GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI THROUGH THE SECRETARY, LAND AND BUILDING DEPARTMENT & ANOTHER v. M/S. K.L. RATHI STEELS LIMITED AND OTHERS Miscellaneous Application No. 414 of 2023

A It was further observed that “in fact, the overruling of a principle of law is not an outcome of appellate jurisdiction but a consequence of its inherent power. This inherent power can be exercised as long as a previous decree vis-à-vis a lis inter partes is not affected”. (f) Further, a Seven-Judge Bench of this Court speaking through B Chandrachud, C.J. in Special Courts Bill, 1978, In RE (1979) 1 SCC 380, observed that it is always open to this Court to re- examine the question already decided by it and to overrule, if necessary, the view earlier taken by it. But insofar as all other Courts in the territory of India are concerned, they ought to be bound by the view expressed by this Court even in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India. Although the principle of stare decisis is not applicable to this Court, on the strength of Article 137 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in a subsequent judgment, can overrule a previous judgment but the same would not unsettle the dictum in the judgment overruled inter partes. Further, the overruled judgment which has held the field is bound to be followed in all other cases till the subsequent judgment overruling the earlier judgment is passed. E (g) In State of West Bengal vs. Kamal Sengupta (2008) 8 SCC 612, Section 22(3) of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 came up for consideration in the context of the power of review. While dealing with the said question, it was held that a Tribunal established under the aforesaid F Act is entitled to review its order or decision if either of the grounds enumerated in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC was available. In that case, the question, whether, the subsequent contra judgment by the same or a superior Court on a point of law can be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of review of an earlier judgment, G was considered as there was a divergence of opinion among the High Courts on the said question. It was observed that in view of there being a dichotomy of opinion on the issue, the Law Commission took cognizance of the same and suggested an amendment to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC H which led to the insertion of the Explanation after Order

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI THR. THE SECRETARY, LAND AND BUILDING 253 DEPT. v. M/S. K.L. RATHI STEELS LTD. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]

XLVII Rule 2 CPC. The following cases were referred to in the aforesaid judgment: (i) Hari Sankar Pal vs. Anath Nath Mitter 1949 FCR 36, a Five-Judge Bench decision of the Federal Court was alluded to, wherein it was observed that if a decision is erroneous in law, the same is certainly no ground for ordering review. Moreover, if the case had been decided erroneously, the error could not be construed as being one apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. C (ii) Reliance was also placed on Parison Devi vs. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715 and it was observed that there is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”. (iii) In Nalagarh Dehati Coop. Transport Society Ltd. vs. Beli Ram AIR 1981 HP 1, a Full Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court considered the Explanation and held that a subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court or a Larger Bench of the same Court taking a contrary view on the point covered by the judgment does not amount to a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record of the judgment sought to be reviewed. F (iv) Reference was also made to Gyan Chandra Dwivedi vs. 2nd ADJ, Kanpur AIR 1987 All 40, in which it was observed that almost all the High Courts except Kerala High Court were unanimous in their opinion of the fact that if a point of law in a judgment has been altered by a G subsequent decision of the superior Court in another case, the same could not afford a valid ground for the review of the judgment. (v) Further, with reference to Netaji Cricket Club (supra), on which reliance has been placed by the review petitioners, it H

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A was observed that the consideration of the exercise of review jurisdiction in that case, based on a subsequent event was confined to purely the facts of the said case involving a controversy between rival Cricket Associations. Hence, it was opined that the decision in Netaji Cricket Club could not be applied as a general ratio. B While delineating the principles from the aforesaid judgments, inter alia, the following principles relevant to the instant cases are reiterated: i) the expression “any other sufficient reason” appearing C in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC has to be interpreted in light of other grounds specified in the said provision. ii) an erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review. (h) In a recent judgement dated 18.08.2022 in Civil Appeals D Nos. 5503-5504 of 2022 arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 9602- 9603 of 2022 along with Civil Appeal No. 5505 of 2022 arising out of SLP (C) No. 11290 of 2022, a Three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of S. Madhusudhan Reddy vs. V. Narayana Reddy (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1034 E had made specific reference to the aforementioned cases of Chajju Ram vs. Neki AIR 1922 P.C 112 and Moran Mar Basselios Catholics vs. Most Rev. Mar Paulose Athanasius (supra) wherein the words “any other sufficient reason appearing in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC” was defined to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the Rule.” In making reference to these cases, the Three-Judge Bench reiterated that an essential principle for exercising review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC is that the review will be maintainable for “any other sufficient reason”, and has narrowed the scope of this ground to mean a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule. (i) In the aforesaid case Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors. (2013) 8 SCC 337 has also been adverted to wherein this Court delineated on H

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI THR. THE SECRETARY, LAND AND BUILDING 255 DEPT. v. M/S. K.L. RATHI STEELS LTD. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]

some of the grounds as to when the review will not be A maintainable as under: - “(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications, (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import, B (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice, C (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error, (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review, D (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched, (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be E permitted to be advanced in the review petition, and (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” F

47Copy pinpoint47. In fact, in State of Haryana vs. G.D. Goenka Tourism Corporation Corporation Ltd. (2018) 3 SCC 585, this Court directed that pending a final decision on making a reference to a Larger Bench on the interpretation of Section 24 of the L.A. Act, 2013, the High Courts ought not to deal with any case relating to the said interpretation. Therefore, between 21.02.2018 till the date of pronouncement of the G judgment by the Larger Bench in Indore Development Authority i.e., 06.03.2020, the High Courts were requested not to deal with cases arising under Section 24(2) of the L.A. Act, 2013, and its applicability to acquisition arising under L.A. Act, 1894, i.e. only insofar as acquisition initiated under L.A. Act, 1894. But insofar as cases which were decided H

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A prior to the aforesaid directions issued by this Court or the High Court or cases decided even by this Court on the strength of the dictum in Pune Municipal Corporation cannot be set at naught between the parties to those cases. The judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation having been overruled, it would only lose its value as a precedent subsequent to the dictum of the Larger Bench in Indore Development B Authority and therefore, cannot be cited as a precedent.

48Copy pinpoint48. Hence, in my view, having regard to the scope and ambit of the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, these review petitions are not maintainable and the judgment and the orders of this Court ought not be reviewed and the review petitions are liable to be dismissed. C

49Copy pinpoint49. It is also important to bear in mind that in various High Courts across the country following the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation, Writ Petitions have been disposed of and the said decisions passed in the said writ petitions or intra court appeals, as the case may be, may have attained finality and binding on the parties thereto. If these review petitions are allowed and are held to be maintainable there would be hundreds of review petitions which would be filed seeking review of the decisions passed by various High Courts in writ petitions following the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation. This would open a Pandora’s Box and upset the binding nature of the decisions between the parties and be contrary to the doctrine of finality in litigation.

50Copy pinpoint50. In Indore Development Authority vs. Shailendra (supra), a majority of two Hon’ble Judges in paragraph 217 while opining that, the judgment rendered in Pune Municipal Corporation and other decisions following Pune Municipal Corporation are per incuriam observed that the “decisions rendered on the basis of Pune Municipal Corporation are open to be reviewed in appropriate cases on the basis of this decision”. However, the Larger Bench in Indore Development Authority did not observe the above, either in paragraph 365 of the judgment or any other paragraph. In fact, the reason as to why a Larger Bench of five Judges was constituted, was because a majority of 2:1 in Indore Development G Authority vs. Shailendra had taken a view that Pune Municipal Corporation was per incuriam and also the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation was by a Two-Judge Bench. Therefore, in order to make an authoritative pronouncement on the question of law concerning the interpretation of Section 24(2) of L.A. Act, 2013 and since there were H many orders passed by this Court questioning the correctness of the

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI THR. THE SECRETARY, LAND AND BUILDING 257 DEPT. v. M/S. K.L. RATHI STEELS LTD. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]

decision in Pune Municipal Corporation, a Larger Bench of five A Judges was constituted by Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India. Now, the unanimous judgment of the Larger Bench of five Judges holds the field. However, in paragraph 365 of the said judgment or in any other paragraph, there is no observation that on overruling the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation as well as all decisions following Pune Municipal B Corporation, the overruled decisions have to be reviewed. The said observation is conspicuous by its absence obviously for the reason that such a review is impermissible having regard to the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC which aspect has been elaborately discussed above. In fact, the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC has not been noticed by the two learned Judges constituting the majority in Indore C Development Authority vs. Shailendra.

51Copy pinpoint51. There is another aspect which ought to be considered. That in two matters i.e., in the very case of Pune Municipal Corporation (decided on 08.02.2018) which has been overruled by Indore Development Authority (decided on 06.03.2020) by a Bench of three D Judges but the judgment has also been recalled vide Order dated 16.07.2020. Similarly, another judgement dated 31.08.2016 passed by this Court following Pune Municipal Corporation has been recalled by order dated 15.02.2022 by this very Bench. I must be forthright in saying that the recalling of the said Orders/Judgment dated 08.02.2018 and 31.08.2016 was done so in the absence of any arguments being E advanced on the maintainability of review petitions itself as in the present cases and without taking into consideration the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. I find that the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC is a bar to the very maintainability of these review petitions in these cases. Hence, before hearing the Civil Appeals / Special Leave F Petitions on merits, the Orders passed recalling the decision passed earlier would call for reconsideration. All judgments and orders which have been recalled till date subsequent to the judgment in Indore Development Authority on the basis that Pune Municipal Corporation was incorrectly decided are G also not in accordance with law in view of the discussion made above.

52Copy pinpoint52. Having held that the judgments/orders sought to be reviewed by the petitioners is impermissible in law, the ground realities would also have to be now taken into consideration on account of the passage of time. It is noted that Section 24 of the L.A. Act, 2013 is in the nature of H

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A a saving clause which is evident on a reading of the same, including the proviso to Sub-Section 2 of Section 24 of the L.A. Act, 2013. The object is to save the acquisition as far as possible. Possibly taking a cue from the proviso, this Court in the impugned judgments reserved liberty to the petitioners herein to initiate acquisition proceedings afresh within one year in some of the cases failing which the land was to be returned to the B land owners if in possession of the review petitioners herein. Thus, if no fresh acquisition proceedings are initiated within the said period of one year by issuing a notification under Section 11 of the L.A. 2013 Act and if the review petitioners herein are in possession of the land, the physical possession thereof shall be returned to original land owners.

53Copy pinpoint53. In the circumstances, the only relief that can be granted to the review petitioners/applicants is to extend the period for initiation of acquisition under the provisions of L.A. Act, 2013 to a period of one year from today. Till then, in those cases where physical possession of the land has already been taken over by the acquiring body or has been handed over to the beneficiary the same shall continue to remain with the acquiring body or the beneficiary, as the case may be.

54Copy pinpoint54. Thus, only a limited relief is being given to the review petitioners/ applicants and impugned judgments/orders of this Court are not being reviewed in the review petitions. There is a delay in filing the same in certain cases. This is owing to the passage of time from the date of passing the judgments/orders sought to be reviewed and the uncertainty in the interpretation of Section 24 (2) of L.A. Act, 2013 and due to Covid-19 and one year time being granted to initiate fresh acquisition, in the impugned order itself. Hence, the said delay is condoned.

55Copy pinpoint55. Where no such direction has been issued in the impugned orders and the Special Leave Petitions have been dismissed, the petitioners are at liberty to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act, 2013, if so advised.

56Copy pinpoint56. In the result, the review petitions are disposed of in the above G terms. No costs.

Nidhi Jain Matter be placed before Hon’ble CJI. (Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)