State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others

impact of the law, and whether the law or a policy adversely affects members of a particular disadvantaged group disproportionately. In other words, when the courts examine the question of rationality of a classification, they in a way also examine non-classificatory arbitrariness. No doubt, in doing so, the court does show a degree of deference. There are decisions of this Court which hold that under- inclusiveness will not result in invalidity of a statute, and that the State is not obligated to extend a policy to all such cases to which it would otherwise apply.50 These decisions are based on the premise that a legislation is permitted to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions or benefits to those cases where the need is the clearest. Legislative or executive action does not deal with absolutes.

59Copy pinpoint59. Thus, over the years, there is a discernible and marked shift from mere formal equality to the broader concept of substantive equality, which encompasses various dimensions of the principle of equality.51 On one hand, substantive equality focuses on correction of historical wrongs, checking stereotypes, stigma, prejudice etc.,52 while on the other, it also scrutinizes if a law or policy is inherently discriminatory. The latter principle applies when the legitimacy of the objective is flawed and manifests arbitrariness. We shall subsequently elaborate on the legal meaning of substantive equality.

60Copy pinpoint60. This evolution of the law under Article 14 aligns with judicial decisions in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and South Africa. For our purposes, we will refer to some decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada that exemplify the development of Canada’s approach to equality as articulated in Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982.53

61Copy pinpoint61. Section 15 of the Canadian Charter54 aims to provide substantive

50 See Ram Krishna Dalmia (supra) and Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 51 Jahnavi Sindhu and Vikram Aditya Narayan, “Equality under the Indian Constitution: Moving away from Reasonable Classification” (November 29, 2022). 52 Sandra Fredman, “Substantive Equality Revisited”, I.CON (2016), Vol. 14 No. 3, 712-738. 53 For short, “Canadian Charter”. 54 Section 15 – (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

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equality.55 To begin, in 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, 56 interpreted Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter to include both direct and indirect discrimination. Subsequently, in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),57 a three-fold test was laid down.58 This included identifying a comparator group of individuals in similar circumstances and determining whether the law’s disadvantage constituted an impairment of human dignity. The Supreme Court of Canada later modified the test in R. v. Kapp,59 reframing the doctrine of substantive equality and held that it should prevail over formal equality. The court noted that the human dignity aspect, included in the third part of the Law v. Canada (supra) test, had not achieved the intended philosophical enhancement. However, human dignity remains a fundamental value underlying the principle of equality.

62Copy pinpoint62. In the context of Section 15, which is divided into subsections (1) and (2)—the latter addressing reverse discrimination and ameliorative measures—the inquiry for classification under Kapp (supra) requires the government to demonstrate that a program has an ameliorative and remedial purpose and specifically targets a disadvantaged group identified by enumerated or analogous grounds. The test was further refined in Withler v. Canada (Attorney

(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex or mental or physical disability. 55 A literal reading of the Constitution of India shows that our founders envisaged a progressive and substantive framework of equal protection of laws. See Article 14, read with Articles 15, 16, 17, and 18 of the Constitution of India. 56 [1989] 1 SCR 143 57 [1999] 1 SCR 497 58 The three-part test is as follows: A court that is called upon to determine a discrimination claim under s. 15(1) should make the following three broad inquiries: A. Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the claimant’s already disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential treatment between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics? B. Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more enumerated and analogous grounds? and C. Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden upon or withholding a benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration? 59 [2008] 2 SCR 483

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General),60 wherein the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly rejected the notion that formal equality alone is adequate, emphasizing the necessity of substantive equality, stating: “Substantive equality, unlike formal equality, rejects the mere presence or absence of difference as an answer to differential treatment. It insists on going behind the facade of similarities and differences. It asks not only what characteristics the different treatment is predicated upon, but also whether those characteristics are relevant considerations under the circumstances. The focus of the inquiry is on the actual impact of the impugned law, taking full account of social, political, economic and historical factors concerning the group. The result may be to reveal differential treatment as discriminatory because of prejudicial impact or negative stereotyping. Or it may reveal that differential treatment is required in order to ameliorate the actual situation of the claimant group.”

63Copy pinpoint63. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada has significantly reshaped the comparator group requirement, providing a broader and wider meaning to equality claims. The test poses two questions – (1) Does the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground? and (2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotypes? The purpose of the distinction component is to demonstrate that the claimant has been treated differently from others—specifically, that they have been denied a benefit available to others or are burdened in a way that others are not, due to personal characteristics that qualify as enumerated or analogous grounds.

64Copy pinpoint64. In Quebec (Attorney General) v. A,61 the court observed that substantive equality is not compromised merely because a disadvantage is imposed; rather, it is denied when that disadvantage is unfair or objectionable. This is often the case when the disadvantage perpetuates prejudice or stereotypes. Such discrimination can overlook significant harms, including marginalization, oppression, and the deprivation of essential benefits. The focus should be on

60 [2011] 1 SCR 396 61 [2012] 1 SCR 61

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the execution and impact of the law, rather than the government’s intent, when applying this test.

65Copy pinpoint65. Section 15 is violated when distinctions lead to the perpetuation of arbitrary disadvantages based on an individual’s membership in an enumerated or analogous group. Importantly, the test requires a flexible and contextual inquiry. Lastly, we will refer to the decision of Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General),62 where the court summarized the law on the adverse effects of discrimination, noting that this occurs when a seemingly neutral law disproportionately impacts members of groups protected on the basis of enumerated or analogous grounds.

66Copy pinpoint66. In this manner, the development of equality jurisprudence in Canada bears resemblances with the progressive development of constitutional jurisprudence in India. In the Indian context, the mere fact that a policy caters to a distinct, intelligible class, does not automatically imply that the rigours of Article 14 are satisfied. The second prong of the reasonable classification test mandates that the distinction created by the policy between the two classes must have a rational nexus with the object that policy seeks to achieve. Furthermore, the objective of the classification should not itself be illogical, unfair and unjust.

67Copy pinpoint67. The substantive equality test, as enunciated in our recent pronouncements, is broader and is not confined to a single principle. No doubt, it accommodates the legislature and the executive’s right to achieve structural change, but this right should be exercised to benefit those who are disadvantaged, marginalized, or those in need or grouped, while excluding others from the benefit or for imposition of the burden or obligation. It is crucial for the Court to consider both the intent behind legislation or policy and its practical impact, especially when it reflects discrimination based on proscribed grounds.63

68Copy pinpoint68. Substantive equality is satisfied when the law or policy genuinely intends to and provides, an equal chance of satisfying the criteria for access to a particular social or economic good. It respects individual dignity, which encompasses three characteristics: (i) a sense of self-worth, (ii) protection of basic choices an individual makes, and

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(iii) protection of individuals against harmful stereotypes. Lastly, substantive equality is achieved when legislation or policies enhance participation and representation, countering both political and socio- economic exclusion. The last aspect permits anti-subordination, as it focuses on the group which has suffered the disadvantage and examines whether the legislation or policy aims at neutrality or incorporates affirmative action to rectify the disadvantage or discrimination. Anti-subordination promotes structural change and aims to rectify disadvantages. In this sense, substantive equality factors in multiple aspects of inequality offering a multidimensional approach that allows the Court to address the interplay of various aspects of equality, and equally accommodate differences instead of masking them with formal equality.64

69Copy pinpoint69. A literal reading of the Constitution’s equality provisions – Articles 14, 15, 16, and 17 which collectively form the core of equality – supports an interpretation of substantive equality. While these Articles are broadly interconnected, they also confer independent rights. Article 18, which prohibits the granting of titles to Indian citizens, aligns with this objective, serving as a response to the colonial practice of elevating certain Indians over others.

70Copy pinpoint70. Article 15(1) explicitly bars discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, caste, sex, and place of birth. These can be loosely called proscribed grounds for classification.65 Classifications based on these criteria will be unconstitutional, unless permitted by clauses (3), (4), (5), and (6) of Article 15 of the Constitution of India, when they are justified on the ground of anti-subordination. Latter clauses specifically permit the State to create special provisions for women and children, and for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes, including Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. These are anti-subordination grounds.66 The clauses permit

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provisions for their admission to educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, with the exception of minority educational institutions. Under Article 15(6), the State is authorized to enact laws for the economically weaker sections, allowing for up to ten percent reservation in employment. Article 16, which deals with equality of opportunity in matters of public employment, prohibits discrimination of any citizen on the ground or religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or residence. However, it permits the State to make provisions for reserving appointments for backward classes that are inadequately represented, as well as for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in State services.

71Copy pinpoint71. Article 14, which provides for equality before the law, and mandates that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of laws, does not specifically refer to a particular classification unlike Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution, allowing greater legislative flexibility. This design is intentional; the framers understood that rigid classifications could hinder the legislature’s ability to address emerging societal issues and adapt to the evolving needs of future generations. By avoiding specificity, the Constitution enables lawmakers to make laws on futuristic grounds which may arise with the struggles and challenges faced by the new generation.67

72Copy pinpoint72. Therefore, this Court has taken the view that Article 14 allows for reasonable and fair classification but prohibits class legislation. Classifications based on the categories outlined in Articles 15 and 16 are acceptable as long as they have a rational connection to their intended objectives. These classifications—such as those pertaining to other backward classes, scheduled castes and tribes, and women and children—aim to fulfil the principle of equal ends. This approach accepts and accommodates the said difference. They adopt an anti- subordination approach, treating these groups differently to promote greater equality. In this manner, Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India explicitly recognize the necessity for legislative measures aimed at uplifting certain disadvantaged sections to achieve equality.

is not violated, and the classification does not result in indirect discrimination. 67 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558, which dealt with the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution, observes that the framers knew that times could blind them to certain truths and later generations could see the laws once thought necessary and proper, in fact, serve only the oppressed. The Constitution endures, a person of every generation can invoke its principles in search for greater freedom.

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73Copy pinpoint73. The substantive equality test will also fail in case the legislation or the policy, in its operation, results in indirect discrimination.68 The principle of indirect discrimination comes into play when legislation or policy applies equally to all but disproportionately disadvantages individuals or groups based on protected characteristics, which cannot be justified. It refers to inequality of results and outcomes. Substantive equality also encompasses equality of opportunity, addressing institutional discrimination and rejecting policies that promote imbalances rather than equalize starting points. Policies should not impose additional obstacles for those requiring protection, or who have faced historical discrimination or do so in the present.

74Copy pinpoint74. Therefore, unless a law meets these criteria of substantive equality, it would violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

75Copy pinpoint75. At this juncture, we will apply the law to the facts of the case. To quote from the GoM No. 242, the land allotment policy seeks to serve the following objective: “Providing shelter is amongst the top priorities of the Government. There are well defined schemes for providing housing for the poor. In so far as meeting the requirement of the other deserving sections of the society, there is no fixed policy and mechanism for alienation of land to such sections and Allotment was done case by case, for the land identified. Therefore, Government have decided to have a comprehensive policy of meeting housing requirement of targeted sections of society by creation of land bank and· accordingly order the following...” We would like to emphasise that the policy, while not targeted towards the poor, is also aimed towards “other deserving sections of the society”, to meet their “housing requirement”.

76Copy pinpoint76. The category of people who have been identified as beneficiaries of this State largesse as “other deserving sections of the society” are: Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court, MPs, MLAs, journalists, State and Central Government employees. It would be apt to note that, not only are these classes of people being allotted

68 See Lt. Col. Nitisha (supra). Also see Anuj Garg and Others v. Hotel Association of India and Others (2008) 3 SCC 1

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land preferentially, the price of such land is also discounted to the basic rate, instead of the prevalent market rate.

77Copy pinpoint77. The State of Telangana, in its defence, has contended that the abovementioned category of people forms a distinct class. However, we have already enunciated above that, not only must a distinct classification exist but such classification should not be arbitrary, artificial or artful, and should be rationally tailored to serve the objective.

78Copy pinpoint78. In the present case, the principle of arbitrariness, as expounded in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu in its puritan form, is applicable.69 The classification giving State largesse to Judges of Constitutional Courts, MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS, journalists, etc. favours a privileged segment of society, which is already better off compared to the vast majority of marginalized and socio-economically disadvantaged individuals. The benefits granted to these privileged and well-off classes come at a cost, as they effectively deprive and deny the essentials to the marginalized and socially vulnerable populations.

79Copy pinpoint79. The allocation of land at basic rates to select privileged groups reflects a “capricious” and “irrational” approach. This is a classic case of executive action steeped in arbitrariness, but clothed in the guise of legitimacy, by stating that the ostensible purpose of the policy was to allot land to “deserving sections of society”. Shorn of pretence, this policy of the State Government, is an abuse of power meant to cater exclusively to the affluent sections of the society, disapproving and rejecting the equal right to allotment of the common citizen and the socio-economically disadvantaged. It would not be wrong to say that the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness, as expounded in Shayara Bano v. Union of India is applicable.70

80Copy pinpoint80. The arbitrariness inherent in the land allocation policy is further reflected in GoM No. 244. This order stipulates that if the available land is insufficient to meet the prescribed allocations for AIS officers, the size of the plots may be reduced according to a specified ratio. However, an exception is carved out for Category 1 beneficiaries,

69 (1974) 4 SCC 3 70 [2017] 9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1; also see Navtej Johar (supra) and Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39

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which includes IAS, IPS, and IFS officers. This category is afforded preferential treatment without any justification for such a distinction, highlighting an undue bias in favour of the most privileged subset within an already irrational classification.

81Copy pinpoint81. In this regard, members of the AIS have asserted that they are “underprivileged”, or have made “sacrifices”, which entitles them to the privilege of preferential land allotment at a discounted rate. We reject this argument as fallacious and untenable. Government servants, elected legislators, Judges in the Supreme Court and High Court, and prominent journalists do not belong to the “weaker” or per se deserving sections of our society, warranting special State reservations to land allotment.

82Copy pinpoint82. Land is a finite and highly valuable resource, particularly in densely populated urban areas, where access to land for housing and economic activities is increasingly scarce. When the government allocates land at discounted rates to the privileged few, it engenders a system of inequality, conferring upon them a material advantage that remains inaccessible to the common citizen. This preferential treatment conveys the message that certain individuals are entitled to more, not due to the necessities of their public office or the public good, but simply because of their status. Such practices foster resentment and disillusionment among ordinary citizens, who perceive these actions as corrupt or unjust, thereby eroding trust in democratic institutions. This policy undermines solidarity and fraternity, reinforcing societal hierarchies rather than actively working to dismantle them.

83Copy pinpoint83. The policy has wider economic ramifications as well. When land is offered at a discounted rate, it distorts the natural market forces that govern the value of land. The true market price of land reflects its demand and utility, but when individuals receive land at a discount, it artificially devalues the property and consequently diminishes public revenue. This has severe financial ramifications for the public exchequer.

84Copy pinpoint84. In Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana,71 this Court observed that, typically, the State is under an obligation to sell public property

71 [1985] Supp. (1) SCR 541 : (1985) 3 SCC 267

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only at the market price, with the sole exception of achieving a constitutionally recognised public purpose: “…Disposal of public property partakes the character of a trust in that in its disposal there should be nothing hanky panky and that it must be done at the best price so that larger revenue coming into the coffers of the State administration would serve public purpose viz. the welfare State may be able to expand its beneficient activities by the availability of larger funds. This is subject to one important limitation that socialist property may be disposed at a price lower than the market price or even for a token price to achieve some defined constitutionally recognised public purpose, one such being to achieve the goals set out in Part IV of the Constitution. But where disposal is for augmentation of revenue and nothing else, the State is under an obligation to secure the best market price available in a market economy…A welfare State exists for the largest good of the largest number more so when it proclaims to be a socialist State dedicated to eradication of poverty. All its attempt must be to obtain the best available price while disposing of its property because the greater the revenue, the welfare activities will get a fillip and shot in the arm…”

85Copy pinpoint85. We are also of the opinion that, accredited journalists cannot be treated as a separate class for such preferential treatment. In fact, a careful study of the policy indicates that higher echelons of all the three wings of the government, —legislators, bureaucrats, and Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts—have been afforded such preferential treatment. Journalists, who are considered the fourth pillar of democracy, have also been included. These four pillars of democracy are expected to act as checks and balances on the arbitrary exercise of the State’s power. However, the distribution of such extraordinary State benefits renders nugatory the very optics of healthy checks and balances within our democratic system.

86Copy pinpoint86. Thus, the core framework of these policies suffers from the malaise of unreasonableness and arbitrariness. It reeks of colourable exercise of power whereby the policymakers are bestowing valuable resources to their peers and ilk, triggering a cycle of illegal distribution of State

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resources. The State holds all its resources in trust for its citizens, to be utilised in larger public and social interest. The State, including the three organs – Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary, are de facto trustees and agents/repositories which function and govern for the benefit of the citizens who are the beneficiaries.72

87Copy pinpoint87. Thus, the allotment policy fails to satisfy the requirements of the two-pronged classification test coupled with arbitrariness. As noted earlier, the jurisprudence surrounding equality law has evolved beyond a purely technical analysis, embracing an approach that considers not only the intent behind legislation or policy but also its real-world impact. We are of the opinion that the policies in question are a relevant example to show that merely likes being treated alike can lead to injustice. The pursuit of consistency through classification, while appealing in theory, does not ensure that the classification is either appropriate or equitable in practice. The substantive equality in contemporary equality jurisprudence calls not for a conceptually tidy “test”, but a multi-pronged approach to equality, which acknowledges the diverse ways in which inequality and discrimination may be perpetuated.73 To test the facts against the standards of substantive equality, we are of the opinion that Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court, MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS, journalists etc. cannot be treated as a separate category for allotment of land at a discounted basic value in preference to others. The object of the policy perpetuates inequality. The policy differentiates and bestows largesse to an advantwaged section/group by resorting to discrimination and denial. It bars the more deserving, as well as those similarly situated, from access to the land at the same price. It promotes social-economic exclusion, to favour a small and privileged section/group. The policy does not meet the equality and fairness standards prescribed by the Constitution.

88Copy pinpoint88. Of course, the State has the discretion and duty under the Constitution, to distribute its resources to marginalised sections of society, or other imminent and deserving personalities, to the extent necessary to discharge their public functions. Personalities who contribute to

72 NOIDA Entrepreneurs Association v. NOIDA and Others (2011) 6 SCC 508 73 The impugned policies are not in furtherance of anti-subordination principle, and they do not raise a presumption of constitutionality.

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the nation’s progress through excellence in sports or other public activities may also be compensated through reasonable and non- arbitrary distribution of State largesse. We would also like to clarify that a policy or law allotting land to public servants may be justifiable provided such allotment is within the confines of Article 14. Unless the classification satisfies the twin prong test and the substantive equality benchmark, the mandate of Article 14 is not met. The State cannot exercise discretion to benefit a select few elites disproportionately, especially ones who are already enjoying pre-existing benefits and advantages.

89Copy pinpoint89. Reliance placed by some of the Cooperative Societies and members on the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317F, and the 1975 Rules, including Section 25,74 is misconceived. Section 25 states that the land can be assigned for special purposes and such assignment shall be lawful. However, it does not mean that the land can be allotted in violation of principle of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

90Copy pinpoint90. Further, Rule 2(b) of the 1975 Rules states that alienation of land means placing land at the disposal of a third person for a public purpose or a specified cause. Alienation of land revenue, as defined in Section 2(c), means the grant of exemption from payment. Section 2(i) defines market value to mean value of the land that would fetch in the open market if sold, subject to appropriate charge for land revenue. Rule 10, which is relied upon by the Cooperative Societies and its members, states that notwithstanding anything contained in the rules, the Government, if it so desires, can sell or otherwise alienate the land or other property in Telangana area by following reasonable procedure, including public auction where alienation is deemed necessary. This rule does not support or assist the Cooperative Societies and their members in their argument.

91Copy pinpoint91. At this juncture, it is worth noting that during the pendency of the Writ Petition before the High Court, several members of the Judiciary, to

74 25. Assigning of land for special purpose to be lawful – When a village is under settlement, the Commissioner of Survey Settlement or the Commissioner of Land Records in that Village and in other cases with the sanction of the Board of Revenue, the Collector may, subject to the orders of the Government, set apart any Khalsa land not in the lawful occupation of any person or class for pasturage of cattle or for grass reserves or for other Government purposes or for the purposes of public benefit; provided that it does not interfere with any right of any person or class. The land so set apart shall not be otherwise appropriated without the order of the Board of Revenue.

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their credit, decided to withdraw their applications for allotment of land. Recognizing the constitutional limitations and acknowledging that such allotment would violate Article 14, they made this decision upon thoughtful consideration. However, many others continued to defend the allotment, vigorously presenting arguments that they constituted a separate class with a rational nexus to the policy. These arguments, however, are devoid of merit and must be unequivocally rejected. Conclusion and Directions

92Copy pinpoint92. In view of the aforesaid findings and discussion, we dismiss the appeals preferred by the State of Telangana, the Cooperative Societies and their members, and we allow the appeal preferred by Mr. Keshav Rao Jadhav challenging the judgment dated 05.01.2010 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition Nos. 7956, 7997 and 23862 of 2008. The said Writ Petitions are allowed, thereby issuing a Writ of certiorari and quashing GoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated 28.02.2005 to the extent they classify MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS/State Government, Judges of the Constitutional Courts, and journalists as a separate class for allotment of land at the basic rate. As a sequitur, GoM Nos. 419, 420, 422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008, and GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008, are declared to be bad in law, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and are quashed by issuing a Writ of certiorari.

93Copy pinpoint93. The interim directions passed by this Court in some of these cases will now stand merged with the final direction. Parties will be accordingly bound by the same.

94Copy pinpoint94. We also deem it appropriate to pass an order of restitution and direct that the Cooperative Societies and their members, as the case may be, will be entitled to a refund of the entire amount deposited by them, including the stamp duty and the registration fee paid by them, along with the interest which may be quantified by the State of Telangana. The rate of interest will not exceed the Reserve Bank of India’s rate of interest applicable from time to time, as may be deemed fit by the State of Telangana. The lease deeds executed by the State of Telangana in favour of the societies/members will be treated as cancelled. Similarly, development charges/expenses paid by the Cooperative Societies/members, as reflected in the books of accounts of the Cooperative Societies /members, duly certified by

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the income-tax returns, will be refunded to them along with interest at the rates specified.

95Copy pinpoint95. It will be open to the State of Telangana to deal with the land in the manner it deems fit and proper and as per law, keeping in mind the observations and findings recorded in this judgment.

96Copy pinpoint96. The appeals and the contempt petitions are accordingly disposed of. All pending applications also stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeals and contempt petitions disposed of.

† Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain