Martanda Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh and Anr.

Judgment · Supreme Court of India · decided

2026 INSC 1081 · Not reported in the Supreme Court Reports
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2026 INSC 1081 · Not reported in the Supreme Court Reports

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Judgment

2026 INSC 1081 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.4722 OF 2026 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.1582 of 2026)

Martanda Singh ...Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Chhattisgarh and Anr. ...Respondent(s)

ORDER Leave granted.

2. A consensual relationship spreading over three

years has eventually ended with a criminal case lodged

against the appellant. On the First Information Statement

(FIS) of the 2nd respondent, FIR No.191 of 2025 was

registered at the Sirgitti Police Station, District Bilaspur, on

the allegation of refusal to marry, after exploiting the 2 nd

respondent sexually on the pretext of marriage.

3. Heard Dr. Rajesh Pandey, learned Counsel for the

appellant and Sri Vinayak Sharma, learned Standing

Counsel for the respondent-State. The 2nd respondent,

Signature Not Verified though served through the Assistant Sub-Inspector of the Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date: 2026.10.05 16:47:39 IST Reason: Police Station, Sirgitti, none appeared for her.

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4. Before we look into the facts, we look at

Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana 1 and extract

paragraph 24 as hereunder:

‘24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.’

[underlining by us for emphasis]

5. With the principle in the above extract in our

minds, we look at the facts of the present case. The 2 nd

respondent is an engineering graduate who had been

Footnotes

1 (2013)
7 SCC 675 Page 2 of 6

studying for competitive examinations. She met the

appellant at an academy, wherein both were enrolled.

Admittedly, they fell in love and their family members

also talked to each other. On an understanding that

they would be married, the appellant used to visit the

house of the 2nd respondent, who lived with her mother

and brother. When nobody was at home, they entered

into a physical relationship, which continued thereafter

for about three years. The specific allegation is that

when her mother was not in station, the appellant

used to frequently come to her house and they had

physical relationship. Obviously, the information that

the mother has left, was passed on by the 2 nd

respondent herself, since we cannot presume that the

appellant had mounted a constant surveillance of the

2nd respondent’s house for this purpose.

6. Admittedly, the physical relationship continued

for three years unabated and later they separated. The

marriage proposal mooted by both the families, also

fell through, upon which the present complaint was

raised. It was also asserted that the appellant had

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agreed to marry the 2nd respondent before the Mahila

Thana Counselling Centre, Bilaspur which was not

complied with. Immediately, we have to observe that

the undertaking would have been on the threat of

criminal prosecution; which even otherwise is

unenforceable. The undertaking also cannot be alleged

to be a promise to marry, since by then admittedly

there was a courtship of three years, when the 2 nd

respondent admittedly had permitted physical

relationship. The consent obviously was not on

coercion or misrepresentation.

7. We cannot but reiterate the proposition as

enumerated in the above extract that the consent

under fear or misconception cannot be loosely inferred

to fasten criminal liability on one of the parties when

both admittedly, had a consensual relationship and the

other party willingly permitted physical relationship.

Even on a bare reading of the complaint, there is no

clear assurance or a promise made of marriage, since

the specific allegation is that they entered into a

physical relationship after courtship, fully knowing the

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consequences, but alleged to be under the pretext of

marriage; clearly an afterthought. The 2 nd respondent

is a well-educated woman, who entered into a

consensual relationship and carried it on, for three

years, allegedly on the pretext of marriage, which

never fructified. She categorically states that she

would drop the charge, if he marries her. A criminal

prosecution cannot be reduced to a strong-arm tactic.

8. We are unable to find any criminal culpability on

the appellant who entered into a consensual

relationship with the 2nd respondent, which consent

cannot be said to be coerced or obtained on a

misrepresentation.

9. We find absolutely no reason to allow the

continuance of the proceedings. The chargesheet filed

as Charge Sheet No.199 of 2025 dated 17.06.2025,

produced as Annexure P4, before the Judicial

Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, has

now matured into Session Case No.216 of 2025

pending before the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC),

Bilaspur (C.G.). Annexure P6 is the order posting the

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case for framing of charges. The charge-sheet filed in

the said case shall stand quashed. There shall be no

further proceedings taken on the said charge levelled

against the appellant and the proceeding in S.C.

No.216 of 2025 pending before the Additional Sessions

Judge (FTC), Bilaspur (C.G.) shall stand closed.

10. The appeal stands allowed.

11. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

rejected.

.......…….……………………. J. (J. B. PARDIWALA)

....……….……………………. J. (K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

NEW DELHI; OCTOBER 01, 2026.

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Source: Supreme Court of India (www.sci.gov.in). Judgment text as published on the Court's website.