ANIL AGARWAL FOUNDATION ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS.

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Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
Bench
M. R. SHAH and KRISHNA MURARI
Citation
[2023] 8 S.C.R. 969
Whole judgment (for printing)

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Judgment · Supreme Court of India · decided · Bench: M. R. SHAH and KRISHNA MURARI

[2023] 8 S.C.R. 969

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A poor and the downtrodden are getting their social and economic entitlements or whether they are continuing to remain victims of deception and exploitation at the hands of strong and powerful sections of the community and whether social and economic justice has become a meaningful reality for them or it has remained merely a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality, so that in case the complaint in the public interest litigation is found to be true, they can in discharge of their constitutional obligation root out exploitation and injustice and ensure to the weaker sections their rights and entitlements.

39. The origin and evolution of public interest litigation in India emanated from realization of constitutional obligation by the Judiciary towards the vast sections of the society - the poor and the marginalized sections of the society. This jurisdiction has been created and carved out by the judicial creatively and craftsmanship.

D 40. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India this Court observed that Article 32 does not merely confer power on this Court to issue direction, order or writ for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Instead, it also lays a constitutional obligation on this Court to protect the fundamental rights of the people. E The Court asserted that, in realization of this constitutional obligation, “it has all incidental and ancillary power including the power to forge new remedies and fashion new strategies designed to enforce the fundamental rights”. The Court realized that because of extreme poverty, a large number of sections of society cannot approach the court. The fundamental rights have no meaning for them and in order to preserve and protect the fundamental rights of the marginalized section of the society by judicial innovation and creativity stated giving necessary directions and passing order in the public interest.

41. The development of public interest litigation has been an extremely significant development in the history of the Indian jurisprudence. The decisions of the Supreme Court in the 1970s loosened the strict locus standi requirements to permit filing of petitions on behalf of marginalised and deprived sections of the society by public spirited individuals, institutions and/or bodies. The higher courts exercised wide powers given to them

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under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. The sort of remedies sought from the Courts in the public interest litigation goes beyond award of remedies to the affected individuals and groups. In suitable cases, the Courts have also given guidelines and directions. The Courts have monitored implementation of legislation and even formulated guidelines in the absence of legislation. If the cases of the decades of 70s and 80s are analysed, most of the public interest litigation cases which were entertained by the courts are pertaining to enforcement of fundamental rights of marginalised and deprived sections of the society.

64. In view of the clear pronouncement of law in the aforesaid cases by the Apex Court this Court has to interfere with the acquisition proceedings and grant of Government lands in favour of the Beneficiary Company to protect the public interest. Hence we have to answer the aforesaid points in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite parties. D

65. For the reasons stated supra, the factual contentions urged by the learned Advocate General, placing reliance upon the report of the Additional Secretary to Tourism Department, is wholly contrary to the Gazette Notification of 1984 referred to supra and the Satellite Map issued by the Forest Department to the petitioners, which is produced for our perusal. Further the legal contentions urged on behalf of the Company by Mr. Sanjit Mohanty, learned Senior Counsel that the petitioners have abused the process of this Court claiming that they are public spirited persons, is also untenable in law for the reason that they have established the case that interest of the public of the locality will be affected and also there will be violation of the Rule of the law if the acquisition of lands and grant of leasehold rights in respect of Government lands in favour of beneficiary Company is held to be not legal and valid and therefore we have to hold that there is no abuse of the process of this Court by the petitioners in approaching this Court G espousing the public cause and public interest as the act of the state Government is in contravention of the Notification issued by the State Government way back in the year 1984 declaring certain lands nearby the lands acquired, as Wild life Sanctuary and the documents produced by the petitioners to prove the fact that two H

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A river are flowing on the acquired lands. For the reasons stated supra we are of the view that the petitioners in the PIL writ petitions have established that they are bona fide public spirited persons who are very much interested in protecting the public interest and see that the State Government discharged its responsibilities and fundamental duties towards the public of the locality keeping in view ‘’the doctrine of public trust” upon the public properties. The disposal of the earlier writ petition filed by nine persons referred to supra upon which reliance is placed by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Company in support of his contention that the writ petitioners in the PIL have abused the process of this Court is not tenable in law, as this Court has not decided the case on merits by answering the substantial issues that arose for its consideration. In the present writ petitions by urging tenable grounds they have made out a strong case for granting the reliefs. If the PIL petitions are not allowed there will be a continuing wrong of the State Government and the beneficiary D Company, which would violate the human rights of the residents of the locality where the lands are acquired and land owners/ interested persons. They are small holders of the lands who belong to the Marginalized sections of the society and therefore they have no access to the justice for which they have got constitutional right under Article 39A of the Constitution and hundreds acres of Government lands are granted in favour of the company is utter violation of law.

66. For the foregoing reasons, absolutely there is no substance in the contentions urged by the learned Senior counsel on behalf of the Company that there is no public interest involved in these cases of PIL writ petitions filed by the petitioners and they have abused the process of the Court is misconceived and wholly untenable in law and the said contention is required to be rejected and the public interested litigation writ petitions also have to be allowed. G Answer to Point Nos. 14 and 15:

67. We have answered all the points framed in these petitions against the State Government and the beneficiary Company by recording our reasons and we have held that the acquisition H proceedings from the stage of initiation till the date of purported

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awards which in fact and law not awarded and the alleged taking over the possession of the lands is in flagrant violation of the statutory provision of Section 4, 5A, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, (2), 23, 24, read with the provisions under Part - VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. We have also answered the points that arose for our consideration in the Public interest Litigation holding that the initiation of the acquisition proceedings in favour of the beneficiary company, on the requisition made by the Vedanta Foundation by misrepresenting fact and playing fraud on the State Government, has vitiated the entire acquisition proceedings. We have further answered that the public interest at large is affected and there is violation of rule of law. Therefore, we have also held the writ petitions filed by the petitioners as public interest litigation are also required to be allowed and made observation that the petitioners in those petitions, apart from public interest, they have pleaded on behalf of small land holders who have no sustenance to approach this Court to fight litigation. Therefore, the acquisition proceedings in its entirety in respect of persons who have approached this Court and even who have not approached this Court are liable to be quashed for the reason that there is flagrant violation of the aforesaid provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as observed by Supreme Court in the case of H.M.T House Building Co-operative Society Vs. Syed Khader & Ors, reported in AIR 1995 SCC 2244. The Supreme Court, while answering the legal questions that arose for consideration, held that prior approval of the Government is required under Section 44-A but as the same has not been followed, the entire acquisition proceedings was quashed. Further, the Supreme Court directed in the above referred case the State Government and the Society which was in the possession, that lands shall be resorted to the respective land owners irrespective of the fact whether they had challenged the acquisition of their lands or not and at paragraph 25 of its judgment has directed as hereunder: “26. We direct that as a result of quashing of the land acquisition proceedings including the notification as aforesaid, the possession of the lands shall be restored to the respective landowners irrespective of the fact whether they had challenged the acquisition of their lands or not. On restoration of the possession to the landowners they shall H

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A refund the amounts received by them as compensation ·or otherwise in respect of their lands. The appellant, the respondents and the State Government including all authorities/ persons concerned shall implement the aforesaid directions at an early date.” B We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court while entertaining the writ petitions and the Public Interest Litigation petitions. 8.3 The grounds on which the High Court has set aside the entire acquisition proceedings by holding that the same is vitiated by non- C compliance of the relevant provisions of the Act, 1894, have been referred to and reproduced hereinabove. 8.4 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the entire acquisition proceedings / proceedings came to be initiated at the instance of the Vedanta Foundation, which commenced in the month of April, 2006. D Initially, the company asked the Government of Orissa specifically to make available for it 15,000 acres of contiguous land around Nuanai, Puri District in Bhubaneshwar-Puri-Konark by 15.06.2006. The process for identifying the suitable locations was by the company. Even from the presentation made to the Chief Minister at the relevant time and the relevant clauses of MoU dated 19.07.2006 and even the Section 41 E agreement executed between the Government of Orissa and the Anil Agarwal Foundation, it can be seen that the land was identified by the company and not by the Government of Orissa. The same has been dealt with and considered by the High Court in extenso. 8.5 At this stage, it is required to be noted that initiation of the acquisition proceedings was by the Vedanta Foundation and thereafter by the Anil Agarwal Foundation, which admittedly at the relevant time and as on 19.07.2006 was a private company having three Directors on its Board and less than seven members. It is the case on behalf of the appellants that as subsequently the Anil Agarwal Foundation, which at the relevant time was a private company was converted to public company as on 13.12.2006 namely, viz., the date when the first Section 4(1) notification was issued and the relevant date for consideration would be 13.12.2006 has no substance and cannot be accepted. As observed hereinabove, the initiation of the proceedings to acquire the identified lands, identified by the appellant company was in the month of April/ H

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June, 2006, which was followed by the MoU dated 19.07.2006. A Therefore, the relevant date for consideration would be 19.07.2006 and not 13.12.2006 as sought to be contended on behalf of the appellants. 8.6 At this stage, it is required to be noted that even otherwise the subsequent alleged conversion from private company to public company was an attempt to get out of the statutory provision under the Act, 1894. B The Law Department specifically observed that the land cannot be acquired by private company for the purposes for which the lands were sought to be acquired, only thereafter the appellants changed the status of the company from private company to public company. The aforesaid was a mala fide exercise on the part of the appellants. C 8.7 It is further required to be noted that when the appellant tried to change its status from private to public company, the same was subject to compliance of Sections 23, 31, 189(2) and 192 of the Companies Act,

1956. As observed and the findings recorded by the High Court and even from the RTI query, it is clear that the appellant did not furnish the certified copy of the Articles of Association (as amended) as required under the provision of Section 31(2A). It is the case on behalf of the appellant that the appellant successfully converted into the public company on 23.11.2006 and it increased number of members from 3 to 7 and in terms of Section 44 of the Companies Act, 1956, it amended its Articles of Association to delete the restriction on free transferability of the shares and the same has been acknowledged by the Registrar of Companies (ROC) by acknowledgment dated 21.02.2007 and 03.03.2011 is concerned, it is required to be noted and as observed hereinabove the relevant date for consideration would be June, 2006 and in any case 19.07.2006 when the MoU was entered into. Even the subsequent acknowledgment by the ROC was on 21.02.2007 and 03.03.2011 even much after Section 4(1) notification. Therefore, as rightly observed and held by the High Court legally, the appellant was not converted to public company, which as such was a Section 25 company and therefore, not a public company. At this stage, Section 44B of the Act, 1894 is required to be referred to, which reads as under:- G “44B. Land not to be acquired under this Part except for certain purpose for private companies other than Government companies. - Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no land shall be acquired under this Part, except for the purpose mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section H

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Footnotes

16 (both inclusive) and sections 18 to
37 (both inclusive) shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any company under this Part, unless with the previous consent of the appropriate Government, not unless the Company shall have executed the agreement hereinafter mentioned.

F 40. Previous enquiry. - (1) Such consent shall not be given unless the appropriate Government be satisfied, either on the report of the Collector under section 5A, sub-section (2), or by an enquiry held as hereinafter provided, - (a) that the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain land G for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the Company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith, or (aa) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some building or work for a Company which is engaged or H

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is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose, or (b) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some work, and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public. (2) Such enquiry shall be held by such officer and at such time and place as the appropriate Government shall appoint. (3) Such officer may summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and compel the production of documents by the same means and, as far as possible, in the same manner as is provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the case of a Civil Court.” 8.9 Thus, at the relevant time, when the company was a private company, in view of the bar under Section 44-B, the lands in question could not have been sought to be acquired / acquired by the appellant company de hors Section 44B read with Section 40(1)(a) of the Act,

1894. Therefore, the High Court has rightly held that the acquisition was illegal on the aforesaid ground. 8.10 At this stage, it is required to be noted that even at the relevant time, the University in question was/is non-existent as no university has come into existence under the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 nor under the Orrisa Universities Act. The case on behalf of the appellant that the State legislature has already passed a bill to establish the university is neither here nor there as even as per the appellant’s response, the same is pending assent of the Governor. 8.11 Even the High Court has given specific findings on Issue No. F 3 that the entire acquisition proceedings in favour of the beneficiary company by issuing a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act were without complying with the mandatory provisions of Sections 39, 40 and 41 of the Act, 1894 read with Rules 3(2) and (4) of the Rules, 1963. Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules, 1963 are as under:- G “3. Land Acquisition Committee. - (1) For the purpose of advising the appropriate Government in relation to acquisition of land under Part VII of the Act, the appropriate Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute a Committee to be called the Land Acquisition Committee. H

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A (2) The Committee shall consist of - (i) The Secretaries to the Government of the Departments of Revenue, Agriculture and Industries or such other officers of each of the said Departments as the appropriate Government may appoint; and B (ii) such other members as the appropriate Government may appoint, for such term as that Government may, by order specify, and (iii) the Secretary to the Department or any officer nominated by him dealing with the purposes for which the company C proposes to acquire the land. (3) The appropriate Government shall appoint one of the members of the Committee to be its Chairman. (4) The Committee shall regulate its own procedure. D (5) It shall be duty of the Committee to advise the appropriate Government on all matters relating to or arising out of acquisition of land under Part VII of the Act, on which it is consulted and to tender its advice within one month from the date on which it is consulted : E Provided that the appropriate Government may on a request being made in this behalf by the Committee and for sufficient reasons extend the said period to a further period not exceeding two months.

4. Appropriate Government to be satisfied with regard F to certain matters before initiating acquisition proceedings. - (1) Whenever a Company makes an application to the appropriate Government for acquisition of any land, that Government shall direct the Collector to submit a report to it on the following matters, namely :- G (i) that the Company has made its best endeavour to find out lands in the locality suitable for the purpose of the acquisition; (ii) that the Company has made all reasonable efforts to get such lands by negotiation with the persons interested therein on payment of reasonable price and such efforts have failed; H

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(iii) that the land proposed to be acquired is suitable for the A purpose; (iv) that the area of land proposed to be acquired is not excessive; (v) that the Company is in a position to utilise the land expeditiously; and B

(vi) where the land proposed to be acquired is good agricultural land, that no alternative suitable site can be found so as to avoid acquisition of that land. (2) The Collector shall, after giving the Company a C reasonable opportunity to make any representation in this behalf, hold an enquiry into the matters referred to in sub-rule (1) and while holding such enquiry he shall, - (i) in any case where the land proposed to be acquired is agricultural land, consult the Senior Agricultural Officer of the D district whether or not such land is good agricultural land; (ii) determine, having regard to the provisions of sections 23 and 24 of the Act, the approximate amount of compensation likely to be payable in respect of the land which, in the opinion of the Collector, should be acquired for the Company; and E (iii) ascertain whether the Company offered a reasonable price (not being less than the compensation so determined), to the persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired. Explanation. - For the purpose of this rule “good agricultural land” means any land which, considering the level of agricultural F production and the crop pattern of the area in which it is situated, is of average or above average productivity and includes a garden or grove land. (3) As soon as may be after holding the enquiry under sub- rule (2), the Collector shall submit a report to the appropriate G Government and a copy of the same shall be forwarded by that Government to the Committee. (4) No declaration shall be made by the appropriate Government under section 6 of the Act unless - H

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A (i) the appropriate Government has consulted the Committee and has considered the report submitted under this rule and the report, if any, submitted under section 5-A of the Act; and (ii) the agreement under section 41 of the Act has been executed by the Company.” B 8.12 At the relevant time, there was no Section 41 agreement at all. Even no inquiry was made by the State Government in terms of Rule 4 read with Rule 3 of the Rules, 1963. Declaration under Section 6 could not have been issued by the State Government without consulting the Land Acquisition Committee to be constituted under Rule 3 of the Rules,

C 1963. Constituting the Core Committee by the State Government, which was to coordinate the entire acquisition cannot be said to be constituting the Land Acquisition Committee as required under Rule 3. The object and purpose of constituting the Land Acquisition Committee under Rule 3 is to advise the appropriate Government on all matters relating to or arising out of acquisition of land under Part VII of the Act, 1894 on D which it is consulted and to tender its advise. Therefore, on this ground also the land acquisition proceedings have been vitiated. 8.13 There is a non-compliance of mandatory requirement under Rule 4 of the Rules, 1963. Before initiating land acquisition proceedings for the company, the Government shall direct the Collector to submit a E report to it on the mattes mentioned in Rule 4 including which are:- “(i) that the Company has made its best endeavour to find out lands in the locality suitable for the purpose of the acquisition; (ii) that the Company has made all reasonable efforts to get such lands by negotiation with the persons interested therein on payment of reasonable price and such efforts have failed; (iii) that the land proposed to be acquired is suitable for the purpose; (iv) that the area of land proposed to be acquired is not excessive; (v) that the Company is in a position to utilise the land expeditiously; and (vi) where the land proposed to be acquired is good agricultural land, that no alternative suitable site can be found so as to avoid acquisition of that land.”

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8.14 As per Rule 4(2)(i) in any case where the land proposed to be acquired is agricultural lands, the Collector is required to consult the Senior Agricultural Officer of the District whether or not such land is good agricultural land. The Collector is also required to satisfy and determine having regard to the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of the Act, the approximate amount of compensation likely to be payable in respect of the land, which, in the opinion of the Collector, should be acquired for the company. 8.15 From the material on record, the High Court has given the specific findings that there is a non-compliance of mandatory provisions under Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules, 1963 and therefore, the entire acquisition proceedings for the beneficiary company has been vitiated and there are checks and balances and certain mandatory procedures and requirements are to be satisfied, more particularly, when the lands are to be acquired for the company, the same have to be adhered to and non- consideration of the relevant aspects, which are mandatory to be considered under Rule 4 would vitiate the entire acquisition proceedings as the subjective satisfaction by the State Government has been vitiated on non-consideration of the relevant aspects, more particularly, the aspects mentioned in Rule 4. 8.16 Even there is a specific finding recorded by the High Court that the beneficiary company has not executed the MoU as required under Section 41 of the Act that the State Government even undertaking as provided in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 41. While ordering so, in paragraph 53, the High Court has observed as under:- “53. Further as could be seen from the original records of the State Government that issuance of the preliminary notifications and obtaining agreements from the Vedanta Foundation and the beneficiary company are also bad in law for the reason that we have answered point no. 1 holding that the beneficiary company is not a public company; it is a private company limited by guarantee. Further acquisition of lands in its private company limited by guarantee. Further acquisition of lands in its favour is permissible only in respect of the purpose of erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the company or for the provision amenities directly connected therewith. The MOU dated 19.7.2006 executed by Vedanta Company in favour of the State Government was before publishing the H

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A preliminary notifications in respect of the acquired lands. On the basis of the said MOU preliminary notification dated 13.12.2006 to 22.12.2006 were published. Therefore, the said agreement was not executed by the beneficiary company in favour of the State Government for publishing section 4(1) notifications by giving previous consent by it as provided under section 39 of the LA.Act B to put the provisions of sections 4 to 16 (both inclusive) and section 18 to 37 in force. Therefore, there is no valid agreement before the State Government to exercise the statutory power and grant previous consent for publishing the preliminary notification. For this reason, publication of the preliminary notifications on the basis of the said MOU executed by Vedanta Company does not enure to the benefit of the beneficiary company. Therefore, the said agreement is not valid as required under section 39 read with section 41 of the LA.Act and, therefore, acquisition of lands by publishing section 4 (1) notification in favour of the beneficiary company is vitiated in law for the reason that before putting the provisions of section 4 to 16 and 18 to 37 in order to acquire land in favour of the beneficiary company, no previous consent of the State Government was there and such consent also shall not be given unless the company has executed the agreement in terms of section 41 of the LA.Act. Therefore, the agreement is not only not in conformity with sub-sections (1) to (4) and (4A) of section 41, but the same is not legal and valid for the reason that much prior to the said agreement, preliminary notification were published and thereafter final notifications were published which are not permissible in law. Therefore, the same is in contravention of section 39 of the Act.” F 8.17 The most important aspect, which is required to be considered is the non-application of mind by the State Government on environmental aspects and passing of two rivers from the acquired lands in question. It is not in dispute that from the lands in question two rivers namely ‘Nuanai’ and ‘Nala’ are flowing, which as such were acquired by the State G Government. How the maintenance of the rivers etc. can be handed over to the beneficiary company. If the lands in question are continued to be acquired by the beneficiary company, the control of the rivers would be with the said private company, which would violate the Doctrine of Public Trust. Even requiring the beneficiary company to maintain the H

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flow of above two rivers may also affect the residents of the locality at large. 8.18 It is also required to be noted that just across the road, there is a Wildlife Sanctuary, which is just adjacent across the road to the proposed university and the lands acquired. Therefore, the large-scale construction for the establishment of the proposed university as observed by the High Court will also adversely affect the Wildlife Sanctuary, entire Eco system and the ecological environment in the locality. It is a duty of the State to protect the Wildlife Sanctuary and it may affect the entire Eco system and the ecological environment in the locality. It is also required to be noted that even the distance of the sea from the proposed Vedanta University is approximately 2000 meters. Merely because the Balukhand C Wildlife Sanctuary is separated from the proposed site by a highway – Puri-Konark Marine Drive, cannot be a ground to acquire the huge lands for the proposed university and as rightly observed by the High Court, the same will adversely affect the Wildlife Sanctuary and the entire Eco system and the ecological environment in the locality. The aforesaid aspects has not at all been considered by the State Government and/or the Collector and/or the appropriate authority even while considering the proposal and/or even the objections under Section 5A of the Act, 1894. 8.19 Even otherwise, there is a non-application on the part of the State Government on the requirement of the lands by the beneficiary company. It is required to be noted that the lands were proposed to be acquired at the instance of one foundation / company and the State Government was dealing with the lands belonging to the agricultural landowners. It is required to be noted that the Government is holding a public trust and has to deal with the lands belonging to private landowners, more particularly, agricultural landowners in accordance with law. The State Government could not have considered the proposal from only one beneficiary/trust. There may be other public trusts / companies, who might be interested in establishing such university. Even no proper inquiry seems to have been initiated by the Government / Collector while considering the proposal by the beneficiary company. It is required to be noted that initially, 15,000 acres of the agricultural lands was sought to be acquired for the proposed university. Ultimately, approximately, 8000 acres of the land belonging to the private landowners / agricultural landowners came to be acquired. The State Government has also handed H

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A over the possession of approximately 495 acres of land belonging to the State Government including the Gochar Lands etc., which could have been used for the other public purpose and even for the Gochar Lands also. 8.20 From the material on record, it appears that undue benefits B were proposed / in fact offered and given to the beneficiary company providing undue largesse like:- (i) total autonomy to Vedanta University and its authorities with regard to administration, admission, fee structure, curriculum and faculty selection; C (ii) proposed university to have complete immunity from any reservation laws of the State Government; (iii) all assistance in getting regulatory approvals from UGC, AICTE etc.; (iv) the Government agreed to provide 4-lane road from Bhubaneshwar city to the proposed site; D (v) in the agreement, the Government also agreed to make the land use/ zoning plan in the 5 km radius from the university boundary only after Consultation with Vedanta; (vi) the Government also promised to exempt all state levies/ taxes/ duties namely, viz. VAT, Works Contract Tax, Stamp E Duty and Entry tax on R&D equipment, educational aids, lab equipment and tools, and construction materials from the date of signing of the MoU; (vii) the Government also promised to assist the Foundation in obtaining NOC from SPCB and all clearances from the F Central Government; (viii) the Government also promised to assist the Foundation in arranging rapid EIA and EMP for the project; (ix) the Government also promised to provide extraordinary huge amounts of electricity and water. G 8.21 It is not appreciable why the Government offered such an undue favour in favour of one trust/ company. Thus, the entire acquisition proceedings and the benefits, which were proposed by the State Government were vitiated by favourism and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. H

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8.22 From the aforesaid and the detailed findings recorded by the A High Court reproduced hereinabove, we are more than satisfied that the High Court has not committed any error and in fact the High Court was justified in setting aside the entire acquisition proceedings, which has been vitiated by non-compliance of the statutory provisions under the Act, 1894 and the Rules, 1963 and vitiated by mala fides and favourism B and is a clear case of the non-application of mind on relevant aspects. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. 8.23 The submission on behalf of the appellant that now the appellant is ready to confine to acquisition of 3837 acres of land only and that they are now willing to exclude the lands belonging to 7 land losers, who have filed the writ petitions, from the acquisition proceedings and/ C or the landowners before this Court and/or the land belonging to the land losers before this Court is concerned, it will strengthen our finding that there was no proper inquiry with respect to the requirement. As observed hereinabove, initially, 15,000 acres was proposed to be acquired, which is now reduced to 3837 acres. Meaning thereby, the proposal was for exaggerated demand. This was mala fide intention on the part of the appellant company / foundation. At this stage, it is required to be noted that it was the specific case on behalf of the original writ petitioners, more particularly, the Public Interest Litigation petitioners that if such a huge land would have been acquired and/or even the lands, which are already acquired, would be misused and/or put to use for some other purpose like mining activities etc. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the lands to be acquired are agricultural lands belonging to 6000 families and their only source of livelihood is on the agricultural lands, which cannot be compensated in terms of money, therefore, the proposal made now has to be rejected outright. F

9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, all these appeals fail and the same deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed with costs, which is quantified at Rs. 5 lakhs to be deposited by the appellant – beneficiary company – Anil Agarwal Foundation with the Registrar of this Court within a period of six weeks from today and on such deposit, the same be transferred to the Orissa State Legal G Services Authority.

Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeals dismissed. (Assisted by : Rahul Rathi, LCRA)

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