Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.

89. Since the petitions for disqualification filed by the Appellants/ Petitioners were kept pending before the Speaker, writ petitions were filed before the High Court.

90. The learned Single Judge, vide judgment and order dated 9 th September 2024, had only asked the Speaker for fixing a schedule of hearing (filing of pleadings, documents, personal hearing etc.) within a period of four weeks. The learned Single Judge further clarified that, if nothing was heard within four weeks, then the matter would be reopened suo motu. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the Secretary of the Telangana Legislative Assembly preferred three separate appeals. Vide impugned judgment and final order dated 22nd November 2024, however, the learned Division Bench of the High Court reversed the order of the learned Single Judge.

91. When the matter was firstly listed on 31st January 2025 before this Court, taking into consideration that the learned Division Bench of the High Court had directed the disqualification proceedings to be decided within a “reasonable period”, we had asked Shri Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents to take instructions from the Speaker as to within how much time would the disqualification proceedings be decided by him. Thereafter, when the matter was listed on 10th February 2025, Shri Rohatgi submitted that he was not in a position to make any statement in that regard. Thereafter, upon the matter being mentioned on 20th February 2025, it was directed to be kept for hearing on 4th March 2025. On the said date, after we had heard Shri Sundaram and Shri Naidu, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants/Petitioners at some length, a hyper technical objection was raised by Dr. Singhvi and Shri Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents that no “formal notice” was issued in these matters and therefore the respondents could not file any reply. Though we found the objection to be totally hyper technical, in order to avoid any complications at a subsequent point of time, where a ground could be raised by the respondents claiming that the petitions were decided without following the principles of natural justice, we issued a formal notice to the respondents returnable on 25th March

2025. It is to be noted that the Speaker had issued notices to the MLAs pertaining to the lead matter only on 16th January 2025 i.e., on the next day after the lead matter was filed before this Court on 15th January 2025. Similarly, notices were issued to the remaining MLAs pertaining to the connected writ petition on 4th February 2025

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i.e., on the next day after the connected matters were heard for the first time by this Court on 3rd February 2025.

92. It could thus be seen that the Speaker did not even find it necessary to issue notices in the petitions filed by the present petitioners for a period of more than seven months and only after the proceedings were filed before this Court, did the Speaker find it necessary to issue notice.

93. The question, therefore, that we ask ourselves is as to whether the Speaker has acted in an expeditious manner, when expedition was one of the main reasons, why the Parliament had entrusted the important task of adjudicating disqualification petitions to the Speaker/Chairman. Non-issuance of any notice for a period of more than seven months and issuing notice only after either the proceedings were filed before this Court, or after this Court had heard the matter for the first time cannot by any stretch be envisaged as acting in an expeditious manner.

94. Though, we do not possess any advisory jurisdiction, it is for the Parliament to consider whether the mechanism of entrusting the Speaker/Chairman the important task of deciding the issue of disqualification on the ground of defection, is serving the purpose of effectively combating political defections or not? If the very foundation of our democracy and the principles that sustain it are to be safeguarded, it will have to be examined whether the present mechanism is sufficient or not. However, at the cost of repetition, we observe that it is for the Parliament to take a call on that.

95. In light of the facts of the present case, however, a failure to issue any direction to the Speaker, in our view, would frustrate the very purpose for which the Tenth Schedule has been brought in the Constitution. If we do not issue any direction, it will amount to permitting the Speaker to repeat the widely criticized situation of “operation successful, patient died”.

96. In any event, we find that there was absolutely no occasion for the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court to have interfered with the well-reasoned order of the learned Single Judge, as learned Single Judge had only asked the Speaker to fix a schedule of hearing (filing of pleadings, documents, personal hearing etc.) within a period of four weeks. The learned Single Judge had not even issued any direction to decide the disqualification proceedings within

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a time-bound period. We, therefore, find that the Division Bench of the High Court has erred in interfering with the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court.

97. We further find that as a matter of fact, there was no occasion for the Secretary, Telangana Legislative Assembly to have challenged the order passed by the learned Single Judge inasmuch as nothing adverse could be found in the said order.

98. Next, it was sought to be urged on behalf of the appellants that taking into consideration the glaring facts in the present case, we ourselves should decide the question with regard to the disqualification as was done by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Rajendra Singh Rana (supra).

99. In that respect, it is pertinent to note that all the judgments of the Constitution Bench, right from Kihoto Hollohan (supra) to Subhash Desai (supra), consistently hold that the Speaker is the authority who should decide the issue with regard to disqualification at the first instance. We are, therefore, not inclined to accede to the said request. We, however, find it appropriate to direct the Speaker to decide the petitions pending before it within a stipulated period.

100. We may clarify that we are inclined to do so in view of the specific finding of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the cases of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) and Subhash Desai (supra), that the Speaker, while acting as an adjudicating authority in Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, acts as a Tribunal amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. While doing so, we are also reminded of the finding of the Constitution Bench that the Speaker/Chairman, while acting as an adjudicating authority under Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution does not enjoy the constitutional immunity as available either under Article 122 or 212 of the Constitution.

101. We are therefore inclined to allow the present appeals/petition.

102. In the result, we pass the following order: (i) The present appeals/petition are allowed; (ii) The impugned judgment and final order dated 22nd November 2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is quashed and set aside;

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(iii) We direct the Speaker to conclude the disqualification proceedings pending against the 10 MLAs pertaining to the present appeals/petition as expeditiously as possible and in any case, within a period of three months from the date of this judgment; and (iv) We further direct that the Speaker would not permit any of the MLAs who are sought to be disqualified to protract the proceedings. In the event, any of such MLAs attempt to protract the proceedings, the Speaker would draw an adverse inference against such of the MLAs.

103. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

104. In the facts and circumstances, no order as to costs.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.