GANAPATI (DEAD) BY HIS LRS v. PRABHAKAR & OTHERS

2026 INSC 1033 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 660 OF 2019

GANAPATI (DEAD) BY HIS LRS … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

PRABHAKAR & OTHERS … RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

S.V.N. BHATTI, J.

1. The Appellants, i.e., the Legal Representatives of the Plaintiff, assail the

decision dated 19.07.2012 in R.S.A. No. 551 of 2007 of the High Court of

Karnataka, Circuit Bench at Dharwad. The Plaintiff filed O.S. No. 9 of 1988

before the Munsiff Court at Banahatti, seeking a declaration and an

injunction against the Respondents herein. Subsequently, the Munsiff Court

at Banahatti transferred the Suit to the Court of the Principal Civil Judge

(Senior Division), Jamkhandi, where it was re-registered as O.S. No. 267 of

1999. The genealogical table showing the relationship between the parties is

set out before adverting to their averments in O.S. No. 267 of 1999. Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by LOKESH ARORA Date: 2026.09.22 17:53:13 IST Reason:

Gangaram

Ganapati Kashibai (Plaintiff) (Second Wife) (Through the first wife)

Shakuntala Kamalavva (Defendant No.1) (Defendant No. 2)

Tatappa Baburao Burashi (Defendant No. 3/Third Party Purchaser)

2. The admitted facts are that the propositus Gangaram died in 1949,

leaving behind his son Ganapati, the plaintiff, by his first wife. His second

wife, Kashibai, had two daughters. The Plaintiff alleges that after the

propositus’s demise, he exclusively succeeded to his father’s estate under

Hindu law and thus became the absolute owner in possession of the suit

properties. The plaint schedule property consists of house properties bearing

TMC Nos. 1074 and 1075, situated at Terdal Village, Jamkhandi Taluka,

Bagalkot District, Karnataka.

3. The relationship of the Plaintiff with Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 is not in

dispute, and it is stated that they are the Plaintiff’s sisters through

Gangaram’s second wife, Kashibai. The Suit has been filed because, after

Kashibai’s death in 1986, Defendant No. 1 applied for and secured mutation

of the suit schedule properties in her name in the municipal records for 1987–

1988, pursuant to the registered Will (Exhibit D-2) executed by Kashibai on

13.10.1984. The Plaintiff’s case is that upon the demise of propositus in 1949,

he became the absolute owner, i.e., to the exclusion of Kashibai and her

daughters, Defendant Nos. 1 and 2. In view of the change of name in the

municipal records, the Plaintiff has filed the Suit for declaration and perpetual

injunction. While the Suit was pending, Defendant No. 1 executed a registered

Sale Deed (Exhibit D-1) dated 03.08.1995, transferring TMC No. 1074 to

Defendant No. 3. Hence, Defendant No. 3, claiming to be a subsequent

purchaser after the Suit was filed, has been impleaded as a party.

4. The Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 first resisted the suit on the ground that

an oral partition had taken place between the Plaintiff and the late Kashibai.

It was contended that, under the oral partition, the suit schedule properties

fell to Kashibai’s share. Accordingly, the 1st defendant’s name has been

mutated in her right as an owner of the plaint schedule properties. As a

consequence of the oral partition, it is also stated that the Plaintiff acquired a

house, TMC No. 1410, sold the said property to a third party via a registered

Sale Deed on 03.12.1974, and left the village Terdal. Secondly, it is stated that

Kashibai has the right to the plaint schedule property as the widow of the late

Gangaram. The Trial Court, by Judgment and Decree dated 17.07.2002,

partly decreed the Suit, and the findings of the Trial Court are summarised

hereunder:

A. Since Gangaram died in 1949, before the enactment of the Hindu

Succession Act, 1956 (“Act, 1956”), his only son, Ganapati, succeeded to the

estate as the sole surviving male coparcener under the prevailing Mitakshara

Hindu law. 3

B. Under Sections 3(1) and 3(3) of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property

Act, 1937 (Act XVIII of 1937) (“Act, 1937”), the widow Kashibai acquired only

a limited interest, with a right to seek partition.

C. A widow must affirmatively exercise her right to partition and have her

share separated. Mere residence in the matrimonial house does not confer

proprietary ownership, nor does it ripen into absolute ownership under

Section 14(1) of the Act, 1956. Upon her death without claiming partition, the

estate devolved entirely on the surviving coparcener by survivorship.

D. The 1974 sale, in itself, does not indicate that the Plaintiff and Kashibai

effected an oral partition. The Defendants failed to discharge the burden of

proving an oral partition under which TMC Nos. 1074 and 1075 were allotted

to Kashibai. DW-1’s statement that her mother told her about a partition was

rejected as hearsay and was not supported by independent witnesses or

contemporaneous records.

E. Since Kashibai possessed no disposable title or partitioned share, the

registered Will dated 13.10.1984 (Exhibit D-2), executed by her in favour of

Defendant No. 1, was void and non-binding on the Plaintiff. Consequently,

Defendant No. 1 had no transferable title to convey TMC No. 1074 to

Defendant No. 3 by the Sale Deed Exhibit D-1.

F. Municipal entries do not confer title but indicate the person from whom

the municipal property taxes have to be collected.

G. Although the Plaintiff did not specifically seek possession, the court

moulded the relief and ordered the Defendants to deliver vacant possession

to the Plaintiff to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

5. The Defendants challenged the Judgment and Decree in O.S. No. 267

of 1999 by filing R.A. No. 19 of 2002 before the Fast Track Court, Jamkhandi.

By the Judgment dated 03.01.2007, the Fast Track Court, Jamkhandi,

dismissed R.A. No. 19 of 2002, confirming the Judgment and Decree of the

Trial Court as follows:

A. The Defendants No. 2 and 3 did not specifically plead the date, month,

or year of the alleged partition between Smt. Kashibai and the Plaintiff. Nor

was there any specific pleading as to whether the said partition was oral or

written, and in whose presence it was effected. There was neither any evidence

on record in respect of these material aspects, nor was any witness examined

in this regard.

B. A composite reading of Section 3 of the Act, 1937 makes it clear that

when a male Hindu dies intestate, leaving his property, his widow and his son

inherit the property, subject to the provisions of Sub-Section (3) of the Act,

1937. Further, a Hindu widow’s interest is a limited interest known as the

Hindu Women’s Estate.

C. Section 14 of the Act, 1956 provides that any such property acquired

by a Hindu widow shall be held by her as the absolute owner. However, under

the Act, 1937, if a widow acquires property from her husband along with other

coparceners of the family, she must claim partition and assert her right to

that property. Thereafter, if the property remains in her possession even after

the enactment of the Act, 1956, that right will be enlarged, and she will

become the absolute owner of the property and will have every right to deal

with it independently, irrespective of whether her sons survive.

D. There is no evidence that the deceased Kashibai claimed partition after

she began residing in the suit property as its owner. Mere residence of a Hindu

widow in her husband’s residential house will not give her a right to share in

the family properties unless she exercises her right by claiming partition.

E. The Plaintiff proved his title after Kashibai’s death and succeeded to the

suit properties as the sole owner. In the circumstances of the case, it is

recorded that the Plaintiff failed to prove possession of the suit properties.

6. The Legal Representatives of Defendant No. 3 filed Regular Second

Appeal No. 551 of 2007, and the substantial question of law framed by the

High Court reads as follows:

“Whether the Courts below were justified in ignoring the vesting of right in Smt. Kashibai- the mother of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 by virtue of Section 3(2) of the Hindu Women’s Right to Properties Act, 1937 read with Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956?”

7. Through the impugned Judgment, the High Court interfered with the

Judgment and Decree of the Trial and Appellate Courts. The High Court, by

accepting the admitted circumstances of the case and noting the findings

recorded during the oral partition, examined the Plaintiff’s entitlement to the

plaint schedule property in terms of the rights of the parties, first arising

under the Acts of 1937 and 1956.

8. Before we advert to the contentions canvassed by the Learned Counsel

appearing for the parties, the conclusion of the impugned Judgment,

particularly on the question of law, is set out:

A. Gangaram died intestate, and by virtue of Section 3(2) of the Act, 1937,

Smt. Kashibai and the Plaintiff will have equal shares in the late Gangaram’s

properties.

B. The suit schedule properties, falling within Gangaram’s share, will

devolve upon his wife, Smt. Kashibai, who will thus become the absolute

owner of the property by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, 1956. The courts

below failed to consider this aspect.

C. Once the suit schedule property became the absolute property of Smt.

Kashibai, she acquired the right to dispose it of as per her will and wish. Thus,

by virtue of the Will executed by Smt. Kashibai and the entries in the

municipal records, Defendant No. 1 became the absolute owner of the said

property.

D. Defendant No. 1, as the absolute owner of the suit schedule property,

had the right to sell it in favour of Defendant No. 3.

E. The Courts below ignored the statutory rights conferred on the deceased

Smt. Kashibai under Section 3(2) of the Act, 1937, and Section 14(1) of the

Act, 1956, and held that she had no right or title in the property. Accordingly,

they held that she could not have executed the Will in favour of her

daughter/Defendant No. 1, a finding incorrect in law and fact.

9. We have heard both the sides and perused the record.

10. Mr. Anil Katarki, Counsel for the Appellants, argued that the impugned

Judgment committed a serious error of law by confirming Kashibai’s right and

then expanding it into an absolute right within the meaning of Section 14(1)

of the Act, 1956. The Respondents’ claim rests on the alleged oral partition

between the Plaintiff and Kashibai. The Trial Court and the First Appellate 7

Court found that the plea of oral partition was not made out. Kashibai cannot

be said to have enjoyed the plaint schedule in her own right between 1949

and 1956 to convert that right into an absolute right. The decisions relied

upon by the High Court are clearly distinguishable, and the Respondents’

claim for title to the plaint schedule is unfounded. The learned Counsel

assailed the impugned Judgment primarily by relying on the findings recorded

by the Trial and the First Appellate Court.

11. Mr. Shanthkumar V. Mahale, learned Senior Counsel for the

Respondents, relies on the impugned Judgment and argues that the

relationship between the parties is admitted. The death of the propositus is a

crucial factor in determining the devolution of the right first to Kashibai and

its subsequent transformation into an absolute right. In the case at hand,

Gangaram died in 1949, leaving the Plaintiff and Kashibai as persons entitled

to one half of the property in the plaint schedule. It is argued that, as the son

of the propositus, the Plaintiff is entitled to a half share in the estate left

behind by the late Gangaram and Kashibai, under Section 3 of the Act, 1937,

and has stepped into the shoes of the propositus. Kashibai, in her right, has

enjoyed the properties. There is no requirement in law that the transformation

of this right into an absolute right occurs only upon partition between the

Plaintiff and the late Kashibai. He relies on the ratio of the following

judgments:

(1) Potti Lakshmi Perumallu v. Potti Krishnavenamma1: The precise

quantum of a widow’s interest must be determined with reference to the date

1 1964 SCC OnLine SC 35.

on which she actually seeks to enforce partition, not the date on which her

husband died.

(2) V. Tulasamma & Others v. Sesha Reddy2: A widow’s right to

maintenance is a pre-existing legal right. Therefore, her limited interest

becomes full ownership.

(3) Raghubar Singh & Ors. v. Gulab Singh & Ors.3: A widow’s right to

maintenance arises from Shastric Hindu law and is not merely a statutory

creation under the Act, 1937. Consequently, instruments recognising this

pre-existing right attract Section 14(1), conferring absolute ownership, rather

than restricting her estate under Section 14(2) of the Act, 1956.

12. We have heard the parties and perused the record.

13. The decisions on the point are to the effect that a Hindu widow, stepping

into her husband’s shoes, holds the properties by satisfying the requirement

of Section 14(1) of the Act, 1956. Even assuming the Defendants have failed

to prove the factum of the oral partition pleaded by them, the necessary

corollary in law under the Act, 1937, read with Section 14(1) of the Act, 1956,

remains intact and unaffected. The consistent view of this Court is to

recognise the right of a Hindu widow as blossoming into an absolute right,

except in cases that fall under Section 14(2) of the Act, 1956. Kashibai held

her husband’s interest subject to the restrictions of Section 3(2) of the Act,

1937. Section 14(1) of the Act, 1956 takes away the effect of Section 3(2) of

the Act, 1937.

2 (1977) 3 SCC 99. 3 (1998) 6 SCC 314.

14. The interplay and expansion between Section 3(2) of the Act, 1937, and

Section 14(1) of the Act, 1956, are no longer res integra, and the following

precedents are closer to the controversy in issue in this Appeal.

14.1 In V. Tulasamma (supra), the issue was whether property allotted to a

Hindu widow in lieu of maintenance, under a compromise decree with a

restriction on alienation, vests in absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of

the Act, 1956. This Court held that a widow’s right to maintenance is a pre-

existing legal right. Accordingly, her limited interest transforms into absolute

ownership. The following is the gist of the observations:

i. A Hindu woman’s right to maintenance is a tangible, pre-existing legal

right against property (jus ad rem), not an illusory claim granted as a

matter of grace or generosity. When property is transferred or allotted

to a widow in lieu of maintenance, the instrument merely recognises,

endorses, or confirms her pre-existing right. It does not confer a new

title or right.

ii. Section 14(1) and its Explanation must be construed liberally in favour

of Hindu females to advance the socio-economic objective of the Act,

1956, which was to convert limited interests into absolute ownership.

The expression “possessed by” has the widest possible amplitude,

denoting the state of owning property, including constructive or legal

possession, provided the woman’s possession is backed by some vestige

of title and not that of a mere trespasser.

iii. Section 14(2) is strictly a proviso or exception to Section 14(1) and

cannot be interpreted in a manner that frustrates legislative intent.

Where an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing right,

such as a claim to maintenance, Section 14(2) has no application, and

any restrictive conditions in the document are wiped out by Section

14.2 In Raghubar Singh (supra), it was held that a widow’s right to

maintenance arises under Shastric Hindu law and is not merely a statutory

imprimatur under the Act, 1937. Consequently, instruments recognising this

pre-existing right attract Section 14(1), which confers absolute ownership,

rather than restricting her estate under Section 14(2). The following is the gist

of the observations:

i. A Hindu widow’s right to maintenance is a pre-existing right that arises

from the spiritual, social, and temporal relationship of marriage under

Shastric Hindu law. Statutes such as the Act, 1937, or the Act, 1956

did not create this right. They merely provided statutory recognition to

rights that already existed.

ii. The term “possessed by” in Section 14(1) of the Act, 1956, has the

widest possible amplitude. It encompasses ownership of property even

without actual or physical possession, provided possession is held

under some vestige of a claim, right, or title.

iii. Where a document, decree, or instrument merely declares, recognises,

or confirms a Hindu female’s pre-existing right to maintenance, her

limited interest automatically becomes an absolute right under Section

14(1) of the Act, 1956. Any restrictions contained in such a document

must be disregarded.

iv. Section 14(2) of the Act, 1956, operates as a proviso and applies only to

instruments, decrees, awards, or gifts that create an independent or

entirely new title in favour of the female for the first time. It does not

apply where the instrument merely endorses or recognises a pre-

existing right.

15. The Appellants distinguish by contending that Kashibai cannot be said

to have enjoyed a right under Section 3(2) of the Act, 1937. This argument

has been canvassed to overcome the binding precedents on the point. Section

3(2) confers on the widow, on the principle of devolution and subject to the

limitation in Section 3(3) of the Act, 1937, the right of her husband. This may

be termed a confirmation by the Legislature of a right for a person to obtain

the property of another on the latter’s death in certain circumstances. It is

not that the property will devolve on another only by survivorship or

inheritance; it can also be through an Act of the Legislature. In the first

instance, Kashibai has a right under Section 3(1) of the Act, 1937. Similarly,

by operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, 1956, Kashibai becomes an absolute

owner of the property devolved in her favour upon the demise of the prepositus

Gangaram. The partition between the Plaintiff and Kashibai, as is well settled,

is not a sine qua non for continuing to enjoy the right as an independent or

absolute owner of the property left behind by the prepositus. Even assuming,

without deciding the said argument, that a partition has not occurred in the

undivided property, the shares in the coparcenary are subject to fluctuation

but not to denial of a right.

16. For the above reasons, the impugned Judgment has applied the

admitted circumstances to the precedents nearer to the case at hand and has

allowed the Second Appeal. The High Court’s exercise of jurisdiction further

conforms to the grounds available under Section 100 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908.

17. For the above discussion, the Civil Appeal fails and is dismissed.

18. No order as to costs. Pending application, if any, shall be disposed of

accordingly.

..……….…………………J. [S.V.N. BHATTI]

..…………………………J. [N.V. ANJARIA]

New Delhi; September 22, 2026.