THE MAVILAYI SERVICE COOPERATIVE BANK LTD. & ORS. v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CALICUT & ANR.

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A “The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case. Where, as in the present case, the language of the main enactment is clear and unambiguous, a proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it by implication what clearly falls within its express terms.” The territory of a proviso therefore is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and exclude something which otherwise would have been within the section. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear it cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting the main enactment or to exclude by implication what the enactment clearly says unless the words of the proviso are such that that is its necessary effect. (Vide also Corporation of City of Toronto v. Attorney-General for Canada [(1946) AC 32, 37].” D (at page 266-267)

42Copy pinpoint42. To similar effect, a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal (1991) 3 SCC 442 held:

E “6. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field, which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted by the proviso and to no other. The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is to confine to that case. Where the language of the main enactment is explicit and unambiguous, the proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it, by implication what clearly falls within its express terms. The scope of the proviso, therefore, is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and it excludes something which otherwise would have been within the rule. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear, the proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify by implication what the enactment clearly says nor set at naught the real object H

THE MAVILAYI SERVICE COOPERATIVE BANK LTD. v. 125 COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CALICUT [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

of the main enactment, unless the words of the proviso are such that it is its necessary effect.”

43Copy pinpoint43. Another two-Judge Bench in J.K. Industries Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers (1996) 6 SCC 665 then declared: “33. A proviso to a provision in a statute has several functions and while interpreting a provision of the statute, the court is required to carefully scrutinise and find out the real object of the proviso appended to that provision. It is not a proper rule of interpretation of a proviso that the enacting part or the main part of the section be construed first without reference to the proviso and if the same is found to be ambiguous only then recourse may be had to examine the proviso as has been canvassed before us. On the other hand an accepted rule of interpretation is that a section and the proviso thereto must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest. A proviso is normally used to remove special cases from the general enactment and provide for them specially. D

34. A proviso qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out from the main provision, a portion, which, but for the proviso would be a part of the main provision. A proviso must, therefore, be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso should not be read as if providing something by way of addition to the main provision which is foreign to the main provision itself.

35. Indeed, in some cases, a proviso, may be an exception to the main provision though it cannot be inconsistent with what is expressed in the main provision and if it is so, it would be ultra vires of the main provision and struck down. As a general rule in construing an enactment containing a proviso, it is proper to construe the provisions together without making either of them redundant or otiose. Even where the enacting part is clear, it is desirable to make an effort to give meaning to the proviso with a view to justify its necessity.

36. While dealing with proper function of a proviso, this Court in CIT v. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd. [AIR 1959 SC 713: (1959) 36 ITR 1] opined: H

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A “The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment, a portion which, but for the proviso would fall within the main enactment. Ordinarily it is foreign to the proper function of a proviso to read it as providing something by way of an addendum or dealing with a subject which is foreign B to the main enactment.” This view has held the field till date.”

44Copy pinpoint44. More recently, in Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh (2015) 4 SCC 421, this Court held as follows: C “20. Equally, it is settled law that a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. Therefore, the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction. This is laid down in Dwarka D Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf [(1976) 1 SCC 128], as follows: “18. We may mention in fairness to counsel that the following, among other decisions, were cited at the Bar bearing on the uses of provisos in statutes: CIT v. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd. [AIR 1959 SC 713]; Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. CST [AIR 1955 SC E 765]; Thompson v. Dibdin [1912 AC 533], AC p. 541; R. v. Dibdin [1910 P 57 (CA)], and Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 1959 SC 1012]. The law is trite. A proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. F It is not a separate or independent enactment. ‘Words are dependent on the principal enacting words to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced from their context’ (Thompson v. Dibdin [1912 AC 533]). If the rule of construction is that prima facie a proviso should be limited in its operation to G the subject-matter of the enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound. To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, H

THE MAVILAYI SERVICE COOPERATIVE BANK LTD. v. 127 COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CALICUT [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction.”

45Copy pinpoint45. To sum up, therefore, the ratio decidendi of Citizen Cooperative Society Ltd. (supra), must be given effect to. Section 80P of the IT Act, being a benevolent provision enacted by Parliament to encourage and promote the credit of the co-operative sector in general must be read liberally and reasonably, and if there is ambiguity, in favour of the assessee. A deduction that is given without any reference to any restriction or limitation cannot be restricted or limited by implication, as is sought to be done by the Revenue in the present case by adding the word “agriculture” into Section 80P(2)(a)(i) when it is not there. Further, section 80P(4) is to be read as a proviso, which proviso now specifically excludes co-operative banks which are co-operative societies engaged in banking business i.e. engaged in lending money to members of the public, which have a licence in this behalf from the RBI. Judged by this touchstone, it is clear that the impugned Full Bench judgment is wholly incorrect in its reading of Citizen Cooperative Society Ltd. D (supra).Clearly, therefore, once section 80P(4) is out of harm’s way, all the assessees in the present case are entitled to the benefit of the deduction contained in section 80P(2)(a)(i), notwithstanding that they may also be giving loans to their members which are not related to agriculture. Also, in case it is found that there are instances of loans being given to non- members, profits attributable to such loans obviously cannot be deducted. E

46Copy pinpoint46. It must also be mentioned here that unlike the Andhra Act that Citizen Cooperative Society Ltd. (supra) considered, ‘nominal members’ are ‘members’ as defined under the Kerala Act. This Court in U.P. Cooperative Cane Unions’ Federation Ltd., Lucknow v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow-I(1997) 11 SCC 287 F referred to section 80P of the IT Act and then held: “8. The expression “members” is not defined in the Act. Since a cooperative society has to be established under the provisions of the law made by the State Legislature in that regard, the expression “members” in Section 80-P(2)(a)(i) must, therefore, be construed G in the context of the provisions of the law enacted by the State Legislature under which the cooperative society claiming exemption has been formed. It is, therefore, necessary to construe the expression “members” in Section 80-P(2)(a)(i) of the Act in H

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A the light of the definition of that expression as contained in Section 2(n) of the Cooperative Societies Act. The said provision reads as under: “2. (n) ‘Member’ means a person who joined in the application for registration of a society or a person admitted to membership B after such registration in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the rules and the bye-laws for the time being in force but a reference to ‘members’ anywhere in this Act in connection with the possession or exercise of any right or power or the existence or discharge of any liability or duty shall not include reference to any class of members who by reason of the provisions of this Act C do not possess such right or power or have no such liability or duty;”” Considering the definition of ‘member’ under the Kerala Act, loans given to such nominal members would qualify for the purpose of deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i). D

47Copy pinpoint47. Further, unlike the facts in Citizen Cooperative Society Ltd. (supra), the Kerala Act expressly permits loans to non-members under section 59(2) and (3), which reads as follows: “59. Restrictions on loans.- (1) A society shall not make a loan E to any person or a society other than a member: Provided that the above restriction shall not be applicable to the Kerala State Co-operative Bank. Provided further that, with the general or special sanction of the Registrar, a society may make loans to another society. F (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a society may make a loan to a depositor on the security of his deposit. (3) Granting of loans to members or to non-members under sub- section (2) and recovery thereof shall be in the manner as may be specified by the Registrar.” G Thus, the giving of loans by a primary agricultural credit society to non-members is not illegal, unlike the facts inCitizen Cooperative Society Ltd. (supra).

THE MAVILAYI SERVICE COOPERATIVE BANK LTD. v. 129 COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CALICUT [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

48Copy pinpoint48. Resultantly, the impugned Full Bench judgment is set aside.The A appeals and all pending applications are disposed of accordingly. These appeals are directed to be placed before appropriate benches of the Kerala High Court for disposal on merits in the light of this judgment.

Devika Gujral Appeals dispoed of. B