NEIL AURELIO NUNES & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

Tools
Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
Bench
DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD and A. S. BOPANNA
Citation
[2022] 11 S.C.R. 585
Whole judgment (for printing)

Source PDF (original scan)
Contains information from the Indian High Court / Supreme Court Judgments dataset, licensed under CC-BY-4.0

Judgment · Supreme Court of India · decided · Bench: DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD and A. S. BOPANNA

[2022] 11 S.C.R. 585

Machine-read from a scanned report. Check the printed page before citing. Report an error.

Headnote — Supreme Court Reports (editorial summary, not part of the judgment)

Catchwords

Constitution of India – Arts. 15(1), 15(4), 15(5), 16(1) and 16(4) – Reservation – National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET) C – Reservation for Other Backward Classes-OBC (non-creamy layer) in the All-India Quota (AIQ) seats in NEET for undergraduate and postgraduate medical courses –

Held

Reservation for OBC candidates in the AIQ seats for UG and PG medical and dental courses is constitutionally valid – Articles 15(4) and 15 (5) are not an exception to Article 15 (1), which itself sets out the principle of substantive equality (including the recognition of existing inequalities) – Merit cannot be reduced to narrow definitions of performance in an open competitive examination which only provides formal equality of opportunity – Open competitive examinations do not reflect the social, economic and cultural advantage that accrues to certain classes and contributes to their success in such examinations – High scores in an examination are not a proxy for merit – Merit should be socially contextualized and reconceptualized as an instrument that advances social goods like equality – In such a context, reservation is not at odds with merit but furthers its distributive consequences – Articles 15(4) and 15(5) F employ group identification as a method through which substantive equality can be achieved – This may lead to an incongruity where certain individual members of an identified group that is being given reservation may not be backward or individuals belonging to the non-identified group may share certain characteristics of backwardness with members of an identified group – The individual difference may be a result of privilege, fortune, or circumstances but it cannot be used to negate the role of reservation in remedying the structural disadvantage that certain groups suffer – Challenge to the constitutional validity of OBC reservation in AIQ seats introduced through the notice dated 29 July 2021 is rejected. H 585

Catchwords

A Constitution of India – Article 14, 15(1), 15(4), 16(4) – Reservation – Merit – Plea of the petitioners that at the level of PG courses, a high degree of skill and expertise is required thus, such opportunities must be available to the most meritorious and providing any reservation for PG seats would be detrimental to national interest –

Held

This is not a novel argument – Special provisions (including reservation) made for the benefit of any class are not an exception to the general principle of equality – Special provisions are a method to ameliorate the structural inequalities that exist in the society, without which, true or factual equality will remain illusory – The binary of merit and reservation has now become superfluous once C Supreme Court has recognized the principle of substantive equality as the mandate of Article 14 and as a facet of Articles 15 (1) and 16(1) – The narrow definition of merit (that is, decontextualised individual achievement) hinders the realisation of substantive equality.

Catchwords

Constitution of India – Reservation – Scheme of All-India Quota (AIQ) seats – Development of – Petitioners argued that Supreme Court in Pradeep Jain case and the subsequent cases has held that there shall be no reservation in the AIQ seats –

Held

Scheme of AIQ was devised to allot seats in State-run medical and dental institutions in which students from across the country could compete – Observations in Pradeep Jain that the AIQ seats must be filled by merit, must be read limited to merit vis-à-vis residence reservation – Supreme Court in Pradeep Jain did not hold that reservation in AIQ seats is impermissible – Evolution of the AIQ in UG and PG medical and dental courses traced.

Catchwords

Constitution of India – Reservation – All-India Quota (AIQ) seats – Power of executive to introduce reservation in AIQ seats – Petitioners argued that the Union Government should have filed an application before Supreme Court before notifying reservations in the AIQ since the AIQ scheme is a creation of Supreme Court –

Held

Argument is erroneous – The Union Government in Abhay G Nath case had made a submission of its intention to provide reservations in the AIQ for the SC and ST candidates since until then in view of the confusion on demarcation of the seat matrix, there was no clarity on whether reservations could be provided in the AIQ – Thus, in Abhay Nath it was clarified that reservations are permissible in the AIQ seats – Therefore, the order in Abhay Nath

587 was only clarificatory in view of the earlier observations in Buddhi A Prakash Sharma – Interpreting the order to mean that the Union of India sought the permission of Supreme Court before providing reservation would amount to aiding an interpretation that would foster judicial overreach – The Union Government was not required to seek the permission of the Court before providing reservation in B AIQ seats – Providing reservation in the AIQ seats is a policy decision of the Government. Constitution of India – Reservation – All-India Quota (AIQ) seats – Impugned notice providing reservation for OBC and EWS categories in the AIQ was issued on 29 July 2021, after the registration for the examination had closed on 18 April 2021 – C Plea of the petitioners that the rules of the examination could have only been changed before the last date for registration and as the candidates registered for the exam having a particular seat matrix in mind, the change in the seat matrix after registration would be arbitrary –

Held

Clause 11 of the information bulletin specifies that the reservation applicable to NEET-PG would be notified by the counselling authority before the beginning of the counselling process – Therefore, the candidates while applying for NEET-PG are not provided any information on the distribution of seat matrix – Such information is provided by the counselling authority only before the counselling session is to begin – It thus cannot be argued that the rules of the game were set when the registration for the examination closed.

Catchwords

Constitution of India – Reservation – The Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act 2019 – Articles 15(6) and 16(6) – Criteria for the determination of the EWS for the ten percent reservation – Challenge to –

Held

Challenge to the very criteria for the determination of the EWS would not only require the matter to be heard at length but also to hear all interested parties – However, in view of the delay in the counselling process due to the pendency of this petition, it is deemed necessary to allow the counselling session to begin with the existing criteria for the identification of the EWS category – Judicial propriety does not permit to pass an interim order staying the criteria for determination of the EWS category – It is a settled principle of law that in matters involving challenge to the constitutionality of a legislation or a rule, the Court must be wary to pass an interim order, unless the Court is convinced

A that the rules are prima facie arbitrary – However, at this stage, without hearing all the interested parties at length on arguments, it would be impermissible to form a prima facie opinion on the alleged arbitrariness of the criteria – Further, in the midst of the pandemic, any delay in the recruitment of doctors would impact the ability to manage the pandemic – Hence, it is necessary to avoid any further delays in the admission process and allow counselling to begin immediately – The implementation of EWS reservation in AIQ seats in NEET UG and PG seats for the academic year of 2021-2022 is allowed – EWS category be identified in view of the criteria in O.M No. 36039/1/2019 – Challenge to the validity of the criteria determined by the Pandey Committee for the identification of the EWS category be listed for final hearing. Directing the matter to be listed for final hearing on challenge to the validity of the criteria determined by the Pandey committee for the identification of the EWS category, the Court

Held

1.1 On its part, this Court initially subscribed to the binary of merit and reservation. Articles 14, 15(1) and 16(1) were thought to embody the general principle of formal equality. Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4) were understood to be exceptions to this general principle, advancing the cause of social justice. This E Court sought to balance these competing imperatives. In such an understanding, merit is equated to formal equality of opportunity which has to be balanced against the concerns of social justice through reservation. In MR Balaji v. State of Mysore a Constitution Bench of this Court observed that Article 15 (4) is an exception to Article 15 (1), which was introduced ¯because the interests of the society at large would be served by promoting advancements of the weaker elements in the society. However, since Article 15 (4) (or reservation) was considered at odds with the notion of formal equality under Article 15 (1), which is broadly understood as complying with the principle of merit, this Court observed that there should be a cap on reservations, which it specified generally should be 50 percent. This view was followed by this Court in subsequent judgements where a special provision made for the benefit of a class was seen as a deviation from the principle of formal equality. However, the dominant view of this Court was challenged by the Justice R Subba Rao in his dissent

Reporter's headnote (continued) and case details

585

(Writ Petition (C) No. 961 of 2021)

p. 586

p. 588

589 in T. Devadasan v. Union of India, where the learned judge stated that Article 16 (4) is not an exception but rather a facet of Article 16 (1), which seeks to redress the historical disadvantage suffered by certain communities. The view expressed by Justice Subba Rao was adopted by this Court in State of Kerala v. NM Thomas, which transformed the equality jurisprudence in India from that of formal equality to substantive equality; thus, also changing our understanding of reservations. The majority of the judges accepted that special provisions (including reservation) made for the benefit of any class are not an exception to the general principle of equality. Special provisions are a method to ameliorate the structural inequalities that exist in the society, without which, true or factual equality will remain illusory. Justice KK Mathew in his concurring opinion observed that while equality under Article 16 (1) is individual-centric (which was the view of the majority – Justice Mathew and Justice Beg‘s majority opinions, and Justice Khanna and Justice Gupta‘s dissents), the manner in which it is to be achieved is through the identification of groups that do not enjoy equal access to certain rights and entitlements. Thus, the learned judge envisaged that equality of individuals is to be achieved by addressing the structural barriers faced by certain classes of citizens, which he called the “conditions and circumstances [that] stand in the way of their equal access to the enjoyment of basic rights or claims”. Justice Krishna Iyer and Justice Fazal Ali in their concurring opinions went a step further to argue that the content of Article 16 (1) is not individual- centric rather it aims to provide equality of opportunity to sections that face structural barriers to their advancement. Justice Krishna F Iyer invoked Article 46 of the Constitution, which although unenforceable, was employed for giving effect to Article 16 (1). In his opinion both Articles 16 (1) and 16 (4) function to equalise group inequalities albeit in different contexts. Justice Fazal Ali in his concurring opinion noted that equality of opportunity under Article 16 (1) entails the removal of barriers faced by certain G classes of society. They cannot be denied the right to equality and relegated to suffer backwardness only because they do not meet certain artificial standards set up by institutions. [Paras 18- 21][619-D-G; 620-E-F; 621-F; 622-E-G; 623-G-H; 624-A-B-F] H

p. 590

A T. Devadasan v. Union of India (1964) 4 SCR 680; CA Rajendran v. Union of India (1968) 1 SCR 721; State of Kerala v. NM Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310 : 1976 (1) SCR 906; Indira Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454 – followed. B MR Balaji v. State of Mysore [1963] Supp 1 SCR 439; Dr Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister (2021) 8 SCC 1 – referred to. 1.2 The binary of merit and reservation has now become superfluous once this Court has recognized the principle of substantive equality as the mandate of Article 14 and as a facet of Articles 15 (1) and 16(1). An open competitive exam may ensure formal equality where everyone has an equal opportunity to participate. However, widespread inequalities in the availability of and access to educational facilities will result in the deprivation of certain classes of people who would be unable to effectively compete in such a system. Special provisions (like reservation) enable such disadvantaged classes to overcome the barriers they face in effectively competing with forward classes and thus ensuring substantive equality. The privileges that accrue to forward classes are not limited to having access to quality schooling and access to tutorials and coaching centres to prepare for a competitive examination but also includes their social networks and cultural capital (communication skills, accent, books or academic accomplishments) that they inherit from their family. The cultural capital ensures that a child is trained unconsciously by the familial environment to take up higher education or high posts commensurate with their family’s standing. This works to the disadvantage of individuals who are first-generation learners and come from communities whose traditional occupations do not result in the transmission of necessary skills required to perform well in open examination. They have to put in surplus effort to compete with their peers from the forward communities. On the other hand, social networks (based on community linkages) become useful when individuals seek guidance and advise on how to prepare for examination and advance in their career even if their immediate family does not have the necessary H

591 exposure. Thus, a combination of family habitus, community A linkages and inherited skills work to the advantage of individuals belonging to certain classes, which is then classified as merit reproducing and reaffirming social hierarchies. [Para 24][627-B- G; 628-A-B] BK Pavithra v. Union of India (2019) 16 SCC 129: B 2019] 7 SCR 1086 – relied on. 1.3 This is not to say that performance in competitive examination or admission in higher educational institutions does not require a great degree of hard work and dedication but it is necessary to understand that merit is not solely of one’s own making. The rhetoric surrounding merit obscures the way in which family, schooling, fortune and a gift of talents that the society currently values aids in one’s advancement. Thus, the exclusionary standard of merit serves to denigrate the dignity of those who face barriers in their advancement which are not of their own making. But the idea of merit based on scores in an exam requires a deeper scrutiny. While examinations are a necessary and convenient method of distributing educational opportunities, marks may not always be the best gauge of individual merit. Even then marks are often used as a proxy for merit. Individual calibre transcends performance in an examination. E Standardized measures such as examination results are not the most accurate assessment of the qualitative difference between candidates. At the best, an examination can only reflect the current competence of an individual but not the gamut of their potential, capabilities or excellence, which are also shaped by lived experiences, subsequent training and individual character. The F meaning of merit itself cannot be reduced to marks even if it is a convenient way of distributing educational resources. When examinations claim to be more than systems of resource allocation, they produce a warped system of ascertaining the worth of individuals as students or professionals. Additionally, since success G in examinations results in the ascription of high social status as a meritorious individual, they often perpetuate and reinforce the existing ascriptive identities of certain communities as intellectual and competent by rendering invisible the social, cultural and economic advantages that increase the probabilities of success. H

p. 592

A Thus, the meaning of merit needs to be reconceptualized. For instance, if a high-scoring candidate does not use their talents to perform good actions, it would be difficult to call them meritorious merely because they scored high marks. The propriety of actions and dedication to public service should also be seen as markers of merit, which cannot be assessed in a competitive examination. B Equally, fortitude and resilience required to uplift oneself from conditions of deprivation is reflective of individual calibre. [Para 25][628-G; 629-A-C; 630-B-E] Michael Sandel, Tyranny of Merit: What‘s become of the Common Good (Penguin Boks), Ashwini C Deshpande, Social Justice Through Affirmative Action in India: An Assessment, in Jeannette Wicks-Lim and Robert Pollin (editors) Capitalism on Trial: Explorations in the Tradition of Thomas Weisskopf, Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc. D (Northampton, MA), 2013, Satish Deshpande, Pass, Fail, Distinction: The Examination as a Social Institution. Marjorie Sykes Memorial Lecture, Regional Institute of Education, Ajmer, 3rd March,

2010. Published by the National Council for E Educational Research and Training, New Delhi – referred to. 1.4 It is important to clarify here that after the decision in NM Thomas there is no constitutional basis to subscribe to the binary of merit and reservation. If open examinations present equality of opportunity to candidates to compete, reservations ensure that the opportunities are distributed in such a way that backward classes are equally able to benefit from such opportunities which typically evade them because of structural barriers. This is the only manner in which merit can be a democratizing force that equalizes inherited disadvantages and privileges. Otherwise claims of individual merit are nothing but tools of obscuring inheritances that underlie achievements. If merit is a social good that must be protected, the content of merit must first be critically examine. Scores in an exam are not the sole determinant of excellence or capability. Even if for the sake H

593 of argument, it is assumed that scores do reflect excellence, it is not the only value that is considered as a social good. The distributive consequences of merit must be looked at. Accordingly, how merit is assessed should also encapsulate if it mitigates or entrenches inequalities. An oppositional paradigm of merit and reservation serves to entrench inequalities by relegating reserved candidates to the sphere of incompetence, and diminishing their capabilities. While examinations are a necessary and convenient method to allocate educational resources, they are not effective markers of merit. The way merit is understood should not be limited to individual agency or ability (which in any event is not solely of our own doing) but it should be envisioned as a social good that advances equality because that is the value that our Constitution espouses. It is important to note that equality here does not merely have a redistributive dimension but also includes recognizing the worth and dignity of every individual. The content of merit cannot be devoid of what is valued in society. Based on the above discussion, it is difficult to accept the narrow definition of merit (that is, decontextualised individual achievement). Such a definition hinders the realisation of substantive equality. [Paras 27 and 28][633-D-G; 634-F-G; 635- A] Amartya Sen, “Merit and Justice” in Arrow KJ, et al E (eds), Meritocracy and Economic Inequality (Princeton University Press 2000) – referred to. 1.5 Coming to the issue of whether reservation can be permitted in PG courses, it is evident Article 15 (5) does not make a distinction between UG and PG courses. The Constitution F enables the State to make special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes for admission to educational institutions at both the UG and PG levels. While on certain occasions, this Court has remarked that there cannot be any reservation in SS courses, this Court has never held that G reservations in medical PG courses are impermissible. In Pradeep Jain, this Court did not hold that reservation in PG courses is altogether impermissible. It was urged on behalf of the petitioners that for many individuals PG is the end of the road and therefore, the PG courses should be equated with SS courses and no H

p. 594

A reservation should be allowed in PG. It is difficult to accept this argument when this Court has time and again permitted reservation in PG courses. This argument merely seeks to create an artificial distinction between the courses offered at the PG level. Further, only certain medical fields do not have SS courses and on the basis of that it cannot be deemed that reservation is B impermissible in PG as a whole. Crucially, the issue here is whether after graduation, an individual is entitled to reservation on the ground that they belong to a class that suffers from social and educational backwardness. It cannot be said that the impact of backwardness simply disappears because a candidate has a C graduate qualification. Indeed, a graduate qualification may provide certain social and economic mobility, but that by itself does not create parity between forward classes and backward classes. In any event, there cannot be an assertion of over-inclusion where undeserving candidates are said to be benefitting from D reservation because OBC candidates who fall in the creamy layer are excluded from taking the benefit of reservation. There is no prohibition in introducing reservation for socially and educationally backward classes (or the OBCs) in PG courses. [Para 29][635-B, D-E; 636-A-D] Dr Preeti Srivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1999) E 7 SCC 120 : [1999] 1 Suppl. SCR 249; AIIMS Student Union v. AIIMS 2002 (1) SCC 428 : [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 79; Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 146 : [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 152 – referred to. 2.1 Having traced the evolution of the AIQ in UG and PG F medical and dental courses, the following questions are answered: whether this Court in Pradeep Jain held that the AIQ seats that were to be filled by an open all- India examination should be free of reservation for the socially and educationally backward classes, and SC and ST as enabled by Article 15(4); and (ii) whether G reservation in the AIQ can be provided only pursuant to a direction of this Court. This Court in Pradeep Jain was deciding on the constitutional validity of reservation based on domicile/ residence. Having held that residence based reservation is constitutionally valid, the next question that this Court was tasked with was adjudicating the quantum of residence-based reservation H

595 that could be permitted. Referring to the decision of this Court A in Jagdish Saran v. Union of India, it was held that there cannot be wholesale reservation (that is, 100 percent reservation). It was observed that a certain percentage of seats must be filled by open merit by an all-India examination without reservation based on residence. The Medical Education Review Committee had suggested that 75 percent of the seats in a medical college shall be reserved for residents of the State. This Court decided that it would be fair to reserve 70 percent of the seats for residents of the State. Therefore, 30 percent of the seats were to be filled through an all-India Examination. This would mean that candidates from all across the country could compete against the 30 percent seats available in State run medical colleges. In this context, this Court had observed, “such reservation should in no event exceed the outer limit of 70 per cent of the total number of open seats after taking into account other kinds of reservations validly made” (paragraph 21). The Bench further observed that at least 30 percent of the open seats shall be available for admission of students on all-India basis irrespective of the State or University from which they come and such admissions shall be granted purely on merit on the basis of either all-India entrance examination or entrance examination to be held by the State (paragraph 21). The observation of this Court that AIQ seats must be filled purely on the basis of merit, cannot be interpreted to mean that there shall be no reservations in the AIQ seats. Merit must be socially contextualised and reconceptualized according to its distributive consequences where it furthers substantive equality in terms of Articles 15 (4) and 15 (5) of the Constitution. The reference to merit in paragraph 21 of the judgment must be read with the previous observations made in the judgment. [Paras 44 and 45][650-E-G; 651-A-D] Dr Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 654 : [1984] 3 SCR 942 – clarified. Jagdish Saran v. Union of India, 1980 AIR 820 : [1980] G 2 SCR 831 – referred to 2.2 While discussing the constitutional validity of domicile- reservation, it was observed that selection of candidates for admission based on the all-India open examination would further H

p. 596

A merit since it would permit the selection of the ‘best minds in the country’. In this context, it was observed that claims that would weigh with this Court in justifying the departure from the principle of merit-based selection are: (i) claim of State interest, where the students by view of their residence are expected to settle down and serve their State; and (ii) the regions’ claim of backwardness (paragraph 16). Further, it was observed that though theoretically, admissions in medical colleges should be based on an all-India examination since it would further merit and would provide equality of opportunity to candidates across the country, keeping in view the differing levels of social, economic, and educational development in different areas, factual equality would not be attained. Therefore, the AIQ seats shall be filed through an all-India examination purely on merit, must be interpreted only with reference to the discussion made on residence-based reservation and the necessity of an all-India examination for admission to medical and dental courses. D References to ‘merit’ must therefore be read in the context of merit vis-à-vis residence reservation. This is further evident from the observation in paragraph 21 of the judgment where it was observed that “atleast 30 per cent of the open seats shall be available for admission of students on all-India basis irrespective of the State or university from which they come and such admissions shall be granted purely on merit on the basis of either all-India entrance examination or entrance examination to be held by the State’. The Bench thought it fit that admission through an all-India entrance examination would further merit, enabling the best minds all over the country to study medicine. This aspect was further clarified by the Bench in Dinesh Kumar (I) where this Court observed that the Union Government and the Medical Council for India had not taken any initiative to conduct an all- India entrance examination for admissions to the AIQ seats. The intention of this Court in Pradeep Jain in creating an AIQ was solely to provide candidates from across the country the opportunity to study medicine in colleges in other parts of the country as well, owing to the unequal number of medical colleges (and opportunities) in different States. [Paras 46 and 47][651-F- H; 652-A-D; 653-B-D] H

597

Dinesh Kumar (I) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College (1985) 3 A SCC 22 : [1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 41 – discussed. 2.3 Reference was made to reservation of backward classes only for the limited purpose of determining the seat matrix. The observation in paragraph 21 in Pradeep Jain on the calculation of seat matrix was clarified in Dinesh Kumar (I). The Bench had clarified that after reservations (for the SC, ST and OBC provided by the States) validly made, 30 percent of the remaining seats would be reserved for AIQ. Therefore, according to the clarification in Dinesh Kumar(I) on the demarcation of seats, the first bifurcation should be between reserved and non-reserved seats, and the seats remaining in the open category must be bifurcated into State Quota and AIQ. It was thus, a three-fold vertical reservation, with the reserved category not being considered within either the AIQ or the State Quota. The logical fallacy of this method of demarcation of seats is that different States provide varying percentages of reservation. Therefore, D the total percentage of unreserved seats would inversely depend on the percentage of reservation provided by the State. The State of Tamil Nadu raised this objection in Dinesh Kumar (II). Pursuant to this, it was held that the AIQ seats shall be determined without excluding any reservation validly made. The seats were first bifurcated to State quota and AIQ, and the vertical and horizontal reservations (for example, for persons with disabilities) were accommodated within the State quota. When the judgment in Dinesh Kumar (II) was pronounced, the Union Government had not yet made any decision on providing reservation in AIQ seats. It was subsequently in 2009 that the Union Government had taken a policy decision to provide reservation for the SC and ST categories in the AIQ. It is important to note that in Jayakumar and Rajeshwaran, the petitioners had sought a direction from this Court for providing reservation in the AIQ seats. In Rajeshwaran, this Court declined to ascertain if a person would be entitled to reservation in the AIQ seats. It was observed that if reservations for SC and ST categories is to be provided in the AIQ seats, it would cause difficulty in adjusting seats since the State and the Central lists would differ. However, when the Union Government submitted before this Court in Abhay Nath that it had taken the decision to reserve seats in the AIQ, it was clarified that there H

p. 598

A was no impediment against the implementation of such reservation. In Buddhi Prakash Sharma, there was a slight deviation from the settled jurisprudence. This Court had held that the total number of PG seats in AIQ would be 50 percent of the total seats without any exclusion for reservation. The Bench had interpreted the observation in Dinesh Kumar (II) that the B AIQ seats would be determined without excluding reservations to mean that there would be no reservation in the AIQ. Therefore, since, Pradeep Jain did not preclude the AIQ seats from reservation, a three-Judge Bench in Abhay Nath clarified that the 50 percent AIQ seats in PG medical and dental seats would C be inclusive of reservation for SC and ST categories. [Paras 48- 51][653-E, G-H; 654-A-C, E-H; 655-A-B] Dinesh Kumar (II) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College (1986) 3 SCC 727 : [1986] 3 SCR 345; Union of India v. Jayakumar (2008) 17 SCC 478; Union of India v. R. D Rajeshwaran (2003) 9 SCC 294; Buddhi Prakash Sharma v. Union of India (2005) 13 SCC 61 – discussed.

3. In Abhay Nath, the Union Government had apprised this Court of its decision to provide reservation for the SC and ST E categories in the AIQ. It had then, as a policy decision decided to only provide reservation for the SC and ST categories. The Parliament enacted the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act 2006 in view of the enabling provision in Article 15(5). Section 3 stipulates that there shall be 15 percent reservation for the SC, 7.5 percent reservation for the ST, and 27 percent reservation for the OBC category in Central Educational Institutions. A Constitution Bench in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India upheld the Constitutional validity of 27 percent reservation for the OBC category provided under the Act of 2006. Though the Act of 2006 would not be applicable to the seats earmarked for AIQ in State-run institutions since it would not fall within the definition of a Central educational institution under the Act, the Union of India in view of Article 15(5) has the power to provide reservations for OBCs in the AIQ seats. It is not tenable for the States to provide reservation in the AIQ seats since these seats have been surrendered’ to H

599 the Centre. It would also lead to the anomaly highlighted in Dinesh A Kumar (II) since the percentage of reservation provided by different States differ, which would lead to an unequal percentage of seats available in the AIQ in different States. This is also coupled with the fact that the SC, ST and OBC lists are not uniform across States. Thus, it is the Union Government’s prerogative to B introduce reservation in AIQ seats. [Para 53][655-F-H; 656-A- D] Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1: [2008] 4 SCR 1; Abhay Nath v. University of Delhi (2009) 17 SCC 705 – referred to. C

4. The impugned notice providing reservation for the OBC and EWS categories in the AIQ seats was issued after the registration had closed but before the exam was conducted. Clause 11 of the information bulletin specifies that the reservation applicable would be notified by the counselling authority before the beginning of the counselling process, unlike the facts in Dr D Prerit Sharma. The candidates while applying for NEET-PG are not provided any information on the distribution of the seat matrix. Such information is provided by the counselling authority only before the counselling session is to begin. [Para 58][659-F-G; 660-B-C] E Dr Prerit Sharma v. Dr Bilu Civil Appeal No. 3840 of 2020 – distinguished.

5. Conclusion- In view of the discussion above it is held that the reservation for OBC candidates in the AIQ seats for UG and PG medical and dental courses is constitutionally valid for the following reasons: (i) Articles 15(4) and 15 (5) are not an exception to Article 15 (1), which itself sets out the principle of substantive equality (including the recognition of existing inequalities). Thus, Articles 15 (4) and 15 (5) become a restatement of a particular facet of the rule of substantive equality that has been set out in Article 15 (1); (ii) Merit cannot be reduced to narrow definitions of performance in an open competitive examination which only provides formal equality of opportunity. Competitive examinations assess basic current competency to allocate educational resources but are not reflective of excellence, capabilities and potential of an individual which are also shaped H

p. 600

A by lived experiences, subsequent training and individual character. Crucially, open competitive examinations do not reflect the social, economic and cultural advantage that accrues to certain classes and contributes to their success in such examinations; (iii) High scores in an examination are not a proxy for merit. Merit should be socially contextualized and reconceptualized as an instrument that advances social goods like equality that we as a society value. In such a context, reservation is not at odds with merit but furthers its distributive consequences; (iv) Articles 15 (4) and 15 (5) employ group identification as a method through which substantive equality can be achieved. This may lead to an incongruity where certain individual members of an identified group that is being given reservation may not be backward or individuals belonging to the non-identified group may share certain characteristics of backwardness with members of an identified group. The individual difference may be a result of privilege, fortune, or circumstances but it cannot be used to negate the role of reservation in remedying the structural disadvantage that certain groups suffer; (v) The scheme of AIQ was devised to allot seats in State-run medical and dental institutions in which students from across the country could compete. The observations in Pradeep Jain that the AIQ seats must be filled by merit, must be read limited to merit vis-à-vis residence reservation. This Court in Pradeep Jain did not hold that reservation in AIQ seats is impermissible; (vi) The Union of India filed an application before this Court in Abhay Nath placing the policy decision of the Government to provide reservation for the SC and ST categories in the AIQ seats since until then in view of the confusion on demarcation of seat matrix, there was no clarity on whether reservations could be provided in the AIQ seats. The Union Government was not required to seek the permission of this Court before providing reservation in AIQ seats. Therefore, providing reservation in the AIQ seats is a policy decision of the Government, which will be subject to the contours of judicial review similar to every reservation policy; (vii) It was clarified in Dinesh Kumar (II) that the total seats demarcated for AIQ shall be determined without excluding reservation as was earlier directed by Pradeep Jain and clarified in Dinesh Kumar (I). However, this Court in Buddhi Prakash Sharma had H

601 erroneously construed the clarification in Dinesh Kumar (II) to mean that there should be no reservation in AIQ seats. Therefore, the order in Abhay Nath was only clarificatory in view of the observations in Buddhi Prakash Sharma; and (viii) Clause 11 of the information bulletin specifies that the reservation applicable to NEET-PG would be notified by the counselling authority before the beginning of the counselling process. Therefore, the candidates while applying for NEET-PG are not provided any information on the distribution of seat matrix. Such information is provided by the counselling authority only before the counselling session is to begin. It thus cannot be argued that the rules of the game were set when the registration for the examination closed. The challenge to the constitutional validity of OBC reservation in AIQ seats introduced through the notice dated 29 July 2021 is rejected. [Para 59][660-D-H; 661-A-H; 662- A-D] Manjusree v. State of AP (2008) 3 SCC 512 : [2008] D 2 SCR 1025; Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Rajendra Bhimrao Mandve (2011) 10 SCC 51; Umrao Singh v. Punjabi University (2005) 13 SCC 365 : [2005] 5 Suppl. SCR 530; Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court (2013) 4 SCC 540 – distinguished. E

Saloni Kumari v Director General Health Services WP(C) No 596/2015; Gulshan Prakash v. State of Haryana (2010) 1 SCC 477: [2009] 16 SCR 1; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2007) 4 SCC 361: 2007 (4 ) SCR 493; State of U.P v. Pradip Tandon F [1975] 2 SCR 761; Nookavarapu Kanakadurga Devi v. Kakatiya Medical College AIR 1972 AP 83; Jagdish Saran v. Union of India, 1980 AIR 820 : [1980] 2 SCR 831; Dr Sandeep Sadashivrao v. Union of India (2016) 2 SCC 328 : [2015] 14 SCR 328 – referred to. G Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (AIR 1993 SC 477) : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454; Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India WP (C) 55/ 2019; Shantistar Builders v. Narayan K. Totame (1990) 1 SCC 520; Debraj Samanta & Ors. v. Medical Counselling Committee WP (C) No. 680 of H

p. 602

A 2021; B K Pavithra v. Union of India (2019) 16 SCC 129 : [2019] 7 SCR 1086; Pradeep Jain v. Union of India 1984 AIR 1420 : [1984] 3 SCR 942; Heart of Millions v. Union of India, 2014 (14) SCC 496 – referred to. B Volume 7, Constituent Assembly of India Debates, 30 November 1948, available at https:// www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_assembly _debates/volume/7/19 48-11-30, Volume 9, Constituent Assembly of India Debates, 23 August 1949, available at https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_ C assembly_debates/volume/9/949-08-23, K.V Syamprasad, Merit and caste as cultural capital: Justifying affirmative action for the underprivileged in Kerala, India, Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies, Vol 17, p.50-81 (2019);. The Bench noticed the judgment in State of D Haryana v, Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220 where the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the State to not appoint all candidates who had secured the minimum percentage of marks. Case Law Reference E In the Judgment: [1984] 3 SCR 942 clarified Para 2 [1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 41 discussed Para 2 [1986] 3 SCR 345 discussed Para 2 F (2009) 17 SCC 705 referred to Para 4 (2003) 9 SCC 294 discussed Para 4(iii) (2008) 17 SCC 478 discussed Para 4(iii) [1999] 1 Suppl. SCR 249 referred to Para 4(v) G [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 152 referred to Para 14(viii) [2009] 16 SCR 1 referred to Para 14(viii) [2007] 4 SCR 493 referred to Para 14(viii) [1963] Supp 1 SCR 439 referred to Para 18 H

603

[1964] 4 SCR 680 followed Para 19 A [1968] 1 SCR 721 followed Para 19 [1976] 1 SCR 906 followed Para 20 [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454 followed Para 23 (2021) 8 SCC 1 referred to Para 23 B [2019] 7 SCR 1086 relied on Para 24 [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 79 referred to Para 29 [1975] 2 SCR 761 referred to Para 31 (2005) 13 SCC 61 discussed Para 40 C

[1980] 2 SCR 831 referred to Para 45 [2008] 4 SCR 1 referred to Para 53 [2008] 2 SCR 1025 distinguished Para 55 D [2005] 5 Suppl. SCR 530 distinguished Para 56 (2011) 10 SCC 51 distinguished Para 56 (2013) 4 SCC 540 distinguished Para 57 [2015] 14 SCR 328 referred to Para 57 E In the Order: [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454 referred to Para 8 (vi) [2019] 7 SCR 1086 referred to Para 26(vii) [1984] 3 SCR 942 referred to Para 27 F [2014] 14 SCC 496 referred to Para 30 CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 961 of 2021. (UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA) G With Writ Petition (C) Nos. 967, 1002, 1021 and 1105 of 2021. V. Krishnamurthy AAG, Arvind Datar, Maninder Singh, A. Mariarputham, Sr. Advs., Subodh S. Patil, Vivek Singh, Ramesh Allanki, Dr. Charu Mathur, Ms. Tanvi, Sanjay Kumar Dubey, Rahul Unnikrishnan, H

p. 604

A Malak Bhatt, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Gaurav Sharma, Kirtman Singh, Waize Ali Noor, Dhawal Mohan, Prateek Bhatia, Ms. Srirupa Nag, Taha Yasin, Amrish Kumar, R. Nedumaran, Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., V. K. Biju, Ms. Ria Sachthey, Chetanya Singh, Amlendu Kumar Akhilesh Kumar Jha, Shaji George, Ms. Vijay Laxmi, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Kumar Prashant, Ms. Vanya Gupta, Avnish Dave, Parmod Kumar B Vishnoi, Ms. Himanshi Shakya, Devashish Bharuka, Mithu Jain, Shashank Ratnoo, Vikram Hegde, Shantanu Lakhotia, Advs. for the appearing parties. The following Judgment and Order of the Court were passed :

Judgment

C JUDGMENT DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J. This judgment has been divided into the following sections to facilitate analysis: D A. Factual Background....................................................3 B. Pendency of the Writ Petition Instituted by Saloni Kumari............................................................10 C. Submissions of Counsel...........................................11

E D. Analysis...................................................................18 D.1 The Merit of Reservation...............................18 D.2 The Court and the AIQ seats........................39 D.3 The Executive’s power to introduce reservation in AIQ seats...................................................59 F D.4 Changing the Rules of the Game....................61 E. Conclusion..............................................................66

G A. Factual Background

11. These writ petitions challenge the reservation for Other Backward Classes1 and the Economically Weaker Section2 in the All-

1 “OBC” H 2 “EWS”

NEIL AURELIO NUNES & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 605 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

India Quota 3 seats in the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test A examination4 for undergraduate5 and postgraduate6 medical courses. The Directorate General of Health Services in the Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare7 issued a notice on 29 July 2021 providing 27 percent reservation for OBC (non-creamy layer) and 10 percent reservation for EWS in the 15 percent UG and 50 percent PG seats in AIQ from the B academic year 2021-2022. By an order dated 7 January 2022, a two- judge Bench of this Court upheld the constitutional validity of the OBC reservation in AIQ seats and posted the challenge to the validity of the EWS criteria for final hearing in the third week of March 2022. This judgement provides reasons for upholding the permissibility of reservations in the AIQ seats and constitutionality of OBC reservation in AIQ seats. C

22. Some of the salient facts that have led to the implementation of OBC reservation in AIQ seats are being adverted for setting out the broad contours of the controversy. While we have discussed in detail the history of the AIQ and the evolution of an All-India common entrance examination in Section D.2, it is sufficient to highlight that the scheme of D AIQ seats was devised by this Court in Dr Pradeep Jain v. Union of India8 to provide domicile free seats in State run medical and dental institutions. The AIQ scheme was further developed by this Court in Dinesh Kumar (I) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College9 and Dinesh Kumar (II) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College10. Presently, under the AIQ scheme, 15 percent UG seats and 50 percent PG seats in State– E run institutions are surrendered by the states to the AIQ. The remaining seats in the State institutions are reserved for candidates domiciled in the respective States.

33. The Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act 2005 amended Article 15 of the Constitution by inserting clause (5) to Article 15 to F empower the State to make special provisions (including reservation) for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes (or

3 “AIQ” 4 “NEET-PG” G 5 “UG” 6 “PG” 7 “MH&FW” 8 (1984) 3 SCC 654 9 (1985) 3 SCC 22 10 (1986) 3 SCC 727 H

p. 606

A the OBCs) relating to their admission in educational institutions. Article 15 (5) reads thus: “(5) Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally B backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30.” C

44. In Abhay Nath v. University of Delhi11, this Court held that reservations for Scheduled Caste12 and Scheduled Tribe13 candidates are permissible in the AIQ seats. The Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admissions) Act 200614, which came into effect on 3 January 2007, was enacted to provide for reservation for students D belonging to the SCs, STs and OBCs in Central educational institutions. The Act of 2006 provided that 15 percent seats shall be reserved for SCs, 7.5 percent seats for STs, and 27 percent seats for OBCs in Central educational institutions. However, reservation for OBCs was not extended to State contributed seats for AIQ in State-run institutions.

55. The State of Tamil Nadu granted 50 percent reservation to OBCs in State-run medical institutions under the Tamil Nadu Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation of Seats in Educational Institutions and of Appointments or Posts in the Services under the State) Act, 199315. Thus, the State quota seats were being F filled according to the provisions of the Act of 1993. A writ petition16 was instituted before this Court by Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam17 seeking a mandamus to provide OBC reservation in AIQ. This Court by its order dated 11 June 2020 directed that the issue be agitated before the Madras High Court. This Court observed thus:

G 11 (2009) 17 SCC 705 12 “SC” 13 “ST” 14 “Act of 2006” 15 “Act of 1993” 16 WP No 507 of 2020 17 H “DMK”

NEIL AURELIO NUNES & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 607 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“The learned senior counsel for the petitioners seek permission to A withdraw these Writ Petitions with liberty to approach the High Court by filing Writ Petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. Permission granted. The Writ Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed as withdrawn with the aforesaid liberty.” B

66. Pursuant to the above order, DMK instituted a writ petition18 before the Madras High Court arguing that the AIQ seats available in State-run medical and dental institutions in the State of Tamil Nadu must follow the reservation policy as applicable under the Act of 1993. However, the Madras High Court after issuing notice in the petition accepted the argument of the Union Government that the hearing in the matter be deferred in view of the pendency of a writ petition19 before this Court on a similar issue. Aggrieved by the deferral of the hearing, special leave petitions were instituted before this Court. By its order dated 13 July 2020, this Court disposed of the petitions holding that the issue raised in the writ petition pending before it is different from the one raised by the DMK before the Madras High Court and directed the High Court to proceed with the hearing of the case. This Court made the following observations: “Permission to file Special Leave Petition without certified/plain copy of impugned order in Diary No. 13644/2020 is granted. E These special leave petitions are directed against the order dated 22.6.2020 by which the High Court adjourned the matters in view of the pendency of Writ Petition No.596 of 2015 in this Court. This order was passed on the basis of the stand taken by the Union of India that the points arising in the writ petitions filed in the High Court are similar to those that arose in Saloni Kumari and Anr. Versus DGHS & Ors. (Writ Petition No.596 of 2015). We have perused the writ petition filed by Saloni Kumari which is pending consideration in this Court. The issue that arises in the writ petition pertains to the implementation of 27% seats for admission to Post Graduate courses in the All India Quota. The complaint of the petitioner is that the seats in the 27% quota of OBCs should not be restricted to Central Government institutions. 18 WP No 8326 of 2020 19 Saloni Kumari v Director General Health Services WP(C) No 596/2015. H

p. 608

A Whereas, the writ petitions pending in the High Court involve a dispute pertaining to the percentage of reservation to be followed in State of Tamil Nadu in respect of the surrendered seats in the All India Quota for PG medical admissions. As the point raised in the writ petitions pending in the High Court B is not similar to that in Saloni Kumari’s case, the High Court can proceed to adjudicate the writ petitions on merits. We are informed that the writ petitions are listed before the High Court for final hearing on 17.7.2020. The High Court is requested to decide the writ petitions expeditiously. Special Leave Petitions are disposed of accordingly.” C

77. The Madras High Court by its judgement dated 27 July 2020 disposed of the writ petition holding that there are no legal or constitutional impediments in extending reservation to OBCs in the AIQ seats in the medical colleges in the State of Tamil Nadu. The High Court directed the Union Government to constitute an Expert Committee for D implementing reservation for OBCs in the seats surrendered by the State of Tamil Nadu in AIQ. However, the High Court observed that the reservation should be implemented only from the academic year 2021- 2022 since it would disturb the selection process that had been set into motion for the academic year of 2020-2021. The State of Tamil Nadu E challenged the order of the Madras High Court dated 27 July 2020 before this Court in a special leave petition20 on the limited ground that the High Court erred in denying implementation of the OBC reservation for the academic year 2020-2021. In its order dated 26 October 2020, this Court upheld the order of the High Court regarding the implementation of the OBC reservation from the subsequent academic year 2021-2022.

88. The MH&FW set up an Expert Committee to determine the modalities of granting reservation to OBC candidates in AIQ seats in UG and PG courses in state-run medical colleges within the State of Tamil Nadu from the academic year 2021-2022. The Committee recommended two options in its final report, i.e., either State-specific G reservation can be implemented for OBCs in AIQ seats or OBC reservation can be granted in terms of the provisions of the Act of 2006.

99. A Contempt petition21 was instituted by DMK before the Madras High Court against the Union of India for non-implementation of OBC 20 SLP (C) No 9286 of 2020 H 21 Contempt Petition No 181 of 2021

NEIL AURELIO NUNES & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 609 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

reservation in AIQ seats. In the meanwhile, a notice dated 29 July 2021 A was issued by the Directorate General of Health Services, MoHFW to implement 27 percent OBC reservation (non-creamy Layer) and 10 percent EWS reservation in the 15 percent UG and 50 percent PG AIQ seats in the current academic session of 2021-22. The notice stated thus: B “NOTICE Urgent Attention Candidates of NEET-UG and NEET-PG: It has been decided by the Government of India to implement 27% OBC reservation (Non-creamy later) and 10% EWS reservation in the 15% AIQ UG seats and the 50% All India Quota C seats (MBBS/BDS and MD/MS/MDS) (contributed by the State/ UTs). This reservation will take effect from the current Academic session 2021-22. Consequently, the overall reservation in 15% UG and 50% PG All India Quota seats would be as follows: D SC-15% ST-7.5% OBC (Non-creamy layer) as per the Central OBC list-27% EWS- as per the Central Government Norms-10% E

PwD-5% Horizontal Reservation as per NMC Norms”

1010. By its order dated 25 August 2021, the Madras High Court dismissed the contempt petition since the Union Government had complied with the order dated 27 July 2020 of the Madras High Court by constituting a committee. The High Court observed thus: “Since the committee required to be constituted by the order dated July 27, 2020 was instituted and such committee gave its opinion and the Union, or its appropriate agencies, have acted on the basis thereof, albeit not exactly in terms of the recommendations, no case of willfull or deliberate violation of the said order can be said to have been made out.” Nonetheless, the High Court proceeded to scrutinize the validity of the notification dated 29 July 2021 providing reservation for OBC and EWS candidates in AIQ seats in medical and dental institutions. With H

p. 610

A respect to the reservation granted to EWS under the notification dated 29 July 2021, the High Court observed that such reservation can be permitted only with the approval of this Court. Special leave petitions were instituted before this Court challenging the order of the Madras High Court. This Court by its order dated 24 September 2021 disposed of the petitions observing that the Madras High Court in its contempt B jurisdiction could not have entered into a discussion on the validity of the EWS reservation provided by the notice dated 29 July 2021 and set aside the direction that the approval of this Court should be received before implementing reservation for the EWS category in AIQ seats.

1111. We have traced the trajectory of the introduction of OBC C reservation in NEET AIQ seats, which is challenged before this Court in the present batch of writ petitions. By its order dated 7 January 2022, this Court upheld the constitutional validity of the OBC reservation in AIQ medical and dental UG and PG seats. The constitutionality of the criteria used for the identification of the EWS category is yet to be D decided. However, in the interim, this Court directed that the counselling in NEET-PG 2021 and NEET-UG 2021 be conducted by giving effect to the reservation provided by the notice dated 29 July 2021, including the 27 percent OBC reservation and 10 percent EWS reservation. The challenge to the validity of the OBC reservation in AIQ seats is dealt with in this judgement. E B. Pendency of the Writ Petition instituted by Saloni Kumari

1212. We are aware that a writ petition was filed by Saloni Kumari seeking 27 percent OBC reservation in AIQ seats in State-run medical institutions on the ground that such reservation should not be restricted to Central education institutions in terms of the Act of 2006. The claim raised in that petition was of parity. The issue that has been raised before us is of the validity of the notification dated 29 July 2021 that provides for 27 percent OBC reservation in the AIQ seats in UG and PG seats from the academic year 2021-2022. On account of the difference in the nature of the issues raised before this Court, we will proceed to rule on the validity of the notification dated 29 July 2021. C. Submissions of Counsel

1313. Mr Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners argued that there must be no reservation for the OBC community in the AIQ quota. In pursuance of this argument, he made the following submissions:

NEIL AURELIO NUNES & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 611 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(i) In Pradeep Jain v. Union of India22, this Court raised serious concerns about the reservation in PG seats. Once a person is qualified as a doctor, he cannot be treated as belonging to a backward class anymore. Therefore, admission in PG seats must be purely based on merit, without any reservation; B (ii) At the level of PG and super-speciality23, doctors are required to possess high degree of skill and expert knowledge in specialised areas. This skill cannot be acquired by everyone. It would be detrimental to national interest to have reservations at this stage. Opportunities that are available for such training are minimal and therefore, it should only be available to the most meritorious; (iii) This Court in Pradeep Jain (supra) created a right against reservation in the AIQ seats. The judgment of this Court in Abhay Nath v. University of Delhi24 allowing reservations for SC and ST categories in the AIQ is per incuriam in light of the judgments in Pradeep Jain (supra), Union of India v. R. Rajeshwaran 25 and Union of India v. Jayakumar26; (iv) The AIQ scheme was conceived by this Court in Pradeep Jain (supra) and developed in Dinesh Kumar (I) (supra) E and Dinesh Kumar (II) (supra). Therefore, only this Court can alter the reservation scheme in the AIQ seats. The Union Government ought to have made an application to this Court apprising it of its intention to provide reservation for OBC and EWS categories in AIQ, and this Court could F decide to allow or deny permission; (v) It has been held by this Court in Dr Preeti Srivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh27 and various other cases that reservation in PG courses must be minimum; G 22 (1984) 3 SCC 654 23 “SS” 24 (2009) 17 SCC 705 25 (2003) 9 SCC 294 26 (2008) 17 SCC 478 27 (1999) 7 SCC 120 H

p. 612

A (vi) Even if reservation for the OBC category in the AIQ seats is constitutionally valid, it ought not to have been introduced for the academic year of 2021-22 since the notice on reservation for the OBC category was introduced after the registration window was closed. It is a settled principle that the rules of the game cannot be changed after the game has begun; (vii) The candidates had registered for the exam against a certain seat matrix, having knowledge of the total number of seats for which they could compete. The impugned notification alters the seat matrix, changing the rules of the game after the game had begun; (viii) The phrase ‘as may be applicable’ in clause 11.1 of the information bulletin must be read to mean the reservation applicable as on the date of registration. The rules of the game were set when the registration closed; and D (ix) In specific branches of specialisation such as MD Radiology, MD Dermatology, MD Gynaecology, MS Psychiatry, MD (Chest), MD Preventive and Social Medicine, MD Forensic Medicine, MS Microbiology, MS Pathology, MD Biochemistry, MS Anatomy, MS Orthopedics, and MS ENT, E no SS course is offered in India. Therefore, such courses are the end of the branch and there must be no reservation in such courses since they are equivalent to SS courses (Dr. Preeti Srivastava (supra)).

1414. The Union of India addressed the following arguments contending that the 27 percent reservation for the OBC category in AIQ seats is constitutionally valid. Mr Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General and Mr KM Nataraj, Additional Solicitor General made the following submissions: (i) The rules of the game were not changed after the process had begun since the reservation through the impugned notice issued on 29 July 2021 was introduced much prior to the date on which the exams were conducted and before the commencement of the counselling process. The NEET PG examination schedule is as follows: H

NEIL AURELIO NUNES & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 613 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(a) Release of Information Brochure: 23 February 2021 A (b) Commencement of Registration Process: 23 February 2021 (c) Last date of Registration: 15 March 2021 (d) Scheduled examination date: 18 April 2021 B (e) Postponement for four months on: 03 May 2021 (f) New date of examinations announced on: 13 July 2021 (g) New date for examination: 11 September 2021 C Clause 11.1 of the information bulletin issued on 23 February 2021 states that reservation of PG seats shall be as per the norms of the Central Government and the respective State Governments. Clause 11.2 states that a separate handbook providing information on the counselling process and applicable reservation shall be released by the designated counselling authority for NEET-PG 2021. Therefore, the process begins only with the commencement of the counselling process and not when the registration closes; (ii) Reservation in AIQ seats according to the impugned notice has been implemented for MDS admissions in the current academic year of 2021-22; (iii) The AIQ scheme was introduced in 1986 to provide domicile free admission to students from across the country. Till 2007, there was no reservation in the AIQ. In 2007, this Court in the case of Abhay Nath (supra) permitted 15 percent reservation for the SCs and 7.5 percent reservation for the STs in the AIQ seats. The Act of 2006 providing 27 percent reservation to OBCs which came into force in 2007 was implemented in all Central educational institutions, including medical colleges run by the Central Government; G (iv) The AIQ scheme is a Central scheme. Therefore, the Central List of OBCs shall be used for implementing the reservation. Around 1500 OBC students in UG and 2500 in PG will be benefitted through reservation for OBC category in AIQ seats; H

p. 614

A (v) In the last six years, MBBS seats in the country have been increased by 56 percent from 54,348 in 2014 to 84,649 seats in 2020. The number of PG medical seats has been increased by 80 percent from 30,191 seats in 2014 to 54,275 seats in 2020; B (vi) Providing reservation for the AIQ seats in medical/dental courses is a matter of policy; (vii) Though observations have been made by this Court on the desirability or otherwise of reservation in PG courses, it has never been held to be unconstitutional; and C (viii) This Court in Pradeep Jain (supra) only held that there would be no domicile-based reservation in the AIQ seats. It was not held that no reservation otherwise would be impermissible in the AIQ seats. Subsequent decisions of this Court (Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India 28; Gulshan Prakash v. State of Haryana29) have clarified that this Court in Pradeep Jain (supra) had only observed that the AIQ seats shall be free from domicile reservation.

1515. Mr P Wilson, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the DMK, submitted that the 27 percent reservation for the OBC seats in the AIQ is constitutionally valid. The Senior Counsel made the following submissions: (i) Parliament by the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act 2005 introduced Clause (5) in Article 15 providing reservation for the SCs, STs and socially and educationally backward classes (or the OBCs) in admission to educational institutions, including private educational institutions, aided or unaided by the State and other minority educational institutions. Pursuant to the amendment, the Union Government enacted the Act of 2006 providing 27 percent reservation for the OBC category in Central educational institutions. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment and the Act of 2006 in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India30. The Tamil Nadu State legislature enacted the Tamil 28 (2003) 11 SCC 146 29 (2010) 1 SCC 477 H 30 (2007) 4 SCC 361

NEIL AURELIO NUNES & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 615 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Nadu Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled A Tribes (Reservation of Seats in Educational Institutions and of Appointments or Posts in the Services under the State) Act 1993 providing 69 percent reservation. The enactment permits 50 percent reservation for backward classes and the most backward classes. Therefore, both the State B legislature and the Parliament allow reservation for the OBC category; (ii) Regulation 9(IV) of the PG Medical Education Regulations 2000 and Regulation 5(5) of the UG Medical Education Regulations stipulate reservation for the categories based on the applicable laws prevailing in the States/Union C Territories. Therefore, reservation must be applicable to all seats including the State contributed seats of AIQ; (iii) Merit cannot be measured solely in terms of marks. Merit must be construed in terms of the social value of a member in the medical profession (Pradeep Jain (supra); D

(iv) In UG courses, the States contribute 15 percent seats to the AIQ. Of the 6060 seats in the AIQ contributed by the States, 1636 seats (that is 27 percent) seats ought to have been reserved for the OBC category on the enactment of the Act of 2006. Similarly, 2569 of the 9515 seats contributed by the States to the AIQ in PG courses ought to have been reserved for the OBC category; (v) The Madras High Court in a judgment dated 27 July 2020 (in WP No. 8626 of 2020) had observed that there was no legal or constitutional impediment in extending the benefit of reservation to the OBC category in the AIQ in PG courses. The petitioners have not challenged the judgment of the Madras High Court; (vi) Clause 11 of the information bulletin for the NEET-PG examination states that reservation would be ‘as per the norms of GOI and State prevailing at the time of counselling’. Therefore, the argument of the petitioners that the rules of the game should not be changed in the middle of the game would be applicable only if the reservation was introduced after the counselling had begun; H

p. 616

A (vii) The submission of the petitioners that no reservation was provided at the level of SS in view of the judgment of this Court in Dr.Preeti Srivastava (supra) is erroneous since the Act of 2006 only exempts reservations in institutions of excellence, research institutions, and institutions of national and strategic importance specified in the schedule of the B Act, and Minority Educational Institutions as referred to under section 4 of the Act of 2006. Reservation is provided in SS courses in Central educational institutions such as AIIMS and JIPMER; (viii) Central medical institutions such as AIIMS and PGI hold their own examination twice a year for PG courses. There is no demarcation of State Quota and AIQ in these Central institutions. Therefore, the AIQ PG seats are different from PG seats of Central institutions; and (ix) Reservation can be provided either through a legislation or by an executive order such as a notification, order, and memorandum.

1616. The arguments of the petitioners are three-fold: (i) Admissions to PG courses must solely be based on open competition; (ii) this Court in Pradeep Jain (supra) and subsequent cases has held that there shall be no reservation in the AIQ seats and that admission to the AIQ seats shall be strictly by open competition; and (iii) as this Court evolved the concept of AIQ seats, any reservation to be introduced in the AIQ seats must only be pursuant to the direction of this Court. D. Analysis F D. 1 The Merit of Reservation

1717. On behalf of the petitioners, it was urged that at the level of PG courses, a high degree of skill and expertise is required. Thus, such opportunities must be available to the most meritorious and providing any reservation for PG seats would be detrimental to national interest. G In effect, a binary was sought to be created between merit and reservation, where reservation becomes antithetical to establishing meritocracy. This is not a novel argument. There has been a longstanding debate over whether reservation for any class impinges on the idea of merit. In the Constituent Assembly Debates on draft Article 10, which H

NEIL AURELIO NUNES & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 617 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Footnotes

10 (now Article
16 (4) of the Constitution) which provided that the State is empowered to make reservation in appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens who, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. Certain members of the Constituent Assembly argued for the deletion of clause (3). For instance, Shri Loknath Misra stated that such a provision puts, “a premium on backwardness and inefficiency” and no citizen had a fundamental right “to claim a portion of State employment, which ought to go by merit alone.” Shri Damodar Swarup Seth argued that reservation results in the “very negation of efficiency and good Government” and appointments should be “made on merit and qualification”. However, the Constituent Assembly rejected these claims and adopted clause (3) of draft Article

10. Although there was debate on the meaning of “backward classes”, it was felt that there must be a provision that enables entry of those communities into administration since they were deprived of such access in the past and formal equality of opportunity would not suffice.31 However, the view that merit or efficiency in service is distinct from concerns of advancement of backward classes persisted for some members. Shri KM Munshi (a member of the Drafting Committee) observed that: “What we want to secure by this clause [Article 10] are two things. In the fundamental right in the first clause we want to achieve the highest efficiency in the services of the State—highest efficiency which would enable the services to function effectively and promptly. At the same time, in view of the conditions in our country prevailing in several provinces, we want to see that backward classes, classes who are really backward, should be given scope in the State services; for it is realised that State services give a status and an opportunity to serve the country, and this opportunity should be extended to every community, even among the backward people.” G However, many members also recognized that merit cannot be separated from the function of the existing inequalities in society. They 31 Volume 7, Constituent Assembly of India Debates, 30 November 1948, available at https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/7/1948- 11-30 H

p. 618

A envisaged that social justice must be read into the promise of equality of opportunity; otherwise the latter merely advances the interests of the privileged. During the debates on draft Article 286, which pertained to the functions of Public Service Commission with regard to appointments to public posts, Dr PS Deshmukh argued that: B “…people’s capacities cannot be measured by mere passing of examinations or obtaining the highest possible marks. But those communities who have had the advantage of English education, because they were prepared to be more servile than the rest, think it is a preserve of theirs, and whenever anybody gets up and speaks on behalf of the millions who have had no chances of education, they consider it as a threat to their monopoly on the part of the rest of the communities and accuse the advocates as communal and communally minded. There is no communalism in this. Neither I nor anybody who speaks on their behalf want any particular community to dominate, where as those who oppose this move are interested only in particular communities. They want to preserve communalism while accusing us of communalism because they have had the advantage of education which they fear will be taken away. They think and urge that merit is or can be tested only by examinations. But so far as the masses of the country are concerned, the millions of our populations who have not had even the chance to get primary school education, they have no place so far as the public services are concerned, so long as the present system lasts.”32 Shri Phool Singh emphatically provided a conception of substantive equality when he stated that merit of candidates cannot be evaluated through an open competition without regard to their social positions. He further highlighted that the meaning of merit should also take into reference the task that is to be carried out. He stated thus: “…Much has been made of merit in this case; but equal merit pre-supposes equal opportunity, and I think it goes without saying that the toiling masses are denied all those opportunities which a few literate people living in big cities enjoy. To ask the people

32 Volume 9, Constituent Assembly of India Debates, 23 August 1949, available at https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/9/1949- H 08-23

NEIL AURELIO NUNES & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 619 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

from the villages to compete with those city people is asking a A man on bicycle to compete with another on a motorcycle, which in itself is absurd. Then again, merit should also have some reference to the task to be discharged. Mr.Tyagi interrupted Dr. Deshmukh by saying that it is a fight for the illiterates. I think, however sarcastic that remark may be, he was probably right. B Self-Government, means a government by the people, and if the people are illiterate, a few leaders have no right to usurp all the power to themselves. This cry, this bogey of merit and fair-play is being raised by those who are in a[n] advantageous position and who stand to suffer if others also come into the picture.”33 While these observations were made in the context of employment to public posts, the debate on conceptualisation of reservation as an exception to the principle of merit has relevance in regard to admission to educational institutions as well. The debates in Constituent Assembly were limited to reservation in public posts because reservation in educational institutions was introduced through a subsequent constitutional amendment.

1818. On its part, this Court initially subscribed to the binary of merit and reservation. Articles 14, 15(1) and 16(1) were thought to embody the general principle of formal equality. Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4) were understood to be exceptions to this general principle, advancing the cause of social justice. This Court sought to balance these competing imperatives. In such an understanding, merit is equated to formal equality of opportunity which has to be balanced against the concerns of social justice through reservation. In MR Balaji v. State of Mysore34, a Constitution Bench of this Court observed that Article 15 (4) is an exception to Article 15 (1), which was introduced “because the interests of the society at large would be served by promoting advancements of the weaker elements in the society”.35 However, since Article 15 (4) (or reservation) was considered at odds with the notion of formal equality under Article 15 (1), which is broadly understood as complying with the principle of merit, this Court observed that there should be a cap on reservations, which it specified generally should be 50 percent.36 This Court stated:

Footnotes

33 Ibid 34 1963 Supp (1) SCR 439
35 Ibid, paragraph 31.
36 Ibid, paragraph 34. H

p. 620

A “32. …Therefore, in considering the question about the propriety of the reservation made by the impugned order, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the reservation is made in respect of higher university education. The demand for technicians, scientists, doctors, economists, engineers and experts for the further economic advancement of the country is so great that it would cause grave prejudice to national interests if considerations of merit are completely excluded by whole-sale reservation of seat in all technical, Medical or Engineering colleges or institutions of that kind. Therefore, considerations of national interest and the interests of the community or society as a whole cannot be ignored in determining the question as to whether the special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) can be special provision which exclude the rest of the society altogether. In this connection, it would be relevant to mention that the University Education Commission which considered the problem of the assistance to backward communities, has observed that the percentage of reservation shall not exceed a third of the total number of seats, and it has added that the principle of reservation may be adopted for a period of ten years (p. 53).”

1919. This view was followed by this Court in subsequent judgements where a special provision made for the benefit of a class was seen as a E deviation from the principle of formal equality.37 However, the dominant view of this Court was challenged by the Justice R Subba Rao in his dissent in T. Devadasan v. Union of India, where the learned judge stated that Article 16 (4) is not an exception but rather a facet of Article 16 (1), which seeks to redress the historical disadvantage suffered by F certain communities. Justice Subba Rao observed thus: “26. Article 14 lays down the general rule of equality. Article 16 is an instance of the application of the general rule with special reference to opportunity of appointments under the State. It says that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the G State. If it stood alone, all the backward communities would go to the wall in a society of uneven basic social structure; the said rule of equality would remain only an utopian conception unless a

37 T. Devadasan v. Union of India (1964) 4 SCR 680; CA Rajendran v. Union of India H (1968) 1 SCR 721

NEIL AURELIO NUNES & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 621 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

practical content was given to it. Its strict enforcement brings about the very situation it seeks to avoid. To make my point clear, take the illustration of a horse race. Two horses are set down to run a race —one is a first class race horse and the other an ordinary one. Both are made to run from the same starting point. Though theoretically they are given equal opportunity to run the race, in practice the ordinary horse is not given an equal opportunity to compete with the race horse. Indeed, that is denied to it. So a handicap may be given either in the nature of extra weight or a start from a longer distance. By doing so, what would otherwise have been a farce of a competition would be made a real one. The same difficulty had confronted the makers of the Constitution C at the time it was made. Centuries of calculated oppression and habitual submission reduced a considerable section of our community to a life of serfdom. It would be well nigh impossible to raise their standards if the doctrine of equal opportunity was strictly enforced in their case. They would not have any chance if they were made to enter the open field of competition without adventitious aids till such time when they could stand on their own legs. That is why the makers of the Constitution introduced clause (4) in Article 16. The expression “nothing in this article” is a legislative device to express its intention in a most emphatic way that the power conferred thereunder is not limited in any way by the main provision but falls outside it. It has not really carved out an exception, but has preserved a power untrammelled by the other provisions of the article.”

2020. The view expressed by Justice Subba Rao was adopted by this Court in State of Kerala v. NM Thomas38, which transformed the equality jurisprudence in India from that of formal equality to substantive equality; thus, also changing our understanding of reservations. Chief Justice AN Ray writing the judgement of this Court held: “44. Our Constitution aims at equality of status and opportunity for all citizens including those who are socially, economically and educationally backward. The claims of members of Backward Classes require adequate representation in legislative and executive bodies. If members of Scheduled Castes and tribes, who are said by this Court to be Backward Classes, can maintain minimum 38 (1976) 2 SCC 310 H

p. 622

A necessary requirement of administrative efficiency, not only representation but also preference may be given to them to enforce equality and to eliminate inequality. Article 15(4) and 16(4) bring out the position of Backward Classes to merit equality. Special provisions are made for the advancement of Backward Classes and reservations of appointments and posts for them to secure adequate representation. These provisions will bring out the content of equality guaranteed by Articles 14, 15(1) and 16(1). The basic concept equality is equality of opportunity for appointment. Preferential treatment for members of Backward Classes with due regard to administrative efficiency alone can mean equality of opportunity for all citizens. Equality under Article 16 could not have a different content from equality under Article 14. Equality of opportunity for unequals can only mean aggravation of inequality. Equality of opportunity admits discrimination with reason and prohibits discrimination without reason. Discrimination with reasons means rational classification for differential treatment having nexus to the constitutionally permissible object. Preferential representation for the Backward Classes in services with due regard to administrative efficiency is permissible object and Backward Classes are a rational classification recognised by our Constitution. Therefore, differential treatment in standards of selection are within the concept of equality.” The majority of the judges accepted that special provisions (including reservation) made for the benefit of any class are not an exception to the general principle of equality. Special provisions are a method to ameliorate the structural inequalities that exist in the society, without which, true or factual equality will remain illusory. Justice KK Mathew in his concurring opinion observed that while equality under Article 16 (1) is individual-centric39 (which was the view of the majority – Justice Mathew and Justice Beg’s majority opinions, and Justice Khanna and Justice Gupta’s dissents), the manner in which it is to be achieved is through the identification of groups that do not enjoy equal access to certain rights and entitlements. The learned judge made the following observations: “73. There is no reason why this Court should not also require the State to adopt a standard of proportional equality which takes

H 39 Ibid, paragraph 52.

NEIL AURELIO NUNES & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 623 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

account of the differing conditions and circumstances of a class of citizens whenever those conditions and circumstances stand in the way of their equal access to the enjoyment of basic rights or claims.

74. The concept of equality of opportunity in matters of employment is wide enough to include within it compensatory measures to put the members of the Scheduled Castes and scheduled tribes on par with the members of other communities which would enable them to get their share of representation in public service. How can any member of the so-called forward communities complain of a compensatory measure made by the Government to ensure the members of Scheduled Castes and scheduled tribes their due share of representation in public services?

75. It is said that Article 16(4) specifically provides for reservation of posts in favour of Backward Classes which according to the decision of this Court would include the power of the State to make reservation at the stage of promotion also and therefore Article 16(1) cannot include within its compass the power to give any adventitious aids by legislation or otherwise to the Backward Classes which would derogate from strict numerical equality. If reservation is necessary either at the initial stage or at the stage of promotion or at both to ensure for the members of the Scheduled Castes and scheduled tribes equality of opportunity in the matter of employment, I see no reason why that is not permissible under Article 16(1) as that alone might put them on a parity with the forward communities in the matter of achieving the result which equality of opportunity would produce. Whether there is equality of opportunity can be gauged only by the equality attained in the result. Formal equality of opportunity simply enables people with more education and intelligence to capture all the posts and to win over the less fortunate in education and talent even when the competition is fair. Equality of result is the test of equality of opportunity.” Thus, the learned judge envisaged that equality of individuals is to be achieved by addressing the structural barriers faced by certain classes of citizens, which he called the “conditions and circumstances [that] stand in the way of their equal access to the enjoyment of basic rights or H

p. 624

A claims”. Justice Krishna Iyer and Justice Fazal Ali in their concurring opinions went a step further to argue that the content of Article 16 (1) is not individual-centric rather it aims to provide equality of opportunity to sections that face structural barriers to their advancement. Justice Krishna Iyer invoked Article 46 of the Constitution, which although unenforceable, was employed for giving effect to Article 16 (1). In his opinion both B Articles 16 (1) and 16 (4) function to equalise group inequalities albeit in different contexts. The learned judge observed thus: “137. “reservation” based on classification of backward and forward classes, without detriment to administrative standards (as this Court has underscored) is but an application of the principle of equality within a class and grouping based on a rational differentia, the object being advancement of backward classes consistently with efficiency. Article 16(1) and (4) are concordant. This Court has viewed Article 16(4) as an exception to Article 16(1). Does classification based on desperate backwardness render Article 16(4) redundant? No. Reservation confers pro tanto monopoly, but classification grants under Article 16(1) ordinarily a lesser order of advantage. The former is more rigid, the latter more flexible, although they may overlap sometimes. Article 16(4) covers all backward classes; but to earn the benefit of grouping under Article 16(1) based on Articles 46 and 335 as I have explained, the twin considerations of terrible backwardness of the type harijans endure and maintenance of administrative efficiency must be satisfied.”

2121. Justice Fazal Ali in his concurring opinion noted that equality of opportunity under Article 16 (1) entails the removal of barriers faced by certain classes of society. They cannot be denied the right to equality and relegated to suffer backwardness only because they do not meet certain artificial standards set up by institutions. Justice Fazal Ali made the following observations: “158. It is no doubt true that Article 16(1) provides for equality of opportunity for all citizens in the services under the State. It is, however, well-settled that the doctrine contained in Article 16 is a hard and reeling reality, a concrete and constructive concept and not a rigid rule or an empty formula. It is also equally well-settled by several authorities of this Court that Article 16 is merely an incident of Article 14, Article 14 being the genus is of universal

NEIL AURELIO NUNES & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 625 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

application whereas Article 16 is the species and seeks to obtain equality of opportunity in the services under the State. The theory of reasonable classification is implicit and inherent in the concept of equality for there can hardly be any country where all the citizens would be equal in all respects. Equality of opportunity would naturally mean a fair opportunity not only to one section or the other but to all sections by removing the handicaps if a particular section of the society suffers from the same. It has never been disputed in judicial pronouncements by this Court as also of the various High Courts that Article 14 permits reasonable classification. But what Article 14 or Article 16 forbid is hostile discrimination and not reasonable classification. In other words, the idea of classification is implicit in the concept of equality because equality means equality to all and not merely to the advanced and educated sections of the society. It follows, therefore, that in order to provide equality of opportunity to all citizens of our country, every class of citizens must have a sense of equal participation in building up an egalitarian society, where there is peace and plenty, where there is complete economic freedom and there is no pestilence or poverty, no discrimination and oppression, where there is equal opportunity to education, to work, to earn their livelihood so that the goal of social justice is achieved. Could we, while conferring benefits on the stronger and the more/advanced sections of the society, ignore the more backward classes merely because they cannot come up to the fixed standards? Such a course, in my opinion, would lead to denial of opportunity to the backward classes resulting in complete annihilation of the concept of equality contained in Articles 14 and 16. The only manner in which the objective of equality as contemplated by the founding fathers of our Constitution and as enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 can be achieved is to boost up the backward classes by giving them concessions, relaxations, facilities, removing handicaps, and making suitable reservations so that the weaker sections of the people may compete with the more advanced and in due course of time all may become equals and backwardness is banished for ever. This can happen only when we achieve complete economic and social freedom. In our vast country where we have diverse races and classes of people, some of whom are drowned in the sea of ignorance and illiteracy, the concept of equality assumes very important proportions. There H

p. 626

A are a number of areas in some States like Kashmir, Sikkim, hilly areas of U.P., Bihar and the South, where due to lack of communications or transport, absence of proper educational facilities or because of old customs and conventions and other environmental reasons, the people are both socially and educationally backward. Could we say that the citizens hailing from these areas should continue to remain backward merely because they fall short of certain artificial standards fixed by various institutions? The answer must be in the negative. The directive principles enshrined in our Constitution contain a clear mandate to achieve equality and social justice. Without going into the vexed question as to whether or not the directive principles contained in Part IV override the fundamental rights in Part III there appears to be a complete unanimity of judicial opinion of this Court that the directive principles and the fundamental rights should be construed in harmony with each other and every attempt should be made by the Court, to resolve any apparent inconsistency. D The directive principles contained in Part IV constitute the stairs to climb the high edifice of a socialistic State and the fundamental rights are the means through which one can reach the top of the edifice. I am fortified in my view by several decisions of this Court to which I will refer briefly.”

2222. Even if the judges differed on whether Article 16 (1) is individual-centric or group-centric, they nonetheless accepted that Article 16 (4) is crucial to achieve substantive equality that is envisaged under Article 16 (1). Articles 16 (4), 15 (4), and 15 (5) employ group identification as a method through which substantive equality can be F achieved. This may lead to an incongruity where individual members of an identified group may not be backward or individuals belonging to the non-identified group may share certain characteristics of backwardness with members of an identified group. However, this does not change the underlying rationale of the reservation policy that seeks to remedy the structural barriers that disadvantaged groups face in advancing in society. G Reservation is one of the measures that is employed to overcome these barriers. The individual difference may be a result of privilege, fortune, or circumstances but it cannot be used to negate the role of reservation in remedying the structural disadvantage that certain groups suffer.

2323. The view that special provisions made for a backward class H are not an exception to the principle of equality was re-affirmed by a

NEIL AURELIO NUNES & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 627 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

nine-Judge Bench in Indira Sawhney v. Union of India40. These A observations were made in the context of Articles 16 (1) and 16(4). In Dr Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister 41, this Court has observed that the principles applied for interpreting Article 16 are also to be used for the interpretation of Article 15. Thus, Articles 15 (4) and Article 15 (5) are nothing but a restatement of the guarantee of the right to equality stipulated in Article 15 (1).

2424. The crux of the above discussion is that the binary of merit and reservation has now become superfluous once this Court has recognized the principle of substantive equality as the mandate of Article 14 and as a facet of Articles 15 (1) and 16(1). An open competitive exam may ensure formal equality where everyone has an equal opportunity to participate. However, widespread inequalities in the availability of and access to educational facilities will result in the deprivation of certain classes of people who would be unable to effectively compete in such a system. Special provisions (like reservation) enable such disadvantaged classes to overcome the barriers they face in effectively competing with forward classes and thus ensuring substantive equality. The privileges that accrue to forward classes are not limited to having access to quality schooling and access to tutorials and coaching centres to prepare for a competitive examination but also includes their social networks and cultural capital (communication skills, accent, books or academic accomplishments) that they inherit from their family. 42 The E cultural capital ensures that a child is trained unconsciously by the familial environment to take up higher education or high posts commensurate with their family’s standing. This works to the disadvantage of individuals who are first-generation learners and come from communities whose traditional occupations do not result in the transmission of necessary F skills required to perform well in open examination. They have to put in surplus effort to compete with their peers from the forward communities.43 On the other hand, social networks (based on community linkages) become useful when individuals seek guidance and advise on how to prepare for examination and advance in their career even if their G 40 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 41 (2021) 8 SCC 1 42 K.V Syamprasad, Merit and caste as cultural capital: Justifying affirmative action for the underprivileged in Kerala, India, Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies, Vol 17, p.50-81 (2019). 43 Ibid H

p. 628

Report an error in this judgment →

Contains information from the Indian High Court / Supreme Court Judgments dataset, licensed under CC-BY-4.0