ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PRIVATE LIMITED v. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX & ANR.

Tools
Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
Bench
R. F. NARIMAN, HEMANT GUPTA and B. R. GAVAI
Citation
[2021] 2 S.C.R. 321
Whole judgment (for printing)

Source PDF (original scan)
Contains information from the Indian High Court / Supreme Court Judgments dataset, licensed under CC-BY-4.0

Judgment · Supreme Court of India · decided · Bench: R. F. NARIMAN, HEMANT GUPTA and B. R. GAVAI

[2021] 2 S.C.R. 321

Machine-read from a scanned report. Check the printed page before citing. Report an error.

Headnote — Supreme Court Reports (editorial summary, not part of the judgment)

Catchwords

Income Tax Act, 1961: s.195 – Amount paid by resident in India to non-resident foreign software suppliers – Liability to deduct tax at source –

Held

In view of the definition of royalties contained in Article 12 of the DTAAs, there is no obligation on the persons mentioned in s. 195 of the Income Tax Act to deduct tax at source, as the distribution agreements/EULAs in the facts of these cases do not create any interest or right in such distributors/end-users, which would amount to the use of or right to use any copyright – The amounts paid by resident Indian end-users/distributors to non- resident computer software manufacturers/suppliers, as consideration for the resale/use of the computer software through EULAs/distribution agreements, is not the payment of royalty for the use of copyright in the computer software, and same does not give rise to any income taxable in India, as a result of which the persons referred to in s.195 of the Income Tax Act are not liable to deduct any TDS under s.195 of the Income Tax Act.

Catchwords

Income Tax Act, 1961: s.194E and s.195 – Distinction between –

Held

s.194E of the Income Tax Act belongs to a set of various provisions which deal with TDS, without any reference to chargeability of tax under the Income Tax Act by the concerned non-resident assessee – This section is similar to s.193 and s.194 of the Income Tax Act by which deductions have to be made without any reference to the chargeability of a sum received by a non-resident assessee under the Income Tax Act – On the other hand, at the heart of s.195 of the Income Tax Act is the fact that deductions can only be made if the non resident assessee is liable to pay tax under the provisions of the Income Tax Act in the first place.

A Income Tax Act, 1961: Applicability of Income Tax Act, 1961 when DTAA applies –

Held

Once a DTAA applies, the provisions of the Income Tax Act can only apply to the extent that they are more beneficial to the assessee and not otherwise – Further, by explanation 4 to s.90 of the Income Tax Act, it has been clarified by the Parliament that where any term is defined in a DTAA, the definition contained in the DTAA is to be looked at – It is only where there is no such definition that the definition in the Income Tax Act can then be applied.

Catchwords

Income Tax Act, 1961: s.90 – Royalty – Meaning of –

Held

As is now reflected by explanation 4 to s.90 of the Income Tax Act and under Article 3(2) of the DTAA, the definition of the term “royalties” shall have the meaning assigned to it by the DTAA, meaning thereby that the expression “royalty”, when occurring in s.9 of the Income Tax Act, has to be construed with reference to Article 12 of the DTAA – This position is also clarified by CBDT D Circular No. 333 dated 02.04.1982 – Thus, by virtue of Article 12(3) of the DTAA, royalties are payments of any kind received as consideration for “the use of, or the right to use, any copyright” of a literary work, which includes a computer programme or software. Income Tax Act, 1961: s.9(1)(vi) explanation 4; s.195 – The question whether persons liable to deduct TDS under s.195 can be held liable to deduct such sums at a time when explanation 4 was factually not on the statute book, all deductions liable to be made and the assessment years in question being prior to the year 2012 – This question is answered by two latin maxims, lex non cogit ad impossibilia, i.e., the law does not demand the impossible and impotentia excusat legem, i.e., when there is a disability that makes it impossible to obey the law, the alleged disobedience of the law is excused – The “person” mentioned in s.195 cannot be expected to do the impossible, namely, to apply the expanded definition of “royalty” inserted by explanation 4 to s.9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax G Act, for the assessment years in question, at a time when such explanation was not actually and factually in the statute. Copyright Act, 1957: Copyright – Meaning of – Though the expression “copyright” has not been defined separately in the “definitions” section of the Copyright Act, yet, s.14 makes it clear that “copyright” means the “exclusive right”, subject to the

Catchwords

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 323 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX provisions of the Act, to do or authorise the doing of certain acts A “in respect of a work” – When an “author” in relation to a “literary work” which includes a “computer programme”, creates such work, such author has the exclusive right, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act, to do or authorise the doing of several acts in respect of such work or any substantial part thereof. B Copyright Act, 1957: s.14(b) – Right to use computer software – When, under a non-exclusive licence, an end-user gets the right to use computer software in the form of a CD, the end-user only receives a right to use the software and nothing more – The end- user does not get any of the rights that the owner continues to retain under s.14(b) of the Copyright Act read with sub-section (a)(i)-(vii) C thereof – Thus, the conclusion that when computer software is licensed for use under an EULA, what is also licensed is the right to use the copyright embedded therein, is wholly incorrect – The licence for the use of a product under an EULA cannot be construed as the licence spoken of in s.30 of the Copyright Act, as such EULA only imposes restrictive conditions upon the end-user and does not part with any interest relatable to any rights mentioned in ss.14(a) and 14(b) of the Copyright Act. Copyright Act, 1957: ss.14, 16, 30, 52(1)(aa), 52(1)(b), 52(1)(ad) – Infringement of copyright –

Held

No copyright exists in India outside the provisions of the Copyright Act or any other special law for the time being in force, vide s.16 of the Copyright Act – When the owner of copyright in a literary work assigns wholly or in part, all or any of the rights contained in s.14(a) and (b) of the Copyright Act, in the said work for a consideration, the assignee of such right becomes entitled to all such rights comprised in the copyright that is assigned, and shall be treated as the owner of the copyright of what is assigned to him – Also, under s.30 of the Copyright Act, the owner of the copyright in any literary work may grant any interest in any right mentioned in s.14(a) of the Copyright Act by licence in writing by him to the licensee, under which, for parting with such interest, royalty may become payable – When such licence is granted, copyright is infringed when any use, relatable to the said interest/right that is licensed, is contrary to the conditions of the licence so granted – Infringement of copyright takes place when a person “makes for sale or hire or sells or lets for hire” or

A “offers for sale or hire” or “distributes…so as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright”, vide s.51(b) of the Copyright Act – Importantly, the making of copies or adaptation of a computer programme in order to utilise the said computer programme for the purpose for which it was supplied, or to make up back-up copies as a temporary protection against loss, destruction or damage so as to be able to utilise the computer programme for the purpose for which it was supplied, does not constitute an act of infringement of copyright under s.52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act – In short, what is referred to in s.52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act would not amount to reproduction so as to amount to an infringement of copyright – C s.52(1)(ad) is independent of s.52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act, and states that the making of copies of a computer programme from a personally legally obtained copy for non-commercial personal use would not amount to an infringement of copyright – s.52(1)(ad) of the Copyright Act cannot be read to negate the effect of s.52(1)(aa), since it deals with a subject matter that is separate and distinct from that contained in s.52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act. Copyright Act, 1957: Copyright owner’s distribution right and the right of the purchaser to further resale – Doctrine of first sale/ principle of exhaustion – Applicability of –

Held

s.14(b)(ii) of the Copyright Act was amended twice, first in 1994 and then again in E 1999, with effect from 15.01.2000 – After the 1999 Amendment, what is conspicuous by its absence is the phrase “regardless of whether such copy has been sold or given on hire on earlier occasions” – This is a statutory recognition of the doctrine of first sale/principle of exhaustion.

Catchwords

Words and Phrases: Expression ‘in respect of ’ – Meaning of – Also in context of explanation 2(v) to s.9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act –

Held

The expression “in respect of”, when used in a taxation statute, is only synonymous with the words “on” or “attributable to” – Such meaning accords with the meaning to be given to the expression “in respect of” contained in explanation 2(v) to s.9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, and would not in any manner make the expression otiose. Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. Under section 5(2) of the Income Tax Act, the total income of a person who is a non-resident, includes all income

Reporter's headnote (continued) and case details

p. 321

(Civil Appeal Nos. 8733-8734 of 2018)

p. 322

p. 324

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 325 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX from whatever source derived, which accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise to such person in India during such year. This, however, is subject to the provisions of the Income Tax Act. Certain income is deemed to arise or accrue in India, under section 9 of the Income Tax Act, notwithstanding the fact that such income may accrue or arise to a non-resident outside B India. One such income is income by way of royalty, which, under section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, means the transfer of all or any rights, including the granting of a licence, in respect of any copyright in a literary work. That such transaction may be governed by a DTAA is then recognized by section 5(2) read with section 90 of the Income Tax Act, making it clear that the C Central Government may enter into any such agreement with the government of another country so as to grant relief in respect of income tax chargeable under the Income Tax Act or under any corresponding law in force in that foreign country, or for the avoidance of double taxation of income under the Income Tax D Act and under the corresponding law in force in that country. What is of importance is that once a DTAA applies, the provisions of the Income Tax Act can only apply to the extent that they are more beneficial to the assessee and not otherwise. Further, by explanation 4 to section 90 of the Income Tax Act, it has been clarified by the Parliament that where any term is defined in a E DTAA, the definition contained in the DTAA is to be looked at. It is only where there is no such definition that the definition in the Income Tax Act can then be applied. [Paras 25, 26][361-C-G]

2. The machinery provision contained in section 195 of the Income Tax Act is inextricably linked with the charging provision F contained in section 9 read with section 4 of the Income Tax Act, as a result of which, a person resident in India, responsible for paying a sum of money, “chargeable under the provisions of [the] Act”, to a non-resident, shall at the time of credit of such amount to the account of the payee in any mode, deduct tax at source at the rate in force which, under section 2(37A)(iii) of the Income G Tax Act, is the rate in force prescribed by the DTAA. Such deduction is only to be made if the non resident is liable to pay tax under the charging provision contained in section 9 read with

p. 326

A section 4 of the Income Tax Act, read with the DTAA. Thus, it is only when the non-resident is liable to pay income tax in India on income deemed to arise in India and no deduction of TDS is made under section 195(1) of the Income Tax Act, or such person has, after applying section 195(2) of the Income Tax Act, not deducted such proportion of tax as is required, that the consequences of a B failure to deduct and pay, reflected in section 201 of the Income Tax Act, follow, by virtue of which the resident-payee is deemed an “assessee in default”, and thus, is made liable to pay tax, interest and penalty thereon. [Para 27][362-E-H; 363-A-B] GE India Technology Centre (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2010) 10 C SCC 29:[2010] 10 SCR 1142 – relied on.

3. It will be seen that section 194E of the Income Tax Act belongs to a set of various provisions which deal with TDS, without any reference to chargeability of tax under the Income Tax Act by the concerned nonresident assessee. This section is similar to sections 193 and 194 of the Income Tax Act by which deductions have to be made without any reference to the chargeability of a sum received by a non-resident assessee under the Income Tax Act. On the other hand, at the heart of section 195 of the Income Tax Act is the fact that deductions can only be made if the nonresident assessee is liable to pay tax under the provisions of the Income Tax Act in the first place. [Para 31][364- E-F] PILCOM v. CIT, West Bengal VII, 2020 SCC Online SC 426 – held inapplicable. F 4.1 Under section 2(o) of the Copyright Act, a literary work includes a computer programme and a computer programme has been defined under section 2(ffc) of the Copyright Act to mean a set of instructions expressed in words, codes, schemes or in any other form capable of causing a computer to perform a particular G task or achieve a particular result. Though the expression “copyright” has not been defined separately in the “definitions” section of the Copyright Act, yet, section 14 makes it clear that “copyright” means the “exclusive right”, subject to the provisions of the Act, to do or authorise the doing of certain acts “in respect of a work”. When an “author” in relation to a “literary H

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 327 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX work” which includes a “computer programme”, creates such A work, such author has the exclusive right, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act, to do or authorise the doing of several acts in respect of such work or any substantial part thereof. In the case of a computer programme, section 14(b) specifically speaks of two sets of acts – the seven acts enumerated in sub- B clause (a) and the eighth act of selling or giving on commercial rental or offering for sale or for commercial rental any copy of the computer programme. Insofar as the seven acts that are set out in sub-clause (a) are concerned, they all delineate how the exclusive right that is with the owner of the copyright may be parted with, i.e., if there is any parting with the right to reproduce the work in any material form; the right to issue copies of the work to the public, not being copies already in circulation; the right to perform the work in public or communicate it to the public; the right to make any cinematograph film or sound recording in respect of the work; the right to make any translation of the work; the right to make any adaptation of the work; or the right to do any of the specified acts in relation to a translation or an adaptation. [Paras 34 and 35][370-F-H; 371-A-D] 4.2 In essence, such right is referred to as copyright, and includes the right to reproduce the work in any material form, issue copies of the work to the public, perform the work in public, or make translations or adaptations of the work. This is made even clearer by the definition of an “infringing copy” contained in section 2(m) of the Copyright Act, which in relation to a computer programme, i.e., a literary work, means reproduction of the said work. Thus, the right to reproduce a computer programme and exploit the reproduction by way of sale, transfer, license etc. is at the heart of the said exclusive right. [Para 36][371-D-F]

5. Importantly, no copyright exists in India outside the provisions of the Copyright Act or any other special law for the time being in force, vide section 16 of the Copyright Act. When the owner of copyright in a literary work assigns wholly or in part, all or any of the rights contained in section 14(a) and (b) of the Copyright Act, in the said work for a consideration, the assignee of such right becomes entitled to all such rights H

p. 328

A comprised in the copyright that is assigned, and shall be treated as the owner of the copyright of what is assigned to him. Also, under section 30 of the Copyright Act, the owner of the copyright in any literary work may grant any interest in any right mentioned in section 14(a) of the Copyright Act by licence in writing by him to the licensee, under which, for parting with such interest, royalty B may become payable. When such licence is granted, copyright is infringed when any use, relatable to the said interest/right that is licensed, is contrary to the conditions of the licence so granted. Infringement of copyright takes place when a person “makes for sale or hire or sells or lets for hire” or “offers for sale or hire” or C “distributes…so as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright”, vide section 51(b) of the Copyright Act. Importantly, the making of copies or adaptation of a computer programme in order to utilise the said computer programme for the purpose for which it was supplied, or to make up back-up copies as a temporary protection against loss, destruction or damage so as to be able to utilise the computer programme for the purpose for which it was supplied, does not constitute an act of infringement of copyright under section 52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act. In short, what is referred to in section 52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act would not amount to reproduction so as to amount to an infringement of copyright. [Para 38][372-A-F]

6. Section 52(1)(ad) is independent of section 52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act, and states that the making of copies of a computer programme from a personally legally obtained copy for non-commercial personal use would not amount to an infringement of copyright. Section 52(1)(ad) of the Copyright Act cannot be read to negate the effect of section 52(1)(aa), since it deals with a subject matter that is separate and distinct from that contained in section 52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act. [Para 39] [372-F-H]

G 7. As is now reflected by explanation 4 to section 90 of the Income Tax Act and under Article 3(2) of the DTAA, the definition of the term “royalties” shall have the meaning assigned to it by the DTAA, meaning thereby that the expression “royalty”, when occurring in section 9 of the Income Tax Act, has to be construed with reference to Article 12 of the DTAA. This position is also H

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 329 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX clarified by CBDT Circular No. 333 dated 02.04.1982. Thus, by virtue of Article 12(3) of the DTAA, royalties are payments of any kind received as consideration for “the use of, or the right to use, any copyright” of a literary work, which includes a computer programme or software. [Paras 42, 43] [376-A-C, G-H]

8. A reading of the distribution agreement would show that what is granted to the distributor is only a non-exclusive, non- transferable licence to resell computer software, it being expressly stipulated that no copyright in the computer programme is transferred either to the distributor or to the ultimate end- user. This is further amplified by stating that apart from a right to use the computer programme by the end-user himself, there is no further right to sub-license or transfer, nor is there any right to reverse-engineer, modify, reproduce in any manner otherwise than permitted by the licence to the end-user. What is paid by way of consideration, therefore, by the distributor in India to the foreign, non-resident manufacturer or supplier, is the price of the computer programme as goods, either in a medium which stores the software or in a medium by which software is embedded in hardware, which may be then further resold by the distributor to the end-user in India, the distributor making a profit on such resale. Importantly, the distributor does not get the right to use the product at all. When it comes to an end-user who is directly sold the computer programme, such end-user can only use it by installing it in the computer hardware owned by the end-user and cannot in any manner reproduce the same for sale or transfer, contrary to the terms imposed by the EULA. In all these cases, the “licence” that is granted vide the EULA, is not a licence in terms of section 30 of the Copyright Act, which transfers an interest in all or any of the rights contained in sections 14(a) and 14(b) of the Copyright Act, but is a “licence” which imposes restrictions or conditions for the use of computer software. Thus, it cannot be said that any of the EULAs in these cases are referable to section 30 of the Copyright Act, inasmuch as section G 30 of the Copyright Act speaks of granting an interest in any of the rights mentioned in sections 14(a) and 14(b) of the Copyright Act. The EULAs in all the appeals do not grant any such right or

p. 330

A interest, least of all, a right or interest to reproduce the computer software. Such reproduction is expressly interdicted, and it is also expressly stated that no vestige of copyright is at all transferred, either to the distributor or to the end-user. Thus, what is “licensed” by the foreign, non-resident supplier to the distributor and resold to the resident end-user, or directly supplied B to the resident end-user in these cases is in fact the sale of a physical object which contains an embedded computer programme. [Paras 45, 46, 47 and 52][386-C-H; 387-A-B; 392-G-H] State Bank of India v. Collector of Customs, (2000) 1 C SCC 727: [2000] 1 SCR 137 – relied on. Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. State of Kerala, [1966] 2 SCR 828 – referred to

9. There is no doubt that section 9 of the Income Tax Act D refers to persons who are non-residents and taxes their income as income which is deemed to accrue or arise in India, thus, making such persons assessees under the Income Tax Act, who are liable to pay tax. There is also no doubt that the “person responsible for paying” spoken of in section 195 of Income Tax Act is not a non-resident assessee, but a person resident in India, E who is liable to make deductions under section 195 when payments are made by it to the non-resident assessee. [Para 54][393-E-F] Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613 : [2012] 1 SCR 573 – relied on.

F 10. DEFINITION OF ROYALTY IN THE DTAAs VIS-À- VIS THE INCOME TAX ACT 10.1 When Article 12 of the India-Singapore DTAA defines the term “royalties” in sub-article (3) thereof, it does so stating that such definition is exhaustive – it uses the expression “means”. Secondly, the term “royalties” refers to payments of G any kind that are received as a consideration for the use of or the right to use any copyright in a literary work. As opposed to this, the definition contained in explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, is wider in at least three respects: It speaks of “consideration”, but also includes a lump-sum consideration H

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 331 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX which would not amount to income of the recipient chargeable under the head “capital gains”; When it speaks of the transfer of “all or any rights”, it expressly includes the granting of a licence in respect thereof; and It states that such transfer must be “in respect of” any copyright of any literary work. However, even where such transfer is “in respect of” copyright, the transfer of all or any rights in relation to copyright is a sine qua non under explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act. In short, there must be transfer by way of licence or otherwise, of all or any of the rights mentioned in section 14(b) read with section 14(a) of the Copyright Act. [Paras 63 and 64][404-H; 405-A-E] State of Madras v. Swastik Tobacco Factory, [1966] 3 C SCR 79 – referred to 10.2 The insertion of sub-sections (v), (vi) and (vii) in section 9(1) of the Income Tax Act, by way of an amendment through the Finance Act 1976 was to introduce source-based taxation for income in the hands of a non-resident by way of interest, royalty and fees for technical services. Consequently, section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act was brought into force. The definition of royalty contained in explanation 2(v) of section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act includes the transfer of all or any rights (including the granting of a licence) “in respect of any copyright, literary, artistic or scientific work”. The comma after the word “copyright” does not fit as copyright is obviously spoken of as existing in a literary, artistic or scientific work. As a matter of fact, this drafting error was rectified in the Draft Taxes Code 2010, under Chapter XIX in Part H thereof. [Paras 67, 69, 70][407-A-B; 408-C-E] F Carborandum & Co. v. CIT, (1977) 2 SCC 862 : [1977] 3 SCR 475 – referred to. 10.3 The transfer of “all or any rights (including the granting of a licence) in respect of any copyright”, in the context of computer software, is referable to sections 14(a), 14(b) and 30 of G the Copyright Act. As has been held, the expression “in respect of” is equivalent to “in” or “attributable to”. Thus, explanation 2(v) to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, when it speaks of “all of any rights…in respect of copyright” is certainly more

p. 332

A expansive than the DTAA provision, which speaks of the “use of, or the right to use” any copyright. However, when it comes to the expression “use of, or the right to use”, the same position would obtain under explanation 2(v) of section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, inasmuch as, there must, under the licence granted or sale made, be a transfer of any of the rights contained B in sections 14(a) or 14(b) of the Copyright Act, for explanation 2(v) to apply. To this extent, there will be no difference in the position between the definition of “royalties” in the DTAAs and the definition of “royalty” in explanation 2(v) of section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act. [Paras 71, 72][409-A-B; G-H; 410-A-B] C CIT v. DCM Limited, ITA Nos. 87-89/1992 – referred to.

11. The question whether persons liable to deduct TDS under section 195 of the Income Tax Act can be held liable to deduct such sums at a time when explanation 4 was factually not on the statute book, all deductions liable to be made and the assessment years in question being prior to the year 2012. This question is answered by two latin maxims, lex non cogit ad impossibilia, i.e., the law does not demand the impossible and impotentia excusat legem, i.e., when there is a disability that makes it impossible to obey the law, the alleged disobedience of the law is excused. The “person” mentioned in section 195 of the Income Tax Act cannot be expected to do the impossible, namely, to apply the expanded definition of “royalty” inserted by explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, for the assessment years in question, at a time when such explanation was not actually and factually in the statute. [Paras 80, 81 and 85][413-D-F; 420-H; 421-A-B] Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal,(2020) 7 SCC 1; Citrix Systems Asia Pacific Ptyl. Ltd., In Re., (2012) 343 ITR 1 (AAR) – referred to. Dassault Systems, K.K., In Re., (2010) 322 ITR 125 (AAR); Geoquest Systems B.V. Gevers Deynootweg, In Re., (2010) 327 ITR 1 (AAR); Director of Income Tax v. A.P. Moller Maersk AS, (2017) 5 SCC 651 – H approved.

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 333 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

12. When, under a non-exclusive licence, an end-user gets the right to use computer software in the form of a CD, the end- user only receives a right to use the software and nothing more. The end-user does not get any of the rights that the owner continues to retain under section 14(b) of the Copyright Act read with sub-section (a)(i)-(vii) thereof. Thus, the conclusion that when computer software is licensed for use under an EULA, what is also licensed is the right to use the copyright embedded therein, is wholly incorrect. The licence for the use of a product under an EULA cannot be construed as the licence spoken of in section 30 of the Copyright Act, as such EULA only imposes restrictive conditions upon the end-user and does not part with any interest relatable to any rights mentioned in sections 14(a) and 14(b) of the Copyright Act. [Para 97][431-E-G] CIT v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. (2012) 345 ITR 494 – not correct law.

13. The expression “in respect of”, when used in a taxation statute, is only synonymous with the words “on” or “attributable to”. Such meaning accords with the meaning to be given to the expression “in respect of” contained in explanation 2(v) to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, and would not in any manner make the expression otiose. Secondly, section 16 of the Copyright Act, E which states that “no person shall be entitled to copyright…otherwise than under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force” has been completely missed, thus making it clear that the expression “copyright” has to be understood only as is stated in section 14 of the Copyright Act and not otherwise. Thirdly, the F storage of a computer programme per se would not constitute infringement of copyright. This, again, would directly be contrary to the terms of section 52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act. [Paras 105, 106 and 107][439-B-E] State of Madras v. Swastik Tobacco Factory [1966] 3 G SCR 79 – relied on Director of Income Tax v. Ericsson A.B., (2012) 343 ITR 470; Director of Income Tax v. Nokia Networks

p. 334

A OY, (2013) 358 ITR 259; Director of Income Tax v. Infrasoft Ltd., (2014) 264 CTR 329; CIT v. ZTE Corporation, (2017) 392 ITR 80 – approved.

14. Copyright is an exclusive right, which is negative in nature, being a right to restrict others from doing certain acts. B Copyright is an intangible, incorporeal right, in the nature of a privilege, which is quite independent of any material substance. Ownership of copyright in a work is different from the ownership of the physical material in which the copyrighted work may happen to be embodied. An obvious example is the purchaser of a book or a CD/DVD, who becomes the owner of the physical article, but does not become the owner of the copyright inherent in the work, such copyright remaining exclusively with the owner. Parting with copyright entails parting with the right to do any of the acts mentioned in section 14 of the Copyright Act. The transfer of the material substance does not, of itself, serve to transfer the copyright therein. The transfer of the ownership of the physical substance, in which copyright subsists, gives the purchaser the right to do with it whatever he pleases, except the right to reproduce the same and issue it to the public, unless such copies are already in circulation, and the other acts mentioned in section 14 of the Copyright Act. A licence from a copyright owner, conferring no proprietary interest on the licensee, does not entail parting with any copyright, and is different from a licence issued under section 30 of the Copyright Act, which is a licence which grants the licensee an interest in the rights mentioned in section 14(a) and 14(b) of the Copyright Act. Where the core of a F transaction is to authorize the end-user to have access to and make use of the “licensed” computer software product over which the licensee has no exclusive rights, no copyright is parted with and consequently, no infringement takes place, as is recognized by section 52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act. It makes no difference whether the end-user is enabled to use computer software that G is customised to its specifications or otherwise. A non-exclusive, non-transferable licence, merely enabling the use of a copyrighted product, is in the nature of restrictive conditions which are ancillary to such use, and cannot be construed as a licence to

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 335 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX enjoy all or any of the enumerated rights mentioned in section 14 A of the Copyright Act, or create any interest in any such rights so as to attract section 30 of the Copyright Act. The right to reproduce and the right to use computer software are distinct and separate rights. The former amounting to parting with copyright and the latter, in the context of non-exclusive EULAs, B not being so. [Para 117][452-C-H; 453-A-D] State Bank of India v. Collector of Customs, (2000) 1 SCC 727 : [2000] 1 SCR 1 – relied on 15.1 Section 14(b)(ii) of the Copyright Act was amended twice, first in 1994 and then again in 1999, with effect from C 15.1.2000. After the 1999 Amendment, what is conspicuous by its absence is the phrase “regardless of whether such copy has been sold or given on hire on earlier occasions”. This is a statutory recognition of the doctrine of first sale/principle of exhaustion. [Para 120][454-A-C] D Copinger and Skone James on Compyright (14 th Edition) (1999); Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. Santosh V.G., CS (OS) No. 1682/2006 [“Warner Bros.”] 2009 SCC OnLine Del 835; John Wiley & Sons Inc. v. Prabhat Chander Kumar Jain, IA No. 11331/2008 in CS(OS) No. 1960/2008 2010 SCC OnLine Del 2000; E UseSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp. (Case C- 128/11) – referred to. 15.2 The doctrine of first sale/principle of exhaustion is dependent, in the first place, upon legislation which either recognises or refuses to recognise the doctrine (thereby continuing to vest distribution rights in the copyright owner, even beyond the first sale of the copyrighted work). Thus, for example, prior to the amendment of section 14(d)(ii) in 2012, dealing with a cinematograph film, the distribution right to sell or give on hire or offer for sale or hire, any copy of the film, would continue to vest in the copyright owner, “regardless of whether such copy ha[d] been sold or given on hire on earlier occasion”, which manifested the legislative intent against the application of the doctrine of first sale/principle of exhaustion. Post 2012, however,

p. 336

A the balance between the copyright owner’s distribution right and the right of the purchaser to further resale, was tilted in favour of the latter, the words “regardless of whether such copy has been sold or given on hire on earlier occasion” being deleted by the amendment. Likewise, when it comes to section 14(a)(ii) of the Copyright Act, the distribution right subsists with the owner of copyright to issue copies of the work to the public, to the extent such copies are not copies already in circulation, thereby manifesting a legislative intent to apply the doctrine of first sale/ principle of exhaustion. Like section 14(d)(ii) of the Copyright Act, section 14(b)(ii), has, after the 1999 Amendment, with effect from 15.1.2000, also deleted the words “regardless of whether such copy has been sold or given on hire on earlier occasions’’, thereby making it clear that the same tilt that had been made in section 14(d)(ii) of the Copyright Act vide the amendment in 2012 in favour of the purchaser, is also to be found post the 1999 Amendment, in section 14(b)(ii) of the Copyright Act. [Paras 140, D 141][470-E-H; 471-A-C] 15.3 The language of section 14(b)(ii) of the Copyright Act makes it clear that it is the exclusive right of the owner to sell or to give on commercial rental or offer for sale or for commercial rental “any copy of the computer programme”. Thus, a distributor who purchases computer software in material form and resells it to an end-user cannot be said to be within the scope of the aforesaid provision. The sale or commercial rental spoken of in section 14(b)(ii) of the Copyright Act is of “any copy of a computer programme”, making it clear that the section would only apply to the making of copies of the computer programme and then selling them, i.e., reproduction of the same for sale or commercial rental. [Para 142][471-C-E, H] 15.4 The object of section 14(b)(ii) of the Copyright Act, in the context of a computer program, is to interdict reproduction of the said computer programme and consequent transfer of the reproduced computer programme to subsequent acquirers/end- users. By way of contrast, once a book is sold, on further resale of the same book, the purchaser loses the material book altogether, as such purchaser has, for consideration, parted with

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 337 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX the book once and for all. This may not be so in the case of a A computer programme. Once it is understood that the object of section 14(b)(ii) of the Copyright Act is not to interdict the sale of computer software that is “licensed” to be sold by a distributor, but that it is to prevent copies of computer software once sold being reproduced and then transferred by way of sale or otherwise, it becomes clear that any sale by the author of a computer software to a distributor for onward sale to an end- user, cannot possibly be hit by the said provision. Further, the distributor cannot use the computer software at all and has to pass on the said software, as shrink-wrapped by the owner, to the end-user for a consideration, the distributor’s profit margin being that of an intermediary who merely resells the same product to the end-user. Distribution of copyrighted computer software, on the facts of the present appeals would not constitute the grant of an interest in copyright under section 14(b)(ii) of the Copyright Act necessitating the deduction of tax at source under section D 195 of the Income Tax Act. [Paras 143, 144][471-G-H; 472-A-D] 16.1 The DTAAs that have been entered into by India with other Contracting States have to be interpreted liberally with a view to implement the true intention of the parties. When the definition of “royalties” is seen in all the DTAAs in these appeal, it is found that “royalties” is defined in a manner either identical E with or similar to the definition contained in Article 12 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. This being the case, the OECD Commentary on the provisions of the OECD Model Tax Convention then becomes relevant. [Paras 145, 150][472-E; 476-C-D] F Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2004) 10 SCC 1 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 222; Formula One World Championship Ltd. v. CIT, (2017) 15 SCC 602 : [2017] 2 SCR 152; CIT v. E-Funds IT Solution Inc., (2018) 13 SCC 294 : [2017] 10 SCR 157 – referred to G Thiel v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, High Court of Australia, [1990] 94 ALR 647; Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 1 : [2011] 8 SCR 725; Director of Income Tax v. New Skies Satellite BV, (2016) H

p. 338

Footnotes

1 SCC 91 : [2015]
14 SCR 848 – referred to G

17. Given the definition of royalties contained in Article 12 of the DTAAs there is no obligation on the persons mentioned in section 195 of the Income Tax Act to deduct tax at source, as the distribution agreements/EULAs in the facts of these cases do

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 339 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX not create any interest or right in such distributors/end-users, A which would amount to the use of or right to use any copyright. The provisions contained in the Income Tax Act (section 9(1)(vi), along with explanations 2 and 4 thereof), which deal with royalty, not being more beneficial to the assessees, have no application in the facts of these cases. the amounts paid by resident Indian B end-users/distributors to non-resident computer software manufacturers/suppliers, as consideration for the resale/use of the computer software through EULAs/distribution agreements, is not the payment of royalty for the use of copyright in the computer software, and that the same does not give rise to any income taxable in India, as a result of which the persons referred C to in section 195 of the Income Tax Act were not liable to deduct any TDS under section 195 of the Income Tax Act. [Paras 168 and 169][491-G-H; 492-A-D] Transmission Corpn. of A.P. Ltd. v. CIT, (1999) 7 SCC 266:[1999] 1 Suppl. SCR 504; Tata Consultancy D Services v. State of A.P., 2005 (1) SCC 308 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 1040 – referred to Case Law Reference [1999] 1 Suppl. SCR 504 referred to para 8 E [2010] 10 SCR 1142 relied on para 9 [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 222 referred to paras 13, 150 (2017) 5 SCC 651 referred to para 20 [2000] 1 SCR 137 relied on paras 48, 117 F [1966] 2 SCR 828 relied on para 51 [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 1040 referred to para 52 [2012] 1 SCR 573 relied on para 56 [1966] 3 SCR 79 referred to para 65 G [1977] 3 SCR 475 referred to para 67 (2020) 7 SCC 1 relied on para 81 [1966] 3 SCR 79 referred to para 105 H

p. 340

A [2017] 2 SCR 152 referred to para 150 [2017] 10 SCR 157 referred to para 150 [2011] 8 SCR 725 referred to para 151 [2015] 14 SCR 848 referred to para 164 B CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 8733- 8734 of 2018 From the Judgment and Order dated 15.10.2011 of the High Court of Karnataka in Income Tax Appeal Nos. 1258 and 1270 of 2006. With C Civil Appeal Nos. 8735-8736 of 2018, 8737-8941 of 2018, 8942- 8947 of 2018, 8950-8953 of 2018, 8948-8949 of 2018, 4419 of 2012, 4420 of 2012, 10114 of 2013, 10097 of 2013, 10112-10113 of 2013, 10106 of 2013, 8954-8955 of 2018, 10115-10117 of 2013, 8956 of 2018, 8957 of 2018, 8990 of 2018, 10103 of 2013, 10104 of 2013, 8960 of 2018, 8966 of D 2018, 8958 of 2018, 8959 of 2018, 8962 of 2018, 8961 of 2018, 8963 of 2018, 8964 of 2018, 8965 of 2018, 8969 of 2018, 8967 of 2018, 8968 of 2018, 8972 of 2018, 8971 of 2018, 8970 of 2018, 4629 of 2014, 8973 of 2018, 4631 of 2014, 4630 of 2014, 8974-8975 of 2018, 6386-6387 of 2016, 10105 of 2013, 7852 of 2012, 1416-1418 of 2013, 1403 of 2013, E 1405 of 2013, 1410 of 2013, 1421 of 2013, 1409 of 2013, 1415 of 2013, 1414 of 2013, 1412 of 2013, 1413 of 2013, 1419 of 2013, 1411 of 2013, 1420 of 2013, 1404 of 2013, 1406 of 2013, 1408 of 2013, 1407 of 2013, 2304 of 2013, 2305 of 2013, 2306 of 2013, 10098-10102 of 2013, 2307- 2308 of 2013, 4666-4667 of 2013, 6764 of 2013, 4634 of 2014, 8976 of 2018, 8977-8988 of 2018, 781 of 2021, 782 of 2021, 783 of 2021, 10673 F of 2016, 784 of 2021, 10674 of 2016, 785 of 2021, 3402 of 2017, 10758 of 2017, 9486 of 2017, 8711 of 2018, 8722 of 2018, 8724 of 2018, 8725 of 2018, 9551 of 2018, 786 of 2021, 2006 of 2019, and 790 of 2021. Tushar Mehta, SG, Balbir Singh, ASG, Arvind Datar, S. Ganesh, Percy Pardiwala, K. Radhakrishnan, Ajay Vohra, Preetesh Kapur, A. G Shankar, Sr. Advs., Mukesh Butani, Shreyash Shah, Shankey Agarwal, Tarun Jain, H. Raghavendra Rao, Rupesh Kumar, Rajat Nair, Zoheb Hussain, D.L. Chidananda, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Ms. Anuradha Dutt, Sachit Jolly, Tushar Jarwal, Rohit Garg, Ms. Disha Jham, Vasudevan G., Ms. B. Vijayalakshmi Menon, Ms. Kavita Jha, Anant Mann, Udit Naresh, T. H Suryanarayan, Ms. Tanmayee Rajkumar, Ms. Yugandhara Pawar Jha,

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 341 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

Ms. Manasa Ananthan, Kunal Verma, Senthil Jagadeesan, Ms. Mrinal A Kanwar, Ms. Sonakshi Malhan, Ms. Suriti Chowdhary, S. Annamalai, Salil Kapoor, Ms. Ananya Kapoor, Sumit Lalchandani, Sanat Kapoor, Ms. Soumya Singh, Kamal Mohan Gupta, V. Balachandran, K.R. Vasudevan, Siddharth Naidu, Kishore Kunal, Manish Rastogi, Ms. Tanushree Jain, Parth Jaiprakash, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Ms. Vanita B Bhargava, Ajay Bhargava, Ms. Trishala Trivedi, Ms. Maithili Moondra for M/s. Khaitan & Co., G. Sridhar, Ms. Gayatri Gulati, Siddharth Vasudev, Rahul Unnikrishnan, Sandeep Bagmar, T. V. S. Raghavendra Sreyas, Ambhoj Kumar Sinha, Vishal Kalra, S.S. Tomar, Anil Kumar Gautam, Debmalya Banerjee, Kartik Bhatnagar, Ms. Astha Prasad, Rohan Sharma, Ujjwal Singh, Vardaan Wanchoo for M/s. Karanjawala & Co., Rony C Oommen John, Piyush Swami, Arshdeep Singh, G.C. Srivastava, Suvinay Kumar Dash, Piyush Sachdev, Ms. Runamoni Bhuyan, Advs. for the appearing parties.

Judgment

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by R.F. NARIMAN, J. D

11. Leave granted.

22. The appeals in these cases are by both the assessees as well as the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance [“Revenue”]. Whereas the assessees have succeeded in the question that was posed E before the High Court of Delhi,1 the Revenue has succeeded insofar as the same question was posed before the High Court of Karnataka,2 and in the ruling by the Authority for Advance Rulings [“AAR”], impugned in C.A. No. 8990/2018. 1 This includes the judgments impugned in C.A No. 8990/2018, C.A Nos. 6386- 6387/ 2016, SLP(C) No. 37580/2016, SLP(C) No. 28867/2016, SLP(C) No. 28868/2016, C.A F No. 10673/2016, SLP(C) No. 29571/2016, C.A No. 10674/2016, SLP(C) No. 36782/ 2016, C.A No. 10758/2017, C.A No. 9486/2017, C.A No. 8711/2018, C.A No. 8722/ 2018, C.A No. 8724/2018, C.A No. 8725/2018, C.A No. 9551/2018, SLP(C) NO. 450/ 2019, SLP(C) No. 6736/2020. 2 This includes the judgments impugned in C.A Nos. 8735-8736/2018, C.A Nos. 8737- 8941/2018, C.A Nos. 8942-8947/2018, C.A Nos. 8950-8953/2018, C.A Nos. 8948- G 8949/2018, C.A No. 4419/2012, C.A No. 4420/2012, C.A No. 10114/2013, C.A No.10097/2013, C.A Nos. 10112-10113/2013, C.A No. 10106/2013, C.A Nos. 8954- 8955/2018, C.A Nos. 10115-10117/2013, C.A No. 8956/2018, C.A No. 8957/2018, C.A No. 10103/2013, C.A No. 10104/2013, C.A No. 8960/2018, C.A No. 8966/2018, C.A No. 8958/2018, C.A No. 8959/2018, C.A No. 8962/2018, C.A No. 8961/2018, C.A No. 8963/2018, C.A No. 8964/2018, C.A No. 8965/2018, C.A No. 8969/2018, C.A No.8967/2018, C.A No. 8968/2018, C.A No. 8972/2018, C.A No. 8971/2018, C.A H

p. 342

33. One group of appeals arises from a common judgment of the High Court of Karnataka dated 15.10.2011 reported as CIT v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., (2012) 345 ITR 494, by which the question which was posed before the High Court, was answered stating that the amounts paid by the concerned persons resident in India to non- resident, foreign software suppliers, amounted to royalty and as this was so, the same constituted taxable income deemed to accrue in India under section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [“Income Tax Act”], thereby making it incumbent upon all such persons to deduct tax at source and pay such tax deductible at source [“TDS”] under section 195 of the Income Tax Act. This judgment dated 15.10.2011 has been relied upon by the subsequent impugned judgments passed by the High Court of Karnataka to decide the same question in favour of the Revenue.

44. The appeals before us may be grouped into four categories: i) The first category deals with cases in which computer software is purchased directly by an end-user, resident in D India, from a foreign, non-resident supplier or manufacturer.3 ii) The second category of cases deals with resident Indian companies that act as distributors or resellers, by purchasing computer software from foreign, non-resident suppliers or manufacturers and then reselling the same to resident Indian E end-users.4 No.8970/2018, C.A No. 4629/2014, C.A No. 8973/2018, C.A No. 4631/2014, C.A No.4630/2014, C.A Nos. 8974-8975/2018, C.A No. 10105/2013, C.A No. 7852/2012, C.A Nos. 1416-1418/2013, C.A No. 1403/2013, C.A No. 1405/2013, C.A No. 1410/ 2013, C.A No. 1421/2013, C.A No. 1409/2013, C.A No. 1415/2013, C.A No. 1414/ 2013, C.A No. 1412/2013, C.A No. 1413/2013, C.A No. 1419/2013, C.A No. 1411/ F 2013, C.A No. 1420/2013, C.A No. 1404/2013, C.A No. 1406/2013, C.A No. 1408/ 2013, C.A No.1407/2013, C.A No. 2304/2013, C.A No. 2305/2013, C.A No. 2306/ 2013, C.A Nos.10098-10102/2013, C.A Nos. 2307-2308/2013, C.A Nos. 4666-4667/ 2013, C.A No.6764/2013, C.A No. 4634/2014, C.A No. 8976/2018, C.A Nos. 8977- 8988/2018, C.A No. 3402/2017, C.A No. 2006/2019. 3 This category includes C.A. Nos. 8733-8734/2018, C.A. No. 10114/2013, C.A. Nos. G 10112-10113/2013, C.A. No. 10106/2013, C.A. No. 10103/2013, C.A. No.10104/ 2013, C.A. Nos. 10098-10102/2013, C.A. Nos. 8735-8736/2018, C.A. Nos.8948- 8949/2018, C.A. No. 8956/2018, C.A. No. 8957/2018, C.A. No. 7852/2012, C.A. Nos. 8974-8975/2018, C.A. No. 2304/2013, C.A. No. 2305/2013, C.A. No. 2306/2013,C.A. Nos. 2307-2308/2013, C.A. No. 10097/2013, C.A. No. 8976/2018, C.A. No. 3402/ 2017, SLP(C) No. 450/2019, C.A. No. 2006/2019. 4 This category includes C.A Nos. 8737-8941/2018, C.A No. 8942-8947/2018, C.A H No. 4420/2012, C.A No. 8959/2018, C.A No. 8963/2018, C.A No. 8962/2018, C.A

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 343 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [R.F. NARIMAN, J.]

iii) The third category concerns cases wherein the distributor happens to be a foreign, non-resident vendor, who, after purchasing software from a foreign, non-resident seller, resells the same to resident Indian distributors or end-users.5 iv) The fourth category includes cases wherein computer software is affixed onto hardware and is sold as an integrated unit/equipment by foreign, non-resident suppliers to resident Indian distributors or end-users.6

55. These cases have a chequered history. The facts of C.A. Nos. 8733- 8734/2018 shall be taken as a sample, indicative of the points of law that arise from the various appeals before us. In this case, the appellant, C Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Pvt. Ltd. [“EAC”], is a resident Indian end-user of shrink-wrapped computer software, directly imported from the United States of America [“USA”]. The assessment years that we are concerned with are 2001-2002 and 2002-2003.

66. The Assessing Officer by an order dated 15.05.2002, after applying Article 12(3) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement [“DTAA”], between India and USA, and upon applying section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, found that what was in fact transferred in the transaction between the parties was copyright which attracted the payment of royalty and thus, it was required that tax be deducted at source by the Indian importer and end-user, EAC. Since this was not done for both the assessment years, EAC was held liable to pay the No.8958/2018, C.A No. 8961/2018, C.A No. 8960/2018, C.A Nos. 8950-8953/2018, C.A No. 8966/2018, C.A No. 8973/2018, C.A No. 8965/2018, C.A No. 8972/2018, C.A No. 8969/2018, C.A No. 8971/2018, C.A No. 8970/2018, C.A No. 8964/2018, C.A No.8967/2018, C.A No. 8968/2018, C.A No. 1403/2013, C.A No. 1414/2013, C.A F No.1412/2013, C.A No. 1413/2013, C.A Nos. 1416-1418/2013, C.A No. 1405/2013, C.A No. 1410/2013, C.A No. 1421/2013, C.A No. 1409/2013, C.A No. 1415/2013, C.A No. 1419/2013, C.A No. 1411/2013, C.A No. 1420/2013, C.A No. 1404/2013, C.A No.1406/2013, C.A No. 1408/2013, C.A No. 1407/2013, C.A Nos. 4666-4667/2013, C.A No. 6764/2013, C.A No. 4419/2012, C.A Nos. 8977-8988/2018, C.A No. 4629/ 2014, C.A No. 4631/2014, C.A No. 4630/2014, C.A No. 10105/2013. 5 This category includes C.A. No. 10758/2017, C.A. No. 8990/2018, C.A. No. 9486/ G 2017, C.A. No. 8711/2018, C.A. No. 8722/2018, C.A. No. 8724/2018, C.A. No. 8725/ 2018, C.A. No. 9551/2018, SLP(C) No. 6736/2020, C.A. No. 4634/2014. 6 This category includes C.A. Nos. 10115-10117/2013, C.A. Nos. 6386-6387/2016, C.A. Nos. 8954-8955/2018, SLP(C) No. 37580/2016, SLP(C) No. 28867/2016, SLP(C) No. 28868/2016, C.A. No. 10673/2016, SLP(C) No. 29571/2016, C.A. No. 10674/ 2016, SLP(C) No. 36782/2016. H

p. 344

A amount of Rs. 1,03,54,784 that it had not deducted as TDS, along with interest under section 201(1A) of the Income Tax Act amounting to Rs. 15,76,567. The appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax [“CIT”] was dismissed by an order dated 23.1.2004. However, the appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal [“ITAT”] succeeded vide an order dated 25.11.2005, in which the ITAT followed its previous order dated B 18.02.2005, passed in Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, ITA Nos. 264-266/Bang/2002.

77. An appeal was made from the order of the ITAT to the High Court of Karnataka by the Revenue. The Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka heard a batch of appeals and framed nine questions, C of which question nos. 8 and 9 are important and are set out as follows: “8. Whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that since the assessee had purchased only a right to use the copyright i.e. the software and not the entire copyright itself, the payment cannot be treated as Royalty as per the Double Taxation Avoidance D Agreement and Treaties, which [are] beneficial to the assessee and consequently section 9 of the Act should not take into consideration.

9. Whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that the payment partakes the character of purchase and sale of goods and therefore cannot be treated as royalty payment liable to Income Tax.”

88. In answering these questions, through a judgment dated 24.09.2009, the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka relied heavily upon the judgment of this Court in Transmission Corpn. of A.P. Ltd. v. CIT, (1999) 7 SCC 266 [“AP Transco”] and held that since no application under section 195(2) of the Income Tax Act had been made, the resident Indian importers became liable to deduct tax at source, without more, under section 195(1) of the Income Tax Act.

99. This view of the High Court was set aside by this Court in GE India Technology Centre (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2010) 10 SCC 29 [“GE G Technology”], which ultimately found that the judgment of the High Court dated 24.09.2009 had misread AP Transco (supra). Consequently, this Court remanded the matter to the High Court of Karnataka to decide, on merits, the question of law framed as follows: “24. In our view, Section 195(2) is based on the “principle of H proportionality”. The said sub-section gets attracted only in cases

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 345 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [R.F. NARIMAN, J.]

where the payment made is a composite payment in which a A certain proportion of payment has an element of “income” chargeable to tax in India. It is in this context that the Supreme Court stated: (Transmission Corpn. case [(1999) 7 SCC 266 : (1999) 239 ITR 587], SCC p. 274, para 10) “10. … If no such application is filed income tax on such sum B is to be deducted and it is the statutory obligation of the person responsible for paying such ‘sum’ to deduct tax thereon before making payment. He has to discharge the obligation [to TDS].” (emphasis supplied) If one reads the observation of the Supreme Court, the words C “such sum” clearly indicate that the observation refers to a case of composite payment where the payer has a doubt regarding the inclusion of an amount in such payment which is exigible to tax in India. In our view, the above observations of this Court in Transmission Corpn. case [(1999) 7 SCC 266 : (1999) 239 ITR D 587] which is put in italics has been completely, with respect, misunderstood by the Karnataka High Court to mean that it is not open for the payer to contend that if the amount paid by him to the non-resident is not at all “chargeable to tax in India”, then no TAS is required to be deducted from such payment. This interpretation of the High Court completely loses sight of the plain words of E Section 195(1) which in clear terms lays down that tax at source is deductible only from “sums chargeable” under the provisions of the IT Act i.e. chargeable under Sections 4, 5 and 9 of the IT Act.

25. Before concluding we may clarify that in the present case on facts ITO(TDS) had taken the view that since the sale of the software concerned, included a licence to use the same, the payment made by the appellant(s) to foreign suppliers constituted “royalty” which was deemed to accrue or arise in India and, therefore, TAS was liable to be deducted under Section 195(1) of the Act. The said finding of ITO(TDS) was upheld by CIT(A). However, in the second appeal, ITAT held that such sum paid by the appellant(s) to the foreign software suppliers was not a “royalty” and that the same did not give rise to any “income” taxable in India and, therefore, the appellant(s) was not liable to deduct TAS. However, the High Court did not go into the merits of the case H

p. 346

A and it went straight to conclude that the moment there is remittance an obligation to deduct TAS arises, which view stands hereby overruled.

26. Since the High Court did not go into the merits of the case on the question of payment of royalty, we hereby set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remit these cases to the High Court for de novo consideration of the cases on merits. The question which the High Court will answer is: whether on facts and circumstances of the case ITAT was justified in holding that the amount(s) paid by the appellant(s) to the foreign software suppliers was not “royalty” and that the same did not give rise to any “income” taxable in India and, therefore, the appellant(s) was not liable to deduct any tax at source?”

1010. The impugned judgment of the High Court of Karnataka, dated 15.10.2011, reported as CIT v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., (2012) 345 ITR 494, dealt with a whole group of appeals, and was thus faced with the following question so posed by this Court: “The question which the High Court will answer is— “whether, on facts and circumstances of the case, the Income- tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the amount(s) E paid by the appellant(s) to the foreign software suppliers was not “royalty” and that the same did not give rise to any “income” taxable in India and, therefore, the appellant(s) was not liable to deduct any tax at source?”” (page 498)

1111. After setting out the facts in one of the appeals treated as the lead matter, namely ITA No. 2808/2005 concerning Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., and the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act, India’s DTAAs with USA, France and Sweden respectively, the High Court of Karnataka, on an examination of the End-User Licence Agreement [“EULA”] involved in the transaction, found that what was sold by way of computer software included a right or interest in copyright, which thus gave rise to the payment of royalty and would be an income deemed to accrue in India under section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, requiring the deduction of tax at source.

1212. Leading the charge on behalf of the appellants in the appeals against this impugned judgment of the High Court of Karnataka, Shri

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 347 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [R.F. NARIMAN, J.]

Arvind Datar, learned Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of IBM A India Ltd. [“IBM India”] in C.A. No. 4419/2012, which is a resident Indian distributor of computer software products purchased from IBM Singapore Pte Ltd. [“IBM Singapore”], submitted that his client is a non- exclusive distributor, which purchases off-the-shelf copies of shrink- wrapped computer software from a foreign company in Singapore for onward sale to Indian end-users under a Remarketer Agreement. He stressed that IBM India, the distributor, is not party to the EULA between IBM Singapore and the ultimate end-users/customers in India. The Indian end-user pays IBM India, and in turn, IBM India pays this amount to IBM Singapore after deducting a portion of profit. Importantly, under the Remarketer Agreement, IBM India does not own any right, title or interest in copyright and other intellectual property owned by IBM Singapore, and merely markets IBM Singapore’s software products in India.

1313. Shri Datar further argued that the computer software that is imported for onward sale from Singapore constitutes “goods” and thus was directly covered by this Court’s judgment in Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P., 2005 (1) SCC 308. He assailed the impugned judgment of the High Court of Karnataka by referring to Article 12 of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Singapore for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on E Income,7 [“India-Singapore DTAA”], and the definition of “royalties” contained therein. He argued that the definition of “royalties” did not extend to derivative products of the copyright, for example, a book or a music CD or software products. He relied upon the judgment in Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2004) 10 SCC 1 [“Azadi Bachao F Andolan”] to argue that by virtue of section 90(2) of the Income Tax Act, the DTAA would prevail over domestic law to the extent it is more beneficial to the deductor of tax under section 195 of the Income Tax Act. According to him, even assuming that under section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act IBM India’s transaction would entail parting with G copyright and attract royalty, upon applying the more beneficial provisions of the India-Singapore DTAA, it would be made clear that the amounts

7 Notification No. GSR 610(E), Dated 8-8-1994 As Amended by Notification No. SO 1022(E), Dated 18-7-2005; No. S.O. 2031(E), Dated 1-9-2011 and No. S.O. 935(E), Dated 23-3-2017. H

p. 348

A payable were not in the nature of royalty, and no income in the hands of the foreign supplier would be deemed to accrue in India. Thus, no tax had to be deducted by the Indian importer under section 195(1) of the Income Tax Act. Equally, he submitted that the retrospective amendment to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act brought in by the Finance Act 2012, which added explanation 4 to the provision and expanded its ambit with effect from 01.06.1976, could also not be applied to the DTAA in question.

1414. Pointing to the provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957 [“Copyright Act”], Shri Datar argued that there was a difference between a copyright in an original work and a copyrighted article, and that this was recognised in section 14(b) of the Copyright Act, which refers to a “computer program” per se and a “copy of a computer program” as two distinct subject matters. He emphasized that under the Remarketer Agreement, no copyright was given by IBM Singapore and that even the end-user in India only received a limited licence to use the product by itself, with no right to sub-license, lease, make copies etc. The licence to use such shrink-wrapped computer software was thus incidental to and essential to effectuate the use of the product. He strongly relied upon the Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital [“OECD Commentary”] by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [“OECD”] E which distinguishes between the sale of a copyrighted article and the sale of copyright itself. He further argued that the doctrine of first sale/ principle of exhaustion was cemented in section 14(b)(ii) of the Copyright Act post the amendment brought in vide Act 49 of 1999, with effect from 15.1.2000 [“1999 Amendment”], thereby making it clear that F the foreign supplier’s distribution right would not extend to the sale of copies of the work to other persons beyond the first sale. Importantly, he added that the importer, IBM India, being only a distributor, had no right to use the computer software, and merely purchased a sealed, shrink- wrapped product and resold it in the same, sealed condition, and thereby did not pay any consideration for any transfer of or interest in copyright. G He cited a number of judgments and other authorities to buttress his submissions.

1515. Shri Percy Pardiwala, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of Rational Software Corporation India Ltd. in C.A. No. 8962/ 2018, supplemented Shri Datar’s submissions, and adverted to the H provisions of the India-Singapore DTAA, Income Tax Act and the relevant

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 349 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [R.F. NARIMAN, J.]

EULA and Remarketer Agreement. Coming to the Finance Act 2012 A which added explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, he argued that the words “any right, property or information used or services utilised” which occur in section 9(1)(vi)(b), make it clear that explanation 4, read both textually and contextually would only apply to section 9(1)(vi)(b), and not expand the scope of the definition of royalty contained in explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi). Further, he referred to Circular No. 10/2002 dated 09.10.2002 by the Central Board of Direct Taxes [“CBDT”] in which “remittance for royalties” and “remittance for supply of articles or…computer software” were addressed as separate and distinct payments, the former attracting the “royalty” provision under Article 12 of the DTAA, and the latter being taxable as business profits under Article 7 of the DTAA, provided that the foreign, non-resident supplier or manufacturer had a permanent establishment [“PE”] in India.

1616. Shri S. Ganesh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of Sonata Information Technology Ltd. in C.A. Nos. 8737-8941/2018, D submitted that to comprehend the nature of a licence, one would have to refer to section 52 of the Indian Easements Act 1882. He stressed the fact that the ruling by the AAR in the case of Dassault Systems, K.K., In Re., (2010) 322 ITR 125 (AAR), as followed in Geoquest Systems B.V. Gevers Deynootweg, In Re., (2010) 327 ITR 1 (AAR), was not appealed against by the Revenue, and the exhaustive statement of law contained therein is something that he relied upon. According to him, if the position of the Revenue were correct, arbitrary results would ensue, inasmuch as his client, receiving a 2% commission, would, however, after the disallowance of the deduction under section 40(a)(ia) of the Income Tax Act, end up paying tax of a huge amount, way beyond the commission, resulting in extreme financial hardship. Thus, if section 195 of the Income Tax Act could be construed in a manner so as to avoid such a result, this must be done. Further, he relied heavily upon the OECD Commentary and went on to argue that mere nomenclature, such as the use of the term “licence”, was not conclusive as to the character of the transaction. He also relied upon section G 52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act to argue that what is mentioned in the provision is exactly what the transactions in these appeals are concerned with, and therefore, the making of copies only in order to utilise the product to the extent permitted by the EULA, would not constitute an infringement of copyright, as expressly stated in this provision. Going by H

p. 350

A what the originator or creator holds by way of copyright, which he either passes on or retains, and what is mentioned in section 52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act, he submitted that what was resold by his client in this case was not copyright, but merely a copyrighted article, which constituted goods in the hands of the end- user, without any right to transfer the same. He also cited several judgments to buttress his submissions. B

1717. Shri Ajay Vohra, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of Sasken Communications Tech Ltd. in C.A. Nos. 10114/2013 and 8957/ 2018, relied upon the Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of India for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion C with respect to Taxes on Income,8 [“India-USA DTAA”] and echoed the submissions of his predecessors. In addition, he argued that the retrospective amendment to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act adding explanation 4, could not be applied as the assessment years that we are concerned with in all these cases are prior to 2012, and that the law cannot compel one to do the impossible, namely, to deduct tax at source on an expanded definition of royalty which did not exist at the time of the payment/deduction to be made under section 195 of the Income Tax Act. He cited various judgments and relied upon the proposition that where no assessment to tax can be made on a foreign, non-resident supplier, the appellants could not be held to be assessees in default for not deducting tax at source under section 195 of the Income Tax Act.

1818. Shri Preetesh Kapur, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of Sunray Computers Pvt. Ltd. in C.A. Nos. 10115-10117/2013, stressed upon the language of section 14(b)(ii) of the Copyright Act, both pre and post the 1999 Amendment, brought in with effect from F 15.1.2000, and cited the doctrine of first sale/principle of exhaustion, arguing that the amendment, after deleting the words “regardless of whether such copy has been sold or given on hire on earlier occasions”, was a statutory application of the doctrine of first sale/principle of exhaustion. This, he argued, made it clear that since no distribution right G by the original owner extended beyond the first sale of the copyrighted goods, it can be said that only the goods, and not the copyright in the goods, had passed onto the importer.

1919. Shri Sachit Jolly, learned advocate appearing on behalf of Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Pvt. Ltd. in C.A. Nos. 8733- H 8 Notification No. GSR 992(E), dated 20-12-1990.

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 351 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [R.F. NARIMAN, J.]

8734/2018, and GE India Technology Centre Pvt. Ltd. in C.A. Nos. A 8735- 8736/2018, also echoed these submissions and in particular, relied upon judgments which made it clear that a retrospective amendment to a statute cannot be applied to an assessment year in which, as a matter of fact, the expanded definition of royalty did not exist.

2020. Shri Kunal Verma, learned advocate appearing on behalf of B Infineon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. in C.A. No. 2006/2019, argued that in any case, in the facts of his case, the payments made by the assessee were in the nature of reimbursement of costs under a cost- sharing agreement with a German supplier of software, and thus no “sum chargeable under the provisions of [the] Act” had been paid, attracting section 195 of the Income Tax Act. To buttress his submission, C he relied in particular upon the judgment in Director of Income Tax v. A.P. Moller Maersk AS, (2017) 5 SCC 651.

2121. Per contra, Shri Balbir Singh, the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Revenue, took us through the provisions of the Income Tax Act, the Copyright Act, the India-USA D DTAA and some of the EULAs between the parties. He argued that explanation 2(v) to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act applied to payments to a non-resident by way of royalty for the use of or the right to use any copyright. For this, he relied upon the language of explanation 2(v) and stressed that the words “in respect of” have to be given a wide E meaning. He then relied upon CBDT Circular No. 152 dated 27.11.1974,9 together with the statement of the Finance Minister made before the Lok Sabha on 07.09.1990,10 and CBDT Notification No. 21/2012 dated 13.06.2012,11 to submit that explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act is clarificatory of the position in law right from 01.06.1976 when section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act was first brought into force. F He then argued that the provisions for TDS are distinct from and exist apart from provisions for assessment under the Income Tax Act. This being so, it is clear that the India-USA DTAA and other such DTAAs would not apply to the persons spoken of in section 195 of the Income Tax Act who are not assessees, since the provisions of the DTAAs, G when read with section 90 of the Income Tax Act, applied only to persons who could be described as assessees. He also relied upon Article 30 of 9 Circular No. 152 [F.No. 484/31/74-FTD-II], dated 27.11.1974. 10 As recorded in CBDT Circular No. 588 dated 02.1.1991. 11 Notification No. 21/2012 [F.No.142/10/2012-SO(TPL)] S.O. 1323(E), dated 13.06.2012. H

p. 352

A the India-USA DTAA which, for the USA, fixes different dates for the entry into force of the provisions concerning withholding taxes and other taxes, unlike the entry into force provision for India, which makes no such distinction. This, he argued, would make it clear that persons who have to make deductions under section 195 of the Income Tax Act do not fall within the subject matter of the India-USA DTAA and other B such DTAAs. He then relied heavily upon AP Transco (supra) and other judgments which make it clear that a “payer” under section 195 and an “assessee” under section 2(7) of the Income Tax Act are distinct. He also relied heavily upon a recent judgment of this Court in PILCOM v. CIT, West Bengal- VII, 2020 SCC Online SC 426 [“PILCOM”], C which dealt with section 194E of the Income Tax Act, for the proposition that tax has to be deducted at source irrespective of whether tax is otherwise payable by the non-resident assessee. He then relied upon CBDT Circular No. 588 dated 02.1.1991,12 which clarified that tax concessions were not available in relation to payments in respect of software imported separately or independently of computer hardware. D

2222. Coming to the Copyright Act, the learned Additional Solicitor General relied upon sections 2(a)(v), 19(3), 30A, 52(1)(ad), 58 and 65A of the Copyright Act to buttress the submission that in some of the cases before us, since adaptation of software could be made, albeit for installation and use on a particular computer, copyright is parted with by E the original owner. He added that section 51(b) of the Copyright Act makes it clear that when any person makes for sale or hire, or sells or lets for hire, or distributes, either for the purpose of trade or to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright, or imports into India, any infringing copies of the work, such importation into India F without a licence would amount to infringement of copyright. Further, section 58 of the Copyright Act regards infringing copies of any work as the property of the owner of the copyright, who accordingly may take proceedings for the recovery of possession thereof or in respect of the conversion thereof. From section 52(1)(ad) of the Copyright Act, the learned Additional Solicitor General sought to argue that only the making G of copies or the adaptation of a computer programme from a legally obtained copy for non-commercial, personal use would not amount to infringement, and therefore in the appeals before us, where such copies were made for commercial use, the converse would be true. He relied strongly upon the AAR’s ruling in Citrix Systems Asia Pacific Ptyl. H 12 187 ITR (St.) 0063.

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 353 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [R.F. NARIMAN, J.]

Ltd., In Re., (2012) 343 ITR 1 (AAR), arguing that it approached the A subject correctly and that the findings made therein are different and preferable to the findings made by the AAR in Dassault Systems, K.K., In Re., (2010) 322 ITR 125 (AAR) and Geoquest Systems B.V. Gevers Deynootweg, In Re., (2010) 327 ITR 1 (AAR), and the other judgments of the High Court of Delhi. B

2323. The learned Additional Solicitor General further pointed out that the Indian Government had expressed its reservations on the OECD Commentary, especially on the parts of the OECD Commentary dealing with the parting of copyright and royalty. He also relied upon on the Report of the High Powered Committee on ‘Electronic Commerce and Taxation’ constituted by the CBDT,13 [“HPC Report 2003”] and the C Report of the Committee on the Taxation of E-Commerce [“E- Commerce Report 2016”], which proposed an equalization levy on specified transactions. He then went on to rely on certain judgments to state that even if the OECD Commentary could be relied upon, it being a rule of international law contrary to domestic law, to the extent it was contrary to explanations 2 and 4 of section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, it must give way to domestic law. Referring to the doctrine of first sale/principle of exhaustion, he cited a number of judgments in order to show that under section 14(b)(ii) of the Copyright Act, this doctrine cannot be said to apply insofar as distributors are concerned. He finally concluded his arguments by stating that the judgments which deal with computer software under sales tax law and excise law have no relevance to income tax law, as the laws relating to indirect taxes are fundamentally different from the laws relating to direct taxes, since they must follow the drill of the chargeability under the Income Tax Act, which is different from chargeability under sales tax law or excise law. F THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961

2424. Having heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of various parties, we first set out the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act that we are directly concerned with: “2. Definitions. G In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— xxx xxx xxx (7) “assessee” means a person by whom any tax or any other sum of money is payable under this Act, and includes— 13 F. No 500/ 122/ 99 dated December 16, 1999. H

p. 354

A (a) every person in respect of whom any proceeding under this Act has been taken for the assessment of his income or assessment of fringe benefits or of the income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable, or of the loss sustained by him or by such other person, or of the amount of refund due to him or to such other person; B (b) every person who is deemed to be an assessee under any provision of this Act; (c) every person who is deemed to be an assessee in default under any provision of this Act; C xxx xxx xxx 14 (37A) “rate or rates in force” or “rates in force”, in relation to an assessment year or financial year, means— xxx xxx xxx (iii) for the purposes of deduction of tax under section 194LBA D or section 194LBB or section 194LBC or section 195, the rate or rates of income-tax specified in this behalf in the Finance Act of the relevant year or the rate or rates of income-tax specified in an agreement entered into by the Central Government under section 90, or an agreement notified by the Central Government under section 90A, whichever is applicable by virtue of the provisions of section 90, or section 90A, as the case may be;” “4. Charge of income-tax. (1) Where any Central Act enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any assessment year at any rate or rates, income-tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions (including provisions for the levy of additional income-tax) of, this Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of every person: Provided that where by virtue of any provision of this Act income- G tax is to be charged in respect of the income of a period other than the previous year, income-tax shall be charged accordingly. (2) In respect of income chargeable under sub-section (1), income- tax shall be deducted at the source or paid in advance, where it is so deductible or payable under any provision of this Act.” 14 H Substituted by the Finance Act 1992 (18 of 1992), sec. 3(c) (w.e.f. 1-6-1992).

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 355 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [R.F. NARIMAN, J.]

“5. Scope of total income. A (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the total income of any previous year of a person who is a resident includes all income from whatever source derived which— (a) is received or is deemed to be received in India in such year by or on behalf of such person; or B

(b) accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise to him in India during such year; or (c) accrues or arises to him outside India during such year : Provided that, in the case of a person not ordinarily resident in C India within the meaning of sub-section (6) of section 6, the income which accrues or arises to him outside India shall not be so included unless it is derived from a business controlled in or a profession set up in India. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the total income of any D previous year of a person who is a non-resident includes all income from whatever source derived which— (a) is received or is deemed to be received in India in such year by or on behalf of such person; or (b) accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise to him in E India during such year. Explanation 1.—Income accruing or arising outside India shall not be deemed to be received in India within the meaning of this section by reason only of the fact that it is taken into account in a balance sheet prepared in India. F Explanation 2.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that income which has been included in the total income of a person on the basis that it has accrued or arisen or is deemed to have accrued or arisen to him shall not again be so included on the basis that it is received or deemed to be received by him in G India.” “9. Income deemed to accrue or arise in India. (1) The following incomes shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India:— xxx xxx xxx H

p. 356

15 A (vi) income by way of royalty payable by— xxx xxx xxx (b) a person who is a resident, except where the royalty is payable in respect of any right, property or information used or services utilised for the purposes of a business or profession carried on by such person outside India or for the purposes of making or earning any income from any source outside India; xxx xxx xxx Explanation 2.—For the purposes of this clause, “royalty” means consideration (including any lump sum consideration but excluding any consideration which would be the income of the recipient chargeable under the head “Capital gains”) for— (i) the transfer of all or any rights (including the granting of a licence) in respect of a patent, invention, model, design, secret formula or process or trade mark or similar property; (ii) the imparting of any information concerning the working of, or the use of, a patent, invention, model, design, secret formula or process or trade mark or similar property; (iii) the use of any patent, invention, model, design, secret formula or process or trade mark or similar property; (iv) the imparting of any information concerning technical, industrial, commercial or scientific knowledge, experience or skill; 16 (iva) the use or right to use any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment but not including the amounts referred to in section 44BB; F (v) the transfer of all or any rights (including the granting of a licence) in respect of any copyright, literary, artistic or scientific work including films or video tapes for use in connection with television or tapes for use in connection with radio broadcasting; or G (vi) the rendering of any services in connection with the activities referred to in 17[sub-clauses (i) to (iv), (iva) and (v)]. 15 Inserted by the Finance Act 1976 (66 of 1976), sec 4(b) (w.e.f. 1-6-1976). 16 Inserted by the Finance Act 2001 (14 of 2001), sec. 4(i) (w.e.f. 1-4-2002). 17 Substituted by the Finance Act 2001 (14 of 2001), sec. 4(ii), for “sub-clauses (i) to H (v)” (w.e.f. 1-4-2002).

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 357 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [R.F. NARIMAN, J.]

18 Explanation 3.—For the purposes of this clause, “computer software” means any computer programme recorded on any disc, tape, perforated media or other information storage device and includes any such programme or any customized electronic data. 19 Explanation 4.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the transfer of all or any rights in respect of any right, property or information includes and has always included transfer of all or any right for use or right to use a computer software (including granting of a licence) irrespective of the medium through which such right is transferred. 20 Explanation 5.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the royalty includes and has always included consideration in respect of any right, property or information, whether or not— (a) the possession or control of such right, property or information is with the payer; (b) such right, property or information is used directly by the payer; (c) the location of such right, property or information is in India.” “90. Agreement with foreign countries or specified territories. E (1) The Central Government may enter into an agreement with the Government of any country outside India or specified territory outside India,— (a) for the granting of relief in respect of— (i) income on which have been paid both income- tax under F this Act and income-tax in that country or specified territory, as the case may be, or (ii) income-tax chargeable under this Act and under the corresponding law in force in that country or specified 18 Substituted by the Finance Act 2000 (10 of 2000), sec. 4, for Explanation 3 (w.e.f. G 1-4-2001). Explanation 3 before substitution, stood as under: “Explanation 3.- For the purposes of this clause, the expression “computer software” shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (b) of the Explanation to section 80HHE”. 19 Inserted by the Finance Act 2012 (23 of 2012), sec 4(b) (w.r.e.f 1-6-1976). 20 Inserted by the Finance Act 2012 (23 of 2012), sec 4(b) (w.r.e.f 1-6-1976). H

p. 358

A territory, as the case may be, to promote mutual economic relations, trade and investment, or (b) for the avoidance of double taxation of income under this Act and under the corresponding law in force in that country or specified territory, as the case may be, without creating B opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance (including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in the said agreement for the indirect benefit to residents of any other country or territory), or

C (c) for exchange of information for the prevention of evasion or avoidance of income-tax chargeable under this Act or under the corresponding law in force in that country or specified territory, as the case may be, or investigation of cases of such evasion or avoidance, or

D (d) for recovery of income-tax under this Act and under the corresponding law in force in that country or specified territory, as the case may be, and may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make such provisions as may be necessary for implementing the agreement. (2) Where the Central Government has entered into an agreement with the Government of any country outside India or specified territory outside India, as the case may be, under sub-section (1) for granting relief of tax, or as the case may be, avoidance of double taxation, then, in relation to the assessee to whom such agreement applies, the provisions of this Act shall apply to the extent they are more beneficial to that assessee. xxx xxx xxx 21 Explanation 4.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that where any term used in an agreement entered into under sub-section (1) is defined under the said agreement, the said term shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in the agreement; and where the term is not defined in the said agreement, but defined in the Act, it shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in the Act and explanation, if any, given to it by the Central Government.”

Footnotes

21 H Inserted by the Finance Act 2017, sec.
39 (w.e.f. 1-4-2018).

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 359 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [R.F. NARIMAN, J.]

“195. Other sums. A (1) Any person responsible for paying to a non-resident, not being a company, or to a foreign company, any interest (not being interest referred to in section 194LB or section 194LC) or section 194LD or any other sum chargeable under the provisions of this Act (not being income chargeable under the head “Salaries”) shall, at the B time of credit of such income to the account of the payee or at the time of payment thereof in cash or by the issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, deduct income- tax thereon at the rates in force: Provided that in the case of interest payable by the Government C or a public sector bank within the meaning of clause (23D) of section 10 or a public financial institution within the meaning of that clause, deduction of tax shall be made only at the time of payment thereof in cash or by the issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode. D Explanation 1.—For the purposes of this section, where any interest or other sum as aforesaid is credited to any account, whether called “Interest payable account” or “Suspense account” or by any other name, in the books of account of the person liable to pay such income, such crediting shall be deemed to be credit of such income to the account of the payee and the provisions of this section shall apply accordingly. 22 Explanation 2.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the obligation to comply with sub-section (1) and to make deduction thereunder applies and shall be deemed to have always applied and extends and shall be deemed to have always extended to all persons, resident or non-resident, whether or not the non- resident person has— (i) a residence or place of business or business connection in India; or (ii) any other presence in any manner whatsoever in India. G (2) Where the person responsible for paying any such sum chargeable under this Act 23(other than salary) to a non- resident considers that the whole of such sum would not be income 22 Inserted by the Finance Act 2012 (23 of 2012), sec. 77(a)(ii) (w.r.e.f. 1-4-1962). 23 Substituted by the Finance Act 2003 (32 of 2003), sec. 80(b) (w.e.f. 1-6-2003). H

p. 360

A chargeable in the case of the recipient, he may make an application in such form and manner to the Assessing Officer, to determine in such manner, as may be prescribed, the appropriate proportion of such sum so chargeable, and upon such determination, tax shall be deducted under sub- section (1) only on that proportion of the sum which is so chargeable.” B “201. Consequences of failure to deduct or pay. (1) Where any person, including the principal officer of a company,— (a) who is required to deduct any sum in accordance with the C provisions of this Act; or (b) referred to in sub-section (1A) of section 192, being an employer, does not deduct, or does not pay, or after so deducting fails to pay, the whole or any part of the tax, as required by or under this Act, D then, such person, shall, without prejudice to any other consequences which he may incur, be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such tax: Provided that any person, including the principal officer of a company, who fails to deduct the whole or any part of the tax in E accordance with the provisions of this Chapter on the sum paid to a payee or on the sum credited to the account of a payee shall not be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such tax if such payee— (i) has furnished his return of income under section 139; F (ii) has taken into account such sum for computing income in such return of income; and (iii) has paid the tax due on the income declared by him in such return of income, and the person furnishes a certificate to this effect from an accountant in such form as may be prescribed: Provided further that no penalty shall be charged under section 221 from such person, unless the Assessing Officer is satisfied that such person, without good and sufficient reasons, has failed to deduct and pay such tax.”

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 361 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [R.F. NARIMAN, J.]

2525. The scheme of the Income Tax Act, insofar as the question raised before us is concerned, is that for income to be taxed under the Income Tax Act, residence in India, as defined by section 6, is necessary in most cases. By section 4(1), income tax shall be charged for any assessment year at any rate or rates, as defined by section 2(37A) of the Income Tax Act, in respect of the total income of the previous year of every person. Under section 4(2), in respect of income chargeable under sub-section (1) thereof, income tax shall be deducted at source or paid in advance, depending upon the provisions of the Income Tax Act. Importantly, under section 5(2) of the Income Tax Act, the total income of a person who is a non-resident, includes all income from whatever source derived, which accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise to such person in India during such year. This, however, is subject to the provisions of the Income Tax Act. Certain income is deemed to arise or accrue in India, under section 9 of the Income Tax Act, notwithstanding the fact that such income may accrue or arise to a non-resident outside India. One such income is income by way of royalty, which, under section D 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, means the transfer of all or any rights, including the granting of a licence, in respect of any copyright in a literary work.

2626. That such transaction may be governed by a DTAA is then recognized by section 5(2) read with section 90 of the Income Tax Act, making it clear that the Central Government may enter into any such agreement with the government of another country so as to grant relief in respect of income tax chargeable under the Income Tax Act or under any corresponding law in force in that foreign country, or for the avoidance of double taxation of income under the Income Tax Act and under the corresponding law in force in that country. What is of importance is that once a DTAA applies, the provisions of the Income Tax Act can only apply to the extent that they are more beneficial to the assessee and not otherwise. Further, by explanation 4 to section 90 of the Income Tax Act, it has been clarified by the Parliament that where any term is defined in a DTAA, the definition contained in the DTAA is to be looked at. It is only where there is no such definition that the definition in the Income G Tax Act can then be applied. This position has been recognised by this Court in Azadi Bachao Andolan (supra), which held: “21. The provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are expressly made “subject to the provisions of this Act”, which would include Section 90 of the Act. As to what would happen in the event of a H

p. 362

A conflict between the provision of the Income Tax Act and a notification issued under Section 90, is no longer res integra.” “28. A survey of the aforesaid cases makes it clear that the judicial consensus in India has been that Section 90 is specifically intended to enable and empower the Central Government to issue a B notification for implementation of the terms of a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. When that happens, the provisions of such an agreement, with respect to cases to which they apply, would operate even if inconsistent with the provisions of the Income Tax Act. We approve of the reasoning in the decisions which we have noticed. If it was not the intention of the legislature to make C a departure from the general principle of chargeability to tax under Section 4 and the general principle of ascertainment of total income under Section 5 of the Act, then there was no purpose in making those sections “subject to the provisions of the Act”. The very object of grafting the said two sections with the said clause is to D enable the Central Government to issue a notification under Section 90 towards implementation of the terms of DTACs which would automatically override the provisions of the Income Tax Act in the matter of ascertainment of chargeability to income tax and ascertainment of total income, to the extent of inconsistency with the terms of DTAC.” E (emphasis supplied)

2727. The machinery provision contained in section 195 of the Income Tax Act is inextricably linked with the charging provision contained in section 9 read with section 4 of the Income Tax Act, as a F result of which, a person resident in India, responsible for paying a sum of money, “chargeable under the provisions of [the] Act”, to a non- resident, shall at the time of credit of such amount to the account of the payee in any mode, deduct tax at source at the rate in force which, under section 2(37A)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, is the rate in force prescribed by the DTAA. Importantly, such deduction is only to be made if the non- resident is liable to pay tax under the charging provision contained in section 9 read with section 4 of the Income Tax Act, read with the DTAA. Thus, it is only when the non-resident is liable to pay income tax in India on income deemed to arise in India and no deduction of TDS is made under section 195(1) of the Income Tax Act, or such person has, after applying section 195(2) of the Income Tax Act, not

ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PVT LTD v. 363 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [R.F. NARIMAN, J.]

deducted such proportion of tax as is required, that the consequences of A a failure to deduct and pay, reflected in section 201 of the Income Tax Act, follow, by virtue of which the resident-payee is deemed an “assessee in default”, and thus, is made liable to pay tax, interest and penalty thereon. This position is also made amply clear by the referral order in the concerned appeals from the High Court of Karnataka, namely, the B judgment of this Court in GE Technology (supra).

2828. However, the learned Additional Solicitor General relied strongly upon the recent judgment of this Court in PILCOM (supra). This judgment dealt with payments made to non-resident sportspersons or sports associations, the relevant provision under section 194E of the Income Tax Act reading as follows: C

“194-E. Payments to non-resident sportsmen or sports associations. - Where any income referred to in Section 115- BBA is payable to a non-resident sportsman (including an athlete) who is not a citizen of India or a non-resident sports association or institution, the person responsible for making the payment shall, D at the time of credit of such income to the account of the payee or at the time of payment thereof in cash or by issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, deduct income tax thereon at the rate of ten percent”

2929. It is in this context that this Court referred to the judgment in E GE Technology (supra) (see paragraph 16) and distinguished the same, stating: “16.1 The submission that unless permission was obtained under Section 195(2) of the Act, the liability to deduct Tax at Source must be with respect to the entire payment, was not accepted. F Relying on the expression “chargeable under the provisions of the Act” occurring in Section 195(1) of the Act, it was held “the obligation to deduct TAS, is however, limited to the appropriate proportion of the income chargeable under the Act forming part of the gross sum of money payable to the non-resident”. G 16.2 This decision, in our view, has no application insofar as payments at serial nos. (vi) and (vii) are concerned. To the extent the payments represented amounts which could not be subject matter of charge under the provisions of the Act, appropriate benefit already stands extended to the Appellant.” H

Report an error in this judgment →

Contains information from the Indian High Court / Supreme Court Judgments dataset, licensed under CC-BY-4.0