Martanda Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh and Anr.
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- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Decided
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 1081 · Not reported in the Supreme Court Reports
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Judgment
2026 INSC 1081 NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.4722 OF 2026 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.1582 of 2026)
Martanda Singh ...Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh and Anr. ...Respondent(s)
ORDER Leave granted.
2. A consensual relationship spreading over three
years has eventually ended with a criminal case lodged
against the appellant. On the First Information Statement
(FIS) of the 2nd respondent, FIR No.191 of 2025 was
registered at the Sirgitti Police Station, District Bilaspur, on
the allegation of refusal to marry, after exploiting the 2 nd
respondent sexually on the pretext of marriage.
3. Heard Dr. Rajesh Pandey, learned Counsel for the
appellant and Sri Vinayak Sharma, learned Standing
Counsel for the respondent-State. The 2nd respondent,
Signature Not Verified though served through the Assistant Sub-Inspector of the Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date: 2026.10.05 16:47:39 IST Reason: Police Station, Sirgitti, none appeared for her.
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4. Before we look into the facts, we look at
Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana 1 and extract
paragraph 24 as hereunder:
‘24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.’
[underlining by us for emphasis]
5. With the principle in the above extract in our
minds, we look at the facts of the present case. The 2 nd
respondent is an engineering graduate who had been
Footnotes
studying for competitive examinations. She met the
appellant at an academy, wherein both were enrolled.
Admittedly, they fell in love and their family members
also talked to each other. On an understanding that
they would be married, the appellant used to visit the
house of the 2nd respondent, who lived with her mother
and brother. When nobody was at home, they entered
into a physical relationship, which continued thereafter
for about three years. The specific allegation is that
when her mother was not in station, the appellant
used to frequently come to her house and they had
physical relationship. Obviously, the information that
the mother has left, was passed on by the 2 nd
respondent herself, since we cannot presume that the
appellant had mounted a constant surveillance of the
2nd respondent’s house for this purpose.
6. Admittedly, the physical relationship continued
for three years unabated and later they separated. The
marriage proposal mooted by both the families, also
fell through, upon which the present complaint was
raised. It was also asserted that the appellant had
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agreed to marry the 2nd respondent before the Mahila
Thana Counselling Centre, Bilaspur which was not
complied with. Immediately, we have to observe that
the undertaking would have been on the threat of
criminal prosecution; which even otherwise is
unenforceable. The undertaking also cannot be alleged
to be a promise to marry, since by then admittedly
there was a courtship of three years, when the 2 nd
respondent admittedly had permitted physical
relationship. The consent obviously was not on
coercion or misrepresentation.
7. We cannot but reiterate the proposition as
enumerated in the above extract that the consent
under fear or misconception cannot be loosely inferred
to fasten criminal liability on one of the parties when
both admittedly, had a consensual relationship and the
other party willingly permitted physical relationship.
Even on a bare reading of the complaint, there is no
clear assurance or a promise made of marriage, since
the specific allegation is that they entered into a
physical relationship after courtship, fully knowing the
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consequences, but alleged to be under the pretext of
marriage; clearly an afterthought. The 2 nd respondent
is a well-educated woman, who entered into a
consensual relationship and carried it on, for three
years, allegedly on the pretext of marriage, which
never fructified. She categorically states that she
would drop the charge, if he marries her. A criminal
prosecution cannot be reduced to a strong-arm tactic.
8. We are unable to find any criminal culpability on
the appellant who entered into a consensual
relationship with the 2nd respondent, which consent
cannot be said to be coerced or obtained on a
misrepresentation.
9. We find absolutely no reason to allow the
continuance of the proceedings. The chargesheet filed
as Charge Sheet No.199 of 2025 dated 17.06.2025,
produced as Annexure P4, before the Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, has
now matured into Session Case No.216 of 2025
pending before the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC),
Bilaspur (C.G.). Annexure P6 is the order posting the
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case for framing of charges. The charge-sheet filed in
the said case shall stand quashed. There shall be no
further proceedings taken on the said charge levelled
against the appellant and the proceeding in S.C.
No.216 of 2025 pending before the Additional Sessions
Judge (FTC), Bilaspur (C.G.) shall stand closed.
10. The appeal stands allowed.
11. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
rejected.
.......…….……………………. J. (J. B. PARDIWALA)
....……….……………………. J. (K. VINOD CHANDRAN)
NEW DELHI; OCTOBER 01, 2026.
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Source: Supreme Court of India (www.sci.gov.in). Judgment text as published on the Court's website.