MS. X v. REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER

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A be in the interest of either the Judicial Officer or the Judiciary. We find that it will be in the interest of judiciary that such a practice is followed by all the High Courts.

87Copy pinpoint87. We are therefore of the considered view that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner’s resignation dated 15th July 2014, could not be construed to be voluntary. In any case, immediately in a fortnight, on 1st August 2014, the petitioner had made a representation to Hon’ble the President of India as well as the Chief Justice of India, with a copy to the Chief Justice of the MP High Court for reconsideration of the circumstances under which, she was left with no option but to resign. Though, it may not be possible to observe that the petitioner was forced to resign, however, the circumstances enumerated hereinabove, would clearly reveal that they were such, that out of frustration, the petitioner was left with no other alternative.

88Copy pinpoint88. It is contended on behalf of the MP High Court that the petitioner, who was on probation, had voluntarily tendered her resignation, which was accepted and as such, led to an irrevocable severance of relationship of the employer and employee. In this regard, it is to be noted that the petitioner was initially appointed on probation for a period of two years on 1st August 2011. Her probation was completed on 1st August 2013. Admittedly, there has been no order extending the period of probation of the petitioner from 1st August 2013 onwards. On the contrary, she was assigned with various additional duties in the year

2013. Not only this, but her assessment for the assessment year 2013, during which, she would be deemed to be confirmed, was ‘very good’. We therefore find that the said contention is nothing but an after-thought.

89Copy pinpoint89. Insofar as the contention with regard to delay is concerned, we find no merit in the said contention also. Immediately after the petitioner resigned on 15th July 2014, she made a representation to Hon’ble the President of India as well as the Chief Justice of India, with a copy to the Chief Justice of the MP High Court, requesting to reconsider the circumstances in which she was left with no option but to resign. The petitioner thereafter had also pursued a writ petition before this Court. Thereafter, she had participated in the proceedings before the G JIC and after the JIC expressed its opinion, that it would be in the interest of justice that she should be re-instated in service, she made a representation to the MP High Court, for re-instatement in service. After the said representation was rejected, she has immediately approached this Court in the present matter. We therefore find that the petitioner H cannot be denied the reliefs on the so-called grounds of delay and laches.

MS. X v. REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF MADHYA 101 PRADESH AND ANOTHER [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

90Copy pinpoint90. That leaves us with the last submission of the learned Solicitor A General, that if we hold the resignation in the present case to be actuated by coercion, it will have far-reaching implications and will open floodgates to the similarly situated Judicial Officers. Another submission made is that, if a decision of the Full Court of the MP High Court is interfered with, it will stigmatize the entire Institution and have catastrophic effects. B

91Copy pinpoint91. We find the said submissions to be totally uncalled for. At the outset, we have clarified that we are only examining the correctness and otherwise of the order of transfer, the rejection of the representations and the question as to whether the resignation in the facts of the present case, could be construed to be voluntary or not. We have not at all gone into the question, regarding the correctness or otherwise of the decisions of the Full Court of the MP High Court with regard to the rejection of the petitioner’s representation. As already discussed hereinabove, there might be reasons and factors which might have weighed with the Full Court of the MP High Court for taking such a decision. At the cost of repetition, we reiterate that we have full respect for the authority of the Full Court to arrive at such a decision. As such, there is no question of stigmatizing the Full Court of the MP High Court. It is a different matter, that if the suggestions made by this Court on more than one occasion would have been accepted, the exercise of examining the factual scenario, could have been avoided. In any case, we have restricted our inquiry only to the facts, which we found necessary to decide the present case. E We have refrained ourselves from going into the details of the findings of the JIC, so as to protect the dignity of all concerned. We have refrained ourselves from mentioning a single name in our judgment.

92Copy pinpoint92. In that view of the matter, the contention of the learned Solicitor General with regard to stigmatizing the MP High Court is without substance. F

93Copy pinpoint93. Insofar as the contention, that if this Court holds the resignation in the present case to be coercive, it will have far-reaching effects on the administration of judiciary is concerned, the same is also without substance. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations made by this Court in the case of Union of India and Others v. Dhanwanti G Devi and Others14: “9. …….. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and 14 (1996) 6 SCC 44 H

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A for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates— (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found……” D It could thus be seen that this Court has held that a decision is an authority only for what it actually decides. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts, proved or assumed to be proved. The generality of the expressions found there, is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found.

94Copy pinpoint94. This Court in the case of The Regional Manager and Another v. Pawan Kumar Dubey15 has succinctly observed thus: “7. …..Even where there appears to be some conflict, it would, we think, vanish when the ratio decidendi of each case is correctly understood. It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts.” G The ratio decidendi is a rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. It has been held that one additional or different fact can make a world of difference between 15 H (1976) 3 SCC 334

MS. X v. REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF MADHYA 103 PRADESH AND ANOTHER [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts.

95Copy pinpoint95. As has already been discussed hereinabove, we may reiterate that we have decided the present matter only on the basis of the peculiar facts and circumstances, as are found in the present matter. We do hope, that in future, similar facts would never arise for consideration, at least in a lis between a High Court and a Judicial Officer. However, we may remind ourselves of the dictum that law is supreme and no one is above law. It would be apt to reproduce the words of Thomas Fuller, which have been quoted by Lord Denning, “Be ye never so high, the law is above you”.

96Copy pinpoint96. Before we part with the judgment, we find it our duty to place on record our appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Smt. Indira Jaising, learned Senior Counsel and Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India.

97Copy pinpoint97. In the result, the writ petition is partly allowed in the following terms: D (i) We hold and declare that the petitioner’s resignation from the post of Additional District & Sessions Judge, Gwalior dated 15th July 2014, cannot be construed to be voluntary and as such, the order dated 17th July 2014, passed by the respondent No. 2, thereby accepting the resignation of the petitioner, is quashed and set aside; and (ii) The respondents are directed to re-instate the petitioner forthwith as an Additional District & Sessions Judge. Though the petitioner would not be entitled to back wages, she would be entitled for continuity in service with all consequential benefits with effect from 15th July 2014.

98Copy pinpoint98. No order as to cost. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in the above terms.

Ankit Gyan Writ petition partly allowed. (Assisted by : Rahul Rathi, LCRA) G