THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS.

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A No such case having been made out in the appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court, interference with and reversal of the well- considered order of the learned Single Judge deserves to be disapproved. 17.2. It has been strenuously argued that the very convening ofthe meeting of General Council, to be held on 11.07.2022, had been illegal B andnonest; the said meeting remains unauthorised; and no resolution taken therein could be said to be permissible in lawfor two main reasons. First that, from a reading of the Rules 19(vii) and 20-A(viii), it is but clear that the authority to convene the General Council meeting is vested only with the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator, acting jointly. C Therefore, the Presidium Chairman neither had the power to make any announcement on 23.06.2022 about convening of the General Council meeting on 11.07.2022 nor he could have convened any such meeting. Further, the written notice dated 01.07.2022, not signed by OPS and sent to the General Council members by an unspecified body (Head Quarters’ Office Bearers) to call for the meeting on 11.07.2022, is voidfor having been issued by the persons without having authority to do so under the byelaws of the party. It has also been submitted that in regard to such questions arising in the past, the High Court has held in the case of S. Thirunavukkarasu (supra), that the scheme of byelaws does not envisage the requisitionists to convene the General Council meeting; and if the General Secretary does not act on the requisition with sufficient dispatch, the only option in such a scenario is to approach the Court. On the same principles and analogy, if at all the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator would fail to convene the meeting, the only option is to seek intervention of the Court but a meeting cannot be convened by the persons not authorised to do so. F Secondly, the notice dated 01.07.2022 did not comply with the requirement of 15 days period as stipulated under Rule 19(vii) of the byelaws of the party; and there is a long-standing practice of AIADMK party to issue written invitations to the members of the General Council for the meetings. It is further submitted that the announcement made by G the Presidium Chairman at the meeting was lacking in material particulars such as venue, etc. which is contrary to settled principles of law as laid out in the authoritative book “Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings”7.

7 H Edited by Madeleine Cordes, John Pugh-Smith, 13 th ed., Thomson Reuters at p. 41.

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17.3. Learned counsel for the appellants have further contended that the balance of convenience in the present matters has been in favour of grant of injunction as prayed for. It is submitted that the so-called will of a purported majority in the General Council does not reflect the will of the entire primary membership of the party; and no data has been submitted by the respondents to suggest that the primary members of the party want to revert to the regime of single leadership. It is further submitted that the issue of balance of convenience is to be considered in light of the nature of prima facie case set up by the plaintiffs in the suit; and not de hors such issue, as has been done by the Division Bench of the High Court in the order impugned. Reliance has been placed on one passage in thedecision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. State of C A.P. and Ors.:(2000) 9 SCC 572 and on another decision of this Court in Surya Nath Singh and Ors. v. Khedu Singh (Dead) by LRS and Ors.:1994 Supp (3) SCC 561 to submit that balance of convenience while granting interim injunction is to be seen from the standpoint of the ‘justice of the situation’. D 17.4. It has also been argued that if the interim injunction is not granted as prayed for, irreparable injury would be caused to the appellantOPS and the persons on his side or similarly situated, who have been purportedly expelled as primary members of the party as a consequence of the resolutions passed in the General Council meeting held on 11.07.2022. This expulsion coupled with other substantial changes E made in the leadership structure of the party would, in effect, exclude OPS from participating in the affairs of the party and by the time of final adjudication of the suit, the changes made to the composition of the party would be irreversible in the absence of protective interim order. 17.5. Furthermore, on the issue of grant of interim injunction as a F discretionary measure, balance of convenience and prima facie case, the learned counsel for the appellants haverelied upon the decisions of this Court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. and Ors.: (1985) 1 SCC 260, Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v. Prahlad Singh and Ors.: (1992) 1 SCC G 719 and American Express Bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Steel Co. and Ors.: (1993) 2 SCC 199.

18Copy pinpoint18. The contra contentions urged on behalf of the respondents in support of the said order dated 02.09.2022 could also be usefully summarised as follows: H

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A 18.1. Learned senior counsel for the respondents have submitted that the decision as to acceptance or rejection of an interim injunction is a matter of discretion, which does not require interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. It has also been argued that the reliefs claimed in the applications in question had beenagainst holding of the General Council meeting dated 11.07.2022, which has already been concluded and hence, the reliefs have practically become infructuous. The decisions of this Court in Seema Arshad Zaheer and Ors. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai and Ors.: (2006) 5 SCC 282 and Skyline Education Institute (India) Private Limited v. S.L. Vaswani and Anr.: (2010) 2 SCC 142 have been relied upon to submit that in the matter of grant or refusal of injunction, interference by the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India could only be considered when the discretion exercised by the High Court is vitiated by an error apparent or perversity or manifest injustice. It is submitted that the impugned order dated 02.09.2022 does not suffer from any such infirmity and hence, calls for no interference. D 18.2. It has further been argued that the General Council is the supreme authority in the party as is evident from Rules 5, 5(vii), 19(i), 19(viii) and 43. The General Council, therefore, has unfettered powers to amend, add or delete the byelaws; including the powers that are not specifically placed in the byelaws; and it is for this supremacy that as a E condition of membership into the party, one has to abide by the decision of the General Council. Relying on the decision of this Court in K. Rajendran and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.:(1982) 2 SCC 273 it has been submitted that the General Council has the power even to create, abolish and replace the post. F 18.3. It has been contended, particularly with reference to Rule 19(vii) of the byelaws, that the notice sent on 01.07.2022 would qualify to be a proper notice for, the byelaws only speak about notice of the meeting and not notice to the members; the byelaws do not require service of written notice for convening of meeting; the dictionary meaning of G the word ‘notice’ is intimation and does not necessarily mean notice in writing; and 15 days’ notice is to be given only for the regular meeting of the General Council and not for the special meeting. Further, it has been submitted that in the Tamil version of byelaws, the expression ‘aforesaid’ in the first part of Rule 19(vii) has been clearly used to denote that 15 days’ notice is required to be given for the regular meeting and not for H

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the special or requisitioned meeting.It has also been submitted that the A formality of notice cannot vitiate the action when parties had intimation of the event, as announced by Presidium Chairman on 23.06.2022. These contentions have been supported by relying on a decision of this Court in Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti and Ors.: AIR 1962 SC 666. B 18.4. As to the functional deadlock, due to the divergent and discordant views of the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator leading to non-functioning of party, the learned counsel for the respondents have relied on the decision in the case of B.N. Viswanathan and Anr. v. Tiffin’s Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd.: (1953) 66 LW 124, wherein it was held that the General Body of shareholders had the power to carry out the functions of the board, when it was impossible for the board to perform its functions. It has been submitted that if there is a vacuum and something is done within the framework, such an action is valid unless it is impermissible within the framework. It has also been submitted that having regard to the position obtaining in the present case, the said decision in S. Thirunavukkarasu (supra) is of no application because therein an expelled member of AIADMK attempted to convene a General Council meeting, parallel to the meeting called by the then General Secretary whereas, in the present case no parallel meeting of General Council has been convened by anyone. E 18.5. It has further been submitted, relying on the decision of this Court in T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria No. 363 S.C. Belgaum and Ors.: (1964) 1 SCR 1,that in the matters pertaining to internal affairs or management of an association, the Court would ordinarily be slow in interfering; and the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court, standing in conformity with these principles, calls for no interference.

19Copy pinpoint19. In rejoinder submissions, learned senior counsel for the appellants have submitted that until 23.06.2022, there was not even a whisper of reverting to the system of singleleadership amongst the party members; the functions of the party were being carried out smoothly; and even during the Panchayat elections, by both the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator jointly. Hence, the argument of “functional deadlock” is disingenuous and incorrect. 19.1. It has been further submitted that the General Council is not superior to the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the party as pursuant H

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A to the amendments made to the byelaws on 01.12.2021, the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are to be elected directly through vote by an electorate consisting of entire primary membership of the party. Further, Rule 45 of the byelaws authorizes them to relax or make alterations to any of the rules and regulations of the party. Therefore, the logic that a party organ is supreme because its members are ultimately elected by B the primary membership of the party applies even more to the posts of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator. 19.2. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that if it be assumed that the posts of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator lapsed because of non-ratification of the amendments of 01.12.2021 by the C General Council, the elections of other office-bearers held after the amendments of 01.12.2021 would also stand annulled and in any case, even according to Rule 20-A(vii) of the byelaws, the other office-bearers as mentioned therein do not have the power to convene the General Council meeting.

20Copy pinpoint20. We have given anxious consideration to the rival submissions and have examined the record of the case with reference to the law applicable. 20.1. Before proceeding further, a few comments on the width and limits of the consideration in these appeals appear necessary. Having E regard to the subject-matter of the civil suits leading to the order dated 17.08.2022 by the learned Single Judge and the impugned order dated 02.09.2022 by the Division Bench of the High Court and the totality of circumstances, it may at once be observed in relation to the submissions made by either of the parties concerning the contents of the resolution taken in the questioned meeting on 11.07.2022, that no challenge thereto as such has been laid in the suits as filed or by way of any amendment of pleadings; and entering into any aspect relating to the substance, contents and merits of the decisions said to have been taken in the said meeting dated 11.07.2022 would be practically traversing even beyond the scope of the subject civil suits. In other words, the real question to be determined in these appeals against the order dated 02.09.2022 would only be as regards the prayer for temporary injunction against convening of the meeting dated 11.07.2022. Within this framework and boundaries, we may examine the rival contentions to determine the question as to whether the impugned order dated 02.09.2022 calls for any interference. H

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21Copy pinpoint21. While dealing with the relevant contentions, we may usefully take note of a few decisions cited in these appeals so as to define the parameters and contours of the discussion forthcoming. 21.1. The case of S. Thirunavukkarasu (supra) has been referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants in order to submit that therein, a Division Bench of the High Court extensively interpreted the scheme of the byelaws of the party-AIADMK and held that the scheme of byelaws does not envisage the requisitionists to convene the General Council meeting; and if the General Secretary (now replaced by the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator jointly) fail to convene the meeting, the only option is to seek intervention of the Court but a meeting cannot be convened by the persons not authorised to do so.The C relevant paragraphs of the said decision read as under: - “69. As per rule 20(v) of the party, the General Secretary of the party is competent to convene the general council meeting. Rule 19(viii) does not authorise anyone else to convene the special general council meeting of the party. On facts, the learned single judge having held that the letter of requisition was not posted, has also held that even otherwise the plaintiff had convened the meeting of the general council as per Rule 19(viii). We have no good reason to differ from the finding recorded by the learned single judge that the letter of requisition was not given to the plaintiff. Once we take the view that the letter of requisition was not given to the plaintiff, the defendant had no authority to convene the meeting of the general council. Even otherwise Rule 19(viii) has not made any provision for convening the meeting of the general council by the requisitioning members in case the plaintiff as the general secretary failed to convene the meeting. F

70. In this regard, the learned senior counsel for the defendant and the learned counsel for the impleading applicants relied on the order of the learned single Judge of this Court in Karuppasamy Pandian & 6 others v. All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and two others, (Application G No.119 of 1988 disposed of on 20.1.1988 is C.S.No.28 of 1988). In our view it is not an authority for the proposition that in case the General Secretary fails to convene the meeting under Rule 19(viii), the requisitioning members can convene a meeting. In the said order the Court refused to convene a meeting by H

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A appointment of a Commissioner. But an observation was made that if the General Secretary refused to convene a meeting, it is always open to any member of the party’s general council to convene a meeting and take any decision after they establish their majority. In our view the order governs the facts of that case in the given circumstances. Even otherwise we do not agree that the requisitioning members may convene a meeting in case the general secretary fails to convene a meeting in terms of Rule 19(viii).

71. Rule 20 (v) specifically states that the general secretary of the party shall have the powers and responsibilities to convene the executive and general council meeting. Rule 19(viii) also obliges the General Secretary to convene special meeting of the general council on requisition within 30 days of the receipt of such requisition. Rule 19(viii) has made a specific provision to preside over the general council meeting, that in the absence of Chairman, D one of the members of the general council elected by the body shall preside over the meeting. Again Rule 23(ii) states that in the absence of the chairman, one of the members present will preside over and conduct the meeting of the central executive committee and general council. In the very party rules, when provisions are made for presiding over meetings in the absence of chairman, a E similar provision could have been made in case of Rule 19(viii) in the matter of convening a meeting.

72. The argument of the learned senior counsel for the defendant is that Rule 19(viii) may be harmoniously construed so as to serve the purpose of the rule; if the general secretary does not convene the meeting, the requisitioning members cannot be made helpless, and in the normal course, having given the requisition, they were entitled to have a meeting, and if not convened by the general secretary within the given time, they could themselves convene such a meeting. He also added that even if the general secretary convenes a meeting within 30 days from the date of receipt of the requisition fixing the date of the meeting after several years, it will create an anomalous situation. In that regard the learned counsel submitted that convening a meeting must be taken as holding a meeting. As already noticed above, general council meeting has to be called atleast once in six months. In case the H

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general secretary convenes a meeting within the time given but scheduling to hold the meeting after few years, in such a situation it can always be challenged as unreasonable and stating that the very object of the rule is defeated or on such other grounds available. It is equally open to the members of the party to amend the rule if so desired so as to make a specific provision in this regard.

73. Rule 19(vii) says that meeting of the general council shall be held once in six months by giving 15 days notice in advance of the date of the meeting. But in Rule 19(viii) of the same rules, it is stated that if a requisition is made the general secretary has to convenespecial meeting within 30 days from the date of receipt of such requisition. Even when the rules were framed a clear difference and distinction between holding a meeting and convening a meeting was kept in view. The learned single Judge in paragraphs 38 to 41 of the order under appeal, referring to various decisions, has taken the view that convening a meeting is to call for a meeting. We agree with the same. As already noticed above, even otherwise the plaintiff herself had convened the meeting. The defendant having been expelled on 19.5.1997 from the primary membership of the party, prima facie, he had no locus standi to convene the meeting of the general council. E

74. Nothing prevented even the requisitioning members participating in the meeting convened by the plaintiff to ventilate their grievances, even though such a meeting was not called on requisition, as according to the plaintiff there was no requisition to call for such a meeting. Under the circumstances when the requisition was not at all received by the plaintiff to convene a F general council meeting, the defendant has been expelled from the primary membership of the party on 19.5.1997 itself and who had no locus-standi to convene a meeting, and the general secretary alone was competent to convene a meeting, prima-facie, we have no hesitation to agree with the finding of the learned G single Judge that the action of the defendant in convening of the meeting of the general council which was held on 3.6.1997 was unauthorised and against the rules of the party.” 21.2. In Wander Ltd. (supra), a decision strongly relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, this Court explained the principle H

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A that ordinarily, the Appellate Court would not be interfering with the exercise of discretion by the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except in the cases where discretion was shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely or against the settled principles of law. This Court observed and held as under: - B “9. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated “...is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the ‘balance of convenience’ lies.” The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie case. The court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted. G ***** ***** *****

14. ….. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or H

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where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating A grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. B The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court’s exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph (1960) 3 SCR 713: (SCR 721) “... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton: 1942 AC 130 ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case’.” E

The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.” 21.3. The case of State of Karnataka (supra) essentially related to a suit involving inter-State water disputes and in the referred passage, it was indicated that even when balance of convenience or inconvenience is another requirement but no fixed rules or notions ought to be had in the matter of grant of injunction; and the relief would depend on facts and circumstances of each case with justice of the situation being the guiding factor, in the following terms: - “168. ….Generally speaking, however, be it noted that the issue of grant of injunction is to be looked at from the point of view as to whether on refusal of the injunction, the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss of injury keeping in view the strength of the parties’ case. Balance of convenience or inconvenience is also another requirement but no fixed rules or notions ought to be had in the H

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A matter of grant of injunction and the relief being always flexible depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The justice of the situation ought to be the guiding factor …..” 21.4. In Surya Nath Singh (supra), this Court held that though the grant of injunction was a matter of discretion, the same must be on settled principles of law to advance the cause of justice; and it is subject to correction by the Appellate Court. This Court said: - “2.…..Though the grant of injunction is discretionary, the same must be exercised on settled principles of law to advance the cause of justice. It is subject to correction by the appellate court….” 21.5. In the case of Dunlop India Ltd. (supra), though expositing in relation to the matters of public revenue, this Court explained the requirements of due consideration of the questions relating to balance of convenience and irreparable injury in the following terms: - D “5. We repeat and deprecate the practice of granting interim order which practically give the principal relief sought in the petition for no better reason than that a prima facie case has been made out, without being concerned about the balance of convenience, the public interest and a host of other relevant considerations. E …..…..There are, of course, cases which demand that interim orders should be made in the interests of justice. Where gross violations of the law and injustices are perpetrated or are about to be perpetrated, it is the bounden duty of the court to intervene and give appropriate interim relief. In cases where denial of interim relief may lead to public mischief, grave irreparable private injury or shake a citizen’s faith in the impartiality of public administration, a court may well be justified in granting interim relief against public authority. But since the law presumes that public authorities function properly and bona fide with due regard to the public interest, a court must be circumspect in granting interim orders of far-reaching dimensions or orders causing administrative, burdensome inconvenience or orders preventing collection of public revenue for no better reason than that the parties have come to the court alleging prejudice, inconvenience or harm and that a prima facie case has been shown. There can be and there are no hard and fast rules. But prudence, discretion and circumspection H

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are called for. There are several other vital considerations apart from the existence of a prima facie case. There is the question of balance of convenience. There is the question of irreparable injury. There is the question of the public interest. There are many such factors worthy of consideration….” 21.6. In the case of Dalpat Kumar (supra), this Court explained the principles for exercise of judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of injunction in the following terms: - “4. Order 39 Rule 1(c) provides that temporary injunction may be granted where, in any suit, it is proved by the affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing … or dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders…... Injunction is a judicial process by which a party is required to do or to refrain from doing any particular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible injury. In other words, the court, on exercise of the power of granting ad interim injunction, is to preserve the subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) F the court’s interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be G greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it.

5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property H

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A or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The B Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court E considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.” 21.7. In the case of American Express Bank Ltd. (supra), on the discretion of the Court in grant of declaration and injunction, this Court observed and held in the referred paragraph as under: - “22. Undoubtedly declaration of the rights or status is one of discretion of the court under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Equally the grant or refusal of the relief of declaration and injunction under the provision of that Act is discretionary. The plaintiff cannot claim the relief as of right. It has to be granted according to sound principles of law and ex debito justitiae. The court cannot convert itself into an instrument of injustice or vehicle of oppression. While exercising its discretionary power, the court must keep in its mind the well-settled principles of justice and fair H

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play and the discretion would be exercised keeping in view the ends of justice since justice is the hallmark and it cannot be administered in vacuum. Grant of declaration and injunction relating to commercial transactions tend to aid dishonesty and perfidy. Conversely, refusal to grant relief generally encourages candour in business behaviour, facilitates free flow of capital, prompt compliance with covenants, sustained growth of commerce and above all inculcates respect for the efficacy of judicial adjudication. Before granting or refusing to grant relief of declaration or injunction or both the court must weigh pros and cons in each case, consider the facts and circumstances in their proper perspective and exercise discretion with circumspection to further the ends of justice. From the backdrop fact-situation we have no hesitation to hold that the relief of declaration granted is unjust and illegal. It tended to impede free flow of capital, thwarted the growth of mercantile business and deflected the course of justice.” 21.8. In the case of Seema Arshad Zaheer (supra), this Court D reiterated that the matter of grant or refusal of injunction was that of discretion and not ordinarily calling for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution unless the discretion had been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or perversely or where the impugned order had been passed while ignoring the settled principles of law. In the said case, this Court held that the Appellate Court was justified in interfering with the matter and vacating the injunction of the Trial Court while observing as under: - “29. This Court also observed that this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136, would not ordinarily interfere with the exercise of discretion in the matter of grant of temporary injunction by the High Court and the trial court and substitute its own discretion therefor, except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely or where the order of the Court under scrutiny ignores settled principles of law.

30. The discretion of the court is exercised to grant a temporary injunction only when the following requirements are made out by the plaintiff : (i) existence of a prima facie case as pleaded, necessitating protection of the plaintiff’s rights by issue of a temporary injunction; (ii) when the need for protection of the plaintiff’s rights is compared with or weighed against the need for H

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A protection of the defendant’s rights or likely infringement of the defendant’s rights, the balance of convenience tilting in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury being caused to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted. In addition, temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiff’s conduct is free from blame and he approaches the court with clean hands. ***** ***** *****

32. Where the lower court acts arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely in the exercise of its discretion, the appellate court will interfere. Exercise of discretion by granting a temporary injunction when there is “no material”, or refusing to grant a temporary injunction by ignoring the relevant documents produced, are instances of action which are termed as arbitrary, capricious or perverse. When we refer to acting on “no material” (similar to D “no evidence”), we refer not only to cases where there is total dearth of material, but also to cases where there is no relevant material or where the material, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the exercise of discretion. In this case, there was “no material” to make out a prima facie case and therefore, E the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction, was justified in interfering in the matter and vacating the temporary injunction granted by the trial court.

33. We find no reason to interfere with the order of the High Court in the seven appeals. We accordingly dismiss these SLPs F as having no merit. The petitioners are granted 15 days time to make alternative arrangements. Parties to bear their respective costs.” 21.9. In Skyline Education Institute (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court again explained that in the matter of injunction, interference G under Article 136 of the Constitution would not ordinarily be made while observing as under: - “19. We have thoughtfully considered the entire matter. Before pronouncing upon the tenability or otherwise of the appellant’s prayer for restraining the respondents from using the word “Skyline” for the Institute of Engineering and Technology H

THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1175 [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

established by them, we consider it necessary to observe that as the suit filed by the appellant is pending trial and issues raised by the parties are yet to be decided, the High Court rightly considered and decided the appellant’s prayer for temporary injunction only on the basis of the undisputed facts and the material placed before the learned Single Judge and unless this Court comes to the conclusion that the discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing to entertain the appellant’s prayer for temporary injunction is vitiated by an error apparent or perversity and manifest injustice has been done to it, there will be no warrant for exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution. ***** ***** ***** C

22Copy pinpoint22. The ratio of the abovenoted judgments is that once the court of first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse to grant relief of temporary injunction and the said exercise of discretion is based upon objective consideration of the material placed before the court and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellate court D will be loath to interfere simply because on a de novo consideration of the matter it is possible for the appellate court to form a different opinion on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury and equity.” 21.10. In the case of Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti (supra), E this Court held that formality of notice cannot invalidate the action when the parties had intimation of the event; and that the term notice doesnot necessarily mean communication in writing. This Court observed and held, inter alia, as under: - “8. Sub-Section (1) of Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 F (Act 10 of 1940) requires the arbitrators or umpire to give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing of the award. Sub-section (2) of that section requires the Court, after the filing of the award, to give notice to the parties of the filing of the award. The difference in the provisions of the two sub-sections with G respect to the giving of notice is significant and indicates clearly that the notice which the court is to give to the parties of the filing of the award need not be a notice in writing. The notice can be given orally. No question of the service of the notice in the formal way of delivering the notice or tendering it to the party can arise H

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A in the case of a notice given orally. The communication of the information that an award has been filed is sufficient compliance with the requirements of sub-section, (2) of Section 14 with respect to the giving of the notice to the parties concerned about the filing of the award. “Notice” does not necessarily mean “communication in writing”. “Notice”, according to the Oxford Concise Dictionary, B means “intimation, intelligence, warning” and has this meaning in expressions like “give notice, have notice” and it also means “formal intimation of something, or instructions to do something” and has such a meaning in expressions like “notice to quit, till further notice”. We are of opinion that the expression “give notice” C in sub-section (2) of Section 14, simply means giving intimation of the filing of the award, which certainly was given to the parties through their pleaders on 21-2-1948. Notice to the pleader is notice to the party, in view of Rule 5 of Order 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, which provides that any process served on the pleader of any party shall be presumed to be duly communicated and made D known to the party whom the pleader represents and, unless the court otherwise directs, shall be as effectual for all purposes as if the same had been given to or served on the party in person. ***** ***** *****

E 10. We see no ground to construe the expression “date of service of notice” in column 3 of Article 158 of the Limitation Act to mean only a notice in writing served in a formal manner. When the legislature used the word “notice” it must be presumed to have borne in mind that it means not only a formal intimation but also an informal one. Similarly, it must be deemed to have in mind the fact that service of a notice would include constructive or informal notice. If its intention were to exclude the latter sense of the words “notice” and “service” it would have said so explicitly. It has not done so here. Moreover, to construe the expression as meaning only a written notice served formally on the party to be affected, will leave the door open to that party, eventhough with full knowledge of the filing of the award he has taken part in the subsequent proceedings, to challenge the decree based upon the award at any time upon the ground that for want of a proper notice his right to object to the filing of the award had not even accrued. Such a result would stultify the whole object which H

THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1177 [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

underlies the process of arbitration — the speedy decision of a A dispute by a tribunal chosen by the parties.” 21.11. In the case of T.P. Daver (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court held that in the matters relating to internal management of an association, the Courts generally do not interfere while observing as under: - B “8. The following principles may be gathered from the above discussion. (1) A member of a masonic lodge is bound to abide by the rules of the lodge; and if the rules provide for expulsion, he shall be expelled only in the manner provided by the rules. (2) The lodge is bound to act strictly according to the rules whether a C particular rule is mandatory or directory falls to be decided in each case, having regard to the well settled rules of construction in that regard. (3) The jurisdiction of a civil court is rather limited; it cannot obviously sit as a court of appeal from decisions of such a body; it can set aside the order of such a body, if the said body acts without jurisdiction or does not act in good faith or acts in D violation of the principles of natural justice as explained in the decisions cited supra.”

22. Apart from the above, we may also take note of the principles in relation to the matters concerning grant of interim relief,which have been stated and re-emphasised by this Court in the case of Union of E India and Ors. v. M/s. Raj Grow Impex LLP and Ors.: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 429as follows: - “194. In addition to the general principles for exercise of discretion, as discussed hereinbefore, a few features specific to the matters of interim relief need special mention. It is rather elementary that in the matters of grant of interim relief, satisfaction of the Court only about existence of prima facie case in favour of the suitor is not enough. The other elements i.e., balance of convenience and likelihood of irreparable injury, are not of empty formality and carry their own relevance; and while exercising its discretion in the matter of interim relief and adopting a particular course, the Court needs to weigh the risk of injustice, if ultimately the decision of main matter runs counter to the course being adopted at the time of granting or refusing the interim relief. We may usefully refer to the relevant principle stated in the decision of Chancery H

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A Division in Films Rover International Ltd. v. Cannon Film Sales Ltd. : (1986) 3 All ER 772 as under:— “….The principal dilemma about the grant of interlocutory injunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is that there is by definition a risk that the court may make the “wrong” B decision, in the sense of granting an injunction to a party who fails to establish his right at the trial (or would fail if there was a trial) or alternatively, in failing to grant an injunction to a party who succeeds (or would succeed) at trial. A fundamental principle is therefore that the court should take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of C injustice if it should turn out to have been “wrong” in the sense I have described. The guidelines for the grant of both kinds of interlocutory injunctions are derived from this principle.” (emphasis in bold supplied)

D 195. While referring to various expositions in the said decision, this Court, in the case of Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden : (1990) 2 SCC 117 observed as under:— “16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are: (1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money.

THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1179 [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

(3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief.

17. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion.” C (emphasis in bold supplied)

196. In keeping with the principles aforesaid, one of the simple questions to be adverted to at the threshold stage in the present cases was, as to whether the importers (writ petitioners) were likely to suffer irreparable injury in case the interim relief was denied and they were to ultimately succeed in the writ petitions. A direct answer to this question would have made it clear that their injury, if at all, would have been of some amount of loss of profit, which could always be measured in monetary terms and, usually, cannot be regarded as an irreparable one. Another simple but pertinent question would have been concerning the element of balance of convenience; and a simple answer to the same would have further shown that the inconvenience which the importers were going to suffer because of the notifications in question was far lesser than the inconvenience which the appellants were going to suffer (with ultimate impact on national interest) in case operation of the notifications was stayed and thereby, the markets of India were allowed to be flooded with excessive quantity of the said imported peas/pulses.”

23Copy pinpoint23. A few of the referred provisions in the byelaws of the party,as existing before the questioned meeting dated 11.07.2022 and even before the amendment dated 01.12.2021, could be usefully extracted as under:- “RULE - 5: MEMBERSHIP *** *** ***

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A vii) Members shall have no right to resort to Court proceedings regarding Party matters. If any member of the party resorts to any Court proceedings against the Party Co-Ordinator’s and joint co-ordinator’s decision he/she shall cease to be a primary member of the party. B The decision of the General Council shall be final with regard to party matters and only those who abide by this condition are eligible to admission for Membership. All those who have become Members of the KAZHAGAM are bound by the decision of the General Council. C *** *** *** RULE-18: FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES i) The responsibility and functions of the above mentioned Office bearers of the Party units at different levels will be as follows: ii) CHAIRMAN: He will preside over and conduct the General Body and the Executive Committee Meetings. In his absence, the meeting shall be presided over and conducted by one of the members. E iii) SECRETARY: The Secretary of the Party unit will be responsible for the administration and execute the decisions of the respective Executive Committee. In case of emergency, where the Secretary is not in a position to convene the Executive F Committee Meeting, he should get the decisions taken by him ratified within fifteen days by the Executive Committee. He should submit any file required by the Audit Committee for scrutiny. *** *** *** G vi) Should a contingency of absence or void of Office Bearers in a Party unit arise, the person elected by the Executive Committee members will exercise the functions on adhoc basis till regular Office bearers of the set-up are elected within one month. H

THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1181 [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

RULE-19: GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE CENTRAL A ORGANISATION i) The General Council of the AIADMK shall consist of the Chairman, Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, Deputy Co- ordinators, Treasurer, Headquarters Secretaries of the Party, the members of the Central Executive Committee, B the members of the General Council elected from the Districts and other States, the Members of the Audit Committee, Property Protection Committee, and the Parliamentary Board. The General Council shall be the Supreme body of the Party with all powers of the Kazhagam. C

ii) The Secretaries of Union Kazhagams, the Secretaries of the Municipal Town Kazhagams and Township Kazhagams, the District Secretaries, the Chairman, Assistant Secretary and Treasurer of the District Kazhagam etc. in Tamil Nadu as well as the Secretaries of State Kazhagams and the D Chairman, Assistant Secretary, Treasurer of the State Kazhagams of other States shall be the members of the General Council by virtue of their offices. iii) The General Council members shall be elected from each District Kazhagam in such numbers equivalent to the total number of Assembly Constituencies in the respective district. In respect of other, State including Pondicherry, the number of the General Council members will be determined by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator with reference to the total number of members registered in the respective State F Kazhagams. iv) The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the Party jointly can nominate not exceeding 100 Members to the General Council of the Central Organisation from among the members of the Party. G v) The General Council of the Central Organisation (Headquarters) shall meet and elect the Chairman of the Central Organisation. vi) The meeting of the General Council of the Central Organisation shall be presided over by the Chairman. In his H

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A absence, one of the members of the General Council may be temporarily nominated to preside over the meeting of the General Council. vii) The General Council Meeting shall be convened once in a year or whenever it is considered necessary by the Co- B ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator by giving 15 days notice in advance of the date of meeting. The quorum for the meeting shall be one-fifth of the total number of members of the General Council. If one-fifth of the members of the General Council request the Co- C ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator to convene the Special Meeting of the General Council, the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator should do so within 30 days of the receipt of such a requisition. viii) The General Council will be the supreme authority to frame D policies and programmes of the Party and for their implementation. The decision of the General Council is final and binding on all the members of the Party. ix) A General Council will have five years tenure. However, the tenure shall get extended till the new General Council E Meeting is convened. RULE-20: GENERAL SECRETARY As per wishes of the members of the party and the party cadre, PURATCHI THALAIVI Dr.J.JAYALALITHA shall be the eternal General Secretary of the party and no person shall be elected/ appointed/nominated to that post. The Post of General Secretary stands abolished. RULE 20-A: CO-ORDINATOR AND JOINT CO- ORDINATOR i) The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator shall be primary members of the party for a continuous period of five years. ii) The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator shall be elected by the members of the General Council. iii) The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator elected as per sub rule (ii) shall hold the post for a period of 5 years.

THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1183 [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

iv) The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator shall discharge/ A perform their duties, obligations and functions and shall exercise their powers as per the Rules and regulations jointly. v) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the Party will be responsible for the entire administration of the Party. vi) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator will constitute the B Executive Committee of the Central Organisation consisting of the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, Chairman, Treasurer, Headquarters Secretaries, District Secretaries and the nominated members. vii) The members of the Central Executive Committee, C Treasurer and the Headquarters Secretaries nominated by the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator will hold the office during the tenure of the office of the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator. If for any reason the post of the Co-Ordinator and Joint D Co-ordinator becomes vacant before the expiry of the tenure the office bearers who were nominated by the previous Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator will hold office and continue to function till the new The Co-Ordinator and JointCo-ordinator are elected and assume office. E viii) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the Party shall have the powers and responsibilities to convene the Executive and the General Council Meetings, to implement policies and programmes of the Party as decided by the General and Executive Councils, to conduct elections and bye elections for Party Organisations, to examine the accounts of all the Party units through the Audit Committee, to manage by self and through the Treasurer the income and expenditure of the Party organizations at all levels, to manage the Party Office, movable and immovable properties of the Party, to represent the Party in the legal proceedings that may arise in respect of Party properties and to take necessary legal steps on behalf of the Party to protect them. The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator will preside over the Party conferences take all kinds of disciplinary H

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A proceedings in accordance with the Party rules against the Party units and its office bearers who violate the Party rules, regulations or act against the Party interest, party discipline, policies and programmes, including immediate suspension of any Party unit or office bearer. The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator shall be the supreme authority to take a B final decision on the disciplinary proceedings recommended by the Party units and shall have over all powers to take all steps to promote and preserve the Party policies and programmes and to develop and protect the Party organizations. C ix) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are empowered to take such actions as he may deem fit on important political events, policies and programmes of urgent nature which cannot brook delay/and await the meeting of either Executive Committee or General Council of the Party. Such D decisions and actions have to be ratified by the General Council in its next meeting. However, it is open to the Co- Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator to obtain the views of the General Council Members on such urgent matters by post when the Council is not in session. E x) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are empowered to deposit the funds of the AIADMK in any of the legally constituted Banks or Financial Institutions either in Current Accounts or Fixed Deposits; to withdraw such funds and to operate the accounts on behalf of the Party. The Co- Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are also empowered to obtain loans for the Party purposes from the above mentioned institutions on the security of the assets of the Party and to do all that is necessary in this regard for and on behalf of the Party. xi) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are vested with powers to authorize the Treasure of the Party to operate on his behalf the Bank Accounts namely to deposit or to withdraw funds, and also in respect of duties mentioned in sub-rule (x) of this Rule.

THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1185 [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

xii) The Authorisation Forms addressed to the Election Officers A for the allotment of the Two Leaves Symbol to the candidates contesting on behalf of the AIADMK shall be signed only by the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator. xiii) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are vested with the right to nominate Joint Secretaries or Deputy B Secretaries, in case of need to Branch units, Union, Town, Township and District Units and other state units, besides elected functionaries. Moreover, the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are also vested with the Powers to nominate women in the posts, to compensate and give due representation to women if in any of the party units at any C level, women do not elected represent one third of the posts. *** *** *** Rule-23: CHAIRMAN i) The Members of the General Council will elect the Chairman D of the Central Organisation of the Party. ii) The Chairman will preside over and conduct the proceedings of the Central Executive Committee and the General Council Meetings. In the absence of the Chairman, one of the Members present will temporarily preside over and conduct E the meetings. *** *** *** RULE-25: CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE *** *** *** F ii) Unless it could not be convened for valid reasons, the Central Executive Committee shall meet once in six months. If found necessary, the AIADMK Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator an convene the meeting at any time. iii) Fourteen days notice should be given for ordinary meetings G and seven days notice for urgent meetings of the Central Executive Committee. *** *** ***

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A RULE-42: TENURE If the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator feels that there are genuine reasons according to changing situations, the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator is vested with the power to exempt from the abovementioned Rules and Regulations. B RULE-43: AMENDMENTS The General Council will have powers to frame, amend or delete any of the Rules of the Party Constitution. *** *** *** C RULE-45: Authorisation to Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator. The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are fully authorized to relax or make alterations to any of the aforesaid Rules and Regulations of the Party.” 23.1. Some of these provisions were amended by the Executive D Committee on 01.12.2021. These provisions, as existing before and after the said amendment dated 01.12.2021, could be noticed in comparative terms as follows:-

THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1187 [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

24Copy pinpoint24. A quick recapitulation of the past events shall be apposite. Though, in the scheme of byelaws, the topmost position in the party was earlier assigned to the General Secretary but, after the demise of the then General Secretary on 05.12.2016, the party organisation went through various changes and ultimately, a system of joint leadership, by Co- D ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, was established by way of amendment of the byelaws on 12.09.2017. The principal contesting parties - OPS and EPS - were jointly, and unanimously, elected to the said positions of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator respectively and acted jointly for a long time, until before convening of the meeting dated 23.06.2022. E However, when the proposition for further amendments of the byelaws – essentially to revert to the system of single leadership at the apex level – was likely to come up in the meeting of the General Council dated 23.06.2022, it led to the litigation. Initially, in the first three civil suits, being CS Nos. 102 of 2022, 106 of 2022 and 111 of 2022, the prayers for interim injunctionagainst holding of the meeting dated 23.06.2022 were declined by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by an order dated 22.06.2022 with reference to the settled principles of law that in matter of internal issues of an association/party, the Courts normally do not interfere while leaving it open to the association/party and its members to pass the necessary resolutions and to frame a particular byelaw, rule or regulation for better administration of the party; and that it were a matter well within their collective wisdom and the Court cannot insist upon the members to act in a particular manner for, it was for the General Council and its members to decide and pass resolutions and the Court cannot interfere with the process of conducting the General Council H

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A meeting. This order was challenged in an intra-court appeal, OSA No. 160 of 2022 wherein, by an order dated 23.06.2022, the Division Bench of the High Court, though allowed the said scheduled meeting of the General Council to go on but, placed fetters by providing that no decision shall be taken on any other matter except 23 items of draft resolution. It B is the case of the respondents that in the said meeting, the proposed agenda items could not be taken up and hence, the proposal for continuance of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator lapsed. The appellant would submit various reasons for which the said meeting dated 23.06.2022 was nothing but faux pas and in any case, the Presidium C Chairman of that meeting had no authority to convene another meeting of the General Council. On 06.07.2022, while examining the challenge to the said order dated 23.06.2022 as passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, this Court took note of the events that had taken place as also the fact that next meeting of the General Council was scheduled to be held on 11.07.2022 and hence, while issuing notice, stayed the operation and effect of the impugned order dated 23.06.2022and made it clear that the meeting slated for 11.07.2022 could proceed in accordance with law while also leaving it open for the learned Single Judge dealing with the civil suits to examine the prayer for any other interim relief and/ or to pass any other order, as may be required on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. Then, the prayers made in the freshly instituted civil suits, being CS Nos. 118 of 2022 and 119 of 2022, for preventing the meeting dated 11.07.2022 were declined by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 11.07.2022, in the order passed just before the scheduled time of the meeting. The said meeting dated 11.07.2022 was, accordingly, held at the scheduled time and various resolutions were adopted therein but, the said order dated 11.07.2022 as passed by the learned Single Judge was found to have been passed on wrong notion about the purport of the order of this Court dated 06.07.2022 and hence, by an order dated 27.09.2022, this Court remanded the matter for reconsideration. Thereafter, the interim relief applications in the said newly filed civil suits were decided by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 17.08.2022 granting certain interim reliefs and providing, inter alia, that status quo ante as existing on 23.06.2022 shall be maintained and there would be no Executive Council or General Council meeting without joint consent of the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator. H

THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1189 [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

The said order dated 17.08.2022 was, however, set aside by the Division A Bench of the High Court by its impugned order dated 02.09.2022. The question is as to whether the order so passed by the Division Bench of the High Court calls for interference by this Court.

25Copy pinpoint25. It is apparent from a close look at the order dated 17.08.2022 that grant of temporary injunction in these matters by the learned Single B Judge was premised essentially on three factors: first and the foremost being that as per the byelaws of the party, the General Council meeting could have been convened only by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator and they having not done so, the meeting dated 11.07.2022 was wholly unauthorised. Additionally, the said meeting dated 11.07.2022 was not C convened by providing 15 days’ advance notice, as required by Rule 19(vii) of the byelaws. Secondly, the learned Single Judge was of the view that by not granting injunction, EPS, who convened the General Council meeting contrary to the provisions of the byelaws, would be in a more convenient position for having allegedly removed the plaintiff OPS D and few others from the party membership and they could not have even participated in the proposed General Secretary elections. According to the learned Single Judge, balance of convenience and irreparable injury in the given context were required to be visualised with reference to the viewpoints of the primary membersof the party. Thirdly, the learned Single E Judge was of the view that when OPS and EPS had successfully functioned jointly as Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, how the party, with more than 1.5 crore cadre strength, suddenly decided to change the existing dispensation. The ultimate injunction issued by the learned Single Judge had been that of restoring status quoante as on 23.06.2022 and F further to that, it was ordained that the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator have to function jointly, meetings have to be called with their joint consent and on being properly requisitioned, they would not refuse to convene the General Council meeting, and that they could approach the Court for necessary directions for conducting the General Council meeting. G

26Copy pinpoint26. On the other hand, while dealing with the intra-court appeals against the order so passed by the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench of the High Court, in the first place, took note of the events that transpired on 23.06.2022 in the General Council meeting and notedthe fact that the requisitionwas given by 2190 members and also the fact H

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A that the plaintiffOPS was very much present in the said meeting dated 23.06.2022 wherein, it was announced that the next meeting would be conducted on 11.07.2022. The Division Bench of the High Court, after examining the record and particularly Rule 19(vii) in its Tamil and English versions, took note of its frame whereby the requirement of 15 days’ B notice appears to be referable to the regular meeting of the General Council to be convened once in a year or whenever considered necessary but not in relation to the meeting requisitioned by 1/5th members of the General Council where the only requirement is for the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator to convene the meeting within 30 days of receipt of the requisition. The High Court observed that it had not been the case of the plaintiffOPS that they were not knowing about announcement made on the floor of the General Council meeting on 23.06.2022. The Division Bench also referred to an undeniable factsituation that the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator were at loggerheads and any strict application of Rule 19(vii) was likely to result in a deadlock. The Division Bench further referred to the past event when the interim General Secretary could not perform the functions because of her incarceration in a criminal case and, therefore, the office bearers convened the meeting on 12.09.2017 based on the requisition made by the members. The Division Bench also took note of the apex position assigned to the General Council in the byelaws to take all the decisions. Yet further, the Division Benchtook note of the stance of the Joint Co-ordinator – EPS– who had sent a communication to the Election Commission of India stating that the post of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator had lapsed for the reason that the election in the Executive Committee meeting dated 01.12.2021 was not ratified in the General Council meeting held on 23.06.2022. The Division Bench observed that when the Joint Co-ordinator had given up his position to continue as such, there was no Joint Co-ordinator in the party. 26.1. As regards the views of the learned Single Judge doubting the requisition as a manufactured document, the Division Bench pointed out that none of the members who signed the requisition or attended the meeting came forward with any such claim. That apart, the plaintiffs did not make any assertion in the plaint that there was no requisition placed in the meeting nor there was any averment that the requisition letter was H a fabricated document. The Division Bench went on to observe that

THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1191 [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

even if the resolutions passed on 23.06.2022 and on 11.07.2022 were A found to be illegal or against the byelaws, it was always open to 1/5th members of the General Council to convene a special meeting and reverse the resolutions passed in these two meetings but no such requisition was given by 1/5th of the General Council members and this factor operated against the claim of irreparable injury. B 26.2. The Division Bench also referred to the principles governing the grant or refusal of temporary injunction and pointed out that the directions given by the learned Single Judge for convening the meeting only with the joint consent of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator was leading to a situation where the party as a whole would undergo C irreparable hardship because there was no possibility of the appellant and the respondent No. 1 – OPS and EPS– acting jointly to convene the meeting. The Division Bench pointed out that the directions of the learned Single Judge would only furtherthe”functional deadlock” already existing in the party. D 26.3. We are not elaborating on all other comments and observations made by the Division Bench of the High Court in the relevant passages quoted in extenso hereinbefore. Suffice it to observe for the present purpose that the Division Bench of the High Court, while passing the order dated 02.09.2022, has amply and clearly pointed out as to how the order of temporary injunction as passed by the learned Single Judge was against the sound judicial principles and the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge was suffering from arbitrariness as also perversity.

27Copy pinpoint27. In our view, the logic and reasoning of the Division Bench of the High Court stand in accord with law as also the facts of the present case.

28Copy pinpoint28. The main plank of submissions on the part of the appellants in challenge to the order dated 02.09.2022 has been that convening of the meeting dated 11.07.2022 suffered from illegalities inasmuch as the meeting was not convened by an authorised person and that 15 days’ notice was not given. The same had been the reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge while finding aprima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs. The said reasoning and similar arguments remain fallacious and cannot be accepted. H

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A 28.1. The facts of the case make it abundantly clear that so far as convening of the meeting dated 23.06.2022 is concerned, the same had never been in doubt or in any dispute. The said meeting was indeed convened by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator jointly. They had been working in tandem until that stage. However, they seem to have fallen apart immediately thereafter, particularly when a proposition for amendment of the byelaws and reverting to the system of single leadership was in the offing. In any case, the meeting dated 23.06.2022 was duly convened and the efforts to prevent the same did not meet with success in the Court. Even if the slated business was not transacted inthe meeting dated 23.06.2022, all that had happened in that meeting could not have been ignored. It remains undeniable that the plaintiff OPS and the persons standing with him were also very much present in the said meeting. The General Council is said to be consisting of 2665 members. If 2190 members out of these 2665 gave a requisition on 23.06.2022 for convening the General Council meeting and the Presidium Chairman D announced the date of this requisitioned meeting as 11.07.2022, in the given set of facts and circumstances, such announcement, at least at the present stage, cannot be dubbed as wholly redundant. At that point of time, when Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator were shown to be not functioning jointly (for whatsoever reason), a functional deadlock came into existence for the party and a workable solution was required to be found. In the given scenario, the actions and steps taken by the requisitioning members as also by the Presidium Chairman cannot be declared as unwarranted or illegal at this stage. That being the position, convening of meeting dated 11.07.2022 could not have been taken as an act unauthorised. The learned Single Judge while passing the order dated 17.08.2022 seems to have fallen in serious error and said order was clearly suffering from perversity when convening of the meeting dated 11.07.2022 was taken as an act unauthorised. The Division Bench of the High Court, in our view, has rightly looked at the substance of the matter and realities of the situation. 28.2.The other alleged infirmityabout want of clear 15 days’ notice has also been rightly dealt with by the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned order dated 02.09.2022. In our view, in such an internal matter of the party, approach of the Court and that too, while considering the prayer for interim relief, cannot beof finding technical faults and

THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1193 [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

flaws detached from the substance of the matter. Even as regards technicalities, the Division Bench appears to have rightly analysed the frame of the said Rule 19(vii), where the requirement of 15 days’ notice is referable to the regular meeting and not as such to a requisitioned or special meeting.

29Copy pinpoint29. The considerations of the learned Single Judge as regards the question of prima facie case had been suffering from basic flaws, as noticed above; and interference by the Division Bench was but warranted looking to the subject-matter of the litigation and its implications. This apart, and even if it be assumed that the plaintiffs were able to project some arguable case before the Court and some elements of prima facie case, in our view, the approach of the learned Single Judge while examining the questions of balance of convenience and irreparable injury had been from an altogether wrong angle. As noticed, the learned Single Judge took the view that by not granting injunction, EPSwould be in a more convenient position for having allegedly removed the plaintiff OPS and few others from the party membership and they could not have even participated in the proposed General Secretary elections. According to the learned Single Judge, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, in the given context, were required to be visualised from the vantage point of the primary members. Such observations and considerations of the learned Single Judge, in our view, do not stand in conformity with sound judicial principles. The questions of balance of convenienceand irreparable injury in relation to the applications under consideration could not have been examined with reference to the consequences or fallout of the meeting dated 11.07.2022. Moreover, the authority of the General F Council to deal with the relevant matters could not have been brushed aside with reference to the strength of the primary membership of the party. It is but clear that the learned Single Judge has not kept in view the relevant tests as expounded in the decisions above-referred. In the present case concerning the internal management of the political party, and looking to the nature of claim made by the plaintiffs, the balance of G convenience had not been in favour of granting any interim injunction on the applications under consideration.

30Copy pinpoint30. Having examined the matter in its totality, we are constrained to observe that the learned Single Judge in the present matter did not H

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A examine the questions relating to balance of convenience and irreparable injury in the correct perspective and particularly failed to weigh the competing possibilities and risk of injustice if ultimately the decision of main matter would run counter to the course being adopted and suggested in the order granting temporary injunction in the manner and form it was being granted. It gets perforce reiterated that if the order as passed by the learned Single Judge was to remain in force until decision of the suits, it would have been drastically detrimental to the interest of political party in question, which is a recognised political party with the Election Commission of India. In the matters of the present nature, the simple and precise view, as stated by the learned Single Judge at the initial stage on 22.06.2022 while declining the prayer for interim relief, had been on the correct statement of lawthat ordinarily the Court would not interfere in the internal issues of an association/party and would leave it open to the association/party and its members to take a particular decision for better administration; and that had been the correct approach towards the facts of the case. In the present case, when General Council is shown to be the apex body of the party, taking any exception to the meeting of the General Council could have neither been countenanced nor interfered with by way of temporary injunction. In the given set of facts and circumstances, the hyper-technical suggestions as sought to be made about the want of valid notice with reference to date, time and place of meeting i.e., with reference to Chapter 5 from Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings (supra) do not further the cause of the appellants, particularly when it is noticed that the date, time and place of the meeting in question were duly declared in the meeting dated F 23.06.2022.

31Copy pinpoint31. The submission on behalf of the appellants based on the decision in S. Thirunavukkarasu (supra) that the scheme of byelaws does not envisage the requisitionists to convene the General Council meeting; and if the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator jointly fail to convene the meeting, the only option is to seek intervention of the Court has its own shortcomings. As rightly noticed by the Division Bench in the order impugned, in the said case, an expelled member of the party called for a General Council meeting, parallel to the meeting called by the then General Secretary. In the given fact situation, the Court granted interim injunction in favour of the General Secretary against convening of the parallel

THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1195 [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

meeting. In the present matter, no parallel meeting of General Council A has been called for or requisitioned by any of the Members. The Division Bench of the High Court has rightly observed that as a general rule, it cannot be laid down that the requisitionists have no option but only to go to the Court if the meeting is not convened. It has also been pointed out that in the past, when the interim General Secretary could not act in the year 2017, the Office Bearers stepped in and convened the meeting based on a requisition received. The present situation too, where the position as occupied earlier by the General Secretary was assigned to the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator in their jointness and it remains beyond a shadow of doubt that Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator do not stand in jointness and cannot act jointly, is akin to the situation when the apex position holder was not in a position to act. Obviously, a workable solution was to be found; and when the solution as found and applied, does not otherwise appear offending the spirit of byelaws as also the norms of functioning of an association or a party, it cannot be said that declaration of the Presidium Chairman for the meeting of the General Council on 11.07.2022 and the follow-up notice by the Office Bearers at Party Headquarters had been wholly unauthorised.

32Copy pinpoint32. Apart from the foregoing, the other considerations in the impugned order dated 17.08.2022 which had prevailed with the learned E Single Judge make it clear that the learned Single Judge has proceededcontrary to the sound and applicable judicial principles. It remains undeniable that law does not envisage performance of any impossibility nor any mandate could be issued by the Court for performance of a practical impossibility. The learned Single Judge F expressed the view that when OPS and EPS had successfully functioned jointly as Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator how the party, with more than 1.5 crore cadre strength, suddenly decided to change the existing dispensation. With respect, in our view, such a question was not even germane to the points for determination arising before the Court. As to how any compact, be it an association or be it a political party, would G manage its affairs and what alterations its governing body would consider appropriate in its rules, regulations or byelaws, are all the matters squarely within the domain of that compact and its governing body. In any case, in the applications before the Court, the only relevant question was about the validity of convening the meeting dated 11.07.2022. The learned H

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A Single Judgeappears to have traversed through such wide areas that ultimately the decision came to be based on entirely irrelevant considerations.

33Copy pinpoint33. It is also noteworthy that the ultimate injunction issued by the learned Single Judge had been that of restoring status quoante as on B 23.06.2022 and further to that, the learned Single Judge directed that the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator would have to function jointly; meetings have to be called with their joint consent; and on being properly requisitioned, they would not refuse to convene the General Council meeting and that they could approach the Court for necessary directions for conducting the General Council meeting. Apart from the fact that the injunction as issued by the learned Single Judge had been far away and beyond the scope of applications before him, the said injunction could have only perpetuated the functional deadlock in the party.The order passed by the learned Single Judge could not have been countenanced from any angle and thus, the Division Bench, in our view, has rightly interfered with the same.

34Copy pinpoint34. In the passing, we may also observe that while filing the suit and seeking interim relief, the plaintiff OPS and even the other plaintiff, have arrayed the parties to the litigation in the manner that the political party- AIADMK, as also its General Council and its Central Executive Committee are said to be represented by “Co-ordinator and Joint Co- ordinator” in terms of assertions of these plaintiffs that the party and its governing/executing bodies are only to be represented by the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator jointly. This effort on the part of the plaintiffs carries its own shortcomings when it remains undeniable that they i.e., OPS and EPS, the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator respectively, do not stand in jointness or even togetherness so as to work cohesively as a unit. The effort on the part of the plaintiffs does not stand in conformity with the existing realities.

35Copy pinpoint35. Before closing on these matters, we need to make it clear again that though several submissions have been made on behalf of the appellants assailing the validity and correctness of the resolutions said to have been adopted in the meeting dated 11.07.2022 and in counter to that, the respondents have attempted to justify the said decisions/ H resolutions but we have chosen not to deal with any of those contentions.

THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1197 [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

This is for the specific reason that the decisions taken in the meeting A dated 11.07.2022 do not form the subject-matter of the applications for temporary injunction, which were restored for reconsideration by this Court and were ultimately decided by the learned Single Judge by the order dated 17.08.2022 and then the intra-court appeals against that order of the learned Single Judge were allowed by the Division Bench B on 02.09.2022. In the interest of justice, we leave all the related aspects concerning the said resolutions open to be agitated, but strictly in accordance with law; and all the objections and rebuttals of the contesting parties are also kept open. 35.1. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and the C scope of these appeals, we have not found it necessary to deal with any of the impleadment applications moved in these matters and we would leave it open for all such applicants also to take recourse to appropriate remedy in accordance with law, in case of any legal grievance existing with a right to seek relief in the appropriate forum. D

36Copy pinpoint36. For what has been discussed hereinabove, the appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 15753 of 2022 and 15705-15706 of 2022 are required to be dismissed while affirming the impugned order dated 02.09.2022.

37Copy pinpoint37. So far as the other appeals are concerned, therein, the aforesaid E order dated 23.06.2022 is in challenge. The operation and effect of the said order was stayed by this Court on 06.07.2022. As noticed, the said order dated 23.06.2022 has even otherwise lost its relevance. However, in order to put the records straight, we deem it appropriate to make the stay order dated 06.07.2022 absolute so as to dispose of the appeals filed in challenge to the said order dated 23.06.2022. F

38Copy pinpoint38. Before concluding, we also make it clear that none of the observations in this judgment shall have any bearing on the merit consideration of the pending civil suits relating to these appeals; and the said suits shall be proceeded with on their own merits and in accordance G with law.

39Copy pinpoint39. Accordingly, and in view of the above:

1. The appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 15753 of 2022 and 15705-15706 of 2022 are dismissed and the order dated 02.09.2022, as passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in OSA Nos. 227 of H 2022, 231 of 2022 and 232 of 2022 stands affirmed.

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A 2. The appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 11237 of 2022, 11579 of 2022 and 11578 of 2022stand disposed of while making the interim order dated 06.07.2022 absolute.

3. The parties are left to bear their own costs of these appeals.

4. All the pending applications also stand disposed of. B

Ankit Gyan Appeals disposed of. (Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)