RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS

257Copy pinpoint257. The counsel for the petitioner, owing to inadvertence or lack of research, had built up his case by placing reliance on the deleted Rules 12 and 13 of the unamended 1959 Rules to support their argument as regards the requirement of personal/public hearing in case of modification. We are pained to note that the said rules were deleted by 1966 amendment dated 28.5.1966 and no reliance whatsoever can be B placed on the said rules in the present subject matter. Rather, the deletion is indicative of legislative intent of doing away with the dispensation provided thereunder for the purposes of modification. The relevant extract of the said notification reads thus: “2. In the Delhi Development (Master Plan and Zonal Development C Plan) Rules, 1959,— (a) rules 12 and 13 shall be omitted; ... ...” D

258Copy pinpoint258. The petitioners have placed reliance upon a decision of the High Court of Delhi on Section-11A in Friends of Rajouri Garden Environment & Anr. v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation325. The judgment merely explains the intent behind the provision and lays out the requirement of inviting objections and suggestions from “any person”, E particularly locally affected persons. In this case, the said objections and suggestions have been invited. Furthermore, that case involved construction activity of a nature different from the use zone of the area without effecting the change in land use prior thereto. The reliance, therefore, is of no significance in this case. Similarly, the decisions relied upon by the petitioners in support of the argument under consideration including Syed Hasan Rasul Numa326 does not take the matter any further. Indeed, decision in Syed Hasan Rasul Numa327 pertains to the 1957 Act. It was, however, a case of objection(s) taken by the concerned person having gone unnoticed by the BoEH and also the Authority. The Court found as of fact that the objection taken by the appellants was not listed in the agenda of the meeting convened for consideration and any justification given by the Authority cannot validate the final decision which otherwise suffered from the vice of principles of natural justice qua the 325 2020 SCCOnline Del 458 (paras 30 and 33) 326 (supra at 220) 327 (supra at 220) H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 483 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

appellants. Further, in that case the appellants were directly affected by the proposed modification.

259Copy pinpoint259. Arguendo, a personal/public hearing was strictly mandated, the relevant query here would be to see whether sufficient opportunity was given, and if not, whether any case of actual prejudice has been made out by the petitioners. It is seen that on 3.2.2020, personal communication was sent to all the objectors. Out of 1292 objectors, 1171 successfully received the emails, 62 emails bounced back due to technical errors and 59 objectors had not provided their email addresses. Additionally, 92 objectors were informed about the scheduled hearing via SMS. Across the span of two days of hearing, 42 objectors were heard including some of the petitioners before this Court. The minutes of the meeting of the Board dated 7.2.2020 succinctly noted the stand of the applicants/objectors in 13 points. Even before us, identical points were repeated by most of the objectors in a stereotype manner, and it has been conceded by the petitioners herein that their grievances were also a part of these 13 points. No other grievance was pointed out to us which was not taken on record and adverted to during the personal/ public hearing. Thus, the absence of petitioners or similarly placed persons during public hearing for whatever reasons mentioned, would be of no consequence. Therefore, the contention that short notice led to denial of fairness or opportunity cannot be accepted. It is no doubt a settled proposition that wherever public consultation is prescribed, it must be done in an effective manner, both quantitatively and qualitatively, so as to make it a meaningful participatory process. And in order to make it meaningful, the requirement of reasonable time is of fundamental importance. But what is reasonable time in a given factual scenario cannot be stated as a general proposition and would depend on the circumstances of each case. In the present case, despite there being no express requirement of personal/public hearing, the same was provided for after keeping the window of sending objections/suggestions open for 30 days and sending personal intimation regarding hearing 3 days prior to the scheduled date. It is not the case of the petitioners that they had not received such communication. G

260Copy pinpoint260. Thus, no case of prejudice whatsoever has been made out by the petitioners in the process of public consultation. It is well settled that principles of natural justice are not an unruly horse. It would be an empty formality to permit large number of persons to raise same 13 H

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A objections multiple times. An attempt was made to impress upon us that due to pandemic situation most of the objectors were unable to remain present on the specified day and time for hearing. As aforesaid, none of the petitioners have invited our attention to any objection taken by them in writing which was different than the 13 points/questions noted by the Authority which were common in all the objections received by it. Hence, B even this plea raised by the petitioners is of no avail. In other words, though the petitioners have vehemently argued about denial of natural justice, the same has not been demonstrated sufficiently to meet the basic standards of judicial conscience so as to warrant our interference.

261Copy pinpoint261. Indeed, principles of natural justice infuse life and blood into C legal processes both judicial and administrative. However, the occasion of their application is not uniform and it cannot be stated as a proposition of blanket application that all administrative exercises are subject to unalterable and absolute standards of natural justice. In Kailash Chandra Ahuja328, this Court in para 36, observed thus: - D “36. … Even in those cases where procedural requirements have not been complied with, the action has not been held ipso facto illegal, unlawful or void unless it is shown that non-observance had prejudicially affected the applicant.” In Canara Bank329, this Court highlighted the fundamental premise of natural justice and observed thus: - “9. The expressions “natural justice” and “legal justice” do not present a water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigants’ defence.” G Reference could also be had to State Bank of Patiala & Ors. v. S.K. Sharma330 wherein this Court had noted thus: 328 (supra at 148) 329 (supra at 147) 330 (1996) 3 SCC 364 H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 485 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

“32. ... Justice means justice between both the parties. The A interests of justice equally demand that the guilty should be punished and that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Principles of natural justice are but the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counter-productive exercise.”

262Copy pinpoint262. In Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation331, this Court observed thus: “24. ....The question as to what extent, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with would depend upon the fact situation obtaining in each case. The principles of natural justice cannot be applied in vacuum. They cannot be put in any straitjacket formula. The principles of natural justice are furthermore not required to be complied with when it will lead to an empty formality....” D (emphasis supplied)

263Copy pinpoint263. In Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Social Welfare Residential Educational Institutions v. Pindiga Sridhar & Ors.332, the Court reiterated the settled position and observed thus: “7. ...By now, it is well settled principle of law that the principles E of natural justice cannot be applied in a straitjacket formula. Their application depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To sustain the complaint of the violation of principles of natural justice one must establish that he was prejudiced for non- observance of the principles of natural justice ...” F

264Copy pinpoint264. In Jagjit Singh333, this Court had observed that: “44. ... However, the principles of natural justice cannot be placed in a straitjacket. These are flexible rules. Their applicability is determined on the facts of each case.”

265Copy pinpoint265. Further, in Chairman, Board of Mining Examination334,the G Court was more categorical in its approach and observed thus: 331 (supra at 150) 332 (2007) 13 SCC 352 333 (supra at 153) 334 (supra at 154) H

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A “13. … Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking landmine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural B expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction.…” In short, the petitioners have not been able to demonstrate any case of denial of natural justice. For, the prescribed procedure, both by statute and convention, seems to have substantially been followed. In fact, in circumstances when challenge is raised to a project of immense national importance which is not limited to any particular city or state or intended to give benefit to any private individual, impediments cannot be induced by reading in requirements which are not mandated by law. The principle of “Rule of Law” requires rule in accordance with the law as it is, and not in accordance with an individual’s subjective understanding of law. Substantial justice is the core of any such inquiry and it is in this direction that processes are to be understood and adjudicated upon. The Court needs to be conscious of all aspects in a non-adversarial public interest litigation where public interest is the sole premise of enquiry. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION

266Copy pinpoint266. Learned Solicitor General has also commended us that the nature of power exercised in the present case falls in the realm of legislative or quasi-legislative exercise and not an administrative exercise of power per se and therefore, the standards of natural justice and judicial review would be restricted. The submission deserves consideration. Reliance has been placed upon Cynamide India335, wherein price fixation was considered as a legislative act, Tulsipur Sugar336, wherein notification extending limits of town area under Section 3 of U.P. Town G Areas Act, 1914 was considered as legislative exercise, Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija337, wherein the merging of municipal areas was considered as legislative exercise, Aircraft Employees’ Cooperative 335 (supra at 17) 336 (supra at 22) 337 H (supra at 23)

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 487 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Society338, wherein preparation of comprehensive development plan, comprehensive zoning of land use, demarcating areas for new housing etc. were considered as legislative exercise and Pune Municipal Corporation339 wherein the power of the State Government of making or amending Development Control Rules was held to be a part of delegated legislation, thereby rejecting any requirement of natural justice over and above what is provided under the statute.

267Copy pinpoint267. We have carefully traversed through the cases relied upon by the respondents. In Cynamide India340, the Court while holding price control fixation as a legislative measure, observed thus: “7. …... It is true that, with the proliferation of delegated legislation, there is a tendency for the line between legislation and administration to vanish into an illusion. Administrative, quasi- judicial decisions tend to merge in legislative activity and, conversely, legislative activity tends to fade into and present an appearance of an administrative or quasi-judicial activity. Any attempt to draw a distinct line between legislative and administrative functions, it has been said, is “difficult in theory and impossible in practice”. Though difficult, it is necessary that the line must sometimes be drawn as different legal rights and consequences may ensue. The distinction between the two has usually been expressed as “one between the general and the particular”. …..” (emphasis supplied) The Court went on to define a legislative and administrative act as: F “… “A legislative act is the creation and promulgation of a general rule of conduct without reference to particular cases; an administrative act is the making and issue of a specific direction or the application of a general rule to a particular case in accordance with the requirements of policy”. “Legislation is the process of formulating a general rule of conduct without G reference to particular cases and usually operating in future; administration is the process of performing particular acts, 338 (supra at 24) 339 (supra at 20) 340 (supra at 17) H

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A of issuing particular orders or of making decisions which apply general rules to particular cases.” It has also been said: “Rule-making is normally directed toward the formulation of requirements having a general application to all members of a broadly identifiable class” while, “an adjudication, on the other hand, applies to specific individuals or situations”. …” B (emphasis supplied)

The Court further observed the uncertainty of such distinction and observed: C “...But, this is only a bread distinction, not necessarily always true. Administration and administrative adjudication may also be of general application and there may be legislation of particular application only. That is not ruled out. …”

D (emphasis supplied)

268Copy pinpoint268. In Lachmi Narain and Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.341,when called upon to adjudge whether a certain exercise of power was that of delegated legislation or conditional legislation, this Court observed: - E “49. …In our opinion, no useful purpose will be served to pursue this line of argument because the distinction propounded between the two categories of legislative powers makes no difference, in principle. In either case, the person to whom the power is entrusted can do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribe the power; he has to act — to use the words of Lord Selbourne — “within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power” and without violating any “express conditions or restrictions by which that power is limited”. There is no magic in a name. Whether you call it the power of “conditional legislation” as Privy Council called it in Burah case [5 IA 178 : ILR 4 Cal 172] or “ancillary legislation” as the Federal Court termed it in Choitram v. CIT [1947 FCR 116 : AIR 1947 FC 32 : ILR 26 Pat 442] or “subsidiary legislation” as Kania, C.J. styled it, or whether you camouflage it under the veiling name of “administrative or quasi-legislative power” — as Professor 341 H (1976) 2 SCC 953

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 489 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Cushman and other authorities have done it — necessary for bringing into operation and effect an enactment, the fact remains that it has a content, howsoever small and restricted, of the law-making power itself. …” (emphasis supplied)

269Copy pinpoint269. It is no doubt true that the classification of legislative or administrative functions can no more be done like a pigeon-holes classification. It was because of this reason that the phrases “quasi- legislative” and “quasi-administrative” have made inroads in the modern administrative law. In fact, in practical parlance, even quasi-legislative functions are treated as falling under the wider ambit of administrative functions. Illustratively, in Ganesh Bank of Kurundwad Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.342, the two-Judge Bench of this Court delineated the ambit of administrative actions and observed thus: - “51. ”13. One of the points that falls for determination is the scope for judicial interference in matters of administrative decisions. D Administrative action is stated to be referable to the broad area of governmental activities in which the repositories of power may exercise every class of statutory function of executive, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial nature. …” (emphasis supplied) E

270Copy pinpoint270. However, the same cannot be accepted as a general proposition in all cases. The demarcation of an executive function as legislative/quasi legislative or administrative has a direct bearing on the aspect of public participation in the decision-making process and thus, the classification becomes imminent in certain cases. It is settled law that public participation is permissible to the limited extent of what is F provided in the statute in case of a legislative exercise of power. As regards Tulsipur Sugar343, the relevant provision (Section 3) dealt with fresh declaration of areas or for defining limits of areas. Such functions undoubtedly have a general character. Similarly, in Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija344, no standards of procedure to be followed during the decision- G making process were prescribed, contrary to the present case where inviting objections/suggestions and consideration thereof is a statutory requirement. 342 (2006) 10 SCC 645 343 (supra at 22) 344 (supra at 23) H

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271Copy pinpoint271. The reliance on Pune Municipal Corporation345 may not assist us in the present enquiry as in that case, the function performed was of amending the “rules” and not a development plan. Amendment of rules which would have the effect of creation of new rules would most certainly qualify as a legislative function, however, limited modification of an existing development plan may not attract a similar B observation. Moreover, the said action was taken under a provision which called for “such inquiry as it may consider necessary” by the relevant authority. This phrase is of a very wide import and clearly grants wide powers to the authority as it does not even provide for a specified method of inquiry. On the contrary, in the present case in Section 11A(3) of the C 1957 Act, the method of inquiry is expressly specified i.e. “inviting objections and suggestions from any person” and further the Authority herein is mandated to consider the objections/suggestions by way of a “shall” provision. The broad requirement of public consultation, no matter how limited, is explicit here. And as observed already, manner of consideration may vary from case to case. D

272Copy pinpoint272. We now discuss the case of Aircraft Employees’ Cooperative Society346 which comes closest to the present enquiry. The precise challenge therein was regarding excessive delegation of legislative powers. The Court recognised that it was not a case of excessive delegation as legislative functions like preparation of comprehensive E development plan and zoning of land in different use zones could be delegated by the legislature to the development authorities for various reasons. Strictly speaking, the Court in that case did not enter upon an examination of whether the function of town planning was of an administrative character or legislative. The Court took it to be of a F legislative character and answered accordingly. The present question was not in issue in that case. Therefore, it cannot be stated as a direct authority upon the enquiry before us. However, the fact that broad activities of town planning involved in that case are synonymous with the activities involved in the present case is of guiding value.

273Copy pinpoint273. In the present case, what is being modified is the master/ zonal plan already in existence. True that is not an action that creates new zones or new parameters as was the case in Aircraft Employees’ Cooperative Society347. However, the underlying nature of activity being 345 (supra at 20) 346 (supra at 24) H 347 (supra at 24)

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 491 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

performed here is of town planning and change in land use of one or couple of plots in a given zone. It is a modification which will provide direction to all future development of the subject plots. We have noted that there is a distinction between modifying the use of land in a given zone and demarcating fresh boundaries for various zones of land. The change of usage of Government land is of a general nature. It is certainly not a purely routine administrative work. That means that the function of change in land use has a quasi-legislative hue to it. POST CHANGE IN LAND USE DECISION

274Copy pinpoint274. The Project had two independent components –expansion/ renovation of Parliament and common Central Secretariat with separate timelines for each of them as per the nuanced policy decision at the appropriate level. The project proponent thus had initiated the process of seeking approval of CVC regarding the former. Accordingly, only the component of expansion/renovation of Parliament is a part of this lis. Thus, no other aspect of the Central Secretariat project and the remaining project arises for our consideration. D

275Copy pinpoint275. We may now advert to the challenge against clearances/ approvals granted by CVC and DUAC. The primary examination pertains to the mandate of these bodies, respective stages of consideration and requirements of application of mind. E CVC CLEARANCE STATUS OF CVC AND PROCEDURE ADOPTED FOR GRANT OF “NO OBJECTION”

276Copy pinpoint276. In light of the submissions advanced by the parties, the following questions emerge for our consideration in this part: - F (i) What is the status of CVC? (ii) Is the Government bound by the opinion of CVC? (iii) Whether CVC has failed to exercise its mandate while granting “No Objection” to the subject proposal? G (iv) Whether the clearance by CVC stands vitiated due to absence of reasons and non-application of mind?

277Copy pinpoint277. At the outset, we may deal with the status of the CVC and legal force of its opinion on the government. The central vista region has H

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A been of immense importance for the Government of India from the time it took control after independence. To ensure that development in this area is regulated and continues to be so, various stakeholders were involved in the process who joined in differing capacities to further that cause. Amongst others, a Specialized Study Group of architects and town planners to advice the Government came to be constituted on B 4.9.1962 vide O.M. No. 6/11/62-WI. The relevant portion thereof reads thus: “The question of development of the Central Vista and Secretariat Complex has been engaging the attention of this Ministry for some time. In view of the national importance of the area and the need C for its planned development, it has been decided to bring the entire area under strict architectural control. …” It then specifies the limitations on development and states that no development is permissible except with its specific approval. The O.M. states thus: D “… No construction or development in the area extending from the Rashtrapati Bhavan to the hexagon around the India Gate will take place without the specific approval of the Govt. of India in the Ministry of WH&S. It has also been decided to set up a Specialised Study Group of architects and town planners, to advise E Govt. on such aspects of the development of the Central Vista and the Secretariat Complex as may be referred to it from time to time. …”

278Copy pinpoint278. What emerges from the above discussion is that the CVC was created by an Office Memorandum (executive fiat) by the F Government at that time as an advisory body to advice the Government on matters sent for its consideration. It was not created by an Act of Parliament. This distinction is crucial in understanding the character of the body. Had it been a statutory body, its functioning and mandate would have been governed by the legislation and any deviation therefrom would have been a case of illegality. However, this cannot be the case when the body is an outcome of an executive order. Executive orders, in the absence of a statutory backing, are passed by the government for improving day to day governance. If the government, in its wisdom, felt the need to constitute a body for advising it on certain matters as and when they are submitted for its consideration, the Court cannot elevate its status to a platform where it becomes an impediment in the functioning

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 493 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

of the government itself. The constitution of CVC was a purely internal matter of the government and a government can choose to incorporate as many steps in the process of decision making as it deems fit. The responsibility of the Court would be to check the status of the body and see whether it has failed to exercise its mandate or has transgressed its mandate altogether. The creation of CVC was to have the benefit of an additional scrutiny over the development of the central vista region in the form of approval. It has no binding authority on Government action and in case of conflict, the decision of the Government must prevail. There is no ambiguity in this regard. Over the course of time, no matter how institutionalised CVC has become in the process of decision making, its inherent character remains the same and in no circumstance, can it override the very institution that created it. The argument as regards the applicability of procedural legitimate expectation is dealt with a little later.

279Copy pinpoint279. Furthermore, it can be seen that the study group was constituted to “advice” the Government and that too on certain aspects of development of the region as may be referred to it from time to time. D The expression “such aspects” categorically signifies that the study group is not meant to approve or reject an entire proposal of development. Instead, its mandate is limited to advising the Government on certain features of the project as and when it is called upon to express its views. The study group was, as originally constituted was chaired by Chief Architect and Town Planner, CPWD. On 17.9.2002, the composition of E the group was altered and ADG (Arch.), CPWD was designated as the Chairman. The group was further reconstituted on 14.10.2019 owing to the change in nomenclature of designations of certain members of the committee. The Office Memorandum notes thus: “… The nomenclature of designations of the Chairman and some F Members of the Special Advisory Group has undergone change. In this regard, Chairman, ADG (Arch.), CPWD has been renamed as ADG (Works) and Member Secretary, CA (NDR), CPWD has been renamed as CA (PRD). Besides this, Chairman, Indian Institute of Architects has also been renamed as President, Indian G Institute of Architects and Chairman, Institute of Town Planners, India has been renamed as President, Institute of Town Planners, India.”

280Copy pinpoint280. On 11.4.2020, Mr. Ashwani Mittal, Executive Engineer, Central Vista Project Division-I, CPWD sent a communication to Chief H

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A Architect (Planning & Design), CPWD titled “Construction of New Parliament Building Plot No. 118. Approval by CVC – regarding” for consideration and approval of CVC. The communication categorically notes that the Committee was supplied with architectural drawings and documents in respect of the project before the date of this communication. It reads thus: B “The architectural drawings and documents in respect of Parliament Building have already been submitted to your good office for accord of local body approval.” The communication further notes that the selected consultant M/ C s HCP Designs was also asked to place before the Committee hard and soft copies of presentation, relevant drawings, brief project report and 3D views of the proposal. It reads thus: “This office is asking the consultants M/s HCP Design to provide the hard and soft copy of presentation and the relevant drawings D including brief report of the project and 3-D views of the proposal in this regard by Monday 13.04.2020. Soft copy of the same shall be shared with you at your office email id delca-prd@cpwd.gov.in accordingly,” The communication further requested the Chief Architect to invite E Senior Architect, CPWD as a special invitee for the CVC meeting wherein the subject proposal was to be considered. It notes thus: “It is kindly requested to invite Shri Vijay Prakash Rao, Senior Architect, CPWD, Senior Architect (DR), CPWD, as a special invitee for the CVC meeting ...”

281Copy pinpoint281. The notice of 5th CVC meeting was circulated to all the members on 16.4.2020 wherein the case proponents were requested to present their proposals along with all other necessary documents and drawings. It reads thus: “Case proponents are requested to present their proposal in the meeting by way of PPT/Drawings and all other necessary documents and material along with their Architects/Team.” Owing to the outbreak of COVID-19, the notice also communicated the possibility of an online meeting on the same day and ensured that electronic means for online conference facility may be issued to attend the meeting. It noted thus:

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 495 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

“Keeping in view the Guidelines for COVID 19 as issued by the A GOI from time to time it is possible and desired that as far as possible the electronic means for online conference facility may be issued to attend and participate in the meeting.”

282Copy pinpoint282. The minutes of the meeting expressly note that detailed presentations were made by the consultant. We must note at the very outset that allegations of mala fide in reconstitution of the Committee are devoid of merit. For, the reconstitution was done not to replace an expert member but only to correct the nomenclature of certain designations in light of the changes that must have taken place in respective organisations. For instance, the office of ADG (Arch.) is now known as ADG (Works) in CPWD and accordingly, the change of this nomenclature in the membership of CVC was warranted to avoid any confusion. This change of nomenclature was a prior administrative decision and the corresponding correction in the CVC membership was merely an incidental step to such change. There is no basis to say that the said change was done solely for perpetuating some foul play in the working of CVC, as is urged before us.

283Copy pinpoint283. Incontestably, the original decision of change of nomenclature has not even been challenged by the petitioners and it would be nothing but absurd to accept a challenge to an incidental step in the absence of any challenge to the main decision that resulted in the incidental step. E Even otherwise, we need not probe into the mental frame of the executive to understand the thought behind a decision, on the basis of surmises and conjectures and especially when the decision is taken by the competent authority and is untainted. Similar line of argument was adopted to challenge the absence of some members and representation of some members through their delegates. The delegates were none else but authorised officials of the same department as that of the designated members. Upon further examination, we find that even in CVC meeting dated 18.10.2018 for “Construction of Reception Building for Rashtrapati Bhawan near Gate No. 37, President Estate, New Delhi” and dated 12.3.2018 for “Construction of National War Museum, New Delhi”, various authorised officials participated in a representative capacity which reinforces the respondents’ submission that this method of participation is a part of ordinary course of business in functioning of Government bodies.

284Copy pinpoint284. The petitioners have gone to the extent of saying that ADG (Works), Chairman of CVC, not being an architect by profession, was H

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A not competent to chair this Committee. We must note that it is one thing to allege an illegality in a process, but it is another to question the professional competency of the office holder who is occupying such position owing to his designation (ex-officio) and not in his personal capacity or by virtue of his qualifications. It is noticed that the post of Chairman is not a qualification-based position, rather, it is a designation- B based office. For, the Chairman is supposed to discharge multiple functions involving but not limited to offering his views on a proposal submitted for the Committee’s consideration. The Committee comprises of various other members who bring their respective expertise onboard and in consideration of a proposal, the Chairman enjoys no special powers or veto to turn down the suggestions of expert members. In other words, the Chairman is entrusted with administrative functions which do not vest in the entire Committee, whereas the function of tendering advice on the subject proposal vests equally in all the members. Therefore, it is a broad-based administrative Committee, which is the amalgam of designated office holders (ex-officio) and of experts. They come together to advise the Government on certain aspects of a given project. Illustratively, the subject meeting was attended by representatives from DUAC, Chief Architect, Chief Planner, Town & Country Planning Organisation and Senior Architect, CVC, CPWD. Thus, merely because the Chairman was not an architect by profession, it could not be assumed that the Committee itself became incompetent to consider the subject proposal.

285Copy pinpoint285. The broad structure of administration and governance of State is premised on the notion that the task of administration is not the sole virtue of a select few who are experts in a particular field of study. F Multiple factors come into play when administration is entrusted to a particular office and it is not for the Court to prescribe a qualifying criterion for discharging the functions assigned to a particular office, particularly when it is sitting in a judicial review of a decision and not in a quo warranto proceeding to challenge the appointment of office holder. The nature of office, nature of functions to be performed, composition of team, mandate of office etc. are some of the considerations that come into play.

286Copy pinpoint286. As regards the absence of some members, we must note that the notice of meeting was communicated to all the members on 16.4.2020 and they were asked to make the requisite arrangements in advance. Furthermore, the members who lacked in technical know-how to interact virtually were given the option of necessary assistance for

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 497 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

the purpose of meeting. In such a scenario, it is inconceivable to say that the members were deliberately kept out of the meeting. None of the members was required to go out for the meeting and the arrangements in place were sufficient for them to register their presence in the meeting and participate in the decision-making. If they failed to join the meeting for reasons best known to them, the outcome of the meeting cannot be assailed by alleging motives. Further, the minutes of meeting were mailed to all the members on 30.4.2020 and even then, no word of discord or dissatisfaction was received from any of these members. It must follow that their absence cannot be equated to an irregularity, much less an illegality. The Committee was not expected to sit over the proposal merely because some members were unwilling to join virtually despite all arrangements being in place. Indisputably, none of the absent members is before us in this case and we have no occasion whatsoever to consider them as being aggrieved in any manner, for no grievance at their instance has come on record.

287Copy pinpoint287. We may broadly revisit the procedure followed by CVC in reference to proposal for expansion and renovation of Parliament Building, in the following order: (a) Communication by Chief Architect (Planning & Development), CPWD for consideration by CVC – 11.4.2020; E (b) Submission of presentations, drawings, project report and other documents for consideration of members – 11.4.2020; (c) Request for invitation to Senior Architect (CPWD) to participate in the meeting as special invitee – 11.4.2020; (d) Notice of meeting to all the members – 16.4.2020; F (e) Request to case proponents for presenting the proposal – 16.4.2020; (f) Communication conveying the possibility of online meeting to all the members and suitable arrangements regarding video conferencing were proposed – 16.4.2020; G (g) Conclusion of Meeting - 23.4.2020; (h) Minutes of meeting communicated to all the members for their approval – 30.4.2020; (i) Minutes approved on 30.4.2020. H

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A Thus, the statement of minutes and preceding steps duly reflect that the committee ensured that all elements of the project are in order. While approving, the committee duly noted the requirement of ensuring that the project is in sync with the flavour of the region. A decision reached by the advisory Committee (which is indisputably an administrative committee and not statutory) after following such an B elaborate process is to be seen in the light of its substance and not its form. Seeing such a decision in isolation from the above order of proceedings would be to miss out on substance for the form. Such is not the standard of scrutiny in judicial review. NON-APPLICATION OF MIND C

288Copy pinpoint288. We may nevertheless advert to the asseveration of non- application of mind. Upon examination of the minutes of meeting dated 23.4.2020 as approved on 30.4.2020 and notice of meeting dated 16.4.2020, we have observed that all documents, presentations, designs etc. were placed before all members of the Committee well in advance D and they were equipped enough to examine the subject project within their mandate and advise the Government. In Committee’s observation, the grant of no objection is an in-principle approval coupled with a suggestion that “the features of the proposed parliament building should be in sync with the existing parliament building”. This E observation is indicative of the due awareness on part of the Committee of heritage requirements relating to Grade-I precincts. Merely because the minutes do not advert to any specific documents already placed before the members of the Committee, it does not follow that the members did not discharge their duty properly. Indisputably, the relevant documents were placed before all the members at least a week before the Committee F meeting and understandably, a week’s time was granted to all the members for examining the documents. In such circumstances, it cannot be assumed that the documents and presentations escaped the minds of the Committee members until and unless a demonstrable infirmity is shown.

289Copy pinpoint289. It is noticed that the argument of non-application of mind has been invoked by the petitioners, irrespective of the nature of body whose decision has come to be assailed. The requirement of due application of mind is one of the shades of jurisprudential doctrine that justice should not only be done but seen to be done. It requires a decision-making body, H judicial or quasi-judicial, to abide by certain basic tenets of natural justice,

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including but not limited to the grant of hearing to the affected persons. A Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. They are means to an end and not end in themselves. The goal of these principles is to prevent prejudice. It is from the same source that the requirement of application of mind emerges in decision making processes as it ensures objectivity in decision making. In order to ascertain that due application of mind has B taken place in a decision, the presence of reasons on record plays a crucial role. The presence of reasons would fulfil twin objectives of revealing objective application of mind and assisting the adjudicatory body in reviewing the decision. The question that arises here is, whether the statement in the recorded minutes of the CVC meeting (“the features of the proposed Parliament building should be in sync with the existing C Parliament building”) is or is not indicative of application of mind.

290Copy pinpoint290. In cases when the statute itself provides for an express requirement of a reasoned order, it is understandable that absence of reasons would be a violation of a legal requirement and thus, illegal. However, in cases when there is no express requirement of reasons, the D ulterior effect of absence of reasons on the final decision cannot be sealed in a straightjacketed manner. Such cases need to be examined from a broad perspective in the light of overall circumstances. The Court would look at the nature of decision-making body, nature of rights involved, stakeholders, form and substance of the decision etc. The list is not exhaustive for the simple reason that drawing a conclusion of non- E application of mind from mere absence of reasons is a matter of pure inference and the same cannot be drawn until and unless other circumstances too point in the same direction. The aforesaid factor of nature of rights has been considered by this Court in E.G. Nambudiri348 thus: F “8. The question is whether principles of natural justice require an administrative authority to record reasons. Generally, principles of natural justice require that opportunity of hearing should be given to the person against whom an administrative order is passed. The application of principles of natural justice, and its sweep G depend upon the nature of the rights involved, having regard to the setting and context of the statutory provisions. Where a vested right is adversely affected by an administrative order, or where civil consequences ensue, principles of natural 348 (supra at 163) H

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A justice apply even if the statutory provisions do not make any express provision for the same, and the person concerned must be afforded opportunity of hearing before the order is passed. But principles of natural justice do not require the administrative authority to record reasons for its decision as there is no general rule that reasons must be given for administrative decision. Order B of an administrative authority which has no statutory or implied duty to state reasons or the grounds of its decision is not rendered illegal merely on account of absence of reasons. It has never been a principle of natural justice that reasons should be given for decisions. C See: Regina v. Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex p. Benaim and Khaida, (1990) 2 QB 417 at 431. ...” (emphasis supplied)

291Copy pinpoint291. It is settled that in cases where individual rights are affected by the decision, an opportunity of being heard and application of mind D couched in the form of reasons form part of the jurisprudential doctrine. Such cases need to be distinguished from cases which do not impinge upon individual rights and involve ordinary administrative processes. For, similar standards cannot be deployed to decide both these cases. When petitioners allege illegality on a ground such as absence of reasons in a E pure administrative process, they must bear the burden to demonstrate the requirement of reasons in the first place. It is not as if reasons are mandatory in all decisions. What we are dealing with is the opinion of an advisory (administrative) body which is appointed by the same Government which calls for its advice and not to adjudicate upon rights of individuals. Even if we assume that the no objection by an advisory F body would have the effect of affecting the objectivity of the final decision, the fact remains that it does not take the final decision. It is meant to invoke its expertise in light of the subject proposal placed before it and advise the Government as regards the feasibility of the proposed development in connection with the existing central vista region. The G final decision would be that of the competent authority of the concerned department. Furthermore, what purpose would it serve to entangle an advisory body into rigidity of recording elaborate reasons when its advice is not going to affect any stakeholder whatsoever nor can be made the basis to challenge the final decision of the competent authority. Not being a statutory body, its opinion has no finality attached to it nor could be H

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appealed against to superior forum. Undeniably, in the process of decision- A making, the Government may choose to consult as many bodies and agencies as it desires and opinion of every such advisory body cannot be assailed by supplying fictional standards without keeping in view the nature of body and context of advice.

292Copy pinpoint292. In E.G. Nambudiri349, this Court noted as to how mere absence of reasons may not render the decision to be illegal thus: “6. ...Ordinarily, courts and tribunals, adjudicating rights of parties, are required to act judicially and to record reasons. Where an administrative authority is required to act judicially it is also under an obligation to record reasons. But every administrative authority is not under any legal obligation to record reasons for its decision, although, it is always desirable to record reasons to avoid any suspicion. Where a statute requires an authority though acting administratively to record reasons, it is mandatory for the authority to pass speaking orders and in the absence of reasons the order would be rendered illegal. But in the absence of any statutory or administrative requirement to record reasons, the order of the administrative authority is not rendered illegal for absence of reasons. If any challenge is made to the validity of an order on the ground of it being arbitrary or mala fide, it is always open to the authority concerned to place reasons before the court which may have persuaded it to pass the orders. …” (emphasis supplied)

293Copy pinpoint293. Had it been a case of any other administrative committee required to adjudicate upon the rights of individuals, merely because it is not mandatory to record reasons would not absolve it of the requirement of objective consideration of the proposal. The ultimate enquiry is of application of mind and a reasoned order is merely one element in this enquiry. In a given case, the Court can still advert to other elements of the decision-making process to weigh the factum of application of mind. G The test to be applied in such a case would be of a reasonable link between the material placed before the decision-making body and the conclusion reached in consideration thereof. The Court may decide in the context of overall circumstances of the case and a sole element (of 349 (supra at 163) H

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A no reasons or lack of elaborate reasons) cannot be enough to make or break the decision as long as judicial mind is convinced of substantial application of mind from other circumstances. Even in common law jurisprudence, there is no absolute requirement of reasoned order in all decisions. In Lonrho plc v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry & Anr.350, it was contended that the decision is not based on convincing reasons and therefore, must be declared as illegal. The House of Lords refused to entertain this contention and noted that mere absence of reasons would not render the decision as irrational. Lord Keith, in his opinion, noted that the only significance of absence of reasons would be that if circumstances overwhelmingly point towards a different conclusion that the one reached by the body, it would be fatal. He noted thus: “The absence of reasons for a decision where there is no duty to give them cannot of itself provide any support for the suggested irrationality of the decision. The only significance of the absence of reasons is that if all other known facts and circumstances appear to point overwhelmingly in favour of a different decision, the decision-maker who has given no reasons cannot complain if the court draws the inference that he had no rational reason for his decision.” In Administrative Law, P.P. Craig notes that it is relevant to consider the context in which decision operates thus: “The court will consider the nature of the decision maker, the context in which it operates and whether the provision of reasons is required on grounds of fairness.351” Mr. Craig also refers to R. v. Ministry of Defence, Ex p. F Murray352 wherein certain principles relating to duty of reasons were elaborated. Lord Chief Justice Bingham, in his opinion, observed that the requirement of giving reasons may be outweighed by concerns of public interest in certain cases, for instance, when it would unduly burden the decision maker. We are not importing any rider of public interest to G negate the requirement of reasons; however, the above exposition is useful to understand the effect of absence of reasons on an otherwise legal, rational and just decision.

350 [1989] 2 All ER 609 351 Administrative Law, 5 th Edn., Thomson Sweet and Maxwell, pg. 440 352 [1998] COD 134 (QBD) H

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294Copy pinpoint294. Notably, this Court in Maharashtra State Board353 and in A Mahabir Jute Mills 354 noted that if the function/decision of the Government is administrative, in law, ordinarily there is no requirement to be accompanied by a statement of reasons unless there is an express statutory requirement in that regard. Again, in Sarat Kumar Dash355, the Court observed that in the field of administrative action, the reasons are link between maker of the order or the author of the decision and the order itself. The record can be called to consider whether the author had given due consideration to the facts placed before him before he arrives at the decision.

295Copy pinpoint295. Therefore, the requirement of reasons in cases which do not demand it in an express manner is based on desirability and the same is advised to the extent possible without impinging upon the character of the decision-making body and needs of administrative efficiency. LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION

296Copy pinpoint296. The petitioners would contend that CVC performs functions akin to statutory bodies and has acted in contravention of legitimate expectations of public. It has been rightly pointed out to us that Zonal Plan for Zone D and tender conditions require consultation with CVC as an essential step. However, it is not the petitioners’ case that no consultation has taken place in furtherance thereof. The argument is ripe with ambiguity. We hold that CVC cannot be given the status of a E statutory body when its mandate and origin, as envisaged in the relevant Office Memoranda, have been duly discussed above.

297Copy pinpoint297. As regards legitimate expectations, it is settled that legitimate expectations may arise in administrative matters depending on the factual matrix of a case. However, it is necessary to understand the basic import of this doctrine. Legitimate expectations may arise in cases when the decision-making body deviates from a set standard, thereby impinging upon the rights of those who are subjected to the decision. In the present case, had the project proponent entirely skipped the step of consultation with CVC, enforcing such consultation by operation of legitimate expectation may have come into play. We need not record our final view in that regard, as it does not arise in this case. In Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. 356, this Court had noted that the 353 (supra at 46, paras 22 and 23) 354 (supra at 165) 355 (supra at 166) 356 (1999) 4 SCC 727 H

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as its slot is just above “fairness in action” but far below A “promissory estoppel”. It may only entitle an expectant: (a) to an opportunity to show cause before the expectation is dashed; or (b) to an explanation as to the cause for denial. In appropriate cases, the courts may grant a direction requiring the authority to follow the promised procedure or established practice. A legitimate expectation, even when made out, does not always entitle the expectant to a relief. Public interest, change in policy, conduct of the expectant or any other valid or bona fide reason given by the decision-maker, may be sufficient to negative the “legitimate expectation”. The doctrine of legitimate expectation based on established practice (as contrasted from legitimate expectation based on a promise), can be invoked only by someone who has dealings or transactions or negotiations with an authority, on which such established practice has a bearing, or by someone who has a recognised legal relationship with the authority. A total stranger unconnected with the authority or a person who had no previous dealings with the authority and who has not entered into any transaction or negotiations with the authority, cannot invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation, merely on the ground that the authority has a general obligation to act fairly.” (emphasis supplied) E

Suffice it to say that this expression does not convey a tangible right. Instead, it is a mere expectation of fair and reasonable treatment and the legitimacy of that expectation would strictly depend upon the facts and circumstances of a case, particularly on whether or not the absence of a procedural step had led to failure of fairness. Legitimate F expectation is a locus-based principle and it is not meant to assuage the expectations of those whose interests are unaffected by a decision. It is easy to form an expectation but difficult to find a legitimate basis for such expectation.

298Copy pinpoint298. Importantly, such expectation gets developed only on the G basis of an established practice in context of the decision being taken and in context of the body taking the decision, and the petitioners have not demonstrated any established practice which has been deviated from in the present case. At any rate, reading in an additional procedural requirement on the basis of legitimate expectations is not a standard H

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A judicial review function and the Court must bear a heavy burden by demonstrating the need as well as an established basis for such an action. The petitioners’ insistence on this doctrine is wholly out of context and in fact has no application to the case under consideration. In such circumstances, any further deliberation on this count would be an exercise in futility. B DUAC APPROVAL STAGE FOR STATUTORY APPROVAL BY DUAC

299Copy pinpoint299. The proposal for DUAC approval pertained only to the “New Parliament Building, Plot No. 118, N.A., New Raisina Road, New Delhi.” C It was not for the entire Central Vista Project as such. Thus, what is under consideration is the validity of DUAC approval for the Parliament project and not the remaining central secretariat project. In light of the submissions detailed above, the following questions emerge for our consideration in this part: D (i) Whether the approval of DUAC was essential even before the release of Consultation Services NIT? (ii) Whether DUAC acted in an arbitrary manner while considering the proposal thereby vitiating the approval granted by it? E

300Copy pinpoint300. DUAC has been constituted as a statutory body under the DUAC Act for the purpose of maintaining the aesthetic quality of urban design. The Preamble to the DUAC Act reads thus: “An Act to provide for the establishment of the Delhi Urban Art Commission with a view to preserving, developing and maintaining F the aesthetic quality of urban and environmental design within Delhi.” In Objectives, Jurisdiction and Guidelines of DUAC, the intent behind the formation of this Commission becomes clear. It is stated thus: G “While developing/redeveloping, maintaining and preserving various parts of the city, there has hardly been any emphasis on the quality of the physical environment and visual character of the city. The aesthetic and visual character of Delhi at least the better part of it leaves much to be desired. In fact certain beautiful areas have been ruined due to sheer negligence and indifference. The need H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 507 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

for a high-powered Design Re-view Board/Commission to guide A and control the aesthetic quality of urban and environmental design of the city and its cultural values has been felt for some time past.” Section 11 of the DUAC Act specifies the functions of the Commission. It reads thus: B

11. Functions of the Commission. — (1) It shall be the general duty of the Commission to advise the Central Government in the matter of preserving, developing and maintaining the aesthetic quality of urban and environmental design within Delhi and to provide advice and guidance to any local body in respect of any project of building operations or engineering operations or any development proposal which affects or is likely to affect the sky- line or the aesthetic quality of surroundings or any public amenity provided therein. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1), it shall be the duty of the Commission to scrutinise, approve, reject or modify proposals in respect of the following matters, namely:— (a) development of district centres, civic centres, areas earmarked for Government administrative buildings and for residential complexes, public parks and public gardens; E (b) re-development of the area within the jurisdiction of New Delhi Municipal Committee including Connaught Place Complex and its environs, Central Vista, the entire bungalow area of Lutyen’s New Delhi, and such other areas as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, F specify; (c) plans, architectural expressions and visual appearance of new buildings in the centres, areas, parks and gardens specified in clauses (a) and (b) including selections of models for statues and fountains therein; G (d) re-development of areas in the vicinity of Jama Masjid, Red Fort, Qutab, Humayun’s Tomb, Old Fort, Tuglakabad and of such other places of historical importance as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify; H

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A (e) conservation, preservation and beautification of monumental buildings, public parks and public gardens including location or installation of statues or fountains therein; (f) under passes, over-passes and regulations of street furniture and hoardings; B (g) location and plans of power houses, water towers, television and other communication towers and other allied structures; (h) any other projects or lay-out which is calculated to beautify Delhi or to add to its cultural vitality or to enhance the quality of the surroundings thereof; C (i) such other matters as may be prescribed by rules. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section,— (i) “civic centre” means the headquarters of a local body comprising therein its office buildings and buildings intended D for cultural activities; (ii) “Connaught Place Complex” means the area comprising Connaught Place and its extension measuring approximately 140 hectares, being the area described as Zone D-I (Revised) in the Delhi Master Plan; E (iii) “district centre” means a self-contained unit created in the Delhi Master Plan comprising areas for retail shopping, general business, commercial and professional offices, forwarding, booking and Government offices, cinemas, restaurants and other places of entertainment.” F A perusal of Section 11 reveals that the Commission (DUAC) is invested with twin duties - first, to advise the Central Government in matter of preserving, developing and maintaining the aesthetic quality of urban and environmental design; G second, to provide advice and guidance to any local body in respect of any project ......... which affects or is likely to affect the skyline or aesthetic quality of surroundings.

301Copy pinpoint301. Sub-Section 2 of Section 11 states that the Commission (DUAC) is duty bound to scrutinize, approve, reject or modify proposals H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 509 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

in respect of “re-development of the area within the jurisdiction of A New Delhi Municipal Committee including Connaught Place Complex and its environs, Central Vista ....”. Furthermore, sub-Section 3 bestows powers upon the Commission (DUAC) to act suo motu to secure its objectives in case the proposal is not submitted to it by the local authority. It states thus: B “(3) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub- section (1) and sub-section (2), the Commission may suo motu promote and secure the development, re-development or beautification of any areas in Delhi in respect of which no proposals in that behalf have been received from any local body.” C

302Copy pinpoint302. Section 12 obligates every local authority, undertaking building/ engineering operations, to refer to the Commission (DUAC) for its scrutiny. Further, the decision of the Commission (DUAC) in that regard would be binding upon the local authority. It reads thus: “12. Duty of local bodies to refer development proposals, D etc., to the Commission. — Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every local body shall, before according approval in respect of any building operations, engineering operations or development proposals referred to in sub-section (1) of section E 11 or intended to be undertaken in any area or locality specified in sub-section (2) of that section, refer the same to the Commission for scrutiny and the decision of the Commission in respect thereof shall be binding on such local body.” Furthermore, in Section 14, F “14. Power to revise decision in certain cases.— Nothing contained in this Act shall preclude the Central Government from calling for and examining, on its own motion, if it considers it necessary so to do in the public interest, any case in which a decision has been made by the Commission under section G 12 but no appeal lies thereto, and passing such order thereon as it thinks fit: Provided that no such order shall be made prejudicially affecting any person except after giving him an opportunity of making a representation in the matter.” H

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303Copy pinpoint303. The aforesaid scheme of the DUAC Act succinctly reveals that the mandate of DUAC is to offer its advice in matters of preservation, development, re-development and maintenance of aesthetic quality of urban and environmental design within Delhi. Such advice is not rendered in context of each and every aspect of the proposal, rather, it only ensures that overall aesthetic quality of the concerned region is not being disturbed. Over and above the concern of aesthetics, there is no other aspect on which the Commission’s (DUAC’s) approval is mandated. It is also noteworthy that the Act draws a clear distinction between local bodies and Central Government insofar as the binding value of the advice of Commission (DUAC) is concerned. Section 12 categorically binds the local bodies with the advice of the Commission (DUAC). This distinction is further strengthened by Section 14 which incorporates a saving clause providing for an overriding power bestowed upon the Central Government to call for and examine the advice of the Commission (DUAC) if public interest so demands and pass “such order thereon, as, it thinks fit”. D

304Copy pinpoint304. As regards the stage of consultation with DUAC, Section 12 enjoins the local bodies to consult before according approval in respect of any building operations, engineering operations or development proposals. Section 2(b) defines “building operations” as: E “(b) “building operations” includes rebuilding operations, structural alterations of, or additions to, buildings and other operations normally undertaken in connection with the construction of buildings;” Section 2(f) defines “engineering operations” as: F “(f) “engineering operations” includes the formation or laying out of means of access to a road or the laying out of means of water supply;” Section 2(e) defines “development” as: “(e) “development” with its grammatical variations means the G carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under, land or the making of any material change in any building or land and includes re- development;” (emphasis supplied) H

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305Copy pinpoint305. The meaning of the expression “development” offers guidance as regards the stage of consultation. It specifies that development means “carrying out of building ...... operations”on land or “making material change” in any building. The words “carrying out” and “making”, when harmoniously read, lay out a clear position that approval of Commission must be sought before actual development i.e., before carrying out operations or making material changes. There is no ambiguity in the operative provision as regards the stage of consultation. The petitioners’ argument that such consultation must be before releasing the tender for consultation services, therefore, has no basis in the governing law. The same intent would reflect from the Preamble of the DUAC Act which stipulates in no uncertain terms that the concern of the Commission is with the aesthetics of concerned region. Indubitably, the consideration whether or not a proposal is in sync with the existing aesthetics would not be possible until and unless the design and shape of the proposed project is ready being site specific. For, without a design before it, the Commission (DUAC) would be incapable of comprehending the compliance of a design with aesthetics of the region.

306Copy pinpoint306. We recall and note that at the stage of tender for consultation services, the prospective bidders were called upon to submit their vision of the proposed project which goes on to show that no final design was in existence at that point of time. It was only after the consultant was selected that the design was finalised and the role of DUAC would not emerge before this crucial step. ARBITRARINESS IN GRANT OF APPROVAL

307Copy pinpoint307. We may now deal with the argument regarding arbitrariness of DUAC in granting approval. In order to understand whether the F DUAC acted in fulfilment of its mandate, we deem it necessary to analyse the Minutes of the meetings of DUAC. Initially, when the proposal was placed before DUAC for its consideration, a detailed presentation was made before it by the consultant wherein various features of the project were delineated. The minutes dated 5.6.2020 note thus: G “2. The proposal was scrutinised by the Commission. The architect also made a presentation of the project (via Video Conference), explained its unique features, client requirements and constraints and provided clarifications to the queries of the Members of the Commission. The Commission appreciated the overall design ...” H

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A Thereafter, the DUAC categorically noted that some inadequacies were found in the proposal and accordingly it was returned with certain observations. Point 3 of the Minutes reads thus: “3. It was observed that as per preliminary scrutiny done by the DUAC Secretariat in May 2020, some of the inadequacies found B in the submission were communicated to the CPWD ....”

308Copy pinpoint308. The DUAC noted that the Vehicular Parking Plan and Landscape Plan was not commensurate with the requirements and observed in point 4 that: “4. The Commission reiterates that the above two viz. a) Vehicular C Parking Plan and b) Landscape Plan need to be submitted as per requirement.” The DUAC elaborated on the observation regarding parking plan and observed thus:

D “5. In the Vehicular Parking Plan, parking for the vehicles needs to be shown as per statutory requirement. Further, the interface between vehicular movement and pedestrian/visitor movement needs to be indicated. The gate opening towards Rafi Marg Circle seems to require further resolution. This may be reviewed.” Even in the Landscape Plan, the DUAC emphasized upon E rationalisation of open spaces around the proposed new building. In point 9, the DUAC asked the integration of new building with the old building. The Committee, in accordance with their mandate, specifically focussed on form and aesthetics of the proposed building in point 10 and noted thus: F “10. The urban form and aesthetics of the main new Parliament building may be improved. The elevation design and treatment needs to be less overbearing and more representative of the diversity and democratic ideals of a modern India. The facade facing the present Parliament should be given appropriate treatment as it will be the link for movement between the two buildings, as well as define a symbolic connection. The form of the new building as visible from Vijay Chowk needs to be visually scaled to the present Parliament building.” Thereafter, the DUAC recorded certain observations relating to interiors and other features of the building like windows, desirability of

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natural light, better ventilation, availability of skylights and sustainability features in accordance with the provisions of green buildings in Delhi. It, then, recorded its decision as “Not Approved” and returned the proposal.

309Copy pinpoint309. The project proponent, thereafter, submitted a revised proposal which was considered by the DUAC in its 1545th meeting on 1.7.2020, to which approval was granted after a detailed discussion and scrutiny, as recorded in the Minutes thus: “3. Now, the revised building plan proposal received (online) with incorporation of observations of the Commission was scrutinized, and after a detailed discussion with the architect/project proponent ...” C The Minutes reveal that even in this round of consideration, the DUAC was not peripheral in its scrutiny and again recorded certain observations relating to parking requirements and environmental concerns. In point (a), it is noted that: “a. The parking requirements for the plot are proposed to be distributed in several plots scattered around the complex. To ensure smooth accessibility and to address environmental concerns, it was suggested that the local body shall explore the possibility of Multi-Level Car Parking (MLCP) after identifying a plot of appropriate size and location, in the vicinity, to relocate all the proposed parking in one consolidated plot wherein parking requirements for all users to the Parliament building including MP Chambers, supporting staff, media, visitors, school children buses, etc. can be accommodated.” Furthermore, touching upon various aspects of the quality and designs of fencing, size, scale and material of gates, the DUAC noted that they should be commensurate with the character and identity of the complex. The Commission also advised the project proponent to enhance natural lightening features and decide location of trees in the manner that pedestrian pathways are not disturbed and shade is enough. In point 3(e), it noted thus: G “e. The Landscape plan has to be more detailed with the appropriate treatment of Hardscape & Softscape. The location and selection of trees to be planted should be appropriate so that there is enough shade and does not interfere with the pedestrian H

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A pathways. Pedestrian circulation must be shaded and suitable for all ages. Covered entrances for pedestrians are advisable.”

310Copy pinpoint310. The above analysis leaves no manner of doubt that the DUAC was not only mindful of its advisory functions, but also discharged the same in accordance with its statutory mandate. The argument that the B DUAC did not apply its mind to various aspects of the project is ill- informed, if not ill-advised. The DUAC was sitting in an advisory capacity so as to advise the Government on aesthetics of a development/re- development project. It is not meant to analyse any other aspect of the project. In that, it is expected to apply its mind to those aspects of the project which may have a bearing on aesthetics. The Minutes succinctly C reveal that complete information relating to designs was placed before the DUAC and it applied itself on an array of factors including parking, plantation of trees, traffic, appearance of facade, ventilation, landscape, building equipment etc. so far as the same are relevant for its enquiry, to fulfil its advisory duties.

311Copy pinpoint311. The law relating to arbitrariness and its application in a legal issue before the Court is well settled. To apply the principle of arbitrariness in an advisory function would entail a situation wherein the advice is rendered without any reasonable thought to the proposal. The law demands a demonstration of inadequacies, for instance, absence of any material to consider the proposal or failing to exercise the mandate or leaving out relevant considerations or mala fide consideration of the proposal. At the very least, the case must reveal a situation of non- application of mind based upon the circumstances of the case or the Minutes of the meeting. The present case does not involve any such situation. The Minutes reveal a thorough and reasonable consideration by DUAC of all relevant aspects and we are in no position to consider it a case of non-application of mind much less arbitrary. Suffice it to observe that the allegation of arbitrariness is easy to raise in a theoretical discourse, but hard to establish in a Court of law where unsubstantiated considerations have no place.

312Copy pinpoint312. As per Conduct of Business Regulations, 1976, the Minutes of the meeting were ratified and confirmed in the next meeting of the Commission and no member has expressed any reservation regarding any aspect of the advice tendered by DUAC. The petitioners’ challenge on this count, therefore, fails. H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 515 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

CHALLENGE TO CHANGE IN LAND USE IN A REFERENCE TO HERITAGE CONSERVATION

313Copy pinpoint313. The concern relating to disregard for heritage conservation laws has been expressed in multiple petitions in this case. From change in land use to grant of approval by various bodies, it is consistently alleged that heritage conservation laws have been kept out of consideration by B the respondents. We note at the very outset that as regards the new Parliament building project, the concern of heritage conservation does not arise directly. For, plot No. 118 (New Parliament Building) is not an enlisted heritage property and does not fall within central vista precincts. However, the concern emerges due to it being an adjoining space with plot no. 116 (Existing Parliament Building) which houses a Grade-I C structure. The impact of this positioning, if any, and role of HCC in examination thereof shall form part of the discussion to follow. From a thorough perusal of the submissions and documents, the following questions emerge for our consideration in this part: (i) Whether the subject new Parliament building project has D breached the scope of changes permissible under Unified Building Byelaws for Delhi, 2016359 relating to heritage buildings/precincts? (ii) Whether the approval of HCC is mandated at the development stage or prior thereto? E

314Copy pinpoint314. At the outset, we note that the argument relating to impermissibility of change in land use without reckoning the heritage related laws shall also be addressed in this part itself, along with the broader argument that the whole project is in contravention of heritage conservation laws. As regards heritage spaces, the general tone of the F 2016 Byelaws is to preserve the heritage as they specify that “conservation of heritage sites shall include buildings, artifacts, structures, areas and precincts of historic, aesthetic, architectural, cultural or environmentally significant (heritage buildings and heritage precincts) ...” G

315Copy pinpoint315. To begin this discussion, the pin-pointed enquiry is whether the broad statement that “once a heritage, always a heritage” or that heritage buildings/precincts have an inviolable character in law with an absolute embargo on any modification whatsoever, is the correct legal 359 For short, “2016 Byelaws” H

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A position. If not, then our examination would pertain to the extent of changes that can be made. The scheme of the 2016 Byelaws plainly enunciates that heritage buildings/precincts are not ipso facto unalterable. For, the Byelaws contemplate three kinds of changes that can be made in respect of heritage buildings/precincts: B (i) physical changes through development work on heritage sites (clause 1.3); (ii) change of ownership of heritage sites (clause 1.12); (iii) change of use of land on which heritage sites are situated (clause 1.12). C In the present challenge, we are concerned with points (i) and (iii) i.e., examination of permissibility of change in land use and physical changes during development as per 2016 Byelaws. We may proceed in that order.

316Copy pinpoint316. But before that, be it noted that the principles of conservation or preservation of heritage buildings/precincts are restricted only to those buildings/precincts which have been listed as heritage buildings/precincts in the official notification. The same gets corroborated by the affidavit of Mrs. Ruby Kaushal, Member Secretary to the HCC where she states that the jurisdiction of the HCC is limited to the listed heritage buildings/ E precincts and that the entire Lutyen’s Bungalow Zone (LBZ) is not a heritage zone. The submission is that only listed buildings/precincts are subject to heritage conservation norms. Clause 1.1 of the Byelaws categorically state that: “1.1. Applicability: This regulation shall apply to heritage sites F which shall include those buildings, artifacts, structures, streets, areas and precincts of historic, architectural, aesthetic, cultural or environmental value (hereinafter referred to as Listed Heritage Buildings/Listed Heritage Precincts) .... which shall be listed in notification(s) to be issued by Government/identified in MPD.” G (emphasis supplied) The Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Bye- laws 23.1 and 23.5 of the Delhi Building Bye-laws, 1983 read with sub- Section (17) of Section 2 of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994, H has published a list of 141 Heritage Sites including Heritage Buildings,

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 517 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Heritage Precincts and Listed Natural Feature Areas for general A information. The same reads thus: “NOTIFICATION Delhi, the 1st October, 2009 F.No. 4/2/2009/UD/l 6565.—Whereas a list of 147 Heritage Sites B including Heritage Buildings, Heritage Precincts and Listed Natural Feature Areas prepared by the Chairperson, New Delhi Municipal Council, on the advice of the Heritage Conservation Committee, was published in the newspaper on June 8, 2005 as a public notice inviting objections and suggestions from all persons likely to be affected thereby within a period of thirty days from the date of publication of the notice. And whereas copies of the said notice were made available to the public on 8th June, 2005. And whereas all objections and suggestions received in respect to the above mentioned public notice have been duly considered by the Heritage Conservation Committee. And whereas out of the original list of 147 heritage buildings and precincts referred to the NDMC by the HCC, two buildings/ precincts have not been found suitable for listing by the NDMC E (Annexure-B) and four buildings/ precincts are being studied and reconsidered by the NDMC (Annexure-C). Nov/, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Bye- laws 23.1 and 23.5 of Delhi Building Bye-laws, 1983 read with sub-section (17) of Section 2 of the New Delhi Municipal Council F Act 1994, the Government hereby publishes the following list of 141 Heritage Sites including Heritage Buildings, Heritage Precincts and Listed Natural Feature Areas for general information (Annexure-A) By Order and in the Name of the Lt. Governor of the National Capital Territory of Delhi, G

R.C. MEENA, Jt. Secy. LIST OF 141 HERITAGE BUILDINGS IN NDMC AREA FOR NOTIFICATION H

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A GRADE-I

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 519 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

GRADE-II A

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C GRADE-III

ANNEXURE-B Deleted List of 2 Heritage Buildings in NDMC Area Grade-II

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 521 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

GRADE-III A

ANNEXURE-C B LIST OF 4 HERITAGE BUILDINGS IN NDMC AREA BEING STUDIED/RECONSIDERED GRADE-I

GRADE-II

GRADE-I

(emphasis supplied)

317Copy pinpoint317. Therefore, our foremost concern is to determine whether any of the seven subject plots are situated on a listed heritage site. On careful examination, we note that out of seven subject plots, only two plots, i.e. plot no. 3 (National Archives listed as Grade-I) and plot no. 4 (which houses a structure titled “Grave Platform” listed as Grade-III), have been listed as heritage sites in the list. At serial no. 13 of Grade-I sites, “National Archives and Campus” located at Janpath is earmarked as a Grade-I heritage building/precinct. The other listed site is at serial no. 3 in Grade-III sites which is a part of plot no. 4.

318Copy pinpoint318. The petitioners have submitted that the entire central vista area is a part of listed heritage sites. In response, learned Solicitor General has commended us with the official colour coded map of Central Vista Avenue signed by Senior Architect (R.D-II Unit) of Central Public Works Department (CPWD), New Delhi alongwith affidavit of Ms. Leenu H

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A Sahgal, Commissioner (Planning), Delhi Development Authority, dated 3.7.2020. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of this factual statement on affidavit. A list of listed heritage sites has also been furnished wherein 141 sites have been listed as heritage buildings, precincts and natural feature areas. We have carefully studied the plan specified in detail in the said map, reproduced hereunder: - B

Note:

1. With regard to Plot No. 1 of area 15 acres mentioned in the public notice dated 21.12.2019, the current land F use is Transportation (Bus Terminal)/Parking) (10.5 acres) and Recreational (Neighborhood Play Area) (4.5 acres). In terms of public notice dated 21.12.2019, it was proposed to change to ‘Govt Office’. However, subsequently, it has been decided by the Government G to use it as ‘Residential’ and accordingly DDA is taking further action to change the land use as per the provisions of Delhi Development Act, 1957.

2. Plot No 8 of area 3.9 acres located in Zone C has been changed from Public Semi Public (Facilities) to H Recreational (District Park).

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 523 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

319Copy pinpoint319. The plan demarcates the Rajpath, central vista lawns and A central vista water body running parallel to Rajpath as a collective space titled “Central Vista Precincts at Rajpath” which is a part of the listed heritage buildings/precincts at Serial No. 9 of Grade-I sites. Whereas, the existing Parliament Building on plot No. 116, has been separately notified as Grade-I at Serial No. 8 of the same list. The proposed B Parliament Building, however, is on plot No. 118. Both these plots (Nos.116 and 118) may come within the central vista area, but are not part of central vista heritage precincts as such. Therefore, it follows that the entire central vista area has not been declared as a heritage precinct and only the central vista precinct at Rajpath is declared as such. Inasmuch as, all other heritage structures/precincts in the central vista area have been listed separately in the list of heritage buildings/precincts. In other words, if the entire central vista area was to be listed as heritage precinct, the requirement of listing its components separately would not have arisen. Further, it is a matter of record that the aforesaid precinct at Rajpath is not a part of the proposed comprehensive development project, as no changes thereto have been proposed as of now.

320Copy pinpoint320. It is relevant to note that the appropriate authority while enlisting the heritage buildings/precincts/natural feature areas was conscious about the difference between building and precincts, as is evident from the published list. Our discussion on the expression “heritage buildings” also clarifies the position. The list separately includes multiple buildings/sites or precincts within the central vista area. For instance, other structures/buildings within central vista area i.e., India Gate, India Gate Canopy, North Block and South Block etc. If the petitioners’ argument that the entire central vista area is a listed precinct would have reflected the correct position and there was absolutely no need for the competent authority to include different buildings/precincts situated in the same region separately. To reinforce this view, reference could be made to the INTACH Report which gives a physical description of “Central Vista, Rajpath” thus: “PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: The vista was designed to link the Viceroy’s House (now the President’s House) to the northern gateway of the Purana Qila. At the eastern end was erected the War Memorial Arch (India Gate), around which were built the Princes’ houses. On both sides on the main road, there are wide lawns. The architectural character of the Central Vista is enhanced H

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A by the landscaping, the street furniture, the water bodies, etc. and it is important that any new addition/intervention is sensitive to and respects the character of the area.” Notably, INTACH is not a statutory authority but only a registered society. Nevertheless, the description by it is also unambiguous and leaves no scope for further scrutiny. It is in complete sync with the stand taken by the respondents on affidavit and which has found favour with us that only the Central Vista Precincts at Rajpath, as described by the INTACH Report, qualify as a listed heritage precinct. As submitted by the respondents, a precinct may include some parts of the appurtenant land as well, however, it will not cover the entire central vista region. It will defeat the whole purpose of the exercise of listing, which is a statutory measure with intent to preserve and conserve only the listed heritage premises.

321Copy pinpoint321. As regards the heritage status of other plots involved in the present lis, during the course of the hearing, the petitioners were called upon to show relevant official documents to depict that the subject plots have been listed as heritage buildings/precincts, as contended. No document to the contrary is forthcoming. Reference was, however, made to some documents downloaded from internet including official website of NDMC. Those documents cannot be the basis to disregard the official documents produced under the signatures of the authorised officer on affidavit including the statutory notification published by the Government for listing of 141 heritage sites/buildings. We would, therefore, rely upon the official documents and the affidavit of the officials of the competent authority, as aforesaid.

322Copy pinpoint322. As per the coded plan, the land use of plot Nos. 3 and 4 is being changed from Public and Semi-Public Facilities to Government Office and Recreational (District Park). Our enquiry is focussed on whether the said change is permissible in law.

323Copy pinpoint323. On change in land use, clause 1.12 is the guiding provision for the present enquiry which categorically states that listing does not ipso facto prohibit change of ownership or usage. However, it adds a caveat by stating that the change in land use of such listed heritage buildings/precincts is not permissible without a “prior approval” of the HCC. It reads: “1.12. Grading of the Listed Buildings/Listed Precincts: ...Listing does not prevent change of ownership or usage. H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 525 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

However, change of use of such Listed Heritage Building/ A Listed Precincts is not permitted without the prior approval of the Heritage Conservation Committee. Use should be in harmony with the said listed heritage site. …” (emphasis supplied) Therefore, it is urged that for the aforesaid two plots, the change B in land use was contingent upon prior approval of HCC. In the first place this prior approval is required if the proposal for change in land use pertains to listed heritage building/listed precincts only. Not for other properties. In any case, the record reveals that this requirement has been substantially complied with by the respondents. C

324Copy pinpoint324. Indisputably, the HCC is constituted as a part of the nodal Ministry i.e., MoHUA and Special Secretary/Additional Secretary of the Ministry is designated as the Chairman of the committee. Other members of the HCC include Additional D.G. (Architecture), CPWD, Chief Planner, Town and Country Planning Organisation, Commissioner D (Planning), DDA, Secretary, DUAC among others. In the present case, both the meetings of the Authority wherein the proposal of change in land use was considered comprised of representatives of all the agencies which were required to give their approval to the project. The minutes of the DDA meeting dated 10.2.2020 wherein the project proposal was approved for final notification reveal that Shri Kamran Rizvi, Additional E Secretary, MoHUA, Government of India, who is also the designated Chairman of the HCC, was present in the meeting and had unreservedly joined in the approval of the HCC to the proposed change in land use. Additionally, we note that various other members of the HCC had also participated in the meeting of the Technical Committee in December, F

2019. In the participation of high officials of HCC including its Chairman, it can be safely accepted that those officials of HCC were fully informed and conscious about their role in approving the proposal regarding change in land use. In other words, the HCC was throughout a part of the process, represented by its Chairman and other members. Their approval to the proposal under consideration has been duly recorded in the said meetings. G It must, therefore, follow that the approval of the HCC as regards the change in land use was implicit and understood in the approvals granted in the said meetings. Resultantly, there is substantial compliance of “prior approval” under clause 1.12. H

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325Copy pinpoint325. This approval under clause 1.12, however, does not dispense with the requirement of a formal written “prior permission” of HCC under clause 1.3. That would become essential before commencing the development work on listed heritage buildings/sites and that stage is yet to arrive, including in respect of construction on plot No. 118 likely to be affected by the expression “Heritage building”360 to include such portion B of land adjoining heritage building (existing Parliament building on plot No. 116) or part thereof as may be required for fencing or covering or in any manner preserving the historic and/or architectural and/or cultural value of such existing heritage building. SCOPE OF DEVELOPMENT ON HERITAGE SITES C (PRIOR APPROVAL VIS-À-VIS PRIOR PERMISSION)

326Copy pinpoint326. The scope of restrictions regarding the development/re- development of the heritage buildings/precincts is stated in clause 1.3 of the Byelaws which reads thus: D “1.3 Restrictions on Development/Re-development/Repairs etc. (i) No development or redevelopment or engineering operation or additions/alterations, repairs, renovations including painting of the building, replacement of special features or plastering or demolition of any part thereof of the said listed buildings or listed precincts or listed natural feature areas shall be allowed except with the prior permission of Commissioner, MCD, Vice Chairman DDA/Chairman NDMC. Before granting such permission, the agency concerned shall consult the Heritage Conservation Committee to be appointed by the Government and shall act in accordance with the advice of the Heritage Conservation Committee. (ii) Provided that, before granting any permission for demolition or major alterations/additions to listed buildings (or buildings within listed streets or precincts, or construction at any listed natural features, or alternation of boundaries of any listed natural feature G 360 “Heritage building” means and includes any building of one or more premises or any part thereof and/or structure and/or artifact which requires conservation and/or preservation for historical and/or environmental and/or architectural and/or artisanary and/or aesthetic and/or cultural and /or environmental and /or ecological purpose and includes such portion of land adjoining such building or part thereof as may be required for fencing or covering or in any manner preserving the historical and/ H or architectural and/or aesthetic and/or cultural value of such building.

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 527 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

areas, objections and suggestions from the public shall be invited A and shall be considered by the Heritage Conservation Committee. .....” (emphasis supplied)

327Copy pinpoint327. Clause 1.3 does not per se prohibit development/ B redevelopment/engineering operations/alterations /additions etc. of the heritage building/precincts. It stipulates that such development work can be undertaken on listed heritage buildings/precincts, only after prior permission of the specified authorities which would mandatorily consult and act in accordance with the advice tendered by the HCC. Clause 1.16 is in line with clause 1.3 and states that “the regulations do not amount to any blanket prevention of demolition or of changes to Heritage Buildings.” The only requirement is to obtain prior permission/ clearance from the relevant authorities from heritage point of view before the development work is actually commenced by the project proponent. Thus understood, heritage buildings/precincts are not ipso facto inviolable in law. The extent of permissible development on the listed heritage buildings/sites is within the domain of HCC.

328Copy pinpoint328. As per clause 1.12, the listed buildings/precincts may be graded into three categories – Grade I, II and III, and based on such grading, the scope of development over such spaces is to be determined. E The extent of physical development is determinable on the basis of grading of heritage buildings/precincts. For instance: (i) No interventions be permitted either on exterior or interior of the heritage building or natural features unless it is necessary in the interest of strengthening and prolonging, the life of the buildings/or precincts or any part or features thereof. For this purpose, absolutely essential and minimum changes would be allowed and they must be in conformity with the original; (ii) Internal changes and adaptive re-use may by and large be allowed but subject to strict scrutiny. Care would be taken to ensure the conservation of all special aspects for which it is included in Heritage Grade-II. In addition to the above, extension or additional building in the same plot or compound could in certain circumstances, be allowed provided that the extension/ additional building is in harmony with (and H

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