RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE CORP. OF INDIA & ANR.

A restored the Srivastav Award (subject to its modification in thereview petition in regards the quantum of back wages), it is also bound by: (a) The order dated 23 October 1992 of a three-judge Bench of this Court in E Prabavathy(supra) which B upheld the scheme formed by LIC for absorption of ad hoc workers; (b) The order dated 22 November 2001 of a two-judge Bench of this Court in G Sudhakar (supra)which held that the scheme which was accepted in E C Prabavathy (supra) would not be limited only to the workers in that case but would be applicable to all the workers of LIC in all its divisions across India; and (c) The settlement which substituted the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, which was recorded by this Court D while disposing of the civil appeals by its final order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra); (vii) On 16 May 2017, LIC issued instructions under Regulation 4 of its Staff Regulations to all Zonal Managers to implement E the Srivastav Award and this Court’s orders. Consequently, 245 workers were offered absorption after being found eligible; (viii) In terms of the order of this Court dated 18 January 2011 in LIC of India v. DV Anil Kumar (supra), LIC framed a F scheme to regularise Class IV workers who were engaged for 5 years or more and consequently, 4770 persons were appointed on regular posts; (v) Following the order of this Court dated 11 May 2018 in the contempt proceedings35, LIC received 8300 representations G from individuals claiming to be covered by the Srivastav Award, which were then scrutinised by a senior officer. Subsequently, 76 claimants were found to be eligible for absorption in addition to the 245 individual claimants who had been absorbed earlier; 35 H Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of 2009

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1031 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(vi) By the order of this Court dated 7 September 2018 in the contempt proceedings arising out a review of TN Terminated Employees Association (supra), it was expressly made clear that: (a) The question whether the benefit of the Srivastav Award should be made available to those who were engaged as badli and temporary workers after 4 March 1991 is a matter for interpretation before this Court; (b) The CGIT would limit its inquiry only to the claims of the workers who were employed between 20 May C 1985 and 4 March 1991; and (c) No case in contempt had been established; (vii) The above position is further clarified by this Court’s order dated 10 September 2018 in the contempt proceedings arising out the review of TN Terminated Employees D Association (supra), in terms of which CGIT was directed to verify the list which was available on its record. Thus, the CGIT was required to scrutinise the applications claiming the benefit of the award against the list of workers who were before the CGIT in the Srivastav Award. Hence, LIC E scrutinized the claims of only those who were part of the certified list before the CGIT in the Srivastav Award and had worked between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991; (viii) All India Life Insurance Employees Association and Life Insurance Employees Association (R6 and R2 in the Dogra F Report), All India Insurance Employees Association and Western Zone Insurance Employees Association (R3 and R4 in the Dogra Report), National Organisation of Insurance Workers (R7 in the Dogra Report) and All India National Life Insurance Employees Federation (R9 in the Dogra Report) were all signatories to the compromise which G substituted the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards and was noted in this Court’s interim order dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra). Further, by the order of this Court dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), the Karamchari Sangh (R10 in the Dogra Report) was also H

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A directed to follow the terms of compromise. Hence, these Unions and Associations who had entered into the compromise substituting the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards are governed by its terms; (ix) The scrutiny which was envisaged by the order of this Court B required the CGIT to: firstly, check the presence of the names of the claimants in the CGIT list in the Srivastav Award; and secondly, conduct a verification of documents such as appointment letters, extension letters and relieving letters to scrutinise whether the claimants were actually employed for 70/85 days for three/two years respectively. C Based on this scrutiny, the 321 eligible workers (245+76) who were beneficiaries of the Srivastav Award have already been absorbed, and any other claims by the workers individually or through the ten Unions are not maintainable; (x) The Dogra Report has erroneously held that the D compromise which was arrived at between the parties was in addition to the rights declared in the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards.To support its reasoning, the Report relies on the findings of this Court at paragraph 39 to 41 of its judgment dated 18 March 2015 in TN Terminated Employees E Association (supra).However, those observations have only adverted to the interim order dated 1 March 1989of this Court in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), and not its final order dated 7 February 1996; (xi) Instead of carrying out the task of verification, the Dogra F Report only takes a prima facie view and has merely stated that the majority of the workers were eligible for absorption without carrying out the process of verification; (xii) Though the Unions have admitted that they do not possess either the residential addresses or other particulars of the G claimants situated in various regions, the Dogra Report has found 1452 workmen to be eligible across the country; and (xiii) In summary, the Dogra Report is flawed because it: (a) Does not consider the CGIT certified list of the Srivastav Award, as directed in the order of this Court H dated 10 September 2018;

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1033 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(b) Ignores that it was not carrying out an adjudicatory function but only a verification exercise; (c) Initially states that the claimants who had joined after 4 March 1991 are not being scrutinised, yet the final directions consider many such claims; and (d) Ignores paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award and gives benefit to persons who are governed by the scheme accepted by this Court in E Prabavathy (supra).

36Copy pinpoint36. On behalf of the Unions, Associations and workers, arguments have been addressed by Dr Manish Singhvi, Mr Pallav Sishodia, Mr R C Singaravelan, Mr V Prakash and Mr Salman Khurshid, Senior Counsel. In addition to the submissions of Senior Counsel, we have heard Mr Nandakumar, Mr Rakesh Shukla andMr Shailesh Madiyal. In addition, Counsel appearing on behalf of the workers in various Miscellaneous Applications have been furnished with an opportunity of being heard in seriatim. The submissions which have been urged on behalf of the workers are summarised below: (i) The present proceedings in the Miscellaneous Applications pertain to the implementation of the Srivastav Award dated 22 June 2001. The Srivastav Award has been upheld in the decision of this Court in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra); (ii) The review petitions arising from the decision in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) were dismissed by the judgment in TN Terminated Full Time F Temporary LIC Employees Assn. v. LIC 36 and the curative petition was also dismissed on 22 February 2017. Thus, the Srivastav Award has attained finality subject to the modification thatthe quantum of back-wages has been reduced to fifty per cent. The doctrine of res judicata applies between the parties and at this stage, it would not G be open to set aside or alter the contents of the award; (iii) Though the contempt petitions were disposed of, the CGIT was directed to look into the implementation of the Srivastav 36 (2016) 9 SCC 366 H

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A Award. The Dogra Report dated 31 May 2019 has been prepared by the CGIT in pursuance of the mandate of this Court; (iv) Four grounds have been advanced on behalf of LIC to assail the Dogra report: B (a) No documents were produced to establish that the workers had worked for 85 days and 70 days across a period of two and three years respectively; (b) The Dogra Report had to consider only the CGIT certified list which was part of the reference proceedings; (c) The Srivastav Award would not apply to workers who commenced work after 4 March 1991; and (d) The Dogra Report also permits the absorption of the workers governed by the judgment of this Court in E Prabavathy (supra); (v) In response to the above grounds, it is submitted that the Dogra Report has correctly drawn an adverse inference against LIC for not producing the records which were in their possession, while approving the lists. Further, the report duly notes that a majority of the workers had produced documents, which have been accepted after verification; (vi) In the event, however, that this Court is inclined to remit the proceedings back for proper verification of the workers who are covered by the Srivastav Award, the following methodology should be adopted: (a) LIC has now stated before this Court that its divisional officesare in possession of the records. LIC must produce in the first instance the records available with it for the purpose of verification; and G (b) The verification to be carried out under the directions of this Court should not be confined to any particular document and the primary onus must lie on LIC to show whether the workers have actually worked during the relevant period; H

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1035 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(vii) The Srivastav Award did not only deal with the cases of workers who had actually filed cases in the industrial reference. The award specifies that it would apply to all workers, and consequently directed that an advertisement be issued for that purpose. If the award was intended to be limited to the CGIT certified list, there was no occasion to direct a verification to be carried out by the CGIT since the certified list was already available with LIC.Hence, the direction in the order of this Court dated 10 September 2018 in the contempt proceedings arising out of the review of TN Terminated Employees Association (supra), that the verification would be carried out of the CGIT list, cannot be read out of context.Consistent with the principles of collective bargaining under the ID Act, all workers who were beneficiaries of the Srivastav Award should be granted absorption; (viii) The plea that workers employed after 4 March 1991 are not entitled to relief under the Srivastav Award is contrary to the provisions of Section 18(3)(d) of the ID Act. The purpose of Section 18(3)(d) is to ensure that an award governs not only those who are in service when it is made but to subsequent workers as well. In any event, at least those workers who were in employment on 18 June 2001, E when the award was made, should be granted relief; (ix) The applicability of the orders of this Court in E Prabavathy (supra) and G Sudhakar (supra) has been considered in the judgment of this Court in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra), and that interpretation has attained finality. Hence, those orders ought not to become the basis to reopen the present proceedings; (x) As a matter of fact, the Dogra Report suffers from under- inclusion since the claims of workers who were engaged after 4 March 1991 have not been considered, though they may have applied in pursuance of the advertisement issued by the LIC to implement the Srivastav Award; (xi) The compromise which was arrived at before this Court, as noted in its orders dated 1 March 1989 and 7 February H

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A 1996, indicates that it was confined to persons who worked from 1 January 1982 to 20 May 1985. Hence, it has no relevance to the Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001, which relates to persons who were engaged after 20 May 1985; (xii) The terms of reference which resulted in the Srivastav B Award related to the employment of badli, temporary and part-time workers after 20 May 1985. Consequently, there is no warrant for restricting the operation of the award to the period upto 4 March 1991 (which was the date of reference). The benefit of the award must enure not only to the workers who were engaged as temporaries or badlis after 20 May 1985 till the date of reference but the same principle must also apply to workers who have been engaged thereafter; and(xiii) The judgment of this Court has directed the payment of fifty per cent back-wages. For the period after the date of the Srivastav Award, full back-wages should be granted to those who have been absorbed. Back-wages cannot be granted only for the period of 70/85 days, and at the rates which were made applicable to the badli workers.

37Copy pinpoint37. The rival submissions would now fall for analysis. G Prelude –Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, and their Aftermath E

38Copy pinpoint38. The Tulpule Award dated 17 April 1986 was made in the context of a reference to the NIT pertaining to the absorption of badli/ temporary/part-time workers as regular employees of LIC. The award held that all workers who had worked in any capacity, temporary, badli or part-time, between 1 January 1982 till 20 May 1985, should be considered as eligible for absorption provided that: (a) Class IV worker sought to have worked for 70 days in any three calendar years; and (b)Class III worker sought to have worked for 85 days in any two calendar years.

39Copy pinpoint39. The Jamdar Award dated 26 August 1998 clarified the meaning of the Tulpule Award dated 17April 1986.The award discussed the object of the earlier reference, and indicated that LIC had engaged badli/ temporary/part-time workers on a large-scale and restricted their employment to a particular number of days in order to prevent them from gaining the status of permanency on the basis of the number of days worked. Hence, it held that the object of the reference was to put H

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1037 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

an end to such unfair legal practices, to regularise the employment of persons who would have been ordinarily absorbed but for such practices and to reduce to aminimum the disproportionately large contingent of such employees who had been deprived of security of service. The Jamdar Award noted that the Tulpule Award did not contemplate that in computing the number of work days only the days worked in two/three consecutive calendars year should be taken into consideration. Further, it noted that when the Tulpule Award spoke of “absorption”, it did not mean “recruitment”.

40Copy pinpoint40. The Tulpule and Jamdar Awards were the subject matter of a challenge before this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra).On 1 March 1989, this Court while granting leave to appeal recorded that eight out of the nine Unions, representing about 99 per cent of the workers, had entered into a compromise with LIC. It was in this backdrop that, pending the disposal of the civil appeals, this Court permitted LIC and these eight Unions to implement the terms of compromise, without prejudice to the rights of the ninth Union. The D terms of compromise envisaged that it would operate in substitution of the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards on the question of the regular employment of the workers concerned in those references. The terms of the compromise adopted the norm of employment for 85 days in any two years for Class III workers and employment for 70 days in any three calendar years for Class IV workers between 1 January 1982 and 20 E May 1985. Temporary, part-time and badli workers who had made applications before a stipulated date were held eligible to be considered for regular employment. The compromise envisaged that the selection of candidates shall be made on the basis of qualifications, age, written test and interview, and also having regard to the number of days worked. F According to the compromise, initially a list of selected candidates was to be drawn up, from which regular employment would be offered in order of merit prospectively from the dates notified, as and when vacancies in sanctioned posts for regular employment were filled up from time to time. Further, as a result of the compromise, the process of recruitment for these candidates would be subject to certain relaxations. Finally, it G was envisaged that the dispute in relation to the workers concerned, which had resulted in the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, would no longer survive, and the rights and obligations of the parties in relation to regular employment would be governed only by the compromise. H

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41Copy pinpoint41. The compromise was ultimately adopted in the final order of this Court dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), which disposed of the civil appeals. In the order, this Court accepted the submission of LIC that since eight out of nine Unions (representing an overwhelming majority of workmen) had accepted the compromise, the ninth Union must also act on the basis of its terms and conditions. The B Court, however, directed that LIC shall exempt Class IVworkers (whom the ninth Union was representing) from a test and interview, if it had the power to do so under the regulations and instructions governing their conditions of service. In the alternative, if there was no such power, it directed that the test which was prescribed for these workers should be of a lower standard than the test prescribed in the two circulars mentioned in the compromise.

42Copy pinpoint42. There is absolutely no manner of doubt that the compromise which was arrived at by eight out of nine Unions indicated that the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards would stand substituted by the terms of the compromise. The compromise clearly stipulated that the workers who fulfilled the requisite days of work in Class III or, as the case may be, Class IV posts would be eligible. As and when vacancies would arise, they would be offered regular appointment.

43Copy pinpoint43. Prior to the final order of this Court in the civil appeals arising from the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, the litigation in the E Prabavathy batch was settled by the order dated 23 October 1992.In the order, the Court found that the scheme for absorption which was propounded by LIC was reasonable. The scheme envisaged that all temporary workers who had worked for 85 days in any two consecutive calendar years with LIC between 20 May 1985 and 23 October 1992 and who conformed to the required eligibility criteria for regular appointment on the date of their initial appointment, would be permitted to compete at the next regular recruitment to be made by LIC. These candidates would be considered on their merit as against the other candidates who applied for these posts, including from the open market. They would also be given an age relaxation while applying for a post, if they were eligible for it on the date of their first temporary appointment. This scheme was approved, subject to the postponement by at least six weeks of a recruitment scheduled for November 1992, in orderto enable all eligible adhoc workers to compete with others for selection at that recruitment. The decision in E Prabavathy (supra) was evidently not noticed in this Court’s H order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra).

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1039 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

44Copy pinpoint44. The order of a two-judge Bench of this Court dated 22 A November 2001 in G Sudhakar (supra) noted that in E Prabavathy (supra), a Bench of three-judges had embodied the clauses of the scheme as a part of their order. Hence, the order in G Sudhakar (supra) expressly clarified that though the scheme before this Court in E Prabavathy (supra) was evolved in relation to a case from the Tamil B Nadu Division of the LIC, it would be equally applicable to the workers of all divisions of LIC in the country. Consequently, in G Sudhakar (supra), it was held that the scheme would apply to workers who were before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh as well, and there was no occasion for the High Court to direct that a new scheme should be framed by LIC. C

45Copy pinpoint45. It is important to note that the orders of this Court dated 23 October 1992 (in E Prabavathy (supra)) and 7 February 1996 (disposing the civil appeals challenging the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards) pre-date the Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001. On the other hand, the order in G Sudhakar (supra), which was dated 22 November 2001, was evidently passed after the Srivastav Award. H Srivastav Award and the Judgement of this Court

46Copy pinpoint46. The reference before the tribunal leading up to the Srivastav Award was made on 4 March 1991. The reference was in relation to the justification ofLIC’s non-absorption of persons recruited as temporary, badli and part-time workers after 20 May 1985. The Srivastav Award contains an observation that LIC was not guilty of unfair labour practices by continuing persons recruited as temporary, badli and part-time workers as non-regular employees. The above observation in the award was in view of the submission of LIC (which was not refuted by the workers) F that the workers were continuing in their positions on the basis of injunction orders issued by tribunals and the court, and due to the pressure of the Unions. However, the award also noted that the terms of the reference did not encompass this aspect and the tribunal was not recording a finding.

47Copy pinpoint47. Paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award referred to the order of G this Court dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra) which governed the scheme of absorption/regularisation for that batch of workers. It noted that the E Prabavathy group of workers were impleaded to the proceedings leading to the award, and had filed a statement of claim. However, the award concluded that since the order dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra) was between the same parties, H

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A the legality of the order of this Court could not be challenged by the workers before the tribunal. Hence, the contention of the workers in that regard was not accepted.

48Copy pinpoint48. In paragraph 88, the Srivastav Award concluded: “88. In view of the fact, I am of definite view that such type of B workmen belonging to temporary and part time categories in class III and class IV service of corporation who were employed after following the procedure and were allowed to continue service beyond the qualifying period and were eligible and suitable in every respect should be given absorption in the service from date of the vacancy in the service in which they could have been absorbed. C It will also apply to those such employees whose services were terminated by the corporation” The award finds that LIC was not justified in denying absorption to those temporary/badli/part-time workers who were employed after 20 May 1985, and that they should be given absorption on the terms and conditions which werestipulated in the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards (which were in respect of workers employed between 1 January 1982 to 20 May 1985). LIC was directed to take into consideration their claim for absorption on the basis of their eligibility and suitability, as dealt with in the Srivastav Award. Thus, all the badli, part-time and temporary workers who have rendered the qualifying period of service and were suitable would also have to be considered for absorption by LIC by publishing a notice in the newspaper. The Srivastav Award directed that in case no regular vacancy was available, supernumerary posts shall be created by LIC for the purpose of absorption and that the case for absorption against existing vacancies would be considered first, irrespective of regular recruitment.

49Copy pinpoint49. The Srivastav Award was set aside by the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court. The Division Bench affirmed the judgment of the Single Judge. Eventually, the dispute travelled to and resulted in the decision of this Court in TN Terminated Employees Association G (supra).

50Copy pinpoint50. The judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra), dated 18 March 2015, arose from concurring judgments of a Single Judge and of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court by which the Srivastav Award had been set aside. In appeal, the principal issue which came for consideration before this Court was: H

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1041 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“34.1. (i) Whether the setting aside of the award passed by CGIT A dated 18-6-2001 by the learned Single Judge by placing reliance upon compromise reached between the parties in SLP No. 14906 of 1988, which was filed against the award of Justice Tulpule, which award was clarified and affirmed by Justice SM Jamdar, legal and valid?” B The next issue, in relation to the workers’ claim for relief, was consequential in nature. After noticing the interim order dated 1 March 1989 passed by this Court in the proceedings arising out of the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), Justice Gopala Gowda, speaking for the two-judge Bench, observed: C “40. From the perusal of the above order of this Court in LIC v. Workmen [ SLP (C) No. 14906 of 1988, order dated 1- 3-1989 (SC)] , nowhere has it been stated in the terms of the compromise between the parties that the award of Justice R.D. Tulpule dated 17-4-1986 which was clarified upon reference made by the Central Government under Section 36-A of the Act by D Justice Jamdar, is either set aside by this Court or substituted the compromise terms in the place of the award except the order referred to supra passed in the above SLP No. 14906 of 1988. In fact, on the other hand it is clearly stated that the compromise terms are between the parties to the said SLP and that it shall not E prejudice the respective rights and obligations in relation to the members of the other union. Therefore, the effect of the award of Justice R.D. Tulpule with regard to the direction given to the Corporation regarding absorption of badli, temporary employees as permanent employees has not been substituted by terms and conditions of the compromise.” F

In the above extract, the Court referred to the interim order of this Court dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) by which, pending the disposal of the appeals,eight out of the nine Unions who had entered into terms of compromise with LIC were permitted to implement it as an interim measure, without prejudice to the rights and G contentions of the remaining Union which had not entered into a compromise. Relying exclusively on the interim order of this Court, it was held: “41. The award of Justice R.D. Tulpule dated 17-4-1986 reiterated by way of clarification in the award passed by Justice Jamdar H

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A dated 26-8-1988, in the dispute subsequently has been operative even after the compromise arrived at between the parties to the compromise in LIC v. Workmen [ SLP (C) No. 14906 of 1988, order dated 1-3-1989 (SC)] before this Court. Therefore, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Corporation that the said awards are not in operation and that only the terms and conditions of compromise and orders of this Court are binding upon the workmen concerned in these appeals is both not factually and legally correct. This abovesaid argument of the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Corporation is not tenable in view of the categorical statement made by this Court in its orders passed in SLP referred to supra, wherein, this Court has permitted the management and members of the said 8 unions to implement the terms of compromise by way of interim measure without any prejudice to the rights and contentions of the members of other union who have not entered into compromise with the management of the Corporation. It is not the case of the D Corporation in these appeals either before CGIT or before the High Court or in these proceedings the workmen concerned have also accepted the said terms and conditions of the compromise arrived at between the parties in SLP No. 14906 of 1988. This Court in the order passed in the abovesaid SLP which is extracted E hereinabove has made it very clear that the said compromise was entered into between unions therein, but it does not prejudice the rights and contentions of the workmen concerned whose disputes are in relation to their absorption in their respective posts who were appointed after 20-5-1985. Further, even if some of the workmen are bound under the said compromise that arose out of F SLP No. 14906 of 1988, this in no way deters their right to raise an industrial dispute and get the same adjudicated vide order of reference by the appropriate Government to CGIT. The award of CGIT was concluded after rightly examining the facts, circumstances of the case and the legal principles laid down in G the awards passed by Justice Tulpule and Justice Jamdar. More importantly CGIT award was passed after rightly appreciating the points of dispute referred to it and on the merits of the case.” The interpretation of the interim order which has been placed by the Court emerges from the following extract: H

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1043 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“46. Further, by a careful reading of the said order in LIC v. Workmen [ SLP (C) No. 14906 of 1988, order dated 1- 3-1989 (SC)] , it has been made clear that the awards passed by NIT (by Justice Jamdar and Justice Tulpule) after adjudicating the points of dispute in the industrial dispute raised by similarly placed workmen is not disturbed by substituting the terms and conditions of compromise between the parties therein in SLP No. 14906 of 1988. Therefore, the awards in relation to the absorption of the workmen as permanent workmen in the Corporation have got statutory force. This is what is stated by CGIT in its award dated 18-6-2001 on the basis of pleadings and evidence on record, which was erroneously set aside by the High Court by assigning erroneous reasons which is sought to be justified by the Senior Counsel on behalf of the Corporation by placing reliance upon the orders and the Scheme framed in E. Prabavathy [E. Prabavathy v. LIC, SLP (C) No. 10393 of 1992, order dated 23- 10-1992 (SC)] and G. Sudhakar [ Civil Appeal No. 2104 of 2000, D order dated 22-11-2001 (SC)] cases which Scheme has no application to the case of the workmen concerned involved in these appeals referred to supra.”

51Copy pinpoint51. The Court proceeded to hold that both the award of Justice Tulpule, reiterated by way of the clarificatory award of Justice Jamdar, are operative and they have not been terminated by either of the parties as provided by Section 19(6) of the ID Act. The Court held that the terms of compromise and the scheme formulated in E Prabavathy (supra) and G Sudhakar (supra) do not result in the substitution of the awards made by Justice Tulpule and Justice Jamdar. The Court held that the Srivastav Award would have to be observed by LIC until it was replaced by another settlement in relation to the service conditions of the workers under Section 12 read with Section 18(3) of the ID Act or by another award following the termination of the awards which are in operation. The judgment of this Court concluded that: (i) The Tulpule and Jamdar Awards continue to remain operative; (ii) The Awards do not stand substituted by the interim order of this court dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra); H

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A (iii) The orders of this Court in E Prabavathy (supra) and G Sudhakar (supra) would not stand in the way of an adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal; and (iv) Unless the awards are substituted either by another award or settlement, the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards continue to B remain operative and binding.

52Copy pinpoint52. On this basis, the Court concluded that the Srivastav Award was legal and valid and shall be implemented by LIC by absorption of the workers concerned in permanent posts. The operative direction which was issued by this Court is extracted below: C “54. It is needless to mention that since we are of the view that the award passed by CGIT in ID No. 27 of 1991 is legal and valid, it shall be restored and implemented by the Corporation by absorbing the workmen concerned in the permanent posts and if they have attained the age of superannuation, the Corporation D will be liable to pay all consequential benefits including the monetary benefits taking into consideration the pay scale and revised pay scale from time to time by the Corporation.”

53Copy pinpoint53. None of the Counsel appearing on behalf of the workers in the present batch of cases disputed the factual position, asserted on E behalf of LIC, that the judgment of the two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) affirming the validity of the Srivastav Award contains no reference whatsoever to the final order dated 7 February 1996 in the batch of civil appeals arising from the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra). The interim order dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), F which forms the basis of the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra), was passed in the backdrop of a compromise which was arrived between LIC and eight out of the nine Unions and Associations representing the workers. Since the appeals were pending at that stage, the Court granted liberty to the parties to the compromise G to implement its terms as an interim measure, without prejudice to the contentions of the ninth Union which had not entered into the compromise. But noticeably, there is a clear omission on the part of the Court in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) to refer to the admitted position that subsequently on 7 February 1996, this Court in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) accepted the submission of LIC that since eight out H

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1045 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

of the nine unions (representing nearly 99 per cent of the workers in A Class III and Class IV posts) had accepted the compromise, there was no justification for theninth Union to object. The Court held that it would be in the interest of industrial peace that theninth Union should also fall in line and act on the terms of the compromise. The civil appeals in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) were disposed of in terms of the above order dated 7 February 1996. The terms of compromise clearly envisaged that the management and the workers had agreed that the awards of the NIT dated 17 April 1986 (Tulpule Award) and 26 August 1988 (Jamdar Award) “be substituted by the terms and conditions of compromise in relation to the question of regular employment of the workmen concerned in the said references”. Once the awards were substituted by the terms of compromise, it would be an impermissible interpretation of law to hold that the awards continued to be operative and binding, notwithstanding the final order of this Court dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra). The final order dated 7 February 1996has not been adverted to by the two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees D Association (supra). The factual finding is based only on the interim order dated 1 March 1989. The final order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) had a crucial bearing on the special leave petitions arising from the judgment of the Delhi High Court setting aside the Srivastav Award. E

54Copy pinpoint54. That having been said, it is necessary to also advert to the interpretation which was placed on the decisions of this Court in E Prabavathy(supra) and G Sudhakar (supra). The two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) opined that the scheme which was framed in E Prabavathy (supra) was the outcome of an order which was passed in writ petitions filed by the workers and F not in the course of the adjudication of an industrial dispute. On this ground, the Court held that the decision in E Prabavathy (supra) would not come in the way of an adjudication by the CGIT or NIT while deciding a reference under Section 10 of the ID Act. The background of the decision in E Prabavathy (supra) has already been noticed earlier. The G decision was rendered on 23 October 1992 in a batch of civil appeals which was being considered by a three-judge Bench. During the pendency of the civil appeals, the Court called upon LIC to formulate a scheme for there gularisation of workers who had been granted ad hoc employment for at least 85 days from time to time. The three-judge Bench held, after H

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55Copy pinpoint55. A plea has been urged on behalf of the workers that the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) has attained finality following the dismissal of the review petition on 9 August 2016 (save for the modification by which the quantum of back-wages was reduced to fifty per cent) and the subsequent dismissal of a curative petition. We are cognizant that the ground, submitting that the decision ignored the final order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen H (supra), was specifically pleaded in review. The only observation in the

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1047 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

judgment in review is that LIC has not submitted anything on record to indicate that the judgment suffers from an error apparent in law. However, having regard to the immense financial burden, the quantum of back- wages would be reduced to fifty per cent.

56Copy pinpoint56. Now, there cannot be any dispute over the principle that the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra), followed by the order in review dated 9 August 2016, are between the present parties and finality has attached to them. LIC is, however, before this Court urging that as a statutory entity with a nationwide presence, it is faced with a situation involving conflicting directions of this Court. LIC has submitted that while on the one hand, the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards C were substituted by the terms of compromise on 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), this was preceded by the order dated 23 October 1992 of a three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy (supra) which accepted the scheme of absorption proposed by LIC and followed by the order dated 28 November 2001 of a two-judge Bench in G Sudhakar (supra) which interpreted the decision in E Prabavathy (supra) as being applicable to all divisions of LIC. The impact of the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) is to substitute and supplant the schemes which were evolved before this Court for providing absorption on specified terms. The essence of the schemes which were accepted by this Court was that those temporary, badli and part-time workers who fulfilled the requirement of the threshold period of service would be eligible to be considered for the grant of the permanency, subject to certain conditions. The orders passed by this Court envisage that these workers would be considered for the grant of permanency in the course of a recruitment process. The impact of the judgment of the two- judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) is that while on the one hand the Court’s orders dated 23 October 1992, 7 February 1996and 22 November 2001 continued to hold the field, on the other hand the restoration of the Srivastav Award brings in place a regime in conflict with what has been accepted by this Court in these orders. Faced with this predicament, it is necessary for this Court to step in and to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice caused by the decision in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) which has been urged to be per incuriam. The consequence of not doing so is serious.

57Copy pinpoint57. The Court is now confronted with claims on behalf of the workers that the principle which has been enunciated in the Srivastav H

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A Award and which has been restored by the two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) must apply to all workers subsequently engaged by applying Section 18(3)(d) read with Section 17A of the IDAct. Hence, a balance will now have to be drawn by this Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the B Constitution, which while on the one hand factors in the finality which has attached to the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) but on the other hand also factors in the essential concerns which have been expressed before this Court by LIC. The formula of providing absorption to part-time, badli or temporary workers who have put in 85 days in any two calendar years in a Class III post C or70 days in any three calendar years in a Class IV post will, unless a balance were to be drawn, become an avenue for disregarding the need for an open and transparent process of recruitment by a public sector corporation governed by therule of law and the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The judgments of this Court, in the context of public employment, lay stress on providing equality of opportunity. As we have recorded earlier in the course of the statements of facts, LIC had been restrained, due to the interim orders which were passed in the course of the various proceedings, from taking recourse to recruitment through the open market. LIC having been restrained by judicial orders from pursuing an open recruitment process, the situation which has now arisen is that unless a balance were to be drawn, absorption of part-time and badli workers would become a substitute for a recruitment process based on sanctioned posts, consistent with the principles of reservation and pursued on the basis of a structured recruitment which gives equal opportunities to all applicants. Such a consequence is a serious detriment to constitutional parameters and to the duty of LIC as a public employer to follow a process which is fair and inconsonance with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. An open and competitive process for recruitment will enable LIC to recruit the best among the available talent. Substituting this by a back-door entry will be detrimental to the interests of the corporation which is governed by statute.

I Validity of the verification in the Dogra Report

58Copy pinpoint58. Mr ANS Nadkarni, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of LIC, assailed the Dogra Report on the ground that the remit before the H

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1049 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“6. The learned Attorney General further submits that as on 31- 3-2015, LIC had 55, 427 Class III employees and 5190 Class IV employees. If LIC is directed to consider the absorption of the workmen to the advertisement, then the number of Class III employees will increase by 11.14% and Class IV employees by 56.65% and the same will affect the employee’s ratio in addition to the increase in its financial burden and that the same will be contrary to the interests of the policy-holders. The learned Attorney G General estimates the financial liability for implementing the order of this Court at approximately Rs 7087 crores, with the annual liability at around Rs 728 crores per year and that this will be a huge financial burden for LIC to bear.” H

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A The above submission indicates that if LIC were directed to consider the absorption of the workers pursuant to the advertisement, the strength of the Class III employees would increase by 11.1 per cent and Class IV employees by 56.65 per cent, resulting in an annual financial liability of Rs 728 crores. Hence, there is merit in the contention of the B Counsel for the workers that the above submission, which is recorded in paragraph 6 of the judgment in review, does not comport with LIC’s present stance that the verification was to be confined only to the certified list.

59Copy pinpoint59. This having been said, it is evident that the Dogra Report C suffers from clear and manifest errors. As we have already noted earlier, LIC had drawn the attention of the Presiding Officer to the fact that the claims which had been submitted by the Unions, Associations and individual workers during the course of the verification contained duplicate entries. LIC has produced a chart containing details of various workers and claimants.For convenience of reference, the chart is extracted below: Chart containing details of various Workmen/Claimants from various Associati ons before the Ld. CGIT Court, New Delhi in I.D. No. 27/1991. All All All All All EP & Tamil Akhil LIC G INDIVI TOTA India India India India India Ors Nadu Bhara Work UJ DUAL L Insur LIC Life Natio Natio (TFT Termi tiya ers’ A S ance Empl Insur nal nal TUCE nated Jeeva Unio R Empl oyees ance Life Life WA) Temp n n, AT oyees Feder Empl Insur Insur orary Bima Kanp TE E Asso ation oyees ance ance ciatio Asso Empl Empl Ful l Time Niga ur m M PR n ciatio oyees oyees LIC Chath A n Feder Feder Empl o urtha R ation ation yees Sreni Y -BNP -VN Asson Kara LI mcha CE NAME OF ri A UNION/ASSO Sang CIATION h Claimants as 10 F A per their list 3337 97 6996 1674 371 1333 376 890 35 5 252 15465 DUPLICATE Less 0 0 3582 0 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 3592 ENTRIES BLANK Less 0 0 9 84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93 ENTRIES 10 B Net 3337 97 3404 1590 371 1333 375 881 35 252 11780 5 Less ENGAGED AFTER 04.03.1991, 10 G not reckoned 5 1 2109 38 22 477 102 692 1 0 33 3580 as per Hon’ble SC order 07.09.18 Less ENGAGED BEFORE 20.05.1985, not reckoned 0 0 2 3 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 10 as per Hon’ble SC order 07.09.18 H

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1051 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

C Net 3332 96 1293 1549 347 856 272 187 34 5 219 8190 A Less Name not found in certified lists 3332 94 1184 1543 339 0 61 186 34 5 219 6997 received from CGIT Less Engaged less than 85 days 0 0 9 1 0 11 90 0 0 0 0 111 (CIII) Less Engaged less than 70 days 0 0 7 1 6 6 36 0 0 0 0 56 (CIV) B D Net 0 2 93 4 2 839 85 1 0 0 0 1026 Party in E.P & Less 0 0 0 0 0 839 83 0 0 0 0 922 Ors E Net 0 2 93 4 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 104 Less Documents not submitted to 0 0 26 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 32 prove eligibility Criminal Case Less pending 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C Fabricated Less 0 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 Documents Found eligible, G 0 0 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 Absorbed

Note:- 2 Individual Petitioners Sl.no. 29 & 31 have now submitted their claim through INTUC-BNP, however no substantiating documents have been submitted” D

60Copy pinpoint60. The Dogra Report eventually concludes that the group of workers, who are governed by the order of this Court in E Prabavathy (supra), would also be eligible for absorption. By considering the workers who are governed by the order in E Prabavathy (supra) tobe eligible for absorption, the Dogra Report has fallen into a clear error. The report has considered those workers who were clearly outside the ambit of its remit since they were governed by a specific order of this Court. That apart, it is evident that the Dogra Report has proceeded on a generalised assumption that a majority of workers had produced documents are eligible for absorption (having drawn a negative inference from LIC’s non-production of documents). In this backdrop, it would be necessary to bring about a proper verification before the claims of the workers can be truly considered. The deficiency of the Dogra Report in carrying out a proper verification stands clearly established. J The Interplay between the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and Section 48 of the LIC Act 1956 G

61Copy pinpoint61. Section 48 of the LIC Act confers a rule making power on the Central Government. Clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) of Section 48 was introduced by Act 1 of 1981 with effect from 31 January 1981. Under clause (cc), the Central Government is empowered to frame rules dealing with the following matters: H

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A “(cc) the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation, including those who became employees of the Corporation on the appointed day under this Act;”

62Copy pinpoint62. Simultaneously by the Amending Act, sub-Sections(2A), (2B) and (2C) were introduced into Section 48. These Sections provide as follows: “(2A) The regulations and other provisions as in force immediately before the commencement of the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, with respect to the terms and conditions of service of employees and agents of the Corporation including those who became employees and agents of the Corporation on the appointed day under this Act, shall be deemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub-section (2) and shall, subject to the other provisions of this section, have effect accordingly. (2B) The power to make rules conferred by clause (cc) of sub- D section (2) shall include- (i) The power to give retrospective effect to such rules; and (ii) The power to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal, the regulations and other provisions referred to in sub-section (2A), with retrospective effect, from a date not earlier than the twentieth day of June, 1979. (2C) The provisions of clause (cc) of sub-section (2) and sub- section (2B) and any rules made under the said clause (cc) shall have effect, and any such rule made with retrospective effect from any date shall also be deemed to have had effect from that date, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, tribunal or other authority and notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or any other law or any agreement, settlement, award or other instrument for the time being in force.”

63Copy pinpoint63. By virtue of sub-Section (2A), the regulations governing the terms and conditions of service of the employees and agents of LIC which were in force immediately before Amending Act 1 of 1981, are deemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) and have effect subject to the other provisions of the Section. By a deeming fiction of law, the regulations which were in existence on the date of the H

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1053 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Amending Act in relation to the terms and conditions of service are given the status of rules framed under clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) of Section 48. The effect of sub-Section (2C) is that the provision of clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) and any rules made under it with retrospective effect, shall also be deemed to have had effect from that date notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, tribunal or other authority and notwithstanding anything contained in the ID Act, or in any other law or any agreement, settlement, award or other instrument for the time being in force. The rules which are framed under Section 48(2)(cc) operate with a non-obstante clause which prevails,inter alia, notwithstanding anything contained in the ID Act. The vires of the Amending Act was upheld in a judgment of a three-judge Bench of this C Court in AV Nachane (supra). Justice AC Gupta, speaking for himself and Justice RS Pathak (as the learned Chief Justice then was), repelled the challenge to the validity of the Amending Act based on Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court also rejected the submission that sub-Section (2C), which was introduced into Section 48 by the Amending Act, suffered D from the vice of excessive delegation. While upholding the Amending Act, the Court held: “8. The contention that Article 14 is infringed arises on the provision of sub-section (2-C) of Section 48 that any rule made under clause (cc) of sub-section (2) of that section touching the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation E shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is true that after rules are made regarding the terms and conditions of service, the right to raise an industrial dispute in respect of matters dealt with by the rules will be taken away and to that extent the provisions of the Industrial F Disputes Act will cease to be applicable. It was argued that there was no basis on which the employees of the Corporation could be said to form a separate class for denying to them the protection of the Industrial Disputes Act. The reply on behalf of the Union of India and the Life Insurance Corporation was that the remuneration that was being paid to Class III and Class IV employees of the G Corporation was far in excess of what was paid to similarly situated employees in other establishments in the public sector. Some material was also furnished to support this claim though that were certainly not conclusive. The need for amending the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 as appearing from the H

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A preamble of the Amendment Act and the Ordinance is as follows: “... for securing the interests of the Life Insurance Corporation of India and its policy-holders and to control the cost of administration, it is necessary that revision of the terms and conditions of service applicable to the employees and agents of the Corporation should be undertaken expeditiously.” Referring to the preamble of the B Act the Attorney-General appearing for the Union of India and the Corporation submitted that the problem of mounting cost of administration led to the making of the impugned law. He added that it was felt that no improvement in the situation was possible by the process of adjudication and a policy decision was taken C that in the circumstances the proper course was legislation and that is why the Amendment Act was passed and the impugned Rules were framed. The learned Attorney-General submitted that it was for Parliament to decide whether the situation was remediable by adjudication or required legislation. According to him the Life Insurance Corporation Act as amended and the Rules D made after amendment placed the Corporation in the same position as other undertakings, that the advantages being enjoyed by the employees of the Corporation which were not available to similarly situated employees of other undertakings have been taken away removing what he described as discrimination in favour of the employees of the Life Insurance Corporation. We have already said that the material produced on behalf of the Union of India and the Corporation to show that the terms and conditions of service of the employees in several other undertakings in the public sector compared unfavourably to those of the Corporation employees was not conclusive. But the burden of establishing hostile discrimination was on the petitioners who challenged the Amendment Act and the Rules. It was for them to show that the employees of the Life Insurance Corporation and the employees of the other establishments to whom the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act were applicable were similarly circumstanced to justify the contention that by excluding the employees of the Corporation from the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act they had been discriminated against. There is no material before us on the basis of which we can hold that the Amendment Act of 1981 and the Rules made on February 2, 1981 infringe Article 14. We do not think that on the facts of this case Express H

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1055 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR 1958 SC 578 A : 1959 SCR 12 : (1961) 1 LLJ 339] , and Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager [AIR 1964 SC 600 : (1964) 5 SCR 683 : (1964) 2 LLJ 467] relied on by the petitioners, have any application.”

64Copy pinpoint64. The Court, however, held that Rule 3 of the Life Insurance B Corporation of India Class III and Class IV Employees (Bonus and Dearness Allowance) Rules 198137 could not nullify the effect of a writ issued by this Court in its earlier decision in LIC v. D.J. Bahadur38, which directed LIC to give effect to the industrial settlement relating to bonus until superseded by a fresh settlement, award or legislation. Holding that the Amending Act of 1981 and the Bonus Rules were relevant legislation, the Court held that these would operative prospectively from the date of the publication of the rules. There was also a concurring opinion of Justice O Chinappa Reddy. While dealing with the constitutional validity under Article 14, the main judgment notes that after rules are made regarding the terms and conditions of service, the right to raise an industrial dispute in respect of matters dealt with by the rules is taken away and to that extent the provisions of the ID Act will cease to be applicable.

65Copy pinpoint65. In the subsequent decision of another Bench of three-judges of this Court in M Venugopal (supra), the impact of the Amending Act E of 1981 on the application of the ID Act came up for consideration. The services of the appellant, who was a probationary Development Officer in LIC, were terminated on his failure to fulfil the targets assigned. A writ petition challenging the termination was allowed by a Single Judge of the High Court on the ground that the termination amounted to a retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the ID Act, and F that the termination was void due to the failure to comply with Section 25F. In appeal, the Division Bench held that as a result of clause (bb) which was introduced in Section 2(oo) from 18 August 1984, the termination of a probationer would not amount to a retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo). Regulation 14(2) of the Staff Regulations G was, as a consequence of Section 48(2A) as introduced by the Amending Act, deemed to be rules framed under Section 48(2)(cc). Clause (4) of Regulation 14 permitted LIC to discharge an employee during the period of probation. Before the introduction of clause (bb) in Section 2(oo) of 37 “Bonus Rules” 38 (1981) 1 SCC 315 H

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A the ID Act, there were only three exceptions which excluded a termination of service from the ambit of retrenchment, namely: (i) Voluntary retirement; (ii) Retirement on superannuation; and (iii) Termination due to continued ill-health. B After the introduction of clause (bb), Parliament excluded from the purview of retrenchment, in addition, the following: (i) Termination as a result of the non-renewal of a contract of employment upon its expiry; and (ii) Termination of a contract under a stipulation in that behalf C contained in the contract of employment. It was held that in this case the termination of the services of the probationer was in terms of the contract of an employment in terms of the stipulation contained in Regulation 14, and hence non-compliance with Section 25F would not vitiate the orders of termination.

66Copy pinpoint66. Justice NP Singh, speaking for the three-judge Bench, then went on to elucidate on the impact of Amending Act 1 of 1981, more particularly the insertion of clause (cc) into sub-Section (2) and the insertion of sub-Sections (2A), (2B) and (2C) in Section 48. The Court held that the ID Act and the LIC Act have both been framed by E Parliament, with the amendments introduced from 31 January 1981 in Section 48 containing a non-obstante clause in sub-Section (2C) making the intent of Parliament “apparent and obvious”. The Court held: “The framers of the Corporation Act through the amendments aforesaid have given the provisions of the Corporation Act an overriding effect over the provisions of the Industrial Disputes F Act, so far as the provisions relating to the terms and conditions of employment, which are in conflict with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are concerned. Unless the said attempt is held to be ultra vires being in conflict with any of the provisions of the Constitution it was open to the Parliament to treat the employees G and agents of the Corporation as a separate class for purpose of fixing their terms and conditions of service.”

67Copy pinpoint67. The Court held that earlier the employees were governed by the regulations framed by LIC under Section 49 as well as by the provisions of the ID Act. Hence, it was open to the workers to enforce their rights and remedies in terms of the regulations framed under the H

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1057 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

LIC Act or in accordance with the provisions of ID Act. However, after A the amendments which were introduced by Parliament in Section 48, the employees of LIC would not be entitled to the protection of the ID Act to which they were entitled before the enforcement of the amendment. The Court held that the validity of the amendment had been upheld in the earlier decision in AV Nachane (supra), and concluded: B “14. The amendments introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act have clearly excluded the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act so far as they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(cc). The result whereof will be that termination of the service of the appellant shall not be deemed to be a “retrenchment” within the meaning of Section 2(oo) even if sub- C section (bb) had not been introduced in the said section. Once Section 2(oo) is not attracted, there is no question of application of Section 25-F on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid. The termination of the service of the appellant during the period of probation is in terms of the order of appointment read with Regulation 14 of the Regulations, which shall be deemed to be now Rules under Section 48(2)(cc) of the Corporation Act.”

68Copy pinpoint68. Therefore, in view of the amended provisions of Section 48(2A) and (2C),the termination of the service of the appellant was held not to amount to a retrenchment even when clause (bb) had not been introduced in Section 2(oo) of the ID Act. Since Section 2(oo) would anyways not stand attracted where the services of a probationer were terminated under Regulation 14(4) of the Staff Regulations which, deemed to be a part of the rules under Section 48(2)(cc), hasan overriding effect over the ID Act and would prevail. F

69Copy pinpoint69. The above provisions of Section 48 were specifically placed before the two-judge Bench of this Court, as is evident from a bare reading of the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra). However, the Court declined to go into the submission based on the provisions of Section 48, holding that the Staff Regulations provided G only two types of employment:(i) Regular; and (ii) Temporary. The Court held that employment in the capacity of badli/part-time workers was not provided in the Staff Regulations, and there was no specific nomenclature of that nature in the Staff Regulations. The decision of the two-judge Bench evidently does not notice either the judgment in AV H

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A Nachane (supra) or the decision in M Venugopal (supra), both of which have been delivered by three-judge Benches. They are binding precedents and could not have been brushed aside.

70Copy pinpoint70. `That apart, it becomes necessary at this stage to advert to the provisions of Regulation 8 of the Staff Regulations. Regulation 8(1) B deals with temporary staff and is prefaced with a non-obstante provision.Clause (1) of Regulation 8is an enabling provision empowering LIC to employ staff in Classes III and IV on a temporary basis, subject to such general or specific directions which may be issued by the Chairperson from time to time. Clause (2) of Regulation 8 stipulates that no person who is appointed under Regulation 8(1) is, only by reason of such appointment, to be entitled to absorption in the service of LIC orto claim preference for recruitment to any post. The expression “shall only by reason of such appointment be entitled to absorption” in this sub- clause (2) is crucial. What the expression postulates is that a person who is appointed on a temporary basis can nether claim an entitlement to absorption or a preference in recruitment merely by having been appointed on a temporary basis. In other words, Regulation 8(2) does not postulate an absolute bar to a claim for absorption but it stipulates that absorption cannot be claimed merely on the ground that a person was engaged on a temporary basis. Regulation 8(2), for instance, will not preclude a claim for absorption being made in terms of a scheme which is propounded by LIC, so long as the scheme contains provisions which facilitate absorption on stipulated terms and conditions. But the mere fact that a person is appointed in a temporary capacity by LIC, does not entitle such a person ipso jure to seek absorption merely by virtue of or only by reason of such an appointment. F 71 The impact of the provisions of clause (cc) of sub-Section (2), sub-Section (2A) and sub-Section (2C) of Section 48 on the clams of the workers appointed after 4 March 1991 must now be considered. The workers who have worked as temporary, badli or part-time workers after 4 March 1991, seek to assert their claims on the basis of Section G 18(3)(d) of the ID Act. Section 18 specifies the person on whom settlements and awards are binding. Section 18(3)(a) stipulates that a settlement or award would bind all the parties to the industrial dispute. Further, clause (d) specifies that where a party to the dispute is composed of workers, the settlement and award binds not only persons who are employed in the establishment to which the dispute relates on the date of H

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1059 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

the dispute but all persons who subsequently become employees in that establishment or a part of it. Section 18(3)(d), in other words, extends the applicability of a settlement or award beyond the workers who were engaged on the date of the dispute to all persons who subsequently become employees in the establishment. Regulation 8 of the Staff Regulation expressly permits the engagement of temporary workers and clause (2) contains a provision to the effect that a person who engaged under its clause (1) shall not, only by reason of such appointment, be entitled to absorption or to claim a preference for recruitment on any post. The effect of sub-Section (2A) of Section 48 is that Regulation 8 is deemed to be a rule which is framed under clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) of Section 48. Moreover, the provisions of Section 48(2C) postulate that a rule which is made under the clause shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the ID Act. Hence, the workers who have been recruited post 4 March 1991 cannot make a claim for absorption ipso jure under Section 18(3)(d) of the ID Act, as a result of the overriding provision which is contained in sub-Section (2C) of Section D 48. K Structuring the Relief

72Copy pinpoint72. For the reasons recorded above during the course of analysis, LIC as a statutory corporation is bound by the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. As a public employer, the recruitment process of the corporation must meet the constitutional standard of a fair and open process. Allowing for back-door entries into service is an anathema to public service.

73Copy pinpoint73. In structuring the relief in present proceedings, it is essential to recapitulate the key legal findings that will govern the determination of rights and equities: (i) On 7 February 1996, a two-judge Bench of this Court in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) had accepted the terms of compromise which was arrived at on 1 March 1989 between the management of LIC and eight Unions, and imposed them upon the ninth Union as well. In addition, the two-judge Bench of this Court had issued certain directions: (a) LIC should exempt Class IV workers from a test and interview, if the management has the power to H

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A do so under the regulations/instructions governing their conditions of service; and (b) In the event that the management of LIC does not possess such a power, the test to be prescribed for these workers would be of a lesser standard compared to other applicants from the open market till the next regular recruitment; (ii) On 23 October 1992, a three-judge Bench of this Court, while disposing of the civil appeals in E Prabavathy (supra), specifically accepted the scheme formulated by LIC for regularising the workers who were engaged on a temporary basis. The scheme was also specifically incorporated as a part of the order in the following terms: “(a) All those temporary employees who have worked for 85 days in any two consecutive calendar years with the Life Insurance Corporation between 20th May 1985 D uptil date and who confirmed totehe required eligibility criteria for regular recruitment on the dates of their initial temporary appointment will be permitted to complete for the next regular recruitment to be made by the Life Insurance Corporation after the regular recruitment for these posts currently scheduled for November, 1992. E (b) These candidates will be considered on their merits with all other candidates who may apply for such appointments, including those from the open market. (c) These candidates will be given an age relaxation for applying for regular recruitment provided that they were F eligible on the date of their first temporary appointment for securing regular appointment with the Life Insurance Corporation. (d) If these candidates are otherwise eligible, they can apply for regular recruitment in the normal course. This G regularisation will, in the circumstances, be by selection for appointment. We make the above clauses of the scheme as part of our order.” The three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy (supra) held that the scheme proposed by LIC is reasonable and that:(a)the regularisation H

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1061 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

will be by selection for appointment; and (b) the above clauses of the scheme would constitute a part of the order of this Court; (iii) On 22 November 2001, a two-judge Bench of this Court in G Sudhakar(supra) directed that though the order dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra) applied to the workers of the Tamil Nadu division, the scheme would equally be applicable to the workers of all divisions of LIC in the country; (iv) The judgment of the two-judge Bench of this Court dated 8 March 2015 in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) failed to notice that as a result of the final order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards had been substituted by the terms of compromise. The two-judge Bench of this Court overlooked the final order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra)and while adverting only to the interim order dated 1 March 1989,it arrived at a palpably erroneous conclusion that the Jamdarand Tulpule Awards were still operative and binding; and (v) Though the petition seeking review of TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) and the curative petition stand dismissed, LIC is confronted with a situation in which it is equally bound by the earlier decision of the three-judge Bench dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra), the judgment of the two-judge Bench dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) dealing with the appeals arising out of the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards and the judgment of the two-judge Bench dated 22 November 2001 in G Sudhakar (supra).

74Copy pinpoint74. The position as it now stands, results in a palpable conflict between the two-judge Bench decision in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) dated 18 March 2015 on the one hand and the earlier binding decision of a larger Bench in E Prabavathy (supra) on 23 October 1992 and of subsequent Benches. This conflict must be harmonised by taking recourse to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. In arriving at a conclusion, this Court finds that: H

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A (i) The remit of the CGIT which resulted in the Dogra Report was confined to the process of verification, as distinct from an adjudication of rights and liabilities; (ii) The Dogra Report is flawed because: (a) The report failed to carry out an accurate verification of only those Class III workers who had put in at least 85 days of work in a period of two years and Class IV workers who had put in70 days of work in a period of three years; (b) The lists which are appended to the report contain patent inconsistencies and errors as a consequence of a failure to carry out an adequate verification; and (c) The report accepted the claims for absorption of those workers who were specifically governed by the decision of this Court in E Prabavathy (supra),inspite of an express stipulation to the contrary in the order of this Court dated23 October 1992 as well as in paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award; (iii) A public employer such as LIC cannot be directed to carry out a mass absorption of over 11,000 workers on such flawed premises without following a recruitment process which is consistent with the principles of equality of opportunity governed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such an absorption would provide the very back-door entry, which negates the principle of equal opportunity and fairness in public employment, which has been specifically decried by this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi39.

75Copy pinpoint75. The dispute is now of an antiquity tracing back to nearly four decades. Finality has to be wrung down on the dispute to avoid uncertainty and more litigation. Nearly thirty-one years have elapsed since 1991. G We have come to the conclusion that the claims of those workers who are duly found upon verification to meet the threshold conditions of eligibility should be resolved by the award of monetary compensation in lieu of absorption, and in full and final settlement of all claims and demands. Thus, this Court directs the following: 39 H (2006) 4 SCC 1

RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1063 CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(i) A fresh verification of the claims of workers who claim to A have been employed for at least 70 days in Class IV posts over a period of three years or 85 days in Class III posts over a period of two years shall be carried out; (ii) The verification shall be confined to persons who were working between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991; B (iii) All persons who are found to be eligible on the above norm shall be entitled to compensation computed at the rate of Rs50,000 for every year of service or part thereof. The payment of compensation at the above rate shall be in lieu of reinstatement, and in full and final settlement of all claims and demands of the workers in lieu of regularisation or absorption and notwithstanding the directions issued by this Court in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra); (iv) In carrying out the process of verification, the Committee appointed by this Court shall not be confined to the certified list before the CGIT and shall consider the claims of all workers who were engaged between 20 May 1985 and 4 March1991; (v) For the purpose of verification, LIC shall make available all the records at the Divisional level to the Committee E appointed by this Court; (vi) It will be open to the workers concerned or, as the case may be, the Unions and Associations representing them, to make available such documentary material in their possession for the purpose of verification; F (vii) The process of verification shall be carried out independently without regard to the Dogra Report, which is held to be flawed; (viii) The payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement shall be effected by LIC within a period of three months from G the date of receipt of the report of verification by the Committee; and (ix) The task of verification shall be carried out by a Committee consisting of: H

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A (a) Mr Justice P K S Baghel, former Judge of the Allahabad High Court; and (b) Shri Rajiv Sharma, former District Judge and member of the UPHJS. LIC shall provide all logistical assistance to the Committee and bear all expenses, including secretarial expenses, travel and incidental expenses, as well as the fees payable to the members of the Committee. Justice P K S Baghel shall fix the terms of remuneration payable to the members of the Committee.

76Copy pinpoint76. The Miscellaneous Applications and the Writ Petitions shall be governed by the above directions and are disposed of in the above terms.

77Copy pinpoint77. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Writ petitions disposed of. D (Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)