INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL & ORS. ETC.

A various provisions in various other Acts, there is the general principle that a party prevented from doing an act by some circumstances beyond his control, can do so at the first subsequent opportunity (see Sambasiva Chari v. Ramasami Reddi, (1898) 8 MLJ 265). The underlying object of the principle is to enable a person to do what he could have done B on holiday, on the next working day. Where, therefore, a period is prescribed for the performance of an act in a court or office, and that period expires on holiday, then the act should be considered to have been done within that period if it is done on the next day on which the court or office is open. C The reason is that the law does not compel the performance of an impossibility. (See Hossein Ally v. Donzelle, ILR (1880) 5 Cal 906.) Every consideration of justice and expediency would require that the accepted principle, which underlies Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, should be applied in cases where it does not otherwise in terms apply. The principles underlying are lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel a man to do the impossible) and actus curiae neminem gravabit (the act of court shall prejudice no man). Above being the position, there is nothing infirm in the orders passed by the forums below. However, the rate of interest fixed appears to be slightly on the higher side and is reduced to 9% to be paid with effect from 3-12-2001, i.e., the date on which the letter was received by HUDA.”

316Copy pinpoint316. In re Presidential Poll 207 , this Court made similar observations. When there is a disability to perform a part of the law, such a charge has to be excused. When performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute is rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons concerned have no control, it has to be taken as a valid excuse. The Court observed: “15. The impossibility of the completion of the election to fill the vacancy in the office of the President before the expiration of the term of office in the case of death of a candidate as may appear from Section 7 of the 1952 Act does not rob Article 62(1) of its mandatory character. The maxim of law impotentia excusat legam is intimately connected with another maxim of 207 H (1974) 2 SCC 33

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law lex non cogit ad impossibilia. Impotentia excusat legam is that when there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law that impotentia excuses. The law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform. “Where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him and has no remedy over it, there the law will in general excuse him.” Therefore, when it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like the act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse. Where the act of God prevents the compliance of the words of a statute, the statutory provision is not denuded of its mandatory character because of supervening impossibility caused by the act of God. (See Broom’s Legal Maxims 10th Edn. At pp. 162-163 and Craies on Statute Law 6th Edn. at p. 268).” D

317Copy pinpoint317. In Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement208, the legal maxim “impotentia excusat legem” has been applied to hold that law does not compel a man to do that which cannot possibly be performed. Though the maxim with respect to the impossibility of performance may not be strictly applicable, however, the effect of the court’s order, for the time being, made the Authorities disable to fulfill the obligation. Thus, when they were incapable of performing, they have to be permitted to perform at the first available opportunity, which is the time prescribed by the statute for them, i.e., the total period of 5 years excluding the period of the interim order.

318Copy pinpoint318. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit is founded upon the principle due to court proceedings or acts of court, no party should suffer. If any interim orders are made during the pendency of the litigation, they are subject to the final decision in the matter. In case the matter is dismissed as without merit, the interim order is automatically dissolved. In case the matter has been filed without any merit, the maxim is attracted commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet, that is, convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong. No person ought to have the advantage of his own wrong. In case litigation has been filed frivolously or without any basis, iniquitously in order to delay and by that it is delayed, 208 (2005) 4 SCC 530 H

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A there is no equity in favour of such a person. Such cases are required to be decided on merits. In Mrutunjay Pani and Anr. v. Narmada Bala Sasmal and Anr209, this Court observed that: “(5) X x x The same principle is comprised in the latin maxim commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet, that is, convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong. To put it in other words, no one can be allowed to benefit from his own wrongful act. …”

319Copy pinpoint319. It is not the policy of law that untenable claims should get fructified due to delay. Similarly, sufferance of a person who abides by law is not permissible. The Act of 2013 does not confer the benefit on unscrupulous litigants, but it aims at and frowns upon the lethargy of the officials to complete the requisites within five years.

320Copy pinpoint320. The States urge that by refusal to accept compensation, one cannot take advantage of own conduct. This idea is explained in Maxwell D on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) by P. St. J. Langon, wherein following observations have been made: “On the principles of avoiding injustice and absurdity, any construction will, if possible, be rejected (unless the policy of the Act requires it) if it would enable a person by his own act E to impair an obligation which he has undertaken, or otherwise to profit by his own wrong. He may not take advantage of his own wrong. He may not plead in his own interest a self created necessity” (Kish v. Taylor, (1911) 1 K.B. 625, per Fletcher Moulton I.J. at page 634).

F Thus an Act which authorised justices to discharge apprentice from his indenture in certain circumstances “on the master’s appearance” before them justified a discharge in his wilful absence. It would have been unreasonable to have construed the Act in such a way that the master derived an advantage from his own obstinacy (Ditton’s Case (1701) 2 Salk. 490)” G

321Copy pinpoint321. In G.T.C. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India 210, it was observed that while vacating stay, it is the court’s duty to account for the period of delay and to settle equities. It is not the gain which can be 209 AIR 1961 SC 1353 210 (1998) 3 SCC 376 H

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conferred. In Jaipur Municipal Corporation v. C. L. Mishra211, it has been observed that interim order merges in the final order, and it cannot have an independent existence, cannot survive beyond final decision. In Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P212, reliance was placed on Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. C.I.T213. It was held that no one could be permitted to suffer from the act of the court and in case an interim order has been passed and ultimately petition is found to be without merit and is dismissed, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralized.

322Copy pinpoint322. In Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation214, it has been observed that the Court can under its inherent jurisdiction ex debito justitiae has a duty to mitigate the damage suffered by the defendants by the act of the court. Such action is necessary to put a check on abuse of process of the court. In Amarjeet Singh and Ors. v. Devi Ratan and Ors215, and Ram Krishna Verma (supra), it was observed that no person can suffer from the act of court and unfair advantage of the interim order must be neutralized. In Amarjeet Singh (supra), this Court observed: “17. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of the case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case, and if the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of its own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter blame the court. The fact that the writ is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that the act of the court shall prejudice no one, becomes applicable in such a case. In such a fact situation, the court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralized, as the institution 211 (2005) 8 SCC 423 212 (1992) 2 SCC 620 213 (1980) 2 SCC 191 214 (1995) 3 SCC 33 215 (2010) 1 SCC 417 H

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B 18. In Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P. (1992) 2 SCC 620, this Court examined a similar issue while placing reliance upon its earlier judgment in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. ITO, (1980) 2 SCC 191 and held that no person can suffer from the act of the court and in case an interim order has been passed, and the petitioner takes advantage thereof, and ultimately the C petition is found to be without any merit and is dismissed, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralized.”

323Copy pinpoint323. In Karnataka Rare Earth and Anr. v. Senior Geologist, D Department of Mines & Geology216, this Court observed that maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit requires that the party should be placed in the same position but for the court’s order which is ultimately found to be not sustainable which has resulted in one party gaining advantage which otherwise would not have earned and the other party has suffered but for the orders of the court. The successful party can demand the delivery of benefit earned by the other party, or make restitution for what it has lost. This Court observed: “10. In x x x x the doctrine of actus curiae neminem gravabit and held that the doctrine was not confined in its application only to such acts of the court which were erroneous; the doctrine is applicable to all such acts as to which it can be held that the court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. It is the principle of restitution that is attracted. When on account of an act of the party, persuading the court to pass an order, which at the end is held as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining advantage which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered, but for the order of the court and the act of such party, then the successful party finally held 216 H (2004) 2 SCC 783

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entitled to a relief, assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated in the same manner in which the parties would have been if the interim order of the court would not have been passed. The successful party can demand: (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim order of the court, or (b) to make restitution for what it has lost.

11. In the facts of this case, in spite of the judgment of the High Court, if the appellants would not have persuaded this Court to pass the interim orders, they would not have been entitled to operate the mining leases and to raise and remove and dispose of the minerals extracted. But for the interim orders passed by this Court, there is no difference between the appellants and any person raising, without any lawful authority, any mineral from any land, attracting applicability of sub-section (5) of Section 21. As the appellants have lost from the Court, they cannot be allowed to retain the benefit earned by them under the interim orders of the Court. The High Court has rightly held the appellants liable to be placed in the same position in which they would have been if this Court would not have protected them by issuing interim orders. All that the State Government is demanding from the appellants is the price of the minor minerals. Rent, royalty or tax has already been recovered by the State Government and, therefore, there is no demand under that head. No penal proceedings, much less any criminal proceedings, have been initiated against the appellants. It is absolutely incorrect to contend that the appellants are being asked to pay any penalty or are being subjected to any penal action. It is not the case of the appellants that they are being asked to pay the price more than what they have realized from the exports or that the price appointed by the respondent State is in any manner arbitrary or unreasonable.” G (emphasis supplied)

324Copy pinpoint324. In A.R. Antulay (supra), this Court observed that it is a settled principle that an act of the court shall prejudice no man. This maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit is founded upon justice and good sense and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law. H

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325Copy pinpoint325. In Superintendent of Taxes v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust217, this Court considered the conduct of the State Government in not H 217 (1976) 1 SCC 766

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questioning the interim order at any stage in seeking variation or modification of the order of injunction. It was held that the State could not take advantage of its own wrong and lack of diligence and could not contend it was impossible to issue notice within the purview of Section 7(2) of the new Act. The decision is distinguishable and turns on its own facts. Though the act is possible to be performed but not as per the public policy which frowns upon violation of the court’s interim order. The decision cannot be applied, particularly in view of the provisions contained in Section 24(2), and on facts, it has no application.

326Copy pinpoint326. Reliance was placed on Neeraj Kumar Sainy v. the State of U.P.218. There, this Court observed that no one should suffer any prejudice because of the act of the court; the legal maxim cannot operate in a vacuum. It has to get the sustenance from the facts. As the appellants resigned to their fate and woke up to have control over the events forgetting that the law does not assist the non-vigilant. One cannot indulge in the luxury of lethargy, possibly nurturing the feeling that forgetting is a virtue. If such is the conduct, it is not permissible to take shelter under the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit. There is no dispute with the aforesaid principle. Party has to be vigilant about the right, but the ratio cannot be applied. In the opinion, the ratio in the decision cannot be applied for the purpose of interpretation of Section 24(2).

327Copy pinpoint327. There can be no doubt that when parties are before court, the final decision has to prevail, and they succeed or fail based on the merits of their relative cases. Neither can be permitted to take shelter under the cover of court’s order to put the other party in a disadvantageous position. If one has enjoyed under the court’s cover, that period cannot be included towards inaction of the authorities to take requisite steps under Section 24. The State authorities would have acted but for the court’s order. In fact, the occasion for the petitioners to approach the court in those cases, was that the State or acquiring bodies were taking their properties. Ultimately case had to stand on its merit in the challenge to the acquisition or compensation, and no right or advantage could therefore be conferred (or accrue) under Section 24(2) G in such situations.

328Copy pinpoint328. The argument of the landowners was that on the one hand, the court should not discern a casus omissus and in effect, the absence of provision to exclude the time during which an interim order operated, 218 (2017) 14 SCC 136 H

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A means that Parliament intended such omission. The maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterious’ means that express mention of one or more persons or things of a particular class may be regarded as by implication excluding all others of that class. The maxim, however, does not apply when the provisions of the legislation in question show that the exclusion could not have been intended. In Colquhoun v. Brooks219, B the House of Lords opined that: “The maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterious’ has been pressed upon us. I agree with what is said in the court below by Wills, J. about this maxim. It is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master to follow in the construction of statutes C or documents. The ‘exclusio’ is often the result of inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied when its application, having regard to the subject matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice.” Lewis Sutherland’s Statutory Construction (2nd ed.), Section 491, D applies the rule as follows: “Expressio unius est exclusio alterious - The maxim, like all rules of construction, is applicable under certain conditions to determine the intent of the lawmaker when it is not otherwise manifest. Under these conditions, it leads to safe and satisfactory conclusions; but otherwise the expression of one or more things is not a negation or exclusion of other things. What is expressed is exclusive only when it is creative, or in derogation of some existing law, or of some provisions in the particular act. The maxim is applicable to a statutory provision which grants originally a power or right.”

329Copy pinpoint329. In a case before the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals decided on 5th November, 1934, Yardley & Co. Ltd. V. United States, the court considered the question of classification and assessment with duty of certain merchandise consisting of empty glass jars and lids, and whether these could be considered as ‘entireties’ that would be dutiable under paragraph 33 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The court in that case relied on the observations in Colquhoun v. Brooks (supra) and held that the glass jars with their lids would be dutiable as entireties, despite there not being an express legislative provision to that 219 H (1889) 21 QBD 52

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effect. It was held that the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterious would not be applicable in the context of the legislative provision in the Tariff Acts of 1909, 1913 and 1922, as the relevant provision therein (in the 1930 Act) was merely declaratory in nature and not in derogation of existing law. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. National Tobacco Company of India Ltd.220, this Court held that the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterious: “is subservient to the basic principle that courts must endeavour to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose, and then adopt a rule of construction which effectuates rather than one that may defeat these.” C

330Copy pinpoint330. In Karnataka State v. Union of India221, the Court observed that: “Before the principle can be applied at all the Court must find an express mode of doing something that is provided in a statute, which, by its necessary implication, could exclude the doing of that very thing and not something else in some other way. Far from this being the case here, as the discussion above has shown, the Constitution makers intended to cover the making of provisions by Parliament for inquiries for various objects which may be matters of public importance without any indications of any other limits except that they must relate to subjects found in the Lists. I have also indicated why a provision like Section 3 of the Act would, in any case, fall under entry 97 of List I of Schedule VII read with Articles 248 and 356 of the Constitution even if all subjects to which it may relate are not found specified in the lists. Thus, there is express provision in our Constitution to cover an enactment such as Section 3 of the Act, hence, there is no room whatsoever for applying the “Expressio Unius” rule to exclude what falls within an expressly provided legislative entry. That maxim has been aptly described as a “useful servant but a dangerous master “ (per Lopes L.J. in Colquhoun v. Brooks G [1888] 21 Q.B.D. The limitations or conditions under which this principle of construction operates are frequently overlooked by those who attempt to apply it. 220 (1972) 2 SCC 560 221 (1977) 4 SCC 608 H

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A To advance the balder and broader proposition that what is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution must be deemed to be deliberately excluded from its purview, so that nothing short of a Constitutional amendment could authorise legislation upon it, is really to invent a “Cams Omissus” so as to apply the rule that, where there is such a gap in the law, the Court cannot fill it. The rule, however, is equally clear that the Court cannot so interpret a statute as “to produce a casus omissus” where there is really none (see: The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Penderson Brothers [1888] 13 A.C. 595). If our Constitution itself provides for legislation to fill what is sought to be construed as a lacuna, how can legislation seeking to do this be held to be void because it performs its intended function by an exercise of an expressly conferred legislative power? In declaring the purpose of the provisions so made and the authority for making it, Courts do not supply an omission or fill up a gap at all. It is Parliament D which can do so and has done it. To hold that parliament is incompetent to do this is to substitute an indefensible theory or a figment of one’s imagination- that the Constitution stands in the way somehow-for that which only a clear Constitutional bar could achieve.” E In Mary Angel (supra) this Court observed as follows: “…The rule of interpretation on the basis of the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius”, … has been considered in the decision rendered by the Queen’s Bench in the case of Dean v. Wiesengrund (1955) 2 QBD 120. The Court F considered the said maxim and held that after all it is more than an aid to construction and has little, if any, weight where it is possible to account for the “exclusio unius” on grounds other than intention to effect the “exclusio alterius”. Thereafter, the Court referred to the following passage from G the case of Colquhoon v. Brooks (1887) 19 QBD 400 wherein the Court called for its approval – “The maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ has been pressed upon us. I agree with what is said in the Court below by Wills J, about this maxim. It is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master to follow in the construction of statutes of documents. The H

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exclusio is often the result of inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied, when its application having regard to the subject matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice. In my opinion, the application of the maxim here would lead to inconsistency and injustice, and would make Section 14(1) of the Act of 1920 uncertain and capricious in its operation.” The aforesaid maxim was referred to by this Court in the case of Asst. Collector, Central Excise v. National Tobacco Co. 1978 (2) ELT 416 (SC), the Court in that case considered the question whether there was or was not an implied power to hold an inquiry in the circumstances of the case in view of the provisions of the Section 4 of the Central Excise Act read with Rule 10(A) of the Central Excise Rules and referred to the aforesaid passage “the maxim” is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master ...’ and held that the rule is subservient to the basic principle that Courts must endeavour to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose, and then adopt a rule of construction which effectuates rather than one that may defeat these. Moreover, the rule of prohibition by necessary implication could be applied only where a specified procedure is laid down for the performance of a duty. In the case of Parbhani Transport Co-op Society Ltd. v. R.T.A. Aurangabad E [1960] 3 SCR 177, this Court observed that the maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ is a maxim for ascertaining the intention of the legislature and where the statutory language is plain and the meaning clear, there is no scope for applying. Further, in Harish Chander Vajpai v. F Triloki Singh, [1957] 1 SCR 370, the Court referred to the following passage from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, pages 316-317: “Provisions sometimes found in statutes, enacting imperfectly or for particular cases only that which was G already and more widely the law, have occasionally furnished ground for the contention that an intention to alter the general law was to be inferred from the partial or limited enactment, resting on the maxim expressio unius, exclusio alterius. But that maxim is inapplicable in such H

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A cases. The only inference which a court can draw from such superfluous provisions (which generally find a place in Acts to meet unfounded objections and idle doubts), is that the Legislature was either ignorant or unmindful of the real state of the law, or that it acted under the influence of excessive caution. B Lastly, we would state that in the case of Pampathy v. State of Mysore (supra), the Court has specifically observed that no legislative enactment dealing with the procedure can provide for all cases and that Court should have inherent powers apart from the express provisions of law which are necessary for the proper discharge of duties.”

331Copy pinpoint331. For all these reasons, it is held that the omission to expressly enact a provision, that excludes the period during which any interim order was operative, preventing the State from taking possession of acquired land, or from giving effect to the award, in a particular case or cases, cannot result in the inclusion of such period or periods for the purpose of reckoning the period of 5 years. Also, merely because timelines are indicated, with the consequence of lapsing, under Sections 19 and 69 of the Act of 2013, per se does not mean that omission to factor such time (of subsistence of interim orders) has any special legislative intent. This Court notices, in this context, that even under the new Act (nor was it so under the 1894 Act) no provision has been enacted, for lapse of the entire acquisition, for non-payment of compensation within a specified time; nor has any such provision been made regarding possession. Furthermore, non-compliance with payment and deposit provisions (under Section 77) only results in higher interest pay-outs under Section 80. F The omission to provide for exclusion of time during which interim orders subsisted, while determining whether or not acquisitions lapsed, in the present case, is a clear result of inadvertence or accident, having regard to the subject matter, refusal to apply the principle underlying the maxim actus curae neminem gravabit would result in injustice. In Re: Principle of Restitution: G

332Copy pinpoint332. The principle of restitution is founded on the ideal of doing complete justice at the end of litigation, and parties have to be placed in the same position but for the litigation and interim order, if any, passed in the matter. In South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P. & Ors.222, 222 H (2003) 8 SCC 648

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it was held that no party could take advantage of litigation. It has to disgorge the advantage gained due to delay in case lis is lost. The interim order passed by the court merges into a final decision. The validity of an interim order, passed in favour of a party, stands reversed in the event of a final order going against the party successful at the interim stage. Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not the fountain source of restitution. It is rather a statutory recognition of the rule of justice, equity and fair play. The court has inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as to do complete justice. This is also on the principle that a wrong order should not be perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting it. In exercise of such power, the courts have applied the principle of restitution to myriad situations not falling within the terms of section 144 CPC. What C attracts applicability of restitution is not the act of the court being wrongful or mistake or an error committed by the court; the test is whether, on account of an act of the party persuading the court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, resulting in one party gaining an advantage which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party having suffered an impoverishment, restitution has to be made. Litigation cannot D be permitted to be a productive industry. Litigation cannot be reduced to gaming where there is an element of chance in every case. If the concept of restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim order. This Court observed in South Eastern Coal Field (supra) thus: E

“26. In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of this submission. The word “restitution” in its etymological sense means restoring to a party on the modification, variation or reversal of a decree or order, what has been lost to him in execution of decree or order of the court or in direct consequence of a decree or order (see Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, U.P., 1984 Supp SCC 505) In law, the term “restitution” is used in three senses: (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; and (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another. (See Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edn., p. 1315). The Law of Contracts by John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo has been quoted by Black to say that “restitution” is an ambiguous term, sometimes referring to the disgorging H

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A of something which has been taken and at times referring to compensation for the injury done: “Often, the result under either meaning of the term would be the same. … Unjust impoverishment, as well as unjust enrichment, is a ground for restitution. If the defendant is B guilty of a non-tortious misrepresentation, the measure of recovery is not rigid but, as in other cases of restitution, such factors as relative fault, the agreed-upon risks, and the fairness of alternative risk allocations not agreed upon and not attributable to the fault of either party need to be weighed.” C The principle of restitution has been statutorily recognized in Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 144 CPC speaks not only of a decree being varied, reversed, set aside or modified but also includes an order on a par with a decree. The scope of the provision is wide enough so as to include therein almost all the kinds of variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of a decree or order. The interim order passed by the court merges into a final decision. The validity of an interim order, passed in favor of a party, stands reversed in the event of a final decision going against the party successful at the interim stage. xxx

27. x x x This is also on the principle that a wrong order should not be perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting it (A. Arunagiri Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami, (1971) 1 MLJ 220). In the exercise of such inherent power, the courts have applied the principles of restitution to myriad situations not strictly falling within the terms of Section 144.

28. That no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a G rule confined to an erroneous act of the court; the “act of the court” embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the court may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. x x x the concept of restitution H

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is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim order even though the battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be countenanced. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated by award of interest at a suitable reasonable rate for the period for which the interim order of the court withholding the release of money had remained in operation.” (emphasis supplied) C

333Copy pinpoint333. In State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Essar Oil Ltd. & Anr223, it was observed that the principle of restitution is a remedy against unjust enrichment or unjust benefit. The Court observed: “61. The concept of restitution is virtually a common law principle, and it is a remedy against unjust enrichment or unjust benefit. The core of the concept lies in the conscience of the court, which prevents a party from retaining money or some benefit derived from another, which it has received by way of an erroneous decree of the court. Such remedy in English Law is generally different from a remedy in contract or in tort and falls within the third category of common law remedy, which is called quasi-contract or restitution.

62. If we analyze the concept of restitution, one thing emerges clearly that the obligation to restitute lies on the person or the authority that has received unjust enrichment or unjust benefit (see Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 9, p. F 434).”

334Copy pinpoint334. In A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam224, it was stated that restitutionary jurisdiction is inherent in every court, to neutralize the advantage of litigation. A person on the right side of the law should not G be deprived, on account of the effects of litigation; the wrongful gain of frivolous litigation has to be eliminated if the faith of people in the judiciary has to be sustained. The Court observed: 223 (2012) 3 SCC 522 224 (2012) 6 SCC 430 H

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A “37. This Court, in another important case in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (of which one of us, Dr. Bhandari, J. was the author of the judgment) had an occasion to deal with the concept of restitution. The relevant paragraphs of that judgment dealing with relevant judgments are reproduced hereunder: (SCC pp. 238-41 & 243-46, paras B 170-76, 183-88 & 190-93) “170. x x x

171. In Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P. this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 630, para 16) C ‘16. The 50 operators, including the appellants/private operators, have been running their stage carriages by blatant abuse of the process of the court by delaying the hearing as directed in Jeewan Nath Wahal’s case and the High Court earlier thereto. As a fact, on the expiry of the initial period of D the grant after 29-9-1959, they lost the right to obtain renewal or to ply their vehicles, as this Court declared the scheme to be operative. However, by sheer abuse of the process of law, they are continuing to ply their vehicles pending the hearing of the objections. This Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. ITO held that the High Court, while exercising its power under E Article 226, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralized. It was further held that the institution of the litigation by it should not be permitted to confer an unfair advantage on the party responsible for it. In the light of that law and in view of the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution this Court, while exercising its jurisdiction would do complete justice and neutralize the unfair advantage gained by the 50 operators including the appellants in dragging the litigation to run the stage carriages on the approved route or area or portion thereof and forfeited their right to hearing of the objections filed by them to the draft scheme dated 26-2-1959.’

172. This Court in Kavita Trehan v. Balsara Hygiene Products Ltd. observed as under: (SCC p. 391, para 22)

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‘22. The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in A every court and will be exercised whenever the justice of the case demands. It will be exercised under inherent powers, where the case did not strictly fall within the ambit of Section

144. Section 144 opens with the words: “144. Application for restitution.—(1) Where and insofar as B a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose ….” The instant case may not strictly fall within the terms of Section 144, but the aggrieved party in such a case can C appeal to the larger and general powers of restitution inherent in every court.’

173. This Court in Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. observed as under: (SCC pp. 326-27, para 4) D ‘4. From the narration of the facts, though it appears to us, prima facie, that a decree in favor of the appellant is not being executed for some reason or the other, we do not think it proper at this stage to direct the respondent to deliver the possession to the appellant since the suit filed by the respondent is still pending. It is true that proceedings are dragged on for a long time on one count or the other and, on occasion, become highly technical accompanied by unending prolixity at every stage, providing a legal trap to the unwary. Because of the delay, unscrupulous parties to the proceedings take undue advantage, and the person who is in wrongful possession draws delight in delay in disposal of the cases by taking undue advantage of procedural complications. It is also a known fact that after obtaining a decree for possession of the immovable property, its execution takes a long time. In such a situation, for protecting the interest of the judgment- G creditor, it is necessary to pass appropriate orders so that reasonable mesne profit which may be equivalent to the market rent is paid by a person who is holding over the property. Inappropriate cases, the court may appoint a Receiver and direct the person who is holding over the property to act as H

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A an agent of the [Receiver with a direction to deposit the royalty amount fixed by the] Receiver or pass such other order which may meet the interest of justice. This may prevent further injury to the plaintiff in whose favor the decree is passed and to protect the property, including further alienation.’

B 174. In Padmawati v. Harijan Sewak Sangh decided by the Delhi High Court on 6-11-2008, the Court held as under: (DLT p. 413, para 6) ‘6. The case at hand shows that frivolous defenses and frivolous litigation is a calculated venture involving no risks situation. You have only to engage professionals to prolong the litigation so as to deprive the rights of a person and enjoy the fruits of illegalities. I consider that in such cases where the court finds that using the courts as a tool, a litigant has perpetuated illegalities or has perpetuated an illegal possession, the court must impose costs on such litigants which should be equal to the benefits derived by the litigant and harm and deprivation suffered by the rightful person so as to check the frivolous litigation and prevent the people from reaping a rich harvest of illegal acts through the courts. One of the aims of every judicial system has to be to discourage unjust enrichment using courts as a tool. The costs imposed by the courts must in all cases should be the real costs equal to deprivation suffered by the rightful person.’ We approve the findings of the High Court of Delhi in the case mentioned above.

F 175. The High Court also stated: (Padmawati case, DLT pp. 414-15, para 9) ‘9. Before parting with this case, we consider it necessary to observe that one of the [main] reasons for overflowing of court dockets is the frivolous litigation in which the courts G are engaged by the litigants and which is dragged on for as long as possible. Even if these litigants ultimately lose the lis, they become the real victors and have the last laugh. This class of people who perpetuate illegal acts by obtaining stays and injunctions from the courts must be made to pay the sufferer not only the entire illegal gains made by them as costs H

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to the person deprived of his right but also must be burdened with exemplary costs. The faith of people in judiciary can only be sustained if the persons on the right side of the law do not feel that even if they keep fighting for justice in the court and ultimately win, they would turn out to be a fool since winning a case after 20 or 30 years would make the wrongdoer as real gainer, who had reaped the benefits for all those years. Thus, it becomes the duty of the courts to see that such wrongdoers are discouraged at every step, and even if they succeed in prolonging the litigation due to their money power, ultimately, they must suffer the costs of all these years’ long litigation. Despite the settled legal positions, the obvious wrongdoers, use one after another tier of judicial review mechanism as a gamble, knowing fully well that dice is always loaded in their favour since even if they lose, the time gained is the real gain. This situation must be redeemed by the courts.’ D

176. Against this judgment of the Delhi High Court, Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 29197 of 2008 was preferred to this Court. The Court passed the following order: (SCC p. 460, para 1) ‘1. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for E the parties. We find no ground to interfere with the well- considered judgment passed by the High Court. The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed.’ * * *

183. In Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans F (P) Ltd. this Court in para 4 of the judgment observed as under: (SCC pp. 326-27) ‘4. … It is true that proceedings are dragged on for a long time on one count or the other and, on occasion, become highly technical accompanied by unending prolixity at every G stage, providing a legal trap to the unwary. Because of the delay, unscrupulous parties to the proceedings take undue advantage, and a person who is in wrongful possession draws delight in delay in disposal of the cases by taking undue advantage of procedural complications. It is also a known H

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A fact that after obtaining a decree for possession of immovable property, its execution takes a long time. In such a situation, for protecting the interest of the judgment-creditor, it is necessary to pass appropriate orders so that reasonable mesne profit which may be equivalent to the market rent is paid by a person who is holding over the property. In B appropriate cases, the court may appoint a Receiver and direct the person who is holding over the property to act as an agent of the Receiver with a direction to deposit the royalty amount fixed by the Receiver or pass such other order which may meet the interest of justice. This may prevent further injury to C the plaintiff in whose favour the decree is passed and to protect the property, including further alienation.’

184. In Ouseph Mathai v. M. Abdul Khadir, this Court reiterated the legal position that: (SCC p. 328, para 13) ‘13. … [the] stay granted by the court does not confer D a right upon a party and it is granted always subject to the final result of the matter in the court and at the risks and costs of the party obtaining the stay. After the dismissal of the lis, the party concerned is relegated to the position which existed prior to the filing of the petition in the court which had granted the stay. Grant of stay does not automatically amount to extension of a statutory protection.” There are other decisions as well, which iterate and apply the same principle.225

335Copy pinpoint335. A wrong-doer or in the present context, a litigant who takes his chances, cannot be permitted to gain by delaying tactics. It is the duty of the judicial system to discourage undue enrichment or drawing of undue advantage, by using the court as a tool. In Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania226, it was observed that courts should be careful in neutralizing the effect of consequential orders passed pursuant to interim orders. Such directions are necessary to check the rising trend among the litigants to secure reliefs as an interim measure 225 Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 161, Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. CIT, (1980) 2 SCC 191, Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P., (1992) 2 SCC 620. Also Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. and Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 325. 226 (2010) 9 SCC 437 H

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and avoid adjudication of the case on merits. Thus, the restitutionary principle recognizes and gives shape to the idea that advantages secured by a litigant, on account of orders of court, at his behest, should not be perpetuated; this would encourage the prolific or serial litigant, to approach courts time and again and defeat rights of others- including undermining of public purposes underlying acquisition proceedings. A different approach would mean that, for instance, where two landowners (sought to be displaced from their lands by the same notification) are awarded compensation, of whom one allows the issue to attain finality- and moves on, the other obdurately seeks to stall the public purpose underlying the acquisition, by filing one or series of litigation, during the pendency of which interim orders might inure and bind the parties, the latter would profit and be rewarded, with the deemed lapse condition under Section 24 (2). Such a consequence, in the opinion of this Court, was never intended by Parliament; furthermore, the restitutionary principle requires that the advantage gained by the litigant should be suitably offset, in favour of the other party. D

336Copy pinpoint336. In Krishnaswamy S. Pd. v. Union of India 227, it was observed that an unintentional mistake of the Court, which may prejudice the cause of any party, must and alone could be rectified. Thus, in our opinion, the period for which the interim order has operated under Section 24 has to be excluded for counting the period of 5 years under Section 24(2) for the various reasons mentioned above. E

In Re Question no.6: Whether Section 24 revives stale and barred claim

337Copy pinpoint337. Before proceeding further, in our opinion, Section 24 contemplates pending proceedings and not the concluded ones in which possession has been taken, and compensation has been paid or deposited. Section 24 does not provide an arm or tool to question the legality of proceedings, which have been undertaken under the Act of 1894 and stood concluded before five years or more. It is only in cases where possession has not been taken, nor compensation is paid, that there is a lapse. In case possession has been taken, and compensation has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, the beneficial provision of the statute provides that all beneficiaries shall be paid compensation as admissible under the Act of 2013. The beneficiaries, i.e., landowners contemplated under the proviso to Section 24(2), are 227 (2006) 3 SCC 286 H

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A the ones who were so recorded as beneficiaries as on the date of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. The provision is not meant to be invoked on the basis of void transactions, and by the persons who have purchased on the basis of power of attorney or otherwise, they cannot claim the benefit under Section 24 as is apparent from proviso to Section 24(2) and the decision in Shiv Kumar and Ors. v. Union of B India and Ors 228.

338Copy pinpoint338. This Court is cognizant that Section 24 is used for submitting various claims, by way of filing applications in the pending proceedings either before the High Court or this Court. There are cases in which in the first round of litigation where the challenge to acquisition proceedings has failed, validity has been upheld, and possession has been taken after passing of the award. It is contended that drawing of panchnama was not the permissible mode to take possession, and actual physical possession remains with such landowners/purchasers/power of attorney holders as such benefit of Section 24 should be given to them notwithstanding the fact that they have withdrawn the compensation also.

339Copy pinpoint339. This Court is cognizant of cases where reference was sought for enhancement of compensation, money was deposited in the treasury, enhancement was made, and possession was taken. Yet, acquisitions have been questioned, and claims are being made under Section 24, that acquisition has lapsed, as the deposit (of compensation amount) in the treasury was not in accordance with the law, the amount should have been deposited in reference court. Further, this Court also notes that there have been cases in which after taking possession, when development is complete, infrastructure has developed despite which claims are being made under Section 24, on the ground that either the possession has not been taken in accordance with law or compensation has been deposited in the treasury, thus questioning the acquisitions. The decision in Mahavir and Ors. v. Union of India229 was an instance in which a claim was made that acquisition was made more than a century ago, and compensation has not been paid as such acquisition has lapsed relating to the land of Raisina Hills in New Delhi. The importance of Raisina Hills is well-known to everybody. The grossest misuse of Section 24 has been sought to be made, which is intended to confer benefit. It 228 2019 (13) SCALE 698 229 H (2018) 3 SCC 588

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was never intended to revive such claims and be used in the manner in which it has been today, where large numbers of acquisitions and development projects, such as construction of roads, hospitals, townships, housing projects, etc., are sought to be undone, though such acquisitions have been settled in several rounds of litigation. In several matters, the validity has been questioned under the guise as if the right has been conferred for the first time under the Act of 2013, claiming that such acquisitions have lapsed. There are also cases in which the claims for release of land under Section 48 of the Act of 1894 have been dismissed. Now, claims are made that as land is open and landowners/intermediaries/ POA holders continue to be in physical possession, thus, it should be returned to them, as the acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2). C Before us also arguments have been raised to grant relief in all such cases by making purposive interpretation of benevolent provisions. It was urged that this Court is bound to give relief as Section 24 is retrospective in operation, and the authorities have not cared to take possession for more than five years or more, and they have not paid the D compensation and deposited it in treasury which cannot be said to be legal. It is declared that the acquisition has lapsed, and the land is given back to them. In case any infrastructure is existing, the State Government should acquire the land afresh after following the process of Act of

2013. Earlier, injustice was done to landowners, as observed in various decisions mentioned above. We should not disturb the decisions of this E Court and are bound to follow the law laid down in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and the principle of stare decisis.

340Copy pinpoint340. By and large, concluded cases are being questioned by way of invoking the provisions contained in Section 24. In our considered opinion, the legality of concluded cases cannot be questioned under the F guise of Section 24(2) as it does not envisage or confer any such right to question the proceedings and the acquisitions have been concluded long back, or in several rounds of litigation as mentioned above, rights of the parties have been settled.

341Copy pinpoint341. In this context, it is noteworthy that the Urban Land (Ceiling G and Regulation) Act, 1976, was repealed in the year 1999; thereafter, claims were raised. After repeal, it was claimed that actual physical possession has not been taken by the State Government as such repeal has the effect of effacing the proceedings of taking possession, which it was alleged, was not in accordance with the law. In State of Assam v. H

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A Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and Ors230, submission was raised by the State of Assam that physical possession has been taken over by the competent authority and it was submitted on behalf of landowner that procedure prescribed under Section 10(5) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, was not followed. It was before taking possession under Section 10(6) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the notification under Section 10(5) was necessary; thus, no possession can be said to have been taken within the meaning of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The question this Court had to consider was whether actual physical possession was taken over in that case by the competent authority. The State of Assam submitted that though possession was taken over in the year 1991, may be unilaterally and without notice to the landowner. It was urged that mere non-compliance with Section 10(5) would be insufficient to attract the provisions of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. This Court repelled the submission of the landowner and held as under: “15. The High Court has held that the alleged dispossession was not preceded by any notice under Section 10(5) of the Act. Assuming that to be the case all that it would mean is that on 7-12-1991 when the erstwhile owner was dispossessed from the land in question, he could have made a grievance based on Section 10(5) and even sought restoration of possession to him no matter he would upon such restoration once again be liable to be evicted under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act upon his failure to deliver or surrender such possession. In reality therefore unless there was something that was inherently wrong so as to affect the very process of taking over such as the identity of the land or the boundaries thereof or any other circumstance of a similar nature going to the root of the matter hence requiring an adjudication, a person who had lost his land by reason of the same being declared surplus under Section 10(3) would not consider it worthwhile to agitate the violation of Section 10(5) for he can well understand that even when the Court may uphold his contention that the procedure ought to be followed as prescribed, it may still be not enough for him to retain the land for the authorities could the very next day dispossess him from the same by simply serving a notice under Section 230 (2015) 5 SCC 321 H

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10(5). It would, in that view, be an academic exercise for any owner or person in possession to find fault with his dispossession on the ground that no notice under Section 10(5) had been served upon him.

16. The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming that a person in possession could make a grievance, no matter without much gain in the ultimate analysis, the question is whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged violation of Section 10(5). If actual physical possession was taken over from the erstwhile landowner on 7-12-1991 as is alleged in the present case, any grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession. If the owner did not do so, forcibly taking over of possession would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such situation, the owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. Any other view would, in our opinion, give a license to a litigant to make a grievance not because he has suffered any real prejudice that needs to be redressed but only because the fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act tempted him to raise the issue regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed procedure. E

17. Reliance was placed by the respondents upon the decision of this Court in Hari Ram case. That decision does not, in our view, lend much assistance to the respondents. We say so because this Court was in State of UP v. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280 considering whether the word “may” appearing in Section 10(5) gave to the competent authority the discretion to issue or not to issue a notice before taking physical possession of the land in question under Section 10(6). The question of whether the breach of Section 10(5) and possible dispossession without notice would vitiate the Act of dispossession itself or render it non-est in the eye of the law did not fall for consideration in that case. In our opinion, what Section 10(5) prescribes is an ordinary and logical course of action that ought to be followed before the authorities decided to use force to dispossess the occupant under Section 10(6). In the case at hand, if the appellant’s H

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A version regarding dispossession of the erstwhile owner in December 1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the Act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That is because Bhabadeb Sarma, erstwhile owner, had not made any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage during his lifetime, implying thereby that he had waived his right to do so.” This Court held that provisions of the Repeal Act could not be extended in such a case where possession has been taken without following the procedure, and the landowner cannot retain the land. This Court also observed that once possession has been taken over in the year 1991, any grievance as to non-compliance of Section 10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession. By sheer lapse of time, the possession would acquire legitimacy. Thus, the owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. This Court also observed that only because of the fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act, which confers certain rights, the litigation had tempted the landowner to raise the issue regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed procedure. It is clear from the aforesaid decision that such claims cannot be entertained, and any such dispute raised belatedly was repelled by this Court.

342Copy pinpoint342. Section 24(2) is sought to be used as an umbrella so as to question the concluded proceedings in which possession has been taken, development has been made, and compensation has been deposited, but may be due to refusal, it has not been collected. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings cannot be made within the parameters of Section 24(2) once panchnama had been drawn of taking possession, thereafter re-entry or retaining the possession is that of the trespasser. The legality of the proceedings cannot be challenged belatedly, and the right to challenge cannot be revived by virtue of the provisions of Section 24(2). Section 24(2) only contemplates lethargy/inaction of the authorities to act for five years or more. It is very easy to lay a claim that physical possession was not taken, with respect to open land. Yet, once vesting takes place, possession is presumed to be that of the owner, i.e., the State Government and land has been transferred to the beneficiaries, H

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Corporations, Authorities, etc., for developmental purposes and third- A party interests have intervened. Such challenges cannot be entertained at all under the purview of Section 24(2) as it is not what is remotely contemplated in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.

343Copy pinpoint343. In matters of land acquisition, this Court has frowned upon, and cautioned courts about delays and held that delay is fatal in questioning the land acquisition proceedings. In case possession has not been taken in accordance with law and vesting is not in accordance with Section 16, proceedings before courts are to be initiated within reasonable time, not after the lapse of several decades.

344Copy pinpoint344. In Hari Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors231, there was a delay of two and a half years in questioning the proceedings. This Court held that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only.

345Copy pinpoint345. In State of T.N. and Ors. v. L. Krishnan & Ors232, this Court held that petitioners could not raise their claim at a belated stage. D Following observations were made: “45. There remains the last ground assigned by the High Court in support of its decision. The High Court has held that the non-compliance with sub-rules (b) and (c) of Rule 3 of the Rules made by the Government of Tamil Nadu pursuant to E Section 55(1) of the Land Acquisition Act vitiates the report made under Section 5-A and consequently the declarations made under Section 6. The said sub-rules provide that on receipt of objections under Section 5-A, the Collector shall fix a date of hearing to the objections and give notice of the same to the objector as well as to the department. It is open to F the department to file a statement by way of answer to the objections filed by the landowners. The submission of the writ petitioners was that in a given case, it might well happen that in the light of the objections submitted by the landowners, the department concerned may decide to drop the acquisition. G Since no such opportunity was given to the department concerned herein, it could not file its statement by way of answer to their objections. This is said to be prejudice. We do

231 AIR 1984 SC 1020 232 (1996) 1 SCC 250 H

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A not think it necessary to go into the merits of this submission on account of the laches on the part of the writ petitioners. As stated above, the declaration under Section 6 was made sometime in the year 1978, and the writ petitioners chose to approach the Court only in the years 1982-83. Had they raised this objection at the proper time and if it were found to be B true and acceptable, the opportunity could have been given to the Government to comply with the said requirement. Having kept quiet for a number of years, the petitioners cannot raise this contention in writ petitions filed at a stage when the awards were about to be passed.”

346Copy pinpoint346. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd233, this Court observed, with respect to delay and laches that: “29. It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised by taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed, and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches. *** G S.B. MAJUMDAR, J. (concurring)—I have gone through the judgment prepared by my esteemed learned brother K. Ramaswamy, J. I respectfully agree with the conclusion to the effect that Respondents 1 and 2 had missed the bus by 233 H (1996) 11 SCC 501

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adopting an indolent attitude in not challenging the acquisition proceedings promptly. Therefore, the result is inevitable that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of gross delay and laches.

35. x x x The acquired land got vested in the State Government and the Municipal Corporation free from all encumbrances as enjoined by Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thus right to get more compensation got vested in diverse claimants bypassing the award, as well as the vested right, was created in favor of the Bombay Municipal Corporation by virtue of the vesting of the land in the State Government for being handed over to the Corporation. All these events could not be wished away by observing that no third party rights were created by them. The writ petition came to be filed after all these events had taken place. Such a writ petition was clearly stillborn due to gross delay and laches. I, therefore, respectfully agree with the conclusion to which my learned brother Ramaswamy, J., has reached that on the ground of delay and laches the writ petition is required to be dismissed, and the appeal has to be allowed on that ground.” (emphasis supplied) There are several other decisions of this Court, where delay was held, to disentitle litigants any relief.234

347Copy pinpoint347. In Jasveer Singh and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & 235 Ors. , the writ petition was filed in which High Court had directed the redetermination of the compensation. In that case the matter was remanded by this Court to consider the additional compensation under F Section 23-(1A). Thereafter a submission was raised in the High Court under Section 24. This Court held that the challenge could not have been entertained. This Court observed thus:

G 234 In Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Bhagwan Singh Bhati and Ors., (2008) 3 SCC 462, there was a fatal delay of 10 years in the filing of the writ petition. In Govt. of A.P. and Ors. v. Kollutla Obi Reddy and Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 493, the writ petition was filed after six years of the land acquisition. The writ petition was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 235 (2017) 6 SCC 787 H

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A “2. On 19-12-2005 the appellants filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking quashing of the acquisition proceedings which was decided by the High Court on 3-12- 2010 directing redetermination of compensation. The said order was set aside by this Court on 16-10-2012 in State of U.P. v. Jasveer Singh [Civil Appeal No.7535 of 2012, order B dated 16-10-2012 (SC)]. It was observed that: “After considering the pros and cons, without entering into serious controversies and making any comment on the merit of the case, we are of the considered opinion that in view of the judgment and order of this Court dated 26-11- C 2010, which was passed in the presence of the counsel for both the parties, the High Court ought not to have heard the matter at all. Thus, the judgment and order impugned before us have lost its sanctity. Therefore, the same is hereby set aside. D However, in order to meet the ends of justice, we remand the case to the High Court to hear the writ petition afresh expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months from the date of production of the certified copy of the order before the Hon’ble Chief Justice. The matter may be assigned to any particular Bench by the Hon’ble Chief Justice for final disposal. The parties shall be at liberty to raise all factual and legal issues involved in the case. The High Court is requested to deal with the relevant issues in detail. More so, if the respondents are so aggrieved regarding withdrawal of their appeals, which had been remanded by this Court for determining the entitlement of interest under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 and an application is made by the respondent to revive the same, the High Court may consider and decide the said application in accordance with law. All the matters shall be heard simultaneously by the same Bench if the appeals are restored.”

3. Thereafter, the High Court considered the contention of the appellants that the award in respect of compensation was no award in the eye of the law and though the possession was taken long back and railway line had been laid out, the H

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acquisition proceedings were liable to be set aside, and compensation was liable to be awarded at present market rate. The High Court rejected the said plea vide judgment dated 30-5-2014 in Jasvir Singh v. the State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 8465. It was observed that objection of the appellants against the award had already been considered and remand by the Supreme Court on 12-9-2005 was only in respect of statutory benefits. For the first time plea was sought to be raised in the writ petition against validity of acquisition which was impermissible in view of the law laid down by this Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC 285, Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) C 4 SCC 695, Sawaran Lata v. State of Haryana, (2010) 4 SCC 532 and Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agarwal, (2011) 5 SCC 394. The judgment of this Court in Royal Orchid Hotels v. G. Jayarama Reddy, (2011) 10 SCC 608, was distinguished as that case related to the fraudulent exercise of power of an eminent domain. The High Court concluded: (Jasvir Singh case, 2014 SCC OnLine All 8465 (SCC OnLine paras 45-47) “45. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the writ petition is highly barred by laches and deserves to be dismissed on the ground of laches alone.

46. As has been observed above, the petitioners’ main grievance is for enhancement of compensation, for which the petitioner has already filed First Appeal No. 880 of 1993 and First Appeal No. 401 of 1998 which appeals are being allowed by order of the date, we see no reason to entertain the writ petition.

47. Although various submissions on merits challenging the entire acquisition proceedings have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, we have taken the view that the writ petition is highly barred by laches, we do not find it necessary to enter into the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners on merits.”

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348Copy pinpoint348. In Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors236, the writ petition was filed after taking possession and award has become final. The writ petition was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. In Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and Ors.237, in the absence of a challenge to the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time, the challenge was repelled. Delay was also fatal in Haryana State Handloom and Handicrafts Corporation Ltd. and Ors. v. Jain School Society238. The writ petition was filed after two years to question the declaration under Section 6 and was dismissed on the ground of delay in Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur vs. Bheru Lal and Ors 239. A Delay of 5 to 10 years was held to be fatal in questioning the acquisition proceedings as held in Vishwas Nagar Evacuee Plot Purchasers Association & Ors. v. Under Secretary, Delhi Admn. & Ors.240

349Copy pinpoint349. There is a plethora of decisions where, owing to delay of 6 months or more, this Court has repelled the challenge to the acquisition proceedings. In our opinion, Section 24 does not revive the right to challenge those proceedings which have been concluded. The legality of those judgments and orders cannot be reopened or questioned under the guise of the provisions of Section 24(2). By reason of our reasoning in respect of that provision (which we have held that under Section 24(2) that word “or” is to be read as ‘and’ or as ‘nor,’ even if one of the requirements has been fulfilled, i.e., either possession taken or compensation paid), there is no lapse unless both conditions are fulfilled, i.e., compensation has not been paid nor has possession been taken; the legality of the concluded proceedings cannot be questioned. It is only in the case where steps have not been taken by the Authorities. The lapse or higher compensation is provided under Section 24(2) and its proviso under the Act of 2013.

350Copy pinpoint350. In U.P. State Jal Nigam and Anr. v. Jaswant Singh and 241 Anr , this Court has observed that if a claimant is aware of the violation of his rights and does not claim his remedies, such inaction or conduct tantamounts a waiver of the right. In such cases, the lapse of time and 236 (2008) 4 SCC 695 237 (1998) 4 SCC 387 238 (2003) 12 SCC 538 239 (2002) 7 SCC 712 240 (1990) 2 SCC 268 241 H (2006) 11 SCC 464

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[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

delay are most material and cannot be ignored by the Court. In A Rabindranath Bose and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors 242, the Constitution Bench of this Court has observed that the Court cannot go into the stale demands after a lapse of several years. This Court observed thus: “32. The learned counsel for the petitioners strongly urges that the decision of this Court in Tilokchand Motichand case needs review. But after carefully considering the matter, we are of the view that no relief should be given to petitioners who, without any reasonable explanation, approach this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after inordinate delay. The highest Court in this land has been given original jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. It could not have been the intention that this Court would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the D Constitution-makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.”

351Copy pinpoint351. In Dharappa v. Bijapur Coop. Milk Producers Societies Union Ltd243, this Court observed that if delay has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost or rendered unavailable, would be fatal. It was held that the time limit of 6 months prescribed under Section 10(4A) of the I.D. Act, 1947 and should not be interpreted to revive stale and dead claims, it would not be possible to defend such claims due to lapse of time and due to material evidence having been lost or rendered unavailable. The lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would be fatal. It will be illogical to hold that the amendment to the Act inserting Section 10(4A) should be interpreted as reviving all stale and dead claims. This Court observed thus: “29. This Court while dealing with Sections 10(1)(c) and (d) G of the I.D. Act, has repeatedly held that though the Act does not provide a period of limitation for raising a dispute under Section 10(1)(c) or (d), if on account of delay, a dispute has become stale or ceases to exist, the reference should be 242 (1970) 1 SCC 84 H 243 (2007) 9 SCC 109

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A rejected. It has also held that lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost or rendered unavailable (vide Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty, (2000) 2 SCC 455; Balbir Singh v. Punjab Roadways, (2001) 1 SCC 133; Asstt. Executive B Engineer v. Shivalinga, (2002) 10 SCC 167 and S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom Distt. Manager, (2003) 4 SCC 27). When belated claims are considered as stale and non-existing for the purpose of refusing or rejecting a reference under Section 10(1)(c) or (d), in spite of no period of limitation is prescribed, C it will be illogical to hold that the amendment to the Act inserting Section 10(4-A) prescribing a time-limit of six months, should be interpreted as reviving all stale and dead claims. ***

D 31. Section 10(4-A) does not, therefore, revive non-existing or stale or dead claims but only ensures that claims which were life, by applying the six-month rule in Section 10(4-A) as on the date when the section came into effect, have a minimum of six months’ time to approach the Labour Court. That is ensured by adding the words “or the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later” to the words “within six months from the date of communication to him of the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination.” In other words, all those who have communicated orders of termination during a period of six months prior to 7-4-1988 were deemed to have been communicated such orders of termination as on 7-4-1988 for the purpose of seeking a remedy. Therefore, the words “within six months from the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later” only enables those who had been communicated order of termination within six months prior to 7-4-1988, to apply under Section 10(4-A).”

352Copy pinpoint352. In State of Karnataka v. Laxuman244, this court held that stale claims should not be entertained even if no time limit is fixed by the statute. This court observed as follows: H 244 (2005) 8 SCC 709

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“9. As can be seen, no time for applying to the Court in terms of sub-section (3) is fixed by the statute. But since the application is to the Court, though under a special enactment, Article 137, the residuary article of the Limitation Act, 1963, would be attracted and the application has to be made within three years of the application for making a reference or the expiry of 90 days after the application. The position is settled by the decision of this Court in Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, (1997) 11 SCC 412. It was held: (SCC p. 414, para 3) “3. Admittedly, the cause of action for seeking a reference had arisen on the date of service of the award under Section C 12(2) of the Act. Within 90 days from the date of the service of the notice, the respondents made the application requesting the Deputy Commissioner to refer the cases to the civil Court under Section 18. Under the amended sub-section (3)(a) of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner shall, within 90 days from D 1-9-1970, make a reference under Section 18 to the civil Court, which he failed to do. Consequently, by operation of subsection 3(b) with the expiry of the aforestated 90 days, the cause of action had accrued to the respondents to make an application to the civil Court with a prayer to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference. There is no period E of limitation prescribed in subsection (3)(b) to make that application, but it should be done within the limitation prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Since no article expressly prescribed the limitation to make such an application, the residuary article under Article 137 of the F Schedule to the Limitation Act gets attracted. Thus, it could be seen that in the absence of any special period of limitation prescribed by clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act, the application should have been made within three years from the date of expiry of 90 days prescribed in Section 18(3)(b), i.e., the date on which cause of action had accrued G to the respondent claimant. Since the application had been admittedly made beyond three years, it was clearly barred by limitation. Since the High Court relied upon the case in Municipal Council, (1969) 1 SCC 873 which has stood overruled, the order of the High Court is unsustainable.” H

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A This position is also supported by the reasoning in Kerala SEB v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, (1976) 4 SCC 634. It may be seen that under the Central Act sans the Karnataka amendment, there was no right to approach the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction to compel a reference, and no time-limit was also fixed for making such an approach. All that was required of a claimant was to make an application for reference within six weeks of the award or the notice of the award, as the case may be. But obviously, the State Legislature thought it necessary to provide a time-frame for the claimant to make his claim for enhanced compensation and for ensuring an expeditious disposal of the application for reference by the authority under the Act fixing a time within which he is to act and conferring an additional right on the claimant to approach the civil Court on satisfying the condition precedent of having made an application for reference within the time prescribed.” D

353Copy pinpoint353. We are of the opinion that courts cannot invalidate acquisitions, which stood concluded. No claims in that regard can be entertained and agitated as they have not been revived. There has to be legal certainty where infrastructure has been created or has been developed partially, and investments have been made, especially when land has been acquired long back. It is the duty of the Court to preserve the legal certainty, as observed in Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India and Ors245. The landowners had urged that since the Act of 2013 creates new situations, which are beneficial to their interests, the question of delay or laches does not arise. This Court is of the opinion that the said contention is without merits. As held earlier, the doctrine of laches would always preclude an indolent party, who chooses not to approach the court, or having approached the court, allows an adverse decision to become final, to re-agitate the issue of acquisition of his holding. Doing so, especially in cases, where the title has vested with the State, and thereafter with subsequent interests, would be contrary to public policy. G In A.P. State Financial Corp. v. Garware Rolling Mill246, this Court observed that equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade the law. There is no dearth of talent left in longing for the undue advantage of the wholesome provisions of Section 24(2) on the basis of wrong interpretation. 245 (2012) 6 SCC 613 H 246 (1994) 2 SCC 647

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354Copy pinpoint354. In British Railway Board v. Pickin 247, the following observations were made: “… equity, when faced with an appeal to a regulatory public statute, which requires compliance with formalities, will not allow such statute (assumedly passed to prevent fraud) to be used to promote fraud and will do so by imposing a trust or equity upon a legal right. …”

355Copy pinpoint355. We are unable to accept the submission on behalf of the landowners that it is by operation of law the proceedings are deemed to have lapsed and that this Court should give full effect to the provisions. It was submitted that lapse of acquisition proceedings was not contemplated under the Act of 1894, and there is departure made in Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Thus, Section 24 gives a fresh cause of action to the landowners to approach the courts for a declaration that the acquisition lapsed, if either compensation has not been paid or the physical possession has not been taken. The decision of this Court in the Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. v. Dossibai N.B. D Jeejeebhoy 248 was relied upon to contend that there cannot be res judicata in the previous proceedings when the cause of action is different; reliance is also placed on Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty and Anr249, where the decision of Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. (supra) was followed as to belated challenges. Reliance was further E placed on Anil Kumar Gupta v. the State of Bihar250 in which it was held that vesting of land in the Government can be challenged on the ground that possession had not been taken in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The invocation of the urgency clause in Section 17, can be questioned on the ground that there was no real urgency. The notification issued under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 F can be challenged on the ground of non-compliance of Section 5-A(1). Notice issued under Section 9 and the award passed under Section 11 can also be questioned on permissible grounds. Reliance has also been placed on Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India 251 to contend that inaction and delay on the part of the acquiring authority would also give G rise to a cause of action in favour of the landowner. 247 (1974) AC 765 248 (1970) 1 SCC 613 249 (2018) 16 SCC 228 250 (2012) 12 SCC 443 251 (1994) 1 SCC 4 H

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356Copy pinpoint356. The entire gamut of submissions of the landowners is based on the misinterpretation of the provisions contained in Section 24. It does not intend to divest the State of possession (of the land), title to which has been vested in the State. It only intends to give higher compensation in case the obligation of depositing of compensation has not been fulfilled with regard to the majority of holdings. A fresh cause of action in Section 24 has been given if for five years or more possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In case possession has been taken and compensation has not been deposited with respect to the majority of landholdings, higher compensation to all incumbents follows, as mentioned above. Section 24 does not confer a new cause of action to challenge the acquisition proceedings or the methodology adopted for the deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of reference court, in that case, interest or higher compensation, as the case may be, can follow. In our considered opinion, Section 24 is applicable to pending proceedings, not to the concluded proceedings and the legality of the concluded proceedings, cannot be questioned. Such a challenge does not lie within the ambit of the deemed lapse under Section 24. The lapse under section 24(2) is due to inaction or lethargy of authorities in taking requisite steps as provided therein.

357Copy pinpoint357. We are also of the considered opinion that the decision in an earlier round of litigation operates as res judicata where the challenge to the legality of the proceedings had been negatived and the proceedings of taking possession were upheld. Section 24 does not intend to reopen proceedings which have been concluded. The decision in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. (supra) is of no avail. Similar is the decision in Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar (supra). No doubt about it that proceedings (i.e., the original acquisition, or aspects relating to it) can be questioned but within a reasonable time; yet once the challenge has been made and failed or has not been made for a reasonable time, Section 24 does not provide for reopening thereof.

358Copy pinpoint358. So far as the proposition laid down in Ram Chand and Ors. G v. Union of India (supra) is concerned, inaction and delay on the part of acquiring authorities have been taken care of under Section 24. The mischief rule (or Heydon’s Mischief Rule) was pressed into service on behalf of landowners relying upon the decision in Bengal Immunity Co v. the State of Bihar (supra), it was submitted that Act of 1894 did not provide for lapse in the case of inordinate delay on the part of acquiring H

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Authorities to complete the acquisition proceedings. Mischief has been sought to be cured by the legislature by introducing the Act of 2013 by making provisions in Section 24 of the lapse of proceedings. The submission is untenable. The provisions made under section 24 have provided a window of 5 years to complete the acquisition proceedings, and if there is a delay of 5 years or more, there is a lapse and not otherwise. The provision cannot be stretched any further, otherwise, the entire infrastructure, which has come up, would have to go and only the litigants would reap the undeserving fruits of frivolous litigation, having lost in several rounds of litigation earlier, which can never be the intendment of the law.

359Copy pinpoint359. We are of the considered opinion that Section 24 cannot be used to revive dead and stale claims and concluded cases. They cannot be inquired into within the purview of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. The provisions of Section 24 do not invalidate the judgments and orders of the Court, where rights and claims have been lost and negatived. There is no revival of the barred claims by operation of law. Thus, stale and dead claims cannot be permitted to be canvassed on the pretext of enactment of Section 24. In exceptional cases, when in fact, the payment has not been made, but possession has been taken, the remedy lies elsewhere if the case is not covered by the proviso. It is the Court to consider it independently not under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. E

360Copy pinpoint360. It was submitted that Section 101 provides for return of unutilized land under the Act of 2013. Section 101 provides that in case land is not utilized for five years from the date of taking over the possession, the same shall be returned to the original owner or owners or their legal heirs, as the case may be, or to the Land Bank of the appropriate Government by reversion in the manner as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government. Section 101 reads as under: “101. Return of unutilized land.— When any land, acquired under this Act remains unutilized for a period of five years from the date of taking over the possession, the same shall be returned to the original owner or owners or their legal heirs, as the case may be, or to the Land Bank of the appropriate Government by reversion in the manner as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government. Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “Land Bank” means a governmental entity that focuses on the conversion H

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A of Government-owned vacant, abandoned, unutilized acquired lands and tax-delinquent properties into productive use.”

361Copy pinpoint361. Section 24 deals with lapse of acquisition. Section 101 deals with the return of unutilized land. Section 101 cannot be said to be B applicable to an acquisition made under the Act of 1894. The provision of lapse has to be considered on its own strength and not by virtue of Section 101 though the spirit is to give back the land to the original owner or owners or the legal heirs or to the Land Bank. Return of lands is with respect to all lands acquired under the Act of 2013 as the expression used in the opening part is “When any land, acquired under this Act C remains unutilized”. Lapse, on the other hand, occurs when the State does not take steps in terms of Section 24(2). The provisions of Section 101 cannot be applied to the acquisitions made under the Act of 1894. Thus, no such sustenance can be drawn from the provisions contained in Section 101 of the Act of 2013. Five years’ logic has been carried into effect for the purpose of lapse and not for the purpose of returning the land remaining unutilized under Section 24(2).

362Copy pinpoint362. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. (supra) is hereby overruled and all other decisions in which Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) has been followed, are also overruled. The decision in Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) cannot be said to be laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions following the same are also overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (Dead) through L.Rs. and Ors., (supra), the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether ‘or’ has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’ was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present judgment.

363Copy pinpoint363. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under:

G 1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1.1.2014 the date of commencement of Act of 2013, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of Act of 2013.

2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the H

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court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) A of the Act of 2013 under the Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed.

3. The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more B prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse. C

4. The expression ‘paid’ in the main part of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894.

5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). Land owners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. G

6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be treated as part of Section 24(2) not part of Section 24(1)(b).

7. The mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/ H

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A memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).

8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse B of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the Act of 2013 came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with concerned authority as on 1.1.2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years. C

9. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor D allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition. Let the matters be placed before appropriate Bench for consideration on merits. E