HARAMANI SAHOO AND OTHERS v. LALITA NAYAK AND OTHERS

2026 INSC 1112 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 13681 OF 2026 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 25635 of 2023]

HARAMANI SAHOO AND OTHERS … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

LALITA NAYAK AND OTHERS … RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

R. MAHADEVAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. The present Civil Appeal has been preferred against the order dated

10.04.2023 passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack 1 in C.M.P. No.1091

of 2022, whereby the High Court declined to interfere with the order dated

21.09.2022 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Second Court, Cuttack 2 in

C.S. No.86 of 2009 and dismissed the said Civil Miscellaneous Petition.

3. The appellants are the legal heirs of the original plaintiff, namely,

Rabindranath Sahoo, who instituted C.S. No.86 of 2009 seeking inter alia

declaration of his right, title and interest over the suit schedule property, Signature Not Verified

recovery of possession, rectification of the registered sale deeds dated Digitally signed by BORRA LM VALLI Date: 2026.10.12 16:31:32 IST Reason:

15.02.1971 and 28.07.1978, under which he had purchased property comprised

in Hal Plot No.3370 / 4045 measuring Ac. 0.10 decimals and Hal Plot No.3371 /

4050 measuring Ac. 0.02 decimals, aggregating Ac. 0.12 decimals out of Ac.

0.16 decimals under Hal Khata No.198 published in the year 1986, and other

consequential reliefs.

4. According to the appellants, in respect of Hal Plot No.3370 / 4045, sale

deeds were successively executed by Defendant No.3 in favour of Defendant

No.2 in the year 1976, by Defendant No.2 in favour of Defendant No.1 in the

year 2005, and by Defendant No.1 in favour of Defendant No.11 in the year

2015. In respect of Hal Plot No.3371 / 4050, a sale deed was executed by

Defendant No.8 in favour of Defendant Nos.9 and 10 in the year 2007. At that

stage, the source of title of Defendant No.8 was not known to the original

plaintiff.

4.1. Upon Defendant Nos.9 and 10 filing their written statement and

disclosing that Plot No.3371 / 4050 under Khata No.1135 / 660 had been

recorded in their names, the original plaintiff sought amendment of the plaint.

By way of the proposed amendment, it was pleaded that Plot No.3371 / 4050

measuring Ac. 0.16 decimals and corresponding to Sabik Plot No.2761 (part),

was vacant land and constituted the exclusive property of Mayadhar Mohapatra,

who had acquired the same pursuant to a mutual partition amongst the

purchasers under the registered sale deed executed in the year 1940. Defendant

Nos.9 and 10 thereafter filed their additional written statement denying the said

averments.

4.2. Subsequently, the original plaintiff filed a further application under Order

VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19083, stating

that although the Hal Plot numbers and Khata numbers had been disclosed by

the defendants in their written statement, the mutation case number had not been

mentioned either in the written statement or in the additional written statement.

Upon conducting a search in the office of the Tahsildar, Niali, the original

plaintiff came to know of a compromise decree passed in T.S. No.105 of 1998,

to which he was not a party. He therefore sought to incorporate the foundational

pleadings relating to T.S. No.105 of 1998 and also sought a declaration that the

final decree passed by the trial Court in the said suit was null and void.

5. During the pendency of the said amendment application, the original

plaintiff died and his legal heirs namely the present appellants were brought on

record. The trial Court rejected the proposed amendment vide order dated

21.09.2022. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred C.M.P. No.1091 of

2022 before the High Court. By the impugned order dated 10.04.2023, the High

Court declined to interfere with the order of the trial Court and dismissed the

Civil Miscellaneous Petition. Hence, the present Civil Appeal.

3 For short, “CPC”

6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the matter

is complex, involving transactions dating back to the year 1940 and several

persons claiming rights in different capacities. It was therefore submitted that

having regard to the nature and complexity of the transactions, it was not

unusual that despite due diligence, the pleadings required correction and

elaboration from time to time.

6.1. It was further submitted that the Tahsildar, Niali in his order dated

31.08.2007 passed in R.P. Case No.998 of 2005, had noticed that there were

multiple registered sale deeds in respect of the same property executed by

different parties and that the Record of Rights had been corrected by the

Tahsildar in individual case proceedings. According to the learned counsel,

these circumstances had resulted in considerable confusion, as is evident from

the observation of the Tahsildar that he was not in a position to decide the

matter and pass any order. It was further submitted that the respondents had also

not disclosed the complete particulars of their source of title and that it was only

upon a thorough search being undertaken in the office of Tahsildar, Niali, that

the original plaintiff came to know of the compromise decree passed in T.S. No.

105 of 1998. Upon obtaining the certified copies of the plaint and final decree

passed in the said suit, the original plaintiff came to know that an area of Ac.

0.04 decimals including the suit land measuring Ac. 0.02 decimals in Plot No.

3371 / 4050 had been allotted to Defendant No.8 pursuant to the said

compromise decree. It was submitted that the said allotment was illegal and the

circumstances in which the compromise decree came to be passed and the

allotment was made were required to be brought on record and adjudicated upon

by the trial Court.

6.2. Learned counsel submitted that without considering these relevant

aspects, both the trial Court and the High Court erroneously rejected the

amendment sought by the original plaintiff and thereafter pursued by the

appellants upon being brought on record as his legal heirs.

6.3. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in A.K. Gupta & Sons Ltd.

v. Damodar Valley Corporation 4 , it was submitted that the proposed

amendment neither introduces a new case nor sets up a new cause of action, but

is necessary to bring on record the real question in controversy between the

parties.

6.4. Learned counsel further submitted that while holding that a fresh suit on

the amended claims would have been barred by limitation on the date on which

the application for amendment was filed, and that the amendment had been

sought after an inordinate lapse of time, both the trial Court and the High Court

failed to appreciate that the question as to whether the relief sought by way of

amendment is barred by limitation has to be examined in the facts and

circumstances of each case. It was contended that the power to permit

amendment of pleadings can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings where

such amendment is necessary for determining the real questions in controversy

4 AIR 1967 SC 96

and in the interests of justice. In support of the said submission, reliance was

placed upon the judgment of this Court in Abdul Rehman & another v. Mohd.

Ruldu & others5.

6.5. On the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the appellants prayed

that the orders passed by the trial Court and the High Court be set aside and the

amendment sought by the appellants be allowed.

7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for Respondent Nos.1 and 9 to 11

opposing the present appeal, submitted that the appellants have been protracting

the proceedings for years by resorting to repeated applications under Order VI

Rule 17 of the CPC.

7.1. Learned counsel traced the history of the litigation and submitted that the

present proceedings have to be viewed in the backdrop of the repeated attempts

made by the original plaintiff. It was submitted that the original plaintiff,

Rabindranath Sahoo, had initially instituted C.S. No.185 of 2007 along with I.A.

No.134 of 2007 before the Civil Judge (Second Court), Cuttack, in respect of

the subject land. The relief sought therein was one of permanent injunction

against Defendant No.1. After due contest, I.A. No.134 of 2007 was dismissed

on 24.01.2008. The original plaintiff thereafter preferred F.A.O. No.11 of 2008

before the District Judge, Cuttack, which also came to be dismissed on

24.11.2008. Instead of proceeding with the said suit, the original plaintiff

subsequently sought amendment of the pleadings after filing of the written

statement and also enhanced the valuation of the suit, which ultimately came to

be numbered as C.S. No.86 of 2009.

7.2. It was further submitted that after filing of the written statement by

Defendant No.1, the original plaintiff again amended the pleadings, pursuant to

which an additional written statement was filed on 16.07.2011. After several

adjournments, the original plaintiff moved an application under Order XXVI

Rule 9 of the CPC seeking appointment of a Survey Knowing Commissioner for

local investigation of the suit property. The said application was rejected on

13.01.2012 after hearing the parties.

7.3. The learned counsel further submitted that the original plaintiff thereafter

amended the plaint by impleading Defendant Nos.7 to 10 and subsequently

Defendant No.11 and filed a consolidated plaint. After the newly added

Defendant Nos.9 to 11 filed their written statements, the original plaintiff once

again moved an amendment application on 19.05.2017, which was allowed

subject to costs. It was contended that the present amendment application

constitutes yet another attempt to enlarge the scope of the suit.

7.4. The learned counsel submitted that the present amendment application

was filed after an inordinate delay of nearly fourteen years from the institution

of the suit and after filing of the written statement as well as the additional

written statement by the contesting defendants. Such an amendment, particularly

at an advanced stage of the proceedings, would, according to the learned

counsel, fundamentally alter the nature and character of the suit and defeat the

very purpose of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC. In support of the

said contention, reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in

Basavaraj v. Indira and others6.

7.5. The learned counsel particularly drew attention to the assertion of the

original plaintiff that while searching for the status and ownership of the plot

referred to in the registered sale deed dated 28.07.1978, he came to know of the

compromise decree passed in T.S. No.105 of 1998. It was submitted that the

amendment application does not disclose when, in what manner, or in what

circumstances such search was undertaken, nor does it disclose when precisely

the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the said compromise decree. The learned

counsel also referred to the written statements filed by Defendant Nos.9 and 10,

wherein particulars relating to Mutation Plot No.3371 / 4050 corresponding to

Mutation Khata No.1135 / 660 had been disclosed. It was submitted that the said

written statement was filed in the year 2017 and therefore, the original plaintiff

was aware of the claim relating to the said plot at least from that point of time.

However, no particulars have been furnished as to why, despite the alleged

discovery, the matter could not have been raised in the earlier amendment

applications. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay, the

appellants ought not to be permitted to introduce a challenge to the compromise

decree by way of amendment.

6 2024 INSC 151

7.6. It was further submitted that the proposed challenge to the compromise

decree is also subject to the statutory bar contained in Order XXIII Rule 3A of

the CPC. According to the learned counsel, the validity of a compromise decree

cannot be challenged by way of a separate suit and therefore permitting the

appellants to introduce such a challenge by way of amendment to the plaint

would amount to allowing them to circumvent the statutory bar contained in the

said provision.

7.7. The learned counsel submitted that the proposed amendment including

the additional reliefs incorporated in the prayer clause, ought not to be

entertained as a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation

on the date of the amendment application itself. Although limitation may

ordinarily be a matter for consideration at the appropriate stage, it was

contended that a claim which is ex facie barred by limitation and is sought to be

introduced after an inordinate delay ought not to be permitted where it causes

prejudice to the opposite party and seeks to reopen rights which have accrued by

efflux of time.

7.8. It was finally submitted that the trial Court upon consideration of the

entire factual and procedural history, rightly rejected the amendment application

and that the High Court by the impugned order dated 10.04.2023, committed no

error in declining to interfere with the said order. Learned counsel therefore

prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

8. We have considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel

appearing for the parties and have perused the material placed on record.

9. The controversy before us essentially concerns the permissibility of the

amendment sought by the original plaintiff under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC.

For ease reference, the said provision is extracted below:

“Amendment of Pleadings.

The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties:

Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.”

10. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that Order VI

Rule 17 of the CPC confers a discretionary power upon the Court to permit

amendments which are necessary for determining the real questions in

controversy between the parties. However, once the trial has commenced, the

exercise of such power is subject to the additional requirement that the Court

must be satisfied that despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the

matter before the commencement of trial. The object of the provision is to

enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon the dispute

between the parties, while at the same time, ensuring that a party does not

introduce at a belated stage, matters which could, with due diligence, have been

raised earlier.

11. The principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Order VI Rule

17 of the CPC are well settled. In A.K. Gupta & Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley

Corporation (supra), this Court explained that an amendment which introduces

a new case or a new cause of action is generally impermissible, particularly

where the new claim is barred by limitation. At the same time, where the

amendment does not introduce a new cause of action or a different case, but

merely sets out a different or additional approach to the same facts, such

amendment may be permitted. The Court thus drew a distinction between an

amendment introducing a new cause of action and one which merely elaborates

or alters the approach to the case already pleaded.

11.1. In Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal & others v. K.K. Modi and others 7 , this

Court held that the “real controversy test” is the basic and cardinal test

governing an application under Order VI Rule 17. The Court is required to

determine whether the proposed amendment is necessary for deciding the real

question in controversy between the parties, while ensuring that such

amendment does not cause injustice or prejudice to the opposite party.

11.2. Similarly, in Abdul Rahman and another v. Mohd. Ruldu and others

(supra), this Court reiterated that amendments necessary for determining the real

7 (2006) 4 SCC 385

questions in controversy ought ordinarily to be permitted, provided they do not

alter the basic nature of the suit. A change in the relief sought does not, by itself,

amount to a change in the nature of the suit. The following paragraph from the

said judgment is pertinent:

“18. We reiterate that all amendments which are necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties should be allowed if it does not change the basic nature of the suit. A change in the nature of relief claimed shall not be considered as a change in the nature of suit and the power of amendment should be exercised in the larger interests of doing full and complete justice between the parties.”

11.3. In Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and Sons &

others8, this Court held that although the Courts have wide discretion in matters

of amendment of pleadings, such discretion must be exercised judiciously and

with great care. The Court further culled out certain factors to be taken into

consideration while allowing or rejecting an application for amendment, which

include the following:

“63. On critically analysing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment:

(1) whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case;

(2) whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide;

(3) the amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money;

(4) refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation;

(5) whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case; and

(6) as a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application.”

11.4. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Private

Limited and another 9 , this Court, while recognising the liberal approach to

amendments, also delineated circumstances in which an amendment may be

declined, including where a time-barred claim is sought to be introduced, the

nature of the suit is changed, or a valid defence of the opposite party is sought to

be taken away. The Court cautioned against adopting a hyper-technical

approach and emphasised that amendments which facilitate effective

adjudication of the dispute and avoid multiplicity of proceedings ought

ordinarily to be permitted, subject to the absence of injustice or prejudice to the

opposite party. The following conclusions are apposite:

“71.2. All amendments are to be allowed which are necessary for determining the real question in controversy provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. This is mandatory, as is apparent from the use of the word “shall”, in the latter part of Order 6 Rule 17CPC.

71.3. The prayer for amendment is to be allowed:

71.3.2. To avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided

(a) The amendment does not result in injustice to the other side,

(b) By the amendment, the parties seeking amendment do not seek to withdraw any clear admission made by the party which confers a right on the other side, and

(c) The amendment does not raise a time-barred claim, resulting in divesting of the other side of a valuable accrued right (in certain situations).

71.4. A prayer for amendment is generally required to be allowed unless:

71.4.1. By the amendment, a time-barred claim is sought to be introduced, in which case the fact that the claim would be time-barred becomes a relevant factor for consideration.

71.4.2. The amendment changes the nature of the suit.

71.4.4. By the amendment, the other side loses a valid defence.

71.5. In dealing with a prayer for amendment of pleadings, the court should avoid a hypertechnical approach, and is ordinarily required to be liberal especially where the opposite party can be compensated by costs.

71.6. Where the amendment would enable the court to pin-pointedly consider the dispute and would aid in rendering a more satisfactory decision, the prayer for amendment should be allowed.

71.7. Where the amendment merely sought to introduce an additional or a new approach without introducing a time-barred cause of action, the amendment is liable to be allowed even after expiry of limitation.

71.8. Amendment may be justifiably allowed where it is intended to rectify the absence of material particulars in the plaint.

71.9. Delay in applying for amendment alone is not a ground to disallow the prayer. Where the aspect of delay is arguable, the prayer for amendment could be allowed and the issue of limitation framed separately for decision.

71.10. Where the amendment changes the nature of the suit or the cause of action, so as to set up an entirely new case, foreign to the case set up in the plaint, the amendment must be disallowed. Where, however, the amendment sought is only with respect to the relief in the plaint, and is predicated on facts which are already pleaded in the plaint, ordinarily the amendment is required to be allowed.

71.11. Where the amendment is sought before commencement of trial, the court is required to be liberal in its approach. The court is required to bear in mind the fact that the opposite party would have a chance to meet the case set up in amendment. As such, where the amendment does not result in irreparable prejudice to the opposite party, or divest the opposite party of an advantage which it had secured as a result of an admission by the party seeking amendment, the amendment is required to be allowed. Equally, where the amendment is necessary for the court to effectively adjudicate on the main issues in controversy between the parties, the amendment should be allowed.”

11.5. More recently, in Akkiraju Panduranga Rao and another v. Gunlapally

Ranga Rao 10 , this Court reiterated that the principal considerations while

deciding an application for amendment are, first, whether the amendment is

necessary for determining the real question in controversy and secondly,

whether it can be allowed without causing injustice or prejudice to the opposite

party. The Court further emphasised that while considering an application for

amendment, courts should adopt a liberal approach and should not be unduly

concerned with technicalities.

11.6. In light of the statutory framework and the principles enunciated above,

we may now examine the permissibility of the amendment sought by the

original plaintiff.

12. In the present case, there is no dispute that the application for amendment

was filed after commencement of the trial and therefore, the proviso to Order VI

Rule 17 of the CPC is attracted. The fact that the amendment was sought at a

belated stage is, by itself, not determinative. The principal question is whether,

the appellants have shown that despite due diligence, the matters now sought to

be introduced could not have been raised before the commencement of the trial.

The further question is whether the proposed amendment would fundamentally

alter the nature and character of the suit.

10 2026 SCC OnLine SC 805

13. As regards the requirement of due diligence, the original suit concerns the

right, title and interest in and possession of the very property which forms the

subject matter of the proposed amendment. The proposed pleading relating to

the compromise decree passed in T.S. No.105 of 1998 arises from the allegation

that the said decree affects a portion of the very suit property, namely, Ac. 0.02

decimals comprised in Hal Plot No.3371 / 4050. The case of the original

plaintiff is that he was not a party to the said suit and was unaware of the

compromise decree. It is stated that only upon obtaining certified copies of the

plaint and final decree on 22.06.2020, did he come to know of the compromise

in respect of suit plot No.3371 / 4050 measuring Ac. 0.04 decimals along with

other properties between Defendant No.8 and others. It is further stated that the

written statement filed by Defendant Nos.9 and 10 did not disclose the source of

title of their vendors.

13.1. The significance of these circumstances cannot be overlooked. The

proposed amendment is not founded upon a transaction or an event wholly

unconnected with the subject matter of the suit, but upon a subsequent discovery

of a decree which, according to the original plaintiff, has a bearing upon the title

to a portion of the very property in dispute. The record indicating that certified

copies of the plaint and final decree were obtained on 22.06.2020 is a relevant

circumstance in assessing the plea of due diligence. At this stage, it is not

necessary for the Court to finally determine whether the plaintiff’s assertion

regarding the date of knowledge is ultimately correct. What is required is to

examine whether sufficient explanation has been furnished for not raising the

matter before commencement of the trial.

13.2. Having regard to the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the view that the

explanation furnished by the appellants cannot, at this stage, be characterised as

a mere omission, inadvertence or negligence. The subsequent discovery of the

compromise proceedings, coupled with the assertion that the original plaintiff

was not a party to those proceedings and that the source of title of the vendors

was not disclosed in the written statement, provides a sufficient basis for

accepting the plea of due diligence for the purposes of the proviso to Order VI

Rule 17 of the CPC. The statutory requirement is therefore satisfied.

14. The next question is whether the proposed amendment fundamentally

alters the nature and character of the suit. In our view, it does not. The original

suit is founded upon the plaintiff’s claim to title, possession and related reliefs

in respect of the suit property. The proposed amendment seeks to place before

the Court facts concerning a compromise decree which, according to the original

plaintiff, affects a portion of that very property and consequently bears upon the

rights claimed in the suit. The proposed amendment may enlarge the factual and

legal questions requiring adjudication; however, such enlargement cannot, by

itself, be equated with a fundamental alteration of the nature and character of the

suit.

14.1. The real inquiry is whether the amendment introduces a distinct and

independent controversy having no connection with the original cause of action,

or whether it merely brings on record additional facts and consequential reliefs

having a direct nexus with the existing controversy. On the facts of the present

case, the proposed amendment falls within the latter category. The subject

matter of the proposed amendment and the original suit substantially overlap,

and the adjudication of the proposed issue would have a direct bearing upon the

title and possession claimed in respect of the suit property.

15. The respondents have however urged that the proposed challenge to the

final decree passed in T.S. No.105 of 1998 is barred by limitation and by Order

XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC. At this stage, we are concerned with the

permissibility of the amendment and not with the ultimate merits or

maintainability of the reliefs sought to be introduced. The objections raised by

the respondents cannot therefore be finally adjudicated upon while deciding the

application for amendment, unless the proposed claim is ex facie barred in law.

16. As regards limitation, it is well settled that a claim which is clearly barred

by limitation, particularly where its introduction would defeat an accrued right

of the opposite party, is a relevant consideration in the exercise of discretion

under Order VI Rule 17. At the same time, where the question of limitation is

itself arguable and depends upon disputed facts, including the date or manner in

which the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the relevant document or transaction,

the amendment need not necessarily be rejected at the threshold.

16.1. In Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan and others11, this Court held that

where the plea of limitation is arguable, the amendment may be allowed and the

question of limitation be left open for determination in the suit. In Sampat

Kumar v. Ayyakannu and another12, this Court held that mere delay in seeking

amendment is not, by itself, a ground for refusing an amendment. Similarly, in

Pankaja and another v. Yellappa (Dead) by LRs and others13, this Court held

that there is no absolute rule that an amendment must be rejected merely

because the relief sought by way of amendment is alleged to be barred by

limitation; the question has to be considered in the facts and circumstances of

each case.

16.2. In the present case, the date of knowledge of the compromise decree itself

is a matter in dispute and has not been conclusively determined. The material

relied upon by the appellants, including the procurement of certified copies of

the plaint and final decree on 22.06.2020 is a circumstance requiring

consideration. It would therefore be inappropriate to finally determine the

question of limitation while considering the application for amendment. The

respondents shall remain at liberty to raise the plea of limitation before the trial

Court, which shall consider the same in accordance with law.

11 (2001) 2 SCC 472 12 (2002) 7 SCC 559 13 (2004) 6 SCC 415

17. Equally, we do not propose to pronounce upon the applicability or

otherwise of Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC. Whether the proposed challenge

to the compromise decree is maintainable; whether such decree is susceptible to

challenge in the manner pleaded; and what legal consequences, if any, flow

from the fact that the original plaintiff was not a party to the proceedings in T.S.

No.105 of 1998 are matters which are best left for consideration by the trial

Court after the pleadings are complete and the parties have had an opportunity

to address the same as per law.

18. It is clarified that permitting the amendment does not amount to

acceptance of the averments incorporated therein, nor does it confer upon the

appellants any declaration or substantive right in respect of the compromise

decree. All questions relating to maintainability of the amended reliefs,

limitation, the binding nature or otherwise of the decree, the applicability of

Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC, title, possession and the merits of the

respective claims are expressly left open for consideration by the trial Court in

accordance with law.

19. The objection as to prejudice also does not warrant rejection of the

amendment. The prejudice relied upon by the respondents principally arises

from the additional factual and legal issues which they would now be required

to meet. Such prejudice can adequately be addressed by permitting the

respondents to file an additional written statement and where necessary, by

imposing appropriate costs. The mere fact that an amendment requires the

opposite party to meet additional pleadings or issues does not, by itself, warrant

refusal of the amendment where the amendment is necessary for a complete and

effective adjudication of the controversy.

20. Conversely, refusal of the amendment may result in the controversy

concerning title to the same property being fragmented into separate

proceedings, with the attendant possibility of inconsistent findings in respect of

the same parcel of land. Avoidance of such multiplicity, while preserving the

respondents’ right to contest the amended pleadings on all available grounds, is

also a relevant consideration in the exercise of jurisdiction under Order VI Rule

17 of the CPC.

21. The decision in Basavaraj v. Indira and others (supra) does not, on the

facts of the present case, call for a different conclusion. The present case turns

upon its own facts. In particular, the disputed chain of title, the assertion that the

original plaintiff was not a party to the compromise proceedings, the subsequent

discovery of the compromise decree, and the material indicating that certified

copies of the plaint and final decree were obtained only on 22.06.2020, furnish

an explanation which cannot, at this stage, be construed as a mere omission or

negligence. As indicated above, the requirement of due diligence contemplated

by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC stands satisfied.

22. At the same time, the considerable delay in seeking the amendment and

the inconvenience that may be caused to the respondents cannot be disregarded.

The appropriate course therefore is to permit the amendment subject to costs,

while preserving the respondents’ right to file their additional pleadings and to

raise all objections available to them in law.

23. Accordingly, the orders dated 21.09.2022 passed by the trial Court in C.S.

No.86 of 2009 and dated 10.04.2023 passed by the High Court in C.M.P.

No.1091 of 2022, are set aside. The application for amendment is allowed,

subject to payment of costs of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand) to

the contesting respondents within two weeks from today. The appellants shall

carry out the consequential amendments in the plaint within a period of four

weeks thereafter. The respondents shall be at liberty to file their additional

written statement(s) within such period as may be fixed by the trial Court. As

observed earlier, all questions relating to limitation, maintainability, the

applicability of Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC, the validity and binding

nature of the compromise decree, title, possession and the merits of the

respective claims are left open for consideration by the trial Court in accordance

with law.

24. The Civil Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

25. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

.…………………………J. [B.V. NAGARATHNA]

.…………………………J. [R. MAHADEVAN] NEW DELHI; OCTOBER 12, 2026.