CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC SCIENCES & ANR. v. BIKARTAN DAS & ORS.

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57Copy pinpoint57. From the aforesaid, it could be said in terms of a jurisdictional error that want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject matter so that the inferior court or tribunal might not have the authority to enter on the inquiry. It may also arise from the absence of some essential preliminary or jurisdictional fact. Where the jurisdiction of a body depends upon a preliminary finding of fact in a proceeding for a writ of certiorari, the court may determine, whether or not that finding of fact is correct. The reason is that by wrongly deciding such a fact, the court or tribunal cannot give itself jurisdiction.

58Copy pinpoint58. In Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission and Another, reported in (1969) 2 AC 147, the House of Lords has given a very broad connotation to the concept of ‘jurisdictional error’. It has been laid down that a tribunal exceeds jurisdiction not only at the threshold when it enters into an inquiry which it is not entitled to undertake, but it may enter into an enquiry within its jurisdiction in the first instance and then do something which would deprive it of its jurisdiction and render its decision a nullity. In the words of Lord Reid: “But there are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive.”

59Copy pinpoint59. So far as the errors of law are concerned, a writ of certiorari could be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. To attract the writ of certiorari, a mere error of law is not sufficient. It must be one which is manifest or patent on the face of the record. Mere formal or technical errors, even of law, are not sufficient, so as to attract a writ of certiorari.

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As reminded by this Court time and again, this concept is indefinite and cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively and so it has to be determined judiciously on the facts of each case. The concept, according to this Court in K.M. Shanmugam v. The S.R.V.S. (P) Ltd. and Others, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1626, ‘is comprised of many imponderables… it is not capable of precise definition, as no objective criterion could be laid down, the apparent nature of the error, to a large extent, being dependent upon the subjective element.’ A general test to apply, however, is that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it is not ‘self-evident’ or ‘manifest’. If it requires an examination or argument to establish it, if it has to be established by a long drawn out process of reasoning, or lengthy or complicated arguments, on points where there may considerably be two opinions, then such an error would cease to be an error of law. (See : Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Others v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, reported in AIR 1960 SC 137.)

60Copy pinpoint60. However, in our opinion, such a test should not be applied in a straitjacket formula and may fail because what might be considered by one Judge as an error self-evident, might not be considered so by another Judge.

61Copy pinpoint61. At this stage, it may not be out of place to remind ourselves of the observations of this Court in Syed Yakoob (supra) on this point, which are as follows: “Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior court or tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or something in ignorance of it, or may be even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Certiorari would also not lie to correct mere errors of fact even though such errors may be apparent on the face of the record. The writ jurisdiction is supervisory and the court exercising it is not to act as an appellate court. It is well settled that the writ court would not re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion of fact for that recorded by the adjudicating body, be it a court or a tribunal. A finding of fact, howsoever erroneous, recorded by a court or a tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before

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the court or the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. It is also well settled that adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal and these points cannot be agitated before the writ court.”

62Copy pinpoint62. In the aforesaid context, it will be profitable for us to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers’ Union and Another, reported in AIR 2000 SC 1508. This Court observed as under: “… The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority duly constituted for the purpose and which ordinarily should be considered to have become final, cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of the writ Court to warrant those findings at any rate, as long as they are based upon such materials which are relevant for the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet another view which can be reasonably and possibly undertaken. …”

63Copy pinpoint63. However, we may clarify that findings of fact based on ‘no evidence’ or purely on surmises and conjectures or which are perverse points could be challenged by way of a certiorari as such findings could be regarded as an error of law.

64Copy pinpoint64. Thus, from the various decisions referred to above, we have no hesitation in reaching to the conclusion that a writ of certiorari is a high prerogative writ and should not be issued on mere asking. For the issue of a writ of certiorari, the party concerned has to make out a definite case for the same and is not a matter of course. To put it pithily, certiorari shall issue to correct errors of jurisdiction, that is to say, absence, excess or failure to exercise and also when in the exercise of undoubted jurisdiction, there has been illegality. It shall also issue to correct an error in the decision or determination itself, if it is an error manifest on the face of the proceedings. By its exercise, only a patent error can be corrected but not also a wrong decision. It should be well remembered at the cost of repetition that certiorari is not appellate but only supervisory.

CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 781 SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

65Copy pinpoint65. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, is issued by a superior court in respect of the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions by another authority when the contention is that the exercising authority had no jurisdiction or exceeded the jurisdiction. It cannot be denied that the tribunals or the authorities concerned in this batch of appeals had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. However, the argument would be that the tribunals had acted arbitrarily and illegally and that they had failed to give proper findings on the facts and circumstances of the case. We may only say that while adjudicating a writ-application for a writ of certiorari, the court is not sitting as a court of appeal against the order of the tribunals to test the legality thereof with a view to reach a different conclusion. If there is any evidence, the court will not examine whether the right conclusion is drawn from it or not. It is a well-established principle of law that a writ of certiorari will not lie where the order or decision of a tribunal or authority is wrong in matter of facts or on merits. (See: King v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd., (1922) 2 AC 128 (PC))

66Copy pinpoint66. We may quote with profit a decision of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde (supra) to understand the true purport and meaning of an error apparent on the face of the record or an error which could be termed as self-evident. The facts of that case were as below:

67Copy pinpoint67. The respondent made an application in the Revenue Court of the Mamlatdar of Sirsi praying for the delivery of possession of property which the appellant was on that date possessing as the tenant under him on the basis of a ‘Mulegeni’ deed executed by the respondent’s predecessor- in-interest in favour of the appellant’s predecessor-in-interest. The case was governed by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and one of the questions in controversy was whether before applying for the delivery of possession, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have given a notice terminating the tenancy. The Mamlatdar made an order for possession in favour of the respondent. The Collector allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Mamlatdar. The Bombay Revenue Tribunal, to whom the matter was taken up on appeal, held that as the respondent had failed to terminate the tenancy by notice before instituting the action for ejectment, he was not entitled to entertain the application for recovery of possession.

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68Copy pinpoint68. Thereafter, the respondent made an application to the High Court of Bombay under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for the quashing of the order of the Revenue Tribunal and the Collector and for the restoration of the order of the Mamlatdar. The High Court was of the opinion that the Tribunal had committed an error which was apparent on the face of the record in holding that an order of possession could not be made unless a notice terminating the tenancy had been given before the institution of the proceeding and it issued a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Tribunal and restoring that of the Mamlatdar.

69Copy pinpoint69. An appeal was filed against the order of the High Court and this Court reversed that order on the ground that the alleged error in the judgment of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal, namely that an order for possession should not be made unless a previous notice required by Section 14 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, had been given, was not an error apparent on the face of the record so as to be capable of being corrected by a writ of certiorari and the following observations were made by this Court: “17.…. An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. As the above discussion of the rival contentions show the alleged error in the present case is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments. We do not think such an error can be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ. .…”

70Copy pinpoint70. We may also quote with profit one more decision of this Court explaining the true scope of issue of a writ of certiorari and what is an error apparent on the face of the record, which could be corrected by issue of a high prerogative writ like certiorari. In the case of Ebrahim Aboobakar and Hawabai Aboobakar v. The Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi, reported in (1952) 1 SCC 798, this Court made the observations in paras 12, 13, 14 and 15, which we quote below: “12. The remaining three questions canvassed before us, unless they are of such a nature as would make the decision of the respondent dated 13-5-1950, a nullity, cannot be the subject-matter of a writ of certiorari.

CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 783 SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

It is plain that such a writ cannot be granted to quash the decision of an inferior court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the decision is wrong. Indeed, it must be shown before such a writ is issued that the authority which passed the order acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice. Want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter, so that the inferior court might not have authority to enter on the inquiry or upon some part of it. It may also arise from the absence of some essential preliminary or upon the existence of some particular facts collateral to the actual matter which the court has to try and which are conditions precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by it. But once it is held that the court has jurisdiction but while exercising it, it made a mistake, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right inasmuch as a court has jurisdiction to decide rightly as well as wrongly. The three questions agitated before us do not seem to be questions which bear upon the jurisdiction of the court of appeal, or its authority to entertain them.

13. It was contended that no court of limited jurisdiction can give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a point collateral to the merits of the case upon which the limit of its jurisdiction depends and that the questions involved in the appeal before the respondent were collateral to the merits of the case. As pointed out by Lord Esher, M.R., in R. v. CIT [R. v. CIT, (1888) LR 21 QBD 313 (CA)] , the formula enunciated above is quite plain but its application is often misleading. The learned Master of the Rolls classified the cases under two categories thus : (QBD pp. 319-20) “… When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned,

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and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may entrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, [and] on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases, I have mentioned it is erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction.”

14. The tribunal constituted to hear appeals under Section 24 has been constituted in these terms: “Any person aggrieved by an order made under Section 7, Section 16, Section 19 or Section 38 may prefer an appeal in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed— (a) to the Custodian, where the original order has been passed by a Deputy or Assistant Custodian; (b) to the Custodian General, where the original order has been passed by the Custodian, an Additional Custodian or an authorised Deputy Custodian.”

15. Like all courts of appeal exercising general jurisdiction in civil cases, the respondent has been constituted an appellate court in words of the widest amplitude and the legislature has not limited his jurisdiction by providing that such exercise will depend on the existence of any particular state of facts. Ordinarily, a court of appeal has not only jurisdiction to determine the soundness of the decision of the

CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 785 SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

inferior court as a court of error, but by the very nature of things it has also jurisdiction to determine any points raised before it in the nature of preliminary issues by the parties. Such jurisdiction is inherent in its very constitution as a court of appeal. Whether an appeal is competent, whether a party has locus standi to prefer it, whether the appeal in substance is from one or another order and whether it has been preferred in proper form and within the time prescribed, are all matters for the decision of the appellate court so constituted. Such a tribunal falls within Class 2 of the classification of the Master of the Rolls [R. v. CIT, (1888) LR 21 QBD 313 (CA)] . In these circumstances, it seems to us that the order of the High Court of Punjab that a writ of certiorari could not be issued to the respondent quashing the order of 13-5-1950, was right. We are further of the opinion that none of the contentions raised has any merit whatsoever.”

71Copy pinpoint71. This Court in Parry and Company Limited v. Commercial Employees’ Association, Madras and Another (1952) 1 SCC 449 : AIR 1952 SC 179, held: “14. The records of the case do not disclose any error apparent on the face of the proceeding or any irregularity in the procedure adopted by the Labour Commissioner which goes contrary to the principles of natural justice. Thus there was absolutely no grounds here which would justify a superior court in issuing a writ of certiorari for removal of an order or proceeding of an inferior tribunal vested with powers to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. What the High Court has done really is to exercise the powers of an appellate court and correct what it considered to be an error in the decision of the Labour Commissioner. This obviously it cannot do. The position might have been different if the Labour Commissioner had omitted to decide a matter which he was bound to decide and in such cases a mandamus might legitimately issue commanding the authority to determine questions which it left undecided [Board of Education v. Rice, 1911 AC 179 (HL)]; but no certiorari is available to quash a decision passed with jurisdiction by an inferior tribunal on the mere ground that such decision is erroneous. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, in our opinion, is plainly unsustainable. (Emphasis supplied)

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72Copy pinpoint72. In another case, the same Court held: ““A certiorari cannot be granted to quash the decision of the appellate tribunal on these points on the ground that the decision is wrong” - ‘Ebrahim Aboobakar v. The Custodian General of Evacuee Property’, 1952 Mad W.N. 502 (SC).”

73Copy pinpoint73. It is, therefore, clear that in all findings on matters of fact and interpretation of law except in cases of defective jurisdiction, the decision of the tribunal must be deemed to be final.

74Copy pinpoint74. The position is authoritatively summed up in Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol.IX in para 1493 where it is laid down thus: “1493. Where the proceedings are regular upon their face and the magistrates had jurisdiction, the superior court will not grant the writ of certiorari on the ground that the Court below has misconceived a point of law. When the Court below has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it cannot be deemed to exceed or abuse its jurisdiction, merely because it incidentally misconstrues a statute, or admits illegal evidence, or rejects legal evidence, or misdirects itself as to the weight of the evidence, or convicts without evidence. Nor will certiorari be granted to quash the decision of an inferior court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the decision is wrong in matters of fact, and the Court will not hear evidence impeaching the decision on the facts. ….”

75Copy pinpoint75. Similarly in the case reported in - ‘Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Willan’, (1874) LR 5 PC 417, it is observed by their Lordships thus: “The question is whether the inferior court has jurisdiction to enter upon the enquiry and not whether there has been miscarriage of the procedure in the course of enquiry.” At page 443 of the same case, the learned Judges observed - “An adjudication by a Judge having jurisdiction over the subject-matter is, if no defect appears on the face of it, to be taken as conclusive of facts stated therein. “The case in (1874) LR 5 PC 417 has been approvingly cited by Fazl Ali, J. who held - ‘Rai Brij Raj Krishna and Another v. Messrs S.K. Shaw and Brothers’, AIR 1951 SC 115 that an error of law does not constitute an error of jurisdiction and that a wrong decision on facts or law cannot be questioned in a civil Court.

76Copy pinpoint76. It being open to the tribunals to come to one or the other conclusion on the materials before them, it cannot by any means be said that the decisions

CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 787 SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

are incorrect so as to attract the extraordinary jurisdiction for interference by a writ of certiorari. In a King’s Bench decision in R. v. Brighton and Area Rent Tribunal, (1950) 1 All England Reporter 946, Lord Goddard, CJ. observed that: “… As the tribunal had observed all the formalities of the Act, had offended against none of its provisions or against the regulations made under it, there was no ground for holding that the tribunal’s determination was not in accordance with law, and, therefore, the motions for certiorari and mandamus should be refused”.

77Copy pinpoint77. The purpose of certiorari, as we understand, is only to confine the inferior tribunals within their jurisdiction, so as to avoid the irregular exercise, or the non-exercise or the illegal assumption of it and not to correct errors of finding of fact or interpretation of law committed by them in the exercise of powers vested in them under the statute. The accepted rule is that where a Court has jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which crops up in the case and whether its decision is correct or otherwise, it is bound to stand until reversed by a competent Court. This Court in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd. Kumbakonam, Tanjore District and Others, (1952) 1 SCC 334 observed: “26. Such writs as are referred to in Article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made.”

78Copy pinpoint78. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we have reached to the conclusion that the impugned order passed by the High Court is not sustainable in law and the same deserves to be set aside.

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79Copy pinpoint79. In the result, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court dated 17.12.2020 in the Writ Petition (C) No. 30620 of 2020 is set aside.

80Copy pinpoint80. No order as to costs.

81Copy pinpoint81. The interim application filed by the intervenors also stands disposed.

Headnotes prepared by : Appeal allowed. Divya Pandey