INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL & ORS. ETC.

1

(S.L.P. (C) Nos. 9036-9038 of 2016)

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

2. Scope of Section 24 2.1 Section 24 begins with a non-obstante clause, overriding all other provisions of the Act of 2013 including Section 114 of the Act of 2013, dealing with repeal and saving. In terms of Section 114 of the Act of 2013, the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, except otherwise provided in the Act, has been saved. Section 6(a) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal has been made. The effect of the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder is also saved by the provisions contained in Section 6(b). As per Section 6(c), the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred. G [Para 94][115 E-G] 2.2 Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 read with the non- obstante clause provides that in case of proceedings initiated

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 7 under the Act of 1894 the award had not been made under Section A 11, then the provisions of the Act of 2013, relating to the determination of compensation would apply. However; the proceedings held earlier do not lapse. In terms of Section 24(1)(b), where award under Section 11 is made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Act of 1894. It B contemplates that such pending proceedings, as on the date on which the Act of 2013 came into force shall continue, and taken to their logical end. However, the exception to Section 24(1) (b) is provided in Section 24(2) in case of pending proceedings; in case where the award has been passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, the physical possession C of the land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed, and such proceedings cannot continue as per the provisions of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013. [Para 95][115 G-H][116 A-C] Principles of Statutory Interpretation (14th Edition) by Justice D G.P. Singh – referred to 2.3 As regards the collation of the words used in Section 24(2), two negative conditions have been prescribed. Thus, even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse, and this logically flows from the Act of 1894 read with the provisions of Section 24 E of the Act of 2013. Any other interpretation would entail illogical results. Thus, for lapse of acquisition proceedings initiated under the old law, under Section 24(2), if both steps have not been taken, i.e., neither physical possession is taken, nor compensation is paid, the land acquisition proceedings lapse. [Paras 99, 101][119 G-H][122 B-C] F

Patel Chunibhai Dajibha, etc. v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and Anr. AIR 1965 SC 1457 : [1965] SCR 328; Punjab Produce & Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, [1971] SCR 977 – relied on G Brown & Co. v. Harrison (1927) All ER Rep 195; Federal Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry 1974 (1) WLR 505 – referred to

8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 2.4 Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is a penal provision - to punish the acquiring authority for its lethargy in not taking physical possession nor paying the compensation after making the award five years or more before the commencement of the Act of 2013 in pending proceedings, providing that they would lapse. The expression “where an award has been made, then the proceedings B shall continue” used in Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 1894 means that proceedings were pending in praesenti as on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013 are not concluded proceedings, and in that context, an exception has been carved out in section 24(2). [Para 112][131 A-C] C M/s. Ranchhoddas Atmaram and Anr. v. The Union of India and Ors. AIR 1961 SC 935 : [1961] SCR 718; Prof. Yashpal & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 420 : [2005] 2 SCR 23; Joint Director of Mines Safety v. Tandur and Nayandgi Stone Quarries D (P) Ltd (1987) 3 SCC 308 : [1987] 2 SCR 911; Samee Khan v Bindu Khan (1998) 7 SCC 59 : [1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 244; State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala [1957] 1 SCR 874; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v State of Rajasthan & Ors AIR 1963 SC 1638 : [1964] SCR 561 – relied on E Pooran Singh v. State of M.P [1965] 2 SCR 853; Sri Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (1975) 2 SCC 671 : [1976] 1 SCR 505; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia (1980) 1 SCC 158 : [1980] 1 SCR 910; State of Punjab v. Ex-Constable Ram Singh F (1992) 4 SCC 54 : [1992] 3 SCR 634 – referred to Marsey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins and Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd. LR (AC) Vol.XIII 1888 595; Re Hayden Pask v. Perry (1931) 2 Ch.333; Metropolitan Board of Works v. Street Bros (1881) VIII G QBD 445 – referred to 2.5 When considering the scheme of the Act of 1894, once the award was made under Section 11, the Collector may, undertake possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Section H 16 of the Act of 1894 enables the Collector to take possession of

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 9 acquired land, when an award is made under Section 11. Clearly, A there can be lapse of proceedings under the Act of 1894 only when possession is not taken. The provisions in Section 11A of the Act of 1894 states that the Collector shall make an award within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and if no award is made within two years, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall lapse. The period of two year excludes any period during which interim order granted by the Court was in operation. Once an award is made and possession is taken, by virtue of Section 16, land vests absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances. Vesting of land is automatic on the happening of the two exigencies of passing award and taking possession, as provided in Section

16. [Paras 114, 115][131 F-H][132 C-E] 2.6 The scheme of the Act of 1894 is clear that when the award is passed under Section 11, thereafter possession is taken as provided under Section 16, land vests in the State Government. D Under Section 12(2), a notice of the award has to be issued by the Collector. Taking possession is not dependent upon payment. Payment has to be tendered under Section 31 unless the Collector is “prevented from making payment,” as provided under section 31(2). In case of failure under Section 31(1) or 31(3), also Collector is not precluded from making payment, but it carries interest under Section 34 @ 9% for the first year from the date it ought to have been paid or deposited and thereafter @ 15%. Thus, once land has been vested in the State under Section 16, in case of failure to pay the compensation under Section 31(1) to deposit under Section 31(2), compensation has to be paid along with interest, and due to non-compliance of Section 31, there is no lapse of acquisition. The same spirit has been carried forward in the Act of 2013 by providing in Section 24(2). Once possession has been taken though the payment has not been made, the compensation has to be paid along with interest as envisaged under section 34, and in a case, payment has been made, possession has not been taken, there is no lapse under Section 24(2). In a case where possession has been taken under the Act of 1894 as provided by Section 16 or 17(1) the land vests absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances, if compensation is not paid, there is no divesting there will be no H

10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A lapse as compensation carries interest @ 9% or @ 15% as envisaged under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. Proviso to Section 24(2) makes some wholesome provision in case the amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, in such an event, not only those persons but all the beneficiaries, though for minority of holding compensation has been paid, shall be entitled to higher compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. The expression used is “all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act”, i.e., Act of 1894, means that the persons who are to be paid higher compensation are those who have been recorded as beneficiaries as on the date of notification under Section 4. The proviso gives effect to, and furthers the principle that under the Act of 1894, the purchases made after issuance of notification under Section 4 are void. As such, the benefit of higher compensation under the proviso to Section 24(2) is intended to be given to the beneficiaries mentioned in the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. [Para 118][133 D-H][134 A-D] 2.7 The benefits under the Act of 2013 envisage that where the award had not been made, or award has been made, but possession has not been taken (because once possession is taken, land is vests in the State) there can be lapse of acquisition. No doubt that payment is also to be made: that issue is taken care of by the provision of payment of interest under Section 34: also, in case of non-deposit- in respect of majority of holdings in a given award, higher compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to all beneficiaries as on the date of notification under Section 4 issued under the Act of 1894. There is nothing in the Statement of Objects and Reasons making specific reference to non-payment of compensation where an award has been made, and possession has been taken. While interpreting the provisions of an Act, the court to consider the objects and reasons of the legislature, which the legislature had in mind also emphasised that once vesting is complete, there is no divesting. [Para 120][134 G-H][135 A-C] Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate [1958] SCR 1156; Mukesh K.

p. 11 Copy page pinpoint

Tripathi v. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC & Ors. A (2004) 8 SCC 387 : [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 127 – relied on 2.8 Interpreting “or” under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 disjunctively, would result in an anomalous situation - because, once compensation has been paid to the landowner, there is no provision for its refund. In case physical possession is with the landowner; and compensation has been paid, there is no provision in the Act for disgorging out the benefit of compensation. In the absence of any provision for refund in the Act of 2013, the State cannot recover compensation paid. The landowner would be unjustly enriched. This could never have been the legislative intent of enacting Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The principle of restitution, unless provided in the Act, cannot be resorted to by the authorities on their own. The absence of provision for refund in the Act of 2013 reinforces conclusion that the word “or” has to be read as conjunctively and has to be read as “and.” D [Para 132][150-E][151 A-B] C. Padma & Ors. v. Dy. Secretary & Ors (1997) 2 SCC 627 : [1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 158; Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh & Ors (2003) 1 SCC 335 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 534; Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice E Cream (P) Ltd 2004 (7) SCC 288 : [2004] 3 SCR 854 – referred to

3. In re: Vesting and divesting Once the land vests in the State, it cannot be divested, even if there is some irregularity in the acquisition proceedings. There F is nothing in the Act of 1894 to show that non-compliance thereof will be fatal or will lead to any penalty. Once vesting takes place, and is with possession, after which a person who remains in possession is only a trespasser, not in rightful possession and vesting contemplates absolute title, possession in the State. G [Paras 141, 147][160-H][161-A][163 F-G] State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram 1996 (7) JT 118; Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors (1996) 11 SCC 698 : [1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 6; Market Committee v. Krishan Murari (1996) 1 SCC 311 : [1995] 4 Suppl. H

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A SCR 787; Puttu Lal (dead) by L.Rs. v. State of U.P. & Anr (1996) 3 SCC 99 : [1996] 2 SCR 638; The Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust [1957] SCR 01; 147 VKNM Vocational Higher Secondary School v. State of Kerala (2016) 4 SCC 216 : [2016] 1 SCR 343; May George v. Special Tahsildar & B Ors. (2010) 13 SCC 98 : [2010] 7 SCR 204; P. Chinnanna & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors. (1994) 5 SCC 486 : [1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 426; Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State of U.P & Ors (1993) 4 SCC 369 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 336; Tika Ram and Ors. v. State C of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 689 : [2009] 14 SCR 905; Pratap & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors (1996) 3 SCC 1 : [1996] 2 SCR 1088; Awadh Bihari Yadav & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors (1995) 6 SCC 31 : [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 197 – relied on D Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Modi Sugar Mills [1961] 2 SCR 189; Dattatraya Moreshwar v. The State of Bombay and Ors., AIR 1952 SC 181 : [1952] SCR 612; State of U.P. and Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 : [1961] SCR 679; Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur v. Municipal Board, Rampur, AIR 1965 E SC 895 : [1965] SCR 970; State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan, AIR 1975 SC 2190 : [1976] 1 SCR 369; Sharif -Ud- Din v. Abdul Gani Lone, AIR 1980 SC 303 : [1980] 1 SCR 1177; Balwant Singh and Ors. v. Anand Kumar Sharma and Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 433 : [2003] 1 F SCR 653; Chandrika Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 2004 SC 2036 : [2004] 3 SCR 834; M/s. Rubber House v. Excellsior Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 1160 : [1989] 1 SCR 986; B.S. Khurana and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 679 : [2000] 3 Suppl. G SCR 357; State of Haryana and Anr. v. RaghubirDayal, (1995) 1 SCC 133 : [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 448; GullipilliSowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani @ Gullipili Pavani, (2009) 1 SCC 714 : [2008] 17 SCR 35 – referred to H

p. 13 Copy page pinpoint

Braithwaite & Co. v. E.S.I.C [1968] 1 SCR 771 – A referred to

4. In re: Vested rights under Section 24 of the Act of 2013 Section 24 of the Act of 2013 does not intend to take away vested rights. This is because there is no specific provision taking away or divesting title to the land, which had originally vested with the State, or divesting the title or interest of beneficiaries or third-party transferees of such land which they had lawfully acquired, through sales or transfers. When repeal is followed by a fresh enactment on the same subject, the provisions of the General Clauses Act would undoubtedly require an examination of the language of the new enactment if it expresses an intent different from the earlier repealed Act. The enquiry would necessitate the examination if the old rights and liabilities are kept alive or whether the new Act manifests an intention to do away with or destroy them. If the new Act manifests different intentions, the application of the General Clauses Act will stand excluded. [Paras 148, 149][164 F-G][166 A-C] State of Haryana v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd (2017) 9 SCC 463 : [2017] 9 SCR 482 – relied on Zile Singh v. State of Haryana (2004) 8 SCC 01 : [2004] E 3 Suppl. SCR 400; CIT v. Sarkar Builders (2015) 7 SCC 579 : [2015] 7 SCR 56; Jawaharmal v. State of Rajasthan [1966] 1 SCR 890; Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar [1964] 1 SCR 897; K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala & Ors (1994) 5 SCC 593 : [1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 405 – relied on F Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd.v L’office Chefifien Des Phosphates & Anr [1994] 1 A.C. 486; Lauri v. Renad (1892) 3 Ch. 402; Gloucester Union v. Woolwich Union (1917) 2 K.B. 374; The King v. The General Commissioners of Income Tax for Southampton G (1916) 2 K.B. 249 – referred to Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edition (2012) – referred to

14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 5. In re: Legislative History of Act of 2013 The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2011 (Bill No.77 of 2011) was introduced in the Parliament. Section 24(1), as introduced originally, contained a provision with respect to award, which has not been made, but it was later on amended, B and now as provided in Section 24(1)(a), there is no lapse and only higher compensation is available in case award has not been passed. The earlier Section 24(2) contained only the provision with respect to possession of the land that has not been taken. Earlier, there was no time limit prescribed, and it was proposed that the process for acquisition of land shall lapse. C Debates in the Lok Sabha on 29.8.2013, were referred to during the hearings, to cite various reasons given in respect of the question why effect should be given retrospectively in cases where acquisition has not been completed. While replying to the debate, the Minister concerned had stated that there would be D lapse only if in case possession has not been taken and compensation has not been paid. The emphasis right from the beginning was on possession. Thus, from the perusal of debate too, it is apparent that the word “or” had been understood as “and”. [Paras 161, 162, 164, 165][178 D-E][179 B-D][180 B- C][180 G-H] E Tinsukhia Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. State of Assam & Ors., (1989) 3 SCC 709 : [1989] 2 SCR 544; C.I.T. v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 387; Balram Kamanat v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 628 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 24; New India F Assurance Co. v. Nulli Nivelle, (2008) 3 SCC 279 : [2007] 13 SCR 598; H.S. Vankani v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 4 SCC 301 : [2010] 3 SCR 485; State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retd.) and Ors., (2013) 3 SCC 1 : [2013] 1 SCR 1 – referred to

G 6. In Re: Objectives of the Act The Act of 2013 has been enacted considering the difficulties caused by the operation of the earlier laws and to subserve the public interest. Thus, the Court should interpret it in the context of the attendant circumstances. At the same time, H the court should not, while ostensibly adopting a purposive or liberal interpretation, affect matters which have become final, or A stale. [Para 166][181 D-E] Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [1962] 1 SCR 44; A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkatachalam Potti [1955] SCR 1196; Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488; Popat Bahiru B Govardhane & Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer & Anr., (2013) 10 SCC 765 : [2013] 8 SCR 241 – relied on Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. & Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 111 : [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 517 – C referred to

p. 15 Copy page pinpoint

7. In Re: proviso to Section 24(2): Whether the proviso is part of section 24(2) or Section 24(1). 7.1 When reading the word “or” as ‘and’ in the main part of section 24(2), it is clear that the proviso has to stay as part of section 24(2) where it has been placed by the legislature, and only then it makes sense. If ‘or’ used in-between two negative conditions of ‘possession has not been taken’ or ‘compensation has not been paid,’ disjunctively, in that case, the proviso cannot be operative and would become otiose and would make no sense as part of Section 24(2). In case of amount not having been paid the acquisition has to lapse, though possession (of the land) has been taken would not be the proper interpretation of the main part, when “or” is read conjunctively, section 24(2) provided for lapse in a case where possession has not been taken, nor compensation has been paid, in such a case proviso becomes operative in given exigency of not depositing amount with respect to majority of landholdings. [Para 171][184 D-F] 7.2 A reading of section 24(2) shows that in case possession has been taken even if the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall not lapse. In case payment has not been made nor deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings in the accounts of the beneficiaries, then all the beneficiaries specified in the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall get the enhanced compensation under the provisions of the Act of 2013. Section 24(2) not only deals with failure to take physical H

16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A possession but also failure to make payment of compensation. If both things have not been done, there is lapse of the acquisition proceeding. Once an award has been passed and possession has been taken, there is absolute vesting of the land, as such higher compensation follows under the proviso, which is beneficial to holders. In a case where both the negative conditions have not been fulfilled, as mentioned in section 24(2), there is a lapse. Thus, the proviso is a wholesome provision and is, in fact, a part of section 24(2); it fits in the context of section 24(2) as deposit is related with the payment of compensation and lapse is provided due to non-payment along with not taking possession for five years or more whereas for non-deposit higher compensation is provided. [Para 172][184 F-H][185 A-D] 7.3 When considering the provisions of section 24(1)(b) where an award has been passed under section 11 of the Act of 1894, such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Act as if it has not been repealed. The only exception carved out is the period of 5 years or more and that too by providing a non-obstante clause in Section 24(2) to anything contained in section 24(1). The non-obstante clause qualifies the proviso also to Section 24(2). It has to be read as part of Section 24(2) as it is an exception to Section 24(1)(b). Section 24(1)(b) is E a self-contained provision, and is also a part of the non-obstante clause to the other provisions of the Act as provided in sub-section (1). Parliament worked out an exception, by providing a non- obstante clause in section 24(2), to Section 24(1). Compensation is to be paid under Section 24(1)(b) under the Act of 1894 and not under the Act of 2013. As such Section 24 (2) is an exception to section 24(1)(b) and the proviso is also an exception which fits in with non-obstante clause of Section 24(2) only. Any other interpretation will be derogatory to the provisions contained in Section 24(1)(b) which provides that the pending proceedings shall continue under the Act of 1894 as if it had not been repealed, that would include the part relating to compensation too. Even if there is no lapse of proceedings under section 24(1)(a), only higher compensation follows under Section 24(1)(a). [Para 173][185 D-H][186-A]

p. 17 Copy page pinpoint

Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh A & Ors. (2018) 14 SCC 161 : [2017] 14 SCR 202 171 – relied on Delhi Development Authority v. Virender Lal Bahri & Ors. – referred to 7.4 Punctuation used in Section 24(2): B

Parliament has used the full stop (.) after section 24(1) and colon (:) after section 24(2). It cannot be gainsaid that punctuation plays a vital role, particularly when an attempt is made to relocate any part of the provision. The use of the colon is to introduce a sub-clause that follows logically from the text before it. Though C as the interpretation of the provision of Section 24(2) and its proviso needs no further deliberation regarding its placement, the same is to be read as a proviso to Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1) (b) Use of punctuation colon reinforces conclusion and punctuation mark has been an accepted method of statutory interpretation when such a problem arises. Though sometimes punctuation can be ignored also but not generally. The full stop after section 24(1)(b) expresses deliberate intent to end a particular sentence and detach it from the next part. It is clear that the colon (:) has a reference to the previous statement and enlarges the same and extends the meaning of the sentence. The colon indicates that the text is intrinsically linked to the previous provision preceding it, i.e., Section 24(2) in this case and not section 24(1). The colon indicates that what follows. The colon proves, explains, defines describes or lists elements of what precedes it. In case the proviso is bodily lifted and placed after section 24(1)(b), section 24(2) will end with a “colon,” which is never done to end a provision. [Paras 174, 176][186 D-G][187 D-E] Falcon Tyres Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2006) 6 SCC G 530 : [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 734; Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Anr v Arabinda Bose & Anr [1953] SCR 1; Jamshed Guzdar v. State of Maharastra (2005) 2 SCC 591 : [2005] 1 SCR 223 – relied on H

18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A State of Gujarat v. Reliance Industries Ltd. (2017) 16 SCC 28 : [2017] 13 SCR 25; State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors (1982) 1 SCC 561 : [1982] 3 SCR 121 – referred to Marshall v. Cottingham [1982] Ch 82; Dingmar v. B Dingmar 2007 (2) All ER 382; Kennedy v Information Commissioner and another (Secretary of State for Justice intervening) [2012] 1 WLR 3524; Taylor v. Caribou 102 Me. 401, 67 A.2 (1907) – referred to ‘Full Stop’ and ‘Colon’, Vepa P. Sarathi in the Interpretation C of Statutes, Fifth Edition; Bennion on Statutory Interpretation – referred to 7.5 The provision of section 24(1)(a) is clear that if an award has not been passed, higher compensation to follow. No lapse is provided. In case award has been passed within the window period of section 24(1)(b), inter alia, the provisions for compensation would be that of the Act of 1894. The only exception to section 24(1) is created by the non-obstante clause in section 24(2) by providing that in case the requisite steps have not been taken for 5 years or more, then there is lapse as a negative condition. The proviso contemplates higher compensation, in case compensation has not been paid, and the amount has not been deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings, to all the beneficiaries under the Act of 2013, who were holding land on the date of notification under Section 4. If the proviso is added, section 24(1)(b) will destroy the very provision of section 24(1)(b) F providing proceedings to continue under the Act of 1894, which is not the function of the proviso to substitute the main Section but to explain it. It is not to cause repugnancy with the main provision. The function of the proviso is to explain or widen the scope. It is a settled proposition of law that the proviso cannot travel beyond the provision to which it is attached. The proviso G would travel beyond the Act of 1894 as it is the intention of section 24(1)(b) the proceedings to govern by the Act of 1894. Thus, the proviso has no space to exist with section 24(1) (b), and it has rightly not been attached by Parliament, with Section 24(2) and has been placed at the right place where it should have been. H The proviso is part of the scheme of section 24(2), and the entire

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL & 19 ORS. ETC.

provision of section 24(2), including the proviso, operates when A inaction is there for a period of 5 years or more, as contemplated therein. [Paras 185, 186][197 D-H][198-A][198 C-D]

8. In re: Proviso to be read as part of provision it is appended proviso has to be construed as a part of the clause to which it is appended. A proviso is added to a principal provision to which it is attached. It does not enlarge the enactment. In case the provision is repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso cannot prevail. The proviso cannot nullify the provision of Section 24(1)(b) nor can it set at naught the real object of the enactment, but it can further by providing higher compensation, thus dealing with matters in Section 24 (2). Therefore, in effect, where award is not made [Section 24 (1)(a)] as well as where award is made but compensation is not deposited in respect of majority of the landowners in a notification (for acquisition) [i.e. proviso to Section 24 (2)] compensation is payable in terms of the new Act, i.e., Act D of 2013. For the said reasons, considering the placement of the proviso, semi-colon having been used at the end of section 24(2), considering the interpretation of section 24(1)(b) and the repugnancy which would be caused in case the proviso is lifted which is not permissible and particularly when reading the word E ‘or’ as ‘nor’ in section 24(2), it has to be placed where the legislature has legislated it, it has not been wrongly placed as part of section 24(2) but is intended for beneficial results of higher compensation for one and all where there is no lapse, but amount not deposited as required. [Paras 190, 196, 197][200 B-C] [207 C-F] F

State of Rajasthan v. Leela Jain & Ors [1965] 1 SCR 276; Sales-tax Officer, Circle 1, Jabalpur v. Hanuman Prasad [1967] 1 SCR 831; Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Board of Revenue, Madras and Anr. v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver etc AIR (1968) SC 59 : G [1968] SCR 148; S. Sundaram Pillai & Ors. v. V.R. Pattabiraman & Ors (1985) 1 SCC 591 : [1985] 2 SCR 643; Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai Nagjibhai [1966] 1 SCR 367; Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Haryana H

20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A State Cooperative Land Development Banks Employees Union & Anr. (2004) 1 SCC 574 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1039; Shimbhu & Anr. v. State of Haryana, (2014) 13 SCC 318 : [2013] 14 SCR 136; Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer and Ors., [1965] 3 SCR 626; Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil B Mills & Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596; Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, (1976) 1 SCC 128 : [1976[ 1 SCR 277; The Commissioner of Income-tax, Mysore, Travancore- Cochin and Coorg, Bangalore v. The Indo Mercantile C Bank Ltd., [1959] (Supp) 2 SCR 256; Romesh Kumar Sharma v. Union of India and Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 510 : [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 227; Motiram Ghelabhai v. Jagan Nagar & Ors (1985) 2 SCC 279 : [1985] 2 SCR 1051; Madhu Gopal v. VI Additional District Judge & Ors. (1988) 4 SCC 644 : [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 276; The D King v. Dominion Engineering Co. Ltd. AIR (34) 1947 PC 94 – relied on Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn. - referred to

9. In re: What is the meaning to be given to the word “paid” E used in section 24(2) and “deposited” used in the proviso to section 24(2) 9.1 The provisions of Section 31 of the Act of 1894 are attracted to the interpretation of provisions of section 24(2) to find out the meaning of the words ‘paid’ and ‘deposited’. Section F 31(1) makes it clear that on passing of award compensation has to be tendered to the beneficiaries and Collector shall pay it to them. The payment is provided only in section 31(1). The expression ‘tender’ and pay to them in section 31(1) cannot include the term ‘deposited.’ Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 deals with deposit in case Collector is ‘prevented’ from making payment by one or more contingencies mentioned in section 31(2). The deposit follows if the Collector is prevented from making payment. In case Collector is prevented from making payment due to contingencies, such refusal to receive the amount, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there is a dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 21 as to the apportionment of it, he (i.e. the Collector) may withhold it or in case there is dispute as to apportionment, he may ask the parties to get a decision from the Reference Court i.e., civil court and to clear the title. In such exigencies, the amount of compensation is required to be deposited in the court to which reference would be submitted under section 18. Section 31(2) B requires deposit in case of reference under section 18 and not the reference, which may be sought under section 30 or section 28A of the Act of 1894. [Paras 198, 199][208 B-F] 9.2 Section 24(2) deals with the expression where compensation has not been paid. It would mean that it has not been tendered for payment under section 31(1). Though the word C ‘paid’ amounts to a completed event, however, once payment of compensation has been offered/tendered under section 31(1), the acquiring authority cannot be penalized for non-payment as the amount has remained unpaid due to refusal to accept, by the landowner and Collector is prevented from making the payment. D Thus, the word ‘paid’ used in section 24(2) cannot be said to include within its ken ‘deposit’ under section 31(2). For that, special provision has been carved out in the proviso to section 24(2), which deals with the amount to be deposited in the account of beneficiaries. Two different expressions have been used in section 24. In the main part of section 24, the word ‘paid’ and in its proviso ‘deposited’ have been used. [Para 200][208 F-H][209- A] 9.3 The consequence of non-deposit of the amount has been dealt with in section 34 of the Act of 1894. As per section 24(2), if the amount has not been paid nor possession has been taken, it provides for lapse. Whereas the proviso indicates amount has not been deposited with respect to a majority of land holdings in a case initiated under the Act of 1894 for 5 years or more. The period of five years need not have been specified in the proviso as it is part of section 24(2) and has to be read with it. Two different consequences of non-deposit of compensation are: (i) higher compensation in a case where possession has been taken, payment has been made to some and amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of the holdings, (ii) in case

22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A there is no lapse, the beneficiaries would be entitled to interest as envisaged under section 34 from the date of taking possession at the rate of 9% per annum for the first year and after that @ 15% per annum. [Para 201][209 B-D] 9.4 The word “paid” in Section 31(1) to the landowner cannot include in its ambit the expression “deposited” in court. Deposit cannot be said to be payment made to landowners. Deposit is on being prevented from payment. However, in case there is a tender of the amount that is to mean amount is made available to the landowner that would be a discharge of the obligation to make the payment and in that event such a person cannot be penalised for the default in making the payment. In default to deposit in court, the liability is to make the payment of interest under Section 34 of Act of 1894. The concept of “deposit” is different and quite apart from the word “paid”, due to which, lapse is provided in Section 24 of Act of 2013. In the case of non- D deposit for the majority of landholdings, higher compensation would follow as such word “paid” cannot include in its ambit word “deposited”. To hold otherwise would be contrary to provisions contained in Section 24(2) and its proviso carrying different consequences. [Paras 203, 204][209 G-H][210-A][210 D-E] E 9.5 There is a breach of obligation to deposit even if it is taken that amount to be deposited in the reference court in exigencies being prevented from payment as provided in Section 31(2). The default will not have the effect of reopening the concluded proceedings. The legal position and consequence which prevailed from 1893 till 2013 on failure to deposit was only the liability for interest and all those transactions were never sought to be invalidated by the provisions contained in Section

24. It is only in the case where in a pending proceeding for a period of five years or more, the steps have not been taken for taking possession and for payment of compensation, then there is a lapse under section 24(2). In case amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings, higher compensation has to follow. [Para 205][210 F-H][211-A] 9.6 When amount has been tendered, the obligation has been fulfilled by the Collector. Landowners cannot be forced to H

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 23 receive it. In case a person has not accepted the amount and wants to take the advantage of non-payment, though the amount has remained due to his own act, it is not open to him to contend that amount has not been paid to him, as such, there should be lapse of the proceedings. Even in a case when offer for payment has been made but not deposited, liability to pay amount along with interest subsist and if not deposited for majority of holding, for that adequate provisions have been given in the proviso also to Section 24(2). The scheme of the Act of 2013 in Sections 77 and 80 is also the same as that provided in Sections 31 and 34 of the Act of 1894. [Para 206][211 B-D] 9.7 Judicial notice is taken of the fact in no other C Government security rate of interest is higher on the amount being invested under sections 32 and 33 of the Act of 1894. Higher rate of interest is available under section 34 to the advantage of landowners. [Para 207][211 E-F] 9.8 Under the old regime, it was open to the Collector to fix a convenient date or dates for announcement of award, and tender payment. In the event of refusal by the landowner to receive, or in other cases, such as absence of the true owner, or in case of dispute as to who was to receive it, no doubt, the statute provided that the amount was to be deposited with the court: as it does today, under Section 77. Yet, neither during the time when the Act of 1894 was in operation, nor under the Act of 2013, the entire acquisition does not lapse for non-deposit of the compensation amount in court. Thus, it would be incorrect to imply that failure to deposit compensation [in court, under Section 31 (2)] would entail lapse, if the amounts have not been paid for five years or more prior to the coming into force of the Act of

2013. Such an interpretation would lead to retrospective operation, of a provision, and the nullification of acquisition proceedings, long completed, by imposition of a norm or standard, and its application for a time when it did not exist. If the expression G “deposited” is held to be included in the expression “paid” used in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, inconsistency and repugnancy would be caused as between the proviso and the main sub-section, which has to be avoided and the non-compliance of the provisions of Section 31(2) is not fatal. Even if the amount has not been H

24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A deposited, higher compensation has to follow in the exigency proviso to Section 24(2). It is apparent that “tender” of the amount saves the party tendering it from the consequence to be visited on non-payment of the amount. [Paras 208, 209, 211][211 G- H][212-A-D][212-F] B The Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Saharanpur v. Gobind [1962] (Supp 3) SCR 318; The Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. The Industrial Tribunal, Delhi & Anr [1965] 1 SCR 998; Indian Oxygen Ltd. v. Narayan Bhoumik (1968) 1 PLJR 94; The Benares State Bank Ltd. v. The Commissioner of C Income Tax, Lucknow (1969) 2 SCC 316 : [1970] 1 SCR 669; Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2012) 9 SCC 552 : [2012] 12 SCR 327; The Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall [1955] 2 SCR 842; Commissioner D of Income Tax, New Delhi v. M/s. East West Import and Export (P) Ltd (1989) 1 SCC 760 : [1989] 1 SCR 570 – relied on Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 6 Moore PC 1; Lord Howard de Walden v. IRC & Anr (1948) 2 AER 825 – E referred to 9.9 Two different expressions have been used in Section 24(2). The expression “paid” has been used in Section 24(2) and whereas in the proviso “deposited” has been used. “Paid” cannot include “deposit”, or else Parliament would have used different expressions in the main sub-section and its proviso, if the meaning were to be the same. The Court cannot add or subtract any word in the statute and has to give plain meaning and when compensation has not been paid under Section 24(2), it cannot mean compensation has not been deposited as used in the proviso. While interpreting the statutory provisions, addition or subtraction in the legislation is not permissible. There cannot be any departure from the words of law, as observed in legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum”. There is a conscious omission of the word “deposit” in Section 24(2), which has been used in the proviso. Parliament cannot be said to have H

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 25 used the different words carrying the same meaning in the same provision, whereas words “paid” and “deposited” carry a totally different meaning. Payment is actually made to the landowner and deposit is made in the court, that is not the payment made to the landowner. It may be discharge of liability of payment of interest and not more than that. Applying the rule of literal construction also natural, ordinary and popular meaning of the words “paid” and “deposited” do not carry the same meaning; the natural and grammatical meaning has to be given to them. [Para 215][214 F-H][215 A-D] Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh – referred to C

9.10 When two different expressions are used in the same provision of a statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the same sense. [Para 216][216 G-H][217-A]

10. In re: Rules framed under Section 55 and the Standing D Orders issued by State Governments 10.1 Rules and the Standing Orders are binding on the concerned Authorities and they have to follow them. They deposit the amounts in court only when a reference (for higher compensation) is sought, not otherwise. Even if a person refuses to accept it and the amount is deposited in court or even it is not tendered, only higher interest follows under Section 34. Once Rules have prevailed since long and even if it is assumed that deposit in court is mandatory on being prevented from payment as envisaged under Section 31(1), the only liability to make the payment of higher interest is fastened upon the State. The liability to pay the amount with interest would subsist. When amounts are deposited in court, there would occur a procedural irregularity and the adverse consequence envisaged is under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. The consequence of non-deposit in the court is that the amount of the landowner cannot be invested in the G Government securities as envisaged under Sections 32 and 33 of the Act of 1894, in which interest is not more 15 per cent. Thus, no prejudice is caused to the landowners rather they stand to gain and still payment is safe as it is kept in the court. Acquisition cannot be invalidated, only higher compensation would follow in case amount has not been deposited with respect to H

26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A majority of land holdings, all the beneficiaries would be entitled for higher compensation as envisaged in the proviso to Section 24(2). [Para 229][227 G-H][228 A-D] 10.2 It is clear that once land is acquired, award passed and possession has been taken, it has vested in the State. It had been allotted to beneficiaries. A considerable infrastructure could have been developed and a third-party interest had also intervened. The land would have been given by the acquiring authorities to the beneficiaries from whose schemes the land had been acquired and they have developed immense infrastructure. Merely by deposit of amount in treasury instead of court would not invalidate all the acquisitions, which have taken place. [Para 241][235 G-H][236-A] 10.3 The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, intends that the Collector would have sufficient funds to deposit it with respect to the majority of landholdings. In case compensation has not been paid or deposited with respect to majority of land holdings, all the beneficiaries are entitled for higher compensation. In case money has not been deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector or in the treasury or in court with respect to majority of landholdings, the consequence has to follow of higher compensation as per proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Even otherwise, if deposit in treasury is irregular, then the interest would follow as envisaged under Section 34 of Act of 1894. Section 24(2) is attracted if acquisition proceeding is not completed within 5 years after the pronouncement of award. Parliament considered the period of 5 years as reasonable time to complete the acquisition proceedings i.e., taking physical possession of the land and payment of compensation. It is the clear intent of the Act of 2013, that provision of Section 24(2) shall apply to the proceeding which is pending as on the date on which the Act of 2013, has been brought into force and it does not apply to the concluded proceedings. Section 24(2) is not a tool to revive those proceedings and to question the validity of taking acquisition proceedings due to which possession in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s were taken, or to question the manner of deposit of amount in the treasury. In case such landowners were interested in questioning the proceedings of taking possession or mode of deposit with H

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 27 the treasury, such a challenge was permissible within the time A available with them to do so. [Para 242][236 B-H] Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa (1969) 3 SCC 392; Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (1980) 3 SCC 304 : [1980] 3 SCR 179; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Thakkidiram Reddy (1998) 6 SCC 554 : B [1998] 3 SCR 1088; Ram Deen Maurya (Dr.) v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors (2009) 6 SCC 735 : [2009] 6 SCR 703; Rai Vimal Krishna and Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 401 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 358; Hissar Improvement v. Smt. Rukmani Devi and Anr (1990) Supp SCC 806; Kishan Das v. State of U.P C (1995) 6 SCC 240 : [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 584; D-Block Ashok Nagar (Sahibabad) Plot Holders’ Assn. v. State of U.P. (1997) 10 SCC 77 : [1997] 3 SCR 1096 – relied on Howard v. Secretary of State for the Environment, (1975) D Q.B. 235; Belvedere Court Management Ltd. v. Frogmore Developments Ltd. (1996) 3 W.L.R. 1008 – referred to

11. Mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 E 11.1 Section 16 of the Act of 1894 provided that possession of land may be taken by the State Government after passing of an award and thereupon land vest free from all encumbrances in the State Government. Similar are the provisions made in the case of urgency in Section 17(1). The word “possession” has been used in the Act of 1894, whereas in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013, the F expression “physical possession” is used. What was contemplated under the Act of 1894, by taking the possession meant only physical possession of the land. Taking over the possession under the Act of 2013 always amounted to taking over physical possession of the land. When the State Government G acquires land and draws up a memorandum of taking possession, that amounts to taking the physical possession of the land. On the large chunk of property or otherwise which is acquired, the Government is not supposed to put some other person or the police force in possession to retain it and start cultivating it till the land is used by it for the purpose for which it has been acquired. H

28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A The Government is not supposed to start residing or to physically occupy it once possession has been taken by drawing the inquest proceedings for obtaining possession thereof. Thereafter, if any further retaining of land or any re-entry is made on the land or someone starts cultivation on the open land or starts residing in the outhouse, etc., is deemed to be the trespasser on land which is in possession of the State. [Paras 244, 245][237 G-H][238- A][238 C-F] 11.2 The concept of possession is complex one. It comprises the right to possess and to exclude others, essential is animus possidendi. Possession depends upon the character of the thing which is possessed. If the land is not capable of any use, mere non-user of it does not lead to the inference that the owner is not in possession. The established principle is that the possession follows title. Possession comprises of the control over the property. The element of possession is the physical control or the power over the object and intention or will to exercise the power. Corpus and animus are both necessary and have to co- exist. [Para 247][239 A-C] Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja & Ors. (1979) 4 SCC E 274 : [1980] 1 SCR 323; Ram Dass v. Davinder (2004) 3 SCC 684; Bhinka & Ors. v. Charan Singh [1959] (Suppl 2) SCR 798; V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. Administrative Officer & Ors (2012) 12 SCC 133 : [2012] 10 SCR 603 – relied on

F S.M. Yaqub v. T.N. Basu AIR 1949 Pat 146 – referred to Kynoch Limited v. Rowlands (1912) 1 Ch 527 – referred to Mitra’s “Law of Possession and Ownership of Property”, 2nd Edn.; Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, West Publishing G Co.; Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, Ed. 1969 – referred to 11.3 It is apparent that vesting is with possession and the statute has provided under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894 that once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It is an indefeasible right and vesting is with possession thereafter. The vesting specified under section 16, takes place after various steps, H

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 29 such as, notification under section 4, declaration under section A 6, notice under section 9, award under section 11 and then possession. The statutory provision of vesting of property absolutely free from all encumbrances has to be accorded full effect. Not only the possession vests in the State but all other encumbrances are also removed forthwith. B The title of the landholder ceases and the state becomes the absolute owner and in possession of the property. Thereafter there is no control of the land-owner over the property. He cannot have any animus to take the property and to control it. Even if he has retained the possession or otherwise trespassed upon it after possession has been taken by the State, he is a trespasser and such possession of trespasser enures for his benefit and on behalf of the owner. The word ‘vest’ has to be construed in the context in which it is used in a particular provision of the Act. Vesting is absolute and free from all encumbrances that includes possession. Once there is vesting of land, once possession has been taken, section 24(2) does not contemplate divesting of the property from the State. [Paras 256, 258][245 E-H][246 G-H][247-A] Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1998) 4 SCC 387 : [1998] 2 SCR 339; B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 700 : [1999] 2 SCR E 1111; Kailash Nath Agarwal and Ors. v. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. and Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 305 : [2003] 1 SCR 1159; DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana and Ors., (2003) 5 SCC 622 : [2003] 2 SCR 1; Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. F Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT, Delhi and Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 501 : [2009] 14 SCR 507; Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar v. State of Punjab & Ors (1996) 4 SCC 212 : [1996] 2 SCR 643; P.K. Kalburqi v. State of G Karnataka and Ors. (2005) 12 SCC 489; National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad & Ors 2011 (12) SCC 695 : [2011] 14 SCR 472; M. Venkatesh and Ors. v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority, etc. (2015) 17 SCC 1 : [2015] 15 SCR 499; Ram Singh v. H

30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Jammu Development Authority (2017) 13 SCC 474 – relied on Ramesh Bejoy Sharma v. Pashupati Rai (1979) 4 SCC 27 : [1980] 1 SCR 6; Maguni Charan Dwivedi v. State of Orissa (1976) 2 SCC 134 : [1976] 3 SCR 76; B Sri Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur Jiu v. Dar Dass Dey & Co. (1979) 3 SCC 106; Karanpura Development Co. v. Union of India (1988) Supp. SCC 488 – distinguished Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Corporation & Anr (2001) 8 SCC 143 : [2001] 2 Suppl. C SCR 50; NAL Layout Residents Association v. Bangalore Development Authority Ors. v. Hindustan Petroleum (2018) 12 SCC 400 : [2017] 13 SCR 1053 – referred to Richardson v. Robertson, (1862) 6 LT 75 – referred to D 11.4 Under the Act of 1894, when possession is taken after award is passed under section 16 or under section 17 before the passing of the award, land absolutely vests in the State on drawing of Panchnama of taking possession, which is the mode of taking possession. Thereafter, any re-entry in possession or retaining the possession is wholly illegal and trespasser’s possession inures for the benefit of the owner and even in the case of open land, possession is deemed to be that of the owner. When the land is vacant and is lying open, it is presumed to be that of the owner. Mere re-entry on Government land once it is acquired and vests absolutely in the State (under the Act of 1894) does not confer, any right to it and Section 24(2) does not have the effect of divesting the land once it vests in the State. [Para 272][255 G- H][256 A-C] Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 792 : [2011] 14 SCR 1113 – Not correct law G Kashi Bai v. Sudha Rani Ghose (2012) 5 SCC 370 : [2012] 3 SCR 841 – relied on 11.5 The court is alive to the fact that there are a large number of cases where, after acquisition, land has been handed over to various corporations, local authorities, acquiring bodies, H

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 31 etc. After depositing compensation (for the acquisition) those bodies and authorities have been handed possession of lands. They, in turn, after development of such acquired lands have handed over properties; third party interests have intervened and now declaration is sought under the cover of section 24(2) to invalidate all such actions. As already held, section 24 does not intend to cover such cases at all and such gross misuse of the provisions of law must stop. Title once vested, cannot be obliterated, without an express legal provision; in any case, even if the landowners’ argument that after possession too, in case of non-payment of compensation, the acquisition would lapse, were for arguments’ sake, be accepted, these third party owners would be deprived of their lands, lawfully acquired by them, without compensation of any sort. [Para 277][258-H][259 A-C] Velaxan Kumar v Union of India (2015) 4 SCC 325; Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of M.P. (2011) 7 SCC 639 : [2011] 6 SCR 443 – overuled D Maria Margadia Sequeria v Erasmo Jack De Sequeria (2012) 5 SCC 370 : [2012] 3 SCR 841; National Thermal Power Ltd v Mahesh Dutta (2009) 8 SCC 339 : [2009] 10 SCR 1084; V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. Administrative Officer & Ors. (2012) 12 SCC 133 : E [2012] 10 SCR 603 – relied on

12. The effect of interim order of Court 12.1 There are two requirements under Section 24(2), which are to be met by the Authorities, where award has been made 5 years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, if the physical possession of the land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. If possession has been taken, compensation has to be paid by the acquiring authorities. The time of five years is provided for authorities to take action, not to sleep over the matter. Lapse is provided only in case of default by Authorities acquiring the land, not caused by any other reason or order of the court. When the interpretation of the provision is clear, there was no necessity for Parliament to make such a provision under Section 24(2) for exclusion of the period of the interim order. Though it has excluded the period of interim order H

32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A for making declaration under the proviso to Sections 19(7) and exclusion has also been made for computation of the period under Section 69 of the Act of 2013, it is due to the necessity to provide so in view of the language of the provision. The provisions of Section 24 cast an obligation upon the Authorities to take steps meaning thereby that it is open to them to take such steps, and B inaction or lethargy on their part has not been countenanced by Parliament. Resultantly, lapse of proceedings takes place. [Para 282][261 C-H][262-A] State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Khandaka Jain Jewellers (2007) 14 SCC 339 : [2007] 12 SCR 105; Padma C Sundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. v. State of T.N. & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 533 : [2002] 2 SCR 383; Union of India v. SICOM Ltd (2009) 2 SCC 121 : [2008] 17 SCR 120 – referred to 12.2 It is not the intendment of the Act of 2013 that those D who have litigated should get benefits of higher compensation as contemplated under Section 24 benefit is conferred on all beneficiaries. It is not intended by the provisions that in piecemeal the persons who have litigated and have obtained the interim order should get the benefits of the provisions of the Act of 2013. E Those who have accepted the compensation within 5 years and handed over the possession too, are to be benefited, in case amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of holdings. There are cases in which projects have come up in part and as per plan rest of the area is required for planned development with respect to which interim stays have been F obtained. It is not the intendment of the law to deliver advantage to relentless litigants. It cannot be said hence, that it was due to the inaction of the authorities that possession could not be taken within 5 years. Public policy is not to foment or foster litigation but put an end to it. In several instances, in various High Courts G writ petitions were dismissed by single judge Benches and the writ appeals were pending for a long time and in which, with respect to part of land of the projects, efforts were made to obtain the benefit of Section 24(2). Parliament did not intend to confer benefits to such litigants for the aforementioned reasons. Litigation may be frivolous or may be worthy. Such litigants have H

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 33 to stand on the strength of their own case and in such a case A provisions of Section 114 of the Act of 2013 and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, are clearly attracted and such proceedings have to be continued under the provisions of the old Act that would be in the spirit of Section 24(1)(b) itself of the Act of 2013. Section 6(b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, B provides that repeal will not affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. Section 6(c) states that repeal would not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. When there is a provision itself in Section 24(1)(b) of continuance of the proceedings where award has been passed under the Act of 1894, for the purposes of Section 24 as provided in Section 24(b), the provisions of Section 114 is clearly attracted so as the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, to the extent of non obstante clause of Section 24, where possession has not been taken nor payment has been made, there is a lapse, that too by the inaction of the Authorities. Any court’s interim order cannot be said to be inaction of the authorities or agencies; thus, time period is not to be included for counting the 5 years period as envisaged in Section 24(2). [Para 287][263 F-H][264 A-G] Union of India and Ors. v. Modi Rubber Ltd (1986) 4 E SCC 66 : [1986] 3 SCR 587 – relied on Syndicate Bank v. Prabha D. Naik and Anr (2001) 4 SCC 713 : [2001] 2 SCR 714 – held inapplicable Madan Singh Shekhawat v. Union of India (1999) 6 F SCC 459; State of U.P. and Ors. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and Ors. (1979) 3 SCC 229 : [1979] 3 SCR 709; M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa [1961] 2 SCR 295; Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar (1988) 2 SCC 513 : [1988] 3 SCR 384 – referred to G Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 K.B. 481 – referred to

34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 12.3 In cases where some landowners have chosen to take recourse to litigation (which they have a right to) and have obtained interim orders on taking possession or orders of status quo, as a matter of practical reality it is not possible for the authorities or State officials to take the possession or to make payment of the compensation. In several instances, such interim orders also impeded the making of an award. Now, so far as awards (and compensation payments, pursuant to such proceedings were concerned) the period provided for making of awards under the Act of 2013 could be excluded by virtue of Explanation to Section 11A. Thus, no fault of inaction can be attributed to the authorities and those who had obtained such interim orders, cannot benefit by their own action in filing litigation, which may or may not be meritorious. Apart from the question of merits, when there is an interim order with respect to the possession or order of status quo or stay of further proceedings, the authorities cannot proceed; nor can they pay compensation. Their obligations are intertwined with the scheme of land acquisition. It is observed that authorities may wait in the proceedings till the interim order is vacated. [Para 297][272-B-E] Abhey Ram (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors (1997) 5 SCC 421 : [1997] 3 SCR 931; Om E Parkash v. Union of India and Ors. (2010) 4 SCC 17 : [2010] 2 SCR 447; Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti (1990) 1 SCC 593 : [1990] 1 SCR 186; Shyam Sunder and Ors. v. Ram Kumar and Anr. (2001) 8 SCC 24 : [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 115 – relied on F Union of India v. Shiv Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564 : [2014] 8 SCR 751; Karnail Kaur v State of Punjab (2015) 3 SCC 206; Rajive Chowdhrie HUF v State (NCT) of Delhi (2015) 3 SCC 541 – distinguished Union of India and Ors. v. North Telumer Colliery & G Ors (1989) 3 SCC 411 : [1989] 3 SCR 455 – referred to 12.4 There is no dispute with the proposition that casus omissus cannot be applied by the court and in case of clear necessity, the court has to interpret the law, if the provision of H

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 35 law is misused and subjected to abuse of process of law. It is for A the legislature to amend, modify and repeal a law, if deemed necessary. Because of the interpretation of the provisions of Section 24 itself, casus omissus is not applied in this case. [Para 309][281 A-B] State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah (1996) 10 B SCC 619 : [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 222; Rana Girders Ltd. v. Union of India (2013) 10 SCC 746 : [2013] 14 SCR 58 – referred to 12.5 There is no doubt that common law principles have to be weighed upon the statutory provision and latter has to prevail, but the statutory provision itself makes it clear that in the instant matter such period has to be excluded, thus, the principles of common law also apply with full force. The maxim “lex non cogit ad impossibilia” means that the law does not expect the performance of the impossible. There are cases in which compensation was tendered, but refused and then deposited in the treasury. There was litigation in court, which was pending (or in some cases, decided); earlier references for enhancement of compensation were sought and compensation was enhanced. There was no challenge to acquisition proceedings or taking possession etc. In pending matters in this Court or in the High E Court even in proceedings relating to compensation, Section 24 (2) was invoked to state that proceedings have lapsed due to non-deposit of compensation in the court or to deposit in the treasury or otherwise due to interim order of the court needful could not be done, as such proceedings should lapse. [Paras 311, 312][311 D-E][283 C-F] F

Mary Angel and Ors. v. State of T.N. (1999) 5 SCC 209 : [1999] 3 SCR 594; Chander Kishore Jha v. Mahabir Prasad (1999) 8 SCC 266 : [1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 754; Mohammed Gazi v. State of M.P. & Ors. (2000) 4 SCC 342 : [2012] 3 SCR 841; Industrial G Finance Corporation of India Ltd. v. Cannanore Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. & Ors. (2002) 5 SCC 54 : [2002] 2 SCR 1093; HUDA and Anr. v. Dr. Babeswar Kanhar & Anr (2005) 1 SCC 191 : [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 282 – referred to H

36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 12.6 Another Roman Law maxim “nemo tenetur ad impossibilia”, means no one is bound to do an impossibility. Though such acts of taking possession and disbursement of compensation are not impossible, yet they are not capable of law performance, during subsistence of a court’s order; the order has to be complied and cannot be violated. Thus, on equitable B principles also, such a period has to be excluded. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit is founded upon the principle that due to court proceedings or acts of court, no party should suffer. If any interim orders are made during the pendency of the litigation, they are subject to the final decision in the matter. In C case the matter is dismissed as without merit, the interim order is automatically dissolved. In case litigation has been filed frivolously or without any basis, iniquitously in order to delay and by that it is delayed, there is no equity in favour of such a person. Such cases are required to be decided on merits. It is not the policy of law that untenable claims should get fructified due to delay. Similarly, sufferance of a person who abides by law is not permissible. The Act of 2013 does not confer the benefit on unscrupulous litigants, but it frowns upon the lethargy of the officials to complete the requisites within five years. [Paras 314, 318, 319][284 D-E][287 F-H][288-A][288 B-C] E re Presidential Poll (1974) 2 SCC 33 : [1975] 1 SCR 504; Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement (2005) 4 SCC 530 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 49 – relied on Superintendent of Taxes v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust F (1976) 1 SCC 766 : [1975] Suppl. SCR 365 – distinguished Neeraj Kumar Sainy v. the State of U.P. (2017) 14 SCC 136 : [2017] 4 SCR 881 – held inapplicable

G Mrutunjay Pani and Anr. v. Narmada Bala Sasmal and Anr AIR 1961 SC 1353 : [1962] SCR 290 – referred to Sambasiva Chari v. Ramasami Reddi ILR (1899) 22 Mad 179; G.T.C. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1998) 3 SCC 376; Jaipur Municipal Corporation v. C. L. H

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 37

Mishra (2005) 8 SCC 423; Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. C.I.T A (1980) 2 SCC 191 : [1980] 2 SCR 765; Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation (1995) 3 SCC 33 : [1995] 1 SCR 543; Amarjeet Singh and Ors. v. Devi Ratan and Ors (2010) 1 SCC 417 : [2009] 15 SCR 1010; Karnataka Rare Earth and Anr. v. Senior B Geologist, Department of Mines & Geology (2004) 2 SCC 783 : [2004] 1 SCR 965; Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. National Tobacco Company of India Ltd. (1972) 2 SCC 560 : [1973] 1 SCR 822; Karnataka State v. Union of India (1977) 4 SCC 608 : [1978] 2 SCR 1 – referred to C Colquhoun v. Brooks (1889) 21 QBD 52 – referred to Lewis Sutherland’s Statutory Construction (2 nd ed.); Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) by P. St. J. Langon – referred to D

13. In Re: Principle of Restitution: The principle of restitution is founded on the ideal of doing complete justice at the end of litigation, and parties have to be placed in the same position but for the litigation and interim order, if any, passed in the matter. A wrong-doer or in the present context, a litigant who takes his chances, cannot be permitted to gain by delaying tactics. It is the duty of the judicial system to discourage undue enrichment or drawing of undue advantage, by using the court as a tool. Thus, the period for which the interim order has operated under Section 24 has to be excluded for counting the period of 5 years under Section 24(2). [Paras 332, F 335, 336][298 G-H][306 E-F][307 D-E] State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Essar Oil Ltd. & Anr (2012) 3 SCC 522 : [2012] 2 SCR 1127; A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam (2012) 6 SCC 430 : G [2012] 4 SCR 74; Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 161 : [2011] 9 SCR 146; Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. CIT, (1980) 2 SCC 191; Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P. (1992) 2 SCC 620 : [1992] 2 SCR 378; Marshall Sons & Co. H

38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. and Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 325 : [1999] 1 SCR 311; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania (2010) 9 SCC 437 : [2010] 10 SCR 971; Krishnaswamy S. Pd. v. Union of India (2006) 3 SCC 286 : [2006] 2 SCR 390 – relied on B

14. Whether Section 24 revives stale and barred claim 14.1 The legality of concluded cases cannot be questioned under the guise of Section 24(2) as it does not envisage or confer any such right to question the proceedings and the acquisitions have been concluded long back, or in several rounds of litigation, rights of the parties have been settled. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings cannot be made within the parameters of Section 24(2) once panchnama had been drawn of taking possession, thereafter re-entry or retaining the possession is that of the trespasser. The legality of the proceedings cannot be challenged belatedly, and the right to challenge cannot be revived by virtue of the provisions of Section 24(2). [Paras 340, 342][309 F-G][312 F-G]

Shiv Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors 2019

(13) SCALE 698; Mahavir and Ors. v. Union of India E (2018) 3 SCC 588 : [2017] 11 SCR 553; Hari Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors AIR 1984 SC 1020 : [1984] 3 SCR 417; State of T.N. and Ors. v. L. Krishnan & Ors (1996) 1 SCC 250 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 663; Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial F Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd (1996) 11 SCC 501 : [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 551; Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Bhagwan Singh Bhati and Ors., (2008) 3 SCC 462 : [2008] 4 SCR 616; Govt. of A.P. and Ors. v. Kollutla Obi Reddy and Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 493 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 513; Jasveer Singh and Anr. v. State of Uttar G Pradesh & Ors. (2017) 6 SCC 787 : [2017] 3 SCR 921; Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors (2008) 4 SCC 695 :[2008] 2 SCR 521; Haryana State Handloom and Handicrafts Corporation Ltd. and Ors. v. Jain School Society (2003) H 12 SCC 538; Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur vs.

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 39

Bheru Lal and Ors (2002) 7 SCC 712 : [2002] 2 Suppl. A SCR 512; Vishwas Nagar Evacuee Plot Purchasers Association & Ors. v. Under Secretary, Delhi Admn. & Ors. (1990) 2 SCC 268; U.P. State Jal Nigam and Anr. v. Jaswant Singh and Anr (2006) 11 SCC 464 : [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 916; Rabindranath Bose and Ors. v. B Union of India and Ors (1970) 1 SCC 84 : [1970] 2 SCR 697; Dharappa v. Bijapur Coop. Milk Producers Societies Union Ltd (2007) 9 SCC 109 : [2007] 5 SCR 729; State of Karnataka v. Laxuman (2005) 8 SCC 709 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 535 – relied on State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and Ors (2015) C 5 SCC 321 : [2014] 14 SCR 1451 – referred to 14.2 There has to be legal certainty where infrastructure has been created or has been developed partially, and investments have been made, especially when land has been acquired long back. It is the duty of the Court to preserve the legal certainty. D The doctrine of laches would always preclude an indolent party, who chooses not to approach the court, or having approached the court, allows an adverse decision to become final, to re-agitate the issue of acquisition of his holding. Doing so, especially in cases, where the title has vested with the State, and thereafter with subsequent interests, would be contrary to public policy. [Para 353][322 D-G] Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India and Ors (2012) 6 SCC 613 : [2012] 1 SCR 573; A.P. State Financial Corp. v. Garware Rolling Mill (1994) 2 F SCC 647 – relied on Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613 : [1970] 3 SCR 830; Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty and Anr (2018) 16 SCC 228 : [2018] 3 SCR 884; Anil Kumar G Gupta v. the State of Bihar (2012) 12 SCC 443; Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 558 – referred to British Railway Board v. Pickin (1974) AC 765 – referred to H

40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 14.3 Section 24 cannot be used to revive dead and stale claims and concluded cases. They cannot be inquired into within the purview of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. The provisions of Section 24 do not invalidate the judgments and orders of the Court, where rights and claims have been lost and negatived. There is no revival of the barred claims by operation of law. Thus, B stale and dead claims cannot be permitted to be canvassed on the pretext of enactment of Section 24. In exceptional cases, when in fact, the payment has not been made, but possession has been taken, the remedy lies elsewhere if the case is not covered by the proviso. It is the Court to consider it independently not under C section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. [Para 359][325 C-E]

15. Section 101 provides that in case land is not utilized for five years from the date of taking over the possession, the same shall be returned to the original owner or owners or their legal heirs, as the case may be, or to the Land Bank of the appropriate D Government by reversion in the manner as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government. Section 24 deals with lapse of acquisition. Section 101 cannot be said to be applicable to an acquisition made under the Act of 1894. The provision of lapse has to be considered on its own strength and not by virtue of Section 101 though the spirit is to give back the land to the original owner or owners or the legal heirs or to the Land Bank. Return of lands is with respect to all lands acquired under the Act of 2013 as the expression used in the opening part is “When any land, acquired under this Act remains unutilized”. Lapse, on the other hand, occurs when the State does not take steps in terms of Section 24(2). The provisions of Section 101 cannot be applied to the acquisitions made under the Act of 1894. [Paras 360, 361][325 E-F][326 A-C] Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr v Harakchand Misrimal Solanki & Ors (2014) 3 SCC 183 : [2014] 1 G SCR 783; Sree Balaji Nagar Residents Association v State of Tamil Nadu (2015) 3 SCC 353 : [2014] 7 SCR 799 – overuled Yogesh Neema & Ors v State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 6 SCC 387; Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Super H

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 41

Cassette Industries Ltd. (2008) 13 SCC 30 : [2008] 9 A SCR 165; Southern Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd. v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill (2012) 2 SCC 108 : [2011] 15 SCR 211; D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India & Ors (2003) 6 SCC 186 : [2003] 3 SCR 1209; Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi (2008) B 4 SCC 720 : [2008] 3 SCR 330; Indore Development Authority v Shailendra (dead) through Lrs. & Ors. (2018) SCC Online SC 100; N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose & Ors (2009) 7 SCC 1 : [2009] 7 SCR 668; Ram Narain v. Stte of U.P. AIR 1957 SC 18 : [1956] SCR 664; Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India C (2002) 3 SCC 722 : [2002] 2 SCR 369; Collector of Central Excise v. Elphinstone Spg.&Wvg.Mills Co.Ltd. (1971)1 SCC 337 : J.Dalmia v Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1964 SC 1866 : [1964] SCR 579; Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd v. Kirusa Software (P) L t d D (2018) 1 SCC 353 : [2017] 10 SCR 1006; Sri K.C Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa [1954] SCR 11; Jagannath Temple Managing Committee v. Siddha Math (2015) 16 SCC 542 : [2015] SCR 46; Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 800 : [1977] 1 SCR 875; Chandragauda Ramgonda E Patil and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 405; Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agarwal (2011) 5 SCC 394 : [2011] 7 SCR 435; Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, (1976) 1 SCC 700 : [1975] Suppl. SCR 250; State of T.N. v. F Mahalakshmi Ammal, (1996) 7 SCC 269 : [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 451; T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam, (1996) 8 SCC 259 : [1996] 2 SCR 402; Om Prakash Verma & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors, (2010) 13 SCC 158 : [2010] 15 SCR 302; A.R. Antulay vs R.S.Nayak & Ors [1988] Suppl 1 SCR 01; Cardio G Vascular Diseases (2014) 2 SCC 62 : [2013] 12 SCR 674; Dau Dayal v State of U.P. [1959] Supp 1 SCR 639; South Eastern Coal Field Ltd v State of M.P. & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 648 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 651; Dev Sharan v State of Uttar Pradesh (2011) 4 H

42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A SCC 769 : [2011] 3 SCR 728; Radhey Shyam v State of UP. (2011) 5 SCC 553 : [2011] 8 SCR 359; Bharat Sewak Samaj v. Lieutnant Governor & Ors. (2012) 12 SCC 675; Madhav Rao Scindhia v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 85 : [1971] 3 SCR 9 (11 Judges); Smt. Parayankandiyal Eravath v. K. Devi (1996) 4 SCC 76 B : [1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 1 (2 Judges); Bharat Kumar v State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 586; Bimla Devi v State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 583; State of Haryana v Vinod Oil and General Mills (2014) 15 SCC 410 : [2014] 13 SCR 524; Sita Ram v State of Haryana (2015) C 3 SCC 597; Ram Kishan v State of Haryana (2015) 4 SCC 347; Competent Automobiles Co. Ltd v Union of India AIR 2015 SC 3186 : [2015] SCR 237; Govt of NCT of Delhi v Jagjit Singh AIR 2015 SC 2683 : [2015] SCR 692; Karan Singh v State of Haryana (2014) 5 SCC 738; Shashi Gupta & Ors. v. State of Haryana D (2016) 13 SCC 380; Delhi Development Authority v Sukhbir Singh (2016) 16 SCC 258 : [2016] 5 SCR 227; Ivo Agnelo Santimano Fernandes v. State of Goa (2011) 11 SCC 506 : [2011] 2 SCR 1142; Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551 : [2005] 1 SCR 1019; E Central Railway Workshop v. Vishwanath (1969) 3 SCC 95; [1970] 2 SCR 726; M/s International Ore and Fertilisers (india) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Employee State Insurance (1987) 4 SCC 203 : [1987] 3 SCR 981; Seksaria Cotton mills v. State of Bombay [1953] SCR 325; Superintendent v. Anil Kumar (1979) 4 SCC 274 : F [1980] 1 SCR 323; B. Gangadhar v. Rajalingam (1995) 5 SCC 238 : [1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 535; Guruchand Singh v. Kamla Singh (1976) 2 SCC 152 : [1976] 1 SCR 739 (67); Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2015) 6 SCC 222 : [2015] 5 SCR 435; The Commissioner of G Sales Tax v. Parson Tools and Plants (1975) 4 SCC 22; G. Narayanswami v. G. Pannerselvam (1972) 3 SCC 71; Kuldip Nayar vs Union Of India (2006) 7 SCC 1 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 1; Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights vs. Union of India (1998) 2 SCC 109 : [1997] 5 Suppl. SCR 469; R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay H

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 43

(1984) 2 SCC 183 : [1984] 2 SCR 495; Life Insurance A Corporation v D. J. Bahadur (1981) 1 SCC 315 : [1981] 1 SCR 1083; B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal (2011) 4 SCC 266 : [2011] 3 SCR 932; Martin Burn Ltd v Corporation of Calcutta [1966] 1 SCR 543; Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v Keshab B Chandra Mandal [1950] SCR 435; State of Maharastra v Nanded Parbhani Sangh (2000) 2 SCC 69 : [2000] 1 SCR 357; Mohd. Kavi v. Fatmabal Ibrahim (1997) 6 SCC 71; M.V. Javali v Mahajan Borewell & Co. Ltd (1997) 8 SCC 72 : [1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 320; SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89 : C [2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 371; State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh [1955] 1 SCR 893; J.K.Cotton Spg. & Wvg.Mils Ltd. v. Union of India (1987) Supp SCC 350 : [1988] SCR 700; Bengal Immunity Co.Ltd. v. State of Bihar [1955] 2 SCR 603; MIG Cricket Club D v.AbhinavSahakar Education Society, (2011) 9 SCC 97 : [2011] 11 SCR 141; Ishwar Singh Bindra & Ors v State of UP [1969] 1 SCR 219 – referred to Giward de Walden (Lord) v. IRS (1948) 2 ALL ER 825 (HL); Secretary of State for Social Security v Tunnicliffe [1991] 2 All ER 712; Howard de Walden (Lord) v. IRC, E (1948) 2 All ER 825 (HL); Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy State Co. L.R (1928) 1 KB 561 – referred to Case Law Reference F (2016) 6 SCC 387 referred to Para 2 [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 24 referred to Para 23 [2008] 3 SCR 330 referred to Para 23 [2010] 3 SCR 485 referred to Para 23 G [2013] 8 SCR 849 referred to Para 31 [1956] SCR 664 referred to Para 31 [2002] 2 SCR 369 referred to Para 34 (1971)1 SCC 337 referred to Para 38 H

44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A [1964] SCR 579 referred to Para 38 [2017] 10 SCR 1006 referred to Para 44 [1971] SCR 977 referred to Para 44 [1969] 1 SCR 219 referred to Para 44 B [1987] 2 SCR 911 referred to Para 44 [1955] 2 SCR 603 referred to Para 47 [1954] SCR 11 referred to Para 47 [2015] SCR 46 referred to Para 47 C [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 534 referred to Para 50 [1977] 1 SCR 875 referred to Para 50 [2009] 14 SCR 507 relied on Para 50 (1996) 6 SCC 405 referred to Para 50 D [2011] 7 SCR 435 referred to Para 50 [1975] Suppl. SCR 250 referred to Para 51 [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 451 referred to Para 51 [1996] 2 SCR 402 referred to Para 51 E [2010] 15 SCR 302 referred to Para 51 [1988] Suppl 1 SCR 01 referred to Para 52 [2013] 12 SCR 674 referred to Para 52

F [1959] Supp 1 SCR 639 referred to Para 52 [2011] 3 SCR 728 referred to Para 53 [2011] 8 SCR 359 referred to Para 53 (2012) 12 SCC 675 referred to Para 53 G [1971] 3 SCR 9 referred to Para 55 [1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 55 (2014) 6 SCC 586 referred to Para 58 (2014) 6 SCC 583 referred to Para 58 H [2014] 13 SCR 524 referred to Para 58

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 45

(2015) 3 SCC 597 referred to Para 58 A (2015) 4 SCC 347 referred to Para 58 [2015] SCR 237 referred to Para 58 [2015] SCR 692 referred to Para 58 (2014) 5 SCC 738 referred to Para 58 B (2016) 13 SCC 380 referred to Para 58 [2016] 5 SCR 227 referred to Para 58 [2011] 2 SCR 1142 referred to Para 59 C [2005] 1 SCR 1019 referred to Para 63 [1970] 2 SCR 726 referred to Para 63 [1987] 3 SCR 981 referred to Para 63 [1953] SCR 325 referred to Para 67 D [1980] 1 SCR 323 referred to Para 67 [1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 535 referred to Para 67 [1976] 1 SCR 739 referred to Para 67 [2015] 5 SCR 435 referred to Para 67 E [2007] 12 SCR 105 referred to Para 69 (1975) 4 SCC 22 referred to Para 70 (1972) 3 SCC 71 referred to Para 70 [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 70 F [1997] 5 Suppl. SCR 469 referred to Para 73 [1984] 2 SCR 495 referred to Para 73 [1981] 1 SCR 1083 referred to Para 73 [2011] 3 SCR 932 referred to Para 79 G [1966] 1 SCR 543 referred to Para 82 [1950] SCR 435 referred to Para 82 [2000] 1 SCR 357 referred to Para 82 (1997) 6 SCC 71 referred to Para 82 H

46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A [1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 320 referred to Para 82 [2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 371 referred to Para 82 [1955] 1 SCR 893 referred to Para 84 [1988] SCR 700 referred to Para 86 B [1955]2 SCR 603 referred to Para 86 [2011] 11 SCR 141 referred to Para 87 [1965] SCR 328 relied on Para 97 (1971) 2 SCC 540 relied on Para 97 C [1961] SCR 718 relied on Para 101 [2005] 2 SCR 23 relied on Para 101 [1987] 2 SCR 911 relied on Para 101 [1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 244 relied on Para 103 D [1964] SCR 561 relied on Para 104 [1957] 1 SCR 874 relied on Para 104 [1965] 2 SCR 853 referred to Para 106 [1976] 1 SCR 505 referred to Para 107 E [1980] 1 SCR 910 referred to Para 108 [1992] 3 SCR 634 referred to Para 109 [1958] SCR 1156 relied on Para 120

F [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 127 relied on Para 121 [1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 405 relied on Para 125 [2004] 3 SCR 854 referred to Para 126 [1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 158 referred to Para 128 G [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 534 referred to Para 128 [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 336 relied on Para 135 [2009] 14 SCR 905 relied on Para 136 [1996] 2 SCR 1088 relied on Para 137 H [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 197 relied on Para 138

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 47

[1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 426 relied on Para 139 A [2010] 7 SCR 204 relied on Para 140 [1952] SCR 612 referred to Para140 [1961] SCR 679 referred to Para 140 [1965] SCR 970 referred to Para 140 B [1980] 1 SCR 1177 referred to Para 140 [2003] 1 SCR 653 referred to Para 140 [2004] 3 SCR 834 referred to Para 140 C [1989] 1 SCR 986 referred to Para 140 [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 357 referred to Para 140 [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 448 referred to Para 140 [2008] 17 SCR 35 referred to Para 140 D [1961] 2 SCR 189 referred to Para 142 1996 (7) JT 118 relied on Para 145 [1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 6 relied on Para 146 [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 787 relied on Para 147 E [1996] 2 SCR 638 relied on Para 147 [1957] SCR 01 relied on Para 147 [2016] 1 SCR 343 relied on Para 148 [2017] 9 SCR 482 relied on Para 149 F [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 400 relied on Para 158 [2015] 7 SCR 56 relied on Para 159 [1966] 1 SCR 890 relied on Para 160 [1964] 1 SCR 897 relied on Para 160 G [2011] 15 SCR 211 referred to Para 160 [1989] 2 SCR 544 referred to Para 160 [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 387 referred to Para 160 [2003] 3 SCR 1209 referred to Para 160 H

48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 24 referred to Para 160 [2007] 13 SCR 598 referred to Para 160 [2008] 3 SCR 330 referred to Para 160 [2008] 9 SCR 165 referred to Para 160 B [2009] 7 SCR 668 referred to Para 160 [2010] 3 SCR 485 referred to Para 160 [2013] 1 SCR 1 referred to Para 160 [1962] 1 SCR 44 relied on Para 166 C [1955] SCR 1196 relied on Para 166 (2000) 5 SCC 488 relied on Para 166 [2016] 5 SCR 227 referred to Para 166 [2002] 2 SCR 383 referred to Para 166 D [2013] 8 SCR 241 relied on Para 166 [2011] 3 SCR 932 referred to Para 166 [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 517 referred to Para 166 [2017] 14 SCR 202 referred to Para 171 E [1953] SCR 1 relied on Para 178 [2005] 1 SCR 223 relied on Para 179 [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 734 relied on Para 180

F [2017] 13 SCR 25 referred to Para 180 [1982] 3 SCR 121 referred to Para 181 [1965] 1 SCR 276 relied on Para 190 [1967] 1 SCR 831 relied on Para 190 G [1968] SCR 148 relied on Para 190 [1985] 2 SCR 643 relied on Para 191 [1966] 1 SCR 367 relied on Para 193 [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1039 relied on Para 193 H [2013] 14 SCR 136 relied on Para 193

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 49

[1965] 3 SCR 626 relied on Para 193 A AIR 1961 SC 1596 relied on Para 193 [1976] 1 SCR 277 relied on Para 193 [1959] (Supp) 2 SCR 256 relied on Para 193 [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 227 relied on Para 193 B [1985] 2 SCR 1051 relied on Para194 [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 276 relied on Para 194 AIR (34) 1947 PC 94 relied on Para 194 C [1962] (Supp 3) SCR 318 relied on Para 212 [1965] 1 SCR 998 relied on Para 213 [1970] 1 SCR 669 relied on Para 214 [2012] 12 SCR 327 relied on Para 219 D [1955] 2 SCR 842 relied on Para 221 [1989] 1 SCR 570 relied on Para 222 [1999] 2 SCR 1111 relied on Para 222 [2003] 1 SCR 1159 relied on Para 222 E [2003] 2 SCR 1 relied on Para 222 (1969) 3 SCC 392 relied on Para 231 [1980] 3 SCR 179 relied on Para 232 [1998] 3 SCR 1088 relied on Para 232 F [2009] 6 SCR 703 relied on Para 236 [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 358 relied on Para 236 (1990) Supp SCC 806 relied on Para 237 [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 584 relied on Para 238 G [1997] 3 SCR 1096 relied on Para 239 [1980] 1 SCR 323 relied on Para 251 (2004) 3 SCC 684 relied on Para 252 [1959] (Suppl 2) SCR 798 relied on Para 252 H

50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A [2012] 10 SCR 603 relied on Para 254 [2011] 14 SCR 472 relied on Para 255 [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 50 referred to Para 257 [1996] 2 SCR 643 relied on Para 263 B (2005) 12 SCC 489 relied on Para 264 [2015] 15 SCR 499 relied on Para 266 (2017) 13 SCC 474 relied on Para 267 [2017] 13 SCR 1053 referred to Para 267 C [1976] 3 SCR 76 distinguished Para 268 (1979) 3 SCC 106 distinguished Para 268 [1980] 1 SCR 6 distinguished Para 269 (1988) Supp. SCC 488 distinguished Para 269 D [2011] 14 SCR 1113 Not correct law Para 271 [2012] 3 SCR 841 relied on Para 272 [2012] 3 SCR 841 relied on Para 273 [2009] 10 SCR 1084 relied on Para 274 E [2012] 10 SCR 603 relied on Para 275 [2008] 17 SCR 120 referred to Para 281 (2015) 4 SCC 325 overuled Para 277

F [2011] 6 SCR 443 overuled Para 277 [1961] 2 SCR 295 referred to Para 289 [1988] 3 SCR 384 referred to Para 289 (1999) 6 SCC 459 referred to Para 290 G [1986] 3 SCR 587 referred to Para 291 [1979] 3 SCR 709 referred to Para 292 [2001] 2 SCR 714 referred to Para 294 [1997] 3 SCR 931 relied on Para 299 H [2010] 2 SCR 447 relied on Para 300

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 51

[1990] 1 SCR 186 relied on Para 301 A [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 115 relied on Para 302 [2014] 8 SCR 751 distinguished Para 305 (2015) 3 SCC 206 distinguished Para 305 (2015) 3 SCC 541 distinguished Para 305 B [2014] 7 SCR 799 overuled Para 305 [1989] 3 SCR 455 referred to Para 306 [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 222 referred to Para 309 C [2013] 14 SCR 58 referred to Para 310 [1999] 3 SCR 594 referred to Para 311 [1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 754 referred to Para 313 [2000] 2 SCR 871 referred to Para 313 D [2002] 2 SCR 1093 referred to Para 314 [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 282 referred to Para 315 [1975] 1 SCR 504 relied on Para 316 [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 49 relied on Para 317 E [1962] SCR 290 referred to Para 318 (1998) 3 SCC 376 referred to Para 321 (2005) 8 SCC 423 referred to Para 321 [1980] 2 SCR 765 referred to Para 321 F [1995] 1 SCR 543 referred to Para 322 [2009] 15 SCR 1010 referred to Para 322 [2004] 1 SCR 965 referred to Para 323 [1975] Suppl. SCR 365 distinguished Para 325 G [2017] 4 SCR 881 held inapplicable Para 326 [1978] 2 SCR 1 referred to Para 330 [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 651 referred to Para 332 H

52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A [2012] 2 SCR 1127 relied on Para 333 [2012] 4 SCR 74 relied on Para 334 [2011] 9 SCR 146 relied on Para 334 (1980) 2 SCC 191 relied on Para 334 B [1992] 2 SCR 378 relied on Para 334 [1999] 1 SCR 311 relied on Para 334 [2010] 10 SCR 971 relied on Para 335 [2006] 2 SCR 390 relied on Para 336 C 2019 (13) SCALE 698 relied on Para 337 [2017] 11 SCR 553 relied on Para 339 [2014] 14 SCR 1451 referred to Para 341 [1984] 3 SCR 417 relied on Para 344 D [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 663 relied on Para 345 [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 551 relied on Para 346 [2008] 4 SCR 616 relied on Para 346 [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 513 relied on Para 346 E [2017] 3 SCR 921 relied on Para 347 [2008] 2 SCR 521 relied on Para 348 [1998] 2 SCR 339 relied on Para 348

F (2003) 12 SCC 538 relied on Para 348 [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 512 relied on Para 348 (1990) 2 SCC 268 relied on Para 348 [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 916 relied on Para 350 G [1970] 2 SCR 697 relied on Para 350 [2007] 5 SCR 729 relied on Para 351 [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 535 relied on Para 352 [2012] 1 SCR 573 relied on Para 353 H

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 53

(1994) 2 SCC 647 relied on Para 353 A [1970] 3 SCR 830 referred to Para 355 [2018] 3 SCR 884 referred to Para 355 (2012) 12 SCC 443 referred to Para 355 [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 558 referred to Para 355 B [2014] 1 SCR 783 overuled Para 362 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 9036-9038 of 2016. From the Judgment and Order dated 30.11.2015 of the High Court C of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in Writ Appeal Nos. 514, 799 and 772 of 2006. With Civil Appeal Nos. 4835 of 2015, 19356, 19362, 19361, 19358, 19357, 19360, 19359, 19363, 19364, 19412 of 2017, S.L.P.(C) Nos. 30577- D 30580 of 2015, 9798-9799, 17088-17089, 37375, 37372, 16573-16605. 34752-34753 of 2016, 15890, 33022, 33114, 33127 of 2017, 30452 of 2018, 16051 of 2019, M.A. No. 1423 of 2017 in C.A. No. 12247 of

2016. M.A. No.1787 of 2017 in C.A. No. 10210 of 2016, M.A. No. 1786 of 2017 in C.A. No. 10207 of 2016, M.A. No. 45 of 2018 in C.A. E No. 6239 of 2017, Diary No. 23842 of 2018, C.C. No.15967 of 2016. Tushar Mehta, SG, Ms. Pinki Anand, ASG, B.K. Satija, Ajay Bansal, AAGs, R. Balasubramanian, Shyam Divan, Manoj Swarup, Gopal Sankarnarayanan, Anoop George Chaudhari, Ms. June Chaudhari, Guru Krishna Kumar, V. Shekhar, K.S. Namdar, Shekhar Naphade, Pritesh F Kapoor, Rameshwar Singh Malik, Dhruv Mehta, Anukul Chandra Pradhan, K. Shashi Kiran Shetty, Mohan Parasaran, Jayanth Muthraj, K. Radhakrishnan, Sr. Advs., Kanu Agarwal, Manan Popli, Rajeev Ranjan, Shantnu Sharma, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Jesal Wahi, Ms. Puja Singh, Ashwani Kumar Dhatwalia, Ms. Garima Prashad, Sumit Teterwal, Ms. Saudamini Sharma, Ms. Snidha Mehra, Ms. Kriti Dua, G Hemant Arya, Ms. Tanisha Samanta, Chakitan V.S. Papta, Ms. Ashita Goyal, Ankur Talwar, Prashant Singh, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Vinod Kumar, Ashwani Kumar, Ms. Peeha Verma, Ravinder Nain, Aayush Agarwala, Anuj Agarwala, Abhinav Malhotra, Sudipto Sircar, Bhav Ratan, Pramod B. Agarwala, Siddharth Batra, Gaurav Agrawal, Avishkar Singhvi, Harsh H

54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Parashar, Nipun Katyal, Ms. Tanvi Bhatnagar, Rahul Kaushik, Dhruv Surana, R. Anand Padmanabhan, Aravind C., Shashi Bhushan Kumar, Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Kamalendra Mishra, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, S. K. Rajora, Akhileshwar Jha, Ms. Sandya Sharma, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Sagar N. Pahune Patil, Ms. S. Lakshmi Iyer, Abhikalp Pratap Singh, Ms. Aishwarya Dash, Durgesh Gupta, A.P. Mayee, A. Rajarajan, B Sanjeev Kumar Choudhary, Jitesh Malik, Ms. Beena, Satish Kumar, Siddharth Batra, Ms. Garima Sehgal, Ms. Sugandha Sharma, Ram Sankar, Om Prakash Kumar Srivastava, Ashish Chaubey, G. Chitrakala, Ms. Maafi, R.K.V. Suhas, R.V. Kameshwaran, Mahesh Thakur, B.S. Srinivas, Mrs. Vipasha Singh, C Sharan Thakur, Siddharth Thakur, Vijay Kumar Pardesi, Shailesh Madiyal, Sudhanshu Parkash, Kartik Anand, Ms. Sheffali Chaudhary, Zoheb Hossain, Ms. Adeeba Mujahid, Ms. Aditi Dani, Ashwin Kumar DS, Piyush Goyal, Vivek Gurnani, Agni Sen, Sanjeev Menon, Ms. Purbita Mitra, Ms. A. Jaswanthi, K.V. Vijayakumar, Anandh Kannan, Deepak Goel, D Kamal Kumar Pandey, Baldev Atreya, Ajay Kumar Singh, Ms. Neelum Goel, Gaurav Yadava, Mrs. Veena Bansal, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Prashant Bhushan, Omanakuttan K.K., Ms. Anannya Ghosh, Abhimanue Shrestha, Pallav Mongia, Abhisth Kumar, Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, Yashraj Singh Deora, Ashok Arora, Dr. Sushil Balwada, Vivek Mishra, Ms. Mansha Shukla, Chandan Kumar, Madhu Prakash, Rituraj Biswas, Rituraj E Choudhary, Hemant Kushwaha, Chand Qureshi, Rajat Verma, Hiren Dasan, Sanjay Kapur, Ms. Megha Karnwal, Bharath Gangadharan, Harshal Narayan, V.M. Khanna, Ms. Shubhra Kapur, Pramod Dayal, Ms. Shashi Kiran, Dr. Satish Chandra, Ms. Usha Mishra, Manoj Jain, Shankar Chillarge (for M/s. Lawyer’s Knit & Co.), Ms. Rachana F Srivastava, Vishnu B. Saharya, Viresh B. Saharya (for M/s. Saharya & Co.), Ms. Rashmi Nandakumar, Ms. Ayushma Awasthi, Shankar Narayanan, Dr. D.V. Rao, B.V. Balaram Das, Kunal Verma, Vinay Kumar Shailendra, Ms. Deepika V. Marawaha, Chandra Bhushan Prasad, Siddhartha Chowdhury, Muhammad Ali Khan, Omar Hoda, Sparsh Prasad, Anurag Singh, Gaurav Goel, S.K. Raut, R.K. Dudeja, G Sachin Gupta, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Vikas Kumar, Ajay Choudhary, M. Ram Babu, Vikrant Yadav, Puneet Chugh, Sudarsh Menon, Ravindra A. Lokhande, Samarandra Beura, Ram Gupta, Keshav Ranjan, Manish Paliwal, Senthil Jagadeesan, Ambhoj Kumar Sinha, R.V. Kameshwaran, Vikas Mehta, Apoorv Khator, Vasanth H Bharani, Mithun Shashank, Abhinav Ramkrishna, Arun K. Sinha,

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 55

Paramasivam, M. Yogesh Kanna, Munawwar Naseem, C.L. Sahu, A Satish Kumar, Rajesh Mahale, Ritesh Khatri, Mrs. Balvinder Kaur Brar, Rajesh Kumar Jha, Dr. M.S. Verma, Ms. Ranjana Vohra, Rakesh Kumar Yadav, Ms. Alpana Malik, Dinesh K. Mudgal, Ms. Shashi Singh, Rajnish Kumar Jha, Yash Pal Dhingra, Divyakant Lahoti, Manish Kaushik, Ms. Amrita Grover, Parikshit Ahuja, Kartik Lahoti, Ms. Praveena Bisht, B Madhur Jhavar, Rajiv Kataria, Ms. Debjani Das P. (for M/s. Delhi Law Chambers), K. Parameshwar, P.V. Dinesh, Ms. Sindhu T.P., Mukund P. Unny, Aniruddha Deshmukh, Rajesh Srivastava, Ms. Suresh Kumari, Yatin M. Jagtap, Rabin Majumder, Sourav Roy, Harsh Anand, Gaurav Majumdar, Ms. Devika Khanna, Yash Ahlawat, Mrs. V.D. Khanna, Manish K. Bishnoi, M/s. S. Narain & Co., Shree Pal Singh, Balaji C Srinivasan, Anupam Raina, Sunando Raha, Arindam Das, Kunal Malik, Dr. Sumant Bharadwaj, Ms. Mridula Ray Bhardwaj, Amol Chitravanshi, Ms. Rinchen Wangmo, Vedant Bharadwaj, Sangam Lal Pandey, Biswajit Das, Hardeep Singh, Anamika Sharma, Abhigya, Varinder Kumar Sharma, Varun Thakur, S. Sharma, Ms. Mandakini Singh, Ms. Sukhmani D Bajwa, Syed Imtiyaz Ali, Ali Safeer Farooqui, Aftab Ali Khan, M.Z. Chaudhry, Ms. Mumtaz Alam Siddiqui, Keshav Thakur, Arvind Kumar K., Aniruddha P. Mayee, R.M. Bhangde, Shivkant Mishra, Hara Prasad Sahu, Vishal Arun Mishra, Pawan Kumar, Pranay Kumar M., Ms. Binu Tamta, Dhruv Tamta, Pankaj Pandey, Advs. for the appearing parties.