TAMIL NADU POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD v. STERLITE INDUSTRIES (I) LTD. & ORS.

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subsection (3A) (“the alternative conditions”) are satisfied in A relation to those proceedings, and (b) that a sufficient case for an appeal to the Supreme Court under this Part of this Act has been made out to justify an application for leave to bring such an appeal, ... (c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B

the judge, subject to the following provisions of this Part of this Act, may grant a certificate to that effect. (2) This section applies to any civil proceedings in the High Court which are either— C (a) proceedings before a single judge of the High Court (including a person acting as such a judge under section 3 of the Judicature Act 1925), or (b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D (c) proceedings before a Divisional Court. (3) Subject to any Order in Council made under the following provisions of this section, for the purposes of this section the relevant conditions, in relation to a decision of the judge in any proceedings, are that a point of law of general public importance is involved in that decision and that that point of law either— E

(a) relates wholly or mainly to the construction of an enactment or of a statutory instrument, and has been fully argued in the proceedings and fully considered in the judgment of the judge in the proceedings, or F (b) is one in respect of which the judge is bound by a decision of the Court of Appeal or of the Supreme Court in previous proceedings, and was fully considered in the judgments given by the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court (as the case may be) in those previous proceedings. G xxx xxx xxx”

33Copy pinpoint33. To similar effect are sections of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act, 2007, and the Employment Tribunals Act, 1996. Such appeals in the U.K. are referred to as “leapfrog appeals” [see S Franses H

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A Ltd. v. The Cavendish Hotel (London) Ltd., [2018] UKSC 62 (at paragraph 7)].

34Copy pinpoint34. It is, therefore, clear that no such provisions, as are contained in the U.K. Acts, being present in any of the Acts that we are concerned with, such leapfrog appeals to the NGT would necessarily be without jurisdiction. (II) RE: ORDERS PASSED UNDER SECTION 33A OF THE WATER ACT AND SECTION 31A OF THE AIR ACT

35Copy pinpoint35. We have referred to the orders dated 12.04.2018, 23.05.2018, and 28.05.2018 passed by the TNPCB under Sections 33A and 31A of the Water Act and Air Act respectively. At this juncture, it is important to state that Section 33B of the Water Act and Section 31B of the Air Act were both enacted on 18.10.2010, which is the very date on which the NGT Act came into force. What is important to note is that whereas Section 33B(c) of the Water Act read with Section 16(c) of the NGT D Act make it clear that directions issued under Section 33A of the Water Act are appealable to the NGT, directions issued under Section 31A of the Air Act are not so appealable. In fact, the statutory scheme is that directions given under Section 31A of the Air Act are not appealable. This being the case, all the aforesaid orders, being composite orders issued under both the Water Act and the Air Act, it will not be possible to split the aforesaid orders and say that so far as they affect water pollution, they are appealable to the NGT, but so far as they affect air pollution, a suit or a writ petition would lie against such orders. Shri Sundaram’s argument that these orders being substantially relatable to the Water Act would, therefore, not hold, as such orders are composite orders made both under the Water Act and the Air Act. Equally disingenuous is the reference to Section 14 of the NGT Act which only refers to the original jurisdiction of the NGT and not to its appellate jurisdiction. Also, to state generally that the subject matter of environment lies with the NGT, is an argument of despair that must be dismissed for the reason that as held by us hereinabove, an appeal being a creature of statute, a G statute either confers a right of appeal or it does not. In the present case, we have seen that so far as directions issued under Section 31A of the Air Act are concerned, there is no right of appeal conferred by the Air Act read with the NGT Act. The ingenious argument made by Shri Sundaram that, in any case, a “direction” under Section 31A of the Air H Act is nothing but an “order”, and would, therefore, be appealable as

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such under Section 31B of the Air Act read with Section 16(f) of the A NGT Act would drive a coach-and-four through the statutory scheme that has just been adverted to. We have seen how all the appellate proceedings to the NGT, whether under the Air Act, the Water Act, or the NGT Act have been brought into force on the same date. Whereas the identical power to give directions by the Board under the Water Act B is appealable to the NGT, the same power to give directions by the Board under the Air Act is not so appealable. The absence of any mention of Section 31A in Section 31B of the Air Act, given the statutory scheme as aforesaid, makes it clear that even this argument must be rejected. Also, “directions” that are issued under Section 31A of the Air Act are of a different quality from “orders” referred to in Section 31 of the same C Act. Directions are issued in the exercise of powers and performance of functions under the Act and are not quasi-judicial in nature, whereas orders that are appealed against under Section 31 are quasi-judicial orders made, inter alia, under Section 21 of the Air Act. For this reason also, we cannot accept the aforesaid argument of Shri Sundaram. However, D Shri Sundaram argued, with particular reference to the explanation to Section 31A of the Air Act that “directions” partake of the nature of “orders” when closure of any particular industry or stoppage of supply of electricity qua any single industry is made, and therefore, such directions are appealable as orders under Section 31 of the Air Act. This argument is also of no avail as Section 33A of the Water Act contains an E identical explanation to that contained in Section 31A of the Air Act. Despite this, the legislative scheme, as stated hereinabove, is that so far as directions under the Water Act are concerned, they are appealable, but so far as directions under the Air Act are concerned, they are not appealable. Hence, reference made to P. Ramanatha Aiyer’s Law F Lexicon and Black’s Law Dictionary, which state that in certain circumstances, orders are also directions and vice versa, would not apply to the present case, given the express statutory scheme. In this connection, Shri Sundaram cited Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi, (1985) 4 SCC 678, and relied upon paragraph 17, where this Court held, referring to Article 324(1) of the Constitution of India, that a “direction” may be G equated with a specific or a general order. The context of Article 324 being wholly different, it is obvious that this authority also has no application, given the statutory scheme in the present case.

36Copy pinpoint36. Shri Sundaram then cited Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh H

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A Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27. In this judgment, the High Court had struck down Regulation 104 of the Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Boards Regulations, 1977, by which, no re- evaluation of an answer book given in an examination can be undertaken. In setting aside the High Court judgment, this Court stated that the process of re-evaluation of answer papers is extremely time consuming, would involve several thousand man-hours, and is bound to throw the entire system out of gear. Further, it is in public interest that the results of public examinations, when published, should have some finality attached to them [see paragraph 27]. It is in this context that this Court held: “29. …… It is equally important that the Court should also, as far as possible, avoid any decision or interpretation of a statutory provision, rule or bye-law which would bring about the result of rendering the system unworkable in practice. ……” To bodily lift the aforesaid sentence and apply it to the fact situation here would be a huge leap which we are not prepared to make. Further, D given the statutory scheme as aforesaid, it is not possible for us to provide an appeal where there is none in the guise of making an appellate system workable in practice.

37Copy pinpoint37. Shri Sundaram then relied upon this Court’s judgments in Galada Power & Telecommunication Ltd. v. United India E Insurance Co. Ltd., (2016) 14 SCC 161 and Allokam Peddabbayya v. Allahabad Bank, (2017) 8 SCC 272 for the proposition that the right of appeal is a statutory right, and like all other statutory rights, it can be waived, unless its waiver is detrimental to public interest. The question in these appeals is not whether an appellant may waive a statutory right F of appeal. The question is whether the NGT, which is only invested with the jurisdiction of entertaining an appeal from an order of an appellate authority, is jurisdictionally capable of entertaining an appeal directly from the original authority. It is clear, as has been held by us, that the NGT possesses no such jurisdiction.

38Copy pinpoint38. One further argument was made that these matters are only procedural, and therefore, substantially, an appeal to the NGT would be maintainable. It is well settled that the right to appeal is not a procedural matter but a substantive one. In Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, 1957 SCR 488, this Court held:

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“From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly A emerge: (i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. B (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. C

(iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise.” (at pp. 514-515) This argument must, therefore, be rejected. (III) RE: ORDER PASSED UNDER SECTION 18 OF THE WATER ACT F

39Copy pinpoint39. So far as the order dated 28.05.2018 is concerned, this order is expressly stated to be made under Section 18 of the Water Act. There is no doubt whatsoever that such an order is not appealable to the NGT either under the Water Act or under the NGT Act. However, Shri Sundaram has argued that Section 18 is referable to orders generally G made, and falls under Chapter IV of the Water Act, which deals with powers and functions of Boards, as opposed to the Sections that follow in Chapter V, which deals with prevention and control of water pollution, which orders are made against individuals and individual industries. On the assumption that Shri Sundaram is correct in this argument, it is clear H

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A that such order can only be set aside in a suit by a Civil Court, or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by a High Court. It is not possible to agree with the argument of Shri Sundaram that such orders can be ignored, being non est. It is settled that an administrative order, when made, does not bear the brand of invalidity on its forehead, as has been held in Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, [1956] 1 All E.R. B 855 (at page 871), which has been followed by this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, (1991) 4 SCC 1 (at page 6); Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd., (1997) 3 SCC 443 (at page 455); Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 211 (at page 225); Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia C v. Bombay Environmental Action Group, (2011) 3 SCC 363 (at page 369); and Kandla Port v. Hargovind Jasraj, (2013) 3 SCC 182 (at page 193). Therefore, this order can only be set aside either in a suit, or by the High Court in the exercise of judicial review. Faced with this, Shri Sundaram then argued that though the said order states that it is traceable to Section 18 of the Water Act, it can, in fact, be traced to Section 29 of the same Act. Section 29 deals with the revisional power, in which the State Government is to pass a quasi-judicial order after hearing both the State Board and the person who is affected. Quite obviously, this order is not a quasi-judicial order as the State Government has not found it necessary to hear either the State Board, or any person affected by such order. Further, such order does not purport to be an order which either affirms or sets aside any order made under Sections 25, 26, or 27 of the Water Act. This argument of despair, therefore, must also be rejected.

40Copy pinpoint40. Shri Sundaram then argued that this Court in L. Chandra F Kumar (supra) made it clear that Tribunals that are set up, generally have the power of judicial review, save and except a challenge to the vires of the legislation under which such Tribunals are themselves set up. For this, he relied strongly upon paragraphs 90 and 93 of the judgment in L. Chandra Kumar (supra). It is important to notice that L. Chandra Kumar (supra) pertained to a Tribunal that was set up under Article G 323A of the Constitution of India. Under Article 323A(2)(d), the Administrative Tribunal so set up would be able to exercise the jurisdiction of all courts except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. This would mean that the Administrative Tribunal so set up could exercise the jurisdiction of all High Courts when it came H to the matters specified in Article 323A. This is further made clear by a

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conjoint reading of Section 14 and Section 28 of the Administrative A Tribunals Act, 1985, which read as follows: “14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to— (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All-India Service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services, being, in either case, a post filled by a civilian; (b) all service matters concerning— (i) a member of any All-India Service; or D (ii) a person not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in clause (c) appointed to any civil service of the Union or any civil post under the Union; or (iii) a civilian not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in clause (c) appointed to any defence services or a post connected with defence, and pertaining to the service of such member, person or civilian, in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government; (c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the Union concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) of clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by a State Government or any local or other authority or any corporation or society or other body, at the disposal of the Central Government for such appointment. Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that references to “Union” in this sub-section shall be construed as including references also to a Union Territory. H

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A (2) The Central Government may, by notification, apply with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification the provisions of sub-section (3) to local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India and to corporations or societies owned or controlled by Government, not being a local or other authority or corporation or society controlled or owned by a State Government: Provided that if the Central Government considers it expedient so to do for the purpose of facilitating transition to the scheme as envisaged by this Act, different dates may be so specified under this sub-section in respect of different classes of, or different categories under any class of, local or other authorities or corporations or societies. (3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall also exercise, on and from the date with effect from which the provisions of this sub-section apply to any local or other authority or corporation or society, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that date by all courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to— (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation or society; and (b) all service matters concerning a person other than a person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) appointed to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation or society and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with such affairs.” xxx xxx xxx “28. Exclusion of jurisdiction of courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.—On and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable under this Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any Service or post or service matters concerning members of any Service or persons appointed to any Service or post, no court except— H

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(a) the Supreme Court; or A (b) any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other corresponding law for the time being in force, shall have, or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning B such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment or such service matters.” Article 323B of the Constitution of India also provides for Tribunals for certain other matters which are specified by sub-clause (2) thereof. Suffice it to say that the NGT is not a Tribunal set up either under Article C 323A or Article 323B of the Constitution, but is a statutory Tribunal set up under the NGT Act. That such a Tribunal does not exercise the jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court is clear from a reading of Section 29 of the NGT Act (supra). Thus, a conjoint reading of Section 14 and Section 29 of the NGT Act must be contrasted with a conjoint D reading of Section 14 and Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

41Copy pinpoint41. It is in the context of Article 323A and the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 that this Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) has observed in paragraph 93 as follows: E “93. Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme F Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this G power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Court concerned H

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A may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.”

42Copy pinpoint42. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 222 [“BSNL”], this Court had to construe the appellate power that is contained in Section 14 of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997, by which, the TDSAT D was conferred with the power to hear and dispose of appeals against any direction, decision, or order of the TRAI. In this context, after distinguishing the judgment in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), this Court held: “108. Before the 2000 Amendment, the applications were required to be filed under Section 15 which also contained detailed procedure for deciding the same. While sub-section (2) of Section 15 used the word “orders”, sub-sections (3) and (4) thereof used the word “decision”. In terms of sub-section (5), the orders and directions of TRAI were treated as binding on the service providers, Government and all other persons concerned. Section 18 provided for an appeal against any decision or order of TRAI. Such an appeal could be filed before the High Court. The Amendment made in 2000 is intended to vest the original jurisdiction of TRAI in TDSAT and the same is achieved by Section 14(a). The appellate jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court is also vested in TDSAT by virtue of Section 14(b) but this does not include decision made by TRAI. Section 14-N provides for transfer to all appeals pending before the High Court to TDSAT and in terms of clause (b) of sub-section (2), TDSAT was required to proceed to deal with the appeal from the stage which was reached before such transfer or from any earlier stage or de novo as considered appropriate by it. Since the High Court while hearing appeal did not have the

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power of judicial review of subordinate legislation, the transferee adjudicatory forum i.e. TDSAT cannot exercise that power under Section 14(b).” xxx xxx xxx “114. …… From the above-extracted portion of the order it is evident that the Bench, which decided the matter, felt that the view taken by TDSAT would encourage rampant violation of the orders without any penal consequence and the entire scheme of the TRAI Act would become unworkable. The word “directions” used in Section 29 of the TRAI Act was interpreted to include orders and regulations in the context of the factual matrix of that case and the apprehension of the Court that Section 29 would otherwise become unworkable, but the same cannot be read as laying down a proposition of law that the words “direction”, “decision” or “order” used in Section 14(b) would include regulations framed under Section 36, which are in the nature of subordinate legislation.” D

xxx xxx xxx “123. In Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn. [(2010) 11 SCC 1] and State of Gujarat v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Assn. [(2012) 10 SCC 353 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1229 : (2013) 1 SCC E (Cri) 35 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 56 : (2012) 10 Scale 285], this Court applied the principles laid down in L. Chandra Kumar case [L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] and reiterated the importance of tribunals created for resolution of disputes but these judgments too have no bearing on the decision of the question formulated before us. F

124. In the result, the question framed by the Court is answered in the following terms: in exercise of the power vested in it under Section 14(b) of the TRAI Act, TDSAT does not have the jurisdiction to entertain the challenge to the regulations framed by TRAI under Section 36 of the TRAI Act.” G In the present case, it is clear that Section 16 of the NGT Act is cast in terms that are similar to Section 14(b) of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997, in that appeals are against the orders, decisions, directions, or determinations made under the various Acts mentioned in Section 16. It is clear, therefore, that under the NGT Act, H

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A the Tribunal exercising appellate jurisdiction cannot strike down rules or regulations made under this Act. Therefore, it would be fallacious to state that the Tribunal has powers of judicial review akin to that of a High Court exercising constitutional powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We must never forget the distinction between a superior court of record and courts of limited jurisdiction that was, in the felicitous language of Gajendragadkar, C.J., in Re: Special Reference, (1965) 1 SCR 413, made in the following words: “We ought to make it clear that we are dealing with the question of jurisdiction and are not concerned with the propriety or reasonableness of the exercise of such jurisdiction. Besides, in the case of a superior Court of Record, it is for the court to consider whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction or not. Unlike a Court of limited jurisdiction, the superior Court is entitled to determine for itself questions about its own jurisdiction. “Prima facie”, says Halsbury, “no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the cognizance of the particular court [Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol. 9, p. 349]”. E (at page 499) For this reason also, we are of the view that the State Government order made under Section 18 of the Water Act, not being the subject matter of any appeal under Section 16 of the NGT Act, cannot be “judicially reviewed” by the NGT. Following the judgment in BSNL F (supra), we are of the view that the NGT has no general power of judicial review akin to that vested under Article 226 of the Constitution of India possessed by the High Courts of this country. Shri Sundaram’s strong reliance on the NGT judgment dated 17.07.2014 in Wilfred v. Ministry of Environment and Forests must also be rejected as this NGT judgment does not state the law on this aspect correctly. This G contention is also without merit, and therefore, rejected.

43Copy pinpoint43. Shri Sundaram then argued that, in any case, this order is an order made by the State Government against the TNPCB, and is therefore, a direction to the TNPCB and not a direction to his client. If this were so, and the order had no effect on his client, there would have H been no necessity to file an appeal before the NGT against such order.

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We have seen, however, that this order has been challenged on merits by the respondent before the NGT. To then say that this order which is challenged would be defended on certain grounds, as a result of which, the NGT then gets vested with the jurisdiction to decide the same, is again to put the cart before the horse. It is clear that no appeal is provided against orders made under Section 18 of the Water Act, and the attempt to bring the NGT in by the backdoor, as it were, would, therefore, have to be rejected. Also, to argue that as against a writ court acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the NGT is an expert body set up only to deal with environmental matters, again does not answer the specific issue before this Court. As we have held earlier, an appeal being a creature of statute, an order passed under Section 18 of the Water Act C is either appealable or it is not. If it is not, no general argument as to the NGT being an expert body set up to hear environmental matters can be of any help.

44Copy pinpoint44. Equally, so far as the order dated 08.08.2013 is concerned, we have seen how the NGT stated that the doctrine of necessity would take over if an appellate authority under the Act is not properly constituted so that no appeal can then be effectively preferred. This, again, is an argument that cannot be countenanced. If an appellate authority is either not yet constituted, or not properly constituted, a leapfrog appeal to the NGT cannot be countenanced. As has been held by us supra, the NGT is only conferred appellate jurisdiction from an order passed in exercise of first appeal. Where there is no such order, the NGT has no jurisdiction.

45Copy pinpoint45. In conclusion, we are cognizant of the fact that the respondent’s plant has been shut down since 09.04.2018. Since we have set aside the impugned judgments of the NGT on the ground of maintainability, the order dated 22.01.2019 passed by the TNPCB, being a consequential order, is also set aside. The respondents are relegated to the position that the six orders impugned before the NGT, dealt with by the impugned judgment dated 15.12.2018, and the order dated 29.03.2013, dealt with by the final judgment dated 08.08.2013, are alive and operative. Given the fact that we are setting aside the NGT judgments involved in these appeals on the ground of maintainability, we state that it will be open for the respondents to file a writ petition in the High Court against all the aforesaid orders. If such writ petition is filed, it will be open for the respondent to apply for interim reliefs considering that their plant has been shut down since 09.04.2018. Also, since their plant has been so H

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A shut down for a long period, and they are exporting a product which is an important import substitute, the respondent may apply to the Chief Justice of the High Court for expeditious hearing of the writ petition, which will be disposed of on merits notwithstanding the availability of an alternative remedy in the case of challenge to the 09.04.2018 order of the TNPCB. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. B

Ankit Gyan Appeals disposed of.