ORISSA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION v. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

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A of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and the scheme of the Administrative Tribunals Act are different and the scheme and context of each enactment must be considered on its own merits.

61Copy pinpoint61. In Ajay Singh (supra), this Court held that the rule of construction embodied in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act did not apply to the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1952 because the subject-matter, context and effect of its provisions were inconsistent with the application of Section 21. In that case, the State of Madhya Pradesh had constituted a single-member high powered committee to investigate an issue of public importance that had arisen within its territory. It later attempted to reconstitute the high-powered committee by replacing the single member. The question in Ajay Singh (supra) was whether the state government could rely on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to rescind the notification by which it had appointed the member at the first instance.

62Copy pinpoint62. This Court answered in the negative because Section 3 of the D Commissions of Inquiry Act 1952 provided for the power to fill any vacancies whereas Section 7 provided for the only situation in which a Commission which was already constituted would cease to exist. This Court observed that the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1952 did not provide for the power to reconstitute a Commission or replace its members. The E scheme of the enactment and its context indicated that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act could not be invoked. Further, the object of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1952 would be frustrated if the appropriate government were permitted to reconstitute a Commission midway through the task that it was charged with completing because it made it possible for an independent agency to exist, free from governmental control. In F the present case, there is no such impediment to the application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The object of the Administrative Tribunals Act would not stand frustrated if an SAT is created and then abolished. The Union and State Governments may take alternate routes (some of which may have already been in operation, supplementing SATs) towards G achieving the same objective. Hence, the decision in Ajay Singh (supra) does not assist the appellants’ case.

63Copy pinpoint63. The appellants have also argued that the Union Government’s power to abolish SATs must flow from the same legislation that vests it with the power to establish them. It is their contention that the Union H Government does not have the power to abolish SATs because the

ORISSA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION v. 779 UNION OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

Administrative Tribunals Act does not provide for it. This argument fails A for the simple reason that the very purpose of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is to provide for contingencies such as the instant case when the statute in question does not explicitly provide for the power to add to, amend, vary, or rescind a notification (or order, rule, or by-law) which has been issued. Of course, the application of Section 21 of the B General Clauses Act is subject to the test laid down in D N Ganguly (supra) as discussed previously as well as the other requirements mentioned in the provision itself.

64Copy pinpoint64. If the argument of the appellants were to be accepted, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act would be rendered otiose. It would not apply to any statute which does not explicitly provide for the power to add to, amend, vary, or rescind notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws. On the other hand, if the statute itself conferred the power to add to, amend, vary, or rescind notifications, orders, rules or by-laws, there would be no need to rely on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. This is not a conceivable position because courts must interpret statutes so as to give effect to their provisions rather than to render them futile.24

65Copy pinpoint65. The appellants have also submitted that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. For the reasons discussed above, neither Article 323-A of the Constitution nor the Administrative Tribunals Act prohibit the abolition of SATs. Hence, it cannot be said that the Union E Government is barred from abolishing the SATs “directly” and that it has resorted to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to evade such a ban and “indirectly” abolish the OAT. The Union Government’s reliance on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to abolish the OAT is legally permissible. F

66Copy pinpoint66. The appellants have urged that the Administrative Tribunal (Amendment) Bill 2006 was introduced in Parliament to provide an enabling provision for the abolition of SATs and for the transfer of pending cases from the abolished SAT to the relevant High Court. This bill was referred to the Rajya Sabha Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice, which submitted its report on 5 December G

2006. The report recommended that the power to abolish an SAT should not be granted to the executive. It is argued that the Union Government does not have the power to abolish SATs because this Bill was not enacted 24 M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa (1961) 2 SCR 295 H

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A into law because of the recommendations contained in the report of the Standing Committee.

67Copy pinpoint67. The appellants seem to be implying that Parliament was of the opinion that the Union Government did not have the power to abolish SATs in the absence of an enabling provision. It may also be the case B that Parliament introduced the Administrative Tribunal (Amendment) Bill 2006 in order to clarify the power of the Union Government to abolish SATs rather than to confer it with that power. This Court cannot possibly enter into a discussion or analysis of all the potential reasons for a proposed amendment.

68Copy pinpoint68. The appellants have put forth another argument on similar lines. It is their case the Union Government’s stance before the Madras High Court in the TNAT Abolition Case (supra) must influence this Court’s decision on whether the Union Government has the power to rescind a notification establishing SATs. The Union Government’s stance was recorded in paragraph 4 of the TNAT Abolition Case (supra): D “4. On the other hand, the stand taken by the Central Government, the first respondent herein, is that though the Government of Tamil Nadu has sent a proposal to the Central Government for abolition, this cannot be done through Notification. The appropriate legislation for this proposal has to be brought in the Parliament E and the same is being contemplated by the Law Department which after due processing and approval will be brought before the Parliament. Mere Notification of the Central Government would not suffice in this case, since Section 74 of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000 would specifically provide for the abolition through Notification. But, such a provision is not available in this F State. Therefore, suitable Parliamentary amendment to the Administrative Tribunal Act is necessary to consider such proposal. The necessary steps for the same are being taken by the Central Government.”

69Copy pinpoint69. The Union Government’s stance on a question of law before G a court in another case or for that matter, any party’s position on a question of law, does not preclude this Court from interpreting the law. In Zakir Abdul Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra25, a two-judge Bench of this Court (of which one of us, Dr. DY Chandrachud, J. was a part) held: 25 H (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1092

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“36. … A submission which is made on a question of law by A counsel appearing for a party (in this case, the state) cannot bind that party or for that matter, preclude this Court from correctly interpreting the law.” The Union Government’s stance before the Madras High Court in the TNAT Abolition Case (supra) will therefore not steer this Court’s B exegesis of the law.

70Copy pinpoint70. At this juncture, we may also deal with three interrelated arguments put forward by the appellants with respect to the transfer of cases from the abolished OAT to the Orissa High Court: a. The Constitution of India (including Article 323-A) does not envisage a transfer of cases from any court or tribunal to a particular High Court except in terms of Article 228 of the Constitution; b. While Section 29 of the Administrative Tribunals Act provides for the transfer of cases from the High Courts (or other courts and authorities) to the relevant SATs, there is no provision which enables the transfer of cases from the abolished SATs back to the forum in which they would have been heard if not for the establishment of SATs; and c. The abolition of the OAT has the effect of enlarging the jurisdiction of the Orissa High Court but Parliament alone has the power to create or enlarge jurisdiction. Reliance is placed on A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602.

71Copy pinpoint71. The response to the three arguments is that the transfer of cases from the OAT to the Orissa High Court is, properly characterized, F a revival of the latter’s jurisdiction. We agree with the impugned judgment that the Orissa High Court’s jurisdiction in relation to matters pending before the OAT is not being created or enlarged by the abolition of the OAT. It previously exercised such jurisdiction and is merely resuming its jurisdiction over the same subject matter. It is for this reason that the G decision in A.R. Antulay (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case.

72Copy pinpoint72. The natural consequence of the Union Government rescinding the notification establishing the OAT would be to restore the status quo ante. Nothing in either Article 323-A of the Constitution or the H

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A Administrative Tribunals Act prevents such a revival. Further, the absence of a provision in the Constitution which explicitly permits a revival does not act as a barrier to such a revival. For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the Union Government’s reliance on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is in accordance with law. B v. The notification dated 2 August 2019 is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution a. The notification dated 2 August 2019 is not based on ir- relevant or extraneous considerations

73Copy pinpoint73. The appellants have urged that the notification dated 2 August C 2019 is based on an incorrect understanding of the decision in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) and is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

74Copy pinpoint74. The principle that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness and that arbitrary action by the state violates the fundamental guarantee of equality has been recognized as a basic postulate since the decision in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N.26: “85. … equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14 … Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality.” (emphasis supplied) G The State Government’s decision to abolish the OAT will therefore have to be scrutinized with a view to understanding whether any extraneous or irrelevant considerations intruded into the decision.

75Copy pinpoint75. The phrase ‘arbitrary’ is often used synonymously with the phrase ‘unreasonable.’ The test as to whether an action is reasonable 26 H (1974) 4 SCC 3

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was formulated by the Court of Appeal in Associated Provincial A Picture Houses, Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation27: “It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? … For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to B consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting “unreasonably.” Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority.” C

This Court has consistently assessed the validity of executive action on the anvil of the test laid down in Wednesbury Corporation (supra), including in G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council28, Tata Cellular v. Union of India29, Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India30 and Union of India v. International Trading Co.31. D

76Copy pinpoint76. The reasons for the State Government’s decision to abolish the OAT are recorded in a document titled ‘A note indicating the rationale’ with the subject ‘Abolition of Odisha Administrative Tribunal.’ This note was prepared by the General Administration Department, Government of Odisha and is dated 16 September 2015. The relevant parts of the E note are extracted below: “1. Background Odisha Administrative Tribunal (OAT) was established on 14th July, 1986 under the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 by F Government of India on the request of Government of Odisha. The Tribunal under the Act was to have similar jurisdiction as the High Court. The applicants were supposed to be freed from the requirement of having to approach the High Court for disposal of their grievances. In lieu of the High Court the aggrieved government employees could go to the Tribunal and G from there on to the Supreme Court directly … 27 [1948] 1 K.B. 223 28 (1991) 3 SCC 91 29 (1994) 6 SCC 651 30 (1999) 4 SCC 727 31 (2003) 5 SCC 437 H

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A 2. Supreme Court Landmark Judgment (18th March, 1997) However, with the decision of the Supreme Court in L Chandra Kumar (1997) the provision of the Act that aggrieved parties could appeal before the Supreme Court against the orders of the Tribunal was held unconstitutional … it was held that the parties aggrieved with the orders of the Tribunal may approach the High Court first before going to the Supreme Court …

3. Impact of the Supreme Court Judgment As a consequence of the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court, the objective of the establishment of the Tribunal to give quick justice to the government employees was defeated and several States felt that the existence of the Tribunal was rendered futile.” (emphasis supplied) The State Government enclosed this note with its letter dated 16 D September 2015 to the Union Government, requesting it to abolish the OAT. The relevant portion of the letter is extracted below: “This is to state that the State Administrative Tribunal has been functioning in Odisha since 14.07.1986. Government of Odisha is of the view that the Tribunal is not able to serve its original objectives, particularly after the Hon’ble Apex Court gave the E Judgment in L. Chandra Kumar case of 1997. As a result of this judgment, very purpose of having a State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) for speedy redressal of the grievances of the State Government employees is not fulfilled as any way the aggrieved parties have to approach the Hon’ble High Court before approaching the Apex Court for a final verdict. Government of Odisha, after taking into account this, have decided to recommend to the Government of India to abolish the Odisha Administrative Tribunal. A note indicating the rationale adopted by the State Government in arriving at this decision is enclosed herewith for your ready reference.” (emphasis supplied)

77Copy pinpoint77. Similar reasons have been recorded in various other documents of the State Government which relate to the abolition of the OAT. The H

ORISSA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION v. 785 UNION OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

State Government requested the Union Government to establish the OAT A with a view to creating an alternate forum to the Orissa High Court. The State Government envisioned a structure of litigation whereby appeals from the OAT would lie directly to the Supreme Court, and would exclude the High Court both as the court of first instance as well as a forum of appeal. In the State Government’s view, the structure of litigation under B the Administrative Tribunals Act would ensure that the dispute achieved quietus in a maximum of two tiers of litigation. However, the decision of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) held that the jurisdiction of High Courts could not be ousted. This resulted in the creation of three tiers of litigation under the Administrative Tribunals Act – first, before the OAT, followed by the High Court, and culminating with the Supreme C Court. The State Government was consequently of the opinion that the “speedy redressal of grievances” was no longer possible in view of the additional rung of litigation. It was of the opinion that its reason for establishing the OAT no longer survived.

78Copy pinpoint78. The appellants contend that the State Government has D misinterpreted the decision in L. Chandra Kumar (supra). It is their submission that the number of tiers of litigation remains the same even if the OAT is abolished and that there is therefore no advantage to be obtained by abolishing the OAT. Instead of parties instituting a case before the OAT at the first instance and preferring a petition under Article 226 before a Division Bench of the High Court and a Special Leave E Petition under Article 136 before the Supreme Court, they will institute a case directly before the High Court. This will be heard by a single judge and parties have the remedy of a writ appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court and a further challenge before this Court. There are hence, three tiers of litigation, regardless of the forum in which the proceedings are conducted. The appellants also contend that the Orissa High Court is itself burdened with a large number of pending cases and that an increase in its workload would not result in efficiency in the disposal of cases.

79Copy pinpoint79. It was not the State Government’s case that it was obliged to abolish the OAT as a result of the decision in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) or that the abolition of the OAT would result in fewer tiers of litigation. Rather, the State Government evaluated the effect of the decision in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) on the purpose that it intended to achieve with the establishment of the OAT. Tribunals, including administrative tribunals, H

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A may be set up for any number of reasons. All the reasons which could possibly or theoretically have had a bearing on the State Government’s decision to establish the OAT are not relevant. Only the State Government’s actual reason for establishing the OAT is relevant in considering whether it misinterpreted L. Chandra Kumar’s case (supra). The State Government’s reason for setting up the OAT was to B achieve speedy justice. A crucial factor (to its mind) was the elimination of a tier of litigation. The State Government was of the opinion that the creation of the OAT would not fulfil the purpose of a speedy redressal of grievances because there was no improvement to the justice delivery system through the elimination of a tier of litigation. C

80Copy pinpoint80. As for the submission that the Orissa High Court’s pendency will increase if the cases pending before the OAT are transferred to it, the State Government is entitled to structure its justice delivery systems within the parameters defined by law. Its decision may be set aside only if it is unconstitutional or without the authority of law. D

81Copy pinpoint81. In addition to the impact of the decision in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the State Government considered other factors related to the functioning of the OAT. In the note dated 16 September 2015, the State Government furnished other reasons for its decision to abolish the OAT:

E “Government is incurring a significant sum of expenditure on the OAT as is exhibited in the table given below: Table 1: Plan and Non-Plan Provision for OAT (Rs in Lakhs) Head of Expenditure 2014-15 2015-16 F Plan 205.59 200

Non-Plan 616.24 697.69

Total 821.83 897.69

G The following table represents the institution and disposal of OA and MP cases in OAT month wise from January 2014 to December 2014:-

ORISSA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION v. 787 UNION OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

E Table 2 shows that there were 47,619 cases pending at the beginning of 2014. During the calendar year 2014, 7417 cases were disposed whereas 13,823 fresh cases were instituted. At the end of the year 2014, the number of pending cases went up to 54,334 … As an institutional mechanism it seems the Tribunal has F not been able to provide speedy decisions …” (emphasis in original) The State Government was therefore concerned not only with the additional tier of litigation at the Orissa High Court but also with the expenditure incurred to operate the OAT as well as the rate at which the G OAT disposed of cases. It was persuaded to abolish the OAT due to a combination of all these factors.

82Copy pinpoint82. From the above discussion, the following conclusions emerge:

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A a. While arriving at the decision to abolish the OAT, the State Government considered relevant reasons. It considered whether the OAT was capable of fulfilling the purpose for which it was established after the decision in L. Chandra Kumar (supra). It placed in the balance the expenditure incurred to operate the OAT as well as the rate of disposal of cases. These reasons were not irrelevant to the decision as to whether a tribunal ought to be continued; b. The State Government’s act of consulting the Orissa High Court (upon receiving a request to this effect from the Union Government) before deciding to abolish the OAT was not irrelevant or extraneous. The cases before the OAT were to be transferred to the Orissa High Court and the opinion of the latter was relevant to State Government’s decision; c. The State Government did not consider factors which were irrelevant or extraneous to its decision; and D d. The decision to abolish the OAT was not one which was so absurd that no reasonable person or authority would ever have taken it. The decision to abolish a tribunal which it had established, based on an analysis of relevant factors is, by no stretch of imagination, an absurd or unreasonable decision. E

83Copy pinpoint83. This Court reached a similar conclusion in the MPAT Abolition Case (supra). The appellants in that case argued that the decision to abolish the MPAT was arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court rejected their argument in the following terms: F “57. … The notification was issued by the Central Government in 1988 and the State Administrative Tribunal was established for the State of Madhya Pradesh. At that time, as per well-settled legal position, decisions rendered by the Administrative Tribunals constituted under the Act of 1985 were “final” subject to jurisdiction G of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. … If, in view of subsequent development of law in L. Chandra Kumar [(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577 : AIR 1997 SC 1125] the State of Madhya Pradesh felt that continuation of State Administrative Tribunal would be “one more tier” in the administration of justice inasmuch as after a decision is rendered by the State Administrative H

ORISSA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION v. 789 UNION OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

Tribunal, an aggrieved party could approach the High Court under A Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and, hence, it felt that such Tribunal should not be continued further, in our opinion, it cannot be said that such a decision is arbitrary, irrational or unreasonable. From the correspondence between the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Central Government as well as from the affidavit-in-reply, it is clear that the decision of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar [(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577 : AIR 1997 SC 1125] had been considered by the State of Madhya Pradesh in arriving at a decision to abolish State Administrative Tribunal. Such a consideration, in our opinion, was relevant, germane and valid.” The decision to abolish the MPAT was based on similar considerations as the decision to abolish the OAT. For these reasons, the abolition of the OAT is not arbitrary or unreasonable. It does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution.

84Copy pinpoint84. Our choice of the test articulated in Wednesbury Corporation (supra) must not be understood to mean that no other yardstick may be utilized to test the constitutional legitimacy of executive action, under Article 14. This Court has previously approved of the use of the proportionality test to evaluate the validity of certain kinds of executive action, including in Om Kumar v. Union of India32 and Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. UT, Chandigarh33. The proportionality test may well be applicable to other cases where executive overreach is alleged. b. The principles of natural justice have not been violated

85Copy pinpoint85. The appellants submit that the Union and State Governments have violated the principles of natural justice by failing to provide the F OAT Bar Association and the litigants before the OAT with an opportu- nity to be heard before abolishing the OAT. They argue that this violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

86Copy pinpoint86. The decision to establish, continue or abolish the OAT is in the nature of a policy formulated and implemented by the State Government G (acting with the Union Government under the Administrative Tribunals Act). The public at large does not have a right to be heard before a policy is formulated and implemented. The process of consultation with 32 AIR (2000) SC 3689 33 (2004) 2 SCC 130 H

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A the public, with experts, and with other stakeholders may be desirable and would facilitate a participatory democracy. However, each member of the class that would be impacted by a policy decision cannot be af- forded an opportunity of hearing. This would not only be time consuming and expensive, but deeply impractical.

87Copy pinpoint87. BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India34 con- cerned the validity of the decision of the Union of India to disinvest and transfer 51% shares of Bharat Aluminium Company Limited. The peti- tioner in that case (the union of the company’s employees) inter alia submitted that it had a right to be heard before and during the process of disinvestment. This Court rejected this argument, observing that: C “57. … As a matter of good governance and administration whenever such policy decisions are taken, it is desirable that there should be wide range of consultations including considering any representations which may have been filed, but there is no provision in law which would require a hearing to be granted before taking D a policy decision. In exercise of executive powers, policy decisions have to be taken from time to time. It will be impossible and impracticable to give a formal hearing to those who may be affected whenever a policy decision is taken. One of the objects of giving a hearing in application of the principles of natural justice is to see that an illegal action or decision does not take place. Any wrong order may adversely affect a person and it is essentially for this reason that a reasonable opportunity may have to be granted before passing of an administrative order. In case of the policy decision, however, it is impracticable, and at times against the public interest, to do so, but this does not mean that a policy decision which is contrary to law cannot be challenged. … If the decision is otherwise illegal as being contrary to law or any constitutional provision, the persons affected like the workmen, can impugn the same, but not giving a pre-decisional hearing cannot be a ground for quashing the decision.” G (emphasis supplied) Although the decision in BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) (supra) was rendered in the context of a policy decision with economic implications, it would be applicable in the present case. The principle 34 H (2002) 2 SCC 333

ORISSA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION v. 791 UNION OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

enunciated in that case is equally applicable to other categories of policy decisions. This is because it is impractical to hear every member of the class impacted by a policy decision.

88Copy pinpoint88. The absence of a right to be heard before the formulation or implementation of a policy does not mean that affected parties are precluded from challenging the policy in a court of law. What it means is that a policy decision cannot be struck down on the ground that it was arrived at without offering the members of the public at large (or some section of it) an opportunity to be heard. The challenge to a policy may be sustainable if it is found to vitiate constitutional rights or is otherwise in breach of a mandate of law. C

89Copy pinpoint89. For the reasons discussed above, the decision to abolish the OAT cannot be assailed on the ground that there was a violation of the principles of natural justice. Article 14 of the Constitution has not been violated. vi. The Union Government did not become functus officio after establishing the OAT

90Copy pinpoint90. P Ramanatha Aiyer’s The Law Lexicon (1997 edition) defines the term functus officio as: “A term applied to something which once has had a life and power, but which has become of no virtue whatsoever … One who has fulfilled his office or is out of office; an authority who has performed the act authorised so that the authority is exhausted”

91Copy pinpoint91. Black’s Law Dictionary (5th edition) defines the term as follows: F “Having fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or accomplished the purpose, and therefore of no further force or authority … an instrument, power, agency, etc. which has fulfilled the purpose of its creation, and is therefore of no further virtue or effect.”

92Copy pinpoint92. The doctrine of functus officio gives effect to the principle of G finality. Once a judge or a quasi-judicial authority has rendered a decision, it is not open to her to revisit the decision and amend, correct, clarify, or reverse it (except in the exercise of the power of review, conferred by law). Once a judicial or quasi-judicial decision attains finality, it is subject to change only in proceedings before the appellate court. H

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93Copy pinpoint93. For instance, Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 provides that a court of law is not to alter its judgment once it is signed: “362. Court not to alter judgment.—Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no B Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.” In Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa35, this Court recognized that Section 362 was based on the doctrine of functus officio: C “10. … The section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a D court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The court becomes functus officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or an arithmetical error.”

94Copy pinpoint94. The doctrine of functus officio exists to provide a clear point where the adjudicative process ends and to bring quietus to the dispute. Without it, decision-making bodies such as courts could endlessly revisit their decisions. With a definitive endpoint to a case before a court or quasi-judicial authority, parties are free to seek judicial review or to prefer an appeal. Alternatively, their rights are determined with finality. Similar F considerations do not apply to decisions by the state which are based entirely on policy or expediency.

95Copy pinpoint95. Turning to the present case, the appellants’ argument that the Union Government was rendered functus officio after establishing the OAT does not stand scrutiny. The decision to establish the OAT was G administrative and based on policy considerations. If the doctrine of functus officio were to be applied to the sphere of administrative decision- making by the state, its executive power would be crippled. The state would find itself unable to change or reverse any policy or policy-based 35 (2001) 1 SCC 169 H

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decision and its functioning would grind to a halt. All policies would attain finality and any change would be close to impossible to effectuate.

96Copy pinpoint96. This would impact not only major policy decisions but also minor ones. For example, a minor policy decision such as a bus route would not be amenable to any modification once it was notified. Once determined, the bus route would stay the same regardless of the demand for, say, an additional stop at a popular destination. Major policy decisions such as those concerning subsidies, corporate governance, housing, education and social welfare would be frozen if the doctrine of functus officio were to be applied to administrative decisions. This is not conceivable because it would defeat the purpose of having a government and the foundation of governance. By their very nature, policies are subject to change depending on the circumstances prevailing in society at any given time. The doctrine of functus officio cannot ordinarily be applied in cases where the government is formulating and implementing a policy.

97Copy pinpoint97. In the present case, the State and Union Governments’ authority has not been exhausted after the establishment of an SAT. Similarly, the State and Union Governments cannot be said to have fulfilled the purpose of their creation and to be of no further virtue or effect once they have established an SAT. The state may revisit its policy decisions in accordance with law. For these reasons, the Union Government was not rendered functus officio after establishing the OAT. vii. The notification dated 2 August 2019 is valid despite not being expressed in the name of the President of India

98Copy pinpoint98. The appellants challenge the notification dated 2 August 2019 on the ground that it does not comply with the requirements of clause (1) F of Article 77 because it was not issued in the name of the President of India.

99Copy pinpoint99. Article 77 of the Constitution of India indicates: “Conduct of business of the Government of India.— G (1) All executive action of the Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President. (2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the President shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the President, and the validity of H

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A an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the President. (3) The President shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business” Article 166 corresponds to Article 77. It states: “Conduct of Business of the Government of a State.— (1) All executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. (2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor, and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor. (3) The Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion” Clause (1) of Article 166 corresponds to clause (1) of Article 77. As a consequence, decisions of this Court with respect to clause (1) of Article 166 will be of persuasive value while interpreting clause (1) of Article 77. F

100Copy pinpoint100. In Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v. Yeshaswinee Merchant36, a two-judge Bench of this Court held that the exercise of statutory power is not rendered invalid if it is not expressed to have been taken in the name of the President: G “72. In our opinion, reference to Article 77 is wholly inappropriate. The exercise of statutory power under Section 34 by the Central Government, even though not expressed to have been taken in the name of President, does not render it invalid. Clause (2) of Article 77 insulates an executive action of the Government formally 36 H (2003) 6 SCC 277

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taken in the name of President from challenge on the ground that A it is not an order or instrument made or executed by President. Even if an executive action of the Central Government is not formally expressed to have been taken in the name of President, Article 77 does not provide that it would, therefore, be rendered void or invalid. … In Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay B (1962) 2 SCR 195, a two-judge bench of this Court held: “25. … Shortly stated, the legal position is this: Article 166(1) is only directory. Though an impugned order was not issued in strict compliance with the provisions of Article 166(1), it can be established by evidence aliunde that the order was made by the appropriate authority. If an order is issued in the name of the C Governor and is duly authenticated in the manner prescribed in Rule (2) of the said Article, there is an irrebuttable presumption that the order or instrument is made or executed by the Governor. Any non-compliance with the provisions of the said rule does not invalidate the order, but it precludes the drawing of any such irrebuttable presumption. This does not prevent any party from proving by other evidence that as a matter of fact the order has been made by the appropriate authority. Article 77 which relates to conduct of business of the Government of India is couched in terms similar to those in Article 166 and the same principles must govern the interpretation of that provision.” (emphasis supplied)

101Copy pinpoint101. Similar principles govern the interpretation of Article 166 and Article 77. A notification which is not in compliance with clause (1) F of Article 77 is not invalid, unconstitutional or non-est for that reason alone. Rather, the irrebuttable presumption that the notification was issued by the President of India (acting for the Union Government) is no longer available to the Union Government. The notification continues to be valid and it is open to the Union Government to prove that the order was indeed issued by the appropriate authority. G

102Copy pinpoint102. In the present case, the notification dated 2 August 2019 was not issued in the name of the President. However, this does not render the notification invalid. The effect of not complying with Article 77 is that the Union Government cannot claim the benefit of the H

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A irrebuttable presumption that the notification dated 2 August 2019 was issued by the President. Hence, the appellants’ argument that the notification dated 2 August 2019 is invalid and unconstitutional is specious.

103Copy pinpoint103. Here, it is appropriate to note that the notification dated 4 July 1986 (by which the OAT was established) was also not issued in B the name of the President. However, the appellants seek to preserve the establishment of the OAT by that notification while assailing the notification abolishing the OAT. If the arguments of the appellants were to be accepted, the notification dated 4 July 1986 would be invalid. We are therefore not inclined to entertain the argument that the notification dated 2 August 2019 is invalid and non-est. C

104Copy pinpoint104. We are satisfied that both the notification dated 4 July 1986 and the notification dated 2 August 2019 were, in substance, issued by the President (acting for the Union Government). The notifications were published in the Gazette of India in accordance with law and there is nothing on record to support the suggestion that an authority which is not empowered to issue the notification has issued it. To the contrary, Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act empowers the Union Government to issue a notification establishing the OAT and as discussed previously, the attendant power to rescind a notification so issued is also available to the Union Government. The issuance of both notifications was an exercise of the Union Government’s statutory power under the Administrative Tribunals Act.

105Copy pinpoint105. The appellants place reliance on the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay37 and specifically on the sentence in paragraph 24, which states: F “24. …when the executive decision affects an outsider or is required to be officially notified or to be communicated it should normally be expressed in the form mentioned in Article 166(1) i.e. in the name of the Governor.”

106Copy pinpoint106. The appellants have failed to notice the very next sentence G in paragraph 24, by which this Court accepts the argument that Article 166 is a directory provision: “24. … The learned Attorney General then falls back upon the plea that an omission to make and authenticate an executive

37 H (1952) 1 SCC 372

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decision in the form mentioned in Article 166 does not make the A decision itself illegal, for the provisions of that article, like their counterpart in the Government of India Act, are merely directory and not mandatory … In my opinion, this contention of the learned Attorney General must prevail.

25. It is well settled that generally speaking the provisions of a B statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice of the courts to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done.”

107Copy pinpoint107. Article 77 is a directory provision. Article 77(1) refers to the form in which the decision taken by the executive is to be expressed. This is evident from the phrase “expressed to be taken” in clause (1) of Article 77. It does not have any bearing on the process of decision- making itself. The public or the citizenry would stand to suffer most from the consequences of declaring an order that is not expressed in the name of the President null and void. Hence, the appellants’ reliance on Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar (supra) is misplaced.

108Copy pinpoint108. The appellants also seek to rely on State of Uttaranchal v. Sunil Kumar Vaish38, where a two-judge bench of this Court observed: “23. … unless an order is expressed in the name of the President F or the Governor and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the rules, the same cannot be treated as an order on behalf of the Government.” In this case, no reference is made to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar (supra), which would be G binding on the two-judge bench in Sunil Kumar Vaish (supra). As noted above, Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar (supra) held that the provisions of Article 166 were directory and not mandatory. This would 38 (2011) 8 SCC 670 H

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A apply squarely to the provisions of Article 77 as well. The decision in Sunil Kumar Vaish (supra) is of no assistance to the appellants’ case.

109Copy pinpoint109. Finally, the appellants have relied on Gulf Goans Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India39 to support their case. However, the decision in this case does not support the position urged by the appellants because B it, too, holds that the consequence of non-compliance with Article 77(1) is that it deprives the Union Government of the immunity conferred by Article 77(2). It also notices that executive action exercised pursuant to powers conferred under a statute stands on a different footing from executive action taken independent of a statute: “19. Article 77 of the Constitution provides the form in which the C Executive must make and authenticate its orders and decisions. Clause (1) of Article 77 provides that all executive action of the Government must be expressed to be taken in the name of the President. The celebrated author H.M. Seervai in Constitutional Law of India, 4th Edn., Vol. 2, 1999 describes the consequences of government orders or instructions not being in accordance with clauses (1) or (2) of Article 77 by opining that the same would deprive the orders of the immunity conferred by the aforesaid clauses and they may be open to challenge on the ground that they have not been made by or under the authority of the President in which case the burden would be on the Government to show that they were, in fact, so made. In the present case, the said burden has not been discharged in any manner whatsoever. The decision in Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v. Yeshaswinee Merchant [(2003) 6 SCC 277, p. 311, para 72 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 840] , taking a somewhat different view can, perhaps, be explained by the fact that in the said case the impugned directions contained in the government letter (not expressed in the name of the President) was in exercise of the statutory power under Section 34 of the Air Corporations Act, 1953. In the present case, the impugned guidelines have not been issued under any existing statute.” (emphasis supplied) In the present case, the notification dated 2 August 2019 was issued in exercise of the statutory powers under the Administrative Tribunals Act. 39 H (2014) 10 SCC 673

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110Copy pinpoint110. For the reasons discussed in this segment, the notification dated 2 August 2019 is valid despite not being expressed in the name of the President of India. viii. The abolition of the OAT is not violative of the funda- mental right of access to justice

111Copy pinpoint111. The appellants have urged that the abolition of the OAT has made the court system less accessible to litigants and that it is therefore violative of the fundamental right of access to justice. They have relied on the decision in Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan40, where a Con- stitution Bench of this Court discussed the components of access to justice: C “33. Four main facets that, in our opinion, constitute the essence of access to justice are: (i) the State must provide an effective adjudicatory mechanism; (ii) the mechanism so provided must be reasonably accessible in terms of distance; (iii) the process of adjudication must be speedy; and (iv) the litigant’s access to the adjudicatory process must be affordable.” The appellants contend that the abolition of the OAT breaches the second and fourth facets of the right of access to justice. They argue that the OAT has two regular benches and two circuit benches but the Orissa High Court has one seat in Cuttack, thereby making the adjudicatory mechanism less accessible in terms of distance. They urge that the distance also makes the adjudicatory process less affordable because of the cost of travelling to Cuttack from different parts of the state.

112Copy pinpoint112. The fundamental right of access to justice is no doubt a crucial and indispensable right under the Constitution of India. However, it cannot be interpreted to mean that every village, town, or city must house every forum of adjudication created by statute or the Constitution. It is an undeniable fact that some courts and forums will be located in some towns and cities and not others. Some or the other litigants will be required to travel some distance to access a particular forum or court. 40 (2016) 8 SCC 509 H

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113Copy pinpoint113. To reiterate the ruling in Anita Kushwaha (supra), adjudicatory mechanisms must be reasonably accessible in terms of distance. The High Court of Orissa has creatively utilised technology to bridge the time taken to travel from other parts of Odisha to Cuttack. Indeed, other High Courts must replicate the use of technology to ensure that access to justice is provided to widely dispersed areas. This will ensure that citizens have true access to justice by observing and participating in the proceedings before the High Courts in cases of concern to them. The submission made on behalf of the State of Odisha that compensation schemes may be used to alleviate financial hardships must also be taken into account. Further, legal aid programs sponsored by the state are also useful in addressing any financial hardships, as observed by this Court in Anita Kushwaha (supra): “40. Affordability of access to justice has been, to an extent, taken care of by the State-sponsored legal aid programmes under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. Legal aid programmes have been providing the much needed support to the poorer sections of the society in accessing justice in courts.”

114Copy pinpoint114. Significantly, the Orissa High Court has established benches which will operate virtually in multiple cities and towns across the state. This negates the appellants’ argument that the Orissa High Court is less accessible than the OAT. In fact, the number of virtual benches of the High Court is greater than the number of benches of the OAT. Litigants from across the state can access the High Court with greater ease than they could access the OAT.

115Copy pinpoint115. Litigants may therefore approach the Orissa High Court for the resolution of disputes. The abolition of the OAT does not leave litigants without a remedy or without a forum to adjudicate the dispute in question. It is therefore not violative of the fundamental right of access to justice. ix. The State Government did not take advantage of its own wrong

116Copy pinpoint116. The appellants have argued that the State Government tried to take advantage of its own wrong by failing to fill the vacancies in the OAT and creating the conditions for the abolition of the OAT.

117Copy pinpoint117. In paragraph 85 of this judgment, a portion of the note pre- pared by the General Administration Department, Government of Odisha H

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dated 16 September 2015 is extracted. The note details the State A Government’s reasons for requesting the Union Government to abolish the OAT. The extract in paragraph 85 reflects data on the institution, disposal, and pendency of cases before the OAT for the year 2014. The State Government had not ceased to make appointments to the OAT at the time at which this note was prepared. At that time, the OAT was B functioning as it usually did. The State Government found the OAT’s usual performance (i.e., rate of disposal of cases) to be unsatisfactory. This aspect of the OAT’s functioning played a role in the State Government’s decision to abolish the OAT.

118Copy pinpoint118. As noticed in the impugned judgment: C “48. … after the decision of the Government of Odisha to abolish the OAT became public, it ceased to make appointments to fill up the vacancies in the OAT. This led to the OAT Bar Association, Cuttack filing W.P.(C) No. 15693 of 2017 in this Court seeking a mandamus to the Government of Odisha to fill up the vacancies in the OAT.” D

(emphasis supplied) Therefore, the State Government discontinued appointments to the OAT as a result of its decision to abolish the OAT and not vice versa. The appellants’ averment confuses the sequence of events on E which their argument is based. The State Government based its decision on an evaluation of the OAT’s functioning in the year 2014, which was prior to its decision to abolish the OAT. Hence, there is no “wrong” which the State Government took advantage of. Similarly, we do not agree with the argument of the appellants that the Union of India had systematically made the OAT non-functional. F

119Copy pinpoint119. A related argument put forth by the appellants is that the State Government’s failure to fill the vacancies in the OAT is a breach of Article 256 of the Constitution. Article 256 inter alia stipulates that the executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament. It is not necessary for us G to address ourselves to this argument because the prayers in the Writ Petitions which resulted in the impugned judgment did not seek an adjudication as to the violation of Article 256. The lis before the Orissa High Court was limited to the validity of the decision to abolish the OAT. We therefore confine our judgment on appeal to the same issue. H

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A x. The failure of the Union Government to conduct a judi- cial impact assessment before abolishing the OAT does not vitiate its decision to abolish the OAT

120Copy pinpoint120. The appellants contend that the Union Government ought to have mandatorily complied with the directions of a Constitution Bench B of this Court (of which one of us, Dr, DY Chandrachud, J was a part) in Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd.41 prior to abolishing the OAT. The intervenor in this matter has also advanced the argument that the Union Government ought to have taken the permission of this Court before abolishing the OAT.

121Copy pinpoint121. In Rojer Mathew (supra), this Court directed the Union C Government to conduct a judicial impact assessment of certain tribu- nals. The operative part of this judgment (from the majority opinion of Ranjan Gogoi, CJI) in relation to judicial impact assessments is extracted below: “223.7. There is a need-based requirement to conduct “judicial impact assessment” of all the Tribunals referable to the Finance Act, 2017 so as to analyse the ramifications of the changes in the framework of tribunals as provided under the Finance Act, 2017. Thus, we find it appropriate to issue a writ of mandamus to the Ministry of Law and Justice to carry out such “judicial impact assessment” and submit the result of the findings before the competent legislative authority.”

122Copy pinpoint122. The direction to conduct a judicial impact assessment, therefore, was of a general nature. It was not geared towards proposals to abolish specific tribunals such as the OAT. Rather, a need was felt to analyse the consequences of the restructuring of tribunals by the Finance F Act 2017 and a writ of mandamus was issued in this regard to the Ministry of Law and Justice. The judicial impact assessment was also directed to be conducted in order to better understand the case load, efficacy, financial impact, and accessibility of tribunals at large, in addition to the filling of vacancies.42 We note that neither the majority opinion authored G by Ranjan Gogoi, CJI nor the opinions of Dr. DY Chandrachud, J. or Deepak Gupta, J. contain a direction to the effect that a tribunal shall not be abolished in the absence of a judicial impact assessment. In the present case, the Union Government issued the notification dated 2 August 2019 41 (2020) 6 SCC 1 42 H See paragraphs 185, 222, 223.7, 234, 387 – 390.

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in a valid exercise of its powers under Section 21 of the General Clauses A Act. The failure to conduct a judicial impact assessment does not vitiate its decision to abolish the OAT. Nothing in the judgment in Rojer Mathew (supra) also indicates the need for the Union Government to obtain the permission of this Court before abolishing the OAT.

123Copy pinpoint123. However, this is not to say that the Union Government and more specifically, the Ministry of Law and Justice may dispense with the directions of this Court in Rojer Mathew (supra). The judgment was delivered on 13 November 2019. More than three years have since passed and the Ministry of Law and Justice is yet to conduct a judicial impact assessment.

124Copy pinpoint124. An assessment such as the one directed to be conducted would only shed light on the impediments faced in the delivery of justice. The lack of an assessment precludes any well-informed, intelligent action concerning tribunals in the country (as a whole). This, in turn, has cascading effects for the citizenry, which is deprived of a well-oiled machinery by which it can access justice. We therefore reiterate the directions of this Court in Rojer Mathew (supra) and direct the Ministry of Law and Justice to conduct a judicial impact assessment at the earliest. xi. Miscellaneous contentions

125Copy pinpoint125. A miscellaneous contention remains to be considered.

126Copy pinpoint126. The appellants have submitted that the so-called real reason for the abolition of the OAT is that many top-ranking officials faced charges of contempt before the OAT, for the reason that they had failed to implement its orders. It is averred that these officials influenced the State Government to abolish the OAT. The appellants argue that the State and Union Governments did not deny this allegation in their counter affidavits before the Orissa High Court and that this allegation is true because of ‘non-traverse.’

127Copy pinpoint127. There is nothing on record which indicates the truth of the appellants’ allegations or even points to a possibility of the truth of such an allegation. It is entirely unsubstantiated and appears to be a last-ditch attempt to sustain their challenge to the abolition of the OAT. In any event, the averment belies logic. All cases pending before the OAT would be transferred to the Orissa High Court, without exception. This in- cludes contempt petitions. Hence, it would not be possible for officials or others to avoid contempt proceedings as a result of the abolition of the OAT. H

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A E. Findings and conclusion

128Copy pinpoint128. In view of the discussion above, we hold that the abolition of the OAT was constitutionally valid for the following reasons: a. The Writ Petitions instituted before the Orissa High Court were maintainable because the appellants claimed that their constitutional rights had been violated. They were therefore entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution; b. Article 323-A does not preclude the Union Government from abolishing SATs because it is an enabling provision which confers the Union Government with the power to establish an administrative tribunal at its discretion (upon receiving a request from the relevant State Government in terms of the Administrative Tribunals Act). The legal and factual context of the power to establish administrative tribunals, the pur- pose of this power and the intention of the legislature estab- D lish that there is no duty to exercise the power conferred by the Administrative Tribunals Act, such that the enabling pro- vision becomes a mandatory provision; c. The Union Government acted in valid exercise of its powers when it invoked Section 21 of the General Clauses Act read with Section 4(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act to re- scind the notification establishing the OAT because the de- cision to establish the OAT was an administrative decision and not a quasi-judicial decision. Moreover, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is not repugnant to the subject-matter, context and effect of the Administrative Tribunals Act and is in harmony with its scheme and object; d. The notification dated 2 August 2019 by which the OAT was abolished is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The State Government did not consider any irrelevant or extraneous factors while arriving at the decision to request the Union Government to abolish the OAT. The decision to abolish the OAT is itself not absurd or so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken it; e. The principles of natural justice were not violated because the class of people who were affected by the decision to abolish the OAT did not have a right to be heard. The public

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at large (or some sections of it) did not have a right to be heard before the policy decision was taken; f. The Union Government did not become functus officio after establishing the OAT because the doctrine cannot ordinarily be applied in cases where the government is formulating and implementing a policy; B g. The notification dated 2 August 2019 is valid though it is not expressed in the name of the President of India because non-compliance with Article 77 of the Constitution does not invalidate a notification or render it unconstitutional; h. The abolition of the OAT is not violative of the fundamental C right of access to justice because the Orissa High Court will hear cases which were pending before the OAT prior to its abolition; i. The State Government did not take advantage of its own wrong because it stopped filling the vacancies of the OAT only after deciding to abolish it. It did not rely on the vacan- D cies (and the consequent increase in pendency) created by its inaction to abolish the OAT; and j. The failure of the Union Government to conduct a judicial impact assessment before abolishing the OAT does not viti- ate its decision to abolish the OAT because the directions in E Rojer Mathew (supra) were of a general nature and did not prohibit the abolition of specific tribunals such as the OAT in the absence of a judicial impact assessment. How- ever, the Ministry of Law and Justice is directed to conduct a judicial impact assessment as directed by this Court in Rojer F Mathew (supra).

129Copy pinpoint129. The challenge to the constitutional validity of the impugned notification dated 2 August 2019 by which the OAT was abolished is rejected. The judgment of the High Court shall stand affirmed in terms of the conclusions recorded above. The appeals are dismissed. G

130Copy pinpoint130. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

Nidhi Jain Appeals dismissed. (Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)