JAi NARAIN PARASRAMPURIA (DEAD) AND ORS. v. PUSHPA DEVI SARAF AND ORS.

A in the suit. This shall be in addition to the sale price already deposited in the Court. The same shall be deposited in the Court within a period of six months and the plaintiffs are entitled to withdraw the same in addition to the amount already deposited ..."'

In Manjunath Anandappa urf Shivappa Hanasi v. Tammanasa & Ors., B [2003] 10 sec 390, was a member, a decree for specific performance was declined as the plaintiff did not approach the court within a reasonable time.

In P.D'Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu, [2004] 6 SCC 649, this Court rejected the contention that inadequacy of consideration may be ground for refusing C relief of specific performance, which may cause hardship stating:

"It is not a case where the defendant did not foresee the hardship. It is furthermore not a case that non-performance of the agreement would not cause any hardship to the plaintiff. The defendant was the landlord of the plaintiff. He had accepted part-payments from the plaintiff from time to time without any demur whatsoever. He D redeemed the mortgage only upon receipt of requisite payment from the plaintiff. Even in August, 1981 i.e. just two months prior to the institution of suit, he had accepted Rs.20,000 from the plaintiff. It is, therefore, too late for the appellant now to suggest that having regard to the escalation in price, the respondent should be denied the benefit E of the decree passed in his favour. Explanation I appended to Section 20 clearly stipulates that merely inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature would not constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 20." F The Court noticed that somewhat a different note was struck in Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corpn. (P) Ltd & Ors., [2002] 5 SCC 481 and opined:

"The said decision cannot be said to constitute a binding precedent to the effect that in all cases where there had been an escalation of prices, the court should either refuse to pass a decree on specific G performance of contract or direct the plaintiff to pay a higher sum. No law in absolute terms to that effect has been laid down by this Court nor is discernible from the aforementioned decision."

In Surinder Singh.v. Kapoor Singh (Dead) through LRs. & Ors., [2005] H 5 SCC 142, it was emphasized that discretionary jurisdiction must be exercised

JAi NARAIN PARASRAMPURIA (DEAD)v. PUSHPA DEVI SARAF [S.B.SINHA, J.] 367 reasonably and having regard to the fact situation obtaining in each case. The A present market value of the property is also a relevant fact. The prices must have gone up manifold. It is situate in a metropolitan town. It has a great potential value.

As noticed hereinbefore, the conduct ofboth the parties are blameworthy. B The value of the property is now said to be a few crores. The appellants had deposited a sum of Rs. I0 lakhs as far back as on 12.6.1984. The said amount must be directed to be refunded to the appellants with interest @15% per annum. Although we decline to grant any relief of specific performance of contract to which the Appellants were otherwise entitled to, we are of the opinion that it is a fit case where the respondents should be asked to C compensate the Appellants. In view of the fact that the Sarafs are also responsible for bringing out such a situation, we are of the opinion that interest of justice would be met if the respondents are directed to pay a sum of Rs.50,00,000/- to the Appellants herein by way of compensation. Such amount should be in addition. to the sum of Rs. I0,00,000/- deposited by the D Appellants together with interest at the rate of 12% per annum thereupon. This order shall not preclude Manoj Kumar Poddar to bring an independent action against the respondents herein,· if he so desires.

Conclusion:

(i) E The property in suit for all intent and purport was acquired for the benefit of the Company. (ii) Only because at the time of acquisition of the property by Sarafs, the Company was unincorporated, the same would not mean that no title could have been passed in favour of the Company. F (iii) In view of their conduct, Sarafs were estopped and precluded from denying and disputing the title of the Company over the property in dispute. (iv) Withdrawal of suit No. 1252 of 1982 by the appellants did not create any embargo in raising a contention that the award of the G arbitrator and the consequent decree passed were void ab initio and of no effect. ~ (v) The agreement for sale dated 11.6.1984 was not a transaction for loan. H

p. 368 Copy page pinpoint

A (vi) Sarafs conduct was condemnable so far as tpey not only raised false and frivolous pleas but also initiated frivolous proceedings in courts of law. (vii) The subject matter of the agreement was not only the house in question but also the entire lands. B (viii)Primafacie the demolition of the house took place at the instance of the appellants. (ix) However, it is not a case where the appellants are entitled to a decree for specific performance of contract. C (x) The respondents should refund the amount of advance of Rs.10,00,000/- (ten lakhs) with interest at the rate of 12% per annum and furthermore pay compensation to the extent of Rs.50,00,000/- (fifty lakhs).

The appeals are allowed to the aforementioned extent. However, in the facts and circumstances of these cases, the parties shall bear and pay their own costs.

K.K.T. Appeals allowed.