MICKY TRADERS v. L.R.Y. LABOUR CONTRACTOR & ORS.

NON-REPORTABLE 2026 INSC 1025 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22161 of 2026) MICKY TRADERS … APPELLANT Versus

L.R.Y. LABOUR CONTRACTOR & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23127 of 2026)

JUDGMENT Alok Aradhe, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. A tender begins with competition, but it proceeds upon rules.

The present appeals concern the meaning of one such rule: a

requirement prescribing the experience which a bidder must

possess before it may compete for a public contract. The

question is how that requirement is to be understood and

applied.

3. These appeals take exception to the order dated 27.05.2026

passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by Jayant Kumar Arora Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No.8671 of 2026, by which the Date: 2026.09.21 17:42:03 IST Reason:

High Court quashed the acceptance of the technical as well as

the financial bid of Micky Traders (the H1 Bidder) and directed

the Punjab State Agricultural Marketing Board (the Board) and

the Market Committee, Ludhiana (the Committee) to issue a

Letter of Acceptance (LoA) in favour of the eligible tenderer. The

H1 Bidder, being aggrieved, has challenged the same in an

appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 22161 of 2026. The Board and

the committee are also challenging the impugned order in

appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 23127 of 2026. L.R.Y. Labour

Contractor (the H2 Bidder) is the primary respondent in both

the appeals, who had filed the writ petition. In order to

appreciate the grievance of the appellants, relevant facts need

mention, which are stated infra.

FACTUAL MATRIX

4. On 13.02.2026, the Committee issued a Detailed Notice

Inviting Tender (DNIT) inviting bids for recovery/realization of

user charges for utilising Mandi infrastructure by retail and

other vehicles of fruits, vegetables, eatables etc. for a period of

twelve months, that is, from 01.04.2026 till 31.03.2027.

Clause 11 of the DNIT required the bidders to submit the

documents enumerated therein in digitally signed copies. The

reserve price of the work was fixed at Rs.12,21,58,500/-

(Rupees Twelve Crore Twenty-One Lakh Fifty-Eight Thousand

Five Hundred only) per annum.

5. In response to the DNIT, H1 Bidder, H2 Bidder and three other

bidders submitted their bids. On evaluation, the technical bid

of the H1 Bidder was found responsive and its financial bid of

Rs.16,51,51,000/- (Rupees Sixteen Crore Fifty-One Lakh Fifty

One Thousand only) was accepted, being the highest bid

received as against the H2 Bidder's bid of Rs.15,03,33,000/-

(Rupees Fifteen Crore Three Lakh Thirty-Three Thousand

only).

6. The H2 Bidder addressed an e-mail to the Secretary, Tender

Opening Committee, Market Committee, Ludhiana, stating

that the H1 Bidder did not possess the requisite experience of

collection of parking fees or user charges and that the Board

had erred in issuing an Enlistment Certificate dated

24.02.2026 in its favour. The objection notwithstanding, a LoA

was issued to the H1 Bidder on 20.03.2026.

7. The H2 Bidder challenged the acceptance of the bid of the H1

Bidder before the High Court in a writ petition filed on

19.03.2026, on the ground that the experience certificate of the

H1 Bidder reflected participation in cattle fairs from

16.12.2023 to 15.12.2024 and did not evidence two years'

experience of collection of user charges or parking fees

immediately preceding 31.12.2025, as required by Clause

9(c)(a) of the Instructions issued by the Board for enlistment of

contractor firms.

8. The High Court, by the impugned order dated 27.05.2026, inter

alia held that the technical bid of the H1 Bidder did not meet

the eligibility criteria, and quashed the LoA dated 20.03.2026

as well as all the consequential actions. The Board and the

Committee were directed to issue a LoA in favour of the eligible

tenderer in accordance with law, and the writ petition was

allowed. In the aforesaid factual background, Civil Appeals

arising out of the Special Leave Petitions filed by the H1 Bidder

and by the Board arise for our consideration.

RIVAL SUBMISSIONS

9. Mr. Siddhartha Iyer, learned counsel for the H1 Bidder,

submitted that the impugned order is vitiated by non-

application of mind and ignores the pleadings of the H1 Bidder

as well as those of the Board and the Committee, who had

themselves defended the eligibility of the H1 Bidder. It was

submitted that the High Court exceeded the limited scope of

judicial review by substituting its own interpretation of the

eligibility clause for that of the tendering authority, in the

absence of any finding of mala fide, arbitrariness, irrationality

or perversity1.

10. It was contended that a provision must be construed

purposively and not literally where a literal reading defeats its

object or produces an unreasonable result2. It was urged that

the High Court adopted an ultra-technical view of Clause 9(c)(a)

by reading the requirement of two years' experience up to

31.12.2025 as one of a continuous contract ending in

December 2025, whereas the clause requires only a minimum

of two years' experience prior to that date. It was pointed out

that the Board has also taken a stand that Instructions for

enlistment are directory and not even part of DNIT. It was

contended that the scope of judicial review in tender matters is

extremely circumscribed. It was argued that experience of a

partnership firm is attributable to its partner/proprietor. It was

1Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd. & Anr., (2016) 16 SCC 818 and Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India & Anr., (2020) 16 SCC 489 2K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam & Anr., (1981) 4 SCC 173

pointed out that the bid of H1 Bidder was rejected on account

of the interim order of the High Court dated 20.03.2026. It was

urged that the bid of the H1 Bidder was higher by about Rs.1.5

crore its rejection would cause substantial loss of public

revenue while rendering many experienced firms ineligible. In

support of aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on

the decisions of this Court3.

11. Mr. Jagjit Singh Chhabra, learned counsel for the Board in the

connected appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.23127 of 2026,

submitted that in the absence of illegality, bias or mala fide,

the High Court ought not to have interfered with the

commercial wisdom of the tendering authority. It was

contended that the enlistment instructions are directory in

nature, being intended to secure uniformity, better competition

and greater revenue for the Board, and were wrongly treated as

mandatory. It was urged that the H1 Bidder was rightly

declared as such after due evaluation and assessment and the

3 K.P. Varghese (supra); Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651; New Horizons Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (1995) 1 SCC 478; Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. & Ors., (2000) 2 SCC 617; Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa & Ors. (2007) 14 SCC 517; Maa Nabadurga Construction v. Saroj Kumar Jena & Ors., 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1933; Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. (supra); Silppi Constructions Contractors (supra); Galaxy Transport Agencies v. New J.K. Roadways, (2021) 16 SCC 808; Agmatel India Pvt. Ltd. v. Resoursys Telecom & Ors., (2022) 5 SCC 362 and Surguja Bricks Industries Co. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2916

rejection of the H1 Bidder’s bid by other Marketing Committees

has no bearing to the present proceeding. In support of the

aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on the

decisions of this Court4.

12. On the other hand, Mr. Amit Rawal, learned senior counsel for

the H2 Bidder, who is the respondent in both the appeals,

submitted that the H1 Bidder produced no experience

certificate of two years up to 31.12.2025 as Clause 9(c)(a)

requires and the certificates produced by it relate to separate

contracts executed through different entities. It was pointed

out that the said certificates neither establish the work nor the

bidder as well as the period. It was urged that a cattle fair

contract does not evidence collection of user charges, since

under the statutory scheme, the contractor pays rent and does

not collect any charge. It was submitted that the construction

advanced by the H1 Bidder converts the clause into one

requiring any two years' experience at any time before

31.12.2025, which the clause does not intend. It was further

4JagdishMandal (supra); Silppi Constructions Contractors (supra); Galaxy Transport Agencies (supra); Utkal Suppliers v. Maa Kanak Durga Enterprises & Ors., (2021) 14 SCC 612; Agmatel India Pvt. Ltd (supra); Tata Motors Ltd. v. Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking, (2023) 19 SCC 1 and N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Jain & Ors., (2022) 6 SCC 127

submitted that the Board itself had rejected the bids of the H1

Bidder at Rajpura and Patiala on an identical clause, and a

norm cannot be mandatory against one bidder and directory in

favour of another5. In support of his submissions, reference

has been made to two decisions of this Court6.

ANALYSIS

13. We have considered the rival submissions and have perused

the record.

THE LIMITED SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN TENDER MATTERS

14. The contours of judicial review in the matters of tender are

well-settled and need only brief restatement. The principles

governing judicial review of the award of a contract are well-

settled. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Tata Cellular

(supra) held that the Court is concerned with the manner in

which the decision is taken and not with the decision itself,

that review lies on the grounds of illegality, irrationality and

procedural impropriety, and that the tender floating authority

5West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. & Ors., (2001) 2 SCC 451; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 6Patel Engineering (supra); Matadeen v. Pointu [1999] 1 AC 98; R (Gallaher Group

Ltd) & Ors. v. CMA [2018] UKSC 25

is the best person to interpret the terms of its tender. In

Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M&N Publications Ltd.7, it was

held that what the Court examines is whether the decision-

making process was reasonable, rational and not arbitrary or

violative of Article 14, and not whether the decision was

correct. In Air India Ltd. (supra), it was held that the State is

free to enter into commercial transactions without undue

interference by the courts, provided its action is fair and free

from arbitrariness.

15. In Jagdish Mandal (supra), the test was stated to be whether

the process or decision is mala fide or intended to favour

someone or is so arbitrary and irrational that no responsible

authority acting reasonably and in accordance with law could

have reached it, and whether public interest is affected. The

question is whether the decision is lawful, not whether it is

sound. In Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of

Karnataka & Ors.8, it was reiterated that the courts do not

sit in judgment over the technical or commercial wisdom of the

tendering authority unless the process is arbitrary or mala fide.

7 (1993) 1 SCC 445 8 (2012) 8 SCC 216

16. In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. (supra), it was held that the

employer, having authored the tender document, is the best

person to understand and interpret it. In Silppi

Constructions Contractors (supra), it was reiterated that the

Court does not sit as a court of appeal over the authority, that

where two interpretations are possible, the interpretation of the

author must be accepted, and that the courts interfere only to

prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, mala fides or

perversity. The same view has been taken in later decisions9,

including by a three-Judge Bench in Galaxy Transport

Agencies (supra).

17. The position was summarised in Agmatel India (P) Ltd.

(supra), where it was held that the author of the tender

document is the best judge of its requirements; that if its

interpretation is manifestly in consonance with the language of

the document, or subserves the purpose of the tender, the

Court will keep restraint; that technical evaluation or

comparison by the Court is impermissible; and that an

interpretation which the constitutional court may not itself find

9Utkal Suppliers (supra); State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Uttar Pradesh State Bridge Corporation Ltd. & Anr., (2022) 16 SCC 633; Surguja Bricks (supra); Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Ltd. v. Mandeepa Enterprises & Ors., (2026) 4 SCC 310

acceptable is not, for that reason alone, a ground for

interference.

18. This deference, however, is not unqualified. The requirement

in Agmatel India (P) Ltd. (supra), that the interpretation be

manifestly in consonance with the language of the tender

document itself shows that where the interpretation cannot be

traced to that language, the protection is not available. The

exception was recently restated in Kimberley Club (P) Ltd. v.

Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad & Ors.10 thus: -

“11. In tender matters, the Court exercising judicial review does not sit in appeal over the decision of a tendering authority regarding disqualification of bid. Only in cases where such decision is dehors the terms of the NIT or is patently arbitrary would the Court exercise powers of judicial review and set aside such a decision.”

19. To the same effect is Vidarbha Irrigation Development

Corporation & Ors. v. Anoj Kumar Agarwala & Ors.11,

where it was held that the words of a tender document cannot

be treated as redundant or superfluous but must be given their

meaning, and that an essential condition not complied with

cannot be condoned by the tendering authority, such

10 2025 INSC 1276 11(2020) 17 SCC 577, para 16

condonation amounting to perversity which a constitutional

court must correct. The rule which emerges is a short one. The

reading given by an authority to its own tender is ordinarily

final, provided that reading is one which the words it has

chosen can bear and is not unfair, perverse or arbitrary.

20. At this stage, it is apposite to notice the Instructions issued by

the Board for Enlistment of Contractor Firms in PMB-

Marketing Branch, 2025, applicable from 01.02.2026. Clauses

3(d), 4(1) and 6(a), which are relevant, read as under:-

“PUNJAB STATE AGRICULTURAL MARKETING BOARD (Instructions regarding Enlistment of Contractor Firms in PMB-Marketing Branch) 3(d). The enlistment of a Firm is a prerequisite to bid/tender for the PMB-Marketing Branch Works. 4(1) – Scope (a) The Enlisted Firm shall only be eligible to bid in office of market committee of Punjab State. (b) The Enlisted Firm shall be borne on the register of Enlisted Firms to be maintained in PMB Marketing Branch.

6. Enlistment Period (a) The enlistment shall be valid for a period of one year that is 01.02.2026 to 31.01.2027.”

21. Clause 9(c)(a) of the said instructions, which lies at the heart

of the controversy and is referred to in the impugned judgment

as Clause 9(a), requires the bidder to: -

“…submit the copy of respective completion certificate(s) indicating the successful execution of annual collecting User Charges/Parking Fees work in Govt./Semi Govt./PSU organizations during last 2 years (upto 31.12.2025).”

22. The eligibility criteria prescribed in the DNIT read as under: -

“[11]. Technical Bid: The Bidder will submit the following documents in the Digitally Signed copies; [i]. Copy of the Enlistment of the Firm in the Punjab Mandi Board in Market Wing for the concerned Tender. [ii] Copy of the Challan/Bank RTGS as proof of having deposited the amount on account of Earnest Money/Biyana. [iii] The Bid given by the Bidder, will be valid for a minimum of 120-Days from the last date of submission of the Bid [As per Annexure-3]. xxx xxx xxx [ix]. Experience certificate regarding works done in various government institutions Board Corporation/Punjab Mandi Board Market Committees (Annexure-2b).”

23. Thus, a tenderer, in order to be eligible, has to satisfy the

following conditions:-

(i) it must be a firm enlisted with the Board in the

Marketing Wing, enlistment being a prerequisite to

bid;

(ii) it must, under Clause 11(ix) of the DNIT, upload with

its technical bid, an experience certificate in

Annexure 2-b of works done in Government

institutions, Board Corporations, the Punjab Mandi

Board or Market Committees;

(iii) the experience so certified must, under Clause 9(c)(a),

be of successful execution of the work of annual

collection of user charges or parking fees;

(iv) such work must have been executed in a

Government, Semi-Government or PSU organisation;

and

(v) such execution must be “during last 2 years (up to

31.12.2025)”, proved by completion certificate(s) of

the organisation concerned.

24. It is well-settled in law that requirements in a tender notice

can be classified into the following two categories: (i) those

which lay down the essential condition of eligibility; (ii) the

other which are merely ancillary or subsidiary to the main

object sought to be achieved by the condition. In the first case,

the authorities issuing the tender may be required to enforce

the condition rigidly whereas in other cases, it may be open to

the authority to deviate from it and not to insist upon strict

literal compliance of the condition12. It is an equally

established legal proposition that any non-conformity with or

relaxation in the prescribed standard allowed in case of any

tenderer, if not resulting in substantial prejudice or injustice

to any of the parties or to public interest in general would not

be bad13. It is equally well-settled in law that where upon due

consideration of the tender document submitted by all the

tenderers on their own merits, if it is ultimately found that

successful bidders had in fact substantially complied with the

purport and object for which the essential conditions were laid

down, the same may not ordinarily be interfered with14.

I. THE NATURE OF THE EXPERIENCE REQUIRED UNDER CLAUSE 9: A SPECIALISED ONE?

25. Clause 9(c)(a) of the Board's instructions required a bidder to

furnish completion certificate(s) evidencing "successful

execution of annual collecting User Charges/Parking Fees

work" in Government, Semi-Government or PSU

12 Poddar Steel Corporation v. Ganesh Engineering Works and Ors., (1991) 3 SCC 273; Om Prakash Sharma v. Ramesh Chand Prashar & Ors., (2016) 12 SCC 632; Central Coalfields Ltd. & Anr. v. SLL- SML (Joint Venture Consortium) & Ors., (2016) 8 SCC 622; Bakshi Security & Personnel Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Devkishan Computed Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (2016) 8 SCC 446 and Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation & Ors. (supra) 13 G.J. Fernandez v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (1990) 2 SCC 488; Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Doshion Veolia Water Solutions Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.,(2010) 13 SCC 364 and National High Speed Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Monte Carlo Ltd. & Anr. (2022) 6 SCC 401. 14 B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. & Ors., (2006) 11 SCC 548 and National High Speed Rail Corporation Ltd. (supra)

organisations, for the last two years up to 31.12.2025”. This

condition cannot be read in the abstract. It has to be read

against the subject-matter of the tender itself, which is the

collection, on behalf of a public market committee, of user

charges from a high volume of retail and commercial vehicles

entering Mandi premises on a daily basis, over a twelve-month

contract period, for a consideration exceeding Rs.16 crores. A

contract of this description calls for demonstrated competence

in gate management, ticketing or token systems, cash

handling and daily reconciliation, accounting to the authority,

and supervision of collection staff across an entire working

year, a specialised, continuous, revenue-facing operation in

which the collection of user charges is not incidental to some

other engagement, but is itself the bidder's principal

contractual obligation to the authority that appoints it.

26. Organising a cattle fair is a fundamentally different

undertaking. Under the Punjab Cattle Fairs (Regulation)

Rules, 1968, the sites required for commercial or other

purposes in connection with a cattle fair are allotted by the

fair officer by auction, and Rule 6(1) requires the successful

bidder to pay the full amount of the rent offered at the fall of

the hammer. The organiser of a cattle fair is, in other words,

a lessee who pays the authority for the privilege of using the

fairground for the duration of the fair; he is not an agent

appointed by a public body to collect, account for and remit a

statutory user charge on its behalf. That such an organiser

may, in the course of running the fair, himself levy some

charge on those who park vehicles or set up stalls within the

fair ground is not disputed; but that charge is levied by him

for his own account, as an incident of a wholly different

commercial arrangement, the temporary lease of fair-ground

space, and not in the discharge of a specialised contractual

duty owed to, and monitored by, a public authority of the kind

that Clause 9(c)(a) contemplates.

27. The distinction is not a semantic one. If experience of the

incidental kind were treated as equivalent to experience of the

specialised kind that Clause 9(c)(a) requires, the eligibility

condition would be rendered practically meaningless, for it is

difficult to conceive of any commercial engagement of scale, a

fair, a festival, an exhibition, even a wedding venue, that does

not involve the organiser collecting some charge from

someone in the course of running it. To hold that any such

incidental collection satisfies a clause that, in terms, requires

proven experience of collecting "User Charges/Parking Fees

work" for Government, Semi-Government or PSU

organisations, is to empty the clause of the very specialisation

it was designed to test. The object of Clause 9(c)(a) is to ensure

that the entity to which the collection of a substantial public

revenue is to be entrusted has previously discharged that very

kind of duty, collection on behalf of, and accountable to, a

public body, and not merely some activity that happens, in

passing, to involve the handling of money.

28. The H1 Bidder’s experience, on its own showing, lies in

organising cattle fairs as a fair contractor/lessee; it does not

lie in collection of user charges or parking fees as a

contractual duty owed to a Government, Semi-Government or

PSU body. The two are not interchangeable, and the

Committee's letter dated 09.03.2026, treating them as such

without more, discloses no application of mind to the

language of its own clause.

II. THE CERTIFICATES DO NOT ESTABLISH THE EXPERIENCE OF THE H1 BIDDER

29. A distinct and equally fatal infirmity attaches to the

certificates themselves. The experience certificate reproduced

in paragraph 15 of the impugned judgment is not a certificate

of work executed by Micky Traders. It records participation,

for fragmented periods between 11.07.2018 and 15.12.2024,

by three separate names, “Shadab Rainder & Company,

Rajpura", "Rajpura, Mukatsar Cattle Fair, Rajpura" and

"Capital Cattle Fair, Rajpura”, none of which is Micky Traders,

that is, the H1 Bidder. The explanation offered is that one

Ravinder Singh, the sole proprietor of Micky Traders, was a

partner in these firms, and that their experience should

accordingly be treated as his own.

30. Even taking that explanation at its highest, it does not carry

the H1 Bidder’s case very far. As a matter of fact, no material

was placed before the Committee, or before the High Court, to

substantiate the claimed nexus, no partnership deed, no

certificate of registration under the Indian Partnership Act,

1932, nothing to show the extent, nature or duration of

Ravinder Singh's association with these firms. An eligibility

criterion cannot be satisfied by an unverified assertion of

identity between a bidder and unrelated third parties.

III. THE H1 BIDDER CANNOT APPROBATE AND REPROBATE ON THE MEANING OF AN IDENTICAL CLAUSE

31. An independent sufficient ground is furnished by the H1

Bidder’s own conduct. It is on record, and noticed in

paragraph 5 of the impugned order, that the H1 Bidder

participated in tenders floated for the very same nature of the

work by the Marketing Committee, Patiala and the Marketing

Committee, Rajpura under Enlistment Instructions requiring

an identical experience criterion, and that its bids were, on

both occasions, held technically non-responsive on the

ground of lack of experience. The H1 Bidder did not challenge

either determination.

32. We are conscious that the Committee is a distinct statutory

authority, not bound by the view taken by the Market

Committee, Patiala or the Market Committee, Rajpura, and

that ordinarily the decision of one tendering authority does

not fetter the discretion of another acting under its own

notice. But the point made against the H1 Bidder is not one

of institutional precedent; it is one of consistency in its own

conduct. Having accepted, by not challenging it, the

construction placed upon an identically worded experience

clause when that construction operated to its disqualification

at Patiala and Rajpura, the H1 Bidder cannot be heard, before

a different authority applying the same clause in substantially

the same terms, to press for the opposite construction merely

because it now happens to serve its interest. A party cannot

approbate and reprobate on the meaning of the very same

contractual language according to the side of the fence on

which it finds itself convenient to stand. That the H1 Bidder’s

own past conduct reflects an understanding of the clause

different from the one it now advances is, moreover, itself

telling evidence that the construction now pressed is not the

more natural or the only reasonable one available, reinforcing,

rather than merely accompanying, the conclusion already

reached.

33. Thus, each of the grounds noticed above independently

supports the conclusion arrived at by the High Court; taken

together, they leave no room for doubt. The reading given by

an authority to its own tender document is ordinarily final and

is not open to re-appraisal by a writ court exercising

jurisdiction under Article 226, or by this Court in appeal,

provided that reading is one that the words of the clause can

reasonably bear. That deference, as Agmatel India (P) Ltd.

(supra), itself makes clear, is available only where the

interpretation is "manifestly in consonance with the language

of the tender document" and subserves its purpose. The

interpretation adopted by the Committee here satisfies neither

test. It treats an incidental collection made in the course of an

unrelated commercial engagement as equivalent to the

specialised, accountable collection of user charges that

Clause 9(c)(a) in terms requires; it attributes to the H1 Bidder

the institutional experience of firms with which no proved

nexus exists; and it does so notwithstanding the H1 Bidder’s

own acquiescence, on two prior occasions, in a contrary

reading of the identical clause. No reasonable authority,

applying its mind to the language it had itself prescribed,

could have arrived at the conclusion that the H1 Bidder

possessed the requisite experience. The interpretation is

accordingly patently arbitrary and is dehors the terms of the

DNIT and falls squarely within the narrow exception

recognised in Kimberley Club (P) Ltd. (supra) and in Jagdish

Mandal (supra). The High Court was, therefore, right in

exercising the power of judicial review and in declining to

extend to the Committee's interpretation the ordinary

deference that authorship of a tender document commands.

34. The submission that the H1 Bidder’s bid, being higher by

about Rs.1.5 crore, ought to be preferred in the interest of the

public exchequer, does not assist the H1 Bidder. Revenue

considerations cannot cure ineligibility. Bids can be compared

only among bidders who are eligible to be compared in the

first place; to hold otherwise would be to allow every eligibility

condition to yield to the highest figure quoted, and would

render the tender document, and the enlistment instructions

framed to secure competence and accountability in the

collection of public revenue, wholly illusory. The public

interest that the H1 Bidder invokes is served, not disserved,

by holding the Committee to the conditions it has itself

prescribed.

35. We find no merit in the contention that the enlistment

instructions are merely directory. The Committee itself

proceeded on the footing that the experience criterion was

mandatory, it did not accept the bid of any bidder that failed

to furnish the certificate at all; it merely erred in its

assessment of whether the particular certificate furnished by

the H1 Bidder satisfied that mandatory requirement. A

condition cannot be mandatory in the abstract and directory

only in its application to a favoured bidder.

36. For the aforementioned reasons, we do not find any infirmity

in the order of the High Court. In the result, the appeals fail

and are hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

37. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand

disposed of accordingly.

………………………………………… J. [K.V. VISWANATHAN]

………………………………………… J. [ALOK ARADHE]

NEW DELHI; SEPTEMBER 21, 2026.