THE DHARANGADllRA CHEMICAL WORKS v. DllARANGADllRA MUNICIPALITY ,& ANOT!IER.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

IULZAPUBKAR, J. 'This litigation in which the Appellant· has challenged the levy of Octroi Vuty imposed by the i{espondent Municipality under .its Octroi Rules ,and Bye-laws framed .under the llombay District Municipal Act, 1901 (1'S adopted by tbe Gov.ernment of Saurashtra) and continued under the Gujarat Municl.pa11t1es Act 1903 · .(as adapted and .applied to the State of S81Jrashtra) .bas a cbequered history. G Briefly stated the facts leading .to the present appeal are the.se. The Appellant is a Company registe~.ed under the Indian Companies Act carrying on business of manufacturing Soda Ash in its factory at l)barangadhra within the Municipal .limits of the Respondent-Municipality. Origlcnslly the Respi>ndent-Municl.pality H being a llistrkt Munk1pal1ty was governed by the pti>vl.st<>ns .of

p. 762

A the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, as adapted and applied to the State of Saurashtra, (for short the Bombay Act) but with effect from 1.1.1965 it is governed by the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 (for short the Gujarat Act).

An Octroi Ordinance called the Saurashtra Terminal Tax and B Octroi Ordinance No. 47 of 1949 was promulgated by the Rajpramukh and brought into force with effect from 31.8.1949. The object of the Ordinance was to enable the State Government · to levy and collect octroi duty in specified cities and towns and other local areas of the State and to pass on the duty so collected by it to those cities and towns until Municipalities therein were constituted under the Bombay Act and those Municipalities made c their own Rules and llye-laws enabling them to levy and collect octroi and other Municipal taxes. To achieve this object s. 3 of the Ordinance empowered the State Government to impose octroi duty iti towns and cities specified in Schedule I thereto, in which Schedule the town of Dharangadhra came to be included subsequently under notification with effect from 26.12.1949. Section 4 of the Ordinance authorised the State Government to D make Rules for the imposition and collection of octroi duty but: under the ·Rules so framed the Municipality of the concerned city or town was to he the collecting machinery. After the inclusion of the Dharangadhra town in the Schedule I octroi was being levied in that town by the State Government under its Rules but the same was being collected thrqugh the machinery of Respondent E Municipality.

It appears that the Respondent Municipality by its Resolution dated 30.3.1953 enhanced the prevailing rate of octroi duty by 50% without complying with the provisions of sections 60 to 62 of Chapter VII of the Bombay Act. The appellant challenged this enhancement in the rate of octroi duty by filing a writ petition \No. 769 of 1962) in the High Court of Gujarat and also filed a suit for refund of the excess amount recovered from i-t for the period ending September 30, 1961 arter serving a statutory riotice on the respondent Municipality. The High Court dismissed the writ petition and upheld the enhancement on the view that while enhancing the rate by its Resolution dated March 30, 1953 the Respondent Municipality had followed the procedure prescribed by the Bombay Act for imposing the octroi and that the enhanced imposition was not under the Ordinance No. 47 of 1949. On appeal, this Court by its judgment dated 20.9.1972 held that the enhanced imposition of duty by the Respondent Municipality II was illegal as the mandatory provisions of ss. 60 to 62 of the

DHAl<ANGA!JliliA CHEMICALS v. i'lUNIClPALITY [TULZAPURKAR, J. J 763

Bombay Act had not been comPlied with nor could the enhanced levy A . be justified under Ordinance No. 47 of 1949 because the State Gov~rnraent alone had the power thereunder to i.mjlose the duty or prescribe its rate and not the Kespondent Municipality. To gee over the effect of this Co.urt' s decision a Validating Act being GuJarat Act No. 6 of 1~78 was passed whereunder the impositio~ of octroi levy and collection thereof prior to 30.4.1965 ·was validated. We are not, however, concerned with the Validating Act inasmuch as that Act has nothing to do with t~e imposition of levy for the period on and after l.S.1965 with which the present appeal is concerned.

It appears that. during the pendency of the aforesaid writ c petition in the Gujarat High Court the Respondent-Municipality proceeded to frame its own Octroi Rules and :Bye-laws under the Bombay Act and after c6mplying with all the procedural steps, such as publishing the draft Rules and Bye-laws, inviting and considering objections thereto, etc. the Respondent-Nunicipal_ity · I) passed a Resolution on 17.12.1963 approving the said draft Rules and Bye-laws whereafter these were forwarded through the Collec- tor· to the DivisiOnal Commissioner, Rajkot;. the Divisional Commissioner made some suggestions to the Respondent-Municipality which were accepted by it; ultimately by his order dated 22.4.1964 the Divisional Commissioner sanctioned the draft Rules and liye-laws; .however, on March 10, 1905 the State G9vernment (as in the meantime the post of the Divisional Commissioner was abolished) issued a Corrigendum to the sanction that had already been accordea with a view to rectify certain printing or typographical errors that had come to the notice of the Respon- dent-Municipality ana thereafter the Respondent-Municipality passed a General Board Resolution dated 29.3.1965 resolving to bring into force these H.ules a~ Bye-laws called "The Dharanga- F dhra Municipality Octroi Rules and Octroi Bye Laws"" with effect from 1.5.1965. The requisite Notification bringing these into force on and from 1.5.1965 was isSued under s. 103 of the Gujarat Act. It may be stated that in the meantime the Bombay Act had been repealed by the Gujarat Act whicl1 had come into fore€ with effect from 1.1.1965.

By the aforesaid Octroi Rules and Bye-laws, 1965 the Kespondent Municipality increased the octroi rates by 12-1/2% on all the goods brought within the Municipal liml.ts of Dharangadhra and also made some changes in the classification of goods so brought in; pursuant thereto it issued bills of octroi payable every month. Feeling aggrieved by this action of the Respondent Municipality the Appellant filed a writ petition (No. 786 of

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A 1965; on 20.7.1965 in the Gujarat High court challenging the ievy of octroi at the en:.anced rate under the said Octroi Rules and llye·-laws on several grnu;;,cs and sought an order restraining the Respondent,-Municipuity frw. levying and collecting an~/or

' enforcing tne recovery theteo! 1a any manner. 'Ihe High Court by its Judi;ment and order dated tl•e 21st January 1971 negatived all the grounds of cMllenge and dismissed the writ petition but by its order dated 8.W.1971 granted a certificate of fitness for appeal to· this Court under Art. 133 (l)(a) and (b) of the Constitution and hence the instant appeal by the appellant.

Though the levy of octroi duty at the enhanced rate under the impugned Octroi Rules and Bye-laws 1965 was challenged on c several grounds in the High Court, counsel for the Appellant in this appeal has raised only three contentions on the basis of which the invalidity of those Octroi Rules and Bye-laws has been pressed into service before us, namely:

(i) Since the exemption from the operation of the Octroi Ordinance No. 47 of 1949 as contemplated by 0 Rule 3 as well as by Bye-law 3 was not granted by the State Government the Municipal Octroi Rules and Octroi Bye-laws 1965 could not be said to have come into force and the Respondent Municipality had no authority or power to bring them into force with effect from 1.5.1965 and therefore, the levy to the extent of the enhanced rate is bad in law.

(ii) That the impugned Octroi Rules and Bye-laws were framed by the Respondent Municipality under the Bombay Act and sanction thereto had also been accorded by the Divisional Commissioner RaJk.ot under the Bombay Act on F l2nd April 1964 but since the Bombay Act was repealed by s. l79\l) of the GuJarat Act with effect from 1.1.1965 and since these Octroi Rules and Bye-laws were not brought into force before the repeal of the Bombay Act they would have no force of law as sub-s. (2) of s •. 279 of the Gujarat Act does not save them G because under clause (Yi) of sub-s.(2) of s. 279 only such Rules and Bye-laws framed under the Repealed Act which were immediately in force prior to 1.1.1965 would stand saved.

(iii)That the Corrigendum to the Octroi Rules and Bye- u laws issued by the Gujarat Government on 10.3.1965 was

DHl\RANGADHRA QlliMICAlS v. MUNICIPALITY [TULZAPURKAR, J.J 765

not by way of purely correcting typographiCal or prin- A tini errors but virtually amounted to a .modification (like inserting Sub-Ru,J.e (5) in &.le 5) of the Rules and Bye-laws without following. the procedure de ~' and, therefore, the ~mpugned Gctroi i<.ules and bye-laws could not: be said to be valid- and could not be brougi1t into force.

in out view there is no substai1ce in any oi these cvn.ce;;:.. tio:;.13 ar&. we proceed' to give Our reas-ons for our View in cegarci t.o each presently.

A..c; re·gards the first contentiOil rai8ed by c:vuns{!l tor t~1e G appeliant it will be necessary to see what Rule ) &mi i>y..-law 3 of tlie Municipal Octroi Rules and Bye-laws, 1965 provide; both are in identieal language and purport to deal wittl the commence- ment of these Municipal Rules and Bye-laws and state these Rules and Bye-laws: ))

''shall come into force after an exemption is granted hy the. Government from the Saurashtra Tewninal Tax and Octro1 Ordinance No. 47 of 1949 and the Rules framed thereunder whi.ch are at pre6ent in force.··

Counsel pointed out that admittedly prior to 1.5.1965 when these Municipal Rules and !lye-laws were purportedly brou;;ht into force E no exemption from the Octro1 Ordinance No. 47 of 1949 and the Rules framed thereunder was granted by the State Government as contemplated by ttle aforesaid provision which could and ought to have been done by issuing a Government Notification withdrawing or deleting the Dharangadhra town and its Municipality from Schedule I to that Ordinance.- Counsel urged that in view of tP.e F cl~e l~nguage of tne above provision the granting of such exemption must be regarded as a condition precedent to the coming into force of these Municipal Octroi Rules artd Bye-Laws and since the condition precedent was not complied with these Rules could not be said to have come into force and the levy at the enhanced rate would be bad in law. Counsel urged that the High Court has G erro~eously treated the insertion of Rule 3 and Bye-law 3 which relate tu the c.ommencement of these Rules and Bye-laws to be a mere surplusage.

In our view- the coatention proceeds upoa a misconception: of th•.: legal pO:>l.tioa in. the ID.a.tt~!' aild· ignores the Objec:. with li wa.icil the Ordinance of 1949 had been promulgated as also the

766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l985j SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A object of inserting Rule 3 and Bye-law 3 in the Municipal Octroi Rules and Bye-laws 1965. It cannot be disputed that the subject matter dealt with by the Ordinance and the Govenunent Rules framed thereunder was levy and collection of octroi duty and the subject matter dealt with by the Bombay Act and the Municipal Rules and Bye-laws framed thereunder (and said to be continued B under the Gujarat Act) is also levy and collection of octroi duty; in ·other words both the pieces of legislation, validly enacted and intended to operate within Municipal limits of the Respondent-Municipality, deal with the same subject matter. In such a situation if there is a repugnancy between the two pieces of legislation, to such an extent that both cannot stand together and operate simultaneously, the later will have the effect of c impliedly repealing the former.

It is true that repeal by implication is not ordinarily favoured by the Courts but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests has been stated in Maxwell on 'Interpreta- tion of Statutes' (Twelfth Edition) at page 193 tubs:

D "If, however, the provisions of a later enactment are so inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of an earlier one that the two cannot stand together the earlier is abrogated by the later". (vide Kutner v. Phillips) [1891] 2 Q.B. 267 at 272.

E In Zaverbhai Amalclas v. The State of Bombay [1955 J 1 s.c.R. 799, this Court has approved the above principle in the context of two pieces of legislation, namely, The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 as amended by Act LI! of 1950 ( a Central Act) and Bombay Act No. XXXVI of 1947 the provisions whereof in the context of enhanced punishment were repugnant to each other. The F Court held that the question of punishment for contravention of orders u.~der the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act both under the Bombay Act and the Central Act constituted a single subject matter and in view of Art. 254(1) of the Constitution Act LU of 1950 (Central enactment) must prevail. The Court quoted with approval Lord Goddar's observations in Smith v. Benabo [1937] 1 K.B. 518, namely "It is a well settled rule of construc- G tion that if a later statute again describes an offence created by a previous one, and imposes a different punishment, or varies the procedure, the earlier statute is repealed by the later statute." After quoting these observations the Court went on to say: "It is true, as already pointed out, that on a questi- H on under Art. 254(1) whether an Act of Parliament

DHARANGAD!IRA CHEMICALS v. MUNICIPALITY [TULZAPURKAR, J.] 767 A prevails against a law of the State, no question of repeal arises;· but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests, namely, that if the subject matter of the later legislation is identical with that of the earlier, so~that they cannot both stand togeth- er, then the earlier is repealed by the later enact- B ment, will be equally applicable to a question under Art. 254(2) whether the further legislation by Parlia- ment is in respect of the same matter as that of the State law. We must accordingly hold that section 2 of Bombay Act No. XXXVI of 1947 cannot prevail as against sec, 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) c Act No. XXXIV of 1946 as amended by Act No. LII of 1950."

The aforesaid principle of implied repeal has been approved and applied in a couple of other decisions of this Court, particular- ly in T. Baral v. Henry Ah Hoe and Another [1983] 1 s.c.R. 905. D

In the instant case the two pieces of legislation are so inconsistent with or repugnant to each other that both cannot stand together and such repugnancy arises from (a) the conferal of power to levy duty on two different bodies, namely, the State Government under the Ordinance and the Municipality under the apporpriate Act and obviously the exercise of .the power con- currently by both the bodies would be incongruous and entirely destructive of the object for which the power was conferred, and (b) the enhanced rate of duty prescribed by the Municipal Rules and Bye-laws - a situation. similar to enhanced punishment ·provided by a later enactment. Having regard to such repugnancy obtaining between the ·two pieces of legislation dealing with the same subject matter the later in point of time will have the effect of displacing the former by necessary implication. That such implied repeal or displacement was within the contemplation of the legislative authority which issued the Ordinance of 1949 will be amply clear if regard is had to the object with which the Ordinance came to be promulgated. The avowed object of the Ordinance was to enable the State Government to levy and collect octroi duty in towns and cities of the erstwhile State of Saurashtra and to pass on the duties so collected by it to those towns and cities until Municipalities therein were constituted under the appropriate Act and those Municipalities made their own Rules and Bye-laws enabling them to levr and collect octroi and other usual Municipal taxes; clause (9) of the Ordinance made express provision for making over such collections to concerned

p. 768

A towns and cities. That such was the object of the Ordinance has been clearly stated by this Court in Mulcbaud Odhavji v. Rajkot Borough Municipality, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 685. In other words the . . Ordinance and the Government Rules framed thereunder were a stop gap measure, being transitional in character which would auto- matically cease to operate no Sooner the concerned Municipality B (here Dharangadhra Municipality) made. and published its own Octroi Rules and Bye-laws under the appropriate Act:

To counter Act the inference of implied repeal, strong. reliance was placed by Counsel for the appellant on the language used in Rule 3 and Bye-law 3 which state that these Rules shall come into force after the exemption from the Ordinance and the C Rules the~eunder has been granted and according to Counsel such language negatives any suggestion of implied repeal. In our view Rule 3 as well as Bye-law 3 proceed on a mistaken assumption of law that the exemption from the Ordinance and the Rules framed thereunder was necessary before the Municipal Rules and Bye-laws could be enforced. Once the Municipal Rules and Bye-laws are validly made and also validly brought into force by following the D requisite procedure prescribed in that behalf under the appro- priate Act the earlier Government Rules would stand pro-tanto repealed notwithstanding what is contained in Rule 3 or Bye-law

3. The legal effect of such a provision (as is contained in Rule 3 or Bye-law 3) would not be and is not to restrain or prevent the municipalities from bringing into force its Rules and ·i:: Bye-laws by following the prescribed procedure. The real aim and object of Rule 3 or Bye-law 3 seems to be to prevent double taxation. If the insertion of Rule 3 or Bye-law 3 was because of a wrong belief or assumption made in the matter of the legal position the Court has to disregard such belief or assumption, for, it is well settled that "the beliefs or assumptions of those F who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law" (vide Lord .Radcliffe in Inlaod Revenue v. Ilolidell O'Mabooey & Co. Ltd. 1952 All England Law Reports 531 at 544). Therefore, the Municipal Rules and Bye-laws 1965 having been validly brought into force after following the prescribed procedure in that behalf, the government Rules under. the Ordinance got impliedly repealed. G Counsel for the appellant also raised the question as to whether the Municipal Rules and Bye-laws being subordinate piece of legislation could repeal either expressly or by implication the Ordinance promulgated by Rajpramukh and the Rules framed thereunder by the State Government and urged that the Municipal 11 Rules or !Sye-laws could not do so; he further urged that for

DHARANGADHRA CHEMICALS v. MUNICIPALITY (TULZAPURKAR, J.] 769

A effecting such repeal the Municipal I\Ules and Bye-laws, 1965 should have at least been raised to the stat\ls of parent legisla- tion by dee'lling them to have been incorporated in the Statute as is done···in some cases like .the town Planning Acts which provide that as soon .as a final· town planning scheme comes.into force it shall be ·deemed ..to have been incorporated. in. the Att :itself. The B contention. as formulated really 11\isses the vital aspect that the effective charge and leVY. of the .octroi. is imposed by the Rules and not by the paren.t legislation, be .it an Ordinance or the appropriate MunicipaJ. Act. The parent. legislation .me~ely confers power on the. specified body or authority t.o frame .Rules for the purpose of. leVYing and collecting ?Ctroi duty. Under the Ordinance of 1949 it was the State Government on whom such power c had been conferred while under the appropriate Act such power has been conferred, on the concerned Municipality; in either case the, leVY and collection.of. the duty is by means ot' subordinate legis,.: lation and .if such subordinate legislation is validly enacted by following the prescribed procedure under the parent le.gislatiqt) there is .no reason why .such subordinate legislation ·shouid ·not have the effect of .impliedly· rep~ling the ~rli~r subordinate legislation and no question.of one ·named body or authority being lower than the other can arise; iil. ...other words the. stS:tus or character of the Rule making body would be irrelevant. 'rn this' view of the· matter there would be no· nece;~ity of . raising th~ Municipal Rules and Bye-laws .t.o highe~.. stat;,s · to th.e parent Legi.slation as contended by . the Couns'll f\)r. the appellant. The E first contention therefore fails. · · ··

. Having thus rejected the first.contention' of .. the appellant for the reasons. indicated above it is UIIDecess.ary ·tor us : t,o consider the effect of deletion of Rule. 3. and .Bye-law 3" from these Oc.troi Rules· and By.,:...laws done: by th~· respondi.nt Muni~i:­ F pality and ·which d~letion ·was .sanctioned by.· the State GOvernment. on 13.4.1966. as such action was clearly taken ex major eauteia . and the operation. o{ .these Rules and Bye-laws. cannot on' :chat. account be ,postponed but ·these.. will have to be regarded as having come int9 force with.effect from 1.5.1965. · '·· · G .The. second contention relates. to t,he effect . ot .. i:he· l~epe~i_-·'oi the Bombay Act under s. 279(1). of the Gujarat Act. The quest'fon is what has been saved.under sub-s. (2) of s; .279 after effecting such repeal. Counsel for the appellant referred to .cliuse (vi) of S\lb-S. (2) which runs thus: . ' .. H "(2) Notwit.hstandfog the repeal of the said Acts,-

p. 770

A (vi) any appointment, notification, notice, tax, fee, order, scheme, licence, permission, rule, bye-law, or form made, issued, imposed, or granted in respect of the said boroughs or districts and in force immediate- ±l_ before the date of the commencement of this Act shall in so far as they are not inconsistent with the l! provisions of this Act be deemed to have been made, issued, imposed or granted under this Act in respect of the borough and shall continue in force.until it is superseded or modified by any appointment, notifica- tion, notice, tax, fee, order, scheme, licence, permission, rule, bye-law, or form made issued, imposed or granted under this Act;" c Relying upon the words "and in force immediately before the date of the commencement of this Act" occurring in the above provision counsel urged that the Municipal Octroi Rules and Bye-laws in question -had been merely framed and at the most had been sanctioned under the repealed Act (the Bombay Act) but these had not been brought into force immediately before the date of the D commencenient of the Gujarat Act, namely, 1.1.1965 and, therefore, could not be said to have been saved under the aforesaid provi- sion. Counsel pointed out that the aforesaid clause (vi) uses both the expressions "order" and "Rule and Bye-law" separately and therefore, Rules and Bye-laws cannot be confused with the order of sanction passed herein by the Divisional Commissioner on E 22.4.1964. It is not possible to accept this contention for more than one reason. In the first place admittedly the Municipal Octroi Rules and Bye-laws were validly made by the respondent Municipality on 17.12.1963 by following the procedure prescribed by the Bombay Act, whereafter these were forwarded to the Divi- sional Commissioner made some suggestions which were accepted by the respondent Municipality; and ultimately by his order dated 22.4.1964 the Divisional Commissioner sanctioned these Rules and Bye-laws. In other words up to this stage everything was validly done under the Bombay Act prior to its repeal on 1.1.1965. Under clause (vi) of sub-s. (2) any order made and which was in force imnediately before the commencement of the Gujarat Act has been saved, inasmuch as it is provided that such order shall be deemed to have been made under the Gujarat Act and will continue to operate until modified or rescinded by another order passed under the Gujarat Act. If the Divisional Commissioner's order sanction- ing the Rules and !!ye-laws is thus saved that order cannot be looked at divorced frcim what was sanctioned thereunder; what was sanctioned would be a part and parcel of the order of sanction.

DHARANGADHRA CHEMICALS v. MUNICIPALITY [TULZAPURKAR, J.] 771

To say that merely the order of sanction dated 22.4.1964 is saved and not the Rules and Bye-laws is to view the order of sanction in the air. In substance what is saved are the sanctioned Rules and Bye-laws. It is true that clause (vi) uses both the expres- sions 'order' and 'Rule and Bye-law' separately and distinct from each other but such separate or distinctive use is conceivably made to cover different situations. In a case where the order ·B that is saved happens to be an order sanctioning Rules and Bye-laws the two will have to be regarded as part and parcel of single instrument which.is saved in its entirety. In other words what is saved under clause (vi) of sub-s. (2) of s. 279 are the sanctioned Municipal Octroi Rules and Bye-laws, 1965. c Secondly the question could be considered under s. 7(b) of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. Section 7 deals with the effect of repeal and reads thus:

"7. Where this Act or any Bombay Act or Gujarat Act made after the comDl<mcement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-

(a) xx xx xx

(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything 'duly done or suffered thereunder;"

The Divisional Commissioner's . order according sanction is obviously saved thereunder but even Rules and Bye-laws could be covered by the ·expression "anything duly done" occurring in clause (b) above inaslllllCh. as the expression "anything duly done" would be comprehensive enough to take in not only the things done but also the effects or legal consequences flowing therefrom. In M/ s Universal Imports Ageucy and Another v. 1be au.et Controller of Imports and Exports & Others, [1961] l s.c.R. 305, while interpreting the expression "things done" occurring in para 6 of the French Establishments' (Application of Laws) Order,. 1954, this Court has taken the view that such expression is comprehen- sive enough to take in not only things done but also the effects or the legal consequences flowing therefrom. In so interpreting the said expression the Court followed the English decision in 1be Queen v. Justice of the Vest ll1diog of Yorkshire, [1876] l H Q.B.D. 220, where the notice was given by a Local Board of Health

772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP;2 s.c.R.

, of-intention to make a rate under the PUblic Health Act, 1848, A and the amending Acts but before the notice had expired these Acts were repealed by the Public Health Act, 1875 which contained a saving- of "anything duly done" under• the repealed enactments, but the Local Board, in ignorance of the repeal, made a rate purporting to be under the repealed Act, and it was held that as B the notice was given before the repealing Act the making of the rate was also saved by the words "anything duly done" under the · repealed enactments. This Court pointed out that the . English 'decision was illustrative of the point that it is not necessary that an impugned thing in itself should have been done before the C Act was repealed but it would be enough if it was ·integrally connected with and was a legal consequence of a thing done before the said repeal. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the ·contention that merely the, order of sanction was saved and not the Municipal Octroi Rules and Bye-laws, 1965•

D As regards the last contention it is difficult to accept .that the Corrigendum dated 10.3.1965 amounts to modification of the Rules and Bye-laws. The material on record clearly shows that corrigendum was issued with a view to rectify typographical errors or mistakes that had crept in the typed copies of the E Rules and Bye'-laws forwarded to the Divisional Commissioner which had come to the notice of the Responent-Municipality. Even the omission of sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 in the copies forwarded appears to be an inadvertant typographical mistake. Besides, so far as the· Rules are concerned the High Court has rejected the F contention on the basis that the corrigendum even if it is held to amoiint to modification in regard to sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 the same cannot be held to be outside the powers of the Govei:'nment. ·The contention is, therefore, rejected. ,. G In the _result the· appeal fails and is dismissed. There will ·be-no.order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.