MAYAWATI v. MARKANDEYA CHAND AND ORS.

MAYAWAT!v.MARKANDEYACHAND[SRINIVASAN,J.] 243

such party which could issue such directions. In such matters, the members A of the House would certainly be given sufficient notice in advance and original political party would have sufficient time to take decisions and issue ... directions.

25Copy pinpoint25. In 'Tue Journal of Parliamentary Information'. 1993 (Vol.39). Article

19. Anti - Defection Law - Split In parties by D. Sripada Rao @p.p. 104 and B 105, it is stated as follows:-

"It is not as though the Schedule does not take into its fold the outside events and organisation. Tue Schedule mentions the direction of the political parties. etc. in Clause (b) of sub-para (l) or para 2. Tue direction of a member of the House can be from a functionary of a C political party outside the House according to the constitution of the respective parties. The label which a member carries and ultimately goes to constitute his Legislature Party under rule 4(2) is an agency outside the House. A member is disqualified for giving up that label and not the membership of the Legislature Party. Tue operation of the D Schedule is not exclusively intramural or confined to the four walls of the House, where the Speaker's writ runs. If the intention of the Parliament in enacting the Schedule is to confine the Speaker merely I to count the members of the Legislature Party there is no need to mention 'the original political party' in paras 3 and 4 in connection with split or merger. There is an inbuilt mechanism in the Schedule to E maintain nexus between the political party and the Legislature Party which is essential for the effective functioning of Parliamentary form of Government. Tue Schedule casts a duty on the Speaker not to lose sight of the nexus while formalising the split or merger. A party split outside the House without the support of I/3rd members inside the p House renders it to wipe out its identity in the House and the House and the Members who engineer a split in Legislature Party without there being a corresponding split in the party outside make themselves vulnerable to forego their seat in the House al~eit their command over I/3rd legislature party". G The above passage shows that no distinction can be made between sub para (a) and sub para (b) vis a vis the meaning of the term 'political party' and that it means only the original political party.

26Copy pinpoint26. It has been rightly held by the Speaker that there is no material whatever to hold that the direction issued on 20.10.97 was issued by the H

244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A B.S.P. or that the appellant was authorized by the BSP to issue such a direction. Neither before the Speaker nor before us any such plea was even raised.

27Copy pinpoint27. There is also no difficulty in accepting the finding of the Speaker that the direction dated 20.10.97 was not in accordance with the law laid down B by this court in 'Hollohan' - In para 123, it is said:

"Keeping in view the consequences of the disqualification i.e., .. termination of the membership of a House; it would be appropriate that the direction or whip which results in such disqualification under Paragraph 2(1 )(b) is so worded as to clearly indicate that voting or c abstaining from voting contrary to the said direction would result in incurring the disqualification under Paragraph 2(l)(b) of the Tenth Schedule so that the member concerned has fore-knowledge of the consequences flowing from his conduct in voting or abstaining from voting contrary to such a direction". D Mr. Sibal's contention that such a warning as mentioned in the above passage is necessary only when whips are issued on unimportant matters and that the above passage in 'Hollohan' is misunderstood by the Speaker is unsustainable. A reading of paras 122 and 123 in 'Hollohan' clearly shows that no meaning can be given to para 123 other than that given by the Speaker. E

28Copy pinpoint28. Hence I hold that the Speaker has not violated para 2( 1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule.

(b) Violation of Para 2(1)(a)

29Copy pinpoint29. The attack of the appellant on the factual findings of the Speaker could be more conveniently and appropriately considered when I discuss violation of principles of Natural Justice and perversity. Under this head, I would discuss the question of law raised by Mr. Sibal.

30Copy pinpoint30. The meaning to be given to the word 'split' in Para 3 is left open in 'Hollohan'. In Para 124, it is said:

"There are some submissions as to the exact import of a "split" - whether it is to be understood an instantaneous, one time event or whether a 'split' can be said to occur over a period of time. The hypothetical poser was that if one-third of the members of a political party in the legislature broke away from it on a particular day and a

MAYAWATI v. MARKANDEYA CHAND [SRINIVASAN, J.] 245

few more members joined the splinter group a couple of days later, A

- would the latter also be a part of the 'split' group. This question of construction cannot be in vacuo. In the present cases, we have dealt with constitutional issues. The meaning to be given to "split" must necessarily be examined in a case in which the question arises in the context of its particular facts. No hypothetical predications can or B need be made. We, accordingly, leave this question to be decided in an appropriate case".

31Copy pinpoint31. Issue No. 6 framed by the Speaker is as follows:-

"Whether on 21.10.97 a group was formed in Bahujan Samaj Party Legislature Party under paragraph 3 of Tenth Schedule of the C Constitution representing the group which had arisen as a result of split in Bahujan Samaj Party and whether there were at least one-third members of Bahujan Samaj Party Legislature Party in such group? If yes, its effect."

There is no dispute before us as to the correctness of the issue as framed. D There is also no difference of opinion among the two sides as to the meaning of para 3.

32Copy pinpoint32. The only question of law raised by Mr. Sibal relates to the maintainability of the plea of split in default of compliance with Rule 3 of the Rules. According to the learned counsel, the Rules, having been framed in E exercise of the powers conferred by para 8 of the Tenth Schedule for giving effect to the provisions of the Schedule, have the same force as constitutional mandates and non-compliance thereof would disentitle the concerned party from invoking the provisions of the Constitution. Rule 3(1) of the Rules reads thus: F "3. (i) The leader of each legislature party, other than a legislature party consisting of only one member shall within thirty days from the date of the first sitting of the House, or, where such legislature party is formed after such date, within thirty days from the date of its formation, and in either case within such further period as the Speaker G may for sufficient cause allow, furnish the following to the Speaker, namely:- (a) a statement in writing in Form I containing the names of members and other particulars of such legislature party:

(b) names and designations of each such member of the legislature H

246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A party who has been chosen as leader of that party or authorized for the purposes referred to in clause (f) of rule 2, to act as, or to discharge the functions of, such leader; ... (c) names and designations of such members of the legislature party who have been authorised for the purposes of these rules to correspond with the Speaker;

( d) a copy of the Constitution and rules (by whatever name called) of such legislature party and of the political party to which its members are affiliated".

33Copy pinpoint33. Learned counsel submits that in the present case though the split was alleged to have taken place on 21.10.97, Markandeya Chand, the leader of JBSP did not within thirty days from the said date or for that matter till 25.2.98, the day on which the arguments before the Speaker were concluded furnish the statement etc. as set out in the Rule. Hence according to him the respondents were not entitled to raise the plea of split in this case.

34Copy pinpoint34. According to him the decision of this Court in Ravi S. Naikv. Union of India and Anr. etc., [ 1994] Supp. 2 S.C.C. 641 is not correct and it requires reconsideration. It is, therefore, argued that the order of the Speaker placing reliance on the said ruling is erroneous and has to be set aside.

35Copy pinpoint35. Before referring to Ravi S. Naik, (supra) I would consider the E question on first principles. Para 3 of the Tenth Schedule excludes the operation of para 2 (I )(a) and (b) where a memberofa House makes a claim that he and any other member of his legislature party constitute the group representing a faction which has arisen as a result of a split in his original political party and such group consists of not less than one third of the members of such p legislature party. The following are the conditions for satisfying the I·

requirements of the para:

(i) A split in the original political party giving rise to a faction.

(ii) The faction is represented by a group of MLAs in the House. G (iii) Such group consists not less than one third of the members of legislature party to which they belong. For the purpose of that para all the three conditions must be fulfilled. It is not sufficient if more than I/3rd members of a legislature party form a separate group and give to itself a different name without there being a split in the original political party. Thus · H the factum of split in the original party and the number of members in the

MAYAWAT!v. MARKANDEYACHAND[SRINIVASAN,J.] 247 'group' exceeding I/3rd of the members of the legislature party are the A conditions to be proved.

36Copy pinpoint36. Rule 3 provides for furnishing of information to the Speaker. Rule 6 provides for recording of such information in a register to be maintained by the Secretary. Will the recording of information in the register conclude the issue relating to the two requirements of para 3 of the Tenth Schedule? There B is not even a provision for presumption as to the correctness of the entries in the register maintained under Rule 6. The entries would at best only show that such and such information was furnished by such and such member. The entries in the register cannot have any other effect whatever.

37Copy pinpoint37. Rule I 0 enables the Speaker to issue from time to time such directions C as he may consider necessary in regard to the detailed working of the rules. Will such directions also be considered as constitutional mandates?

38Copy pinpoint38. Rules 7,8 and 9 set out the procedure for seeking disqualification of a member. In this case the petitions for disqualifications were filed even on D 24.10.97 long before the expiry of the period of 30 days specified in Rule 3. The question of disqualification had to be decided in those petitions. The power to decide disputed disqualification under Para 6(1) of the Tenth schedule is 'pre-eminently of a judicial complexion'. The Speaker or the Chairman acting under Para 6(1) is a Tribunal (See 'Hollohan' [1992] Supp. 2 S.C.C. 651. Can the entries in the register maintained under Rule 6 by the Secretary have the effect of establishing the two conditions required for para 3 of the Tenth Schedule? It can if at all be only a piece of evidence in support of the claim of one party. If as contended by the appellant's counsel, failure to comply with the rule will prevent the raising of a plea of split, the compliance of the rule must have the effect of conclusively proving the conditions required for para 3. That will lead to an anomalous situation. When a disqualification proceeding is initiated against the members who claim the benefit of para 3, they can defeat the proceeding by furnishing some information to the Speaker under Rule 3 and getting it recorded in the Register under rule 6. Thus a matter which has to be decided judicially under Para 6(1) of the Tenth schedule may get decided administratively by compliance of Rules 3 and 6. Undoubtedly G such a status cannot be given to the rules which are only procedural. If the contention of Mr. Sibal is accepted, form will stand exalted over substance.

39Copy pinpoint39. Now I shall advert to 'Ravi S. Naik' 1994 Supp. (2) S.C.C. 641. Both the learned Judges who decided the case were party to the majority Judgment in "Hollohan'. It is too much to say that they had not properly understood H

248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A their own dictum in 'Hollohan'. After referring to the provisions of the Tenth Schedule and the decision in 'Hollohan' the Bench dealt with the facts of each appeal separately. The Bench observed in C.A. 3390 of 1993 as follows:

" ... The Disqualification Rules have been framed to regulate the procedure that is to be followed by the Speaker for exercising the B power conferred on him under sub-paragraph ( 1) of Paragraph 6 of the Ofenth Schedule to the Constitution. The Disqualification Rules are, therefore, procedural in nature and any violation of the same would amount to an irregularity in procedure which is immune from judicial scrutiny in view of sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 6 as construed by

c this Court in Kihoto Hollohan case. Moreover, the field of judicial review in respect of the orders passed by the Speaker under sub- paragraph(!) of paragraph 6 as construed by this court in Kihoto Hollohan case is confined to breaches of the constitutional mandates, malafides, non compliance with rules ofNatural Justice and perversity. We are unable to uphold the contention of Shri Sen that the violation D of the Disqualification Rules amounts to violation of constitutional mandates. By doing so we would be elevating the rules to the status of the provisions of the constitution which is impermissible. Since the Disqualification Rules have been framed by the Speaker in exercise of the power conferred under paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule, they have a status subordinate to the Constitution and cannot be equated .E with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot, therefore, be regarded as constitutional mandates and any violation of the Disqualification Rules does not afford a ground for judicial review of the order of the Speaker in view of the finality clause contained in sub-paragraph (I) of paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule as construed by this Court in Kihoto Hollohan case.

40Copy pinpoint40. Again in Civil Appeal 2904of1993, the Bench dealt with paras 2 and 3 of the 10th Schedule and said:

"As noticed earlier paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule provides for disqualification on the ground of defection if the conditions laid down therein are fulfilled and paragraph 3 of the said schedule avoids such disqualification in case of split. Paragraph 3 proceeds on the assumption that but for the applicability of the said provision the disqualification under Paragraph 2 would be attracted. The burden to prove the requirements of paragraph 2 is on the person who claims that a H member has incurred the disqualification and the burden to prove the

MA YAWAT!v. MARKANDEYACHAND[SRINIVASAN,J.] 249 requirements of paragraph 3 is on the member who claims that there has been a split in his original political party and by virtue of said split the disqualification under paragraph 2 is not attracted. In the present case Naik has not disputed that he has given up his membership of his original political party but he has claimed that there has been a split in the said party. The burden, therefore, Jay on Naik to prove that the alleged split satisfies the requirements of paragraph 3. The said requirements are:

(i) The member of a House should make a claim that he and other members of his legislature party constitute the group representing a faction which has arisen as a result of a split in his original party; and C (ii) Such group must consist of not less than one-third of the members of such legislature party.

In the present case the first requirement was satisfied because Naik has made such a claim. The only question is whether the second requirement was fulfilled. The total number of members in the legislature party of the MGP (the original political party) was eighteen. In order to fulfil the requirements of paragraph 3, Naik's group should consist of not Jess than 6 members of the legislature party of the MGP. Naik has claimed that at the time of split on December 24, 1990 his group consisted of eight members whose signatures are contained in the declaration, a copy of which was filed with the reply dated February 13, 1991.

The Speaker has held that the split had not been proved because no intimation about the split has been given to him in accordance with Rules 3 and 4 of the Disqualification Rules. We find it difficult to endorse this view. Rule 3 requires the information in respect of matters specified in clauses (a) (b) and (c) of sub-rule (1) to be furnished in the prescribed form (Form 1) to the Speaker by the leader of the legislature party within 30 days after the first sitting of the House or where such legislature is formed after the first sitting, within 30 days after its formation. Rule 4 relates to information to be furnished by every member to the Secretary of the Assembly in the prescribed form (Form III). In respect of a member who has taken his seat in the House before the date of commencement of the Disqualification Rules, the information is required to be furnished within 30 days from such date. Jn respect of a member who takes his seat in the House after the H

250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A commencement of the Disqualification Rules, such information has to be furnished before making and subscribing an oath or affirmation under Article 188 of the Constitution and taking his seat in the House. Rule 4 has no application in the present. case because the stage for furnishing the required information had passed long back when the members made and subscribed to oath and affirmation after their B election in 1989. Rule 3 also comes into play after the split and the failure on the part of the leader of the group that has been constituted as a result of the split does not mean that there has been no split. As to whether there was a split or not has to be determined by the Speaker on the basis of the material placed before him. In the c present case the split was sought to be proved by the declaration dated December 24, 1990 whereby eight MLAs belonging to the MGP declared that they had constituted themselves into a group known as Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (Ravi Naik Group). A xerox copy of the said declaration was submitted along with the reply filed by Naik on February 13, 1991 and the original declaration bearing the signatures of the eight MLAs was produced by the advocate for Naik during the course of the hearing before the Speaker on February 13, 1991. The genuineness of the signatures on the said declaration was not disputed before the Speaker. One of the signatories of the declaration, namely, Dharma Chodankar, had written to the Speaker that his signatures were obtained forcibly. That may have a bearing on the number of members constituting the group. But the fact that a group was constituted is established by the said declaration." [Emphasis supplied]

With respect, I express my whole-hearted agreement with the reasoning. The ruling does not at all require re-consideration. The contention of the appellant is therefore rejected. I hold that the Speaker has not violated any of the constitutional mandates.

(JI) Violation of principles of Natural Justice

41Copy pinpoint41. Under this head, the argument of the appellant relates to two affidavits filed on 25.2.98, six on 4.3.98 and one on 10.3.98. The two affidavits filed on 25.2.98 were that of Narinder Singh and Markandeya Chand. They were presented when the arguments were proceeding. The same was objected to by the counsel who was appearing for the appellant before the Speaker on the ground that they had been filed after 9.2.98 which was the last day to produce evidence. In the copy of the proceedings dated 25.2.98, the following statement is found :

MAYAWATlv. MARKANDEYACHAND[SRINIVASAN,J.] 251 "Whether the above affidavits be placed on record and be read in evidence or not will be considered presently during arguments".

According to the appellant, the Speaker did not pass any order thereafter to take the affidavits on record but he relied on them in his order and thus violated the principles of Natural Justice as the appellant had no opportunity to controvert the averments in the affidavits. B

42Copy pinpoint42. In his order, the Speaker has stated as follows:

"When we resumed the hearing at 6.00 P.M. on 25.2.98 the respondents' counsel Shri A. Kumar made a request that the presence of6 MLAs who were in the division of the BSP on 21.10.97 be noted C and the affidavits ofChaudhary Narendra Singh and Shri Markandeya Chand be read in evidence. These six MLAs were Sarvasri Munna Lal Maurya, Rajendra Singh Patel, Jai Narain Tewari, Ved Prakash, Shiv Ganesh Lodhi and Qasim Hasan. The names of all these MLAs are mentioned in Annexure I to the aforesaid affidavits. D Similarly, the petitioners also produced Sarvasri Haji Akbar Husain, Ram Ratan Yadav, Vibhuti Prasad Nishad, Shiv Charan Prajapati, Ram Kripal Singh, Chhotey Lal Rajbhar and Matesh Chandra Sonkar MLAs and requested that their presence on the petitioners' side be also noted. The names of these persons also find place in Annexure I to E the said affidavits.

The presence of all the above mentioned MLAs presented by both sides was accordingly noted.

So far as the affidavits of Chaudhary Narendra Singh and F Markandeya Chand are concerned, the petitioners counsel strongly objected to the same on the ground that the respondents were given last opportunity to file affidavit by 9.2.1998 which date has expired and hence the affidavits should not be taken or record.

On being asked whether the petitioners would like to file reply to G the said affidavit in case the same is placed on record, the petitioners' Senior Counsel Shri Umesh Chandra stated that he would not file any reply but would object to taking the same on record. During the course of arguments Shri Umesh Chandra referred to some paragraphs of this affidavit also to contend that there was no division of the BSP. (Underlining mine) H

252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A I find that for determining the controversy completely and finally it is in the interest of justice to place the affidavits on record and particularly when the petitioners do not want to file any reply to the same.

Again in another place, it is stated as follows: B The various applications, pleadings and affidavits filed after the petition was amended on 5.12.97, have already been stated earlier in this order and they need not be repeated here. Reference to the relevant applications, pleadings and affidavits shall made where considered necessary. Suffice it to say that in order to finally and C completely adjudicate upon the controversy, and in the interest of justice, and particularly keeping in view the serious consequences flowing from disqualification of a member of the Assembly, I have taken on record all the applications and affidavits filed even after 9.2.1998. Parties have been afforded sufficient opportunity to meet the case of each other. D

43Copy pinpoint43. In the S.L.P. a ground is raised that the averment in the order that the appellant's counsel said that he would not file any reply to the affidavits is factually incorrect. But there is no denial whatever in the SLP of the averment that during the course of arguments Shri Umesh Chandra referred to some paragraphs of that affidavit also to contend that there was no division of the BSP. No argument was also advanced before us challenging the correctness of that averment. When the appellant's counsel had himself relied on portions of the affidavits filed on 25.2.98, there is no substance in the contention that the Speaker had ta~~n them on record behind the back of the appellant. There is also no substance in the contention that the appellant had no opportunity to controvert the contents of those affidavits. On the very same day (25.2.98), the appellant filed an application and affidavits of nine MLAs at 7.40 P.M. She could have then said whatever she wanted to say about the contents of the affidavits filed by the respondents. It is not the case of the appellant that Speaker did not permit her to file any affidavit in reply to the said affidavits of the respondents. The only objection to the reception of the affidavits in question was that it was filed after the expiry of the time granted earlier to file a list of members of BSP. The appellant was represented by practising lawyers who knew very well that the Speaker had ample powers to condone the delay in filing the affidavits. In the Proceedings of 25.2.98 it is stated towards the end that "learned counsel for the two sides had made their submissions on factual and legal aspects". It is not the case

MAY AW AT! v. MARKANDEY A CHAND [SRINIVASAN, J.) 253 of the appelwnt that any argument with reference to the said affidavits was shut out. Moreover the contents of the affidavits filed on 25.2.98 are almost a repetition of the contents of the Additional Written Statement filed on 2.2.98 plus the two annexures containing the names of26 members, who formed the group of JBSP on 21.10.97 and 18 members, who continued in the group till then besides a plea of split within split. I do not find any violation of the principles of Natural Justice in the Speaker's taking on record the two affidavits filed by the respondent on 25.2.98.

44Copy pinpoint44. The other affidavits said to have been taken on record without notice to the appellant were filed on 4.3.98 and 10.3.98. According to the respondents, those affidavits were filed in reply to the nine affidavits filed by the appellant on 25.2.98 at 7.40 P.M. According to them the appellant filed them without serving copies on them and they had to obtain copies from the office of the Speaker on 27.2.98. It is stated by the appellant that the affidavits filed on her behalf were presented before the Speaker in the course of arguments in the presence of counsel for the parties. The proceedings of the Speaker dated 25 .2.98 do not make any reference to the said affidavits. The endorsement on the margin of the application of the appellant dated 25.2.98 and the affidavits filed therewith prove that they were filed in the office of the Secretary to the Speaker at 7.40 P.M. and on the same day, the Speaker has made an endorsement in the margin directing the placing of the application and affidavits on record. Whatever ·it may be, it is not the case of the appellant that copies of those affidavits were served on the respondents or their counsel. There is no record to prove such service.

45Copy pinpoint45. The Speaker has dealt with this matter in his order as follows:-

"The petitioners themselves had filed 9 affidavits at 7 .40 P.M. on F 25.2.1998 while hearing on the petitions was going on. Copies of these affidavits were not served on respondents on 25.2.1998. Their counsel obtained it on 27.2.1998 i.e. after the orders were reserved on the case on 25.2.1998. The respondents filed 6 affidavits dated 25.2.1998 and 27 .2.1998 by means of an application dated 4.3 .I 998 which specifically stated that these affidavits were being filed in reply to the said 9 G affidavits. The affidavit ofShri Ram Ratan Yadav filed on 10.3.1998 is almost entirely the same as the affidavits filed by the petitioners on 252.1998.

One more fact needs to be stated at this stage. Shri R.K. Chaudhary, petitioner, sent an application/letter dated 16.3.1998 asking for copies H

254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of the affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents after the order was reserved on 25.2.1998. The copies of these affidavits were sent to Shri R.K. Chaudhary along with a letter dated 17.3 .1998 in which he was infonned that copies of the affidavits filed by the petitioner on 25.2.1998 were received by the respondents' counsel on 27.2.1998 and the affidavits filed alongwith the application dated 4.3.1998 were filed in B reply thereof. Along with the said letter, a copy of the affidavit filed by Shri Ram Ratan Yadav dated 10.3.98 was also sent to Shri R.K. Chaudhary. It was specifically mentioned in the letter of 17.3.98 that in case he wanted to submit anything he may appear before me on 19.3.98 at 1.00 P.M. lnfonnation of this date was sent to the respondents c also. On 19.3.98 the respondents Chaudhary Narendra Singh and Markandeya Chand appeared along with their counsel Shri A. Kumar and Sri N.K. Pandey. On behalf of the petitioners Shri Daya Ram Pal, President of the U.P. BSP handed over a letter of Shri R.K. Chaudhary that the purpose of the letter dated 17.3.98 was not clear and as such the same be made clear. In reply to this letter of Shri R.K. Chaudhary, D a letter was sent to him on 19.3.98 infonning him that ifhe wanted to file any reply to the said affidavit or submit anything in his favour or to file anything, he may do the same on that date i.e. 19.3.98. Nobody appeared thereafter on behalf of the petitioner Shri R.K. Chaudhary nor filed any document. The aforesaid letters have been placed on the E records. In my view, in the particular circumstances of the case no prejudice has been caused to any of the parties by admitting the aforesaid affidavits on record".

46Copy pinpoint46. Again the Speaker has stated thus in his order:-

F "Since the facts stated about the split and threat etc. in the affidavits of Sri Vans Narain Singh and others filed on 2.2.1998 and the affidavits dated 25.2.1998 of Shri Markandeya Chand and Chaudhary Narendra Singh, (including the allegations of split within split) and the facts stated in the six affidavits filed through the application dated 4.3 .1998 have not been controverted despite G opportunity having been given to the petitioner Shri R.K. Chaudhary (who was also looking after the petitions of Ms. Mayawati), I prefer to place reliance on them and hold that there was a split in the Bahujan Samaj Party on 21.l 0.1997 and a faction had risen as a result of this split in the BSP and a group of BSP MLAs consisting of 26 H BSP MLAs (whose names are mentioned in Annexure I to the affidavits

MAYAWATiv. MARKANDEYACHAND[SRINIVASAN,J.] 255 of Chaudhary Narendra Singh and Shri Markandeya Chand, filed on A 25.2.1998) was constituted on 21.10.97 itselfrepresenting the faction, which thus arose and that this group known as Jantantrik BSP".

47Copy pinpoint47. An objection is taken before us in the course of arguments that R.K. Chaudhary never represented the appellant in the proceedings before the Speaker and notice to him will not amount to notice to the appellant. No such ground has been taken in the S.L.P. There is no denial in the S.L.P. of the averment found in the order of the Speaker that R.K. Chaudhary was looking after the petitions of the appellant. Without challenging the correctness of the statement in the S.L.P., it is not open to counsel for the appellant to raise the contention for the first time in the course of his arguments. In the order of the Speaker dated 7.11.97 it is stated that R.K. Chaudhary, MLA and D.R. Verma, Ex Chairman Legislative Assembly came and produced two letters of the appellant before the Speaker which shows that R.K. Chaudhary did represent the appellant in these proceed in gs. In fact he filed petitions for disqualification only on 11.11.97 and those petitions were nothing but repetition of the petitions filed by the appellant. In the circumstances it is not possible for this Court to say that the averment made by the Speaker in his order that R.K. Chaudhary was looking after the petitions filed by the appellant is not correct.

48Copy pinpoint48. While I am unable to accept the factual contention that the appellant had no opportunity to controvert the affidavits filed before the Speaker on 25.2.98, 4.3.98 and 10.3.98, I am of the opinion that even so there is no violation of the principles of riatural justice. This court has in The Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and Anr. v. Ramjee, [ 1977] 2 S.C.C. 256, discussed the principles of natural justice and ~: F "Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and G circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt - that is the conscience of the matter................................ H

256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

"But then we cannot look at law in the abstract or natural justice as a mere artifact. Nor can we fit into a rigid mould the concept of reasonable opportunity" ..... '............................................................................... .

"These general observations must be tested on the concrete facts of each case and every miniscule violation does not spell illegality. If the totality of circumstances satisfies the court that the party visited with adverse order has not suffered from denial of reasonable opportunity the Court will decline to be punctilious or fanatical as if the rules of natural justice were sacred scriptures".

49Copy pinpoint49. It has not been proved by the appellant that there is a failure of substantial justice. In the absence of bias and ma/a-fides, the contention that the order of the Speaker is vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice has to fail.

(III) PERVERSITY

50Copy pinpoint50. One of the contentions urged under this head is that Speaker has by unduly delaying the proceedings acted perversely. Though learned senior counsel stated expressly in the course of his arguments that he is not alleging bias or personal ma/a fides against the Speaker, in the written submissions given by him, it is stated as follows: F "The Hon 'ble Speaker by not deciding the petitions expeditiously and by allowing the BJP time to gamer support for the purposes of the defence of the respondents under paragraph 3 has acted contrary to the constitutional mandate".

G The said submission is not permissible in view of the statement expressly made and referred to above. In any event, merely because there is a delay in concluding the hearing, the order cannot be said to be perverse. The Speaker has framed the question properly as to whether a split, as alleged by the respondents, had taken place on 21.10.97 and whether it was supported by acceptable evidence. This Court in exercise of its power of limited judicial review has only to see whether the findings arrived at by the Speaker are

MA YAWATI v. MARKANDEY A CHAND [SRINIVASAN, J.] 257

perverse in the sense in which the expression "perversity" has been understood by this court in several decisions. I am unable LO accept that as a matter of law, delay in the completion of proceedings would by itself vitiate the order passed by him.

51Copy pinpoint51. But I wish to add that it is absolutely necessary for every Speaker to fix a time schedule in the relevant rules for disposal of the proceedings for disqualification of MLAs or MPs. In my opinion all such proceedings shall be concluded and orders should be passed within a period of three weeks from the date on which the petitions are taken on file.

52Copy pinpoint52. Before considering the relevant findings of the Speaker which are said to be perverse by the appellant, it is better to refer to the rulings which define perversity.

53Copy pinpoint53. As pointed out already in Kihoto Hallahan v. Zachillhu and others, [1992] Supp. 2 S.C.C. 651 the Constitution Bench has laid down that the power of judicial review vis-a-vis the order of the Speaker under paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth schedule is confined to jurisdictional errors only based on violation of constitutional mandate, ma/a fides, non compliance of rules of natural justice and perversity.

54Copy pinpoint54. In Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) Vol 2 All England Reports 680 Lord Greene, M.R. dealt with a case where the proprietors of a Cinema theatre sought a declaration that a condition imposed by the Wednesbury Corporation on grant of permission for Sunday performances to be held in that cinema was ultra vires. The Court dismissed the action. The relevant passage in the judgment reads as follows: F "In the present case we have heard a great deal about the meaning of the word "Unreasonable". It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. What does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to the exercise of statutory discretions often use the word "unreasonable" in a rather G comprehensive sense. It is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to the matter that he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may H

258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A truly be said, and often is said, to be acting "Unreasonably". Similarly, you may have something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority .... "

After referring to a judgment of Theatre de Luxe (Halifax) Ltd. v. Gledhill. 5 (1915) 2 K.B. 49 the learned Judge observed: B "I do not find in any of the language that he used any justification for thinking that it is for the court to decide the question of any justification for thinking that it is for the court to decide the question of reasonableness rather than the local authority. I do not read him as in any way dissenting from the view which I have ventured to c express, that the task of the court is not to decide what it thinks is reasonable, but to decide whether the condition imposed by the local authority is one which no reasonable authority, acting within the four corners of their jurisdiction, could have decided to impose".

55Copy pinpoint55. In "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" 5th ed. at P.549 it is D stated as follows:

"Unreasonableness" is sometimes used to denote particularly extreme behaviour, such as acting in bad faith, or a decision which is "perverse" or "absurd" - implying that the decision-maker has taken leave of his senses". E

56Copy pinpoint56. In CCSU v. Minister for Civil Service, (1984) 3 All E.R. 935 Lord Diplock observed :-

"By 'irrationality' I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' (see Associated Provincial F Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) Vol. 2 All E.R. 680, (1948) 1 K.B. 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defence of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it". G

57Copy pinpoint57. In Nottinghamshire County Council v. Secretary of the Environ- ment and Anr., appeal ( 1986) Vol 1 All E.R. 199 Lord Scarman observed as follows:

"Such an examination by a court would be justified only if a prima facie case were to be shown for holding that the Secretary of State

MA YAWATI v. MARKANDEYA CHAND [SRINIVASAN, J.] 259

had acted in bad faith or for an improper motive, or that the consequences of his guidance were so absurd that he must have taken leave of his senses".

58Copy pinpoint58. In Tata Cellular v. Union ofIndia, (1994] 6 S.C.C. 651, a Three Judge Bench of this court to which one of us (M.M. Punchhi, J., as His Lordship then was) was a party, the law was stated thus: B " ... Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under:

(i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision making power and must C give effect to it.

(ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness.

(iii) Procedural impropriety"

59Copy pinpoint59. In Union of India and another v. G. Ganavutham, (1997] 7 S.C.C. D 463 this court has interpreted reasonableness and rationality which are two grounds for judicial review. The Court referred to the rule in Wednesbury (supra) and observed:

"Therefore to arrive at a decision on "reasonableness" the Court has to find out if the administrator has left out relevant factors or taken into account irrelevant factors. The decision of the administrator must have been within the four corners of the law, and not one which no sensible person could have reasonably arrived at, having regard to the above principles, and must have been a bona fide one. The decision could be one of many choices open to the authority but it was for that authority to decide upon the choice and not for the Court to substitute its view".

60Copy pinpoint60. The order of the Speaker has to be tested in the light of the above principles only in order to decide whether it is perverse. The Speaker has taken note of the following circumstances for accepting the case of the respondents:

(i) Markandeya Chand announced on the floor of the Assembly on 21.10.97 that under his leadership 23 MLAs got separated from BSP and they formed one group. Th is was not controverted by the appellant or the other m=~~~BS~ H

260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (ii) In spite of such announcement, the petition filed by the appellant on 24.10.97 did not invoke paragraph 2(l)(a) of the Tenth Schedule for disqualifying the respondents. There was no mention whatever about the split announced in the Assembly. .....• (iii) In the petitions filed by R.K. Chaudhary on 11.11. 97, the position B was the same. There was no reference to the split announced in the Assembly.

(iv) On 13.11.97 applications were filed for amendment of the petitions which were allowed by the Speaker but there was no reference in these applications either to the split or to paragraph 2 (l)(a) of the Tenth Schedule.

c (v) On 25.11.97 the respondents filed the written statement in which it was stated that a split had occurred as a result of which there was more than one third of the BSP legislators under the leadership of Markandeya Chand. On 26.11.97 appellant filed a reply/rejoinder. There was no denial of the split referred to in the written statement of the respondents. D (vi) On 5.12.97 applications for amendment of the petitions were filed in which there was only a denial of correctness of the statement made by Markandeya Chand in the Assembly that 23 legislators of BSP were with him. In Paragraphs 7A and 78 of the petitions, which were introduced by the said amendment, there was no dispute of the factum of split pleaded by the E respondents.

(vii) On 2.2.98 an additional written statement was filed by Vansh Narain Singh setting out the facts relating to the split and formation of JBSP. There was also a reference to the threat caused by the appellant to JBSP F members and the fact that they were prevented from going to Lucknow. There was also an allegation that signatures wt:re taken on blank papers from such members. The averments in the additional written statement were never controverted.

(viii) The affidavits filed by the appellant on 25.2.98 were sworn to in G November, 1997. There was no explanation for the same. Three of the affidavits were contradicted and controverted by the deponents thereof. The stamp papers on which the affidavits had been prepared were issued on the same day and the names of the persons to whom the stamp papers were issued were not written by the stamp vendor.

H (ix) The list of persons who joined JBSP on 21.10.97 was for the first

MAYAWATiv. MARKANDEYACHAND[SRINIVASAN,J.] 261 time disclosed on 25.2.98 only but the appellant had obtained affidavits from A

- 9 of them in November 1997 itself. That shows that the appellant knew that those 9 MLAs were at that time in the group led by Markandeya Chand.

(x) The video cassettes and other records filed in the case revealed that the appellant had instigated violence in the Assembly on 21.10.97 and disrupted the proceedings. That itself probablises the version that the MLAs who B ·supported the respondents were kept under threat by the appellant and prevented from going to Lucknow for some time. The matter is one of oath against oath and the affidavits filed by the respondents and the other evidence produced by them were acceptable.

61Copy pinpoint61. All the above circumstances referred to and relied on by the C Speaker are quite relevant and germane for deciding the issue whether there was a split on 21.10.97 and whether the group led by Markandeya Chand had not less than one third members of the BSP legislature party.

62Copy pinpoint62. Apart from this, the Speaker has considered the various facts relied D on by the appellant and discussed the same. According to the appellant the following are the facts which would disprove the case of the respondents:

(a) That a claim was made by Markandeya Chand in the Assembly that he had 23 BSP MLAs along with him who got separated but the respondents who are 12 in number were the only members of the BSP E who had voted in support of the Motion of Confidence on that day.

(b) Those 12 persons became Ministers on 27.10.97.

(c) In spite of several opportunities having been given and in-spite of expiry of the time finally granted till 9.2.98, the respondents did not disclose the names of the members of the JBSP who were said to be F 26 in number.

(d) When the list was given on 25.2.98 there were only 17 members in all in JBSP.

(e) The respondents have not complied with the mandatory provisions G of Rule 3 of the Rules in-spite of extension of time granted by the Speaker.

63Copy pinpoint63. All the above circumstances relied on by the appellant have been referred to and discussed in detail by the Speaker in his order. If any of them had been ignored, it could be said that his order is vitiated. But that is not H

262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the case here. When there is no bias or mala fide, the acceptance of one

- party's statement on facts and rejection of the other cannot be canvassed before this Court.

64Copy pinpoint64. The appellant's counsel argued that the Speaker is in error in proceeding on the basis that the averments in the affidavits filed on 25.2.98 B on behalf of the respondents were not controverted by the appellant and the Speaker has overlooked that in the application filed by the appellant on 25.2.98 along with nine affidavits they have been specifically controverted. It is also argued that the Speaker is in the wrong in rejecting the affidavits of the MLAs filed by the appellant on the ground that they were sworn in C November 1997 on different dates. It is submitted by learned counsel that the appellant started collecting such affidavits from all the members of the BSP from 6.11.97 after the respondents claimed that they had 24 members in their group and that she could get them only when the concerned MLAs were available"in Lucknow.

65Copy pinpoint65. The above arguments are fallacious. The first of them negatives the other plea of the appellant that no opportunity was given to her to controvert the averments in the affidavits of the respondents filed on 25.2.98. It is already seen that the relevant averments were all made in the additional written " statement filed on 2.2.98 and the appellant did not file any reply thereto. The E averments setting out the reason for the split in the party on 21.10.97 and the averments describing the way in which the appellant kept the MLAs under threat and forced them to sign blank papers were never controverted. That is a crucial circumstance relied on by the Speaker and he cannot be faulted therefore. The Speaker has drawn an inference that the appellant knew that the 9 MLAs whose affidavits were filed by her on 25.2.98 were members of the group of the respondents when it was formed on 21.10.97 and that is why she got affidavits from them in November 1997 by force. In the S.L.P. the said inference of the Speaker has not been traversed. There is no averment in the S.L.P .. or any other record that the appellant got affidavits from November' 97 onwards of all the MLAs who continued to be in the BSP. In the absence of any such record, an argument advanced by counsel at the fag end of the arguments cannot be accepted.

66Copy pinpoint66. The reasoning of the Speaker is in the following passages:-

"The affidavits of the respondents thus remain uncontroverted and there is nothing on the record to disbelieve them. On the other hand, the statements made on oath in the respondents' affidavits are

MAYAWATI v. MARKANDEYACHAND[SRINIVASAN,J.] 263

corroborated by the following materials on the record:- A (i) Statement of Shri Sardar Singh made on the floor of the House on 21.10.97 while speaking on the motion of confidence. The petitioners have not filed any evidence to controvert the statement of Shri Sardar Singh, which was made on the fust available opportunity. B (ii) Admission in Paragraph 3 of the 9 affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents that there was anarchy in the House on 21.10.97. These affidavits have been sworn in the month of November, 1997 and are totally silent on the points of Ms. Mayawati's direction given on 21.10.97. C (iii) Video cassettes recording the proceedings dated 21. l 0.97 of the House unmistakably, and with prominence, show Ms. Mayawati instigating, exhorting and directing the BSP MLAs sitting behind her and on her side, to come to the well of the House and create disturbance. It may be noticed the Speaker D was being attacked by BSP MLAs and other opposition MLAs by suing(sic) wooden loud speaker box, microphones etc. The video cassettes of Enadu, Bl, Zee, ANITV channels may be referred to in this behalf. These cassettes are on the record. Still photographs taken from some of the video cassettes have also been placed on the record.

(iv) The fact that violence was committed, and disturbance created, in the House at the instance of Ms. Mayawati and some other opposition MLAs immediately after the recital of 'V ande Matram' was over and the Speaker was attacked. This is precisely what Ms. Mayawati had directed her MLAs to do on 21.10.97."

G "The video cassettes clearly show that Ms. Mayawati instigated and abetted the commission of violence in the House on 21.10.1997 in which microphones, table tops and sound boxes were pulled up from _._the legislators' and reporters' table and used for assaulting the Speaker and others. Their acts are criminal in nature. Abetrnent of these acts H

264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A is also a crime. There is prima facie evidence in the present petitions to show that Ms. Mayawati is guilty of this offence".

B "Now it is to be seen as to whether as matter of fact a faction had arisen as a result of split in the BSP and the respondents have made a claim that they and other members of the BSP Legislature party had constituted a group representing that faction. c Paragraph 1I of the affidavits of Sarvsri Vans Narain Singh and other respondents, filed on 2.2.98, clearly states that in the background of directions given by Ms. Mayawati to the BSP MLAs when they had sat in the cars for coming to the Assembly, these respondents and other MLAs of the BSP, whose number was not less than one- D third of the total number of the BSP MLAs, sat in the lobby, discussed the matter and at that very moment there was a split amongst the BSP MLAs and these members of the BSP, who separated from the BSP, formed a separate group under the leadership of Shri Markandey Chand and that the number of such members was not less than one- third of the BSP members. It is further averred that it was not possible E for them to remain members of the BSP any more and that the fact was stated by Shri Markandey Chand in the House on 21.10.97. Paragraph 12 of the said affidavits further state that as was apparent from the statement of Shri Markandey Chand there was a split in the BSP and there were 23 member (MLAs) after that split with him and this became F a separate group. The timings of the split was given before the Speaker came to the sitting of the House on 21.10.1997.

The averments in these affidavits are corroborated by the statement ofShri Markandey Chand given on the floor of the House on 21.10.1997 which was read in evidence by agreement of parties. G The petitioners did not file any reply to the said affidavits".

MAY AWAT! v. MARKANDEY A CHAND [SRINIVASAN, J.] 265

"There is no sufficient reason to disbelieve the avennents in these A affidavits. They have been corroborated in material particulars by circumstance and other materials on record. The reason given for splitting the BSP has been found to be true as it is supported by the actual happening of violent events in the House on 21.10.1997, which took place at the active instigation exhortation and abetting of Ms. B Mayawati herself. The video cassettes and the news reports of the proceedings of the House of 21.10.97 further support this. Then the statement of Shri Sardar Singh about the split and its cause and Shri Markandey Chand's statement about the split both made on the first available opportunity on the floor of the House on 2 l. l 0.97 itself are there. Shri Markandey Chand informed the House of the fact of split C in BSP by 23 BSP MLAs under his leadership.

Another fact which supports the case of the respondents is that, apart from the respondents, there were many BSP MLAs who did not participate in the disorder or violence in the House. The respondents say that they were those who were in the group of BSP MLAs D causing split. This fact of non-participation of several BSP MLAs in disorder or violence is corroborated by the video cassettes".

E "Further, the petitioners counsel had stated on 26.11.97 that he did not propose to file any documentary evidence except those filed with the petitions. These affidavits have been suddenly produced on 25.2.98 when Chaudhary Narendra Singh and Shri Markandey Chand filed their affidavits disclosing the names of 26 MLAs and further setting up the case of split within split. The contents of these affidavits F are not supported by the events of21.10.1997. There is no reason why their recent affidavits were not filed. In fact they do create a suspicion in the mind that they had been obtained by the petitioners under threat as alleged by the respondents". G

67Copy pinpoint67. There is not even an attempt to explain any of the above features relied on by the Speaker for rejecting the nine affidavits filed by the appellant on 25.2.98. Nor is there any argument against the reliance placed by the Speaker on the video tapes showing how the appellant instigated the MLAs to resort to violence and disturb the proceedings in the Assembly on 21.10.97. The question before this Court is not whether on the facts and circumstances H

266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of the case there was a split as alleged by the respondents on 21.10.97 but the question is whether the conclusion arrived at by the Speaker after taking note of all the aforesaid circumstances, for and against the respondents is so unreasonable or absurd or perverse that he must have taken leave of his senses. The Speaker has not left out any relevant material from consideration; nor has he referred to any irrelevant matter. In the facts and circumstances of this case it can not be said that no reasonable or sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at the findings given by the Speaker. It should not be forgotten while dealing with this question of perversity that according to the appellant's counsel there was no bias or mala fide on the part of the Speaker. If the materials on record are considered on that basis it can at best be said that, if at all, two conclusions were possible and the Speaker has chosen one of them. In the circumstances I do not find any perversity in the findings rendered by the Speaker. It is worth recalling the observations of Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in Re Amin (1983) 2 All E.R. 864 at page 868, that "Judicial review is concerned not with the merits of a decision but with the manner in which the decision was made ... Judicial review is entirely different from an ordinary appeal".

68Copy pinpoint68. The Speaker has considered the question of split within split alleged to have taken place in JBSP. It is unnecessary for the purpose of this case to go into that question. Such a subsequent split in JBSP is referred to by the respondents only for the purpose of explaining how there were only 19 members in that group on 25.2.98. The only relevant question is whether there was a split on 21.10.97 and the group which got separated from the BSP consisted of not less than one third members of the BSP legislature party. That question having been answered in favour of the respondents, it is not necessary to go into the question whether there was a further split in JBSP and if so, the effect, thereof. After considering the materials on record, I am of the opinion that the findings arrived at by the Speaker are not vitiated by perversity.

G. SEQUEL TO JUDICIAL REVIEW G

69Copy pinpoint69. In the view I have taken it is not necessary for me to consider the question whether this Court should decide the entire matter here in the event of setting aside the order of the Speaker or remand the matter for fresh disposal by the Speaker in accordance with the judgment of this Court. For the sake of completion, I wish to express my opinion on that question too. H If the order of the Speaker is to be set aside, I am of the view that the matter

MAY AW ATl v. MARKANDEYA CHAND [SRINIVASAN, J.] 267

should go back to the Speaker for fresh decision. It is not the function of this A Court to substitute itself in place of the Speaker and decide the questions which have arisen in the case. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the judgment of this court in Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd., Calcutta v. Their workmen, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 136. The law as stated in that case is as follows: B " ..... A free and liberal exercise of the power under Art. 136 may materially affect the fundamental basis of such decisions, namely, quick solution of such disputes to achieve industrial peace. Though Art. 136 is couched in widest terms, it is necessary for this Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction only in cases where awards are C made in violation of the principles of natural justice, causing substantial and grave injustice to parties or raises an important principle of industrial law requiring elucidation and final decision by this court or discloses such other exceptional or special circumstances which merit the consideration of this Court". D I do not know how this passage would help the appellant. This Court has only said that interference under Article 136 is necessary (!)where awards are made in violation of the p:inciples of natural justice causing substantial and grave injustice to parties (2) where the case raises an important principle of law requiring elucidation and final decision of this Court and (3) where the case discloses such other exceptional circumstances which merit the E consideration of this Court. The passage cannot be interpreted to mean that after setting aside the order of the Tribunal, the factual questions could be decided by this Court. Learned counsel referred also to Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd., [1979] l S.C.R. 563. The Court relied upon the passage in Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical F Work Ltd., (supra) extracted above and modified the award. That ruling also does not help the appellant in any manner.

70Copy pinpoint70. In Vice Chancellor, Utkal University v. S.K. Ghosh, [1954] S.C.R. ~83 the Constitution Bench held that it is not the function of Courts of law to substitute their wisdom and discretion for that of the persons to whose G judgment the matter in question is entrusted by the law.

71Copy pinpoint71. When the Tenth Schedule has expressly constituted the Speaker or the Chairman as the case may be to decide the question of disqualification and attach finality thereto, it is not for this Court to consider the facts and decide the said question by substituting itself in the place of the Speaker. If H

268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the order of the Speaker is set aside on any of the grounds mentioned in 'Hollohan' (supra) by exercising the power of limited judicial review, the consequential course to be adopted is to leave the matter to the Speaker to decide afresh in accordance with law.

H. CONCLUSION B

72Copy pinpoint72. The Speaker has found on the basis of the records that the appellant instructed the members of the BSP to indulge in violence and disrupt the proceedings in the Assembly on 21.10.97. It is also found that the allegations made by the respondents that the members of the JBSP were kept under threat by the appellant and prevented from entering Lucknow. In view of such finding also which is supported by records, the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution should not be exercised in favour of the appellant.

For all the above reasons this appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.

T.N.A. Appeal disposed of.