with the decision of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261. In its decision in that case, this Court inter alia ruled that: B a. Clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323- B were unconstitutional to the extent that they excluded the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution; b. Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act was C unconstitutional as were ‘exclusion of jurisdiction’ clauses in all other legislation enacted under Articles 323-A and 323- B;c. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution form a part of the basic structure of the Constitution; and D

d. Other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. As a consequence of this decision, challenges under Article 226 E of the Constitution to the decisions rendered by the SATs lay to Division Benches of the respective High Courts within whose jurisdiction the SATs operated. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction could be invoked under Article 136 against the decisions of the High Courts.

8Copy pinpoint8. The decision in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) seems to have influenced the State of Odisha to request the Union Government to abolish the OAT. By a letter dated 16 September 2015, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Odisha requested the Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Personnel and Training to issue a notification under the Administrative Tribunals Act abolishing the OAT. The letter recorded the State Government’s reason for making this request in the following terms: “Government of Odisha is of the view that the Tribunal is not able to serve its original objectives, particularly after the Hon’ble Apex Court gave the Judgment in L. Chandra Kumar case of 1997. As a result of this judgment, the very purpose of having a State H

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A Administrative Tribunal (SAT) for speedy redressal of the grievances of the State Government employees is not fulfilled as any way the aggrieved parties have to approach the Hon’ble High Court before approaching the Apex Court for a final verdict.” A note annexed to the letter dated 16 September 2015 elaborated B on the State Government’s rationale for seeking to abolish the OAT: “As a consequence of the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court [in L. Chandra Kumar], the objective of the establishment of the Tribunal to give quick justice to the government employees was defeated… The aggrieved parties are approaching the High C Court against OAT orders and then the Supreme Court resulting in protracted litigation … Government is incurring a significant sum of expenditure on the OAT … The abolition of the Tribunal will reduce the burden of litigation for the Government and will also reduce the time for resolution of disputes / litigation.”

D Evidently, the State of Odisha was of the opinion that the raison d’etre of the OAT was defeated – the fact that the OAT’s decisions were subject to two tiers of challenge (first before the High Court and then the Supreme Court) meant that speedy justice could not be delivered. The State Government proposed to transfer the cases pending before the OAT to the Orissa High Court. E

9Copy pinpoint9. On 12 January 2016, the Union Government requested the State of Odisha to provide information about the Orissa High Court’s views on the proposal to abolish the OAT, the legal mechanism by which the cases pending before the OAT could be transferred to the Orissa High Court, and regarding the plan of action with respect to the employees of F the OAT. Accordingly, on 1 February 2016, the State of Odisha solicited the Orissa High Court’s views on the matter. Thereafter, the Union Government communicated its ‘in-principle’ approval of the proposal to abolish the OAT to the State of Odisha.

10Copy pinpoint10. By a letter dated 5 February 2019 to the Union Government G and the State of Odisha, the Orissa High Court conveyed that that it had resolved to accept the decision to abolish the OAT and the attendant proposals regarding the transfer of employees and pending cases. On 22 February 2019, the State of Odisha wrote to the Union of India, intimating it that the employees of the OAT would be “suitably adjusted in other heads of the department under the Government of Odisha H

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depending upon the vacancies in equivalent cadre and post.” The letter A also stated that the State Government had decided to transfer the cases pending before the OAT to the Orissa High Court and that the latter had accepted this decision.

11Copy pinpoint11. The Union Government took recourse to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act 189710 and abolished the OAT by issuing Notification B GSR 552(E) on 2 August 2019. The relevant portion of this notification is extracted below: “Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub- section (2) of Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985, read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act 1897 (10 of C 1897), the Central Government hereby rescinds the said notification number GSR 934(E), dated the 4th July 1986, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before such rescission, with effect from the date of publication of this notification in the Gazette of India.” D ii. The impugned judgment

12Copy pinpoint12. In 2019, each of the appellants filed a Writ Petition before the Orissa High Court for quashing the notification dated 2 August 2019 (as well as the decision of the Cabinet of the State Government dated 9 September 2015 to abolish the OAT). After considering the rival sub- E missions, the Orissa High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions by its com- mon judgment dated 7 June 2021, for the following reasons: 13. a. Article 323-A is an enabling provision. It does not make it mandatory for the Union Government to establish F administrative tribunals or refrain from abolishing them once they are established; b. The decision to abolish the OAT is an administrative decision. There is therefore no bar to the Union Government invoking Section 21 of the General Clauses Act read with Section 4(2) G of the Administrative Tribunals Act to rescind the notification establishing the OAT; c. The invocation of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act does not result in a denial of justice because the cases pending 10 “General Clauses Act” H

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A before the OAT will be heard by the Orissa High Court. Hence, litigants are not prejudiced by the invocation of Section 21; d. The proposition that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly is not applicable because neither Article 323- A of the Constitution nor Section 4(2) of the Administrative B Tribunals Act prohibits the Union or State Government from abolishing an SAT; e. The Union Government was not rendered functus-officio after it established the OAT because it was exercising an administrative function and not a judicial or quasi-judicial C function; f. The jurisdiction of the Orissa High Court was neither created nor enlarged as a consequence of the notification dated 2 August 2019. Rather, the High Court’s jurisdiction was revived; g. The decision-making process of the Union and State D Governments was not arbitrary, irrational, or unreasonable, and it did not violate Article 14 of the Constitution; h. There is no factual foundation for the allegation that the decision to abolish the OAT was motivated by government servants seeking to avoid contempt proceedings before the OAT. In E any event, all cases including contempt proceedings would be heard by the Orissa High Court; and i. The notification dated 2 August 2019 was not vitiated for the reason that it did not state that it had been issued in the name of the President of India. F The High Court also observed that the procedure adopted by the Union Government may have been rendered arbitrary if it had failed to ensure that the High Court was consulted prior to abolishing the OAT because such a decision would directly impact the functioning of the High Court. G B. Submissions

14Copy pinpoint14. Mr. Ashok Panigrahi and Dr. Aman Hingorani, learned coun- sel led arguments on behalf of the appellants. They were joined by Mr. C Ravichandran Iyer, Advocate-on-Record, who is an intervenor in this appeal. H

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15Copy pinpoint15. Their submissions were: A a. Article 323-A of the Constitution is in the nature of a mandate. It requires the Union Government to establish SATs and does not empower the Union Government to abolish a SAT, once established; b. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked to abolish the OAT. The power to abolish a SAT must flow from the same legislation that vests the Union Government with the power to establish SATs. The Administrative Tribunals Act does not vest either the Union Government or the State Government with the power to abolish SATs. In any event, the conditions for the invocation of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act are not satisfied. The abolition of the OAT was therefore without legal basis; c. The Administrative Tribunal (Amendment) Bill 2006 was introduced to provide an enabling provision for the abolition of D SATs and for the transfer of pending cases from the abolished SAT to the relevant High Court. This bill was not enacted into law and therefore the Union Government and the State Governments do not have the power to abolish SATs; d. The State Government’s interpretation of the decision in L. E Chandra Kumar (supra) as reducing the efficiency of the adjudication process for service matters is incorrect and unreasonable; e. The OAT has two regular benches and two circuit benches but the High Court has a single bench in Cuttack. The abolition of the OAT makes the court system less accessible to litigants and violates the fundamental right of access to justice; f. The Union and State Governments have violated the principles of natural justice by failing to provide the OAT Bar Association and the litigants before the OAT with an opportunity to be heard before abolishing the OAT. This is also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution; g. The notification dated 2 August 2019 by which the OAT was abolished is invalid because it is not expressed in the name of the President of India in terms of Article 77 of the Constitution; H

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A h. The Constitution does not envisage a transfer of cases from any court to a particular High Court except as specified in Article 228 of the Constitution; i. The State Government is trying to take advantage of its own wrong by failing to fill the vacancies in the OAT and creating the conditions for the abolition of the OAT. The failure of the State Government to fill the vacancies is also a breach of Article 256 of the Constitution; j. The abolition of the OAT has the effect of enlarging the jurisdiction of the Orissa High Court but Parliament alone has the power to create or enlarge jurisdiction; k. The real reason for the abolition of the OAT is that officials in Odisha faced charges of contempt before the OAT and sought to avoid these proceedings by having the OAT abolished; l. A judicial impact assessment ought to have been carried out before abolishing the OAT; m. Once the Union Government established the OAT, it became functus officio; and n. The Union Government ought to have obtained the permission of this Court before issuing the notification dated 2 August E 2019.

16Copy pinpoint16. The submissions urged on behalf of the appellants have been opposed by the Union of India and the State of Odisha. Mr. Balbir Singh, Additional Solicitor General made the following submissions for the Union of India: F a. Section 4(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act enables the Union Government to establish an SAT upon receiving a request in this behalf from the State Government. Consequently, it is the prerogative of the State Government to establish, continue, or abolish the relevant SAT; G b. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act may be pressed into service to abolish an SAT. Neither the Constitution nor the Administrative Tribunals Act is required to be amended to give the Union Government the power to abolish an SAT;

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c. The fundamental right to justice has not been violated because A the cases pending before the OAT were transferred to the Orissa High Court;

17Copy pinpoint17. Mr. Ashok Kr Parija, learned Advocate General for the State of Odisha supplemented the arguments put forward by the Union of India. He urged that: B a. The Writ Petitions before the Orissa High Court which led to the impugned judgment were not maintainable because the rights of the petitioners were not affected by the abolition of the OAT. Litigants cannot claim a fundamental right to access the OAT; C b. The State Government took a policy decision to abolish the OAT, in light of the low rate of disposal of cases by the OAT. The State Government is also of the view that the purpose of the OAT (to ensure speedy disposal of cases) is not served subsequent to the decision of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar D (supra); c. The word “may” in Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act is unambiguous and must be interpreted strictly. d. An intra-court appeal is different from an appeal to a separate forum and the former streamlines the process of adjudication. E It cannot be said that there is no advantage to be had by abolishing the OAT; e. The principles of natural justice were not violated; The abolition of the OAT does not make the court system less F accessible to litigants because they would have been required to travel to Cuttack in any event in order to participate in the writ proceedings before the Orissa High Court. The number of cases transferred from the Circuit Benches of the OAT at Berhampur and Sambalpur to the Orissa High Court are 275 and 235 respectively. The Principal Bench at Bhubaneswar G and the regular Bench at Cuttack, on the other hand, had 11,483 and 32,911 cases respectively, which were transferred to the Orissa High Court. Financial hardships faced by litigants can be alleviated through compensation schemes which exist for this purpose; and H

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A f. It was not mandatory for the government to conduct a judicial impact assessment test before abolishing the OAT.

18Copy pinpoint18. In its counter affidavit, the Orissa High Court detailed the action taken to transfer the cases pending before the OAT to the High Court – nodal officers were appointed to monitor the transfer, a B committee was constituted to oversee the transfer, the committee devised a methodology for shifting pending cases, and a dedicated branch called the ‘OA Branch’ was created to deal exclusively with transferred matters. C. Issues

19Copy pinpoint19. Based on the submissions which have been canvassed by the parties, the issues which arise for determination are: a. Whether the Writ Petitions instituted by the appellants before the Orissa High Court were maintainable;

D b. Whether Article 323-A of the Constitution makes it manda- tory for the Union Government to establish SATs;c. Whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be in- voked to rescind the notification establishing the OAT, thereby abolishing the OAT; d. Whether the abolition of the OAT is arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution; e. Whether the abolition of the OAT is violative of the fundamental right of access to justice; f. Whether the Union and State Governments have violated the principles of natural justice by failing to provide the OAT Bar Association and the litigants before the OAT with an opportunity to be heard before arriving at a decision to abolish the OAT; g. Whether the notification dated 2 August 2019 is invalid because it is not expressed in the name of the President of India; h. Whether the transfer of cases from the OAT to the Orissa High Court has the effect of enlarging the jurisdiction of the latter; i. Whether the State Government took advantage of its own wrong by ceasing to fill the vacancies in the OAT;

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j. Whether the failure of the Union Government to conduct a A judicial impact assessment before abolishing the OAT vitiates its decision to abolish the OAT; and k. Whether the Union Government became functus officio after establishing the OAT. D. Analysis B

i. An overview of the proceedings arising from the abolition of the Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal11 and the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal12

20Copy pinpoint20. The parties to this appeal have advanced some arguments in C relation to decisions arising from the abolition of certain other SATs. It is therefore necessary to understand the decisions of this Court in relation to the abolition of those SATs. To this end, the abolition of the MPAT and the TNAT as well as the legal proceedings arising from those decisions are briefly discussed. The effect of these proceedings on the decision in this case is also examined. D a. The abolition of the MPAT

21Copy pinpoint21. The State of Madhya Pradesh was reorganized into the State of Madhya Pradesh and the State of Chhattisgarh with the enactment of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganization Act 2000. Section 74(1)(ii) of this E legislation vested the State Governments of these two states with the power to abolish “every 1. Commission, Authority, Tribunal, University, Board or any other body constituted under a Central Act, State Act or Provincial Act and having jurisdiction over the existing State of Madhya Pradesh.” F

22Copy pinpoint22. The State of Madhya Pradesh issued a notification abolishing the MPAT pursuant to a decision taken by it along with the State of Chhattisgarh. This notification was challenged before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The petitioners in that case also challenged the constitutionality of Section 74 of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganization Act 2000. G

23Copy pinpoint23. The High Court upheld the constitutional validity of sub-clause (1) of Section 74. It held that sub-clauses (2) and (3) of Section 71 (concerning the termination of employees and the compensation for the 11 “MPAT” 12 “TNAT” H

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A unexpired period of their tenure respectively) were ultra vires the Constitution. The High Court also held that the State Government could not have abolished the MPAT by issuing a notification. Rather, it was required to request the Union Government to issue a notification abolishing the MPAT because the MPAT was established by the Union Government. It held that the Union Government would have no choice but to accept B such a request and issue a notification to this effect. The High Court accordingly quashed the notification issued by the State of Madhya Pradesh by which the MPAT was abolished.

24Copy pinpoint24. On appeal, this Court upheld the interpretation accorded to the Madhya Pradesh Reorganization Act 2000 by the Madhya Pradesh C High Court. The decision of this Court was reported as M.P. High Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India (2004) 11 SCC 766.13 As seen from a discussion of the facts, the MPAT Abolition Case (supra) concerned the powers of the State of Madhya Pradesh under the Madhya Pradesh Reorganization Act 2000 as well as the D constitutional validity of certain provisions of that enactment. This Court was not called upon to adjudicate whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act would be applicable to Section 4(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act. A decision on the abolition of an SAT by the exercise of special powers under a legislation enacted for the reorganization of a E state does not have any bearing on whether an SAT may be abolished in exercise of powers under the Administrative Tribunals Act. The MPAT Abolition Case (supra) is therefore not germane to the issue of whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act would be applicable to Section 4(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act. However, the issue whether the decision to abolish the MPAT was arbitrary, unreasonable and F therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution was decided in that case. A similar issue is before us in the present case and this aspect of the decision in the MPAT Abolition Case (supra) may be instructive. b. The abolition of the TNAT

G Between 1994 and 2004, the Government of Tamil Nadu requested the Union Government to abolish the TNAT. Thereafter, it stopped ap- pointing the Chairperson, the Vice Chairperson and the Members of the TNAT, which was rendered inoperative as a result. Approximately 30,000 cases were pending before it at this time. Various parties instituted writ 13 H “MPAT Abolition Case”

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petitions before the Madras High Court seeking directions to the State A Government of Tamil Nadu to fill the vacancies in the TNAT to enable it to function until it was abolished. These writ petitions culminated in the decision of the Madras High Court in Tamil Nadu Government All De- partment Watchman and Basic Servants Association v. Union of In- dia14. B

25Copy pinpoint25. In its decision in the above case, the Madras High Court held that the Union Government had the power to rescind a notification es- tablishing an SAT, under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. It relied on the MPAT Abolition Case (supra) to hold that it was open to the State Government to take a “policy decision” to abolish the SAT and request the Union Government to abolish it. It further held that the latter C would have no option but to issue a notification in this regard. On this basis, it directed the Union Government to issue a notification abolishing the TNAT “as there is no necessity for the Central Government to wait for the amendment before the Parliament and the mere issu- ance of Notification would suffice for abolition of the Tribunal.” D Two appeals against the decision in the TNAT Abolition Case (supra) were preferred before this Court. The first was dismissed in limine by an order dated 16 August 2005. The second was an appeal filed by the Union of India. Before this appeal could be adjudicated on merits, the Union Government issued a notification on 17 February 2006 E abolishing the TNAT. On 28 March 2017, this Court dismissed the ap- peal for having become infructuous. It observed that the question of law had been kept open.

26Copy pinpoint26. The TNAT Abolition Case (supra) does not hence consti- tute a precedent which binds this Court. The proceedings arising from F the TNAT Abolition Case (supra) in appeal before this Court, too, do not have a bearing on the approach to be adopted while deciding the merits of the issues before us because the question of law was ex- pressly kept open. ii. The Writ Petitions instituted before the Orissa High Court G were maintainable

27Copy pinpoint27. The State of Odisha has interrogated the maintainability of the Writ Petitions instituted by the appellants before the Orissa High 14 2005 SCC OnLine Mad 333- “TNAT Abolition Case” H

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A Court (which led to the impugned judgment) on the ground that the rights of the petitioners were not impacted by the abolition of the OAT.

28Copy pinpoint28. The appellants are the OAT Bar Association, Cuttack and the Odisha Retired Police Officers’ Welfare Association. Both associations are registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860. Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act 1860 authorizes registered societies to sue and be sued. Both the appellants are therefore organizations which are entitled to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Consti- tution.

29Copy pinpoint29. Both appellants have also alleged that an existing legal right of theirs was violated. As held by this Court in Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal (2002) 1 SCC 33, the existence of a legal right of the petitioner which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226: “38. There is no dispute regarding the legal proposition that the rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest. The existence of the legal right of the petitioner which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under the aforesaid article. The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a person to reach the court has undergone a sea change with the development of constitutional law in our country and the constitutional courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on hypertechnical grounds. If a person approaching the court can satisfy that the impugned action is likely to adversely affect his right which is shown to be having source in some statutory provision, the petition filed by such a person cannot be rejected on the ground of his not having the locus standi. In other words, if the person is found to be not merely a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of his not having the locus standi.” (emphasis supplied) H

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30Copy pinpoint30. In State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Dev AIR 1964 SC 685, A a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the existence of a right is the foundation of a petition under Article 226: “8. … Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the High Court is undoubtedly very wide. Appropriate writs can be issued by the High Court under the said article even for purposes other than the enforcement of the fundamental rights and in that sense, a party who invokes the special jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not confined to cases of illegal invasion of his fundamental rights alone. But though the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is wide in that sense, the concluding words of the article clearly indicate that before a writ or an appropriate order can be issued in favour of a party, it must be established that the party has a right and the said right is illegally invaded or threatened. The existence of a right is thus the foundation of a petition under Article 226.” (emphasis supplied) D

31Copy pinpoint31. In this case, the Odisha Retired Police Officers’ Welfare Association alleged that its right to speedy redressal of grievances (a facet of the fundamental right of access to justice) was violated. The OAT Bar Association joined the Odisha Retired Police Officers’ Welfare Association in alleging that the state’s action of abolishing the OAT E violated its right under Article 14 of the Constitution. Having alleged that these rights were violated by the abolition of the OAT, they were entitled to invoke the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Whether there is substance in the grievance is a separate matter which has to be analysed. F iii. Article 323-A does not preclude the Union Government from abolishing SATs

32Copy pinpoint32. In order to assess whether it is mandatory for the Union Gov- ernment to establish SATs, it is necessary to advert to Article 323-A of the Constitution of India: G “323A. Administrative tribunals.—(1) Parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any H

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A local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government. (2) A law made under clause (1) may— (a) provide for the establishment of an administrative tribunal for B the Union and a separate administrative tribunal for each State or for two or more States; (b) specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the power to punish for contempt) and authority which may be exercised by each of the said tribunals; C (c) provide for the procedure (including provisions as to limitation and rules of evidence) to be followed by the said tribunals; (d) exclude the jurisdiction of all courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in clause (1); (e) provide for the transfer to each such administrative tribunal of any cases pending before any court or other authority immediately before the establishment of such tribunal as would have been within the jurisdiction of such tribunal if the causes of action on which such suits or proceedings are based had arisen after such establishment; (f) repeal or amend any order made by the President under clause (3) of article 371D; (g) contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions (including provisions as to fees) as Parliament may deem necessary for the effective functioning of, and for the speedy disposal of cases by, and the enforcement of the orders of, such tribunals. (3) The provisions of this article shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force.” (emphasis supplied)

33Copy pinpoint33. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 323-A use the expression “may,” indicating that Article 323-A does not compel Parliament to enact a law to give effect to it. Parliament is entrusted with the discretion to enact a

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law which provides for the adjudication of certain disputes by administrative tribunals. It is a permissive provision. The provision is facilitative and enabling.

34Copy pinpoint34. However, in certain cases, the power to do something may be coupled with a duty to exercise that power. In Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd. (1977) 2 SCC 166, this Court expounded on when the word “may” carries with it an obligation to exercise the power conferred by that word in a particular manner: “8. Thus, the question to be determined in such cases always is whether the power conferred by the use of the word “may” has, annexed to it, an obligation that, on the fulfilment of certain legally prescribed conditions, to be shown by evidence, a particular kind of order must be made. If the statute leaves no room for discretion the power has to be exercised in the manner indicated by the other legal provisions which provide the legal context. Even then the facts must establish that the legal conditions are fulfilled … It is not the conferment of a power which the word “may” D indicates that annexes any obligation to its exercise but the legal and factual context of it. …

10. The principle laid down above has been followed consistently by this Court whenever it has been contended that the word “may” carries with it the obligation to exercise a power in a particular manner or direction. In such a case, it is always the purpose of the power which has to be examined in order to determine the scope of the discretion conferred upon the donee of the power. If the conditions in which the power is to be exercised in particular cases are also specified by a statute then, on the fulfilment of those conditions, the power conferred becomes annexed with a duty to exercise it in that manner.” (emphasis supplied) G

35Copy pinpoint35. In Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P.15, this Court held that the intention of the legislature must be discerned while determining whether a provision is directory or mandatory: 15 (2007) 8 SCC 338 H

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A “36. … In our judgment, mere use of word “may” or “shall” is not conclusive. The question whether a particular provision of a statute is directory or mandatory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule of universal application. Such controversy has to be decided by ascertaining the intention of the legislature and not by looking at the language in which the provision is clothed. And for B finding out the legislative intent, the court must examine the scheme of the Act, purpose and object underlying the provision, consequences likely to ensue or inconvenience likely to result if the provision is read one way or the other and many more considerations relevant to the issue.”

36Copy pinpoint36. In order for the word “may” to acquire the character of the word “shall”, the following aspects of the provision or legislation (or in this case, the Constitution) must be analysed: a. The legal and factual context of the conferment of the power;

D b. The purpose of the power; c. Whether the statute (or the Constitution) specifies the conditions in which the power is to be exercised; and d. The intention of the legislature discerned inter alia from the scheme of the enactment, the purpose and object of the provision, the consequences of reading the provision one way or another, and other relevant considerations. This is not an exhaustive list of factors which will aid courts in interpreting whether a provision is directory or mandatory.

37Copy pinpoint37. Article 323-A does not specify the conditions in which the power to enact laws providing for the adjudication of certain disputes by administrative tribunals must be exercised. It therefore cannot be said that Parliament was obligated to exercise this power upon the fulfilment of certain conditions.

38Copy pinpoint38. The legal and factual context of the power to enact laws providing for administrative tribunals may be understood from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Constitution (Forty- fourth Amendment) Bill 1976. The Statement of Objects indicates that the object was “To reduce the mounting arrears in High Courts and to secure the speedy disposal of service matters, revenue matters and certain

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other matters of special importance in the context of the socio- A economic development and progress, it is considered expedient to provide for administrative and other tribunals for dealing with such matters while preserving the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in regard to such matters under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is also necessary to make certain modifications in the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts under article 226.” The Statement of Objects and Reasons also sheds light on the purpose of the power to provide for administrative tribunals i.e., to reduce mounting arrears in the High Courts and to secure the speedy disposal of service matters. The purpose and the legal and factual context of the power conferred by Article 323-A do not have the effect of narrowing the scope of the discretion afforded to Parliament by the word “may.” The purpose of reducing arrears in the High Courts or securing the speedy disposal of service cases is not of a nature as to cast an obligation upon Parliament to enact laws providing for administrative tribunals. This is because the same purpose can be achieved through other routes. D Article 323-A merely provides for the enactment of legislation as of one of many routes. It is open to Parliament to choose any legally acceptable method to reduce arrears in the High Courts and secure the speedy disposal of service matters, including but not limited to creating administrative tribunals. Article 323-A does not deprive Parliament of the power to choose an alternate course of action to reduce arrears or E ensure speedy justice, by any other modality, including by strengthening other adjudicatory mechanisms. The intention of Parliament could not have been to mandate the establishment and continuation of administrative tribunals. Besides the purpose of the provision discussed above, nothing in the scheme of Article 323-A indicates that it is a mandatory provision. F The consequences of reading Article 323-A as mandating the creation of administrative tribunals, would be to foreclose the possibility of the adoption of an alternate course of action to achieve the desired objective of reducing arrears and ensuring speedy justice. This, too, indicates that it could not have been the intention of Parliament to mandate the establishment of administrative tribunals as the only remedy to mounting G arrears or as the only manner in which speedy justice could be secured.

39Copy pinpoint39. Another important consequence of interpreting Article 323-A as being mandatory is that it prevents Parliament and the State Governments from evaluating the manner in which administrative tribunals function by inter alia accounting for: H

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A a. The rate of disposal of cases; b. The quality of the judgments; c. How often the decisions of the SAT are overturned in the writ jurisdiction, appeal or review; d. Whether the tribunals are functioning independently; B e. The availability of qualified and suitable candidates for the posts of members and chairpersons of the tribunals; f. Whether SATs do indeed reduce arrears in the High Courts and streamline the justice delivery mechanism; C g. The cost incurred by the state; and h. The costs (monetary and otherwise) to litigants. The Orissa High Court refers to some of these factors in paragraphs 70 to 75 of the impugned judgment albeit in a slightly different context. The intention of Parliament could not have been to prevent the D Union or State Governments from evaluating the efficiency and desirability of administrative tribunals once they were established. However, the effect of reading Article 323-A as a mandatory provision would be to do precisely that.

40Copy pinpoint40. The appellants have relied on the decision of this Court in E Dilip K Basu v. State of West Bengal (2015) 8 SCC 744 to argue that it is mandatory for the Union Government to establish SATs. In that case, this Court was required to interpret Section 21 of the Protection of Human Rights Act 1993 which stipulated that State Governments “may” constitute a State Human Rights Commission. The question was whether the word “may” ought to be read as the word “shall.” This Court noted that the Protection of Human Rights Act 1993 enjoined the State Human Rights Commissions to promote human rights, prevent their violation, and provide redressal. It held that this legislative intent would be negated if State Human Rights Commissions were not established in every state. This Court reasoned that the consequence of this was that Section 21 of the Protection of Human Rights Act 1993 not only conferred State Governments with the power to set up State Human Rights Commissions but also imposed on them the duty to do so. In the present case, the intention of Parliament in enacting Article 323-A of the Constitution (i.e., to reduce arrears and provide speedy justice) would not necessarily be negated in the absence of SATs in each state, for the reasons discussed above.

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41Copy pinpoint41. We also note that in Dilip K Basu (supra), the fact that victims or complainants would not have access to an efficacious remedy in the absence of State Human Rights Commissions weighed heavily with this Court. They would be required to approach the National Human Rights Commission, which this Court noted could prove inaccessible to people living in places far away from New Delhi where it is headquartered. B Here, the absence of SATs does not leave litigants without an efficacious remedy. The High Courts or other forums already designated for the purpose of adjudicating service matters continue to be operational in each state and the absence of SATs does not inconvenience litigants any more than they otherwise would have been.

42Copy pinpoint42. Hence, the word “may” in Article 323-A of the Constitution is C not imparted with the character of the word “shall.” Article 323-A is a directory, enabling provision which confers the Union Government with the discretion to establish an administrative tribunal. The corollary of this is that Article 323-A does not act as a bar to the Union Government abolishing an administrative tribunal once it is created. D iv. Applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act

43Copy pinpoint43. The Union Government invoked Section 21 of the General Clauses Act read with Section 4(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act to rescind the notification establishing the OAT. Section 21 of the Gen- eral Clauses Act, which is a rule of construction, is extracted below: E “Power to make, to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind, orders, rules or bye-laws.— Where, by any Act or Regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or byelaws so issued.”

44Copy pinpoint44. The appellants contend that the Union Government could not have taken recourse to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. A two- step analysis must precede the answer to the question posed by the appellants. a. There is no bar to the applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to the administrative order establish- ing the OAT

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45Copy pinpoint45. In Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare16, this Court held that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be pressed into service to vary, amend, or review a quasi-judicial order or notification. It is important to note that a quasi-judicial order or notification cannot be rescinded by relying upon Section 21 of the Gen- eral Clauses Act. The notification dated 2 August 2019 rescinded the notification dated 4 July 1986 by which the OAT was established. It is therefore the notification dated 4 July 1986 which established the OAT which must be analysed to determine whether it is a quasi-judicial noti- fication, and not the notification dated 2 August 2019, the effect of which was to abolish the OAT. If the answer is that the decision to establish the OAT was indeed a quasi-judicial decision, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be relied on to reverse this decision. As a conse- quence, the notification dated 2 August 2019 will be invalid, being im- properly issued. If, however, the decision to establish the OAT was ad- ministrative , there would be no bar to the invocation of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to rescind the notification establishing the OAT. D

46Copy pinpoint46. This Court discussed the meaning and contours of a quasi- judicial act in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani17, where SR Das, J. in his concurring opinion held: “80.1.(i) that if a statute empowers an authority, not being a court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and 80.2.(ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially.

81. In other words, while the presence of two parties besides the deciding authority will prima facie, and in the absence of any other 16 (2002) 5 SCC 685 H 17 (1950) SCC 551

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factor impose upon the authority the duty to act judicially, the A absence of two such parties is not decisive in taking the act of the authority out of the category of quasi-judicial act if the authority is nevertheless required by the statute to act judicially.”

47Copy pinpoint47. In Indian National Congress (I) (supra), this Court held that: B “29. … another test which distinguishes administrative function from quasi-judicial function is, the authority who acts quasi- judicially is required to act according to the rules, whereas the authority which acts administratively is dictated by the policy and expediency.” C

48Copy pinpoint48. In Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta18, this Court expounded upon when an authority is required to act judicially: “8. … Now it may be mentioned that the statute is not likely to provide in so many words that the authority passing the order is D required to act judicially; that can only be inferred from the express provisions of the statute in the first instance in each case and no one circumstance alone will be determinative of the question whether the authority set up by the statute has the duty to act judicially or not. The inference whether the authority acting under E a statute where it is silent has the duty to act judicially will depend on the express provisions of the statute read along with the nature of the right affected, the manner of the disposal provided, the objective criterion if any to be adopted, the effect of the decision on the person affected and other indicia afforded by the statute.” F

49Copy pinpoint49. From the above decisions, it emerges that: a. The decision of an authority is prima facie, and in the absence of any other factor, a quasi-judicial act when there is a lis before it, with two parties with competing claims; b. When the authority has the power to do something which will G prejudicially affect the subject, the decision it takes is a quasi- judicial act even in the absence of a lis and two parties with competing claims, when the authority is required by the statute in question to act judicially. The express provisions of the statute, 18 AIR 1962 SC 1110 H

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A the nature of the right affected, the manner of disposal, the objective criterion (if any) to be adopted while deciding one way or the other, the effect of the decision, and other signs in the statute may be considered when evaluating whether there is a duty to act judicially; and B c. The decision of an authority is quasi-judicial when it is made in accordance with rules. The decision is administrative when it is dictated by policy and expediency.

50Copy pinpoint50. Having laid down the above principles, it must be realised that the distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative acts is not always well defined and its application is not always certain. Doctrine and practice are not necessarily happy partners. The instant case evidently does not involve a lis or two parties with competing claims appearing before an authority who will determine their respective rights. Further, the act of the Union Government establishing the OAT did not prejudicially affect the subject in any manner. Litigants or other citizens were not left without a forum. They could continue to pursue their remedies before the OAT when it was first established, instead of before the Orissa High Court.

51Copy pinpoint51. The Union Government was not acting in a judicial capacity when it set up the OAT. On the establishment of the OAT, pending cases before the High Court were transferred to the OAT. Indeed, the decision to establish an SAT is based on policy and expediency. It is up to each State Government to evaluate the need for an SAT within their state, to consider the advantages and disadvantages as well as the financial, administrative, and other practical aspects of establishing an F SAT. The Union Government may then establish the SAT upon receiving a request, in terms of Section 4(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act. The decision to establish an SAT is undoubtedly an administrative decision. Administrative decisions, unlike quasi-judicial decisions, may be reversed by the application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act does not stand G excluded in the present case.

52Copy pinpoint52. The appellants’ reliance on Industrial Infrastructure Development Corpn. (Gwalior) M.P. Ltd. v. CIT19 is misplaced for similar reasons. In that case, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act was 19 (2018) 4 SCC 494 H

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found to be inapplicable to the order because it was a quasi-judicial order. For the reasons discussed above, the order establishing the OAT is an administrative order.

53Copy pinpoint53. We clarify that the distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative decisions has been invoked for the purpose of determining whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act may be invoked to reverse the decision to establish an SAT. Administrative orders continue to be amenable to judicial review in accordance with law. b. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is otherwise appli- cable to the Administrative Tribunals Act

54Copy pinpoint54. Having decided that there is no threshold bar to the applicabil- C ity of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, we now consider whether it applies in the present case. The locus classicus on this subject is State of Bihar v. D N Ganguly20, where this Court held: “9. … It is well settled that this section embodies a rule of construction and the question whether or not it applies to the provisions of a particular statute would depend on the subject- matter, context, and, the effect, of the relevant provisions of the said statute. In other words, it would be necessary to examine carefully the scheme of the Act, its object and all its relevant and material provisions before deciding whether by the application of the rule of construction enunciated by Section 21, the appellant’s contention is justified that the power to cancel the reference made under Section 10(1) can be said to vest in the appropriate government by necessary implication. If we come to the conclusion that the context and effect of the relevant provisions is repugnant to the application of the said rule of construction, the appellant would not be entitled to invoke the assistance of the said section. We must, therefore, proceed to examine the relevant provisions of the Act itself.”

55Copy pinpoint55. In Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India21, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that: G “10. … Section 21 of the General Clauses Act embodies a rule of construction, and that rule must have reference to the context 20 1959 SCR 1191 21 1957 SCR 1052 H

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A and subject-matter of the particular statute to which it is being applied”

56Copy pinpoint56. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be invoked when its application would not be repugnant to the subject-matter, context, and effect of the statute and when it is in harmony with its scheme and B object. The court may refer to the provisions of the statute in question to determine whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act will be applicable.

57Copy pinpoint57. The scheme of the Administrative Tribunals Act is briefly analysed below: C a. Section 4 enables the Union Government to establish an SAT upon receipt of a request in this behalf from the concerned State Government; b. Section 5 provides for the composition of SATs. Sections 8 and 10B stipulate the term of office of the Chairperson and D the Members; c. Section 15 governs the jurisdiction of SATs; d. Chapter IV sets out the procedure to be followed before the Tribunal as well as the powers exercisable by it; and E e. Section 29 provides that every suit or proceeding pending before any court or authority immediately before the date of establishment of a tribunal under the Administrative Tribunals Act which would have been within the jurisdiction of the tribunal if the cause of action in such suit or proceeding had arisen after the establishment of the tribunal, stands transferred F to the tribunal on the date of its establishment.

58Copy pinpoint58. The Administrative Tribunals Act does not contain a provision and a corresponding procedure for the abolition of an SAT once it is established. However, this does not mean that the abolition of an SAT, once it is set up, is impermissible. First, the Administrative Tribunals Act G does not proscribe the abolition of an SAT by the Union Government, upon the latter receiving a request from the concerned State Government. Second, nothing in the scheme of the statute implies or suggests that such an abolition would be incompatible with the objective sought to be achieved. To the contrary, if the concerned State Government is of the considered view that the SAT is failing to meet the objectives of the

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Administrative Tribunals Act or that an alternate route for meeting the same objectives is preferable to that of operating an SAT, it is free to act upon its view and request the Union Government to abolish the SAT. An amendment to the Administrative Tribunals Act is not a prerequisite for the State Government to make a request to the Union Government.

59Copy pinpoint59. As noticed above, the object of the Administrative Tribunals B Act is to reduce arrears and enable the provision of speedy justice to litigants. Abolishing an SAT would not frustrate this objective because SATs are not the only method by which the object is capable of being achieved. Further, the effect of such an abolition would not be to deprive litigants of a remedy because the cases before the SAT would stand revived in the forum in which they were pending prior to the establishment of that SAT. The subject matter and the context of the Administrative Tribunals Act, too, do not militate against the application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. There is therefore nothing in the Administrative Tribunals Act which is repugnant to the application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The relevant State Government has the implied power to issue a request to abolish the SAT in its state to the Union Government. The Union Government in turn has the implied power to rescind the notification by which that SAT was established, thereby abolishing the SAT.

60Copy pinpoint60. The appellants have relied on decisions of this Court in Lt. E Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma22 and State of M.P. v. Ajay Singh23 to support their case. In Avinash Sharma (supra), this Court held that after the Government takes possession of land pursuant to a notification under Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, the land vests with the Government and the notification cannot be cancelled under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. Further, the notification could not be withdrawn in exercise of the powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, once possession of the land was taken. The present case does not concern the acquisition of land, making the decision in Avinash Sharma (supra) irrelevant to the question at hand. Moreover, Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 had a specific provision governing a withdrawal from acquisition and hence the conditions contained in the statutory provision could not be obviated by taking recourse to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The scheme 22 (1970) 2 SCC 149 23 (1993) 1 SCC 302 H