SAMATHA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS.

members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area and under Clause (b) to A regulate the allotment of land to members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area; under clause (c) regulates money-lending to the tribals in the Scheduled Area.

In the Constitution, the expression 'Scheduled Areas' has been defined to mean such area as the President may by order declare to be B Scheduled Areas. Clause (2) of para 6 provides that the President may at any time by order (a) direct that the whole or any specified part of a Scheduled Area shall cease to be a Scheduled Area or a part of such an area; (aa) increase the area. of any Scheduled Area in a State, after consultation with the Governor of that State; (b) alter, but only by way of rectification of boundaries, any Scheduled Area; (c) on any alteration of the boundaries of a State or on the admission into the Union or the establishment of a new State, declare any territory not previously included in any State to be, or to form part of, a Scheduled Area, Clause (d) deals with the rescission of any order under para 6. Such order may contain such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be necessary and proper, but save as aforesaid, the order made under sub- paragraph (1) of that paragraph shall not be varied by any subsequent order. Part D, para 7 empowers the Parliament to amend the Schedule by way of addition, variation or repeal of any of the provisions of the Fifth Schedule. Such a varied or modified Schedule shall be referred to such amended Schedule. The other details are not material for the purpose of this case. Hence they are omitted.

Scope and Sweep of the Regulation 1970.

As has been stated, the Regulation came into force on March 4, 1959 in Andhra area and in Telangana area with effect from December 1, 1963. F The prior order in operation in Telangana area will be dealt with a little later. The material provisions relevant for the purpose are dealt with hereunder.

Section 2(a) defines 'Agency tracts' to mean the areas in the districts G of East Godavari, West Godavari, Visakhapatnam, Srikakulam,Vi.zianagar, Adilabad, Nizamabad, Warangal, Khammam and Mahaboobnagar declared from time to time as Scheduled areas by the President under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. 'Scheduled Tribe' has been defined in Section 2(f) to mean any tribe or tribal community or part of or groups within any tribe or tribal community H

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A resident in the Agency tracts and specified as such by a public notification by the President under Clause (1) of Article 342 of the Constitution. Section 2(g) defines 'transfer' to mean mortgage with or without posses- sion, leas~, sa!e, gift, exchange or "any other dealing" with immovable property, not being a testamentary disposition and includes a charge on such property or a contract relating to such property in respect of such B mortgage, lease, sale, gift, exchange or other dealing. The definition of transfer is a comprehensively vide definition except testamentary disposi- tion by a tribal to another tribal so as to effectuate the prohibition of transfer of immovable property to any person other than a Scheduled Tribe or a Cooperative Society composed solely of members of the Scheduled C Tribes. ., Section 3(1) reads as under :

"3. Transfer of immovable property by a member of a Scheduled Tribe - D (l)(a) Notwithstanding anything in any enactment, rule or law in force in the Agency tracts any transfer of immovable property situated in the Agency tracts by a person. Whether or not such person is a member of a Scheduled Tribe,. shall be absolutely null and void, unless such transfer is made in favour of person, who is E a member of a Scheduled Tribe or a Society, Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act 1964 (Act 7of1964) which is composed .. solely of members of the Scheduled Tribes.

(b) Until the contrary is proved, any immovable property situated in the Agency tracts and in the possession of a person who is not a member of Scheduled Tribe, shall be presumed to have been acquired by person or his predecessor in possession through a transfer, made to him by a member of a Scheduled Tribes.

( c) Where a person intending to sell his land is not able to effect such sale, by reason of the fact that no member of a scheduled Tribe is willing to purchase the land or is willing to purchase the land on the terms offered by such person, then such person may apply to the Agent, the Agency Divisional Officer or any other prescribed officer for the acquisition of such land by the State H Government, and the Agent. Agency Divisional Officer or the

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prescribed officer as the case may be may by order, take over such A land on payment of compensation in accordance with the prin- ciples specified in Section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961 (Act X of 1961) and such land shall thereupon vest in the State Government free from all en- cumbrances and shall be disposed of in favour of members of the B Scheduled Tribes or a society registered or deemed to be registered under the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 (Act 7 of 1964) composed solely of members or in such other manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed."

.... Section 2 reads as under : c "2(a) Where a transfer of immovable property is made in con- travention of sub-st:ction (i), the Agent, the Agency Divisional Officer or any other prescribed Officer may, on application by any one interested, or on information given in writing by a public servant, or suo motu decree ejectment against any person in possession of the property claiming under the transfer, after due notice to him in the manner prescribed and may restore it to the transfer of his heirs.

(b) If the transferor or his heirs are not willing to take back the property or where their whereabouts are not known, the Agency, the Agency Divisional Officer or prescribed officer, as the case may be may order the assignment or sale of the property to any other member of a Scheduled Tribe (or a society registered or deemed to be registered under any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in the State) composed solely of members of the Scheduled Tribes, or otherwise dispose of it, as if it was a property at the disposal of State Government."

Section 4 reads as under :

"(4) For the purposes of this section, the expression 'transfer' G includes a sale in execution of a decree and also a transfer made by a member of Scheduled Tribe in favour of any other member of a Scheduled Tribe benami for the benefit of a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Tribe; but does not include a partition or a devolution by succession." H

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A Section 3, therefore, prohibits transfer of immovable property by a member of the Scheduled Tribes to a non-Scheduled Tribe. Sub- section (l)(a) envisages, with a non obstante clause, that notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment, rule or law in force in the Agency tracts, any transfer of immovable property situated in the Agency tracts by a person, whether or not such person is a member of a Schedule Tribe, shall be absolutely null and void, unless such transfer is made in favour of a Scheduled Tribe or a society registered or deemed to be registered under the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 and composed solely of members of the Scheduled Tribes. Clause (b) provides rule of evidence by way of presumption that until the contrary is proved, any immovable property situated in the Agency tracts and in the possession of a non-Scheduled Tribe, shall be presumed to have been acquired by such person or his predecessor in possession, through a transfer made to him by a member of a Scheduled Tribe (emphasis supplied). The burden would always be on the non-tribal to prove that the Land in his possession was not acquired by transfer from a tribal; in other words, the land belongs to tribal and the non-tribal possesses it in contravention of law.

Clause (c) of Section 3 provides that if a non-schedule tribe, though intending to sell, is unable to sell his land on account of either unwillingness of other tribal to purchase the land or the terms offered by him to a tribe, are inaccessible to a tribal, he may apply to the agent named or other prescribed officer who would acquire the land and take over possession of such land on payment of compensation in accordance with the principles laid down in Section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural F Holdings Act, 1961, as amended in 1972. Such land shall thereupon vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances and shall be disposed of in favour of members of the Scheduled Tribes or a Co-operative Society composed solely of members of the Scheduled Tribes or in such other manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed.

G In case of any transfer made in contravention of sub-section (1) of Section 3, the agent, the Agency Division Officer, or any other prescribed officer, may, on an application by any one interested, or on information given in writing by a public servant or suo nwtu, issue decree of ejectment against an¹ person in possession of the property claiming under the H transfer. This should be done after due notice to such person. Clause (b)

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of sub-section (2) of Section 3 provides that if a transferer or his heirs are A not willing to take back the property or where whereabouts of the transferer are not known, the said officer may by order assign or sell the property to another member of the Schedule Tribe or a Co-operative Society. Sub- section 3(4) provides that for the purpose of Section 3(4), the expression 'transfer' includes sale in execution of a decree and also a B benami transfer made by a member of a Scheduled Tribes in favour of any other member of the Scheduled Tribes but does not include a Partition or a devolution by succession.

Section 3-A makes special provision relating to mortgages without possession; the details thereof are not material. Section 4 provides for the C remedy of suit to be instituted in the Agency Courts against the member of the Scheduled Tribe; the details thereof are not material. Section 5 provides for attachment and sale of immovable property. Section 6 gives revisional power to the State Government. Section 6-A provides for penal- ties for contravention of the provisions of the Regulation. Section 7 D prescribes limitation for purpose of initiating proceedings under the Regulation. Section 8 gives power to the State Government to make rules. Section 9 provides for repeal of repugnant provisions of the Madras Act 1 of 1917. Section 10 provides for baving of certain transfers and rights.

It is settled law that the transfer of immovable property between a E member of the Scheduled Tribe to a Non-scheduled Tribe in the Agency tracts is null and void. The non-tribal transferee acquires no right, title and interest in that behalf in furtherance of such sale. This Court in Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (1984) 3 SCC 301 had declared such sales to be voidable. In Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State F of Maharashtra & Anr., [1985] 1 SCC 479 this Court upheld the con- stitutionality of similar provisions of Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974.

When the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Regulation was im- pugned as violative of Articles 19(1)(t) and 14 of the Constitution, this G Court, in P. Rami Reddy & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., [1988) 3 SCC 433 upheld its validity holdings that the Regulation aims to restore the lands to the tribals which originally belonged to them but passed into the hands of non-tribals. It would be unjust, unfair and highly unreasonable merely to freeze the situation, instead of reversing the injustice and restor- H

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A ing the status quo ante. The non-tribal economic exploiters would get no immunity and not be accorded a privileged treatment by permitting them to transfer the lands and structures, if any, raised on such lands to non- tribals and to make profits at the cost of the tribals. Section 3, though it causes hardship to the non-tribals, equally, alleviates hardship of the tribals. The Court must keep in mind the larger perspective of the interest of the tribal community in its entirety; the restrictions cannot be con- demned as unreasonable. The presumption embodied in Section 3(1)(b) is a rule of evidence. The non-tribals could be reasonably expected to disclose their title to the properties. The tribals due to handicaps and ignorance are unable to prove their right to land. The burden to prove title, therefore, was shifted to the non- tribals. The presumption was upheld as reasonable.

As a part of on-going industrial advancement, large industries or projects are being set up or constructed in the scheduled areas displacing the tribals and rendering them impoverished landless labourers. When their lands are acquired for public purpose, the Government should give alternative lands for rehabilitation and easy loans for reclamation. Law relating to prohibition of alienation and restoration of lands to tribes must be simple, less cumbersome and result-oriented. The machinery must be speedy and the officers must have compassion and sense of dedication and direction to ameliorate the economic status of the tribes to assimilate them into national main-stream.

In Telangana area of the State of Andhra Pradesh, prior to the F Regulation and pursuant to Part B State Regulation in Fifth Schedule, the AP Tribal Area Regulation, III of 1359F promulgated by Raj Pramukh of Hyderabad was in vogue. Section 46 of Agricultural Land and Tenancy Act, 1950 prohibits transfer of agricultural land without sanction of the competent authority. Section 3 of the Tribal Area Regulation excludes the application of any Act, Regnlation or Rules by a notification published in G the official Gazette. Section 4 gives power to the Government to make Rules. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 prohibits eviction of tribals from the lands in their possession or occupied by them. Clause (t) prohibits grant of patta rights over any land in notified area to a non-tribal; the agent is empowered to cancel such trans[er or revise any title of land granted to a H non-tribal in any notified tribal area. Clause (g) prohibits sale in execution

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of a decree or whenever made, cancellation of sales not finally confirmed before corning into force of the regulation etc. As stated earlier, the Regulation was extended to Telangana region w.e.f. December 1, 1963. Prior thereto, law in Telangana area was in operation prohibiting any transfer of agricultural lands without prior permission of the officers and 1950 Regulation referred to earlier draws rebuttable presumption that all the acquisitions of immovable property situated in Scheduled Areas are acquired through a transfer from tribals. The non-tribals shall be presumed to have acquired title from tribals unless they are able to prove to the contrary that their possession of properties in the Agency tracts was lawfully acquired. c Scope of Fifth Schedule - Interplay with Regulation.

The predominant object of Para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and the Regulation is to impose total prohibition of transfer of immovable property to any person other than a tribal for peace and proven good management of tribal area; to protect possession, right, title and interest of the members of the Scheduled Tribes held in the land at one time by the tribals. The non-tribals, at no point of time, have any legal or valid title to immovable pruperty in Agency tracts unless acquired with prior sanction of the Government and saved by any law made consistant with the Fifth Sche'dule. With the passage of time, when persons other than tribals gained unlawful title to and possession of the lands in agency tracts, their acquisition and holding of the immovable property, unless proved otherwise, have always been null and void. The Regulation, as its predecessor law, did prohibits transfer by a tribal to any other person and . even benami purchaser in the name of a tribal for the benefit of a non-tribal also is null and void. Non-tribal thereon, acquires no right, title and interest in the land situated in scheduled area .. Indisputably, any transfer inter vivos between tribals or non-tribals or inter se between non-tribals except testamentary disposition to a tribal, has been totally prohibited. The only exception engrafted is the transfer to Co- operative Societies composed solely of tribals or mortgage of the land to a Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank registered as an instrumentality of the State or any Government approved lending agency to improve the agricultural lands or sale to an agent to the Government etc. A non-tribal person who is unable to find a tribal buyer is not totally prohibited to transfer it. He should offer it to H

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A the named or nominated Government agent etc. who would purchase it in the prescribed manner under the Regulation and assign it on to a tribal. The Andhra Pradesh High Court had held that the transfer of land in Scheduled Area by a tribal given to either a Scheduled Caste or a Backward Class settled in Agency tracts as void. B In P. Rami Reddy's case, this Court had observed thus :

"Within the scheduled areas of both Telangana and Andhra regions the land was entirely in occupation of different tribal communities. The area was an inaccessible tract of land covered by forests and c hills. These tribal communities were in occupation of lands and lived by shifting cultivation and gathering whatever produce that was available.

The non-tribals who arrived in these areas late in the 19th D Century in certain areas and the early 20th Century in certain other areas found the tribals who were in occupation of these lands an easy pray for the schemes of exploitation. The non-tribals were lending money to the tribal communities and taking the land belonging to them as security though nothing was taken in writing from a tribal. The rates of interest charged ranged between 25 to E 50 per cent and in certain cases even 100 per cent. The tribals who were traditionally honest and who were simple in their thought and habits fell an easy prey to the schemes of the non-tribals. It was observed by several committees that the non-tribals were able to find ways and means to circumvent the provisions of Regulation 1 F of 1959 by entering into benami transactions and other clandestine transactions with unsophisticated tribals. It is absolutely necessary to create conditions for peace and maintain peace and prevent the new non- tribals from settling down in the scheduled area. If the alienations are permitted to the non-tribals there is a danger of large-scale exploitation by the new non-tribals again with the result peace will be disturbed in that area.

Unless new enterants into the scheduled areas are prevented from settling down in the scheduled areas by purchasing properties either from tribals or non-tribals, it is not possible to prevent the exploitation of the unsophisticated tribals. It is only with a view to

SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.) 377

enforce tlie valid provisions of Regulation I of 1959, the Regulation A viz., Regulation I of 1970 was made. It is in the interests of the tribals and for their protection Regulation I of 1970 was passed, because without restricting or prohibiting the alienation of lands in the possession of non- tribals to non-tribals the objectives cannot be achieved. B xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

True, transfer by 'non-tribals' to non-tribals' would not diminish the pool. It would maintain status quo. But is it sufficient or fair enough to freeze the exploitative deprivation of the 'tribals' and thereby legalize and perpetuate the past-wrong instead of effecting the same. As matter of fact, it would be unjust, unfair and highly unreasonable merely to refreese the situation instead of reversing the injustice and restoring the status quo ante."

In this Constitutional perception and statutory operation, the crucial question that aries for consideration is : whether the transfer of its land in a scheduled area, by the Government is valid in law?

It is indisputable that apart from the patta lands or· other lands held by the tribals, the State holds vast tracts of land in scheduled area, in some areas with rich mineral deposits. The questions are; whether the State E Government is exempt from the Regulation?; whether the State Govern- ment stands above the law?; whether the meaning of the word "person" in Section 3(i)(a) of the Regulation would include the State Government? Article 244(1) read with the Fifth Schedule, Part I, while defining "State" excepts certain States as enumerated therein. It bears repetition that paragraph 5(2) of Fifth Schedule enjoins the Governor to make regulations f~r the peace and good governance in a Scheduled area. Without prejudice to the general power, subsequent clauses amplify particular powers. Clause (a) empowers him to prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by or among members of the tribals and non-tribals in such area. Clause (b) regulates the allotment of land only (added to emphasise) to members of the Scheduled Tribes in the area. The question, therefore, is : while regulating allotment of land under trus clause, can the Government exclude itself from the power to allot land to a non-tribal when the object of Article 244(1) read with the Fifth Schedule is to control and maintain peace and good governance of the Scheduled area for the social and economic advance- H

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A ment of Scheduled Tribes? Would it be permissible to construe that the land belonging to the Government is outside such control or prohibition or restriction; whether the State Government could allot its land to non- tribals in violation of the Constitution and the law? Answer to these crucial questions bears paramount significance and impact since the object of the founding fathers of the Constitution in empowering the Governor, on the B basis of his personal satisfaction, is to regulate by law the administration or control of the Scheduled area for peace and good governance of the Scheduled Tribes in the area. The question is : whether any contra inter- pretation would subserve the Constitutional animation or would it frustrate the constitutional objective? The Division Bench of the High Court in C Samatha's case relied upon the dictionary meaning of the word 'person' and the prohibition on transfer of land inter vivas between natural persons of Schednled Tribes and non-tribes in Agency tracts ; it came to conclude that the Regulation does not apply to the land owned by the State Govern- ment since the State Government is not a natural person. The earlier D Division Bench had taken contra view. The question, therefore, is : which of the two views subserves the constitutional purpose and is correct in Jaw?

Meanings of the word 'Person' - whether Government is persona ficta?

From this perspective, the next question that arises is : whether the E State Government is a person within the meaning of Section 3 of the Regulation aud whether its transfer of land to non- tribals or company is valid in law?

The word 'person' in the interplay of juristic thought is either natural or artificial. Natural persons are human beings while artificial persons are Corporations. Corporations are either Corporation aggregate or Corpora- tion sole. In "English Law'' by Kenneth Smith and Denis Keenan (Seventh Edition) at page 127, it is stated that "(L)egal personality is not restricted to human beings. In fact various bodies and associations of persons can, by forming a corporation to carry out their functions, create an organisation with a range of rights and duties not dissimilar to many of those possessed by human beings. In English law such corporations are formed either by charter, statute or registration under the Companies Acts; there is also the common law concept of the Corporation Sole". At page 163, it is further stated that "(T)he Crown is the executive head in the United Kingdom and H Commonwealth, and government departments and civil servants act on

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108. On the concept of "legal personality" and the concept of "person", in "Elementary Principles of Jurisprudence" by Keeton (1949 Edition) relied on by Shri Rajeev Dhawan, in Chapter XIII at page 150, it is stated that in modern law, this personification by law is confined to certain definite limits, although this restriction is based, not upon principle, but upon convenience. In law, however, we are concerned with legal persons, whther they are natural, i.e., human beings capable of sustaining rights and duties, or artificial or juristic, i.e., grnups or things to which the law attributes the capacity to bear rights and duties. Legal personality is itself · nothing but a fiction, in so far as it is intended to imply no more than that a legal person is simply a complex of legal rights and duties. At page 151, it is stated that juristic persons may be defined as those persons or groups of persons which the law deems capable of holding rights and duties, with a few exceptions. At page 152, he has amplified that corporation sole is a juristic person and it succinctly describes the position in modern English law. The conception of separate personality attaching to the successive occupants of a particular office is as valid juristically as the conception of incorporation of the members of a group. The Law of Property Act, 1925, H

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A Section 180 contents itself with addition briefly, that a corporation sole may now hold personal property with rights and duties. At page 154, it is stated that principles applying to corporation aggregate are not fully applicable to corporation sole. "Court regarded the corporation sole not as a person, but as a device for the transmission of rights from one natural person to another". He quotes Blackstone : that "corporation sole consists of one person only and his successors, in some particular station, who are incor- porated by law, in order to give them legal capacities and advantages, in particular that of perpetuity, which in the natural persons could not have had. In this sense the King is a corporation sole". At page 155, it is further stated that the law, therefore, has wisely ordained, that the person, qua tenus. person, shall never· die, any more than the King; by making him and his successors a corporation sole. By which means all the original rights of a personage are preserved entirely to the successors. At page 169, it is stated that the reason for King personality, a corporate sole, is that corporate personality is a technical device, applied for a multitude of very diverse aggregations, institutions and transactions, whereas each of many theories has been conceived for a particular type of juristic personality. None of them foresaw the extent to which the device of incorporation would be used in modern business, or we may add, to cloak the activities of some branch of Government.

E Thus, in Great Britain, Crown has been regarded as a Corporation sole, persona ficta so that it has never been considered necessary to personify the State. The Crown in its political represents the State in England and can sue in the English courts as a person. In Madras Electric Corporation case, the same view was reiterated but when liability was sought to be imposed upon a person, it was held that the general principle of person, does not include the Crown, unless the statute is binding on the Crown, by express provision or by necessary implication. As held in l.R. Commissioner v. Whiteworth Coal Co. Ltd., (1968) 2 All ER 91 at 108, in a taxing statute it was held that there was no objection to interpret the word 'person' to include the Crown in any provision other than those which seek to impose a burden.

In the American Jurisprudence 2nd Series, Vol. 72, page 407, it is stated that a State, in the ordinary sense of the Federal Constitution, is a political community of free citizens, occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and organised under a government sanctioned and limited by

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a written constitution, and established by the consent of the governed. A While the municipal corporation is organised under the authority of a state legislature and draws its public character from the law of the state creating it, it is endowed with a public character by virtue of having been invested by the legislature with subordinate legislative powers to administer local and internal affairs of the community, as well as by having been created as B a branch of the state government to assist it in the civil government of the State. A public corporation, with capacity to sue and be sued, under modern statutory provisions, is a legal person. So also, for purposes of convenience, certain Departments of Government or the board of managers of a public institution are sometimes incorporated, but the corporations thus created, although public, are not municipal corporations. In Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, Page 675, the word "Government" has been defined thus :

"From the Latin gubernaculum, signifies the instrument, the helm, whereby the ship to which the state was compared, was guided on course by the "gubernator" or helmsman, and in that view, the government is but an agency of the state, distinguished as it must be in accurate thought from its scheme and machinery of govern- ment. E In the United States, government consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in addition to administrative agen- cies. In a broader sense, includes the federal government and all its agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments. F The system of polity in a state, that form of fundamental rules and principles by which a nation or state is governed, or by which individual members of a body politic are to regulate their social actions. A constitution, either written or unwritten, by which the rights and duties of citizens and public officers are prescribed and G defined, as a monarchical government, a republican government, etc. The sovereign of supreme power in a state or nation. The machinery by which the sovereign power in a state expresses its will and exercises its functions, or the framework of political institutions, departments, and officers, by means of which the H

382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS· [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A executive, judicial, legislative, and administrative business of the state is carried on."

In Edgar B. Sims. v. United States of America, (359 US 108 : 3 L ed 2d 66), Federal tax authorities issued notices of levy of tax for assessment on unpaid income of employees of the State of West Virginia, and had the notice served on the defendant. The State auditor, seized the accrued salaries of the taxpayers pursuant to Sections 6331 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The defendant-State refused to honour the levy and instead, delivered payroll warrants to the taxpayers for their, then accrued salaries. Thereafter, the Government brought the action in the District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia to recover from defendant the amount of salaries he had so paid to the taxpayer in disobedience to the Government's levies. The District Court upheld the Government's order. The Court of Appeals, on appeal, affirmed it. On a writ of certiorari, it was held by the Supreme Court of USA that the levy of tax made under Section D 6331 was authoriser:\ levy and that defendant under Section 6332 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as 'person' was liable to pay the same.

In State of Ohio v. Guy T. Helvering, (292 US 360 : 78 L ed 1307 at 1310) the question was whether "the State'', when it was selling liquor through its agency and sources, "was a person" within the meaning of E U.S.C. title 26, Section 205 (Section 3244, as amended)? It was held at page 1310 that the tax is levied upon every person who sells liquor etc. The word 'person' as used in the title, should be broadly construed as to mean and include a partnership, association, company or corporation, as well as a natural person. Whether the word 'person' or 'corporation' includes a State F or the United States depends upon the connection in which the word is found. In South Carolina case, the United States Court disposed of the question by holding that since the State was not exempt from the tax, the statute reached the individual sellers who acted as dispensers for the State. While not rejecting that view, the Court preferred to place on the word 'person' the broader ground that when the State itself becomes a dealer in G intoxicating liquors, it falls within the reach of the tax either as a 'person' under the statutory extension of that word to include a corporation, or as a 'person' without regard to such extension.

In State of Georgia v. Hiram W Evans, (316 US 159 : 86 L ed 1346) H the same view was reiterated by the U.S.A. Supreme Court and it was held

SAMA1HA v. STATE [KRAMASWAMY,J.) 383

that if the word 'person' is to include a State as plaintiff, it must equally A include a State as a defendant or else the language used would be meaningless.

In United States of America v. Cooper Corporation et al., (312 US 600: 85 L ed 1071) relied on by Sri Sudhir Chandra, considering the word B 'person' used in Sections 7, 85 and 178 of the Sherman Anti Trust Act, it was held that although the term "person", as used in a statute, is not ordinarily construed to include the sovereign, this is not a hard and fast rule of exclusion, but may be negatived by resort to aids to construction indicating a contrary intent. On the facts, it was held that State was not a person. In that context it was held that in the absence of any indication to C the contrary, the term 'person', when used in different sections of a statute, was employed throughout the statute, in the same, and not different sense. But the said decision was reversed in State of Georgia case. In United States v. l.C.C., (1949) 337 U.S. 426 it was held that when relief is sought against State itself, the word 'person' would include the State and be construed· D accordingly.

In Superintendent & Legal Remembrancer, Staie of West Bengal v. Corporation Calcutta, [1967] 2 SCR 170 a Bench of nine Judges of this ,, Court was to consider whether the State of West Bengal, when it was carrying on trade, as owner and occupier of the market at Calcutta, without obtaining the licence, was bound by the Calcutta Municipality Act or, by necessary implication, was exempted to obtain licence. A complaint against the State, for its failure to obtain licence was filed by the Municipal Corporation. It was contended that the State is not a person under Section 218 of the said Act. Per majority, it was held that the Common Law rule of construction that the Crown is not, unless expressly named or clearly intended, bound to be a State, was held to be not acceptable as a rule of construction. It was held that the archaic rule based on prerogative and protection of the Crown has no relevance to a democratic republic. It is inconsistent with the rule of law based on the doctrine of .equality and introduces conflicts and anomalies. The normal construction, viz., that an enactment applies to citizens as well as to the State, unless it expressly or by necessary implication exempts the State from its operation, steers clear of all the anomalies and is consistent with the philosophy of equality enshrined in the Constitution. Under the Act there is a distinction between fine imposed under Section 537 and under Section 541 of the Act, the fines H

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A under Section 537 are in respect of offences enumerated therein they certainly go to the coffers of the States. In respect of such offences it may be contended that, as the fines paid reach the State itself, there is an implication that the State was not bound by the Sections enumerated therein, for a person who receives the fine, cannot be the same person who pays it. This incongruity may lead to the said necessary implication. Another Bench of nine Judges in State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors., AIR (1963) SC 1811 at 1817 per majority interpreted the word 'citizen' in a broader perspective. In Union of India v. Jubbi, AIR (1968) SC 360 at 362 a three-Judge Bench had held that a statute applies to State as much it does to a citizen, unless, it expressly or by necessary implication, exempts the State from its opera- tions. If the Legislature intended to exclude the applicability of the Act to the State, it could have easily stated in Section 11 itself or by a separate provision that the Act was not to be applied to the Union or to the lands held by it. In the absence of such a provision, in a constitutional set up like I) the one we have in this country, and of which the overriding basis is the broad concept of equality, free from any arbitrary discrimination, the presumption would be that a law of which the avowed object is to free the tenant of landlordism and to ensure to him security of tenure would bind all landlords irrespective of whether such a landlord is an ordinary_ in- dividual or the Union. In that case., it was contended that Abolition of Big E Landed Estates and'land Reforms Act, 1953 and Section 11 thereof does ~ not apply to the land held by the Government. This Court rejected that contention. It would, therefore, be settled law that the question whether or not the word 'person' used in a statute would include the State has to be determined with reference to the provisions of the Act, the aim and its F object and the purpose the Act seeks to subserve. There is no reason to consider the word 'person' in a narrow sense. It must be construed in a broader perspectivity, unless the statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, exempts the State from the operation of the Act as against the State and would include "State Government".

G Property of the State - how dealt with under the Constitution.

Part I of the Constitution of India deals with Union and its territories. Article 1 declares that India, that is Bharat shall be a Union of States. The States and the territories thereof have been specified in the First Schedule H to the Constitution. The territory of India shall comprise of - (a) the

SAMATIIA v. S}ATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 385 ' territory of States; (b) the Union territories specified in the First Schedule; A and (c) such other territories as may be acquired. Articles 2 to 4 deal with · the power of the Parliament to admit into the Union, by law, any State, or establish new States on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. Formation of the new States and alteration of areas, boundaries and names of the existing States are regiµated by law made by Parliament. It also gives power B to the Parliament to amend the First and the Fourth Schedules and to provide for supplemental, incidental and consequential matters. The First Schedule enumerates the States and the first in the alphabetical order is Andhra Pradesh with territories specified thereunder.

Under Part VI of the Constitution titled "The States", Article 152 C defines "State". For the Interpretation of the Constitution, by operation of Article 367, unless the context otherwise requires or modifies, the General Clauses Act shall apply. Section 3(23) thereof defines'"Government to include both the Central Government and State Government. Section 3(8) defines "Central Government" and Section 3(60) defines "State D Government" as regards anything done and or to be done, shall mean the Governor. The Governor of each State is its Executive Head and the executive power of the State shall be exercised by the Governor either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with· the Constitution as envisagec\. under Article 154. The executive power of the E State, subject to the provl~ons of the Constitution, by operation of Section 162, shall extend to the ~atters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws. The proviso thereto is not relevant for the purpose of this case.

The executive power, therefore, of the State is co-extensive with that F of the legislative power of the State. The Governor shall appoint the Chief Minister and on his advise, he appoints the Council of Ministers, who shall aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his function except, in so far as he is, by or under the Constitution, reqilired to exercise his functions or any of them, in his discretion. The Council of Ministers, headed by the G Chief Minister, shall be collectively and individually responsible to the Legislature and the people in the matter of the governance of the State. AH· executive actions of the Government of a State, shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor and the business of the Government is conducted in accordance with Article 166 and the Business Rules made, H

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A by the Governor, by clause (3) thereof.

Under Chapter III of Part XII, Article 294 vests in the union and the corresponding State all property and assets which immediately before the commencement of the Constitution were vested in His Majesty for the B Purposes of the Government of Dominion of India or of each Governor's Province, whether arising out of any contract or otherwise; similarly all rights, liabilities and obligations, respectively of the Government of the Dominion of India and of the Government of each corresponding State, shall belong to the Government of India and the Government of each corresponding State. Article 295 provides for succession to the property, C assets, rights, liabilities and obligations in other cases. Article 298 provides that the executive power of the Union and of each State shall extend to the carrying on of any trade or business, and to the acquisition, holding and disposal of property and the making of contracts for any purpose co-extensive with legislative power. The Union of India and each State under Article D 300 may sue or be sued, with all rights and liabilities as a constituent power of the State under the Constitution. Article 299 empowers Union of India and the Government of each State to enter into contract, in the exercise of the executive power, to be expressed in the name of the president or the Governor, as the case may be. All assurances of property made in the E exercise of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor, by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or otherwise. However, the President or the Governor shall not be personally liable therefor. Article 300 is of material importance. As stated earlier, the Government of India or a State may sue or be sued, by the name of the F State and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the law enacted and by virtue of the power conferred by the Constitution, it can sue and be sued in relation to their respective affairs in the like cases.

The members of the Legislature are elected by the people periodically at the end of every five years. The political party or group of G political parties who secure majority in the Legislative Assembly of the State elects the leader who would be called upon by the Governor to form the Govt. and on his appointment as the Chief Minister. On his advise, the Governor appoints his Council of Ministers who act in collective responsibility to aid and advise the Governor in the governance of the State H during the tenure of their office.

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Pennanent bureaucracy acts as an ann of the Government. A Articles 309 to 312A in Chapter I of Part XIV under the heading "Services under the Union and the States" regulate the recruitment and conditions of service and appointments to the public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or the States, subject to the provisions of the Constitution and acts of the appropriate Legislature. B Details thereof are not material for the purpose of this case; suffice it to state that Constitution has created permanent bureaucracy consisting of diverse all India services allotted to various States and State Services created thereunder, to assist the political executive and to implement the provisions of the Constitution, the laws and the executive policy of the appropriate Government. Under the Constitution, in all ordinary matters of administration, the Ministers take full responsibility, subject to the control by the Legislature. The bureaucracy gives shape to the decisions taken .by the council of Ministers at the Cabinet meeting or by the in- dividual Ministers by working out the details and they are applied in the given set of facts. In Halsbury's Laws of England {4th Edn.) Vol. 8 in paragraph 1152 at page 711, it is stated that the Government offices and departments through which the general executive administration of the country is carried on owe their establishment and organisation, together with the powers they possess and duties they perform, partly to the royal prerogative and partly to the Parliament. They derive almost all their powers directly or indirectly from Parliament, which alone can provide them with the supplies of money, necessary for their operations. Their internal arrangements, on the other hand, are hardly ever organised or directly interfered with by Parliament, but have been a matter for the royal prerogative. This principle proprio vigore applies to Cabinet form of functioning under our Constitution. In paragraphs 1155 at page 713, it is further stated that where functions entrusted to a minister or to a depart- ment are performed by an official employed in the ministry or department there is in law no delegation because constitutionally the acts or decisions of the officials are that of the Minister. In the exercise of their functions relating to land under any enactment, every Minister and government department must have regard to the desirability of conserving the natural beauty and amenity of the countryside.

Ministerial Responsibility.

As stated hereinbefore, the Constitution envisions to establish an H

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A egalitarian social order rendering to every citizen, social, economic and political justice in a social and economic democracy of that Bharat Republic. Article 261(1) of the Constitution provides that full faith and credit shall be given, throughout the territory of India, to public acts, record and judicial decisions of the Union and of every State. In Secretary, B Jaipur Development Authority v. Dau/at Mal Jain, [1997] 1 SCC 35, a Bench of this Court had held thus ;

"The Governor runs the Executive Government of a State with the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers which exercise the powers and performs its duties by the individual c Ministers as public officers with the assistance of the bureaucracy working in various Departments and Corporate sectors etc. Though they are expressed in the name of the Governor, each Minister is personally and collectively responsible for the actions, acts and policies. They are accountable and answerable to the people. Their powers and duties are regulated by the law and the rules. The legal and moral responsibility or liability for the acts done or omissions, duties performed and policy laid down rest solely on the Minister of the Department. Therefore, they are indictable for their conduct or omission, or misconduct or misap- propriation. The Council of Ministers are jointly and severally responsible to the Legislature. He/they, is/are also publicly ac- countable for the acts or conducts in the performance of duties.

The Minister holds public office though he gets constitutional status and performs functions under Constitution, law or executive policy. The acts done and duties performed are public acts or duties as holder of the public office. Therefore, he owes certain accountability for the acts done or duties performed. In a democratic society governed by rule of law, power is conferred on the holder of the public office or the concerned authority by the Constitution by virtue of appointment. The holder of the office, therefore, gets opportunity to abuse or misuse of the office. The politician who holds public office must perform public duties with the sense of purpose, and a sense of direction, under rules or sense of priorities. The purpose must be genuine in a free democratic society governed by the rule of law to further socio-economic democracy. The executive Government should frame its policies

SAMA1HA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 389

to maintain the social order, stability, progress and morality. All A actions of the Government are performed through/by individual persons in collective or joint or individual capacity. Therefore, they.. should morally be responsible for their actions.

When a Government in office misuses its powers, figuratively, we refer to the individual Minister/Council of Ministers who are constituents of the Government. The Government acts through its bureaucrats, who shapes its social, economic and administrative policies to further the social stability and progress socially, economically and politically. Actions of the Government, should -- be accounted for social morality. Therefore, the actions of the individuals would reflect on the actions of the Government. The actions are intended to further the goals set down in the Constitu- tion, the laws or administrative policy. The action would, therefore, bear necessary integral connection between the 'purpose' and the end object of public welfare and not personal gain. The action cannot be divorced from that of the individual actor. The end is something aimed at and only individuals can have and shape the aims to further the social, economic and political goals. The ministerial responsibility thereat comes into consideration. The Minister is responsible not only for his actions but also for the job of the bureaucrats who work or have worked under him. He owes the responsibility to the ekctors for all his actions taken in the name of the Governor in relation to the Department of which he is the head."

In Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., [1974] 2 SCC 831, a F Bench of seven Judges of this Court had held that under the Cabinet System of Government as embodied in our Constitution, the Governor is the Formal head of the State. He exercises all his powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution, on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers, save in spheres where the Governor is required G by or under the Constitution to exercise his function in his discretion. The satisfaction of the Governor for the exercise of any power or function, . required by the Constitution, is not the personal satisfaction of the Gover- nor but is the satisfaction in the constitutional sense under the Cabinet System of Government. The executive is to act subject to the control of the legislature. The executive power of the State is vested in the Governor as H

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A head of the Executive. The real executive power is vested in the Ministers of the Cabinet. The Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as its head aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his executive functions. The same principle was reiterated by a Bench of · three Judges in R.K. Jain v. Union of India, [1995] 4 SCC 119. Therein, it was held that in a democracy governed by rule of law, State is treated on B par with a person by Article 19(6) in c<immercial/industrial activities.

It would thus be clear that in a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the administration is run through constitutional mechanism i.e., Cabinet form of Govt. by a Council of Ministers headed by the Chief C Minister. They aid and advise the Governor, the executive head of the State. The bureaucracy - an arm of the political executive - assists as an -- integral part of administrative mechanism. Their actions or the acts, individually or collectively, are directed to elongate and fulfil the sociO- economic goals set down in the Constitution to establish the egalitarian social order in which socio-economic justice is secured to the poor and we~er sections of the society including the Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes, in particular, as enjoined in Article 46 of the Constitution, to promote their socio-economic interest and protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. The State is, therefore, a "person" within the constitutional mechanism persona ficta is enjoined to elongate the objects of the Constitution.

Scope of the power of the Govt. in disposal of its property in Scheduled area and constitutional duty and limitation of the State.

F In "In the Framing of the India's Constitution", a study by B. Shiva Rao, (Volume II) in Chapter 20 on the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution on the Tribal Area, the author has surveyed the historical background for integration of Scheduled Tribes into the national mainstream. The histori- cal survey and legislative development do assure us that throughout... ... A system of modified exclusion of law was applied to the Scheduled areas. G The power was with the Governor. He exercises the executive and legisla- tive power to apply, or to refrain from applying any law made by Parliament or State Legislature to the Agency tracts. The object of Government policy is to protect the tribals or their land, .... by securing to them protection from exploitation. The principal duty of the administration is to protect them from exploitation. Considering the past experience and the exploita-

SAMA1HA v. STATE (K. RAMASWAMY,J.) 391 tion of the tribals' simplicity and truthfulness by the non-tribals, it became imperative by statutory safeguards to preserve the land which is their natural endowment and mainstay for their economic empowerment. No laws affecting social matters, occupation of land including tenancy laws allotment of land and setting apart of land for village purposes and village · management, including the establishment of village panchayats, would apply, unless they are suitable to the conditions. Shiva Rao has stated at page 579 thus :

"The transfer of land in a Scheduled Area from a tribal to a non-tribal was forbidden; and the State Government was also prohibited from allotting State land in a Scheduled Area to non- C tribals except in accordance with rules made after consulting the Tribes Advisory Council. Likewise, if advised by the council, the Governor was obliged to license money-lending, prescribing such conditions as were considered necessary; and the breach of these conditions would be an offence. In order that public attention must D be focussed on the development work carried out in these areas, the State Government was required to show separately in its annual financial statement the revenues and expenditure pertaining to these areas."

Thus, the Fifth and Sixth Schedules an integral scheme of the Con- E stitution with direction, philosophy and anxiety is to protect the tribals from exploitation and to preserve valuable endowment of their land for their economic empowerment to elongate social and economic democracy with liberty, equality, fraternity and dignity of their person in our political Bharat. F Egalitarian Social Order - Scope and Content.

Justice is an attribute of human conduct. Law, as a social engineer- ing, is to remedy existing imbalances, as a vehicle to establish an egalitarian social order in a Socialist Secular Bharat Republic. The Upanishad says G that, "let all be happy and healthy, Jet all be blessed with happiness and let non be unhappy". Bhagwatgeeta preaches through Yudhishtra that, "I do not Jong for kingdom, heaven or rebirth, but I wish to alleviate the suffer- ings of the unfortunate'. Prof. Friedlander in his "Introduction of Social Welfare" at page 6 states that social welfare is the organised system of social service and institutions are designed to aid individuals and groups H

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A to attain specified standard of life and health and personal and social relationship which permit them to develop their full capacities and to promote their well-being in harmony with the needs of their families and the community. Welfare State is a rubicon between unbridled individualism and communism. All human rights are derived from the dignity of the person and his inherent worth. Fundamental Rights and Directive Prin- ciples of the Constitution have fus~d in them as fundamental human rights as indivisible and inter- dependent. The Constitution has charged the State to provide facilities and opportunities among the people and groups of people to remove social and economic inequality and to improve equality of status. Article 39(b) enjoins the State to direct its policy towards securing distribution of the ownership and control of the material resources of the community as best to subserve the common good. The founding fathers with hind sight, engrafted with prognosis, not only inalienable human rights as part of the Constitution but also charged the State as its policy to remove obstacles, disabilities and inequalities for human develop- D ment and positive actions to provide opportunities and facilities to develop human dignity and equality of status and of opportunity for social and economic democracy. Economic and social equality is a facet of liberty without which meaningful life would be hollow and mirage.

Right to development - a fundamental right. E Declaration of "Right to Development Convention" adopted by the United Nations and ratified by India, by Article 1 "right to development" became part of an inalienable human right. By virtue thereof, every human person and all people are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms would be fully realised (emphasis sup- plied). Clause (2) thereof provides that "the human right to development also implies the full realisation of the right of the people to improve their natural wealth and resources". Article 2(1) provides that "the human person is the central subject of development and should be and active participant and beneficiary of the right to development". Clause (2) says that all human beings have a responsibility for development, individually and collectively, taking into account the need for full resp~ for their human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to the community, which alone can ensure free and complete fulfilment of the human being and they - H should, therefore, promote and protect an appropriate political, social and

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economic order for development". Clause {3) thereof provides that the A State have "the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well- being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom". B Article 3(1) recognises and enjoins that it is the State's primary responsibility to create conditions favourable to the realisation of the right to development. Under clause (3) thereof, it reminds the State of its duty to cooperate with each other and of "ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development". Article 6(2) reassures that "human rights and C fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent; equal att.ention and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights (em- phasis supplied) and clause (3) thereof enjoins that "the States should take steps to eliminate obstacles to development. Article 8 enjoins that "the D State should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the realisation of the right to development and shall ensure inter alia equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income". it also provides that "an appropriate economic and social reform should be canied out with a view to eradicating all social injustice". Article 9 gives a E right declaring that "all the aspects of the right to development set forth in the present declaration are indivisible and interdependent and each of them should be considered in the context of the whole" and Article 10 concludes and reminds the State of its duty "to take steps to ensure them the full exercise and progressive enhancement of the right to development, including F the formulation, adoption and implementation of policy, legisl_ative and other measures at the national levels". The directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution are fore-runners to the Convention (Emphasis sup- plied).

India being an active participant in the successful declaration of the G Convention on Right to Development and a party signatory thereto, it is its duty to formulate its policies, legislative or executive, accord equal attention to the promotion of, and to protect the right to social, economic, civil and cultural rights of the people, in particular, the poor, the Dalits and Tribes as enjoined in Article 46 read with Articles 38, 39 and all other H

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A related Articles read with right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. By that constant, endeavour and interaction, right to life would become meaningful so as to realise its full potentiality of "person" as inalienable human right and to raise the standard of living, improve excellence and to live with dignity of person and of equal status with social and economic justice, liberty, equality and fraternity, the trinity are pillars to establish the egalitarian social order in Socialist Secular Democratic Bharat Republic.

Social and economic democracy is the foundation on which political democracy would be a way of life in the Indian polity. Law as a social engineering is to create just social order removing inequalities in social and economic life, socio-economic disabilities with which poor people are languishing by providing positive opportunities and facilities to individuals and groups of people. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, in his closing speech in the Constituent Assembly on November 25, 1949, had lucidly elucidated thus : D "What does social democracy mean? It means way of life which recognises liberty, equality and fraternity as the principles of life. These principles of liberty, equality and fraternity are not to be treated as separate items in a trinity. They form a union of trinity E in the sense that to divorce one from the other is to defeat the very purpose of democracy. Liberty cannot be divorced from equality, equality cannot be divorced from liberty. Nor can liberty and equality be divorced from fraternity. Without equality, liberty would produce the supremacy of the few over the many. Equality F without liberty, would kill individual initiative - we have in India a society based on the principle of graded inequality which means elevation for some and degradation for oth~rs. On the economic plan, we have a society in which there are some who have immense wealth as against many who live in abject poverty". We cannot afford to have equality in politic:tl life and inequality in economic G life. How long shall we continue to live this life of contradiction? How long shall we continue to deny equality in our social and economic life? We must remeve this contradiction at the earliest possible moment or else those who suffered from inequality will blow up the structure of politiccil democracy which this Assembly H has laboriously built up."

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(Vide B. Shiva Rao's, 'The Framing of India's Constitution : Select A Documents', Vol. IV, p. 944.) .~ The core constitutional objective of "social and economic democracy" in other words, just social order, cannot be established without removing the inequalities in income and niaking endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status through the rule of law. The mandate for social and economic retransformation requires that the material resources or their oWnership and control should be so distributed as to subserve the common good. A new social order, therefore, would emerge, out of the old unequal or hierarchical social order. The legislative or executive measures, therefore, should be necessary for the reconstruction of the unequal social order by corrective and distributive justice through the rule of Jaw.

Right to life - Scope and Content.

Article 21 of the Constitution reinforces "right to life" - a fundamental right - which is an inalienable human right declared by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the sequential Conventions to which India is a signatory. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C Mazdoor Congress, AIR (1991) SC 101at173 in paragraph 223, this Court had held that right to life would include right to continue in permanent employment which is not a bounty of the employer nor can its survival be at the volition or mercy of the employer. Income is the foundation to enjoy many fun- damental rights and when work is the source of income, the right to work would become as much a fundamental right. Fundamental rights can ill-afford to be consigned to the limbo of undefined premises and uncertain application. That will be a mockery of them. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. F Union of India, [1984] 3 SCC 161 at 183-84, this Court had held that right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy and that opportunities and facilities should be provided to the children to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. Adequate facilities, just and humane conditions of work etc. are the minimum requirements which must G exist in order to enable a person to live with human dignity and the State has to take every action. In Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR {1991) SC 420, this Court had held that the right to life includes the right to enjoyment of pollution free water and air for full enjoyment of life. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR (1986) SC 180, this Court had H

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A held that right to livelihood is an important facet of the right to life. In C.E.S.C. Ltd. & Ors. v. S.C. Bose & Ors., [1992] 1 SCC 441 at 462-63, para 30, it was held that right to social and economic justice is a fundamental right. Right to health of a worker is a fundamental right. Therefore, right to life enshrined in Article 21 means something more than mere survival of animal existence. The right to live with human dignity with minimum sustenance and shelter and all those rights and aspects of life which would go to m~e a man's life complete and worth living, would form part of the right to life. Enjoyment of life and its attainment - social, cultural and intellectual - without which life cannot be meaningful, would embrace the protection and preservation of life guaranteed by Article 21. Right to health and social justice was held to be fundamental right to workers in Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of India, [1995] 3 SCC 42 and Life Insurance Corporation v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, [1995] 5 SCC 482. Right to economic equality is held to be fun- damental right in Dalmia Cement Bharat Ltd. & Anr. Etc. v. Union of India D & Ors. Etc., IT (1996) 4 SC 555. Right to shelter is held to be a fundamental human right in P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [1995] Supp. 2 SCC 182, M/s. Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khim/al Totame & Ors., [1990) 1 SCC 520, Chameli Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr. [1996) 2 SCC 549 andAhmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Guiab Khan & Ors., JT (1996) 10 SC 485. The tribals, therefore, have fundamental right to E social and economic empowerment. As a part of right to development to enjoy full freedom, democracy offered to them through the States regulated power of good Government that the lands in Scheduled areas are preserved for social economic empowerment of the tribals.

p Meaning of Socialist Democratic Republic.

It is necessary to consider at this juncture the meaning of the "socialism" envisaged in the Preamble of the Constitution. Establishment of the egalitarian social order through rule of law is the basic structure of the Constitution. The Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles are the means, as two wheels of the chariot, to achieve the above object of democratic socialism. The word "socialist" used in the Preamble must be read from the goals Articles 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 23, 38, 39, 46 and all other cognate Articles seek to establish, i.e., to reduce inequalities in income and status and to provide equality of opportunity and facilities. Social justice enjoins the Court to uphold government's endeavour to remove economic

SA.1v1ATIIA v. STATE [K RAMASWAMY, J.] 397

inequalities, to provide decent standard of living to the poor and to protect the interest of the weaker sections of the society so as to assimilate all the sections of the society in the secular integrated socialist Bharat with dignity of person and equality of status to all.

Shri P.A. Choudhary, learned senior counsel for the 13th respondent, contended that the word 'person' in Section 3(1) of the Regulation does not cover the executive Government of the State nor does it prohibit the Government from transferring its land. According to him, such an inter- pretation would get the Regulation exposed itself to be ultra vires of Article 298 of the Constitution which should be avoided. The premise of his contention is founded on the principle that the Constitution empowers the C Executive to acquire, hold and dispose of the property and the Governor, as sovereign head of the Executive, gets no power under the Fifth Schedufe to prohibit the State Government to transfer its property to non-tribals. On the other hand, the Constitution has full faith in the Executive to implement the directives contained in the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution to promote the welfare of the Tribes. The Constitution has built up a balance structure distributing powers and functions to each of the three branches of the State. The Fifth Schedule read with Article 244 of Chapter X of the Constitution, with a non-obstante clause, has conferred only the legislative power on the µovernor, referable to Article 245 to enact the law relating to scheduled areas. The power to acquire, hold and dispose of the property of the State was wisely left untouched in that behalf. The prohibition contained in Fifth Schedule, therefore, does not effect the power of the State under Article 298 to dispose of its property situated in Scheduled area in the manner it deems appropriate. To buttress his contention, the learned counsel cited a.passage froni Walter Bagehot - The English Con- F stitution at page 283 that the queen, without consulting the Parliament, can by law disband the Army, engage or dismiss the officers from General Commanding-in-Chief doWnwards. She could sell all her war ships and all novel stores etc. He also cited "Governmental Law" by Hartley and Griffith, paie-~289 in that behalf. He further cited Lord Birkeenhead's dictum in G Efrkdale District Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. Corporation of Southport, (1926) AC 355 at 364, wherein it was held that power entrusted to a person or public body by the Legislature was to effectuate public purpose. They cannot divest themselves of those powers and duties. Nor can they do any action incompatible with due exercise of their powers or the discharge of H their duties.

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A In Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v. The King, [1921] 3 KB 500, cited by the learned counsel, the Government had given an undertaking to the owners and permitted the neutal warships to carry a particular class of cargo to a British colony in which event the said ships will be released from detention On the faith of it the owners of the ships carried the cargo and requested for their release from detention. When clearance was refused, B action was laid in the court for damage for breach of contract. It was held that such an undertaking by the Government was not enforceable in a Court of law, as it was not being within the competence of the Crown to make a contract which would have the effect of limiting its power of executive action in the future. c He also cited Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company et al. v. Charles Sa"'.Yer, 343 US 579 at 632: 96 L ed 1153 at 1198 for the proposition that the President has executive inherent power to seize private property to meet an emergency subject to the legislation confronting him of the power. He also cited Lois P. Myers v. United States, 272 US 160 : 71 ~ ed 11 D wherein it was held that th!'! President has the executive power to appoint and remove executive subordinates.

In the State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, [1961] 2 SCR 679, cited by Shri Choudhary, it was held that the pleasure doctrine E of the President under Article 310 of the Constitution is qualified by Article 311 and is not subject to any law made by the Parliament or the Legislature of the State. In other words, according to the learned counsel, the ratio therein reiterates that the executive power of the President/Governor granted under the Constitution is not subject to any limitations but is co-extensive with the exercise of the legislative power. F Marn Ram Etc. Etc. v. Union of India &Anr., [1981] 1SCR1196 was cited for the proposition that the power, of the President under Article 72 and of the Governor under Article 162, are not subject to legislative control. The power of Legislature imposing minimum sentence of im- G prisonment under Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not subject to, nor can nullify wholly or partly, the executive power of the President or the Governor to pardon or to reduce the life imprisonment of a convict.

It is true, as contended by Shri Chowdhary, that the Constitution has H demarcated legislative, executive and judicial powers and entrusted them

SAMATIIA v. STATE[K.RAMASWAMY,J.) 399

to the three wings of the;State; in particular the PresidenUGovernor of the A State is to exercise the executive power in their individual discretion. It is not subject to legislative limitations to be done in accordance with rules of business. In particular, the PresidenUGovernor is entrusted with the execu- tive power co-extensive with the legislative power enumerated in the j Seventh Schedule read with Article 245 of the Constitution. The executive B power especially conferred by the Constitution like the pleasure tenure or the power of pardoning a convict are in our view, not apposite to the issue. The power of the executive Government in that behalf has wisely been devised in the Constitution is not subject to any restriction except in accordance with the Constitution and the law made under Article 245 read with the relevant Entry in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is c subject to Fifth Schedule when it is applied to Scheduled area. The power of the Government to acquire, hold and dispose of the property and the making of contracts for any purpose conferred by Article 298 of the Constitution equally is co-extensive with the legislative power of the Union/State. However, Article 244 (1) itself specifies that provisions of the D Fifth Schedule shall apply to the administration and control of the Scheduled areas and Scheduled Tribes in any State except the excluded areas specified therein. The legislative power in Clause (1) of Article 245 equally is "subject to the provisions of the Constitution" i.e. fifth Schedule. Clause (1) of para 5 of Part B of the Fifth Schedule applicable to E Scheduled areas, adumbrates with a non obstante clause that "Not- -! withstanding anything in the · Constitution, in other words, despite the power, under Article 298, the Governor may, by public notification, direct that any particular Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State shall not apply to a Scheduled Area or any part thereof in the State or shall apply to a Scheduled Area or any part thereof in the State, subject to such exceptions and modifications as he may specify in the notification and any direction given under clause (1) of para 5, may be given so as to have retrospective effect". The executive power of the State is, therefore, subject to the legislative power under clause 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule. Similarly sub-para (2) thereof empowers the Governor to make regulation for the peace and good government of any area in a State which is for the time being a Scheduled Area. In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such regulation may regulate the allot- ment of land to members of the Scheduled ·Tribes in such area or may prohibit or restrict the transfer of land under clause (a) by or among the H

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A members of the Scheduled Tribes in such areas. In other words sub-para 5(2) combines both legislative as well as executive power, clause 5(2)(a) and (c) legislative power and clause (b) combines both legislative as well as executive power. The word 'regulation' in para 5(2)(b) is thus of wide import.

B Meaning of the word 'Regulation' in the title of the Regulation, para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution.

The question then is: whether the word "regulate" in para 5 clause (2)(b) would .include prohibition to transfer the Government land? It C requires no elaborate discussion in this behalf. While interpreting Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, this Court has consistently being held that the term 'regulation' would include total prohibition vide Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, [1960] 2 SCR 372; Fatehchand Himmatla/ v. State of Maharashtra, [1977] 2 SCC 670; State of U.P. & Ors. v. Hindustan D Aluminium Corpn. and Ors., [1979] 3 SCC 229; K. Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., [1985) 2 SCC 116. This Court consider the meaning of the word "regulation" in Air India Statutory Corporation Etc. v. United Labour Union & Ors. Etc., 1996 9 SCALE 70 paragrapl). 56 at 104-05. Therein, the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 came for consideration. The question was whether the word "regulation" would include regularisation of the contract labour in the establishment in which contract labour system was abolished, though it was not expressly provided. A Bench of three Judges had held that the word "regulation", in the absence of restrictive words, must be regarded as plenary in the larger public interest. By necessary implication it includes to do everything which is indispensable for the purpose of carrying out the purposes in view. Accordingly, it was held that though no express provision was made in the Contract Labour Regulation and Abolition Act to regularise the services of the contract labour, working in an establishment after the abolition of contract labour, by necessary implication, the word 'regulation' includes the power to regularise their services as permanent employees in the establishment. Therefore, the word "regulate" the allotment of land to · members of Scheduled Tribes in scheduled area in the Fifth Schedule by Clause 5(2)(b) must be read as a whole to ensure regulation of the land only to and among the members of the Scheduled Tribes in the Scheduled area. In the light of the provisions contained in clause (a) of sub-para (2) H of para 5, there is implied prohibition on the State's power of allotment of

SAMATIIA v. STATE[K.RAMASWAMY,J.) 401 its land to non-tribals in the Scheduled Areas. When so read there is no incompatibility and inconsistency between the power of the executive Government and the Constitution and conjoint operation would elongate the good governance of the Scqeduled Areas. So, while prohibiting transfer of land between natural persons, i.e., tribles and non-tribals and preventing non-tribals to purchase from or transfer to another non-tribal, his right, title of interest in the land in the scheduled area, at the same breathe would not be permissible for the Government to transfer their land to a non-tribal except for equally competing public purpose. The answer obviously should be that it is permissible' to the Government to transfer its lands to the non-tribals. This negatii~ answers leads to effectuate the constitutional objective to preserve the land in the scheduled area to the tribals, prohibits the Government from allotting their land to the non- tribals; prohibit infiltration of the non-tribals into the scheduled area and prevents exploita- tion of the tribals by non- tribals in any form. This purposive interpretation would ensure distributive justice among the tribals in this behalf and elongates the constitutional commitment. Any other interpretation would sow the seed beds to disintegrate the tribal autonomy, their tribal culture and frustrate empowerment of them, socially, economically and politically, to live a life of equality, dignity of person and equality of status.

It would, therefore, be clear that the executive power of the State to dispose of its property under Article 298 is subject to the provisions in the E Fifth Schedule as an integral scheme. of the Constitution. The legisJative power of the State under Article 245 is also subject to the Fifth Schedule, to regulate the allotment of the Government land in the Scheduled Areas. Obviously, therefore; the State legislature of Andhra Pradesh has now imposed total prohibition under Mines Act to transfer its lands to the F non-tribals. Doubtless that under Article 298, the State exercises its power of disposal for public purpose. When two competing public purposes claim preferential policy decision, option to the State should normally be to elongate a,nd achieve constitutional goal. Secondly, the constitutional priority yields place to private purpose, though it is hedged by executive policy. As a facet of interpretation, the Court too adopts purposive inter- G pretation tool to effectuate the goals set down in the Constitution. Equally, the executive Government in its policy options requires to keep them in the backdrop and regulate disposal of their land-property in accordance with the constitutional policy, executive decision backed by Public policy and, at the same time, preserve paramount Tribal interest in the scheduled H

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A area. No abstract principle could be laid in that behalf. Each case requires examination in the backdrop of the legislative/executive action,its effect on the constitutional objectives and the consequential result yields therefrom. The law relating to the power of the President under the Constitution of U.S.A. as has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of U.S.A. or the executive power of the Queen under the scheme in English unwritten Constitution transformed by Convention does not assist us much in this behalf. Shri Chowdhary also cited an article "The Notion of a Living Constitution" written by William H. Rehnquist, the present Chief Justice of Supreme Court of USA [Texas Law Review Vol. 54, 693) emphasising that the Executive should have full freedom in exercising its executive power and the Court cannot limit the executive power by interpretation of a statute or regulation. This also is of no assistance since the Constitution oUndia conferred express power of judicial review on the constitutional Courts, i.e., Supreme Court of India and High Courts under Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution respectively. From the aforestated constitutional perspective and the interpretation of the words 'person' and 'regulation' put up in the earlier parts of the judgment, the question arises: whether the word 'person' under Section 3(1) of the Regulation would include the State Government.

Shri Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior counsel for the appellant, con- E tended that the word 'person' in Section 3(1)(a) requires interpretation, keeping in view the contextual -constitutional history of prohibition on transfer of the land by a tribal to a non-tribal including that of the Government land, differently depending upon the context in which it has occurred ·in the first part of Section 3(2)(a) the word 'person' may be considered in a generic sense and in the second part thereof to mean a natural person. Prohibition on the transfer of the land by a tribal to a non-tribal visualises transfer between natural persons. The factum of mem- bership of the person as a tribe does not necessarily cut down the width of the word 'person', namely, legal person taken alongside the natural person. The word 'person' requires interpretation in the natural sense of the Context in which it is used. Legal person may be natural, artificial or statutory person. The words "whether or not" in clause 3(2) (a) are in the nature of clarification and it would not cut down the contextual meaning. The words "such person" in the first part of Section 3(1)(a) must be interpretated to mean transferor, namely, artificial or statutory person apart from natural person. The objection of Section 3(1)(a) would be

SAMATIIA v. STATE[KRAMASWAMY,J.) 403

rendered nugatory if the meaning of the word 'person' is confined or restricted to natural person in Section 3(2)(a). Generic person may be a co-operative society, a shareholder of a company and equally a Govern- ment constitutionally capable to hold, acquire and dispose of the property. Therefore, the word 'person' used in the first part of Section 3(2)(a) is of wider import in the context of ownership of the land transfer of which is prohibited within the scheduled area to a non-tribal. The word 'person' in the second clause was used in the context of natural persons, i.e., the transfer between the tribes and non-tribes. In that context, the word 'person' was used in a restricted sense. So in the context of the artificial or juriuical or statutory person, the word 'person' is of wider import. Any C other interpretation would defeat the object of the Fifth Schedule and the Regulation. Similarly, Section 3(2)(b) regulates the reverse effect. The land in Scheduled area is presumed to belong to the tribals treating them as a class. The meaning of the word 'person' does not detract from the meaning of the word 'person' in Section 3(2)(a). Similarly, in Section 3(2)(c) if a non-tribal intends to sell the land to a tribal and if the latter is not willing to purchase the same, the government may purchase the land from the non-tribal person and distribute it to the tribal (in such manner .as may be prescribed). The words "manner of disposal" would indicate that it should be only in favour of the Scheduled Tribes since the sole object of the Fifth Schedule and its species, .the regulation, is that the land in Scheduled area requires preservation among the tribals by allotment and their enjoyment by the tribals along. Section 3(2)(b) reinforces that the assignment or sale of the property should only be in favour of the Scheduled Tribes or ·a Society composed solely of the members of the Scheduled Tribes. The entire property in Scheduled area is treated to be the property, be it taken from the non- tribals or is of the Government and at the disposal of the State Government. In that context, the learned counsel has drawn our attention to the word 'regulation' in the Fifth Schedule, para 5(2)(b). He also contends that the word 'regulation' requires to be interpreted broadly to preserve not only the tribal autonomy but also to subserve distributive justice in favour of the tribals in· the matter of assignment of the land belonging to the Government in their favour. Conversely, there is implied prohibition on the transfer of Government land in favour of the non-tribal. The words "peace and good government" used in para 5(2) also requires to be tinderstood in a wider sense. Good Government must, of necessity, be in accordance with the Constitution and dispensation of socio-economic H

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A justice to the tribals including regulation of the land, distribution between the tribals and prohibition on the non-tribals to entrench into scheduled ·- area, to acquire, hold and deal with the lands in scheduled area. It would defeat the object of the Constitution envisaged in the Fifth Schedule thereof because the non-tribals get the Government land transferred in their favour and manoeuvre to have the tribals deprived of their land by other illegal means. The word 'State', therefore, would include within the concept of the word 'person' in Section 3 of the Act. In support thereof, Shri Rajeev Dhavan cited State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [1964] 1 SCR 371 and Madras Electric Corporation case. He has also drawn our attention to construe the provisions in the context of the whole statute relying upon Rese1ve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Invest- ment Co. Ltd. & Ors., [1987] 1 SCC 424 para 33 at page 450-51 and C.E.S.C. Ltd. & Ors. v. Subhash Chandra Bose & Ors., [1992] 1 SCC 441 at

464. He further contends that in view of the object, the word may be read broadly, in the light of public purpose and social and economic justice which the Regulation seeks to serve. He cited, in support of his contention, the following decisions viz. The State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamar- baugawaia, [1957] SCR 874 at 892-95; Ishwar Singh Bindra & Ors. v. The State of U.P., [1969] 1 SCR 219 at 225; Nedurimilli Janardhana Reddy v. Progressive Democratic Students' Union & Ors., [1994] 6 SCC 506 para 6. A word may be read in different contexts in a different way. He cited that the word 'sale' used in the context of freedom of speech and expression was given different meaning in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. & Ors. v. Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors., [1994] 2 SCC 434 at 445; Pushpa Devi & Ors. v. Milkhi Ram (dead) by his Lrs., [1990] 2 SCC 134 and Commissioner of Income-tax, Bangalore v.J.H. Got/a Yadagiri, [1985] 4 SCC 343. The word p 'vest' was interpreted with a different meaning in Dr. M. Ismail Farnqui & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1994] 6 SCC 360 at pp. 393, 404-05 and 423. He therefore, contends that different meaning is required to be given to the word 'person' as used in Section 3(1)(a), 3(1)(b) and 3(1)(c) of the Act. We find force in his contention.

G M/s. Sudhir Chandra, L. Nageshwara Rao, A.V. Rangam and their companion learned advocates, contended that in Section 3 of the Regula- tion read with the Fifth Schedule, para 5 sub-clauses 2(b), the word "person" would be understood in its natural and contextual perspective which would indicate that the word 'person' would be applicable only to H natural persons. The learned counsel laid great emphasis on the Statement

SAMATHA v. STAIB(KRAMASWAMY,J.] 405

of Objects and Reasons for amendment of the Regulation in 1970. Accord- A ing to the learned counsel, the golden rule of interpretation is that the legislative intent is to be effectuated by giving natural and grammatical meaning to the word used in a statute. Only when the court finds ambiguity of the expression used by the statute, principles of interpretation would be applicable. In this case, there is no such ambiguity. The word 'person' is simple and plain, connoting prohibition on transfer of land between natural persons, namely, tribals and non-tribals. That is made manifest by the Statement of Objects and reasons of the amended Regulation which en- visages that the Regulation was brought on statute to prohibit alienation of the lands in the scheduled area by tribal in favour of a non-tribal. By necessary implication the Government is not intended to be included in the word 'person'. Shri P.A. Chowdhary, learned Senior Counsel, further elaborated, stating that Section 3(2)(b) amplifies that the land is purchased from a non-tribal by the Government or where the heirs of a tribal transferor are not willing to take back the property, assignment or disposal of the said property in favour of another tribal as "a property at the disposal of the State Government" and prosecution for violation of the Regulation under Section 6A by way of penalty, are not intended to be applied to the Government when the transfer is made in violation of the provisions of the Regulation; and, therefore, the word 'person' should be given restricted meaning applicable only to natural person. E Sri Sudhir Chandra further contended that Clause 2(a) of para 5 of the Fifth Schedule restricts transfer of land by or among members of the Scheduled Tribes; Clause (b) regulates the allotment of land to members of the Scheduled Tribes in such areas; and clause (c) regulates money-lend- ing business by non-tribals to members of the Scheduled Tribes in scheduled area and para 5(3) gives power to the Governor to regulate by law or to repeal or amend any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State or any existing law in relation to that area. The purpose. thereby, is to prevent exploitation of tribals by non-tribals. The State Government is not expected to exploit the tribals. The Fifth Schedule does not prevent establishment of any factory or an industry or any scheme for development of the tribal area by non-tribals. Exploitation of valuable minerals by the ·non-tribals is not intended to be prevented by Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. In particular, they laid emphasis on para 5, clause 2(b) of the Fifth Schedule, which does not prohibit the .allotment of the land to the non- tribals. It is contended that the word "regulate" used therein does not H

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A necessarily imply prohibition. If such a construction is adopted, it would .. hinder the progress of the tribal areas. It introduces mutually internal and external contradictions. Harmonious interpretation, therefore, has to be adopted to make the Regulation and the Fifth Schedule work as a consis- tent whole, regulating prohibition on transfer of land in the tribal areas to the non-tribal natural persons only. Thereby, the word 'person' should be understood in that perspective. The government and juristic persons are outside the purview of paras 5(2) and 5(3) of the Fifth Schedule and Section 3 of the Regulation.

The respective contentions give rise to the question: whether the regulation prohibits the State Government transferring its lands to non- tribals?

The historical evidence collected and culled out from B. Shiva Rao's "In the making of the Constitution' and the scheme of the representative form of Government furnishes background material for interpretation of the word "person". It is well established rule of interpretation that the words of width issued in the Constitution requires wide interpretation to effectuate the goals of establishing an egalitarian social order supplying flesh and blood to the glorious contents and context of those words and to E . enable the citizen to enjoy the rights enshrined in the Constitution from generation to generation. InAshok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., JT (1997) 4 SC 251, this Bench has applied the rule of wide interpretation of the Constitution. It bears no reiteration; reasons given therein mutatis mutandis would proprio vigore apply to the fact situation. From the above perspective, having given our deep and anxious consideration to the respective F contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the considered view that the interpretation put up by Shri Rajeev Dhavan merits acceptance. It is seen and bears recapitulation that the purpose of the Fifth and Sixth Schedules to the Constitution is to prevent exploitation of truthful, inarticulate and innocent tribals and to empower them socially, 0

G educationally, economically and politically to bring them into the mainstream of national life. The founding fathers of the Constitution were conscious of and cognizant to the problem of the exploitation of the Tribals. They were anxious to preserve the tribal culture and their holdings. At the same time, they intended to provide and create opportunities and H facilities, by affirmative action, in the light of the Directive Principles in

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