RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS

vidhipandit.com/case/sc-2021-15-283-714

Judgment · Supreme Court of India · decided · Bench: A.M. KHANWILKAR, DINESH MAHESHWARI and SANJIV KHANNA

[2021] 15 S.C.R. 283

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Headnote — Supreme Court Reports (editorial summary, not part of the judgment)

A of Environment and Forest (MoEF) is just, proper and in accordance with law including the 2006 Notification – Project proponent may set up smog tower(s) of adequate capacity, as being integral part of the new Parliament building project; and additionally, use smog guns at the construction site throughout the construction phase is in progress on the site – The stage of prior permission under clause B 1.3 of the Building Bye Laws of the Heritage Conservation Committee (HCC), is the stage of actual development/ redevelopment etc. work is to commence and not the incipient stage of planning and formalisation of the Project – Accordingly, respondents to obtain prior permission of the designated Authority before actually starting any development /redevelopment work on the stated plots/structures/ precincts governed by the heritage laws including on plot No. 118, if already not obtained – Held (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) (partly dissenting) (Minority judgment): The dissent is only on aspects of public participation on interpretation of the statutory provisions, failure to take prior approval of the Heritage Conservation D Committee (HCC) and order passed by the Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) – However on aspects of Notice inviting Bid, award of consultancy and the order of the Urban Arts Commission, as a standalone and independent order, there is no disagreement – Final notification of modification /change of the land use dated 28th March E 2020 in respect of the 6 plots in the Central Vista quashed and set aside, with directions – Order of EAC dated 22nd April, 2020 and environment clearance by Ministry of Environment and Forest dated 17th June, 2020 set aside, and an order of remit to the EAC passed with a request that they may decide the question on environment clearance, without awaiting the decision on the question of change/ F modification of land use – Delhi Development Act, 1957 – s.11A(2) – Delhi Urban Arts Commission Act, 1973 – Environment Protection Act, 1986 – Building Byelaws for Delhi, 2016 – Master Plan of Delhi, 2021. Doctrines / Principles – Principle of Rule of Law –

Held

The principle of Rule of Law runs as a common thread through the substantive as well as procedural laws – A democratic polity requires all organs of the state to attach equal importance to substance of law as well as to the procedure delineated to perform such substantive functions – That must be the constant endeavour to touch both ends as well as means.

Catchwords

Judiciary and Rule of Law – The duty enjoined upon the judiciary is to ensure checks and balances; and to place itself between the Government and citizens when they come face to face in a Court of law – The judicial organ is not meant to impose the citizens’ or even its own version of good governance upon the Government in the name of Rule of Law in exercise of its power of judicial review. Government Policy – Interference with – Judicial Review – Scope –

Held

The Courts do not sit in appeal over the decisions of the Government to do merit review of the subjective decision as such – The Government may examine advantages or disadvantages of a policy at its own end, it may or may not achieve the desired objective – The Government is entitled to commit errors or achieve successes in policy matters as long as constitutional principles are not violated in the process – It is not the Court’s concern to enquire into the priorities of an elected Government – Judicial review is never meant to venture into the mind of the Government and thereby examine validity of a decision.

Catchwords

Judicial Review – Principled judicial review – “Constitutional due process” –

Held

In a principled judicial review a “check” is maintainable without tilting the “balance” – An elected Government is the repository of public faith in matters of development – E Dispensation of judicial review cannot be resorted to by the aggrieved /dissenting section for vindication of their point of view until and unless it is demonstrated that the proposed action is in breach of procedure established by law or in a given case, colourable exercise of powers of the Government – Therefore, it is important for the Courts to remain alive to all the attending circumstances and not interfere merely because another option as in the perception of the aggrieved/dissenting section of public would have been a better option.

Catchwords

Doctrines / Principles – Constitutionalism –

Held

Constitutionalism is a relative concept which envisages a G constitutional order wherein powers and limits on the exercise of those powers are duly acknowledged – It is a tool which is used to reach upto the ultimate goal of constitutionalization of governance but it cannot be deployed to present an alternative model of governance – Principle of constitutionalism is a work in progress

A which is meant to infuse life and blood into an existing scheme which has stood the test of constitutional validity and not to nudge with the scheme itself – It may only be deployed to evolve minimum standards of procedures prescribed by law – It is not to undermine or supplant the elaborate statutory regulatory schemes. B Constitution of India – Role of –

Held

Constitution in our system plays twin role – First, Constitution as the guardian of fundamental rights and second, Constitution as the structure of governance.

Catchwords

Democracy – Principle of participatory democracy – Elements C – Scope of public involvement in Government processes –

Held

The principle of participatory democracy has two integral elements – first, public participation in decision making and second, placing information regarding Government actions in public domain – The scope of public involvement in Government processes is however a matter dependent on legal framework of a country and the Court should be loath to venture into that area in the guise of eminence of the project under consideration – In a democratic setup where the citizen has entrusted abundant governance to the Government, it is bounden obligation of the Government to keep the citizens well informed about its actions, as a prudent trustee would.

Catchwords

Policy and Development – Role of the Courts –

Held

Courts operate within the boundaries defined by the Constitution, and cannot be called upon to govern, for, they have no wherewithal or prowess and expertise in that regard – The political issues including regarding development policies of the Government of the day must be debated in the Parliament, to which it is accountable – The role of Court is limited to examining the constitutionality including legality of the policy and Government actions – The right to development is a basic human right and no organ of the State is expected to become an impediment in the process of development as long as the government proceeds in accordance with law – G Judiciary. In the instant matters, this Court was called upon by the petitioners to undertake a comprehensive and heightened judicial scrutiny regarding the permissibility of the Central Vista Project of the Government of India. As per the policy documents, the

A Commission Act, 1973 and the clearance/no-objection for construction of a new Parliament House under the Environment Protection Act, 1986. Failure to take prior permission/approval of the Heritage Conservation Committee as per Annexure II of the Unified Building Bye-Laws is alleged. In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 853/2020, the Notice inviting Bid and award of consultancy to the ninth respondent therein has been challenged. At a deeper and conceptual level the question relates to the government’s duty to consult and the scope and ambit of the citizen’s right to participate in the quasi legislative exercise. Connected with the two issues is the third question of scope and amplitude of the power of judicial review. Disposing of the matters, the Court Per A.M. Khanwilkar, J. [for himself and for Dinesh Maheshwari, J.] (Majority judgment) D

Held

1.1. The Rule of Law requires law in existence; such law must qualify as law within the meaning of the Constitution and must satisfy the standards laid therein and legally applicable meaning of Rule of Law in India can be best understood as a democratic rule within the four corners of the Constitution, as originally envisaged and as is interpreted from time to time. The existence of democracy per se does not guarantee adherence to Rule of Law, but abidance of Rule of Law by one and all is the hallmark of a real thriving democracy. [Para 133][386-B-D] 1.2. The fact that all power flows from law and must be exercised in accordance with such law is easy to be theorized in F a constitutional discourse, but difficult to be sustained in the aftermath of ever-expanding potpourri of the law itself. It is for this very reason the statement – ‘Rule of Law’ must encompass a dynamic concept albeit rooted in four corners of the Constitution. It provides a constant trigger to any state-citizen intercourse and calls upon this Court to strike a just balance between two entities, both equally bound by the same principle of superiority of law. A just and time-tested methodology to strike this balance lies in the end product of furthering the avowed goal of a democracy premised upon Rule of Law and not dragging it backwards. [Para 134][386-D-F] H

A 132 and “Charting the Boundaries of Hawaii’s Extensive Public Trust Doctrine Post Waiâhole Ditch Charting the Boundaries of Hawaii’s Extensive Public Trust Doctrine Post-Waiâhole Ditch, Ana Ching, Page 2 – referred to. B Per Sanjiv Khanna, J. (partly dissenting) (Minority judgment)

Held

1. This separate dissenting judgment is on account of difference with the opinion expressed by A.M. Khanwilkar, J. on the aspects of public participation on interpretation of the statutory provisions, failure to take prior approval of the Heritage Conservation Committee and the order passed by the Expert Appraisal Committee. However on the aspects of Notice inviting Bid, award of consultancy and the order of the Urban Arts Commission, as a standalone and independent order, there is no disagreement with the final conclusions in the judgment authored by A.M. Khanwilkar, J. [Para 3][599-D-E] 2.1. Gunning principles, first established in 1985, can be crystallised as under: (a) consultation must occur when the proposals are still at a formative stage; (b) the proponent must give sufficient reasons for the proposal that permit intelligent consideration and response; (c) adequate time must be given for consideration and response; and (d) the product of consultation must be conscientiously taken into account in finalising any statutory proposals. These principles ref lect the basic requirements essential if the public consultation process is to be sensible and meaningful. They would normally form the basis and foundation for proper application of the duty to consult and right to be consulted. Nevertheless, these principles should not be put in a strait-jacket and the degree of application would depend upon the factual matrix and is situation specific. [Para 25][639-D- G] G 2.2. Sections 7 to 11-A of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 decree detailed procedure for preparation of a Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan(s) including direction that the Authority shall prepare a draft and make a copy available for inspection to general public and invite objections and suggestions

Reporter's headnote (continued) and case details

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(Transferred Case (Civil) No. 229 of 2020) Judicial Review – Scope and amplitude of – Central Vista Project of the Government of India – Judicial scrutiny regarding C its’ permissibility – Government’s duty to consult – Scope and ambit of the citizen’s right to participate in quasi legislative exercise – Issues concerning decisions taken by the statutory Authorities including regarding the change in land use, grant of statutory and other permissions, environmental as well as heritage clearances etc. – Challenge to change in land use of six plots in the Central D Vista under the Delhi Development Act, 1957, and the permissions /approvals granted by the Central Vista Committee, the Delhi Urban Arts Commission under the Delhi Urban Arts Commission Act, 1973 and clearance/no-objection for construction of a new Parliament House under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 – Failure to E take prior permission/approval of the Heritage Conservation Committee as per Annexure II of the Unified Building Bye-Laws, alleged – Plea of absence of sufficient public participation in the entire process – Held (per majority) (per A.M. Khanwilkar, J. [for himself and Dinesh Maheshwari, J.]): There is no infirmity in the grant of “No Objection” by the Central Vista Committee (CVC); F “Approval” by the Delhi Urban Art Commission (DUAC) as per the DUAC Act, 1973; and “Prior approval” by the Heritage Conservation Committee (HCC) under clause 1.12 of the Building Byelaws for Delhi, 2016 – Further, exercise of power by the Central Government u/s.11A(2) of the DDA Act, 1957 is just and proper G and thus modifications regarding change in land use of plot Nos. 2 to 8 in the Master Plan of Delhi, 2021/Zonal Development Plan for Zone-D and Zone-C vide impugned notification dated 20.3.2020, confirmed – Recommendation of Environmental Clearance (EC) by Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) and grant thereof by Ministry H 283

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RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 285 ORS.

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RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 287 ORS.

need for the development of the Central Vista Project is rooted A in the creation of a larger working space for efficient functioning of the highest legislative wing of the country and for integrated administrative block for Ministries/ Departments presently spread out at different locations including on rental basis. The Central Vista lies in the heart of the national capital, and within the B “Lutyens’ Bungalow Zone” (LBZ), and is described by the Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage (INTACH) as the “ensemble with main axis Rajpath...the Rashtrapati Bhawan at Raisina Hills, flanked by the Secretariat (North and South Blocks)...the Parliament House...the hexagonal round-about that has the India Gate and the Canopy...” C Diverse issues concerning the decisions taken by the statutory Authorities including regarding the change in land use, grant of statutory and other permissions, environmental as well as heritage clearances etc., were raised in the proceedings. The challenge was premised on high principles of democratic values as applicable in India and not limited to mere infringement of statutory provisions of the governing enactments. That is on account of the nature of project – being of high political significance and eminence for our democratic republic; and for upholding the “Rule of Law”, which is on a higher pedestal than the governance by “Rule by Law”. An argument was also advanced as regards the absence of sufficient public participation in the entire process. Advancing the argument regarding direct public consultation, the petitioners stated that the concept of participatory democracy demands that a project of this nature must involve the common public as they are the real stakeholders of national heritage and must be consulted at every stage of the project including prior to drawing outline of the project, releasing consultancy tender, modifying the Master Plan and finalisation of the design and making changes therein. The dispute relating to the modification and redevelopment of the Central Vista has different facets. First, is the legal challenge to change in the land use of six plots in the Central Vista under the Delhi Development Act, 1957, and the permissions/approvals granted by the Central Vista Committee, the Delhi Urban Arts Commission under the Delhi Urban Arts H

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RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 289 ORS.

1.3. The principle of Rule of Law runs as a common thread A through the substantive as well as procedural laws. A democratic polity requires all organs of the state to attach equal importance to substance of law as well as to the procedure delineated to perform such substantive functions. That must be the constant endeavour to touch both ends as well as means. [Para 135][386- F-G] B

2.1. The trajectory of our jurisprudence in review of matters involving personal liberties has been one of strict approaches. It is, however, a misnomer to propagate that we have gradually transformed from chosen “procedure established by law” into once consciously rejected “due process of law”. The petitioners, despite their best of efforts, have not been able to demonstrate a case of deprivation of life or personal liberty of any individual on account of any of the impugned executive action. Whereas, it is essential for the petitioners to demonstrate a real and direct impact or restriction on their core fundamental rights due to the impugned executive action to invoke the due process argument. A cause-effect relationship is essential. Only then the burden would shift on the State to either show the absence of restrictions or justification of restrictions within the permissible exceptions of Part-III. [Para 144][394-E-G] 2.2. A judicial review is an exercise in reference to some existing rights and the reliefs and remedies prayed for. The Rule of Law, as accepted and settled in India, with regard to judicial interference in administrative and executive or policy matters is no more res integra. The duty enjoined upon the judiciary is to ensure checks and balances; and to place itself between the F Government and citizens when they come face to face in a Court of law. It is meant to act as an equaliser and ensure that the flow of decisions from executive to citizens is overseen through the prism of well-established principles, as and when called upon to do so. The judicial organ is not meant to impose the citizens’ or even its own version of good governance upon the Government G in the name of Rule of Law in exercise of its power of judicial review. [Para 145][394-H; 395-A-C] 2.3. In India, what prevails is the “constitutional due process” i.e., the process which is due under the constitutional scheme. And what is due, is a principled judicial review wherein H

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A a “check” is maintainable without tilting the “balance”. For, all organs of the state are constitutionally committed to and beholden by the common goal of giving effect to processes and procedure established by law, ideals, expectations, rights and duties due under the Constitution and no deviation can be permitted therefrom. [Para 158][405-A-C] B

3. In a democracy, the electors repose their faith in the elected Government which is accountable to the legislature and expect it to adopt the best possible course of action in public interest. Thus, an elected Government is the repository of public faith in matters of development. Some section of the public/ C citizens may have another view point if not complete disagreement with the course of action perceived by the elected Government, but then, the dispensation of judicial review cannot be resorted to by the aggrieved/dissenting section for vindication of their point of view until and unless it is demonstrated that the proposed D action is in breach of procedure established by law or in a given case, colourable exercise of powers of the Government. Therefore, it is important for the Courts to remain alive to all the attending circumstances and not interfere merely because another option as in the perception of the aggrieved/dissenting section of public would have been a better option. [Para 163][406-H; 407- E A-C] 4.1. The Courts do not sit in appeal over the decisions of the Government to do merit review of the subjective decision as such. The Government may examine advantages or disadvantages of a policy at its own end, it may or may not achieve the desired F objective. The Government is entitled to commit errors or achieve successes in policy matters as long as constitutional principles are not violated in the process. It is not the Court’s concern to enquire into the priorities of an elected Government. Judicial review is never meant to venture into the mind of the G Government and thereby examine validity of a decision. [Paras 164 and 165][407-C; 408-B-C] 4.2. Judicial review primarily involves a review of State action – legislative, executive, administrative and policy. The primary examination in a review of a legislative action is the existence of power with the legislature to legislate on a particular

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subject matter. For this purpose, doctrines of pith and substance, harmonious construction, territorial nexus etc. are often resorted to. Once the existence of power is not in dispute, it is essentially an enquiry under Article 13 of the Constitution which enjoins the State to not violate any of the provisions of Part-III in a lawmaking function. The review of executive action would depend upon the precise nature of the action. For, the domain of executive is wide and is generally understood to take within its sweep all residuary functions of the State. Thus, the precise scope of review would depend on the decision and the subject matter. For instance, an action taken under a statute must be in accordance with the statute and would be checked on the anvil of ultra vires the statutory or constitutional parameters. The enquiry must also ensure that the executive action is within the scope of executive powers earmarked for State Governments and Union Government respectively in the constitutional scheme. The scope of review of a pure administrative action is well settled. Since generally individuals are directly involved in such action, the Court concerns itself with the sacred principles of natural justice – audi altrem partem, speaking orders, absence of bias etc. The enquiry is also informed by the Wednesbury principles of unreasonableness. The review of a policy decision entails a limited enquiry. Second guessing by the Court or substitution of judicial opinion on what would constitute a better policy is strictly excluded from the purview of this enquiry. Under the constitutional scheme, the government/executive is vested with the resources to undertake necessary research, studies, dialogue and expert consultation and accordingly, a pure policy decision is not interfered with in an ordinary manner. The burden is heavy to demonstrate a manifest illegality or arbitrariness or procedural lapses in the culmination of the policy decision. However, the underlying feature of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution must inform all enquiries of State action by the constitutional Court. [Para 167][410-D-H; 411-A-B] G 5.1. Constitutionalism is a relative concept which envisages a constitutional order wherein powers and limits on the exercise of those powers are duly acknowledged. It is a tool which is used to reach upto the ultimate goal of constitutionalization of H

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A governance and it cannot be deployed to present an alternative model of governance. It would not only be absurd but also fraught with dangers of overreach and ambiguity if subjective principles of interpretation are applied by detaching them from the textual scheme of the Constitution, particularly when the textual scheme lays down an elaborate structure of administration. For, to do so would be to drag a duly elected Government on the edges as it would be under a constant fear of being adjudged wrong on the basis of undefined principles which appeal to “three gentlemen or five gentlemen sitting as a Court”. And what will suffer is public interest in the form of public exchequer including sovereignty of the nation. [Para 170][412-C-F] 5.2. The principle of constitutionalism is a work in progress which is meant to infuse life and blood into an existing scheme which has stood the test of constitutional validity and not to nudge with the scheme itself. It may only be deployed to evolve minimum standards of procedures prescribed by law. It is not to undermine or supplant the elaborate statutory regulatory schemes. [Para 172][413-A-B] 6.1. A holistic understanding of the dispensation envisaged under our Constitution would reveal that we are a representative democracy with strong elements of participatory democracy embedded in it. The element of participation, however, is regulated not only by statutes but also by the Constitution. The Constitution, if it would have envisaged every important decision to be flowing from the public in the manner proposed by the petitioners, would have clearly provided for that dispensation. It F has not. Understood thus, the Constitution in our system plays twin role – first, Constitution as the guardian of fundamental rights and second, Constitution as the structure of governance. [Para 183][421-C-D] 6.2. The principle of participatory democracy has two integral elements – first, public participation in decision making and second, placing information regarding Government actions in public domain. The first element, no matter how desirable, is carefully circumscribed by the state of Rule of Law or procedure established by law, as present, and a fine balance has been struck between need for public participation and effective functioning of

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administration. The legislature has expressly provided for such public participation and the extent thereof in the governing enactments.[Para 184][421-E-F] 6.3. The participation itself involves three features – the stage, the extent and the nature of participation. The extent and quality of permissible participation is dependent upon a multitude of factors including, but not limited to, the stage of procedure, nature of subject matter, number of affected persons, local conditions, geography, strategic importance of project, budgetary allocations for the project etc. The subject matter of a development project having no direct bearing on lives and livelihoods cannot be equated with a project which has a direct impact upon their lives and livelihoods. [Para 185][421-F-G] 6.4. Pertinently, this exercise cannot be undertaken in abstractness merely because participation is one of the facets of a democratic structure. Rather, it involves delicate analysis of a complex web of factors. Whether in a given case personal oral hearing is to be provisioned for or mere representations be invited or public discussion is called for, is a matter for the legislature to make a law in that regard. [Para 186][422-B] 6.5. One may very well have our own notion of participation and it could be radically different from the prescribed one. It may be possible that some people feel unheard in a direct manner, however, a democracy, in an ultimate analysis, is about prevalence of collective wisdom of citizens, which may or may not commend to individual wisdom of few. The citizens are completely free to advocate any notion along the Government policy or the manner of making it in their free exercise of right to speech and expression, but enforcement of such notion cannot be fructified by resorting to judicial review. The idea of public involvement in administrative matters is based upon the stage and extent of representation prescribed by the legislature. No country with a sizeable population like ours can give a promise of direct participation to every individual in the decision-making process (of the Government) in administrative matters unless the law so prescribes. [Paras 187 and 188][422-C-F]

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A 6.6. However, it must be borne in mind that such public participation is not to supplant the discretion of the Government or to retard the development work. It is only for inviting constructive suggestions/objections from all stakeholders for effective implementation of the policy of the Government, to subserve public interest. [Para 189][422-F-G] B 6.7. The prosaic, bland, inapplicable metaphysical principles of constitutional theory, imported from foreign jurisdictions, cannot create an extra-constitutional standard of judicial review or to extend involvement of public at every level of governance absent any statutory regime in that regard. Thus, the scope of public involvement in Government processes is a matter dependent on legal framework of a country and the Court should be loath to venture into that area in the guise of eminence of the project under consideration. [Para 191][426-A-B] 6.8. The other facet of participatory democracy is disclosure of information in public domain about the actions of Government. The petitioners’ argument is that for effective participation, the citizens must know what they are participating in and why. This merits consideration. For, unless complete and relevant information about Government decision is placed in public domain, the public would be ill-equipped to engage with the Government in a meaningful manner. In a democracy, disclosure of full information is empowerment and acts as an enabler for meaningful participation. Granting open access to information also secures the goal of transparency to which all public institutions are wedded. It is right to say that the Right to Information Act, F 2005 has empowered the citizen to obtain information from the Government but it would be absolutely untenable to say that there is no duty on the Government to be open. In a democratic setup where the citizen has entrusted abundant governance to the Government, it is bounden obligation of the Government to keep G the citizens well informed about its actions, as a prudent trustee would. [Paras 193 and 194][428-C-D; 431-C] 6.9. The idea of political justice is not constrained to an orthodox understanding of a democratic form of Government. We are in an information age and political justice would be H

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incomplete without informational justice which essentially A requires the decision makers to consider the subjects of their decisions as rightful recipients of all information that may have an impact on their lives. Furthermore, open availability of information would also advance the objective of education and empowerment. Article 51(h) provides for the fundamental duty B “to develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform”. The furtherance of spirit of inquiry and reform is largely dependent on the availability of information. It is nothing but a duty which enjoins the citizens to participate in good governance. Notably, the respondents in the present case have recognised the importance of openness and have placed C elaborate data to demonstrate how all steps of the project including all permissions, orders, invitations, approvals etc. were made available for direct public access online from time to time at the earliest available opportunity. [Paras 196 and 197][431-H; 432- A-D] D

7. In the present case, the petitioners enthusiastically called upon this Court to venture into territories that are way beyond the contemplated powers of a constitutional court. No doubt, the Courts are repositories of immense public trust and the fact that some public interest actions have generated commendable results is noteworthy, but it is equally important to realise that Courts E operate within the boundaries defined by the Constitution. The Court cannot be called upon to govern. For, the court has no wherewithal or prowess and expertise in that regard. [Para 420][595-E; 595-G-H; 596-A]

8. The constitutionally envisaged system of “checks and F balances” has been completely misconstrued and misapplied in this case. The principle of “checks and balances” posits two concepts - “check” and “balance”. Whereas the former finds a manifestation in the concept of judicial review, the latter is derived from the well enshrined principle of separation of powers. The G political issues including regarding development policies of the Government of the day must be debated in the Parliament, to which it is accountable. The role of Court is limited to examining the constitutionality including legality of the policy and Government actions. The right to development is a basic human right and no organ of the State is expected to become an H

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A impediment in the process of development as long as the government proceeds in accordance with law. [Para 421][596-B- D]

9. In conclusion, it is declared and directed as follows: (i) There is no infirmity in the grant of: (a) “No Objection” B by the Central Vista Committee (CVC); (b) “Approval” by the Delhi Urban Art Commission (DUAC) as per the DUAC Act, 1973; and (c) “Prior approval” by the Heritage Conservation Committee (HCC) under clause 1.12 of the Building Byelaws for Delhi, 2016. (ii) Further, the exercise of power by the Central C Government under Section 11A(2) of the DDA Act, 1957 is just and proper and thus the modifications regarding change in land use of plot Nos. 2 to 8 in the Master Plan of Delhi, 2021/Zonal Development Plan for Zone-D and Zone-C vide impugned notification dated 20.3.2020 stands confirmed. D (iii) The recommendation of Environmental Clearance (EC) by Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) and grant thereof by MoEF is just, proper and in accordance with law including the 2006 Notification. The same along with appropriate directions therein are upheld to ensure that the highlighted mitigating measures are followed by the project proponent in their letter and spirit. E (iv) The project proponent may set up smog tower(s) of adequate capacity, as being integral part of the new Parliament building project; and additionally, use smog guns at the construction site throughout the construction phase is in progress on the site. F (v) The respondent MoEF to consider issuing similar general directions regarding installation of adequate capacity of smog tower(s) as integral part in all future major development projects whilst granting development permissions, particularly in cities with bad track record of air quality - be it relating to G Government buildings, townships or other private projects of similar scale and magnitude, including to use smog guns during the construction activity of the Project is in progress. (vi) The stage of prior permission under clause 1.3 of the Building Bye Laws of the Heritage Conservation Committee H (HCC), is the stage of actual development/redevelopment etc.

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work is to commence and not the incipient stage of planning and formalisation of the Project. Accordingly, the respondents shall obtain aforementioned prior permission of the designated Authority before actually starting any development/redevelopment work on the stated plots/structures/precincts governed by the heritage laws including on plot No. 118, if already not obtained. (vii) The selection/appointment of Consultant, in light of the limited examination warranted in this case, is held to be just and proper. [Para 423][596-F-H; 597-A-H; 598-A] Lal Bahadur v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2018) C 15 SCC 407; Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa & Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 54 : [1991] 3 SCR 102 ; R.K. Mittal & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2012) 2 SCC 232 : [2011] 15 SCR 877; Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v. Hiraman D Sitaram Deorukhar & Ors. (2019) 14 SCC 411; Goel Ganga Developers India Private Limited v. Union of India Through Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Forests & Ors. (2018) 18 SCC 257; Union of India & Anr. v. Cynamide India Ltd. & Anr. (1987) 2 SCC 720; Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited & Anr. v. Union E of India & Ors. (1990) 3 SCC 223 : [1990] 1 SCR 909; State of Punjab v. Tehal Singh & Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 7: [2002] 1 SCR 27; Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Promoters and Builders Association & Anr. (2004) 10 SCC 796 : [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 207; Transmission F Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited & Anr. v. Sai Renewable Power Private Limited & Ors. (2011) 11 SCC 34 : [2010] 8 SCR 636; Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. v. the Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur (1980) 2 SCC 295 : [1980] 2 SCR 1111; Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija & Ors. v. Collector, Thane, Maharahstra & Ors. (1989) 3 SCC G 396 : [1989] 3 SCR 405 ; Bangalore Development Authority v. Aircraft Employees’ Cooperative Society Limited & Ors. (2012) 3 SCC 442 : [2012] 4 SCR 881; Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. (2007) 8 SCC 705 : H

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A [2007] 6 SCR 799; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors. (2019) 12 SCC 720; Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association v. Designated Authority & Ors. (2011) 2 SCC 258 : [2011] 1 SCR 198; State of U.P. & Ors. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh & Ors. (1989) 2 SCC 505 : [1989] 1 SCR 176; Aruna B Roy & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2002) 7 SCC 368: [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 266; Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India (1969) 3 SCC 868 : [1970] 3 SCR 40; Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India (2019) 15 SCC 401 : [2019] 5 SCR 916; Rajendra Shankar C Shukla & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. (2015) 10 SCC 400 : [2015] 11 SCR 723; S.N. Chandrashekar & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 208 : [2006] 1 SCR 1039; Virender Gaur & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 577 : [1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 78; Inderpreet Singh Kahlon & Ors. v. State of D Punjab & Ors. (2006) 11 SCC 356: [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 772; Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia & Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 65 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1023; National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan & Ors. E (1998) 7 SCC 66: [1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 156; R.S. Garg v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 430 : [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 120; Council of Architecture v. Mukesh Goyal & Ors. 2020 SCC Online SC 329; Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi & Ors. (1991) 2 SCC 716 : F [1991] 1 SCR 772 ; Alaknanda Hydropower Company Limited v. Anuj Joshi & Ors. (2014) 1 SCC 769 : [2013] 11 SCR 784; Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India & Ors. (1996) 5 SCC 647: [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 241; A.P. Pollution Control Board II v. Prof. M.V. G Nayudu (Retd.) & Ors. (2001) 2 SCC 62 : [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 249 ; Lafarge Umiam Mining Private Limited v. Union of India (UOI) & Ors. (2011) 7 SCC 338: [2011] 7 SCR 954; Keystone Realtors Private Limited v. Anil V. Tharthare & Ors. (2020) 2 SCC 66 : [2019] 17 SCR 539; Bengaluru Development Authority H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 299 ORS.

v. Sudhakar Hegde & Ors. 2020 SCC Online SC 328; A Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P. & Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 549 : [2006] 2 SCR 419; Common Cause v. Union of India & Ors. (2017) 9 SCC 499 : [2017] 13 SCR 361; State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Thakur Bharat Singh AIR 1967 SC 1170 : [1967] 2 SCR 454; B K.S. Puttaswamy (Retired) & Anr. (II) v. Union of India & Anr. (2019) 1 SCC 1 : [2018] 8 SCR 1; Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India (2020) 10 SCC 274 : [2020] 2 SCR 297; Cellular Operators Association of India & Ors. v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India & Ors. (2016) 7 SCC C 703 : [2016] 9 SCR 1; K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. (I) v. Union of India & Ors. (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569; State of U.P. v. Raj Narain & Ors. (1975) 4 SCC 428: [1975] 3 SCR 333; Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers, D Bombay Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. (1988) 4 SCC 592 : [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 212; M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath & Ors. (1997) 1 SCC 388 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 12; I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs v. State of T.N. (2007) 2 SCC 1 : [2007] 1 SCR 706 ; Government (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India & Anr. (2018) 8 SCC 501 : [2018] 7 E SCR 1; Lok Prahari Through its General Secretary v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2018) 6 SCC 1 : [2018] 6 SCR 1076 ; Rajeev Mankotia v. Secretary to the President of India & Ors. (1997) 10 SCC 441 : [1997] 3 SCR 421; Sushanta Tagore & Ors. v. Union of India F & Ors. (2005) 3 SCC 16 : [2005] 2 SCR 502; K. Guruprasad Rao v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2013) 8 SCC 418 : [2013] 11 SCR 581; Manohar Joshi v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2012) 3 SCC 619; Public Interest Foundation & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr. (2019) 3 SCC 224; Brajendra Singh Yambem v. Union G of India & Anr. (2016) 9 SCC 20 : [2016] 6 SCR 333; Hindustan Construction Company Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 2019 SCC Online SC 1520; State of Punjab & Anr. v. Khan Chand (1974) 1 SCC 549 : [1974] 2 SCR 768; Shayara Bano v. Union of H

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A India & Ors. (2017) 9 SCC 1: [2017] 9 SCR 797; Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 (2012) 10 SCC 1 : [2012] 9 SCR 311; Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014) 9 SCC 1 : [2014] 9 SCR 965; Global Energy Limited & Anr. v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2009) 15 B SCC 570: [2009] 9 SCR 22; Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 305 : [1962] 3 SCR 842; Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1972) 2 SCC 788 : [1973] 2 SCR 757; Union of India & Ors. v. Motion Picture Association & C Ors. (1999) 6 SCC 150: [1999] 3 SCR 875; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Prof. Manubhai D. Shah (1992) 3 SCC 637 : [1992] 3 SCR 595; Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India & Ors. v. Cricket Association of Bengal & Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 161: [1995] 1 SCR 1036 ; Chandramouleshwar D Prasad v. Patna High Court & Ors. (1969) 3 SCC 56 : [1970] 2 SCR 666; Orissa Mining Corporation Limited v. Ministry of Environment & Forests & Ors. (2013) 6 SCC 476 : [2013] 6 SCR 881; Archaeological Survey of India v. Narender Anand & Ors. (2012) 2 SCC 562 E : [2012] 1 SCR 260; Nagar Nigam, Meerut v. Al Faheem Meat Exports Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (2006) 13 SCC 382 : [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 354; Dutta Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Indo Merchantiles Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (1997) 1 SCC 53 : [1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 710; Meerut Development Authority v. Association of Management Studies & Anr. F (2009) 6 SCC 171 : [2009] 6 SCR 663; Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary & Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 516 : [2014] 8 SCR 446; Radha Krishna Agarwal & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (1977) 3 SCC 457 : [1977] 3 SCR 249 ; Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad G & Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma (2013) 5 SCC 182: [2013] 6 SCR 199; Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2011) 5 SCC 29 : [2011] 5 SCR 77; Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India & Ors. (1986) 3 SCC 247 : [1986] 3 SCR 63; Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa & Ors. (2007) 14 H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 301 ORS.

SCC 517 : [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 606; Ramana A Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India & Ors. (1979) 3 SCC 489 : [1979] 3 SCR 1014; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494 : [1979] 1 SCR 392; Rajbala & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.(2016) 1 SCC 463 : [2015] 9 SCR 113; B Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay AIR 1951 SC 128 : [1951] 0 SCR 228; Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India & Ors. (2000) 10 SCC 664 : [2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 94; Shimnit Utsch India Private Limited & Anr. v. West Bengal Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited & Ors. (2010) 6 SCC C 303 : [2010] 6 SCR 1110; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Anr. (2011) 7 SCC 639 : [2011] 6 SCR 443; Directorate of Film Festivals & Ors. v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain & Ors. (2007) 4 SCC 737 : [2007] 5 SCR 7; State of Kerala v. Joseph Antony (1994) D 1 SCC 301 : [1993] 3 Suppl. SCR 531; G. Sundarrajan v. Union of India & Ors. (2013) 6 SCC 620 : [2013] 8 SCR 631; University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao & Anr. [1964] 4 SCR 575; Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr. (1996) 9 SCC 709 : [1996] 3 Suppl. SCR 808; Federation of Railway Officers E Association & Ors. v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 289 : [2003] 2 SCR 1085; Avishek Goenka v. Union of India & Anr. (2012) 5 SCC 275 : [2012] 5 SCR 547; Dental Council of India v. Subharti K.K.B. Charitable Trust & Anr. (2001) 5 SCC 486 : [2001] 3 SCR 149; F Basavaiah (Dr.) v. Dr. H.L. Ramesh & Ors. (2010) 8 SCC 372 : [2010] 9 SCR 227; K.T. Plantation Private Limited & Anr. v. State of Karntaka (2011) 9 SCC 1 : [2011]13 SCR 636; Rohit Dhupar & Ors. v. Lt. Governor & Ors. (2009) SCC Online Del 487; Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy (2005) 6 SCC 321 : [2005] 3 G SCR 81; Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr. v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja (2008) 9 SCC 31 : [2008] 10 SCR 222; Punjab National Bank & Ors. v. Manjeet Singh & Anr. (2006) 8 SCC 647 : [2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 825; Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation H

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A & Anr. v. S.G. Kotturappa & Anr. (2005) 3 SCC 409 : [2005] 2 SCR 520; Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd. & Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 337 : [2005] 3 SCR 1095; Ranjan Kumar Mitra v. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. & Ors. (1997) 10 SCC 386; Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2006) 11 SCC 1 : [2006] 10 Suppl. B SCR 521; Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee (1977) 2 SCC 256 : [1977] 2 SCR 904; Sohan Lal Gupta (Dead) through LRs. & Ors. v. Asha Devi Gupta & Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 492 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 249; Major G.S. Sodhi v. C Union of India (1991) 2 SCC 382; Bhim Sen & Ors. v. State of Punjab AIR 1951 SC 481: [1952] SCR 18; Barium Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. v. Company Law Board & Ors. AIR 1967 SC 295: [1966] Suppl. SCR 311; Rohtas Industries v. S.D. Agarwal & Ors. (1969) 1 SCC 325 : [1969] 3 SCR 108; M. Jhangir Bhatusha & Ors. D v. Union of India & Ors. (1989) 2 Suppl. SCC 201 : [1989] 3 SCR 356; Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr. (2002) 3 SCC 496 : [2002] 1 SCR 621; Puranlal Lakhanpal v. President of India & Ors. AIR 1961 SC 1519 : [1962] 1 SCR 688; E Union of India & Ors. v. E.G. Nambudiri AIR 1991 SC 1216 : [1991] 2 SCR 451; Mahabir Jute Mills Ltd., Gorakhpore v. Shibban Lal Saxena & Ors. (1975) 2 SCC 818 : [1976] 1 SCR 168; Sarat Kumar Dash and Ors. v. Biswajit Patnaik and Ors. (1995) 1 Suppl. SCC 434 : [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 223; Dr. Ashwani Kumar v. F Union of India & Anr. 2019 SCC Online SC 1144; R.K. Garg v. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 4 SCC 675 : [1982] 1 SCR 947; Premium Granites & Anr. v. State of T.N. & Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 691 : [1994] 1 SCR 579; Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India (1996) 2 SC G 405 : [1996] 2 SCR 767 ; BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India & Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 333 : [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 511; G.B. Mahajan & Ors. v. Jalgaon Municipal Council & Ors. (1991) 3 SCC 91 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 20; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) 1 Suppl. SCC : [1975] Suppl. SCC 1; H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 303 ORS.

State of Karnataka v. Union of India & Anr. (1977) 4 A SCC 608 : [1978] 2 SCR 1; Kuldip Nayar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 7 SCC 1 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 1; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India & Ors. (2008) 6 SCC 1 : [2008] 4 SCR 1; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association & Anr. v. Union of B India (2016) 5 SCC 1 : [2015] 13 SCR 1; Indian Railway Construction Company Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar (2003) 4 SCC 579 : [2003] 2 SCR 387; Asia Foundation & Construction Ltd. v. Trafalgar House Construction (I) Ltd. and Others (1997) 1 SCC 738 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 209; Reliance Airport Developers C (P) Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India & Ors. (2006) 10 SCC 1: [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 398; Himachal Pradesh Housing and Urban Development Authority v. Universal Estate & Anr. (2010) 14 SCC 253; Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India & Ors. D (2009) 7 SCC 561: [2009] 9 SCR 225; Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2000) 8 SCC 606; Sterlite Industries (India) Limited & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2013) 4 SCC 575 : [2013] 6 SCR 573; Municipal Corporation, Ujjain & Anr. v. BVG India Limited & Ors. (2018) 5 E SCC 462 : [2018] 6 SCR 861; N.D. Jayal & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2004) 9 SCC 362 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 152; Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. AIR 1963 SC 1295 : [1964] 1 SCR 332; Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, F New Delhi & Ors. AIR 1967 SC 1836: [1967] 2 SCR 525; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 : [1970] 3 SCR 530; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr. AIR 1978 SC 597 : [1978] 2 SCR 621; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 : [1996] 3 SCR 721; State of A.P. & G Ors. v. McDowell & Company & Ors. (1996) 3 SCC 709; Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India & Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 737: [2014] 11 SCR 1009; Swiss Ribbons Private Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2019) 4 SCC 17 : [2019] 3 H

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A SCR 535; Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala & Anr. (1973) 4 SCC 225 : [1973] Suppl. SCR 1; Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Limited & Anr. v. Reserve Bank of India (1992) 2 SCC 343 : [1992] 1 SCR 406; Daroga Singh & Ors. v. B.K. Pandey (2004) 5 SCC 26 : [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 113; B Syed Hasan Rasul Numa & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1991) 1 SCC 401 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 165; Mackinonn Mackenzie & Company Limited v. Mackinnon Mackenzie Employees Union (2015) 4 SCC 544 : [2015] 4 SCR 45; Babu Verghese & Ors. v. Bar C Council of Kerala & Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 422 : [1999] 1 SCR 1121; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh & Ors. AIR 1964 SC 358; Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of West Bengal & Ors. (2017) 11 SCC 601 : [2016] 11 SCR 263; Khub Chand & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. AIR 1967 SC 1074 : [1967] 1 SCR 120; Mithu v. D State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 277 : [1983] 2 SCR 690; Rajbala and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. (2016) 2 SCC 445 : [2015] 12 SCR 1106; Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651: [1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 122; Bhanumati and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh E & Ors. (2010) 12 SCC 1 : [2010] 7 SCR 585; K. Krishna Murthy and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Anr. (2010) 7 SCC 202 : [2010] 6 SCR 972; Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors. (1978) 1 SCC 405 : [1978] 2 SCR 272; Janhit Manch and Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra F and Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 505 : [2018] 14 SCR 860; S.P. Gupta & Ors. v. President of India & Ors. AIR 1982 SC 149 : [1982] 2 SCR 365; R.K. Jain v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 119 : [1993] 3 SCR 802; Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash G Chandra Agarwal (2020) 5 SCC 481 : [2019] 16 SCR 424; T.S.R. Subramanian and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2013) 15 SCC 732 : [2013] 11 SCR 991; Anjali Bhardwaj and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 2019 (3) SCALE 447; Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 1267: [1993] H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 305 ORS.

1 SCR 480; Machavarapu Srinivasa Rao & Anr. v. A Vijayawada, Guntur, Tenali, Mangalagiri Urban Development Authority & Ors. (2011) 12 SCC 154 : [2011] 12 SCR 639; Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Anr. (2015) 15 SCC 1 : [2015] 9 SCR 890; Superintendent and Remembrancer B of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta AIR 1967 SC 997 : [1967] 2 SCR 170; State Bank of Patiala & Ors. v. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC 364 : [1996] 3 SCR 972; Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Social Welfare Residential Educational Institutions v. Pindiga Sridhar & Ors. (2007) 13 SCC 352 : [2007] 4 SCR 145; C Lachmi Narain and Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1976) 2 SCC 953: [1976] 2 SCR785; Ganesh Bank of Kurundwad Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 10 SCC 645 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 437; Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. (1999) 4 D SCC 727 : [1999] 2 SCR 1033; Union of India & Ors. v. Hindustan Development Corporation & Ors. (1993) 3 SCC 499 : [1993] 3 SCR 128; Ram Pravesh Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 381 : [2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 512; Col. A.S. Sangwan v. Union of India & Ors. 1980 Supp. SCC 559; Secretary, E Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, Government of India v. Cipla Ltd. & Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 1 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 177; Sooraram Pratap Reddy & Ors. v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy Distt. & Ors. (2008) 9 SCC 552 : [2008] 13 SCR 126; Michigan Rubber F (India) Limited v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2012) 8 SCC 216 : [2012] 8 SCR 128 and Kalpana Mehta & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors (2018) 7 SCC 1 : [2018] 4 SCR 1 – referred to. Utkarsh Mandal v. Union of India 2009 SCC Online Del 3836; T. Muruganandam v. Ministry of Environment G & Forests Manu/GT/0135/2014 (NGT decision dated 10.11.2014 in Appeal No. 50/2012); Sunil Kumar Chugh & Ors. v. Secretary, Environment Department, Government of Maharashtra & Ors. MANU/GT/0153/ H

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A 2015 [Appeal No. 66 of 2014 decided on 3.9.2015; Samata & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 2013 SCC Online NGT 101; Sarpanch, Grampanchayat, Tiroda, Tal. Sawantwadi, District Sindhudurg, Maharashtra & Ors. v. Ministry of Environment & Forests & Ors. 2011 SCC Online NGT 10; M/s. Lithoferro & Ors. v. Ministry B of Environment and Forests (2013) SCC Online NGT 40; S. Rama Rao & Ors. v. Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Hyderabad & Anr. 1977 SCC Online AP 27; Aircel Cellular Ltd. v. Union of India 2016 SCC Online Mad 8463; Friends of Rajouri C Garden Environment & Anr. v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation 2020 SCC Online Del 458 – referred to. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. People of the State of Illinois [146 US 387 : 36 L Ed 1018 (1892)] Democratic Alliance & Anr. v. Masondo NO & Anr. 2003 (2) BCLR D 128 (CC); Matatiele Municipality & Ors. v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Ors. 2007 (1) BCLR 47 (CC); South African Veterinary Association v. Speaker of the National Assembly & Ors. 2019 (2) BCLR 273 (CC); Law Society Case of Kenya v. Attorney General & Ors. [Decision of Court of Appeal, Kenya E in Civil Appeal No. 96 of 2014 decided on 27.9.2019]; Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 1984 (3) All ER 935; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation (1947) 2 All ER 680; R v. Secretary of State for the Home F Department, Ex Parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433; Regina (Mahmood) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 WLR 840; Huang & Ors. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 3 All ER 435; Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 285 U.S. 262; West Coast G Hotel Co. v. Parrish 300 U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U.S. 144 (1938); American Federation of Labor Et. Al. v. American Sash & Door Co. 335 U.S. 538 (1949); Ferguson, Attorney General

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 307 ORS.

of Kansas, Et. Al. v. Skrupa 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Wolf A v. Colorado 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Legg & Ors. v. Inner London Education Authority [1972] 1 WLR 1245; Bishop v. Wood 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett, Director, Office of Economic Opportunity, Et. Al. v. Kennedy Et. Al. 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Board of Regents of State B Colleges Et. Al. v. Roth 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155; Morey, Auditor of Public Accounts of Illinois Et. Al. v. Doud Et. Al. 354 US 457 (1957); King & Ors. v. Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control & Anr. 2006 (4) BCLR 462; Ethyl Corporation v. EPA C 426 U.S. 941 (1977) : 541 F.2d 1 (1977); Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly & Ors. 2006 (12) BCLR 1399; Kiambu County Government & Ors. v. Robert N. Gakuru & Ors [Decision of Court of Appeal, Kenya in Civil Appeal D No. 200 of 2014 decided on 30.6.2017]; Lonrho Plc v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry & Anr. [1989] 2 All ER 609 and R. v. Ministry of Defence, Ex p. Murray [1998] COD 134 (QBD) – referred to. Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. I, VIII, IX and XI; T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice, Oxford University E Press (Edn. 2001) pg. 1; Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1977, No. 2, Eighth Annual Administrative Law Issue (May, 1977), pp. 453-488; The Nature of the Judicial Process, Benjamin Cardozo, New Haven: Yale University Press, 13th Edn. 1946 pg. 141; Administrative Law, 5th Edn., F Thomson Sweet and Maxwell, pg. 440; Dictionary of Environment & Ecology Dictionary of Environment & Ecology, Bloomsbury, P.H. Collin, 5th Edn., page 116; “Implementing the Right to Development International Law and Sustainable Development – Principles and Practice, Edn. 2004, pg. 354; Professor Schotland D.C. G Circuit Judicial Conference, Environmental Protection: Law and Policy, 2nd Edn., pg. 122; Landscape Architecture Magazine, Frederick SteinerandJohn Roberts Prospect: Public Trust Doctrine, Landscape Architecture Magazine, May/June, 1986, Vol. 76, pg. H

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RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 309 ORS.

from any person. Gunning principles can be substantially read as resonating in Sections 10, 11 and 11-A of the Development Act and Rules 4, 8, 9 and 10 of the Delhi Development (Master Plan and Zonal Development Plan) Rules, 1959. To ignore their salutary mandate as to the manner and nature of consultation in the participatory exercise, would be defeat the benefic objective of exercise of deliberation. Public participation to be fruitful and constructive is not to be a mechanical exercise or formality, it must comply with the least and basic requirements. Thus, mere uploading of the gazette notification giving the present and the proposed land use with plot numbers was not sufficient compliance, but rather an exercise violating the express as well as implied stipulations, that is, necessity and requirement to make adequate and intelligible disclosure. This condition also flows from the common law general duty of procedural fairness. Doctrine of procedural legitimate expectation as explained below would be attracted. Intelligible and adequate disclosure of information in the context of the Development Act and the Development Rules means and refers to the degree to which information should be available to public to enable them to have an informed voice in the deliberative decision making legislative exercise before a final decision is taken on the proposals. In the present matter this lapse and failure was acknowledged and accepted by the Board of Enquiry and Hearing (BoEH), which had recommended disclosure and furnishing of details. Intelligible and adequate disclosure was critical given the nature of the proposals which would affect the iconic and historical Central Vista. The citizenry clearly had the right to know intelligible details explaining the proposal to participate and express themselves, give suggestions and submit objections. The proposed changes, unlike policy decisions, would be largely irreversible. Physical construction or demolition once done, cannot be undone or corrected for future by repeal, amendment or modification as in case of most policies or even enactments. They have far more permanent consequences. It was therefore necessary for the respondents to inform and put in public domain the redevelopment plan, layouts, etc. with justification and explanatory memorandum relating to the need and necessity, with studies and reports. Of particular importance is whether by the changes, H

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A the access of the common people to the green and other areas in the Central Vista would be curtailed/restricted and the visual and integrity impact, and proposed change in use of the iconic and heritage buildings. [Paras 27, 28][641-A-B; 642-A-H]

3. In the context of the present case, given the nature and importance the statutory provisions which emphasise on fair participation of the public in the deliberations, and the importance and significance of Central Vista, it would not be appropriate and correct to ignore failure on the part of the respondents to ascribe to the principle of intelligible and adequate disclosure to fulfil the requirement of public participation. Right to make objections and suggestions in the true sense, would include right to intelligible and adequate information regarding the proposal. Formative and constructive participation forms the very fulcrum of the legislative scheme prescribed by the Development Act and the Development Rules. Every effort must be made to effectuate and actualise the participatory rights to the maximum extent, rather than read them down as mere irregularity or dilute them as unnecessary or not mandated. [Para 37][649-F-H; 650- A-B]

4. The Central Government has not placed on record even E a single document or minutes to show that the objections and suggestions were considered by the Central Government. [Para 51][662-D-E]

5. The core issue in the present case is whether or not the respondents have performed their duty to consult the public, F followed the prescribed procedure and the authority competent had acted to modify/amend, in terms of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 and the Delhi Development (Master Plan and Zonal Development Plan) Rules, 1959. Merits of the public policy is not per se a dispute being decided by the Court. [Para 55][671- E; 672-C] G

6. It is a well-settled proposition that where power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, then the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. When the statute prescribes a particular act must be done by following a particular procedure, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The Technical Committee of

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 311 ORS.

the Authority in its meeting held on 5th December, 2019 while examining the proposal had, inter alia, stated that steps would be taken to seek approval of the Heritage Conservation Committee. However Heritage Conservation Committee was never moved to secure approval/permission. No approval/permission has been taken. [Paras 71, 72][688-F; 689-A-B] B

7. Respondents raised two other defences. First, the construction of the new Parliament being on a vacant plot adjacent to the existing Parliament building does not require approval/no objection from the Heritage Conservation Committee. This contention according to the petitioners is fallacious as it is contrary to the statutory Master Plan of Delhi and the Unified C Building Bye-Laws. They rely on the definition assigned to the term ‘heritage building’, which ‘includes such portion of land adjoining such building and part thereof as may be required for fencing or covering or in any manner preserving the historical and/or architectural and/or aesthetic and/or cultural value of such D building’. However, the respondents should have moved and asked for clarification from the Heritage Conservation Committee. Further, if the interpretation as put forward by the respondents, including the NDMC, is to be accepted, then as a sequitur it follows that construction or development can take place in a vacant plot adjacent to or adjoining the Grade-I building. E This interpretation appears unacceptable as it is contrary to the express stipulations in the Master Plan and the Unified Building Bye-Laws. It would also lead to unintended consequences and would be incompatible with the purpose and objective of these two legislations, a relevant principle when one interprets F provisions in case of doubt or ambiguity. This is a tentative view, as it is for the Heritage Conservation Committee to opine on ‘includes such portion of land adjoining such building and part thereof as may be required for fencing or covering or in any manner preserving the historical and/or architectural and/or aesthetic and/or cultural value of such building’. [Para 74][689- G H; 690-A-E]

8. Central Government could not have notified the modified the land use changes, without following the procedure and without prior approval/permission from the Heritage Conservation H

p. 312

A Committee. Further, the local body is expressly interdicted from issuing building permits in respect of the listed heritage buildings/ precincts. The local body i.e. NDMC should have approached the Heritage Conservation Committee for clarification/ confirmation and proceed on their advice. [Para 75][690-G-H; 691-A] B

9. The Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) [which carried out the entire decision making process in the build-up to the issuance of the Environmental Clearance] proceeded to impose as many as fifteen conditions including those relating to other clearances which would be required, like clearance from Delhi C Pollution Control Committee under the Air and Water Pollution Act, provision for adequate fire safety measures, etc. What is of concern is lack of discussion, reasons or even the conclusion or finding on the aspect of slicing or inclusion. Proceedings before the EAC are not adversarial in nature. EAC acts both as a fair investigator and an independent objective adjudicator when deciding whether or not to grant environmental clearance. There must be application of mind which is reflected when reasons justifying the conclusion are recorded. Mere reproduction of the contesting stands is not sufficient. On the contrary it would reflect mechanical grant without application of mind. Further, it is not for the court/appellate forum to assume what weighed, whether the conclusion relies on material which is relevant, irrelevant or partly relevant, or whether the decision is partly based on surmises and conjectures and partly on evidence. [Paras 89, 90][703-F-G; 704-C-E]

F 10. It was argued that the relevant clause of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification of 2006 does not require giving of reasons when environment clearance is granted. However, the apprising body, which includes EAC as well as the Ministry, has to make categorical recommendations to the regulatory authority either for grant of clearance or G rejection, together with reasons for the same. Further, the orders passed by the EAC are appealable before the National Green Tribunal. Appellate forum would not be able to decipher and adjudicate unless reasons are set out and stated in the order under challenge. The whole purpose of outsourcing the task to H EAC, comprised of experts and specialists, is to have a proper

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 313 ORS.

evaluation on the basis of some objective criteria. EAC is a body that has to apply its collective mind and not to record conclusions. It must justify and give basis for its conclusions. [Para 92][706- D-E; 707-C-D]

11. There are complex and esoteric issues which have to be at first stage considered and decided by the specialised authorities like the Heritage Conservation Committee. If the merits of the pleas is considered and examined, it would be a direct encroachment on their jurisdiction and exceeding the power of judicial review. It is the reasoning and discussion in the orders by the statutory /quasi-judicial that are subjected to judicial scrutiny and review. Further, matters pertaining to heritage, architectural, functionality etc are for the experts and specialists in the field like Architects, town planers, historians, urbanists, engineers etc. to examine and guide. The respondents without doubt do verily believe that redevelopment of Central Vista and new Parliament building is an imperative necessity. Central Vista D requires a makeover. The hutments and some of the non-heritage buildings like Shashtri Bhawan, Nirman Bhawan, Udyog Bhawan etc. which it is stated occupy more than 90 acres of land require re-development. Similarly, if new parliament building is required and being a must, it should be constructed. Several former and the present Speaker have expressed the need for construction of a new Parliament. Some of the petitioners do not oppose partial and regulated redevelopment for functionality, while maintaining and preserving the heritage, ethos and visual look. Central Vista and Parliament House is an heritage and belongs to the Nation and the people. Their primary grievance is lack of information and details. They submit that experts and specialists can provide acceptable solutions to conserve and make historical buildings functional, as it has happened elsewhere. The issues raised by the petitioners along with the stand of the respondents have to be taken into consideration by the statutory authorities in terms of and as per the statutory mandate. Ultimately, the issue has to be decided as per law after ascertain details by professional experts. [Para 96][711-D-H; 712-A-C]

12. While setting aside and quashing the final notification of modification/change of the land use dated 28th March 2020 in respect of the 6 plots in the Central Vista, it is directed as under: H

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A A) The Central Government/Authority would put on public domain on the web, intelligible and adequate information along with drawings, layout plans, with explanatory memorandum etc. within a period of 7 days. B) Public Advertisement on the website of the Authority B and the Central Government along with appropriate publication in the print media would be made within 7 days. C) Anyone desirous of filing suggestions/objections may do so within 4 weeks from the date of publication. Objections/ suggestions can be sent by email or to the postal address which would be indicated/mentioned in the public notice. D) The public notice would also notify the date, time and place when public hearing, which would be given by the Heritage Conservation Committee to the persons desirous of appearing before the said Committee. No adjournment or request for postponement would be entertained. However, the Heritage Conservation Committee may if required fix additional date for hearing. E) Objections/suggestions received by the Authority along with the records of BoEH and other records would be sent to the Heritage Conservation Committee. These objections etc. would also be taken into consideration while deciding the question of approval/permission. F) Heritage Conservation Committee would decide all contentions in accordance with the Unified Building Bye Laws and the Master Plan of Delhi. G) Heritage Conservation Committee would be at liberty to also undertake the public participation exercise if it feels appropriate and necessary in terms of paragraph 1.3 or other paragraphs of the Unified Building Bye Laws for consultation, hearing etc. It would also examine the dispute regarding the boundaries of the Central Vista Precincts at Rajpath. H) The report of the Heritage Conservation Committee would be then along with the records sent to the Central H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 315 ORS.

Government, which would then pass an order in accordance with law and in terms of Section 11A of the Development Act and applicable Development Rules, read with the Unified Building Bye-laws. I) Heritage Conservation Committee would also simultaneously examine the issue of grant of prior permission/approval in respect of building/permit of new parliament on Plot No. 118. However, its final decision or outcome will be communicated to the local body viz., NDMC, after and only if, the modifications in the master plan were notified. C J) Heritage Conservation Committee would pass a speaking order setting out reasons for the conclusions. [Para 97][712-C-H; 713-A-G]

13. The order of the EAC dated 22nd April, 2020 and the environment clearance by the Ministry of Environment and Forest D dated 17th June, 2020 are set aside, and an order of remit to the EAC passed with a request that they may decide the question on environment clearance within a period of 30 days from the date copy of this order received, without awaiting the decision on the question of change/modification of land use. [Para 98][713-G-H; 714-A] E

All India Recruitment Board and Another v. K. Shyam Kumar and Others (2010) 6 SCC 614 : [2010] 6 SCR 291; Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) 3 SCC 637; Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (2016) 7 SCC F 353 : [2016] 3 SCR 579; K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar- 5J) (2019) 1 SCC 1 : [2018] 8 SCR 1; Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sale Tax (1974) 4 SCC 98 : [1974] 2 SCR 879; In Re.: The Delhi Laws Act. AIR 1951 SC 332: [1951] SCR 747; G Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641 : [1985] 2 SCR 287; Kerala Samsthana Chetu Thozhilali Union v. State of Kerala & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 327 : [2006] 3 SCR 420; Ispat Industries Limited v. Commissioner of Customs (2006) 12 SCC 583 : [2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 733; Union of India H

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A v. Cynamide India Ltd., (1987) 2 SCC 720 : [1987] 2 SCR 841; Pune Municipal Corporation v. Promoters and Builders’ Association (2004) 10 SC 796 : [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 207; State of U.P. and Others v. Renusagar Power Co. and Others (1988) 4 SCC 59; [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 627; Cellular Operators Association of India and B Others v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and Others (2016) 7 SCC 703 : [ 2016] 9 SCR 1; State of U.P. v. Raj Narain (1975) 4 SCC 428 : [1975] 3 SCR 333; Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal (1995) C 2 SCC 161 : [1995] 1 SCR 1036; Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers, Bombay Pvt. Ltd. (1988) 4 SCC 592; People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (2004) 2 SCC 476: [2004] 1 SCR 232; Central Board of Secondary Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay D (2011) 8 SCC 497 : [2011] 11 SCR 1028; Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Rampur AIR 1965 SC 895; [1965] SCR 970 ; Lachmi Narain v. Union of India (1976) SCC 2 953 : [1979] 1 SCR 845; Harvinder Singh and Others v. State of Punjab (1979) E 1 SCC 137 : [1979] 1 SCR 845; Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Bal Mukund Bairwa (2009) 4 SCC 299 : [2009] 2 SCR 161; Annamalai University v. Secretary to Government, Information and Tourism Department (2009) 4 SCC 590 : [2009] 3 SCR 355; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2019) 12 SCC 720; R.K. F Mittal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 2 SCC 232 : [2011] 15 SCR 877; Rajendra Shankar Shukla v. State of Chhattisgarh (2015) 10 SCC 400 : [2015] 11 SCR 723; Indore Development Authority v. Madan Lal (1990) 2 SCC 334; Syed Hasan Rasul Numa v. Union G of India (1991) 1 SCC 401: [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 165; State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava AIR 1957 SC 912: [1958] SCR 533; State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhyay AIR 1961 SC 751: [1961] SCR 679 ; Superintendent and Legal Remembrancer, State of West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta AIR 1967 SC 997 : H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 317 ORS.

[1967] SCR 170; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of A India AIR 1957 SC 676 : [1957] SCR 1052; Scheduled Caste and Weaker Sections Welfare Association v. State of Karnataka (1991) 2 SCC 604 : [1991] 1 SCR 974; State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Limited 2020 (12) JT 78; Parinder Singh v. Union of India B (2016) 9 SCC 20 : [2016] 6 SCR 333; Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 224; Dhani Sugar and Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 5 SCC 480 : [2019] 6 SCR 307; Bengaluru Development Authority v. Sudhakar Hegde (2019) 15 SCC 401 : [2019] 5 SCR 916; Dheeraj Lal and Girdhari Lal v. C Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1955 SC 271; S.N. Mukharji v. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 1984: [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 44; Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India and Another (1976) 2 SCC 981: [1976] Suppl. SCR 489; D Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Chand Varshney (2009) 4 SCC 240: [2009] 5 SCR 326; Commissioner of Income Tax v.Walchand and Co. Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 1435 :[1967] SCR 214; State of Punjab v. Bhag Singh (2004) 1 SCC 547 : [ 2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 904; E India Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India (2019) 15 SCC 401 : [2019] 5 SCR 916 and Lok Prahari v. State of U.P. (2018) 6 SCC 1:[2018] 6 SCR 1076 – referred to. Bhausaheb Tavanappa Mahajan v. State of F Maharashtra AIR 1982 Bom 284 and Gau Raxa Hitraxak Manch v. Union of India (2013) SCC Online NGT 85 – referred to. Montral Street Railway Company v. Normandin AIR 1917 PC 142 and Nazeer Ahmed v. King Emperor AIR G 1936 PC 253 – referred to. Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation 1947 (2) All ER 680 (CA); R. Oakes 1986 1 SCR 103 [Decision of Canadian Supreme Court]; Mixnam’s Properties Ltd. v. Chertsey Urban District H

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A Council (1632) 2 All ER 787; Kruse v. Johnson 1898, Divisional Court; R (Moseley) v. London Borough of Haringey (2014) UKSC 56; R v. Brent London Borough Council, ex parte Gunning (1985) 84 LGR 168; Stephen Viera v. London Borough of Camden (2012) EWHC 287; R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p B Coughlan 2001 QB 213 : (2000) 2 WLR 622 (CA);

Regina v. Secretary of State for Social Services 1986

WLR Vol. 1 pg. 1; Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 [Decision of Constitutional Court of South C Africa]; R (Bhatt Murphy) and Others v. Independent Assessor (2008) EWCA Civ 755; R (Majid) v. London Borough of Camden 2009 EWC Civ 1029; R (Kelly) v. London Borough of Hounston 2010 EWHC Civ 1256; R (on the application of Vieira) v. London Borough of Camden 2012 EWHC 287 – referred to. D Case Law Reference In the judgment of A.M. Khanwilkar, J. (2018) 15 SCC 407 referred to Para 24 [1991] 3 SCR 102 referred to Para 24 E [2011] 15 SCR 877 referred to Para 24 (2019) 14 SCC 411 referred to Para 24 (2018) 18 SCC 257 referred to Para 24 (1987) 2 SCC 720 referred to Para 30 F [1990] 1 SCR 909 referred to Para 30 [2002] 1 SCR 27 referred to Para 30 [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 207 referred to Para 30 [2010] 8 SCR 636 referred to Para 30 G [1980] 2 SCR 1111 referred to Para 30 [1989] 3 SCR 405 referred to Para 30 [2012] 4 SCR 881 referred to Para 30 [2007] 6 SCR 799 referred to Para 30 H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 319 ORS.

(2019) 12 SCC 720 referred to Para 35 A [2011] 1 SCR 198 referred to Para 35 [1989] 1 SCR 176 referred to Para 35 [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 266 referred to Para 35 [1970] 3 SCR 40 referred to Para 35 B [2019] 5 SCR 916 referred to Para 35 [2015] 11 SCR 723 referred to Para 35 [2006] 1 SCR 1039 referred to Para 35 [1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 78 referred to Para 35 C [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 772 referred to Para 48 [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1023 referred to Para 48 [1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 156 referred to Para 51 [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 120 referred to Para 52 D [1991] 1 SCR 772 referred to Para 52 [2013] 11 SCR 784 referred to Para 60 [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 241 referred to Para 64 [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 249 referred to Para 64 E [2011] 7 SCR 954 referred to Para 65 [2019] 17 SCR 539 referred to Para 67 [2006] 2 SCR 419 referred to Para 67 [2017] 13 SCR 361 referred to Para 67 F [1967] 2 SCR 454 referred to Para 80 [2018] 8 SCR 1 referred to Para 85 [2020] 2 SCR 297 referred to Para 85 [2016] 9 SCR 1 referred to Para 86 G [2017] 10 SCR 569 referred to Para 86 [1975] 3 SCR 333 referred to Para 92 [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 212 referred to Para 92 H

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A [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 12 referred to Para 97 [2007] 1 SCR 706 referred to Para 98 [2018] 7 SCR 1 referred to Para 98 [2018] 6 SCR 1076 referred to Para 98 B [1997] 3 SCR 421 referred to Para 98 [2005] 2 SCR 502 referred to Para 98 [2013] 11 SCR 581 referred to Para 98 (2012) 3 SCC 619 referred to Para 98 C (2019) 3 SCC 224 referred to Para 98 [2016] 6 SCR 333 referred to Para 98 [1974] 2 SCR 768 referred to Para 98 [2017] 9 SCR 797 referred to Para 98 D [2012] 9 SCR 311 referred to Para 98 [2014] 9 SCR 965 referred to Para 98 [2009] 9 SCR 22 referred to Para 98 [1962] 3 SCR 842 referred to Para 98 E [1973] 2 SCR 757 referred to Para 98 [1999] 3 SCR 875 referred to Para 98 [1992] 3 SCR 595 referred to Para 98 [1995] 1 SCR 1036 referred to Para 98 F [1970] 2 SCR 666 referred to Para 98 [2013] 6 SCR 881 referred to Para 98 [2012] 1 SCR 260 referred to Para 98 [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 354 referred to Para 98 G [1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 710 referred to Para 98 [2009] 6 SCR 663 referred to Para 98 [2014] 8 SCR 446 referred to Para 98 [1977] 3 SCR 249 referred to Para 98 H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 321 ORS.

[2013] 6 SCR 199 referred to Para 98 A [2011] 5 SCR 77 referred to Para 98 [1986] 3 SCR 63 referred to Para 98 [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 606 referred to Para 98 [1979] 3 SCR 1014 referred to Para 98 B [1979] 1 SCR 392 referred to Para 110 [2015] 9 SCR 113 referred to Para 110 [1951] SCR 228 referred to Para 111 [2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 94 referred to Para 114 C [2010] 6 SCR 1110 referred to Para 114 [2011] 6 SCR 443 referred to Para 114 [2007] 5 SCR 7 referred to Para 114 [1993] 3 Suppl. SCR 531 referred to Para 114 D [2013] 8 SCR 631 referred to Para 114 [1964] 4 SCR 575 referred to Para 114 [1996] 3 Suppl. SCR 808 referred to Para 114 [2003] 2 SCR 1085 referred to Para 114 E [2012] 5 SCR 547 referred to Para 114 [2001] 3 SCR 149 referred to Para 114 [2010] 9 SCR 227 referred to Para 114 [2011]13 SCR 636 referred to Para 114 F [2005] 3 SCR 81 referred to Para 114 [2008] 10 SCR 222 referred to Para 114 [2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 825 referred to Para 114 [2005] 2 SCR 520 referred to Para 114 G [2005] 3 SCR 1095 referred to Para 114 (1997) 10 SCC 386 referred to Para 114 [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 521 referred to Para 114 H

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A [1977] 2 SCR 904 referred to Para 114 [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 249 referred to Para 114 (1991) 2 SCC 382 referred to Para 114 [1952] SCR 18 referred to Para 114 B [1966] Suppl. SCR 311 referred to Para 114 [1969] 3 SCR 108 referred to Para 114 [1989] 3 SCR 356 referred to Para 114 [2002] 1 SCR 621 referred to Para 114 C [1962] 1 SCR 688 referred to Para 114 [1991] 2 SCR 451 referred to Para 114 [1976] 1 SCR 168 referred to Para 114 [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 223 referred to Para 114 D [1982 ]1 SCR 947 referred to Para 114 [1994] 1 SCR 579 referred to Para 114 [1996] 2 SCR 767 referred to Para 114 [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 511 referred to Para 114 E [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 20 referred to Para 114 [1975] Suppl. SCC 1 referred to Para 114 [1978] 2 SCR 1 referred to Para 114 [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 114 F [2008] 4 SCR 1 referred to Para 114 [2015] 13 SCR 1 referred to Para 114 [2003] 2 SCR 387 referred to Para 114 [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 209 referred to Para 114 G [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 398 referred to Para 114 (2010) 14 SCC 253 referred to Para 114 [2009] 9 SCR 225 referred to Para 114 (2000) 8 SCC 606 referred to Para 114 H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 323 ORS.

[2013] 6 SCR 573 referred to Para 114 A [2018] 6 SCR 861 referred to Para 114 [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 152 referred to Para 114 [1964] 1 SCR 332 referred to Para 114 [1967] 2 SCR 525 referred to Para 114 B [1970] 3 SCR 530 referred to Para 114 [1978] 2 SCR 621 referred to Para 114 [1996] 3 SCR 721 referred to Para 114 (1996) 3 SCC 709 referred to Para 114 C [2014] 11 SCR 1009 referred to Para 114 [2019] 3 SCR 535 referred to Para 114 [1973] 0 Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 114 [1992] 1 SCR 406 referred to Para 114 D [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 113 referred to Para 114 [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 165 referred to Para 121 [2015] 4 SCR 45 referred to Para 121 [1999] 1 SCR 1121 referred to Para 121 E AIR 1964 SC 358 referred to Para 121 [2016] 11 SCR 263 referred to Para 121 [1967] 1 SCR 120 referred to Para 121 [1983] 2 SCR 690 referred to Para 143 F [2015] 12 SCR 1106 referred to Para 143 [1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 122 referred to Para 147 [2010] 7 SCR 585 referred to Para 177 [2010] 6 SCR 972 referred to Para 177 G [1978] 2 SCR 272 referred to Para 177 [2018] 14 SCR 860 referred to Para 193 [1982] 2 SCR 365 referred to Para 193 H

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A [1993] 3 SCR 802 referred to Para 193 [2019] 16 SCR 424 referred to Para 193 [2013] 11 SCR 991 referred to Para 193 2019 (3) SCALE 447 referred to Para 193 B [1993] 1 SCR 480 referred to Para 195 [2011] 12 SCR 639 referred to Para 211 [2015] 9 SCR 890 referred to Para 224 [1967] 2 SCR 170 referred to Para 247 C [1996] 3 SCR 972 referred to Para 261 [2007] 4 SCR 145 referred to Para 263 [1976] 2 SCR 785 referred to Para 268 [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 437 referred to Para 269 D [1999] 2 SCR 1033 referred to Para 297 [1993] 3 SCR 128 referred to Para 297 [2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 512 referred to Para 297 1980 Supp. SCC 559 referred to Para 346 E [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 177 referred to Para 347 [2008] 13 SCR 126 referred to Para 347 [2012] 8 SCR 128 referred to Para 392 [2018] 4 SCR 1 referred to Para 416 F In the judgment of Sanjiv Khanna, J. [2010] 6 SCR 291 referred to Para 7 (2020) 3 SCC 637 referred to Para 8 [2016] 3 SCR 579 referred to Para 8 G [1986] 1 SCR 103 referred to Para 8 [2018] 8 SCR 1 referred to Para 8 [1974] 2 SCR 879 referred to Para 10 [1951] SCR 747 referred to Para 10 H

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[1985] 2 SCR 287 referred to Para 11 A [2006] 3 SCR 420 referred to Para 11 [2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 733 referred to Para 13 [1987] 2 SCR 841 referred to Para 14 [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 207 referred to Para 14 B [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 627 referred to Para 15 [2016] 9 SCR 1 referred to Para 17 [1975] 3 SCR 333 referred to Para 18 [1995] 1 SCR 1036 referred to Para 18 C (1988) 4 SCC 592 referred to Para 18 [2004] 1 SCR 232 referred to Para 18 [2011] 11 SCR 1028 referred to Para 19 [1965] SCR 970 referred to Para 20 D [1979] 1 SCR 845 referred to Para 21 [1979] 1 SCR 845 referred to Para 23 [2009] 2 SCR 161 referred to Para 27 [2009] 3 SCR 355 referred to Para 27 E (2019) 12 SCC 720 referred to Para 30 [2011] 15 SCR 877 referred to Para 31 [2015] 11 SCR 723 referred to Para 32 (1990) 2 SCC 334 referred to Para 33 F [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 165 referred to Para 34 [1958] SCR 533 referred to Para 35 [1961] SCR 679 referred to Para 35 [1967] SCR 170 referred to Para 53(b) G [1957] SCR 1052 referred to Para 53(c) [1991] 1 SCR 974 referred to Para 53(c) 2020 (12) JT 78 referred to Para 53(e) H

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A [2016] 6 SCR 333 referred to Para 71 (2019) 3 SCC 224 referred to Para 71 [2019] 6 SCR 307 referred to Para 71 [2019] 5 SCR 916 referred to Para 90 B AIR 1955 SC 271 referred to Para 90 [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 44 referred to Para 91 [1976] Suppl. SCR 489 referred to Para 91 [2009] 5 SCR 326 referred to Para 91 C [1967] 3 SCR 214 referred to Para 91 [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 904 referred to Para 91 [2019] 5 SCR 916 referred to Para 92 [2018] 6 SCR 1076 referred to Para 95(b) D CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Transferred Case (Civil) No. 229 of 2020. From the Judgment and Order dated 28.02.2020 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in LPA No. 119 of 2020. With E Transferred Case (Civil) No. 230 Of 2020, Civil Appeal No. 12 Of 2021, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 510, 638, 681, 845, 853, 922 And 1041 of 2020. Mr. Tushar Mehta, SG , Sanjay R. Hegde, Shyam Divan, Rajiv F Bansal, Harish N. Salve, Sr. Advs., Shikhil Suri, Shiv Kumar Suri, Ms. Madhu Suri, Ms. Shilpa Saini, Ms. Shweta Saini, Ms. Nikita Thapar, Ms. Vinishma Kaul, Ankit Yadav, Anshuman Srivastava, Rohan Pratap Talwar, Ms. Sugandha Yadav, Ms. Ria Singh Sawhney, Ms. Sanam Tripathi, Bhav Ratan, Ms. Vrinda Bhandari, Gautam Bhatia, Ms. Sanam Tripathi, Shadan Farasat, Bharat Gupta, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Kanu Agarwal, G Ashok Panigrahi, Ms. Garima Prasad, G.S. Oberoi, Rajat Nair, Kanu Agarwal, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Yoginder Handoo, Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Ms. Deepti Sarin, Ms. Tahira Karanjawala, Anupm Prakash, M/s. Karanjawala & Co., Saurabh Mishra, Onkar Singh, Arun Verma, Ms. Neha Tripathi, Chirag M. Shroff, Ms. Sanjana Nangia, Ms. Abhilasha Bharti, Anshuman Srivastava, Advs. for the appearing parties. H

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Judgment

The Judgments of the Court were delivered by A A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.

*Ed. Note: Pagination is as per the original judgment. H

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A INTRODUCTION

11. By these petition(s)/appeal(s)/case(s), we are called upon by the petitioners to undertake a comprehensive and heightened judicial scrutiny regarding the permissibility of the Central Vista Project1 of the Government of India. Diverse issues concerning the decisions taken by B the statutory Authorities including regarding the change in land use, grant of statutory and other permissions, environmental as well as heritage clearances etc., have been raised in these proceedings. The challenge is premised on high principles of democratic values as applicable in India and not limited to mere infringement of statutory provisions of the governing enactments. That is on account of the nature of project – C being of high political significance and eminence for our democratic republic; and for upholding the “Rule of Law”, which is on a higher pedestal than the governance by “Rule by Law”. OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT

22. As per the policy documents, the need for the development of the Project is rooted in the creation of a larger working space for efficient functioning of the highest legislative wing of the country and for integrated administrative block for Ministries/Departments presently spread out at different locations including on rental basis.

33. The Parliament House building, a Grade-I heritage structure, was commissioned in 1927 and stands as a 93 years old structure today. The structure has been subjected to various modifications in the post- independence period so as to maintain its functionality as per changing requirements. Post 1971 census wherein the total population of India was recorded as 548,159,6521, the number of seats for the House of F People was fixed at 545. Today, the population has spiralled exponentially and is stated to have crossed the 130-crore mark. The next delimitation exercise, proposed to take place in 2026, is bound to result in a substantial increase in the total number of seats in both the Houses. Accordingly, enhanced and commensurate spatial requirements ought to be in place.

44. The present Central Hall has a seating capacity of only 440 persons. That already falls short of the present need to accommodate members of both Houses together during a joint session. Presently, there is no scope to expand the existing Central Hall. Resultantly, the Joint Sessions of both the Houses of Parliament are conducted by way of a 1 H For short, “the Project”

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makeshift arrangement in the Central Hall causing inconvenience to the A members attending official functions thereat, apart from undermining their dignity. Furthermore, the structure falls short of fire, water and electrical safety norms and poses a grave security risk for the legislators and secretariat staff.

55. In order to address the concerns stated above, the Central B Government decided to construct a new Parliament building with a futuristic approach and the House of People being 3 times the size of the present chamber. That along with the present Parliament building and Annexe attached therewith, would be referred to as the Parliament Complex. It is further proposed that all the 51 Ministries of the Central Government be housed in 10 buildings within an integrated complex marked with underground transit connectivity and structural identity. Expressing the need for urgent completion of the project, it has been stated that the new Parliament shall symbolize the 75th Independence Day of the country in 2022 as well as the Global G-20 Summit to be hosted by India in the same year. The objectives, as stated in the written submissions of the respondents, succinctly read thus: “(i) A new Parliament Building with space and technology to meet the present and emerging needs of vibrant Indian democracy. (ii) Common Central Secretariat with all Ministries in a single location for efficiency and synergy in functioning. (iii) Central Vista to be redeveloped as a world class public space and venue for national and international events.”

66. Similar structural defects, along with acute shortage of office spaces, have been pointed out in the offices of various Ministries F presently spread across 47 buildings in the Central Vista region and in particular, Central Secretariat block. It is stated that various buildings housing the Ministries, including North Block and South Block, are ill- equipped to meet even the basic fire and earthquake safety norms and require regular upgradations involving recurring expenses to the tune of G Rs.50 crores annually. As per Non-Availability Certificates (NACs) issued by Directorate of Estate, a shortage of 3.8 lakh sq.m. of office space has been flagged. To add to this state of affairs, the Central Government is spending an amount equivalent to about Rs.1,000 crores on rental spaces to accommodate the offices of various Ministries annually. The proposal states thus: H

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A “Most of the buildings in the Central Vista area are more than 40- 50 years old and have either outlived or approaching their structural lives. Further buildings constructed over 100 years ago such as North and South Block are not earthquake safe. There is shortage of working spaces, parking amenities and services. The spread of Central Government Ministries and Departments in different B locations leads to inefficiencies and difficulty in coordination.”

77. Upon examination of other documents associated with the Project, the objectives for redeveloping/constructing the existing Central Secretariat have been broadly summed up thus: C (i) Even after 73 years of independence, the nation does not have a common secretariat building. Some Ministries are housed in Central Vista complex while some Ministries are housed in other parts of Delhi; (ii) Various Ministries, due to lack of available space, have hired premises on rent and till date most of the rent paid for and on behalf of the Central Government for using its Ministries in Delhi runs into thousands of crores; (iii) Except North Block and South Block and one or two other buildings, rest of the buildings are not heritage buildings and are constructed in the near vicinity based upon the need; (iv) Most of the existing buildings have outlived its structural life and are not earthquake resistant; (v) As there is no common Central Secretariat and Ministries are spread over different locations, the resultant effect is administrative inefficiency and difficulty in inter- departmental coordination; (vi) This also leads to travelling, resulting into traffic congestion and pollution; (vii) Existing secretariat buildings spread all over haphazardly, suffering from poor servicing, inefficient use of land, inadequate facilities and outdated infrastructure; (viii) There are six plots on Central Vista, which houses temporary barracks or stable building during 2nd World War occupying 90 acres of land, which has remained underutilised; H

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(ix) To utilise the underutilised spaces in the Central Vista region; A (x) Integrated functioning of all offices of the Central Government; (xi) Modernisation of Government work spaces for enhanced productivity and efficient management of human resources; B (xi) To promote the concept of green buildings commensurate with scientific standards and sustainable with the needs of future generations; and (xiii) To connect all the ministerial offices through an underground shuttle transportation system for smooth performance of routine administrative functions.

88. As regards the decision to supplement the existing Parliament building (on plot No. 116 admeasuring 10.75 acres having built-up area 44940 sq. mts.) with utilities constructed on plot No. 118 admeasuring 10.5 acres having built-up area of 5200 sq. mts. which is not a heritage building/site; has been felt necessary because: (i) The existing Parliament House was constructed during 1921- 1927; (ii) The building was constructed prior to independence to house the Imperial Legislative Council and was never intended to house a bicameral national legislature; (iii) 2 floors were added to this structure in 1956 as per the demand for more space; (iv) Periodically ad-hoc additions have taken place in this building as per the requirement of the day, which has added to an additional stress on the heritage structure; (v) The building is not designed as per the fire norms; (vi) Water supply lines and sewer lines are installed in a haphazard manner, leading to seepage and destroying the heritage nature of the building; (vii) These systems like audio-video system, A/c system etc. are later additions and were installed in various stages on an ad-hoc basis; H

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A (viii) By 2026, the number of seats in Lok Sabha would increase from 545. Both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha are packed and would have no capacity for addition of seats when the number of seats would increase; (ix) To prepare the Houses of Parliament for emerging spatial requirements in light of the impending delimitation exercise. (x) In the Central Hall of the Parliament, the seating capacity is only for 440 persons. Whenever constitutional joint sessions are held, large number of temporary seats are placed in the aisles, undermining the dignity of this great democratic institutions; (xi) The cramped seating arrangement both for members of the House and the staff posed a serious security risk in case of either any fire hazard or any external attack requiring quick evacuation. The existing Parliament is not built from the earthquake resistant point of view; D (xii) Concerns about these factors have been raised periodically by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Chairman of the Rajya Sabha in past. (xiii) To ensure a modern and technologically advanced space for single and joint sittings of the Houses of Parliament E commensurate with modern safety norms; and (xiv) To preserve the built heritage by not undertaking aggressive reconstruction activity on graded heritage structures on which only minimum renovation measures are permissible in law. F

99. Before we begin the discussion, we deem it fit to observe that the proposal, as far as change in land use is concerned, comprises of seven plots falling in the central vista region – Plots no. 22 (or Plot No. 118 – New Parliament Building), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. The terms “central vista region or area” and “central vista precincts”, as used at various G places in the judgment, are not interchangeable. Whereas the central vista region broadly refers to the entire region as per the master plan, central vista precincts refers to the “Central Vista Precincts at Rajpath” as per the list of 141 heritage buildings/precincts. The subject plots, except 2 For short, “plot no. 2" or “plot no. 118" H

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plot no. 3, fall in the central vista region and not in the central vista precincts.

1010. In a constitutional democracy governed by Rule of Law where diversity of views is both heard and respected; and the principle of constitutionalism touches both ends as well as means of accomplishing the wisest of intentions, every action of the Government, howsoever laudable, need not have a free flow in its implementation and unless it stands the test of constitutional parameters. In the same vein, the petitioners herein (claiming to be public spirited persons) have approached this Court taking exception to various aspects of the project, including but not limited to the manner and procedure adopted for effecting the proposed changes in the central vista precincts. Our examination flows from such objections which have been presented to us in this set of cases. PROCEEDINGS AND CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES D

1111. After objections to the proposed change in land use were received by the Delhi Development Authority3 and public hearings were conducted thereagainst, the petitioners approached the High Court of Delhi4 for challenging the Public Notice dated 21.12.2019 in W.P. (C) No. 1568 of 2020. The learned single Judge of High Court, vide order dated 11.2.2020, directed the respondents to inform the Court before E taking any step in furtherance of the impugned public notice. The relevant extract of the order reads thus: “20. In case, a decision is taken to notify the proposed changes in MPD 2020-21, the DDA will approach the court before notifying such decision.” F

1212. The respondent Union of India took exception to the aforesaid order by filing L.P.A. No. 119 of 2020 before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench ordered an ex-parte stay on the above direction of learned single Judge vide order dated 28.2.2020. Another writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 1575 of 2020 was also pending before G the High Court.

1313. Aggrieved by the order of the Division Bench, the petitioners approached this Court vide S.L.P. (Civil) Diary No. 8430 of 2020 which 3 For short, “DDA” or “the Authority”, as the case may be 4 For short, “the High Court” H

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A resulted in the withdrawal of the entire subject matter before this Court in terms of order dated 6.3.2020, which reads thus: “……… In our opinion, it is just and proper that writ petition itself is heard by this Court instead of examining the grievance about the manner in which the interim directions have been passed and then vacated by the High Court. Indeed, this order is not a reflection on the proceedings before the High Court, in any manner, but in larger public interest, we deem it appropriate that the entire matter pertaining to challenge pending before the High Court is heard and decided by this court expeditiously. We are given to understand that there is one more writ petition pending before the High Court involving the same issue. Accordingly, Writ Petition Nos. 1568 and 1575 of 2020 pending before the High Court of Delhi shall stand withdrawn to this Court D and be registered as Transferred Cases, to be heard along with the present Special Leave Petition on 18.03.2020. Letters Patent Appeal No. 119 of 2020 before the High Court stands disposed of in terms of this order. Any steps taken by the authorities, in the meantime, will be subject E to the outcome of the proceedings. Liberty is granted to both sides to file additional documents. The Registry shall forthwith call for the case records of Writ Petition Nos. 1568 and 1575 of 2020 from the High Court.” F Thereafter, more petitions were filed and we agreed to hear all petitions analogously. We deem it apposite to reproduce two other orders passed in the leading case dated 19.6.2020 and 29.7.2020 respectively. The same read thus: 19.6.2020 G “O R D E R We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Application(s) for amendment of petition(s) are allowed subject to just exceptions and without prejudice to the contentions available to the respondent(s). H

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The petitioner(s) in the respective case(s) to file separate A compilation with index consisting of writ petition memo, as amended, along with annexure(s) thereto, followed by the affidavits filed before the Delhi High Court in seriatum. The said compilation will be used at the time of hearing of the concerned cases. The compilation in the respective transferred cases be filed by 23rd B June, 2020 through e-mail/on-line. Mr. Shikhil Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner(s), has informed us that one more petition has been filed in this Court being Writ Petition (C) No.510 of 2020. The said petition shall be heard along with these petitions (transferred cases). C We make it clear that any other petition/proceedings instituted or to be filed hereafter by any party concerning the subject Project, be heard and proceeded along with the present cases. The respondent(s) may file consolidated reply on or before D 3rd July, 2020, which can be placed on record in the respective transferred cases/proceedings. List these matter(s) along with all connected cases on 7th July, 2020.” 29.7.2020 E “O R D E R Heard learned counsel for the parties on the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant(s)-intervenor(s). F In deference to the observations made by the Court, Mr. Shyam Divan submits that he would commend to the applicant(s) in application I.A. No.59230/2020 to file substantive writ petition challenging the environmental clearance dated 17.06.2020 by way of writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution while maintaining the preliminary objection already raised so that all G aspects can be considered by the Court at appropriate stage. Counsel for the respondent(s) and the petitioner(s) have no objection to take recourse to this option while permitting each of them to file response to the proposed writ petition, to be filed by H

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A the applicant(s) in I.A. No.59230/2020. As assured by Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel, the substantive writ petition will be filed within one week from today. The respondents in the said writ petition to file a comprehensive reply within one week from service of memo of B writ petition. Advance copy of the proposed writ petition be served by the applicant(s) in the office of the Solicitor General through e-mail/on-line, at the time of filing the same in the Registry. List the matters at the end of Board in the week commencing 17th August, 2020.” C Being mindful of the prevailing state of affairs amidst the pandemic, we refrained from insisting upon technicalities during the course of hearing and granted complete freedom to the parties, both in terms of timelines and volume of submissions, to file pleadings, written statements and documents. We may now advert to the challenge raised by the D petitioners in the subject petitions. Civil Appeal No. …......./2021 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.……….2021 @ Diary No. 8430/ 2020)

1414. The appellant (writ petitioners) has challenged the order of E Division Bench on the ground that well-considered order of learned single Judge came to be vacated by the Division Bench without hearing the appellant. This amounted to violation of the basic principles of natural justice which required the appellant to be heard before passing an adverse order. It is further stated that the learned single Judge had asked the respondents to file a reply to the original writ petition, however, no reply was filed and the Division Bench failed to consider this aspect while vacating the stay granted by the learned single Judge.

1515. In this appeal arising out of special leave petition, the applicants (third parties) filed I.A. No. 59796/2020 praying for recall/modification of the order of this Court dated 6.3.2020 whereby the following direction was issued: “We make it clear that any other petition/proceedings instituted or to be filed hereafter by any party concerning the subject Project, be heard and proceeded along with the present cases.” H

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The applicants have contended that the aforesaid direction debarred A the applicants from approaching the National Green Tribunal 5for the invocation of their statutory remedy of challenging the grant of environmental clearance6. It is submitted that NGT, being an expert body equipped with technical members, ought to exercise jurisdiction concerning environmental issues in the first place. Hence, the order of this Court B could not have curtailed the statutory remedies otherwise available to the applicants. At the conclusion of the hearing of these cases, however, the learned counsel for the applicants had prayed that this application be disposed of as infructuous. T.C. (C) NO. 229/2020 C (formerly W.P. (C) No. 1568 of 2020 before the High Court of Delhi)

1616. In this petition, originally filed in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners therein have assailed the public notice dated 21.12.2019 and final notification for change in land use dated 20.3.2020. The relevant prayers read thus: “I. Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction calling for records and quashing Public Notice S.O. 4587 E dated 21.12.2019, issued by Respondent No. 1 Delhi Development Authority (DDA); and/ or xxx xxx xxx IV. Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction calling for records and quashing Notification S.O. 1192 (E) dated 20.03.2020 issued by Union of India Represented Through Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs.” F

1717. The Land & Development Officer7, Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs8, Government of India, being the land-owning agency of the plots, initiated the process of change in land use vide letter no. L&DO/ L-IIA/11(1158)/545 dated 4.12.2019 for 8 plots. Plots No. 1 to 7 and 8 are in Planning Zone-D and C respectively of the central vista area. The G said proposal was considered in the Technical Committee Meeting of 5 For short “NGT”. 6 For short, “EC” 7 For short, “the L&DO” 8 For short, “MoHUA” H

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A the DDA on 5.12.2019 wherein the proposal was recommended for further processing by the Authority. The recommendation reads thus: “After detailed deliberation, the proposal as contained in Para 4.0 of the agenda with the above modification in landuse for Plot No. 1 was recommended by the Technical Committee for further B processing under Section-11A of DD Act, 1957. With the following conditions: (i) The clearances from the PMO, Heritage Conservation Committee and Central Vista Committee shall be taken by L&DO. C (ii) The heritage buildings shall be dealt as per the relevant heritage provisions.” (emphasis supplied)

1818. Thereafter, on 11.12.2019, in the meeting of the Authority at D Raj Niwas, Delhi (Lieutenant Governor’s Residence), the recommendations of the Technical Committee were placed for consideration. The Authority approved the recommendations with a direction for issuing public notice inviting objections/suggestions from the public qua the proposed modifications in accordance with Section- 11A of the Delhi Development Act, 19579. The decision taken on E 11.12.2019 reads thus: “The proposal contained in the agenda item was approved. Public notice inviting objections/suggestions under Section-11A of DD Act, 1957 be issued.”

1919. Thereafter, on 21.12.2019, the Authority issued Public Notice F S.O. 4587 E with a proposal for the change in land use of Plots No. 1 to 8 situated at different direction/location in Zones C and D and inviting suggestions/objections from the citizens of the country qua the said proposal. After a public hearing on objections, the matter was considered by the Authority in its following meeting chaired by Lt. Governor, Delhi G on 10.2.2020. The Board recommended that a fresh proposal be initiated as regards plot no. 1. This recommendation was accepted by the Authority in the meeting. Thus, plot no. 1 stood excluded from the original proposal and is not the subject matter of these petitions. As regards plots no. 2 to 8, the Authority approved the proposal after public consultation 9 H For short, “the 1957 Act”

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and the same was finally submitted to the Central Government for issuing A the final notification. On 20.3.2020, the final notification (impugned) was issued by the Central Government notifying the change in land use of plots nos. 2 to 8.

2020. To buttress the challenge, the petitioner would assert that the changes in land use had been proposed without framing an updated Zonal B Development Plan10 for Zone D, as mandated in the Master Plan Delhi, 202111, and therefore, the changes are not backed by updated information and empirical data. It is submitted that the respondents relied upon an old ZDP of 2001 for carrying on the changes. Further, in the absence of an updated plan, an informed decision could not have been taken by the respondents with regard to the proposed changes, more particularly C relating to standards of population density. It is supplemented by referring to Chapter-16 of the Master Plan which requires a comprehensive land use plan based on current data for undertaking different urban activities, social and physical infrastructure.

2121. It is submitted that the proposal issued is ultra vires Section D 11A of 1957 Act as the Authority had no power to modify the land use of subject plots. The argument stems from the understanding that the proposed modifications substantially alter the Master Plan and Section 11A(1) prohibits the Authority from undertaking modifications of a nature that effect important alterations in the character of the plan. It is submitted that the nature of changes proposed could not have been carried forth in the name of modifications as they were of a substantial nature and thus, required a fresh Master Plan or amendment to the extant Master Plan.

2222. Mr. Shikhil Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that since the notice dated 21.12.2019 stood vitiated in terms of the abovementioned submissions, the final notification dated 20.3.2020 is bad and illegal as such notification ought to have preceded by a valid public notice. The petitioner submits that the proposed changes contradict the Master Plan. An attempt has been made to demonstrate contradictions within various chapters of the plan. It is stated that the public notice does not advert to Chapter-17 of the Master Plan which provides for a G “Development Code” and lays emphasis on the quality of built 10 For short, “ZDP” or “zonal plan” 11 For short, “Master Plan” (Prepared by Delhi Development Authority and approved by the Central Government under Section 11A(2) of Delhi Development Act 1957 and notified on 7th February 2007 (The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II–Section 3 Subsection (ii) No. 125 (Magha 18, 1928) vide S.O. 141- (E)). H

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A environment while considering any land use proposals and development policies. It is stated that Chapter-8 of the plan requires decentralization of Government offices in the NCR region which is contrary to the proposal of creating an integrated vista of Government offices. It is further stated that proposal to alter central vista precincts does not reckon the mandate of Chapter-10 for conservation of built heritage. B

2323. It is urged that the respondents have acted in an arbitrary manner and have violated Article 21 as well as the Doctrine of Public Trust by denying basic access to public/recreational spaces which are essential to life and liberty.

2424. To buttress their submissions, the petitioners have placed reliance upon Lal Bahadur v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 12, Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa & Ors.13, R.K. Mittal & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.14, Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v. Hiraman Sitaram Deorukhar & Ors. 15 and Goel Ganga Developers India Private Limited v. Union of India D Through Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Forests & Ors. 16.

2525. In the counter affidavit filed by DDA, it is submitted that the proposal is merely meant to align the existing land use with the proposed plan for optimum utilisation whilst preserving and conserving environment and built heritage of the central vista precincts as a whole. As regards E the contention of population density, it is submitted that the project is not going to result in any enhancement in population density as the area attracts floating population which brings in a temporary footprint during official working hours only.

2626. As regards the absence of an updated ZDP, the respondent F DDA, in its counter affidavit, placed reliance upon Chapter-16 of the Master Plan to urge that such plan was not required at all as Chapter-16 expressly permits the usage of the previous plan. It is submitted that in the absence of an updated plan, the ZDP formulated under the previous Master Plan continues to be operative.

2727. In the consolidated counter affidavit, the respondents (Union of India) have urged that the changes indicated in the proposal regarding 12 (2018) 15 SCC 407 (paras 12, 13 and 15) 13 (1991) 4 SCC 54 (paras 23 and 24) 14 (2012) 2 SCC 232 (para 47) 15 (2019) 14 SCC 411 (para 6) 16 H (2018) 18 SCC 257

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land use are in the nature of minor modifications and not substantial alterations of the Master Plan, as suggested. Responding to the argument of lack of authority, the respondents have urged that the power of Central Government to propose modifications falling under Section 11A(2) is not restricted as the limitations of sub-Section (1) are strictly meant for the Authority and do not apply to the Central Government as such. To buttress the submission, it is urged that the powers of Central Government under sub-Section (2) are untrammelled and uninhibited by restrictions which apply to the Authority.

2828. Countering the argument that DDA possessed no power to issue public notice, it is submitted in the written submissions that procedure prescribed under the Act requires DDA to publish notice inviting objections, be it for modification of the existing plan or for preparation of new Master Plan. Reference has been made to S.O. 141 dated 7.2.2007 to support this view.

2929. It is further urged in the written submissions that procedure prescribed by law has been strictly followed by the Authority. In that, the proposal was initiated by Land & Development Office – land owning agency – and was placed for due consideration of Technical Committee on 5.12.2019 before being finally placed before the Authority on 11.12.2019 wherein all recommendations of the Technical Committee were considered before approving the release of public notice. Appearing for the respondents, learned Solicitor General has submitted that the above sequence of events reveals due application of mind and no ground for arbitrariness has been made out.

3030. The respondents, in addition to the arguments, have placed reliance upon Union of India & Anr. v. Cynamide India Ltd. & Anr.17, Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & F Ors.18, State of Punjab v. Tehal Singh & Ors.19, Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Promoters and Builders Association & Anr. 20, Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited & Anr. v. Sai Renewable Power Private Limited & Ors.21, Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. v. the Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur 22, Sundarjas Kanyalal G 17 (1987) 2 SCC 720 (paras 4, 6, 7 and 14) 18 (1990) 3 SCC 223 (paras 36 to 47) 19 (2002) 2 SCC 7 (paras 36 to 44) 20 (2004) 10 SCC 796 (paras 2 to 5) 21 (2011) 11 SCC 34 (para 39) 22 (1980) 2 SCC 295 (para 3, 5, 7 and 8) H

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A Bhatija & Ors. v. Collector, Thane, Maharahstra & Ors. 23 , Bangalore Development Authority v. Aircraft Employees’ Cooperative Society Limited & Ors.24 and Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. 25. T.C. (C) No. 230/2020 [formerly W.P. (C) No. 1575 of 2020 B before the High Court of Delhi]

3131. The challenge in this petition is to the public notice dated 5.2.2020 and also the final notification dated 20.3.2020. The relevant extract of prayers read thus: “a) Issue a Writ in the nature of mandamus or any other Writ/ C Order/Direction thereby quashing the impugned public notice dated 05.02.2020 issued by the Respondent No. 1 herein and all consequential actions taken thereto; b) Issue a Writ in the nature of mandamus or any other Writ/ Order/Direction thereby quashing the impugned notification for D change in land use dated 20.03.2020 issued by the Respondent No. 2 herein and all actions taken in furtherance thereof.”

3232. In response to the notice inviting objections/suggestions regarding the change in land use, a total of 1292 responses were received by the Authority. Thereafter, on 3.2.2020, the Authority sent emails and E SMS to the objectors conveying about personal/public hearing on the said responses before the Board of Enquiry and Hearing26 scheduled for 6.2.2020 and 7.2.2020. Additionally, on 5.2.2020, the Authority also published a notice (impugned notice) in six leading newspapers having wide circulation informing about the said hearing. The objectors were asked to remain present for personal/public hearing as per the slot (time) F allotted to objections clubbed on the basis of commonality of the issue(s) raised by them so as to hear them together. In response, only 42 persons appeared for the oral hearing. The hearings were concluded as per the schedule published for that purpose.

3333. Assailing the said notice, the petitioners submit that the G respondents called the objectors for public hearing at short notice of only one day which effectively disabled most of the objectors from 23 (1989) 3 SCC 396 (para 2, 3, 5, 7, 15, 27 and 28) 24 (2012) 3 SCC 442 (paras 2, 8, 9, 66, 67, 76 and 77) 25 (2007) 8 SCC 705 (paras 20, 42 and 87 to 90) 26 H For short, “BoEH”

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appearing as travel arrangements could not be made within such short period. It is submitted that short notice resulted in the denial of natural justice to the objectors and negated the very essence of the requirement of public consultation as envisaged in Section-11A of 1957 Act. To buttress this submission, it is urged that the impugned notice had the effect of reducing the hearing into a mere formality and violated the requirements of fair opportunity which is an essential facet of democratic decision making. It is further submitted that as many as 200 persons were called for oral submissions within a time slot of one hour, thereby rendering the hearing itself as meaningless and ineffective.

3434. Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners further submitted that the respondents did not place complete information regarding the proposed changes in public domain and without adequate information, it entailed in denial of opportunity of raising effective objections. Reliance has been placed upon a series of judgments to support the view that a Master Plan ought to be preceded by a comprehensive consultative exercise based on multiple parameters including population density, availability of open spaces etc. D

3535. To support their case, the petitioners have made reference to M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors. 27 , Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association v. Designated Authority & Ors. 28, State of U.P. & Ors. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh & Ors.29, Aruna Roy & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.30, Travancore Rayon E Ltd. v. Union of India31, Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India32, Utkarsh Mandal v. Union of India33, R.K. Mittal34, Rajendra Shankar Shukla & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. 35, S.N. Chandrashekar & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. 36 , Lal Bahadur37, Bangalore Medical Trust38 and Virender Gaur & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.39. F 27 (2019) 12 SCC 720 (para 13 and 15 to 18) 28 (2011) 2 SCC 258 (paras 16, 63, 77-80 and 83) 29 (1989) 2 SCC 505 (para 64) 30 (2002) 7 SCC 368 (paras 7 and 8) 31 (1969) 3 SCC 868 (paras 7 and 12) 32 (2019) 15 SCC 401 (para 112.8) G 33 2009 SCCOnline Del 3836 (paras 31 and 32) 34 (supra at 14, paras 48 and 49) 35 (2015) 10 SCC 400 (paras 7, 38, 39, 103, 108 and 109) 36 (2006) 3 SCC 208 (paras 31, 33 and 34) 37 (supra at 12, paras 12, 14 to 16, 24 and 26) 38 (supra at 13, paras 13 and 23 to 29) 39 (1995) 2 SCC 577 (paras 7, 8 and 10) H

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3636. To counter the aforesaid submissions, respondent DDA, in its consolidated reply, has submitted that out of 1292 objections, 1156 were identical and even remaining objections raised similar issues. It is urged that personal communication in the form of emails and SMS was sent to the objectors at least 3 days before the date of hearing which constitutes reasonable time in the facts and circumstances of the case and thus, denial of principles of natural justice cannot be alleged. To buttress this submission, it is further submitted that apart from aforesaid communication, the notice of public hearing was also published in six leading newspapers to encourage participation.

3737. Responding to the argument of lack of information in public domain before calling for objections, the consolidated reply states that each and every detail relating to the project was published on the official website of Authority (www.dda.org.in) and it was open to common public to access it at any point of time.

3838. Learned Solicitor General, appearing for the respondents, contended that there is no requirement of oral hearing in the 1957 Act or in the 1959 Rules and despite that the hearing was provided by the Authority as a measure of fairness and transparency. He further submitted that none of the heritage buildings is being adversely affected in the process.

3939. In the written submissions filed by the respondents, it is submitted that the argument of denial of natural justice cannot be sustained as modification of Master Plan and town planning are activities of a legislative character and in legislative functions, public hearing can be allowed only to the extent provided in the law unlike other administrative processes. F W.P. (C) No. 510/2020

4040. Post the final notification of change in land use, the Special Advisory Group of Central Vista assembled at its 50th meeting to consider the agenda item – Proposed New Parliament Building at Plot No. 118 on 23.4.2020. The minutes of the said meeting were released on G 30.4.2020 wherein “No Objection” was granted to the said proposal. The petitioner herein seeks to challenge the said grant of “No Objection”. Another challenge to the Office Memorandum dated 14.10.2019 issued by Works Division, MoHUA whereby the Central Vista Committee40 was reconstituted. The relevant prayers read thus: 40 H For short, “CVC”

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 345 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

“I. Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to Respondent A No. 2 Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA), calling for records and quashing the Minutes of Meeting of Central Vista Committee dated 30.04.2020 at the 5th Meeting of Special Advisory Group of Central Vista and Central Secretariat Central Vista Committee with Agenda Item – Proposed New Parliament B Building at Plot No. 118 New Delhi which was held on 23rd April 2020; and/or II. Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to Respondent No. 2 Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA), quashing Office Memorandum F.No.6/21/2018/ADG (Works)/338-W-1 dated 14th October, 2019 which was reconstituted as a patently biased Central Vista Committee with obvious conflict of interest in the Central Vista Project.”

4141. In the additional written note submitted by the petitioner, it is urged that the reconstitution of the CVC was done to rush through the proposals regarding the subject project without any impartial and objective scrutiny. It is submitted that the project proponent herein was Chief Architect (CPWD) and after reconstitution, the chairmanship of the Committee was entrusted to ADG (Works), CPWD, another officer of the project proponent, indicative of the fact that there was an apparent conflict of interest in the CVC. It is further urged that similar identity of the Project Proponent and Chairman subjugated the principle of Nemo Judex In Causa Sua. Referring to the minutes of the meeting, the petitioner argues that the minutes reveal a clear non-application of mind on the part of this Committee as no reasons are supplied for the alleged “No Objection”. To buttress this submission, it is urged that the Committee was originally envisaged to be a study group which was meant to advise the Government and contrary to this purpose, the Committee paid a mere lip service to their duty and failed to act as a study group.

4242. It is further submitted that the said meeting was not convened in a proper manner as it was not attended by designated officers and various junior officers were present on their behalf to consider the proposal. It is further submitted that the prescribed quorum of the meeting was not complete as only 7 out of 12 members of the study group were present in the meeting, thereby leaving out 5 members belonging to independent non-Governmental organisations. As per the petitioner’s case, the absence of representation from non-Government organisations and H

p. 346

A presence of junior officers of the Government goes to show that there was no effective deliberation and application of mind.

4343. The petitioner further submits that detailed maps, drawings, scheme, layouts and other relevant documents of the subject project were not placed before the Committee and these documents were sine qua non for taking an informed decision regarding the proposal. The absence of consideration of the relevant material, argues the petitioner, had vitiated the outcome of the meeting.

4444. In the counter affidavit filed by respondents, it is submitted that the CVC serves a limited purpose and is meant to study the development proposals submitted for its consideration and examine whether the proposal is in sync with the overall character of the region. It is submitted that the Committee has been reconstituted at various points of time in the past as per emerging needs and nomination to chairmanship is made on the basis of designation (ex-officio) irrespective of individual holder of office. As regards the absence of designated members, it is submitted that as a general practice, when some members are preoccupied with other engagements, their representatives from the same department/office are nominated and authorised to act on their behalf. As regards quorum, it is stated that no quorum is prescribed for the meetings of the Committee and in absence thereof, the standard quorum of 25% would suffice the requirement.

4545. Regarding the conduct of meeting, the counter affidavit states that the online meeting was in tune with the standard Government protocol amidst the pandemic and it was aimed towards facilitation of participation without requiring the members to step out of their homes for the purpose of meeting. It is submitted that the grant of no objection by CVC was a pre-requisite to further processing of the proposal and the entire project could not have been kept in abeyance by delaying the CVC meeting indefinitely amidst the uncertainties of the pandemic. The respondents have also highlighted that the minutes of the meeting were sent to all the members (including the non-attendees) and no objections were raised by them nor received from any member concerning the propriety of the grant of no objection. W.P.(C) No. 638/2020

4646. The thrust of this petition is also on the “No Objection” dated 23.4.2020 granted by the CVC. The relevant prayer reads thus: H

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 347 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

“A. Issue a Writ in the nature of mandamus or any other Writ/ A Order/Direction thereby quashing “No-objection” granted by the Respondent No. 2 herein, being the Central Vista Committee, to the proposed New Parliament Building in its meeting dated 23.04.2020, which is reflected in the minutes of that meeting circulated on 30.04.2020 and all consequential actions taken thereto;”

4747. In addition to the grounds urged in W.P. (C) 510/2020, the petitioners herein submit that the CVC was functioning under the chairmanship of ADG (Works) who is not an architect or town planner and thereby lacks the requisite skills/knowledge required for considering the said proposal. The argument is supplemented in the written submissions where it is stated that the nature of duties entrusted to CVC requires the head of the Committee to be a professional architect or town planner so as to consider the proposal in a nuanced manner. To buttress this submission, the petitioners contend that the meeting was called despite absence of external experts and it was a deliberate step to avoid professional scrutiny of the professional, thereby rendering the said no objection as arbitrary and illegal.

4848. The petitioners have also pressed the argument of non- application of mind, akin to that taken in W.P. (C) 510/2020, on the ground that no assessment was made by the respondents to consider the viability and need of a new Parliament building and the entire process was carried in undue haste. To buttress this argument, reliance has been placed upon Inderpreet Singh Kahlon & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.41 and Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia & Ors.42 to urge that an action taken in undue haste could be declared as bad in law. F

4949. It is further submitted that CVC disregarded the legal framework for dealing with heritage structures. The petitioners seek support from clause 7.26 read with Annexure-II of Building Byelaws to contend that minimum changes are permissible on Grade-I heritage buildings/precincts and the Committee failed to take that into G consideration. The said no objection is also assailed on the alleged failure of the Committee to take into consideration various factors concerning environmental impacts, traffic assessment etc. 41 (2006) 11 SCC 356 (paras 72 and 73) 42 (2004) 2 SCC 65 (paras 24 and 25) H

p. 348

5050. During the hearing, Mr. Hegde, appearing for the petitioners, submitted that CVC, though originally conceived as an advisory body, has assumed a statutory character owing to its long functioning and is expected to discharge pivotal role in development of such projects. In “Supplementary Note on the Role of Central Vista Committee” submitted by the petitioners, reference is made to the notice inviting bids and clause B 6.4.3 of ZDP for Zone-D to support the view that CVC was envisaged as a statutory committee.

5151. Alternatively, it is urged that the statutory mandate of CVC is in line with the doctrine of legitimate expectations in administrative matters. The petitioners have relied upon National Buildings C Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan & Ors.43 to contend that this doctrine is premised on the ground of reasonableness and natural justice, and has now become a source of substantive as well as procedural rights.

5252. In addition to cases noted above, the petitioners have placed reliance upon R.S. Garg v. State of U.P. & Ors. 44, Council of Architecture v. Mukesh Goyal & Ors.45and Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi & Ors. 46

5353. The argument regarding the statutory character of CVC has been countered by learned Solicitor General. He would urge that it is merely an advisory body with a limited mandate to advise the Government on a proposal submitted for its consideration. It has no authority to grant approvals or take decisions. Further, merely because a body has been referred to in the ZDP (Zone-D) or has been working for a prolonged period, it will not assume a statutory character on its own until it is so provided by a statute.

5454. As regards the argument of non-application of mind, it is submitted that CVC is not supposed to supply reasons for its approval in a manner akin to judicial/quasi-judicial bodies and the fact that CVC, in its decision, had asked the project proponent/CPWD to ensure that the project is in sync with the character of Central Vista reveals due application of mind. It is urged that application of mind must be revealed 43 (1998) 7 SCC 66 44 (2006) 6 SCC 430 (para 28) 45 2020 SCCOnline SC 329 (para 58) 46 H (1991) 2 SCC 716 (paras 20 and 21)

RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & 349 ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

from a substantial compliance perspective. The respondents have urged that the present case is a sui generis one and must be treated accordingly keeping in mind larger national interest. For brevity, other submissions of the respondents to this prayer are not being repeated here. W.P.(C) No. 681/2020 AND W.P. (C) No. 845/2020

5555. On 12.2.2020, the project proponent (CPWD) filed application for EC for “Expansion and Renovation of Existing Parliament Buildings, New Delhi”. The Expert Appraisal Committee47 considered the said application in its 49th meeting dated 25-26.2.2020. After examining details of the project, EAC noted that several objections have been received by the Committee as well as by the Ministry of Environment, Forests & C Climate Change48 wherein various concerns have been expressed regarding the project. After underlining this information, the Committee deemed it appropriate to record the said objections and ask the project proponent to submit additional information for further deliberation. Thus, the proposal stood deferred. On 11.3.2020, CPWD responded to the Committee’s observation for supplying additional material and submitted the relevant documents for consideration of the proposal. Form-I and Form-IA were also revised in light of the additional information sought by the Committee. In the revised form, details touching upon cost of project, total built-up area and number of trees were modified. The total cost of the Project was enhanced from Rs. 776 crores to Rs.922 crores, total built-up area of the proposed Parliament was enhanced from 59,800 sq.m. to 65,000 sq.m., number of trees on plot no. 118 was enhanced from 326 to 333. In its 50th meeting on 22.4.2020, EAC considered the revised proposal and approved the same for grant of EC subject to certain specific conditions commensurate with the nature of subject project along with standard conditions of EC. Thereafter on 17.6.2020, the MoEF F accepted the recommendations of EAC and granted EC to the proposal on Expansion and Renovation of Parliament building. This grant of EC stands impugned in these two petitions. The relevant extract of prayers read thus: “a. Pass an order in the nature of a Writ/Order quashing and G setting aside the impugned Environmental Clearance dated 17.06.2020 issued by the Respondent No. 1 in respect to the project titled as “Expansion and Renovation of 47 For short, “EAC” 48 For short, “the MoEF” H

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