SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER v. MOHAMMED KAMRAN

2026 INSC 1140 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026 [ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL) NO. 7504 OF 2026]

SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER …APPELLANT

VERSUS

MOHAMMED KAMRAN …RESPONDENT

ORDER

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Senior Intelligence Officer, Directorate General of Service Tax

Intelligence1, challenges the judgment and order dated 26th December,

20252 of a Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka3, granting bail

to Mohammed Kamran4.

3. What is gleaned from the factual matrix is this. Appellant lodged a

private complaint before the Special Court for Economic Offences,

Bengaluru5 against the respondent alleging commission of offences

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by MANIK KUMAR1 appellant Date: 2026.10.16 17:24:34 IST Reason: 2 in Criminal Petition No. 16884 of 2025 3 High Court 4 respondent 5 trial court

under Section 16(2)(b) read with Sections 132(1)(b), 132(1)(c) and

132(1)(f) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 20176, punishable

under Section 135 thereof. The allegation in the complaint, inter alia,

is that the respondent, being the proprietor of M/s MK Traders, issued

invoices without supply of goods, availed fraudulent input tax credit

and falsified documents and financial statements and furnished false

information to the appellant with an intent to evade payment of tax

under the CGST Act, thereby causing a loss of Rs. 43,08,22,936/-.

4. Apart from the challenge on merits to the grant of bail to the

respondent, it is the primary contention of the appellant that it was

not afforded any opportunity to present its case, much less sufficient

opportunity. According to the appellant, the High Court erroneously

recorded the name of the Special Public Prosecutor/Senior Standing

Counsel as having appeared representing the appellant when he was

not present in the country, let alone in the Court, on the relevant date;

that a request seeking adjournment, in view of absence of counsel,

was rejected by the Court; and that the application for bail was heard

and disposed of hurriedly during the winter vacation of the High Court.

5. It has also been alleged on behalf of the appellant that a search was

carried out at the declared residential premises of the respondent as

well as his actual residence, during which he offered stiff resistance

and ultimately fled from the spot. A separate FIR came to be registered

for this offence.

6 CGST Act

6. On 16th September, 2025, the respondent was arrested. Successive

bail applications filed by him before the trial court as well as the

Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge7 came to be rejected.

7. Respondent then filed the criminal petition before the High Court

seeking bail. The petition was listed for the first time on 12th December,

2025; learned counsel for the respondent was directed to serve a copy

of the petition upon the Standing Counsel for the appellant; and the

appellant was directed to file its statement of objections within two

weeks.

8. Though the winter vacation of the High Court commenced from 20th

December, 2025, the criminal petition came to be listed promptly on

26th December, 2025 pursuant to a memo moved by the learned

counsel for the respondent. A learned counsel for the appellant did

appear before the Single Judge. There are conflicting versions of what

transpired in Court, which we propose to note hereafter. The petition,

however, was allowed by the Single Judge by granting bail to the

respondent. The order dated 26th December, 2025 granting bail is the

subject matter of challenge in this appeal.

9. We have heard Mr. N. Venkataraman, learned Additional Solicitor

General for the appellant and Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior

counsel for the respondent.

10. Mr. Venkataraman vehemently contends that the High Court ought not

to have heard the criminal petition in the first place, when a request

7 Sessions Court

for adjournment was made on behalf of the appellant citing the

absence of its arguing counsel. According to him, the learned counsel

who appeared before the Single Judge, though on the panel of the

appellant, had no instructions to contest the petition on merits, and

thus, had rightly sought an adjournment. Appellant having been

denied the opportunity of presenting its case to the fullest, he further

contends that principles of natural justice have been brazenly violated

in the process.

11. It is additionally brought to our notice by Mr. Venkataraman that on

22nd December, 2025, the respondent had instituted a writ petition8

before the High Court challenging the legality of his arrest and seeking

quashing of the complaint filed before the trial court as well as the

order taking cognizance of the offences. An interim/ad-interim prayer

was also made in the writ petition seeking stay of further proceedings

and release on the ground that an application under Section 483 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 20239 is not an efficacious

remedy. The disclosure made in the writ petition with regard to the

criminal petition, which was pending, reads thus:

35. the petitioner has filed Bail Petition for release under Section 483 of BNSS in Cr.P.No.46884/2025 but it is not efficacious and therefore exercise of Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to protect Fundamental Right is necessary, otherwise the petitioner will suffer illegal detention which is in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution.

12. Mr. Venkataraman submits that not only was the prayer for ad-interim

relief refused on 22nd December, 2025, the writ petition was finally

dismissed by an order dated 7th July, 2026; however, the respondent

never disclosed this fact of refusal of ad-interim relief to the Single

Judge on 26th December, 2025.

13. Urging that a litigant like the respondent who left no stone unturned

to obtain bail by abusing the process of law should be dealt with firmly,

Mr. Venkataraman submits that the order granting bail is liable to be

set aside.

14. Per contra, Mr. Nagamuthu submits that the contention regarding

absence of the arguing counsel for the appellant was not taken before

the Single Judge. According to him, the learned Additional Solicitor has

not been appropriately instructed. In fact, the learned counsel

appearing before the Single Judge initially, faintly, sought an

adjournment; however, later on proceeded to address the Court on the

merits of the matter. That apart, the appellant miserably failed to file

its statement of objections within two weeks, as directed. Having failed

to avail such opportunity, it would be incorrect to claim that the

appellant was not adequately represented before the High Court or

that it was denied natural justice.

15. On merits, Mr. Nagamuthu submits that having regard to the nature of

allegations, the gravity of the offences allegedly committed, the long

incarceration of the respondent, the investigation having been

completed, the offences being Magistrate triable, and the maximum

punishment that the offences attract is five years, this is not a case

where this Court ought to step in to curtail the liberty of an accused;

more particularly when in excess of nine months has elapsed since

then.

16. Mr. Nagamuthu, thus, prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

17. Ordinarily, we would have been inclined to dismiss the special leave

petition at the outset. However, notice was issued having regard to the

special facts and circumstances. A grievance had been raised that the

appellant was not heard by the High Court. Since the issue between

the parties has bearing on the twin questions of judicial propriety and

uberimma fides, we prefer to deal with the same.

18. Vide our order dated 10th September, 2026 we permitted the appellant

to place on record the true and correct version of facts by filing an

additional affidavit, while also permitting a reply thereto to be filed by

the respondent.

19. Along with his reply affidavit, the respondent placed on record a pen

drive containing the recording of the hearing that took place on the

day the impugned order was passed. We have carefully perused the

affidavits as well as the video recording and the transcript thereof.

20. There appears to be merit in the submission of Mr. Nagamuthu that

the learned counsel representing the appellant, who was present on

26th December, 2025 before the Single Judge, in fact, did advance

some submissions concerning the merits of the matter. However, it is

equally true that a request had been made by the learned counsel

representing the appellant to adjourn hearing on the ground that the

Standing Counsel has been engaged to appear for the appellant. Since

adjournment was not granted, it seems that as an officer of the Court,

the learned counsel chose to assist the Single Judge by opposing the

prayer for bail. Thus, while on the one hand, it would not be entirely

correct to claim that the appellant was wholly unrepresented before

the Single Judge, on the other it stands to reason that the appellant

could not be represented by its Standing Counsel.

21. Having said so, what bothers us is the conduct of the respondent and

the manner in which he moved the High Court for an expedited hearing

of his criminal petition on 26th December, 2025. In fact, not only has

he abused the process of law, he has suppressed material facts from

the High Court. There is clear lack of uberimma fides, which is the

foundation for invoking the equitable and discretionary jurisdiction for

grant of bail.

22. Respondent had filed the criminal petition before the High Court

seeking bail on 9th December, 2025. On the day following, viz. 10th

December, 2025, he filed a similar application seeking bail before the

Sessions Court. Such application came to be rejected at a point of time

when the criminal petition before the High Court was pending.

Undeterred, on 22nd December, 2025, the respondent challenged the

legality of his arrest by filing the writ petition. As noted, not only did

he seek quashing of the complaint filed before the trial court, he also

sought ad-interim stay of further proceedings and release from

custody stating that the remedy of applying for bail under Section 483,

BNSS is not efficacious. Admittedly, a prayer for interim/ad-interim

release was made on 22nd December, 2025 in the writ petition before

the High Court, which came to be refused. Later in the day, a memo

seeking listing of the criminal petition came to be filed. This was

allowed and the petition was directed to be listed on 26 th December,

2025. Refusal of the prayer for ad-interim release was not disclosed to

the Single Judge who, having heard the parties and regard being had

to the nature of the case, proceeded to grant the respondent bail.

23. Mr. Venkataraman seems to be fully justified in highlighting that the

respondent has been crafty and disingenuous and in urged this Court

not to let the respondent off lightly, since he has abused the process

of law and suppressed material facts.

24. Two issues of substantial importance do arise in the present

circumstances.

25. First, pursuit of parallel remedies before various fora by the

respondent. He simultaneously pursued proceedings seeking

bail/release before the Sessions Court as well as in his writ petition

before the High Court while the criminal petition seeking bail before

the High Court was pending consideration. Rejection of the prayer for

bail (fourth in the series) by the Sessions Court as well as refusal by

the writ court to order release from custody were particularly not

brought to the notice of the High Court. The fact that the respondent

engaged in forum shopping is evident. Appellant, however, failed to

place relevant materials on record by not filing its objections; may be,

the time was too short. Also, in view of the winter vacation that

followed and without having notice of the memo moved by the

respondent for urgent listing of his criminal petition on 26th December,

2025, neither the appellant nor the learned counsel who appeared on

26th December, 2025 on its behalf could bring all facts to the attention

of the Single Judge. Of utmost importance is that the respondent too

did not! He indulged in suppressio veri and suggestio falsi.

26. Respondent’s conduct in pursuing such parallel remedies, while

keeping all judicial authorities in the dark, must be severely

deprecated. It may be a right of the accused to challenge his arrest or

to approach a court seeking bail; however, such conduct of pursuing

remedies parallelly, particularly without adequate disclosure, clearly

amounts to abuse of the process of law.

27. Secondly, the criminal petition before the Single Judge was listed, upon

a memo having been moved by the learned counsel for the respondent,

post 22nd December, 2025, during the winter vacation of the High

Court. Ideally, in view of the earlier direction, the criminal petition

should have been listed upon reopening of the High Court after the

winter vacation particularly when such petition had not been made

returnable on a specific date falling during such vacation or the Single

Judge had not directed its listing before the Vacation Bench. To have

obtained listing of a petition, without adequate notice to the appellant,

was clearly an attempt to steal a march by even misleading the Court.

28. Had it been a case of arrest for a heinous offence, we would have taken

a very strict view of the respondent’s conduct.

29. Be that as it may, regard being had to the entire turn of events, we

are of the view that though the bail granted by the High Court to the

respondent may not be set aside at this stage, certainly the matter

needs to be remitted to the Single Judge who had the occasion to deal

with the criminal petition on 26th December, 2025 for its fresh

consideration.

30. Thus, we set aside that part of the impugned order whereby the

criminal petition stood disposed of with the result that the same shall

revive on the file of the High Court; and we direct that instead of the

bail granted by the Single Judge, the respondent shall continue to

remain on interim bail on earlier terms and conditions. Appellant is

granted liberty to place all materials on record by filing a counter

affidavit within two weeks, peremptorily. Respondent will have a

week’s time to file his rejoinder. The Single Judge shall, thereafter,

decide the criminal petition on its own merits, preferably by the end of

this year. Needless to observe, interim bail granted to the respondent

shall be operative till such time further orders are passed by the Single

Judge on the criminal petition.

31. The appeal stands disposed of on the above terms.

32. Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed.

33. Before parting, we wish to make certain observations on urgent listing

of matters, be it a petition or application or appeal, before a Bench of

a high court when the court is on vacation.

34. In cases of the present nature, where a Bench of a high court directs

listing of a petition “two weeks hence” and the day following expiry of

the period of “two weeks”, in terms of such direction, happens to fall

in the midst of a vacation, the period of two weeks should ordinarily

be computed by the registry of each such court excluding the period

during which the court is on vacation. However, if the petition is made

returnable on a specific date by the Bench which falls during the

vacation or the Bench directs listing before the Vacation Bench, such

petition should ideally be accordingly listed. This, of course, would be

subject to the relevant rules framed by the high courts.

35. These observations, aimed at serving the interest of justice better, are

essential to secure uniformity as well as to ensure that litigants are

not prejudiced due to an inadvertent act of the court.

…………………………………J. DIPANKAR DATTA

..……………………………….J. SHEEL NAGU

New Delhi; October 16, 2026.