THE KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD & ANR. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

A be in force. The respondents/writ petitioners, however, seek to deduce such a requirement from the provisions of the TNHB Act.” In view of the provisions under Section 4 of the L.A. Act and the decision in L. Krishnan’s case as extracted above, it cannot be said that for initiation of land acquisition proceedings under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act proposing to acquire any particular land for the purpose of KHB a duly published final scheme prepared in accordance with the provisions of KHB Act should be in force. Despite the said position obtained from Section 4 of the L.A. Act and the decision in L. Krishnan’s case the attempt herein is to deduce such a mandate from the provisions under the KHB Act. The scanning of Section 33(2) of the KHB Act, as above would clearly show that it contains no condition, either expressly or by necessary implication, that before a Notification under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act is issued proposing to acquire land or interest therein, for the purpose of KHB, a sanctioned and published housing scheme/ D land development scheme/labour housing scheme should be in force. In the said circumstances, the said contention cannot be sustained.

39Copy pinpoint39. Unlike the provisions under TNHB Act, which mandate for acquisition of land for the purpose of TNHB Act and Tamil Nadu Housing Board only in accordance with the provisions of L.A. Act, Section 33(2) E of the KHB Act empowers the KHB to take steps for compulsory acquisition of any land or any interest therein, required for the execution of a housing scheme in the manner provided in the L.A. Act, as modified by KHB Act.

40Copy pinpoint40. Therefore, the next question is whether L.A. F Act stands modified in any manner by the KHB Act in respect any particular aspect or procedure. A bare perusal of sub-Section (2) of Section 33 itself would answer this question. Its latter limb contains ‘a deeming provision’. Certainly, that is attracted only on establishing the foundational fact that the acquisition of land or interest therein is for the G purposes of KHB Act. The said provision, extracted hereinbefore, would go to show that upon establishing the same the acquisition of land concerned or interest therein, as the case may be, shall have to be deemed as an acquisition for the purpose within the meaning of L.A. Act, viz., Section 3(f) of the L.A. Act that defines “public purpose”. Therefore, in terms of the same L.A. Act stands modified by KHB Act to the extent H

THE KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD & ANR. v. STATE OF 1041 KARNATAKA & ORS. [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

mentioned above. Hence, it would be suffice if the Notification specifies A that the acquisition is for the purpose of KHB. It is a fact that in the TNHB Act no provision pari materia to Section 33(2) of the KHB Act enabling the Housing Board to take steps for compulsory acquisition for the purposes of the Act/the Board as also a deeming provision relating ‘public purpose’, as mentioned hereinbefore, is available. B

41Copy pinpoint41. Another allied question arises for consideration is whether non-particularisation with sufficient specificity of the land to be acquired can be a reason for annulling acquisition proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act as modified by KHB Act for the purpose of KHB Act. The contention raised is to the effect that owing to such vagueness in the Notification the holders/land owners would be deprived of the opportunity C to file an effective objection under Section 5A of the L.A. Act. In that context, it is worthy to refer to the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Aflatoon’s case (supra). That was a case where the question was whether before publishing the Notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act the Government had not declared any area in Delhi as a D development area under Section 12(1) of the Delhi Development Act nor was there a Master Plan drawn up in accordance with Section 7 of the Act. On that basis Notification under Section 4 was attacked. The contention that no development of land could be undertaken or carried out in such circumstances in terms of Section 12(3) of the said Act was negatived by the Constitution Bench. In the said case, it was held that the wording of Section 5A of the L.A. Act would make it clear that all that is necessary to be specified in a Notification under Section 4 is that the land is needed for a public purpose. It is true that the specific purpose is also to be mentioned. In L. Krishnan’s case the decision in Aflatoon was referred to. It was held that whether a particular Notification is vague or not is a question of fact to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case. In the cases falling under the provisions of KHB Act mentioning of the fact that the acquisition is required for the purposes of the KHB would make it one for public purpose within the meaning of L.A. Act and a further mentioning of the locality in which acquisition would be effected, would save it from the attack based on G Section 5A. At the stage of Section 4 Notification to enable persons interested to file objection, especially in the light of the provisions under Section 33(2) carrying the aforesaid deeming provision, a mention on the aforesaid lines would be sufficient. As already noted that in the appeal arising from SLP(C)No.1361/2021, the deceased mother of Respondent H

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A Nos.2 and 3 had filed objections under Section 5A. It is also relevant to note that the High Court had also noted the fact that in some of the cases acquisition based on the selfsame Notification were effected and awards were also passed.

42Copy pinpoint42. We have already noted the provisions under Section 24 of the B KHB Act and held that Section 24(1) speaks of the question as to when KHB could proceed to execute the housing schemes, land development schemes and labour housing schemes included in the programme. That apart, we have also held that Section 24(2) pertains to executability of such a scheme not included in the programme and in respect of such a scheme falling within the sweep of Section 24(2) the mandate thereunder is that it shall not be executed unless the same has been sanctioned by the State Government. In such circumstances, a conjoint reading of Section 33(2) and Section 24(2), of the KHB Act would make it clear that prior approval or sanction of any schemeis not required for compulsory acquisition invoking the power under Section 33(2). This is because in terms of the State amendment of Section 4(1), notification marking initiation of acquisition proceedings under L.A. Act, is issued by the appropriate Government or by the Deputy Commissioner and thereafter, the said formal expression of the decision to start acquisition proceedings gets into concrete shape and form by publication in the Official Gazette of Government of Karnataka. In such circumstances, if it is for the purposes of KHB, in other words, for implementation of a scheme of the KHB, what is statutorily required is to wait for its execution till the same is sanctioned by the State Government. In other words, the mere factum of non-existence of a sanctioned and published scheme prior to the initiation of acquisition proceedings, by itself, will not make the notifications and the initiated acquisition proceedings null and void.

43Copy pinpoint43. One another aspect also requires reference in the context of the rival contentions and situation. The scheme of the Act reveals that KHB has also a duty to undertake the schemes entrusted to it by the State Government. Section 32(1) of the KHB Act exclusively make it clear that in respect of scheme entrusted to KHB by Government, provisions under Sections 18-24 (both inclusive) shall not be applicable, except to such an extent and subject to such modifications as may be specified in general or special order made by the State Government. It is also to be noted that in respect of housing schemes, land development schemes or labour housing schemes entrusted to the Board by the H

THE KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD & ANR. v. STATE OF 1043 KARNATAKA & ORS. [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

Government, sometimes such entrustment takes place only after acquisition of the necessary extent of land by the State Government. All the above mentioned provisions and situations would reveal that the contention of the appellants other than the appellants in the appeal arising from SLP(C)No.1361/2021 and Respondent Nos.2 and 3 therein that existence of a finally sanctioned scheme is a pre-condition for initiation of acquisition of any land or any interest therein is a pre-condition and its non-existence must invariably make the acquisition proceedings null and void, are unsustainable and liable to be rejected. Hence, on a careful perusal of Sections 18 to 24 (both inclusive) and Section 33(2) we have no hesitation to hold that KHB Act carry no statutory insistence that for initiation of acquisition invoking the power under Section 33(2), for the purposes of the KHB Act/KHB, framing, finalization and publication of a housing scheme or land development scheme or labour housing scheme, is a pre-condition.

44Copy pinpoint44. For all the above reasons we answer the mooted question in the negative and to the effect that initiation of proceedings for acquisition invoking the power under Section 33(2) of the KHB Act without the housing scheme being in existence or the housing scheme not having been sanctioned under Section 24(2) thereof, would not render such proceedings null and void. We also hold that unless sanction is obtained from the State Government for execution of any scheme therein, in terms of Section 24(2) of KHB Act, the actual act to complete the process, viz., execution shall not be effected thereon.

45Copy pinpoint45. In view of the answers to the moot question and the other allied issues we pass the following orders: (i) In the appeal arising from SLP(C) No.1361/2021 no question other than the moot question (decided as per this judgment) was considered. In view of our clear conclusions and findings the judgment and order dated 01.12.2020 in Writ Appeal No.5712/2012, where the law on the question was exposited to the contrary, is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, it is set aside. Nothing further survives for consideration in this appeal. Consequently, Writ Petition No.25184/2011 from which Writ Appeal No.5712/2012 arose, stands dismissed. (ii) In Civil Appeal Nos.7011-13/2013, 9002-9003/2013 and 7017-19/2013 the position is that as per the common H

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A judgment and orders respectively in Writ Petition Nos.4625/ 2004, 18596/2006, 11568/2008 and 47616/2004 dated 26.4.2013 and also the judgment in Writ Appeal Nos.1244- 45/2009, the Division Bench virtually decided that for initiation of acquisition proceedings for the purposes of KHB, existence of a sanctioned and published scheme is B not a pre-condition. Consequently, the Division Bench confirmed the decision of the leaned Single Judge on that question and thereupon, the Writ Petitions concerned/Writ Appeals were disposed of with request to the learned Single Judge to decide whether Sections 18-23 of the KHB Act C were complied with or not. Obviously, those Writ Petitions are now pending. The issue is whether in view of the facts involved in those cases, the question of scrupulous adherence of Sections 18-23 of the KHB Act survives or needs to be followed, requires consideration depending upon the nature of acquisition and other relevant facts. Hence, D Civil Appeals shall be listed before appropriate Bench for consideration on their own merits, subject to this judgment.

Divya Pandey and Anurag Bhaskar Directions issued. (Assisted by : Priyanshu Agarwal, LCRA) E