K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS

A merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing". (Halsbury Laws of England Vol. IV para 221). In The Queen v. The inhabitants of St. Ma1y Whitechapel, [1848] 12 Q.B. 120 at page 127, it was observed that the rule against retrospective opera- ' tion was not applicable to a statute merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. This principle B was approved by our Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR (1953) SC 394 at 398 and in T.K Lakshmana Iyer and Others v. State of Madras and others, AIR (1968) SC 1489. In T1imbak Damodhar Raipurkar v. Assaram Hiraman Patil & Ors., AIR (1966) SC 1758, it was observed by the Constitution Bench. c 11 ........ where a statute operates in future it cannot be said to be

retrospective merely because within the sweep of its operation all existing rights are included.......... ".

In Bishun Narain Misra v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR (1965) D SC 1567 a rule made by the State Government providing that the age of retirement would be 55 years came up for consideration before the Con- stitution Bench. It was argued that since the rule could not apply retrospec- tively, a Government servant who was recruited and appointed earlier to the date when the rule was made by the Government could not be retired E in exercise of power under this rule otherwise it would amount to applica- tion of the rule retrospectively. The submission was repelled and it was held that the rule could not be struck down on the ground that it was retrospective in operation as all that it provided was that from the date it came into force the age of retirement became 55 years.

F In St. Whitechapel (supra) the law intended to secure that a widow residing in a parish with her husband shall not be removed for twelve months after his death. The benefit of the law extended even when the husband had died before coming into force of the Act and it was observed:

"It was said that the operation of the statute was confined to persons who had become widows after the Act was passed, and that the presumption against a retrospective statute being intended · supported this construction; but we have shown before that the statute is in its direct operation prospective, as it relates to future removals only, and that it is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from

K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OFKERAIA [SARAI, J.) 473

time antecedent to its passing. In this case the words 'shall be removed' were thus found appropriate to cover all cases of future removals irrespective of whether the husband had died prior to the Act but they were not found wide enough to nullify completed removals prior to the Act, even if the widow was removed within twelve months of her husband's death." B This observation was made was the literal and abstract construction would hav~ resulted in hardship. Any legislation specially a legislation enacted to mitigate special mischief is norm~lly construed to serve the public good. Principles of interpretation are only the guideline they are not conclusive. The sure and safe way is to interpret the provision on the necessity and C requirement as appears from the objective of the Act and the words used by the Legislature. Reliance was placed on observations made by Lord Goffe in Alexander v. Mercouris [1979] 3 All England Law Reports 305 distinguishing Whitechepals case that a statute, 'would not be operating prospectively if it creates new rights and duties arising out of past transac- D tion.' This decision turned more on the language of the Section than the principle that the prospectivity of a provision is not effected even if it draws partly from past transactions. Section 1(1) of the Defective Premises Act, 1972 provided that a person taking on work for or in connection with the provision of a dwelling' owes a duty to see that the work is done properly, 'so that as regards that work the dwelling will be fit for habitation when E completed.' The question that arose was 'whether this duty applied where the work was taken on before the commencement of the 1972 Act but completed after. It was held that the substance of the matter was the initial act of 'taking on' the work, therefore, the duty could not be said to arise unless the 'taking on' occurred after the commencement of the Act'. The F decision thus turned on the explicit language used in the Section. No exception can be taken to the observation that a statute creating new right on past transactions cannot be held to be prospective. How does this principle help the State? Section 23(1-A) does not create any right on past transactions. Misconception appears to be prevailing due to fixation of the G period for which additional compensation shall be paid. The two termini, that is, issuance of notification under Section 4(1) and publication of declaration under Section 6 are erroneously understood as creating right or furnishing starting point from which the Section shall apply. The right which is substantive in nature is to get additional compensation at the rate of twelve per cent. The right is not created on past transactions. It operates H

474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3-S.C.R.

A in future, that is, confer benefit of additional compensation from the date it came into force and not from a date prior to coming into force of the provisions.

A substantive law is held to be prospective as a matter of legal policy since it is founded on public policy tqat no right be so created as to work to the disadv~tage for whom it is crated as if it be so, 'it would be betrayal of what the law stands for' (Bennion on Statutory Interpretation). Section 23(1-A) does not suffer from such betrayal. It is just the otherwise. It instead of operating to disadvantage promotes the law and fairness by extending the benefit provided by the Section to all such proceedings which are pending before the court under Section 18. It ensures uniformity and equality.

The Section ·is not robbed off its prospectivity because for the e.icer- D cise of right the calculation of compensation has to be made on' facts which come into existence prior· to the date of the Amending Act. To take a practical illustration a law may be made that any person who suffers an injury or damage would be liable to be compensated. If there is no, date of its commencement then the law under General Clauses Act would start applying from the date of its enactment. And any person suffering any E injury or damage after the date of enactment can file the suit. the law being substantive a person suffering any injury prior to the date of enact- ment would not be entitled to file the suit. To this extent the law is prospective. But if the Legislature while enacting such law provides the scale of damages and links it with year or place or time prior to the date. F of coming into force of the Act it cannot be said that since part of it extends to any point of time anterior to the law the provision has become retrospec· tive. In Kapur Chand v. B.S. Grewa~ Financial Commissioner, Punjab, Chandigarh & Ors., AIR (1965) SC 1491: Section 14-A added from 1955 to the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 permitted a land owner ·to bring a suit for eviction notwithstanding anything to the contrary if the G tenant failed to pay rent regularly as provided in Section 9(ii) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. The suit was filed by the land owner for eviction for arrears due for the years 1952, 1953, 1954 and January,

1955. It was decreed and the argument that since the provisions came into force in 1955 the arrears of certain period could not furnish the cause of , H action else it would become retrospective was repelled and it was observed,

K.S.PARIPOORNAN v.STATEOFKERAIA[SAHAI,J.) 475

".............. In our opinion, the conduct of the tenant prior to the coming into force of the new section can be taken into aceount. No doubt a statute must be applied prospectively. But a Statute is not applied retrospectively because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a mom~nt of time prior to its passing. The clause in question makes a particular conduct the ground for an application for eviction. The necessary condition for the applica- tion of S.9(1) (ii) may commence even before the Act came into force and past conduct, which is as relevant for the clause as conduct after the coming. into force of the Act, cannot be over looked;" c The substantive right to evict was enforced prospectively but the necessary facts for its enforcement were taken even from before coming into force of the Act. The law was not held to be retrospective on that account. In Master Ladies Tailors Organisation & Anr. v. Minister of Labour & National Service, (1950) (1) All England Law Reports p. 525, a question arose if an order passed by the Minister fixing remuneration for work and holding was ultra vires the Act as it applied retrospectivity. It was held the effect of the provisions relating to accrued remuneration being merely to determine and limit the quantum to be made the order could not be construed as having retrospective operation. It was observed by the Court that if a prospective benefit is in certain cases to be measured by or depends on antecedent facts does not make the provision retrospective. This decision makes it clear that a substantive provision is not rendered retrospective if the right created by the provision provides the scales or fixes the benefit from period prior to coming into force of the provision. Therefore, merely beeause the substantive right of additional compensation at the rate of ·12% on the p compensation determined it to be paid for the period ~mmencing from 'the date the notification under Section 4(1) was issued to. the date the publication was made under Section 6 which period may be prior to coming into force of the amending Act would not render the provision retrospec- tive. By calculating compensation for the period between the two notifica- tions the right to receive additional compensation is not taken into the past. G The right operates from the date the amending Act came into force. As explained earlier, Section 23(1A) creates not only the right to receive· additional compensation but also lays down the period for which the amount shall be paid. By the latter part of the Section which only provides for measure for compensation, the Section is not rendered retrospective. H

476 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A It is not the method of drafting a provision that makes it prospective or retrospective but its effect on the rights of the parties effected by it. If the legislature would have stopped by providing for additional compensation at the rate of 12% to be calculated in the manner prescribed probably no argument could have been raised about it being applied retrospectively. B Therefore, it does not make any difference if the Legislature instead of providing separately that the additional compensation shall be payable for the period covered by the tWo notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 chose to provide it in the same section. The substantive provision which otherwise is applicable to all proceedings which are pending before the reference court, would not become retrospective as for calculation of the C compensation the notification issued prior to coming into force of the Act, is to be taken into consideration.

Even though no part of the Section, is of any help for deciding if the Section applies to only future or past acquisitions, yet this Court in Union D of India & Anr. v. Zora Singh & Ors., [1992] 1 SCC 673 tried to find out the point of time from which the Section would operate and observed as follows,

"The expression "award" used in Section 23(1-A) suggests that the intention of the legislature was to make the provisions of the E said sub-section applicable to cases where the Collector had yet to make his award or the trial Court hearing the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act had still to make its award after the coming into force of the said-section on September 24, 1984."

(Emphasis supplied) F Whereas in KS. Paripooman & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors., (1992] 1 SCC 684 the order by which reference was made to the larger Bench it was observed,

"The legislature having designed the horizontal growth in such G manner, the collective scheme which has been made operational prospectively on September 24, 1984 and onwards becomes plain because that is the date on which the amendnient comes into effect. When we import this understanding to the scheme of things it becom~s evident that a Court when applying sub-section ( 1-A) of H Section 23 would do so only if it has in hand an acquisition based

K.S. P ARIPOORNAN v. STATE OF KERALA [SARAI, J.] 477

upon a notification under Section 4 of the Act issued on September A 24, 1984 or thereafter and not to any such notification issued earlier to that date. Same would be the role of the Collector at his end when employing Section 15 and making an award under Section 11 of the Act."

(Emphasis supplied) B

The expression 'commencing on' used before the words 'on and from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1)' or the words 'to be date of award' etc., do not indicate directly or indirectly that the Section shall be applied from this or that date to the proceedings C of one or the other nature. A provision laying down the date or the period on which the valuation of land shall be determined cannot be taken as the date from which the amendment in the Act providing for additional com- pensation could be said to apply. Literally or even constructionally the law requires the Court determining compensation under Section 18 of the Act, D to pay additional compensation in every case coming before it after the amendment came into force. Any other interpretation would result in rendering Section 23(1-A) dormant and non-operative in class of those cases where compensation is being determined by the Court on objection raised by interested persons against making of award by the Collector prior to 1982 not on the language of the Section but on assumption that the E Section was designed to apply to notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act after the Amendment Act came in to force.

Necessity to construe a provision. by taking recourse to adding or substracting words may arise if the provision is otherwise ambiguous or it may lead to disastrous consequence. If the construction in Zora Singh F (supra) was adopted by straining the language then the interpretation suggested in Paripooman's case (supra) is unduly restrictive. What has not been taken notice of in either decisions is the expression 'the court shall in every case' award the amount. Use of the word 'shall' has been used to impart it mandatory character. This obligation the court has to discharge G in every case. In absence of any expression limiting the exercise of power in only those cases where notification is issued after September, 1984 or making it retrospective so as to apply to every case in which proceedings for acquisition had started before coming into force of the Act, the provision has to be applied to every case which was pending for award of compensation on and after the date when the Section became operative. H

478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Any other construction may result in consequences which were not in- tended by the Legislature and may leave the mischief as it was. Such impractical or inconvenient result should be avoided. In Municipal Council of Sydney v. Margaret Alexandra Troy, AIR (1928) PC 128 in more or less similar circumstances when rate of interest payable on compensation was increased from four to six per cent, it was held that the increase in the rate .... · B of interest was payable in respect of land acquired before the date the Act came into force and such construction did not result in making the provision retrospective as, 'the provision being substantive one which was not made to depend on any reference to corresponding provision iii the earlier Statute.' Similarly, the substantive part of Section 23(1-A) also does C not depend on any reference to the corresponding provision in the prin- cipal Act. It has been explained earlier that it stands on its own. Even otherwise when the Court proceeds to determine compensation after Sep- tember 1984 it cannot ignore sub-section (1-A) added to Section 23. That would be against plain and simple language of the Section.

D The additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) was thus pay- able on every matter which was pending ln. Court on 24th September, 1984. But that would not have been complete and full realisation. of the legisla- ture intention as the malady which the Legislature intended to cure was concerned not only with present and future but past as well. Section 23(1-A) being prospective in nature it could not have applied to acquisition E proceedings which were pending before September, 1984 in which award has been made or not. To cover up this Section 30 was enacted which read as under:

"30. Transitional provisions - (1) The provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) F of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, -

(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day or April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) G Bill, 1982 in the House of ~he People), in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date;

(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date whether or not H an award has been made by the Collector before the com-

K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OF KERAIA [SAHAI, J.) 479

mencement of this Act. A

(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or B Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) ~d before the commence- ment of this Act." c The Section is headed as transitional provision. The word transitional according to dictionary means, 'passage or change from one act or set of circumstances to another'. The objective of such a provision is to bridge the gap between commencement of the Act and its operation prior to it: It is a drafting measure to, 'regulate the coming into operation of these enactments and modify their effect during the period of transition'. As stated earlier, Section 23(1-A) empowers the Court to grant additional compensation in every case which was before it on ·the day the Act came into operation. But that could not have served the legislative purpose, therefore, Section 30 was added to serve as transitional provision to extend the benefit of Section 23(1-A) by bridging the gap and providing for payment of additional compensation to even those who were not covered otherwise in Section 23(1-A). The Section has two sub- clauses. Clause (a) takes back applicability of section 23(1- A) to all those proceedings in which notifications had been issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Ac- quisition Act and proceedings were pending on 30th day of April, 1982 as no award had been made by the Collector before that date. Clause (b) extends the benefit of Section 23(A) to the proceedings which had com~ menced after 30th April, 1982. This date .was chosen as the Bill for amending the Act was initiated in 1982. It provides that where notification had been issued after 1982 the land owner is entitled to additional com- G pensation whether the award had been made before September, 1984 or not.

In acquisitions in which notification has been issued prior to 1982 the Legislature placed them in two categories, one, where award had been made and others where it was still pending at a stage prior to making of H

480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the award. Where awards had been made prior to 1982 and the persons interested had not accepted it and sought reference it was pending before the court on the date the Section came into force. No provision was necessary for such matters as they came within the purview of Section 23(1-A). But in those cases where the matter was still pending a provision had to be made to obviate any injustice to them and, therefore, clause (1) B of Section 30 provided for payment of additional compensation to them as ---- well. Therefore, if Section 23(1-A) and Section 30 are read together they cover among themselves entire proceedings for the acquisition of land in which notification had been issued under Section 4(1) of the Act before 1982 but the proceedings had not become final either because no award had been made by the Collector or because award had been made but it was pending before the court under Section 18 or the proceedings had been initiated between April, 1982 and September, 1984, irrespective of whether the award had been made or not. What was canvassed from the other side is that Section 23(1-A) having been made retrospective by Section 30 and its operation being limited to those cases where the award had not been made by the Collector, a land owner was not entitled to claim a~ditional compensation where the award had been made before that date. That is not a correct way of construing the two Sections. In absence of Section 30 it would have been difficult for a land owner whose land had been acquired under a notification issued under Section 4(1) before com- ing into force of the Act and in which no award had been made to claim additional compensation. That would have been contrary to the legislative objective. Therefore, the Legislature in order to cover up all those cases in which award had not been made added a transitional provision. It can better be explained by taking a practical illustration. Suppose two notifica- tions were issued on January, 1979 for acquiring the land mentioned in the notification. In one the award is made before April, 1982 and in the other it remained pending. If the construction as suggested on behalf of the Union of India and other State Governments is accepted then the addi- tional compensation would be payable only in a case in which the proceed- ings were pending and not in those in which the proceedings had become final before the Collector. Such construction would be highly unjust and inequitable. The benefit of additional compensation could not be denied on of chance of the award having been made. There must be some rationale for giving benefit to that class of land owners in whose cases due to delay for one or the other reasons the proceedings could not be finalised and others where award had been made. A construction which leads to anomalous and illogical results should be avoided. True once the award is H

(' K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OFKERAIA(SAHAl,J.] 481

made right to compensation accrues but Section 23(1-A) does not on its A own make a distinction for purposes of payment of additional compensa- tion between pendency of proceedings and making of award. A transitional - provision cannot curtail operation of the substantive provision. The field of operation of Section 30 being narrow, namely to extend the benefit of Section 23(1-A) to all those land owners whose land has been notified to be acquired before 1982 and in which no award has been made by Callee- B tor, it cannot be taken help of for determining the scope of the main provision and hold that what is not covered by it stands excluded from Section 23(1-A). A transitional provision cannot become main provision nor it can curtail the ambit and width of the principle Section. The prospectivity of Section 23(1-A) is not eroded by applying it to the proceedings pending before it. Nor could the concept of limited retrospec- tivity be imported by resorting to sub-section (1) of Section 30. In fact the field of operation of Section 23(1-A) and Sections 30(1)(a) and (b) are entirely different. Neither can be projected in another. The submission that Section 23(1-A) applied only to situation visualised by Section 30 is not made either by the language employed by the two Sections or any principle of interpretation or construction. Section 23(1-A) does not suffer from casus ommisa which requires to be supplied by taking recourse to external help. The Legislature was never in doubt about the matters pending before court in reference u/s 18. Therefore, by the transitional provision it at- tempted to cover other cases. That is why it uses the expression, 'also'. The significance of this word should not be lost sight of. It is clear indication of extended the benefit provided by Section 23(1-A) not only to those cases in which the award had been made and the matters were pending in court, but 'also' to all those cases in which acquisition proceedings due to delay were still pending. In fact in absence of transitional provision there might have been difficulty in awarding additional compensation in cases covered by sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 30 as Section 23(1-A) could not have applied to proceedings which were pending prior to coming into force of the Act. In any case, the ambit of Section 23(1-A) coll·~ not be narrowed by operating Section 30 as it would be contrary to cannon8 of interpretation. G Reliance was placed on construction of sub-section (2) of Section 30 by the Constitution Bench in Union of India & Anr v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by LRs. etc., [1989) 3 SCR 316 and it was urged that since the two sub-sections of Section 30 were enacted on the same date with same purpose and objective, the interpretation put by the Constitution Bench on H

482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the limited retrospectivity of sub-section (2) should be extended to sub- section (1) of Section 30 as well. The submission suffers from inherent fallcy of ignoring the difference in phraseology of the two sub-sections and the objective sought to be achieved by them. Their field of operation is different and they serve different purpose. The amendment in sub-section (2) of Section 23 brings about a change in existing ratio of solatium from B 15% to 30%. And sub-section (2) of Section 30 makes it operative from 30th April 1982, in relation to any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award. Both the decisions, i.e., Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, [1985) Supp. 2 SCR 949 which was held to be incorrectly decided and Raghubir Singh agreed to the extent that the retrospectivity visualised by the sub-section applied to the award made by the Collector or Court. But difference arose as to whether 30% enhanced solatium was payable in appeals pending in the High Court and this Court irrespective of the date of award. The interpretation turned on expression 'such award' used in the sub-section. In Bhag Singh (supra) it ~as extended even to the appeals pending in the High Court or Supreme Court against award of the Collector or the Court whereas in Raghubir Singh (supra) it was confined to those appeals in High Court or this Court which arose out of, 'such award'. The question of liniited retrospectivity arose on .specific language of the sub-section. In absence of sub-section (2) of Section 30 the enhanced solatium would have been payable on not only an award after E 30th April 1982 but in all appeals pending in the High Court or this Court irrespective of the date of award. The Legislature, therefore, carved out an exception and confined payment of enhanced solatium in pending appeals only if they had arisen out of award made after 30th April 1982. A comparison of the two sub-sections of Section 30 indicates thi\t the expres- F sion of sub- section (1) beginning from the "provisions of sub-section" and upto "in relation to" are identical to first part of sub-section (2). But there the similarity ends. Sub-section (l)(a) applies to every proceeding which was pending on 30th day of April, 1982 in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date. Whereas sub-section (2) extends the benefit of retrospectivity to any award made by the Collector or Court or G to any order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal against any, 'such award' under the provisions of the principal Act after 30th day of April,1982. The construction in Raghubir Singh case (supra) turned on the use of the words 'such award'. It was held that the use of the expression 'any such award' restricted the operation of the Section to only those awards which had been made after 30th day of April, 1982. H

K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERAIA[SAHAI,J.] 483

T~erefore, it was held that a land-owner could claim additional solatium in those appeals only which were directed against such award as had been made after 30th April, 1982. The interpretation placed on sub-section (2), therefore, could not help in arriving at the legislative intention of sub- section (1) of Section 30. Why this d,ifference in phraseology of the two sub-sections ? What could be the rationale for confining additional solatium in appeals arising out of the awards made after 1982? A Legisla- B ture is presumed to know the needs of its people. Similarly it should be presumed to be aware of the state of affairs prevalent at the time of enacting a law. Solatium is no do:ubt compensation but it is in nature of payment for displacement. The effect of acquisition due to rise in price and inflation. was not so acute in Sixties or Seventies as in Eighties and C Nineties. It was for this economic reason that the Legislature enhanced the solatium from 15% to 30%. But this enhanced amount was not to be paid to those land owners whose land had been acquired much before 1982 but its final adjudication was pending in appeal in the High Court or this Court. The Legislature must be presumed to be aware that such disputes in which land had been acquired much earlier were still pending and could not be D· disposed of due to heavy work load in higher ·courts. Therefore, the Legislature in its wisdom considered it proper to confine the benefit of enhanced solatium to those land owners whose appeals arose out of the award made after 1982. ·

Same rationale which in fact furnished basis in K Kamala Jamman- E niavarn (Dead) by Lrs. v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, [1985] 2 SCR 914, and was approved in Raghubir Singh (supra) cannot be applied to reference pending before the Court under Section 18 of the Act. The Legislature for good reason, therefore, used different language in two sub-sections. And the construction of one cannot furnish basis for constru- F ing the other in same manner.

Although brother Sawant, J. has agreed . ~th me on construction of Section 23(1-A) of the Amendment Act but he has written a separate order to highlight the difference between exercise of power by the Court under \ Section 16 on one hand and High Court and Supreme Court on the other. G He has also attempted to cull out power in favour of Collector to award additional compensation from Section 30(1). So far the first is concerned I fully agree with his reasons and conclusions. But I have reservations on the second. Section 30(1) does not spell out power of the Collector. Its clauses (a) and (b) are descriptive of those proceedings ~o which the H

484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A benefit of Section 23(1-A) has been extended. They deal with retrospec- tivity given to Section 23(1-A). But I agree with him that the Collector should be deemed to have this power otherwise it would cause injustice in those large number of cases where a land owner does not seek any reference either because he is satisfied with the determination of compen- ...... sation or his financial resources prevent him from pursuing the hazard of taking recourse to Court of law. However, this power, in my opinion, flows froni Section 15 itself. In any case it in just and reasonable to hold that the additional compensation is payable even by the Collector when he is making an award under Section 11.

c What remains to be considered is if the benefit under Section 23(1- A) could be extended even in those cases where appeals were pending in the High Court or Supreme Court against the award made by the court under section 18 of the Act. The word, 'court' used in Section 23(1-A) appears to refer to the court under Section 18, only, as the court under this provision has been empowered to award additional compensation on such market value as is determined by taking into consideration Section 23 of the Act. The word 'court' in Section 23(1-A) does not appear to have been • used in the wider sense as including the Court of appeal or the court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. In Zora Singh (supra) it was observed rightly by this Court that the Legislature's intention was to award additional compensation only at the stage of award made by the Collector or the Court under Section 18. The construction of the word 'court' in the wider sense would not be in consonance with the purpose and objective of the legislation the background of which has been traced in detail. It is thus clear that the benefit of Section 23(1-A) is available only in those cases where the matter was pending for determination of compensation at the stage of reference under Section 18 in respect of acquisitions which had started even before 1982.

Having explained the scope of Section 23(1-A) and Section 30, their inter-relation and the field of their operation, it may now be seen as to how I these provisions have been dealt with by this Court in various decisions which came before it. When Sectiun 23(1-A) was added Section 23(2) providing for solatium was amended and from 15% it was raised to 30%. Its operation during transitional period was regulated by Section 30(2) of the Act. This provisions came up for consideration earlier in point of time

KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERAIA[SAIW,J.] 485

and by 1989 there were at least four decisions one of them being Constitu- A tion Bench Union of India and Another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. etc., [1989] 2 SCC 754. Since this decision has been considerably influenced the decisions on Section 23(1-A) which have been rendered since 1990 it may be adverted to first. The following question was referred for considera- tion by the Constitution Bench, B "Whether under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 the claimants are entitled to solatium at 30 per cent of the market value irrespective of the dates on which the acquisition proceedings are initiated or the dates on which the award had been passed?" C

But the Bench did not enter into the larger issue and confined itself to the limited question of whether the amended provision for enhanced solatium was available only in appeals arisir.tg out of awards made by the Collector or the Court between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September 1984 or even prior to it. And on construction of the expression, 'or to any order passed D by the High Court or subordinate court on appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principle Act' after 30th April 1982 and before 24th September 1984 held that in the context they were used they intended to awards made by the Collector or the Court between the two dates. According to the Bench, E "In other words Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefit of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 or to appeals against such a~ards decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the F High Court or Supreme Court are rendered before 24 September, 1984 or after that Date. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984."

This decision was not concerned with the jurisdiction and power of the G Court to grant enhanced solatium in reference pending before it under Section 18 as the notification for acquiring the land was issued on 13th November 1959 and the reference court had decided the proceedings on 10th June 1968. What was pending on the date the amendment came into force was the appeal in the High Court. Therefore, the main provision of H

486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Section 23(2) was not attracted. The land owners could get the benefit only if their case was governed by the transitional provision. Further, the con- struction turned on use of the expression, 'against such award under the provisions of the Principal Act after 30th April, 1992'. No such language has beeu used in clause (a) of Section30(1). The ratio of the decision, thus, has to be appreciated in this context. B In the present set of petitions this Court is concerned whether the power of the Court to grant additional compensation, which as explained earlier, in absence of any express indication to the contrary extends in all those cases where reference was pending at the stage of making the award by the Court under Section 18 could be curtailed or negatived by taking recourse to the transitional provision. The question cropped up first in Union of India & Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (1990) 1 SCC 277 when this Court while recognising that Section 23(1-A) enjoined a duty on the Court to award the additional amount on 12% on the market value of the land observed as under :

"But this again is a part of the scheme for determining compensa- tion under Section 23(1) of the Act. It also operates on the market value of the land acquired. It is plainly and distinctly prospective in its operation since market value has to be determined as on the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1). But the legislature has given new starting point for operation· of Section 23(1-A) for certain cases. That will be found from Section 30 sub-sections (l)(a) and (b) of the Transitional Provisions."

F Consequently the Court held that a land owner was entitled to additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) only if the acquisition proceedings were pending on April 30, 1982 or they had been commenced after that day and were either pending or concluded before September 1984. In taking this view the Bench held an owner to be entitled to additional compensation if the acquisition of his land was covered in either clauses G of Section 30 or if the notification under. sub-section (1) of Section 4 had been issued after coming into force of the amended provision. No excep- tion can be taken so far as the construction of Section 30 is concerned. But the observation that the Legislature has given new starting point of opera- tion of Section 23(1-A) was based on Raghubir Singh's decision (supra). H The starting point in that decision was given for purposes of appeals

KS.PARIPOORNAN v.STATEOFKERAIA(SAIW,J.] 487

pending in High Court or the Supreme Cotirt. The Bench did not examine A if the benefit of enhanced solatium under Section 23(2) could not be extended to the acquisitions which were pen~g before the court under Section 18. Yet prospectivity of the Section 23(1-A) was linked with issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act after coming into force of the Act. The Section does not give any such indication. Determina- B tion of market value on the date the no~ification is issued under Section 4(1) fixes the point of time on which date the court shail determine compensation and not the date from which the Act shall commence to operate. Use of expression, 'in addition to the market value of the land' cannot be stretched to mean that the additioMJ compensation shall be payable only in those cases in which notification under Section 4(1) has been issued after coming into force of the Act. This decision was not accepted as laying down correct law in Zora Singh (supra) as expression 'award' used in Section 23(1-A) according to the Bench suggested that the intention of the legislature was to make the provisions of the said section applicable to cases where the Collector or the court hearing the reference had yet to make its award. It has been explained earlier that such construc- tion would be straining language of the Section. In KS. Paripooman (supra) doubt has been expressed on correctness of Zora Singh (supra). Basis for it appears to be same as was expressed in Filip Tiago's case (supra). Neither of the decisions have noticed that in absence of any indication to the contrary the Section became operative on the date it came into force that is 24th September, 1984. If it came into force on that date and the Section requires the court to pay additional compensation in every case then the ambit of the section cannot be narrowed by confining its operation to those cases where notification is issued after coming into force of the Act. The scope of Section 23(1-A) has already been explained. It p has also been explained, at length, as to what was the objective and purpose of it. In light of that it would not be reasonable to restrict the operation of this Section to those proceedings which will be taken for determination of compensation after the Act came into force in September 1984. The expression 'in addition to' is only descriptive rather explanatory by direct- ing that in all those cases where the Court was awarding compensation G after coming into force of the Act it shall award an additional amount as provided in sub-section (1) of the Act.

For all these reasons the questions raiseq in these petitions are answered as below : H

488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A (1) Section 23(1-A) providing for additional compensation is at- tracted in every case where reference was pending under Section 18 before the Court (Section 23(1-A).

(2) No additional compensation is payable in appeals pending on or after 24th September 1984 either in High Court or this Court. B (3) Additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) is also payable in all those case where the proceedings were pending and the award had not been made by the Collector on or before 30th April 1982 [Section 30(1)(a)]. c (4) Similarly every land owner is entitled to additional compensa- tion where the land acquiring proceedings started after 24th April 1982 whether the award by the Collector was made before 24th September 1984 or not [Section 30 (l)(b)].

(5) Additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) is liable to be paid by the Collector as well. (Section 15 of the Act).

ORDER OF THE COURT (PER MAJORITY)

In respect of acquisition proceedings initiated prior to the date of commencement of the Amending Act 68 of 1984, the payment of the additional amount under Section 23(1-A) of the Act will be restricted to matters referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub- section (1) of Section 30 of the said Amending Act. Union of India & Anr. v. Zora Singh & Ors., (1992) 1 Sec 673 insofar as it holds that the said amount is payable in all cases· where the reference was pending before the reference court on F September 24, 1984, irrespective of the date of which the award was made by the Collector, does not lay down the correct law.

The question referred is answered accordingly. The matters be now placed before the appropriate Benches for consideration and disposal of G the appeals in the light of this order and on the other contentions, if any, raised in the appeals.

U.R. Appeals disposed of.