X v. O/o Speaker of the House of People & Ors.

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strictly. It exhausts all contemplated scenarios on the giving of motions, namely: (i) motion in one House alone; (ii) motions in both Houses on ditterent days (in which case the second proviso applies); and (iii) motions given in both the Houses on the same day (triggering the first proviso). Undisputedly, in the present case motions were given on the same day in both the Houses and the challenge thus centers upon the first proviso.

7. As per the Petitioner, the JIC could not have been constituted unless both the Speaker and the Chairman had admitted the motions in both Houses and only thereafter proceeded to constitute the JIC jointly. The use of double peremptory negatives (“no” committee and “unless”) is evidence of a manifest intent to underscore its mandatory and non- derogable character [Fuleshwar Gope v. Uol [2024 SCC OnLine SC 2610 - para 27; Vijay Narayan Thatte v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 9 SCC 92 - paras 5, 10, 12, 13, 14 & 15].

8. Since the power to admit a motion stands conferred upon two co- equal constitutional authorities, the statute mandates concurrence to avoid conflicting decisions, separate committees coming to be constituted or parallel inquiries being initiated. A decision not to admit if taken by one of those authorities would undoubtedly cast a cloud of invalidity on the other. It is these considerations which inform the mandate of concerted action.

9. Implicit in the first proviso is the situation where one motion is rejected and one admitted. In such a situation the motion would clearly fail and cannot be proceeded with. Lapsing of a motion is a consequence that follows not only from the plain and exhaustive words of the proviso but also from the fact that both the Houses are equal and the determination of the Speaker and Chairman (as the case may be) to not admit a motion cannot be overridden or overruled by a contrary view of the other functionary. To read the proviso as not providing for that consequence would mean that Section 3 is incomplete.

10. It would be incorrect and inconceivable to assume that Parliament was either not cognizant or unaware of such a possibility or conundrum even though it chose to introduce a specific provision to deal with motions presented on the same date and promulgated a complete and exhaustive code. Legislative oversight cannot be readily assumed or inferred.

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11. The admission of both motions is not liable to be read as a condition precedent for the applicability of the first proviso. This condition is indelibly linked to the expression ‘no committee shall be constituted…’. If the Inquiry Act were to be interpreted in any other manner, it would compel one to hold that it fails to provide for a situation where one of the motions presented on the same day is rejected. This, despite the Inquiry Act having been acknowledged to be a complete code, a comprehensive legislation on the subject of removal, and Section 3 thereof constituting its center piece.

12. Respondents’ interpretation that the first proviso applies only when both motions are “admitted” is wrong. This interpretation seeks to introduce the phrase ‘given and admitted’ into the statute and contradicts settled principles of statutory interpretation [G Narayanaswami v. G Pannerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717 – para 18-20]. This more so since adhering to the plain text of the statute does not lead either to absurdity or to any unworkable situations.

13. Respondents’ contention that there is no prejudice caused due to non-compliance with the statute cannot be countenanced [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379]. The doctrine of prejudice or useless formality has no application to mandatory statutory safeguards and more so when we are concerned with salutary constitutional safeguards. Petitioner is facing removal proceedings even though one of the two similar and identical motions were found not to warrant further consideration. The mere fact that an adverse report may ultimately be placed before both Houses cannot justify a Judge being subjected to a process which is constitutionally infirm and unwarranted. Additionally, the mere right of addressing both Houses at a belated stage cannot overcome the prejudice caused. Last but not the least, the reputational damage caused as a result of the impugned proceedings is prejudice in itself.

D. CONSIDERATION OF RAJYA SABHA MOTION IS CONTRARY TO LAW

14. The Rajya Sabha motion was “not admitted” by the Deputy Chairman on 11.08.2025. No formal order to this effect has been communicated or supplied to Petitioner. The file notings supplied demonstrate

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that the consideration on the motion was by the Secretary General (Respondent No. 2) and merely “affirmed” by the Deputy Chairman.

15. Petitioner submits that the Deputy Chairman lacked authority to exercise any powers in respect of the motion given on 21.07.2025. The Act defines “Chairman” and “Speaker” exhaustively by using the categorical “means”, rather than the fluid or expansive “means and includes”. The use of “means” is intended to be an explicit statement of the full connotation of a term, thus, leaving no room for ambiguity. The definitions (absent in the Bill) were included in the Act to “ensure and maintain the independence of the judiciary” [Joint Committee Report on the Judges (Inquiry) Bill, 1964]. Where any role was perceived for the Deputies, it had been specifically carved out (See Rules 16 & 17, Judges Inquiry Rules, 1969) and which too is plainly a limited, expressly defined role, confined to proceedings in the House after the submission of the JIC Report.

16. Article 91 confers only limited, pro tem authority relating to proceedings in the House and cannot extend to statutory functions under the Act. Parliament was conscious of Article 91 and still adopted exhaustive definitions under the Act reserving admission powers in the Speaker/ Chairman alone as persona designata. The Parliament appears to have been guided inter alia by Article 100 which gives only a casting vote to the Speaker/Chairman (unlike a member of the House including the Deputy Chairman who can sign the motion and vote on it if the Report calls for removal of the Judge).

17. Further, unlike Article 65(3) which effects a complete substitution of authority, Article 91 envisages only a pro tem role. Accepting the Respondents’ contention would mean that any other member” temporarily presiding over House proceedings (in the absence of the Deputy Chairman) could also exercise powers under Section 3. This would clearly be contrary to the import and intent of the statute. Therefore, Petitioner submits that for all the reasons set out above. the constitution of the JIC is liable to be declared non est, and this Hon’ble Court ought to allow the present petition.

Filed on: 12.01.2026 Place: New Delhi.

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APPENDIX- II

SHORT NOTE

ON BEHALF OF TUSHAR MEHTA, SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA

A. PRELIMINARY SUBMISSIONS

1. The Petitioner has assailed the action of the Hon’ble Speaker admitting the notice of motion on 12.08.2025 and the constitution of a three-member Inquiry Committee under Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (“Act”). It is the Petitioner’s case that since notices of motion were “given” in both Houses on the same day, the proviso to Section 3(2) mandated that no Committee could be constituted unless the motion was admitted in both Houses and, if admitted, the Committee must be constituted jointly by the Speaker and the Chairman.

2. It is respectfully submitted that the Writ Petition is misconceived and founded on an erroneous reading of the statutory scheme. At the outset, the Respondents’ have divided their arguments broadly on the following four issues : a. The proviso to Section 3(2) of the Act is attracted only where the motions are “admitted” in both Houses, and not just being “given” b. In any event, the Petitioner demonstrates no real, demonstrable and gross prejudice so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court under Article 32; and c. The Rajya Sabha motion was, upon scrutiny, expressly “not admitted” by the Deputy Chairman, who was validly acting as the Chairman under Article 91 when the office fell vacant and was constitutionally and statutorily permitted to exercise such a power. This order is not and could not have been challenged.

B. INTERPRETATION OF PROVISO TO SECTION 3(2)

3. It is respectfully submitted that Articles 121 and 211 of the Constitution prohibit any discussion in the House with regard to the conduct of any judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court, except upon a

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motion for presenting an address to the President praying for the removal of the Judge. A perusal of Article 124(4) read with Article 217 and 218, makes it crystal clear that a Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court cannot be removed from office except on the ground of proven misbehaviour or incapacity.

4. Therefore, the constitutional scheme for removal of a Judge culminating in an order of the Hon’ble President is passed only after an address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting, ensuring stringent thresholds that operate as a substantive inbuilt safeguard. It ensures that such motions for removal of Judges are not initiated in a routine manner and that the process is insulated against proceedings founded on frivolous allegations, extraneous considerations or patently false claims.

5. It is thus respectfully submitted that by virtue of Article 122, these notices of motion cannot be impugned in a court of law as long as they do not contravene any constitutional or statutory mandate.

6. The Act incorporates an important safeguard in Section 3(1) by drawing a clear distinction between a motion being “given” and its subsequent “admission”. A motion does not automatically set the statutory machinery in motion merely upon being “given”. It is only upon “admission” that the statutory consequence of constituting a three-member Committee follows. The Legislature has, therefore, consciously used two distinct expressions, and the language employed is the determinative factor of the legislative intention. At this stage, it is also pertinent to note that, as per Rule 2(e) of the Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969, “motion” is defined to mean the motion admitted under Section 3(1).

7. As per Section 3(1) of the Act, “giving” a motion is essentially a ministerial act of presentation/filing, whereas “admission” is a substantive, independent decision that necessarily entails due scrutiny and application of mind by the Speaker or the Chairman after consulting such person, if any, as he thinks fit. Thus, the Speaker or the Chairman has an option either to admit the motion or refuse to admit the motion.

8. This Hon’ble Court in P.D. Dinakaran (2) v. Judges Inquiry Committee, (2011) 8 SCC 474 had held that the Speaker/Chairman, is

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not bound to admit the motion submitted with the requisite numerical strength as a matter of course because he had the discretion under the Act to consult such persons as he may think fit and consider any material which is made available to him before taking a decision on the admission of motion. This Hon’ble Court also held that, in a given case, he may even choose to refuse to admit the motion.21

9. It is crucial to highlight that this Hon’ble Court in Sarojini Ramaswami (Mrs) v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 506 has also held the following:

95. “.....The law so enacted under Article 124(5) provides that any accusation made against a sitting judge to enable initiation of the process of his removal from office has to be only by not less than the minimum number of Members of Parliament specified in the Act, all other methods being excluded. On initiation of the process in the prescribed manner, the Speaker/Chairman is to decide whether the accusation requires investigation. If he chooses not to act on the accusation made in the form of motion by the specified minimum number of Members of Parliament, the matter ends there. On the other hand, if the Speaker/ Chairman, on a consideration of the materials available and after consulting such persons as he thinks fit, forms the opinion that a prima facie case for investigation into the accusation against the Judge is made out, he constitutes a Committee of judicial functionaries in accordance with Section 3(2) of the Act.”

10. If this condition of an independent application of mind with an order “admitting” the motion is not read, there is a possibility of members gathering mere requisite numerical strength “filing” motions even on the basis of some unpopular judgment given by a Judge resulting in the appointment of a Committee. Such a reading of Section 3(1) would render a mere achievement of numerical strength as the only condition precedent for forming a Committee under Section 3(2), rendering the second part of Section 3(1) otiose.

11. Further, it is humbly submitted that in the absence of a mandatory requirement of independent scrutiny culminating in a formal order of

21 Paragraphs 26 & 31 of P.D. Dinakaran (2). See also Krishna Swami v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 605 ¶45.

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“admitting” the motion, the statutory safeguard would be rendered illusory. Mere fulfilment of the numerical strength of the members could trigger the process of removal by simply “giving” the notice of motion, even on the basis of an unpopular judgment given by a Judge, thereby mechanically leading to the constitution of a Committee without any threshold assessment of whether the motion warrants such grave proceedings.

12. The procedure contemplated in the Act is sui generis and will have to be interpreted in view of the constitutional scheme in general and Articles 121 and 211 in particular. Section 3(2) of the Act also specifically and consciously uses the word “if the motion referred to in subsection (1) is admitted”. This further highlights the significance of “admission” of the motion, which is different from mere “giving” of the motion. It thus provides that if a motion for removal of a Judge is admitted by the Speaker or the Chairman, the Speaker or the Chairman shall keep the motion pending and “constitute, as soon as may be,” a three-member Committee to investigate the grounds for removal of a judge.

13. It is pertinent to note that the proviso to Section 3(2) stipulates that where notices of a motion are given on the same day in both Houses of Parliament, “no Committee shall be constituted unless the motion has been admitted in both Houses” and it is only when the motion is admitted in both Houses, that the Committee shall be constituted jointly by the Speaker and the Chairman. Thus, when notices of motion are initiated simultaneously in both Houses, the law envisages a joint action only if both Houses admit the motion. The proviso is intended to avoid two committees being constituted simultaneously to inquire into the same allegations, which may result in conflicting views.

14. The logical corollary of this is that when notices of motion are given on the same day, but only admitted by one House and rejected by the other House, then the Speaker/Chairman, as the case may be, who admits the motion is well within its statutory right to keep it pending and constitute a Committee as per Section 3(2) of the Act.

15. In the facts of the present case, notices of motion were indeed submitted on the same day, i.e., 21 July 2025, in both Houses of Parliament. On the one hand, the notice of motion for removal given in the Lok Sabha was received by the Hon’ble Speaker at 12:30 pm

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and was signed by 146 members belonging to different political parties. On the other hand, the notice of motion given in the Rajya Sabha was signed by 62 members, and the then Chairman made an announcement in the House between 4:07 pm to 4:19 pm. The address of the then Chairman makes it evidently clear that he was neither “admitting” the motion nor “refusing to admit” the motion.22 Moreover, the Hon’ble Law Minister had also informed the Chairman that another motion was given in the Lok Sabha, pursuant to which the Chairman directed the Secretary General to “take necessary steps in this direction”.

16. It is pertinent to note that the then Chairman of the Rajya Sabha resigned as the Vice-President on 21 July 2025, and the Deputy Chairman assumed charge under Article 91 of the Constitution. Upon scrutiny of the notice, the Deputy Chairman, on 11 August 2025, concluded that the motion contained infirmities and that the notice was not in order and thus not admitted. The Hon’ble Deputy Chairman, Rajya Sabha, directed that the Secretary General, Lok Sabha, may be informed accordingly. This decision of refusal to admit the motion was communicated in writing by the Rajya Sabha Secretariat to the Lok Sabha Secretariat on the same day, i.e. 11 August 2025.

17. Thus, after following the due process, the Speaker admitted the motion received from members of the Lok Sabha and made an announcement to this effect on 12 August 2025 and kept it pending for inquiry. Accordingly, considering the fact that Rajya Sabha’s motion was not admitted, on 12 August 2025, only one House, i.e., Lok Sabha, had an admitted motion for the removal of the Petitioner.

18. Therefore, the requirement of a joint committee under the proviso to Section 3(2) was not triggered in these circumstances. The proviso operates only when (i) notices of motion are given on the same day and (ii) both the Houses admit the motion. The Hon’ble Speaker, before constituting the Committee, waited for the Rajya Sabha’s decision, and only when he was formally informed that the Rajya Sabha motion was not admitted, the Committee was constituted on 12 August 2025.

19. It is pertinent to note that while the proviso bars constituting a Committee unless both Houses admit the motion, it nowhere says that the rejection

22 The then Chairman, specifically mentioned that “Then the right of the Speaker or the Chairman to admit or reject the motion is not there” (Pg. 47 of the Petition @ Para 1).

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of a motion in one House automatically invalidates an admitted motion in the other. To hold otherwise would allow one House’s refusal to admit the motion (potentially even a nefarious rejection) to defeat the removal process approved by the other House, which is neither the intent of the law nor a reasonable interpretation of the proviso.

20. The Petitioner’s contention that the constitution of the Committee is invalid “because the motion was not admitted in both Houses” is misplaced. Such a situation arose only because the Rajya Sabha’s motion failed to meet the threshold for admission. The law does not prohibit the Speaker from acting on a properly admitted motion of one House when the notice of motion given in the other House did not culminate in an admission. It is humbly submitted that any other interpretation would undermine the removal process by effectively giving one House a veto over the initiation of an inquiry, even where the other House has fulfilled all statutory requirements.

21. At this juncture, it is submitted that it is a settled law that a proviso has to be understood from the language used in the main provision and not vice versa. Moreover, it is also a settled law that if the substantive provision is clear on fair interpretation, the language in the proviso cannot be used to defeat the basic intent expressed in the said provision.23

C. DEMONSTRATIVE, GROSS AND REAL PREJUDICE SHOULD BE SHOWN FOR INVOKING ARTICLE 32

22. It is submitted that the Petitioner has not shown any “demonstrable, gross or real prejudice” caused to him by the manner in which the process for removal has been initiated, even if a purported procedural lapse is assumed to have taken place. It is submitted that such a demonstrable, gross or real prejudice must be proved by the Petitioner.24 In substance, the Petitioner’s complaint is that he lost

23 See Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, (1976) 1 SCC 128 ¶16; Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, (1980) 2 SCC 378 ¶9; S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591 ¶27; J.K. Industries Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers, (1996) 6 SCC 665 ¶35; Director of Education (Secondary) v. Pushpendra Kumar; (1998) 5 SCC 192 ¶8; Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma, (2013) 11 SCC 451 ¶20. 24 See ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 ¶30[v]; State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC ¶28, 33(3) & 33(7); State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706 ¶36 & 42.1-42.5; S.P. Gupta v. U.P. State Electricity Board, (1991) 2 SCC 263 ¶5; State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, 2025 SCC OnLine 1702 ¶20.1.3-20.1.7; L&T Housing Financing Limited v. Trishul Developers, (2020) 10 SCC 659 ¶19.

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the “benefit” of a joint committee constituted by both the Speaker and the Chairman. However, this does not translate into any prejudice or a real or demonstrable disadvantage.

23. The Committee constituted by the Speaker is a duly authorized body formed strictly in conformity with Section 3(2) (a), (b) and (c) of the Act. The Committee is bound to conduct its investigation fairly and give the Petitioner full opportunity to be heard. The Petitioner remains entitled to submit his defence, adduce evidence, cross-examine witnesses and respond to any allegations before this Committee, in the same manner as he would before a joint committee.

24. It is respectfully submitted that the ultimate safeguard of Parliamentary approval under Article 124(4) also remains intact. Even if the Committee holds that the Judge is guilty of any misbehaviour or suffers from any incapacity, then the motion, along with the report of the Committee, would be taken up for consideration by the Houses of Parliament. Removal of a Judge cannot take place except by an order of the President passed after an address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the House present and voting. Therefore, a procedural divergence (a single-House Committee as opposed to a Joint Committee) does not undermine the fairness of the process or the Petitioner’s ability to defend himself. He suffers no substantive disadvantage at this stage.

25. It is submitted that the proviso to Section 3(2) is primarily for avoiding an anomalous situation arising out of a possibility of two simultaneous committees being appointed and to avoid a contingency where two motions remain “pending” with two different committees investigating the same act. The proviso does not confer any right on anyone, including the recipient of the charge memo by the Committee. The real purpose behind the proviso is for the benefit of the members.

26. When the constitution of the Committee jointly does not confer any right, there can be no prejudice. The prejudice can possibly arise in the event that both motions are given on the same day and are admitted, and the Speaker or the Chairman alone constitute a Committee.

27. The extraordinary remedy under Article 32 of the Constitution is available only to address breaches of fundamental rights or patent gross injustice. In the present case, the Petitioner’s grievances are

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at best technical and procedural. He has not pointed to any breach of his fundamental rights. It is submitted that the Petitioner’s rights are safeguarded by the presence of an impartial and independent Committee and the multiple stages of decision-making that lie ahead.

D. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN TO EXERCISE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CHAIRMAN WHEN THE OFFICE IS VACANT AS PER ARTICLE 91 OF THE CONSTITUTION

28. It is submitted that Article 91(1) of the Constitution of India explicitly provides for the contingency where the office of Chairman of the Rajya Sabha is vacant. In such a case, the duties of the office shall be performed by the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha. The Constitution thus, ensures that the absence or vacancy of the Chairman does not paralyze the functioning of the House. The Deputy Chairman automatically steps into the role by a constitutional mandate.

29. It is humbly submitted that a statute cannot be read in isolation to negate a clear constitutional authorization. In the present case, the trigger for invoking Article 91 was the resignation of the Hon’ble Chairman from the office of the Vice-President on 21 July 2025. Since then, by operation of law, the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha was empowered to perform all duties and exercise all the powers of the Chairman, including admitting/refusing to admit motions, as envisaged under Section 3(1). Therefore, the Deputy Chairman’s authority in this capacity flows directly from the Constitution, and any other interpretation would render Article 91, in the context of the Act, unworkable, redundant, and otiose.25

Result of the case: Writ petition dismissed.

25 It is a settled position of law that no provision of the Constitution of India can be considered to be otiose. See Welfare Assn., A.R.P. v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358 ¶28; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1 ¶126; Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu, (1979) 2 SCC 34 ¶74; Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2017) 12 SCC 1 ¶13 & 15; Jayant Verma v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 743 ¶25; Rajendra Diwan v. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala, (2019) 20 SCC 143 ¶75.