CENTRAL PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA AGARWAL

424 [2019] SUPREME COURT 16 S.C.R. 424 REPORTS [2019] 16 S.C.R.

A B (Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010) C Right to Information Act, 2005 – Collegium system for appointment and elevation of judges to the Supreme Court and the High Courts; declaration of assets by judges, etc. – Information in context of – The respondent filed three applications under the RTI Act, 2005 seeking information regarding: 1) copies of the correspondence exchanged between constitutional authorities together with file notings, relating to the appointment of three Judges of the Supreme Court, who had superseded seniority of another three Judges by an application dated 23.01.2009; 2) a copy of the resolution dated 07.05.1997 of the Judges of the Supreme Court requiring every sitting Judge and all the future judges upon assuming office to make a declaration of assets by an application dated 10.¹¹.2007 and 3) on the basis of a newspaper report, the complete correspondence exchanged with the Chief Justice of India in regards to a Union Minister having allegedly approached a judge of the High court, through a lawyer to influence a judicial decision by an application dated 06.⁷.2009 – In an application dated 06.⁷.2009, the information was denied by the CPIO of the Supreme Court on the ground that the information sought by the respondent was not handled and dealt with by the Registry of the Supreme Court and neither maintained nor available with Registry – However, the Central Information G Commission (CIC) directed disclosure of information and observed that disclosure will not infringe upon the status of the Judges – The information sought in application 23.01.2009 was again denied by CPIO observing that the Supreme Court Registry did not deal with the matters pertaining to appointment of the Judges of the H Supreme Court – However, the CIC directed the furnishing of 424

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 425 AGARWAL information – Insofar as application dated 10.¹¹.2007 is concerned, it was also dismissed by the CPIO and the CIC again directed the CPIO of the Supreme Court to provide the information asked by the respondent in his RTI application unless, the disclosure of information was exempted by law – The appellant instituted writ petition before the Delhi High Court and the same was dismissed holding, inter alia, that the declaration of assets furnished by the Judges of the Supreme Court to Chief Justice of India and its contents constituted ‘information’, subject to the provisions of the RTI Act – The Full Bench of the High Court upheld the decision of the Single Judge of the High Court – Aggrieved by the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court and the CIC in the RTI C applications, the CPIO, Supreme Court has preferred the appeals before the Supreme Court against the order of the CIC in applications dated 06.⁷.2009, 23.01.2009 and the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court – Held [Per Sanjiv Khanna, J. (for himself, Ranjan Gogoi, CJI, and N.V. Ramana, Dr. D.Y. D Chandrachud and Deepak Gupta, JJ.)]: The information sought by the respondent in application dated 10.¹¹.2007, regarding declaration of the assets, the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court is upheld, which had upheld the order passed by the CIC directing the CPIO, Supreme Court to furnish information on the Judges of the Supreme Court who had declared their assets – E Such disclosure would not in any way, impinge upon the personal information and right to privacy of the judges – The fiduciary relationship rule in terms of cl(e) to s. 8(1) of the RTI Act is inapplicable – It would not affect the right to confidentiality of the Judges and their right to protect personal information and F privacy, which would be the case where the details and contents of personal assets in the declaration are called for and sought in which event the public interest test as applicable vide s. 8(1)(j) and proviso to s.11(1) of the RTI Act would come into operation – As far as other two RTI applications dated 06.⁷.2009 and 23.01.2009 are concerned, these application are remitted to the CPIO, Supreme G Court to re-examine the matter after following the procedure u/s. 11(1) of the RTI Act as information relates to third parties. Right to Information Act, 2005 – s.2 cl(h) and sub-cl (ii) in cl(e) to s.2 – Whether the Supreme Court of India and the Chief Justice of India are two separate public Authorities – Held [Per H

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A Sanjiv Khanna, J. (for himself, Ranjan Gogoi, CJI, and N.V. Ramana, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Deepak Gupta, JJ.)] : It is undebatable that the Supreme Court is a ‘public authority’, as defined vide cl(h) to s.2 of the RTI Act as it has been established and constituted by or under the Constitution of India – The office of the Chief Justice or for that matter the judges is not separate from the Supreme Court and is part and parcel of the Supreme Court as a body, authority and institution – The Chief Justice and the Supreme Court are not two distinct and separate ‘public authorities’, albeit, the latter is a ‘public authority’ and the Chief Justice and the Judges together form and constitute the ‘public authority’, that is, the Supreme Court of India. Right to Information Act, 2005 – s.2 cl.(f)(i) and (j) – Information and Right to Information – Held [Per Sanjiv Khanna, J. (for himself, Ranjan Gogoi, CJI, and N.V. Ramana, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Deepak Gupta, JJ.)] : What is explicit as well as implicit from the definition of ‘information’ in cl.(f) to s. 2 follows and gets affirmation from the definition of ‘right to information’ that the information should be accessible by the public authority and ‘held by or under the control of any public authority’ – The words ‘under the control of any public authority’ as per their natural meaning would mean the right and power of the public authority to get access to the information – It refers to dominion over the information or the right to any material, document etc. – The words ‘under the control of any public authority’ would include within their ambit and scope information relating to a private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force subject to the pre-imposed conditions and restrictions as applicable to access the information. Right to Information Act, 2005 – s. 8(1)(e) – Relationship between the Chief Justice and Judges – Held [Per Sanjiv Khanna, J. (for himself, Ranjan Gogoi, CJI, and N.V. Ramana, Dr. D.Y. G Chandrachud and Deepak Gupta, JJ.)] : Ordinarily the relationship between the Chief Justice and Judges would not be that of fiduciary and a beneficiary – However, it is not an absolute rule/code for in certain situation and acts, fiduciary relationship may arise – Whether or not such a relationship arises in a particular H situation would have to be dealt with on the tests and parameters.

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 427 AGARWAL

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1. Article 124 of the Constitution, which relates to the establishment and constitution of the Supreme Court of India, H states that there shall be a Supreme Court of India consisting

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 429 AGARWAL of a Chief Justice and other judges. It is undebatable that the A Supreme Court of India is a ‘public authority’, as defined vide clause (h) to Section 2 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 as it has been established and constituted by or under the Constitution of India. The Chief Justice of India as per sub- clause (ii) in clause (e) to Section 2 is the competent authority B in the case of the Supreme Court. Consequently, in terms of Section 28 of the RTI Act, the Chief Justice of India is empowered to frame rules, which have to be notified in the Official Gazette, to carry out the provisions of the RTI Act. [Para 13] [479-F-H] C

2. The Supreme Court of India, which is a ‘public authority’, would necessarily include the office of the Chief Justice of India and the judges in view of Article 124 of the Constitution. The office of the Chief Justice or for that matter the judges is not separate from the Supreme Court, and is part and parcel of the Supreme Court as a body, authority and institution. The Chief Justice and the Supreme Court are not two distinct and separate ‘public authorities’, albeit the latter is a ‘public authority’ and the Chief Justice and the judges together form and constitute the ‘public authority’, that is, the Supreme Court of India. The interpretation to Section 2(h) cannot be made in derogation of the Constitution. To hold to the contrary would imply that the Chief Justice of India and the Supreme Court of India are two distinct and separate public authorities, and each would have their CPIOs and in terms of sub-section (3) to Section 6 of the RTI Act an application made to the CPIO of the Supreme Court or the Chief Justice would have to be transferred to the other when ‘information’ is held or the subject matter is more closely connected with the ‘functions’ of the other. This would lead to anomalies and difficulties as the institution, authority or body is one. The Chief Justice of India is the head of the institution and neither he nor his office is a G separate public authority. [Para 14] [480-A-D]

3. This is equally true and would apply to the High Courts in the country as Article 214 states that there shall be a High Court for each State and Article 216 states that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other judges as the H

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A President of India may from time to time deem it appropriate to appoint. [Para 15] [480-E] INFORMATION AND RIGHT TO INFORMATION UNDER THE RTI ACT

4. ‘Information’ as per the definition clause is broad and wide, as it is defined to mean “material in any form” with amplifying words including records (a term again defined in widest terms vide clause (i) to Section 2 of the RTI Act), documents, emails, memos, advices, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in electronic form, etc. The last portion of the definition clause which states that the term ‘information’ would include ‘information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force’ has to be read as reference to ‘information’ not presently available or held by the public authority but which can be accessed by the public authority from a private body under any other law for the time being in force. The term – ‘private body’ in the clause has been used to distinguish and is in contradistinction to the term – ‘public authority’ as defined in Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. It follows that any requirement in the nature of precondition and restrictions prescribed by any other law would continue to apply and are to be satisfied before information can be accessed and asked to be furnished by a private body. [Para 17] [481-F-H; 482-A]

5. What is explicit as well as implicit from the definition of ‘information’ in clause (f) to Section 2 follows and gets affirmation from the definition of ‘right to information’ that the information should be accessible by the public authority and ‘held by or under the control of any public authority’. The word ‘hold’ as defined in Wharton’s Law Lexicon, 15 th Edition, means to have the ownership or use of; keep as one’s own, but in the context of the present legislation, we would prefer to adopt a broader definition of the word ‘hold’ in Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, as meaning; to keep, to retain, to maintain possession of or authority over. The words ‘under the control of any public authority’ as per their natural meaning would mean the right and power of the public authority to get access to the information. It

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 431 AGARWAL refers to dominion over the information or the right to any material, document etc. The words ‘under the control of any public authority’ would include within their ambit and scope information relating to a private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force subject to the pre-imposed conditions and restrictions as applicable to access the information. [Para 18] [482-B-D]

6. When information is accessible by a public authority, that is, held or under its control, then the information must be furnished to the information seeker under the RTI Act even if there are conditions or prohibitions under another statute already in force or under the Official Secrets Act, 1923, that restricts or prohibits access to information by the public. In view of the non-obstante clause in Section 22 of the RTI Act, any prohibition or condition which prevents a citizen from having access to information would not apply. Restriction on the right of citizens is erased. However, when access to information by a D public authority itself is prohibited or is accessible subject to conditions, then the prohibition is not obliterated and the pre- conditions are not erased. Section 2(f) read with Section 22 of the RTI Act does not bring any modification or amendment in any other enactment, which bars or prohibits or imposes pre- E condition for accessing information of the private bodies. Rather, clause (f) to Section 2 upholds and accepts the said position when it uses the expression – “which can be accessed”, that is the public authority should be in a position and be entitled to ask for the said information. Section 22 of the RTI Act, an overriding F provision, does not militate against the interpretation as there is no contradiction or conflict between the provisions of Section 2(f) of the RTI Act and other statutory enactments/law. Section 22 of the RTI Act is a key that unlocks prohibitions/limitations in any prior enactment on the right of a citizen to access information which is accessible by a public authority. It is not a G key with the public authority that can be used to undo and erase prohibitions/limitations on the right of the public authority to access information. In other words, a private body will be entitled to the same protection as is available to them under the laws of this country. [Para 19] [482-E-G; 483-A-C] H

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7. Sub-section (1) of Section 8 begins with a non-obstante clause giving primacy and overriding legal effect to different clauses under the sub-section in case of any conflict with other provisions of the RTI Act. Section 8(1) without modifying or amending the term ‘information’, carves out exceptions when access to ‘information’, as defined in Section 2(f) of the RTI Act would be denied. Consequently, the right to information is available when information is accessible under the RTI Act, that is, when the exceptions listed in Section 8(1) of the RTI Act are not attracted. In terms of Section 3 of the RTI Act, all citizens have right to information, subject to the provisions of the RTI Act, that is, information ‘held by or under the control of any public authority’, except when such information is exempt or excluded. [Para 25] [491-C-E]

8. Clauses in sub-section (1) to Section 8 can be divided into two categories: clauses (a), (b), (c), (f), (g), (h) and (i), and clauses (d), (e) and (j). The latter clauses state that the prohibition specified would not apply or operate when the competent authority in clauses (d) and (e) and the PIO in clause (j) is satisfied that larger public interest warrants disclosure of such information. Therefore, clauses (d), (e) and (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act incorporate qualified prohibitions and are conditional and not absolute exemptions. Clauses (a), (b), (c), (f), (g), (h) and (i) do not have any such stipulation. Prohibitory stipulations in these clauses do not permit disclosure of information on satisfaction of the larger public interest rule. These clauses, therefore, incorporate absolute exclusions. [Para 26] [401-E-G]

9. Sub-section (2) to Section 8 states that notwithstanding anything contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 or any of the exemptions permissible in accordance with sub-section (1), a public authority may allow access to information if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests. The disclosure under Section 8(2) by the public authority is not a mandate or compulsion but is in the form of discretionary disclosure. Section 8(2) acknowledges and empowers the public authority to lawfully disclose information held by them despite the exemptions under sub-section (1) to H

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Section 8 if the public authority is of the opinion that the larger public interest warrants disclosure. Such disclosure can be made notwithstanding the provisions of the Official Secrets Act. Section 8(2) does not create a vested or justiciable right that the citizens can enforce by an application before the PIO seeking information under the RTI Act. PIO is under no duty to disclose information covered by exemptions under Section 8(1) of the RTI Act. Once the PIO comes to the conclusion that any of the exemption clauses is applicable, the PIO cannot pass an order directing disclosure under Section 8(2) of the RTI Act as this discretionary power is exclusively vested with the public authority. [Para 27] [492-A-D] C

10. Section 9 provides that without prejudice to the provisions of Section 8, a request for information may be rejected if such a request for providing access would involve an infringement of copyright subsisting in a person other than the State. [Para 28] [492-E] D 10.1 Section 10 deals with severability of exempted information and section 11 deals with third party information and incoporates conditional exclusion based on breach of confidentiality. [Paras 29 and 30] [492-E-F; G] 10.2 In Aditya Bandopadhyay, wherein this Court, on the E aspect of general principles of interpretation while deciding the conflict between the right to information and exclusions under section 8 to 11 of the RTI Act had made some observations in paragraphs 61, 62 and 63. This Court respectfully concurs with the paragraph 63 of the Judgment and the same has to be read with the observations made on last portion of clause (f) to section F 2 defining the word ‘information’. [Para 31] [494-A-B; 495-G] FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP UNDER SECTION 8(1)(e) OF THE RTI ACT

11. Fiduciary relationships, regardless of whether they are formal, informal, voluntary or involuntary, must satisfy the four G conditions for a relationship to classify as a fiduciary relationship. In each of the four principles, the emphasis is on trust, reliance, the fiduciary’s superior power or dominant position and corresponding dependence of the beneficiary on the fiduciary which imposes responsibility on the fiduciary to act in good faith H

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A and for the benefit of and to protect the beneficiary and not oneself. Section 8(1)(e) is a legal acceptance that there are ethical or moral relationships or duties in relationships that create rights and obligations, beyond contractual, routine or even special relationships with standard and typical rights and obligations. Contractual or non-fiduciary relationships could require that the party should protect and promote the interest of the other and not cause harm or damage, but the fiduciary relationship casts a positive obligation and demands that the fiduciary should protect the beneficiary and not promote personal self-interest. A fiduciary’s loyalty, duties and obligations are stricter than the morals of the market place and it is not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honour which is the most sensitive standard of behaviour which is applied {Opinion of Cardozo, J. in Meinhard v. Salmon}. Thus, the level of judicial scrutiny in cases of fiduciary relationship is intense as the level of commitment and loyalty expected is higher than non-fiduciary relationships. Fiduciary relationship may arise because of the statute which requires a fiduciary to act selflessly with integrity and fidelity and the other party, that is the beneficiary, depends upon the wisdom and confidence reposed in the fiduciary. A contractual, statutory and possibly all relationships cover a broad field, but a fiduciary relationship could exist, confined to a limited area or an act, as relationships can have several facets. Thus, relationships can be partly fiduciary and partly non- fiduciary with the former being confined to a particular act or action which need not manifest itself in entirety in the interaction and relationship between two parties. What would distinguish non-fiduciary relationship from fiduciary relationship or an act is the requirement of trust reposed, higher standard of good faith and honesty required on the part of the fiduciary with reference to a particular transaction(s) due to moral, personal or statutory responsibility of the fiduciary as compared to the beneficiary, resulting in dependence of the beneficiary. This may arise due to superior knowledge and training of the fiduciary or the position he occupies. [Para 34] [499-A-H; 500-A-B]

12. Ordinarily the relationship between the Chief Justice and judges would not be that of a fiduciary and a beneficiary. However, it is not an absolute rule/code for in certain situations H

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 435 AGARWAL and acts, fiduciary relationship may arise. Whether or not such A a relationship arises in a particular situation would have to be dealt with on the tests and parameters enunciated above. [Para 35] [500-C] RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER SECTION 8(1)(j) AND CONFIDENTIALITY UNDER SECTION 11 OF THE RTI B ACT.

13. If one’s right to know is absolute, then the same may invade another’s right to privacy and breach confidentiality, and, therefore, the former right has to be harmonised with the need for personal privacy, confidentiality of information and effective governance. The RTI Act captures this interplay of the competing rights under clause (j) to Section 8(1) and Section 11. While clause (j) to Section 8(1) refers to personal information as distinct from information relating to public activity or interest and seeks to exempt disclosure of such information, as well as such information which, if disclosed, would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of an individual, unless public interest warrants its disclosure, Section 11 exempts the disclosure of ‘information or record…which relates to or has been supplied by a third party and has been treated as confidential by that third party’. By differently wording and inditing the challenge that privacy and confidentiality throw to information rights, the RTI E Act also recognises the interconnectedness, yet distinctiveness between the breach of confidentiality and invasion of privacy, as the former is broader than the latter. [Para 36] [500-D-G]

14. While clause (j) exempts disclosure of two kinds of information, as noted in paragraph 47 above, that is “personal information” with no relation to public activity or interest and “information” that is exempt from disclosure to prevent unwarranted invasion of privacy, this Court has not underscored, as will be seen below, such distinctiveness and treated personal information to be exempt from disclosure if such disclosure invades on balance the privacy rights, thereby linking the former kind of information with the latter kind. This means that information, which if disclosed could lead to an unwarranted invasion of privacy rights, would mean personal information, that is, which is not having co-relation with public information. [Para 53] [510-F-G] H

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A 15. Reading of the aforesaid judicial precedents, in our opinion, would indicate that personal records, including name, address, physical, mental and psychological status, marks obtained, grades and answer sheets, are all treated as personal information. Similarly, professional records, including qualification, performance, evaluation reports, ACRs, disciplinary proceedings, etc. are all personal information. Medical records, treatment, choice of medicine, list of hospitals and doctors visited, findings recorded, including that of the family members, information relating to assets, liabilities, income tax returns, details of investments, lending and borrowing, etc. are personal information. Such personal information is entitled to protection from unwarranted invasion of privacy and conditional access is available when stipulation of larger public interest is satisfied. This list is indicative and not exhaustive. [Para 59] [512-G; 513- A-B]

D 16. This Court clarifies that Section 11 is not merely procedural but also a substantive provision which applies when the PIO intends to disclose information that relates to or has been supplied by a third party and has been treated as confidential by that third party. It requires the PIO to issue notice to the third party who may make submission in writing E or orally, which submission has to be kept in view while taking a decision. Proviso to Section 11(1) applies in all cases except trade or commercial secrets protected by law. Pertinently, information including trade secrets, intellectual property rights, etc. are governed by clause (d) to sub- section (1) of Section 8 F and Section 9 of the RTI Act. In all other cases where the information relates to or has been supplied by the third party and treated as confidential by that third party, disclosure in terms of the proviso may be allowed where the public interest in disclosure outweighs in importance any possible harm or injury to the interest of the third party. Confidentiality is protected and preserved in law because the public interest requires such protection. It helps and promotes free communication without fear of retaliation. However, public interest in protecting confidentiality is subject to three well-known exceptions. The first exception being a public interest in the disclosure of iniquity for there cannot be any loss of confidentiality involving a

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 437 AGARWAL wrongdoing. Secondly, there cannot be any public interest when the public has been misled. Thirdly, the principle of confidentiality does not apply when the disclosure relates to matters of public concern, which expression is vastly different from news value or news to satiate public curiosity. Public concern relates to matters which are an integral part of free speech and expression and entitlement of everyone to truth and fair comment about it. There are certain circumstances where the public interest in maintaining confidentiality may be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure and, thus, in common law, it may not be treated by the courts as confidential information. These aspects would be relevant under the proviso to Section 11(1) of the RTI C Act. [Para 61] [515-C-H]

17. Proviso to Section 11(1) of the RTI Act is a statutory recognition of three exceptions and more when it incorporates public interest test. It states that information, otherwise treated confidential, can be disclosed if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the possible harm and injury to the interest of such a third party. The expression ‘third party’ has been defined in clause (n) to Section 2 to mean a person other than the citizen making a request for information and includes a public authority. Thus, the scope of ‘information’ under Section 11 is much broader than that of clause (j) to Section 8 (1), as it could include information that is personal as well as information that concerns the government and its working, among others, which relates to or is supplied by a third party and treated as confidential. Third-party could include any individual, natural or juristic entity including the public authority. [Para 62] [516-A-C] F

18. Most jurists would accept that absolute transparency in all facets of government is neither feasible nor desirable, for there are several limitations on complete disclosure of governmental information, especially in matters relating to national security, diplomatic relations, internal security or G sensitive diplomatic correspondence. There is also a need to accept and trust the government’s decision- makers, which they have to also earn, when they plead that confidentiality in their meetings and exchange of views is needed to have a free flow of views on sensitive, vexatious and pestilent issues in which H

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A there can be divergent views. This is, however, not to state that there are no dangers in maintaining secrecy even on aspects that relate to national security, diplomatic relations, internal security or sensitive diplomatic correspondence. Confidentiality may have some bearing and importance in ensuring honest and fair appraisals, though it could work the other way around also and, therefore, what should be disclosed would depend on authentic enquiry relating to the public interest, that is, whether the right to access and the right to know outweighs the possible public interest in protecting privacy or outweighs the harm and injury to third parties when the information relates to such third parties or the information is confidential in nature. [Para 70] [524-A-D] MEANING OF THE TERM ‘PUBLIC INTEREST’ Public interest in access to information refers to something that is in the interest of the public welfare to know. Public welfare is widely different from what is of interest to the public. D “Something which is of interest to the public” and “something which is in the public interest” are two separate and different parameters. For example, the public may be interested in private matters with which the public may have no concern and pressing need to know. However, such interest of the public in private matters would repudiate and directly traverse the protection of privacy. The object and purpose behind the specific exemption vide clause (j) to Section 8(1) is to protect and shield oneself from unwarranted access to personal information and to protect facets like reputation, honour, etc. associated with the right to privacy. Similarly, there is a public interest in the maintenance of confidentiality in the case of private individuals and even government. [Para 75] [527-E-H] 20.The public interest test in the context of the RTI Act would mean reflecting upon the object and purpose behind the right to information, the right to privacy and consequences of invasion, and breach of confidentiality and possible harm and injury that would be caused to the third party, with reference to a particular information and the person. [Para 76] [528-A-B] 21.Public interest has no relationship and is not connected with the number of individuals adversely affected by the disclosure which may be small and insignificant in comparison

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 439 AGARWAL to the substantial number of individuals wanting disclosure. It A will vary according to the information sought and all circumstances of the case that bear upon the public interest in maintaining the exemptions and those in disclosing the information must be accounted for to judge the right balance. Public interest is not immutable and even time-gap may make a B significant difference. The type and likelihood of harm to the public interest behind the exemption and public interest in disclosure would matter. The delicate balance requires identification of public interest behind each exemption and then cumulatively weighing the public interest in accepting or maintaining the exemption(s) to deny information in a particular C case against the public interest in disclosure in that particular case. Further, under Section 11(1), reference is made to the ‘possible’ harm and injury to the third party which will also have to be factored in when determining disclosure of confidential information relating to the third parties. [Para 78] [529-D-F] D

22. The last aspect in the context of public interest test would be in the form of clarification as to the effect of sub-section (2) to Section 6 of the RTI Act which does not require the information seeker to give any reason for making a request for the information. Clearly, ‘motive’ and ‘purpose’ for making the request for information is irrelevant, and being extraneous cannot be a ground for refusing the information. However, this is not to state that ‘motive’ and ‘purpose’ may not be relevant factor while applying the public interest test in case of qualified exemptions governed by the public interest test. It is in this context that this Court in Aditya Bandopadhyay has held that beneficiary cannot be denied personal information relating to him. Similarly, in other cases, public interest may weigh in favour of the disclosure when the information sought may be of special interest or special significance to the applicant. It could equally be a negative factor when the ‘motive’ and ‘purpose’ is vexatious or it is a case of clear abuse of law. [Para 79] [529-G-H; 530-A- G B]

23. In the RTI Act, in the absence of any positive indication as to the considerations which the PIO has to bear in mind while making a decision, the legislature had intended to vest a general discretion in the PIO to weigh the competing interests, which H

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A is to be limited only by the object, scope and purpose of the protection and the right to access information and in Section 11(1), the ‘possible’ harm and injury to the third party. It imports a discretionary value judgment on the part of the PIO and the appellate forums as it mandates that any conclusion arrived at must be fair and just by protecting each right which is required to be upheld in public interest. There is no requirement to take a fortiori view that one trumps the other. [Para 80] [530-C-D] JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

24. This Court has referred to the decisions and viewpoints to highlight the contentious nature of the issue of transparency, accountability and judicial independence with various arguments and counter-arguments on both sides, each of which commands merit and cannot be ignored. Therefore, it is necessary that the question of judicial independence is accounted for in the balancing exercise. It cannot be doubted and debated that the independence of the judiciary is a matter of ennobled public concern and directly relates to public welfare and would be one of the factors to be taken into account in weighing and applying the public interest test. Thus, when the public interest demands the disclosure of information, judicial independence has to be kept in mind while deciding the question of exercise of discretion. However, we should not be understood to mean that the independence of the judiciary can be achieved only by denial of access to information. Independence in a given case may well demand openness and transparency by furnishing the information. Reference to the principle of judicial independence is not to undermine and avoid accountability which is an aspect we perceive and believe has to be taken into account while examining the public interest in favour of disclosure of information. Judicial independence and accountability go hand in hand as accountability ensures, and is a facet of judicial independence. Further, while applying the proportionality test, the type and nature of the information is a relevant factor. Distinction must be drawn between the final opinion or resolutions passed by the collegium with regard to appointment/ elevation and transfer of judges with observations and indicative reasons and the inputs/data or details which the collegium had examined. The rigour of public interest in divulging the input details, data and particulars of the candidate would be different

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 441 AGARWAL from that of divulging and furnishing details of the output, that is the decision. In the former, public interest test would have to be applied keeping in mind the fiduciary relationship (if it arises), and also the invasion of the right to privacy and breach of the duty of confidentiality owed to the candidate or the information provider, resulting from the furnishing of such details and particulars. The position represents a principled conflict between various factors in favour of disclosure and those in favour of withholding of information. Transparency and openness in judicial appointments juxtaposed with confidentiality of deliberations remain one of the most delicate and complex areas. Clearly, the position is progressive as well as evolving as steps have been taken to make the selection and appointment process more transparent and open. Notably, there has been a change after concerns were expressed on disclosure of the names and the reasons for those who had not been approved. The position will keep forging new paths by taking into consideration the experiences of the past and the aspirations of the future. [Para D 88] [539-A-H; 540-A] CONCLUSIONS

25. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court dismisses Civil Appeal No.2683 of 2010 and uphold the judgment dated 12 th January, 2010 of the Delhi High Court in LPA No. 501 of E 2009 which had upheld the order passed by the CIC directing the CPIO, Supreme Court of India to furnish information on the judges of the Supreme Court who had declared their assets. Such disclosure would not, in any way, impinge upon the personal information and right to privacy of the judges. The fiduciary F relationship rule in terms of clause (e) to Section 8(1) of the RTI Act is inapplicable. It would not affect the right to confidentiality of the judges and their right to protect personal information and privacy, which would be the case where details and contents of personal assets in the declaration are called for and sought, in which event the public interest test as applicable vide Section G 8(1)(j) and proviso to Section 11 (1) of the RTI Act would come into operation. [Para 89] [540-D-P]

26. As far as Civil Appeal Nos. 10045 of 2010 and 10044 of 2010 are concerned, they are to be partly allowed with an order of remit to the CPIO, Supreme Court of India to re-examine the H

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A matter after following the procedure under Section 11(1) of the RTI Act as the information relates to third parties. [Para 90] [540-G] Central Board of Secondary Education and Another v. Aditya Bandopadhyay and Others (2011) 8 SCC B 497 : [2011] 11 SCR 1028 ; Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Limited and Others v. State of Kerala and Others (2013) 16 SCC 82 : [2013] 14 SCR 475 ; Khanapuram Gandaiah v. Administrative Officer and Others (2010) 2 SCC 1 : [2010] 1 SCR 1 ; K.S. Puttaswamy and Another v. Union of India and Others C (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569 ; Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner and Others (2013) 1 SCC 212 : [2012] 8 SCR 1097 ; Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Public Information Officer and Another AIR 2012 Delhi D 29 – relied on ; R.K. Jain v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 119 : [1993] 3 SCR802 ; Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms and Another (2002) 5 SCC 294 : [2002] 3 SCR 696 ; Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi and Another (2012) 13 SCC 61 : [2012] 11 SCR 1032 ; E Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 1 : [2015] 13 SCR 1 ; Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association and Others v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 659 – relied on. F S.P. Gupta v. Union of India & Others (1981) Supp SCC 87 : [1980] SCR 365 ; Bhudan Singh and Another v. Nabi Bux and Another (1969) 2 SCC 481 : [1970] 2 SCR 10 ; Kailash Rai v. Jai Ram (1973) 1 SCC 527 : [1973] 3 SCR 411 ; State of U.P. v. Raj G Narain and Others (1975) 4 SCC 428 : [1975] 3 SCR 333 ; Reserve Bank of India v. Jayantilal N. Mistry (2016) 3 SCC 525 : [2015] 14 SCR 505 ; District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank (2005) 1 SCC 496 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 833 ; Spencer v.

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R. (2014) 2 SCR 212 ; Canara Bank v. C.S. Shyam A and Another (2018) 11 SCC 426 : [2017] 7 SCR 741 ; Subhash Chandra Agarwal v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India and Others (2018) 11 SCC 634 ; R.K. Jain v. Union of India and Another (2013) 14 SCC 794 : [2013] 5 SCR 411 ; Helen Suzman Foundation v. Judicial Service Commission Case 289/16 decided B on 24 th April 2018 ; C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee and Others (1995) 5 SCC 457 : [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 319 ; High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil (1997) 6 SCC 339 : [1997] 3 SCR 1131 ; Jasbir Singh v. State of Punjab C (2006) 8 SCC 294 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 174 – referred to. Re Coe’s Estate Ebert et al v. State et. al 33 Cal.2d 502 ; Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie S.A. v. Bank of England (1950) 2 All E.R. 611 ; New Castle upon Tyne D v. Information Commissioner and British Union for Abolition of Vivisection (2011) UKUT 185 AAC ; Meinhard v. Salmon (1928) 164 N.E. 545, 546 ; Coco v. AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd. [1969] RPC 41 ; Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. (2001) QB 967 ; PJS v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. (2016) UKSC 26 ; United States v. E Miller 425 US 435 (1976) ; Peck v. United Kingdom (2003) EMLR 15 ; Australian Broadcasting Corporation v. Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 185 ALR 1 ; Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Limited (2004) UKHL 22 ; Attorney General (UK) v. F Heinemann Publishers Pty Ltd. (1987) 10 NSWLR 86 at 191 ; Commonwealth v. John Fairfax and Sons Ltd. (1980) 147 CLR 39 at 51 ; Attorney General v. Jonathan Cape Ltd. [1976] QB 752 ; Burmah Oil Ltd v. Governor And Company Of The Bank Of England And Another [1980] AC 1090 ; Butters Gas and Oil G Co. v. Hammer 1982 AC 888 (H.L.) ; Air Canada v. Secretary of State for Trade 1983 2 AC 394 (H.L.) ; Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 1985 AC 374 (H.L.) - referred to.

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A Case Law Reference [1980] SCR 365 referred to Para 3 [1970] 2 SCR 10 referred to Para 9 [1973] 3 SCR 411 referred to Para 9 B [1975] 3 SCR 333 referred to Para 9 [2011] 11 SCR 1028 relied on Para 9 [2015] 14 SCR 505 referred to Para 9 [2013] 14 SCR 475 relied on Para 12 C [2010] 1 SCR 1 relied on Para 21 [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 833 referred to Para 39 [2017] 10 SCR 569 relied on Para 40 [2014] 2 SCR 212 referred to Para 43 D [2012] 8 SCR 1097 relied on Para 54 [2017] 7 SCR 741 referred to Para 55 (2018) 11 SCC 634 referred to Para 56 [2013] 5 SCR 411 referred to Para 57 E AIR 2012 Delhi 29 relied on Para 60 [1993] 3 SCR 802 relied on Para 64 [2002] 3 SCR 696 relied on Para 71 [2012] 11 SCR 1032 relied on Para 74 F [2015] 13 SCR 1 relied on Para 84 [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 659 relied on Para 85 [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 319 referred to Para 86 [1997] 3 SCR 1131 referred to Para 86

27. The judiciary is an important organ of the Indian state, and it has a vital role in the proper functioning of the state as a

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 445 AGARWAL democracy based on the rule of law. The integrity, independence, and impartiality of the judiciary are preconditions for fair and effective access to justice and for the protection of rights. The judiciary has a vital role to play as a bulwark of the integrity infrastructure in the country. [Para 45] [575-F]

28. Failure to bring about accountability reforms would erode trust in the courts’ impartiality, harming core judicial functions. Further, it also harms the broader accountability function that the judiciary is entrusted with in democratic systems including upholding citizens’ rights and sanctioning representatives of other branches when they act in contravention of the law. Transparency and the right to information are crucially linked to the rule of law itself. [Para 45] [575-G; 576-A] Judicial accountability

29. Judicial independence and judicial accountability are often seen as conflicting values. It is believed that judicial independence, which mandates that adjudication take place free from interference by the legislature and the executive, is compromised by the questions of responsibility which judicial accountability entails. In this view, accountability compromises the ability of judges to decide free from external pressure and is undesirable. There is a fallacy about the postulate that independence and accountability are conflicting values. [Para 46] [576-C-D]

30. Judicial independence is defined by the existence of conditions which enable a judge to decide objectively, without succumbing to pressures and influences which detract from the course of justice. To be independent a judge must have the ability to decide ‘without fear or favour, affection or ill will’. The Constitution creates conditions to secure the independence of judges by setting out provisions to govern appointments, tenure and conditions of service. These are provisions through which the conditions necessary to secure judicial independence are engrafted as mandatory institutional requirements. These are intrinsic elements of our constitutional design. But constitutional design must be realised through the actual working of its functionaries. Mechanisms which facilitate independence are H

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A hence a crucial link in ensuring that constitutional design translates into the realisation of judicial independence. Facilitative mechanisms include those which promote transparency. For true judicial independence is not a shield to protect wrong doing but an instrument to secure the fulfilment of those constitutional values which an independent judiciary is tasked to achieve. Judicial independence is hence not a carte blanche to arbitrary behaviour. Where the provisions of the Constitution secure a standard of judicial independence for free and impartial adjudication, the independence guaranteed by the Constitution must be employed in a manner that furthers the objective for which it was secured. In the quest for a balance between the freedom guaranteed and the responsibility that attaches to the freedom, judicial independence and judicial accountability converge. [Para 47] [576-E-H; 577-A-B]

31. Judicial independence does not mean the insulation of judges from the rule of law. In a constitutional democracy committed to the rule of law and to the equality of its citizens, it cannot be countenanced that judges are above the law. The notion of a responsible judiciary furthers the ideal for which an independent judiciary was envisaged. It is the exercise of the decision making authority guaranteed by judicial independence in a just and responsible manner, true to the ethos of judicial office that sub-serves the founding vision of the judiciary. [Para 56] [582-F; 583-A]

32. The executive in a cabinet form of government in accountable to the legislature. Ministers of the government are elected members of the legislature. Collectively, the government is accountable to the legislature as an institution and through the legislature to the people. Unlike the elected representatives of the people, judges of the district and higher judiciary are not elected. The accountability which the political process exacts from members of the legislature is hence distinct from the accountability of judges who are accountable to the trust which is vested in them as independent decision makers. Making them accountable in the discharge of that trust does not dilute their independence. The independence of judges is designed to protect them from the pressures of the executive and the H

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 447 AGARWAL legislature and of the organised interests in society which may detract judges from discharging the trust as dispassionate adjudicators. Scrutiny and transparency, properly understood are not placed in an antithesis to independence. They create conditions where judges are protected against unwholesome influences. Scrutiny and transparency are allies of the conscientious because they are powerful instruments to guard against influences which threaten to suborn the judicial conscience. To use judicial independence as a plea to refuse accountability is fallacious. Independence is secured by accountability. Transparency and scrutiny are instruments to secure accountability. [Para 57] [583-E-G; 584-A-B] C

Fiduciary relationship 33.The Chief Justice of India in exercising his official functions in accordance with the 1997 resolution while holding asset information of other judges does not act for and on behalf of other judges of the Supreme Court. There exists no fiduciary relationship between them. The Chief Justice of India is not entrusted with the power to protect and further the interests of individual judges who disclose their assets. The information is required by the mandate of the resolution dated 7 May 1997 passed by all the then sitting judges of the Supreme Court and it cannot be said that such information is being provided in any personal capacity. The Chief Justice of India merely holds the information in accordance with the official functions and not in any fiduciary capacity. The judges of the Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice of India occupy a constitutional office. F There exists no set hierarchies between the judges and they enjoy the same judicial powers and immunities. The judges who disclose their assets cannot be said to be vulnerable to and dependent on the Chief Justice of India. In these circumstances, it cannot be held that asset information shared with the Chief G Justice of India, by the judges of the Supreme Court, are held by him in a fiduciary capacity, which if revealed, would result in breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, the argument that the information sought is held in a fiduciary capacity is inapplicable and cannot be used to prevent the information from being made public. [Para 69] [591-D-H] H

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A The right to privacy and the right to know.

34. It is also pertinent to note that clauses (a), (b), (c), (f), (g) and (h) to clause (1) of Section 8 provide an absolute exemption from the obligation of disclosure under the RTI Act. However, clauses (d), (e), (i) and (j) to clause (1) of Section 8 B provide a qualified exemption from disclosure. For example, clause (a) to sub section (1) of Section 8 provides an unconditional exemption where it is determined that disclosure of the information sought “would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India”. On the other hand, while clause (d) to Section 8(1) similarly provides that information is exempt from disclosure where such disclosure “would harm the competitive position of a third party” the exemption is further qualified by the phrase, “unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure”. Thus, the exemption under clause (d) is not absolute but is qualified and cannot be invoked where there exists a “larger public interest”. Where the Information Officer determines that the “larger public interest” warrants a disclosure, the exemption in clause (d) cannot be invoked and the information must be disclosed. [Para 75] [597-B-D]

E 35. Clause (j) of Section 8(1) provides a qualified exemption from disclosure where the information sought relates to “personal information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest” or the disclosure of the information would cause an “unwarranted invasion of the privacy”. However, the exemption may be overridden where the F Information Officer is “satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure”. Clause (j) is not an absolute exemption from the disclosure of information on the ground of privacy but states that disclosure is exempted in cases where “personal information” is sought and there exists no “larger public interest”. Where the Information Officer is satisfied that the existence of the “larger public interest” justifies the disclosure of the “personal information”, the information must be disclosed. The exact contours of the phrases “personal information” and “larger public interest” with respect to members of the judiciary, and the exact manner in which they relate to each other form the subject matter of the third referral question and shall be

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 449 AGARWAL analysed during the course of this judgement. [Para 76] [597- A B-D]

36. The definition of a “third party” includes a public authority. ‘Third party information’ is information which “relates to or has been supplied by any other person (including a public authority) other than the information applicant and has been treated as confidential by such third party. Where disclosure of ‘third party information’ is sought, and such information has been prima facie treated as confidential by the third party in question, the procedure under Section 11 of the RTI Act is mandatory. The Information Officer shall, within five days of receiving the request for ‘third party information’ notify the relevant third party to whom the information relates or which had supplied it. The notice shall invite the third party to submit reasons (in writing or orally) as to whether or not the information sought should be disclosed. Section 11(2) provides the third party with a right to make a representation against the proposed disclosure within ten days of receiving the notice. The provision expressly mandates the Information Officer to take into consideration the objections of the third party when making a decision with respect to disclosure or non-disclosure of the information. It encapsulates the fundamental idea that a party whose personal information is sought to be disclosed is afforded the opportunity to contest disclosure. The proviso to sub section (1) of Section 11 permits disclosure where the “public interest” in disclosure “outweighs” any possible harms in disclosure highlighted by the third party. [Para 77] [598-F-H; 599-A-C] F

37. Sections 8 and 11 must be read together. Other than in a case where the information applicant seeks the disclosure of information which relates to the information applicant herself, information sought that falls under the category of “personal information” within the meaning of clause (j) of Section 8(1) is also “third party information” within the ambit of Section 11. G Therefore, in every case where the information requested is “personal information” within the operation of clause (j) of sub section 1 of Section 8, the procedure of notice and objections under Section 11 must be complied with. The two provisions create a substantive system of checks and balances which seek H

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A to balance the right of the information applicant to receive information with the right of the third party to prevent the disclosure of personal information by permitting the latter to contest the proposed disclosure. [Para 78] [599-C-E]

38. The procedure under Section 11 must be complied with not only in cases where information has been supplied to the public authority by a third party, but equally when the information which is held by the public authority “relates to” a third party. Section 11 is not merely a procedural provision, but a substantive protection to third parties against the disclosure of their personal information held by public authorities, without their knowledge or consent. The mere fact that the public authority holds information relating to a third party does not render it freely disclosable under the RTI Act. A third party may have good reason to object to the disclosure of the information, including on the ground that the disclosure would constitute a D breach of the right to privacy. By including the requirement of inviting objections and providing a hearing on the proposed disclosure of third party information to the very party who may be adversely impacted by the disclosure, Section 11 embodies the principles of natural justice. [Para 79] [600-H; 601-A-B]

E 39. In the present case, the information sought pertains to the declaration of assets of members of the judiciary and official file notings and correspondence with respect to the elevation of judges to the Supreme Court. The information sought with respect to the assets of judges is not generated by F the Supreme Court itself, but is provided by individual judges to the Supreme Court. The file notings with respect to the elevation of judges do not merely contain information regarding the operation of the Supreme Court, but also relate to the individual judges being considered for elevation. Thus, the information sought both “relates to” and “has been supplied by” G a third party and has been treated as confidential by that third party”. The procedure under Section 11 is applicable in regard to the information sought by the respondent and must be complied with. [Para 80] [601-C-E]

40. The RTI Act, although a statutory enactment, engages the rights contained in Part III of the Constitution of India.

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 451 AGARWAL

Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution contains the right to freedom of expression which grants all citizens not merely the right to free speech, but also the right to freely disseminate speech. The freedom of the press to disseminate speech has long been recognised under our Constitution. An inherent component of the right to disseminate speech freely is the corresponding right of the audience to receive speech freely. The right to receive information disseminated has also been recognised as a facet of the freedom of expression protected by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. In addition to the right to receive information already being disseminated in the public domain, Article 19(1)(a) includes a positive right to information. Contrasted with the negative content of the right to receive information, which prohibits the State from restricting a citizen’s access to information already in the public domain, the right to information, as a facet of Article 19(1)(a), casts a positive duty on the State to make available certain information not already in the public domain. [Para 81] [601-F-H; 602-A-B]

41. The right to privacy is a constitutional right emanating from the right to life and personal liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution and from the facets of freedom and dignity embodied in Part III of the Constitution. Any restriction on the right to privacy by the State must be provided for by law, pursue E a legitimate aim of the State and satisfy the test of proportionality. The requirement of proportionality is satisfied when the nature and extent of the abridgement of the right is proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued by the State. The constitutional protection of privacy encompasses not merely personal F intimacies but also extends to decisional and informational autonomy. An individual has a constitutionally protected right to control the dissemination of personal information. The unauthorised use of information abridges a citizen’s right to privacy. [Para 85] [607-G-H; 608-A] G

42. The information disclosed under the RTI Act may include personal information relating to individuals. The RTI Act does not contain any restrictions on the end-use of the information disclosed under its provisions. The information disclosed by an Information Officer of the State pursuant to a right to information application may subsequently be widely H

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A disseminated. Clause (j) of sub section (1) of Section 8 provides that, in certain situations, even personal information of an individual may be disclosed under the RTI Act. Where the RTI Act contemplates the disclosure of “personal information”, the right to privacy of the individual is engaged. The Act recognise that the absolute or unwarranted disclosure of an individual’s B personal information under the RTI Act would constitute an “unwarranted invasion of the right to privacy” under the statutory provisions of the RTI Act and also abridge the individual’s constitutional right to privacy. However, the RTI Act has various checks and balances to guard against the C unadulterated disclosure of personal information under the RTI Act. [Para 86] [608-B-D]

43. The constitutional validity of the RTI Act as a measure abridging the right to privacy is not in question before this Court. But it is trite to say that the RTI Act satisfies the test of legality D (by virtue of being a legislation) and also pursues a legitimate state aim of ensuring, transparency and accountability of government and an informed electorate. By requiring the Information Officer to balance the public interest in disclosure against the privacy harm caused, clause (j) creates a legislatively E mandated measure of proportionality to ensure that the harm to the individual’s right to privacy is not disproportionate to the aim of securing transparency and accountability. [Para 87] [608- E-F]

44. RTI Act is a legislative enactment which contains a F finely tuned balancing of interests between the privacy right of individuals whose information may be disclosed and the broader public interest in ensuring transparency, accountability and an informed electorate. Both these interests have significant implications as they engage constitutional rights under Part III. The overarching scheme of the RTI Act, and in particular G Sections 3, 4 and 7 constitutes a mandate to fulfil the positive content of the ‘right to information’ as a facet of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The privacy interest protected by clause (j) to sub section (1) of Section 8 engages the principle of informational privacy as a facet of the constitutional privacy as recognised by this Court in K S Puttaswamy. Neither the ‘right

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 453 AGARWAL to information’ as a facet of Article 19(1)(a) nor the right to informational privacy as a facet to the right to privacy are absolute. The rights under Article 19(1)(a) may be restricted on the grounds enumerated in clause (2) of Article 19. The right to privacy and its numerous facets may be permissibly restricted where the abridgement is provided by law, pursues a legitimate B State objective and complies with the principle of proportionality. [Para 88] [608-G-H; 609-A-C]

45. Clause (j) of sub section (1) of Section 8 requires the Information Officer to first determine whether the information sought falls within the meaning of “personal information”. Where the information sought falls within the scope of “personal information” and has “no relationship to any public activity or interest” the information is exempt from disclosure under the RTI Act. However, where there exists a ‘public interest’ in the disclosure of the information sought, the test to be applied by the Information Officer is different. The Information Officer must evaluate whether the “larger public interest” justifies the disclosure of the information notwithstanding the fact that the information is “personal information”. In doing so, the Information Officer must balance the privacy interest of the individual whose personal information will be disclosed with the right to information of the public to know the information sought. E The substantive content of the terms “personal information” and “public interest” must be informed by the constitutional standards applicable to the ‘right to know’ and the ‘right to privacy’ as disclosure and non-disclosure under the RTI Act directly implicate these constitutional rights. In striking a balance within the framework of the RTI Act, the Information Officer must be cognisant of the substantive contents of these rights and the extent to which they can be restricted within our constitutional scheme. It is also crucial for the standard of proportionality to be applied to ensure that neither right is restricted to a greater extent than necessary to fulfil the legitimate interest of the countervailing interest in question. It is now necessary to examine the content of “personal information” and “public interest”. [Para 89] [609-D-H]

46. To understand the scope of information which is protected from disclosure under the RTI Act, it is of relevance H

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A to identify the nature of information which may be regarded as “personal information”. The RTI Act does not put forth a definition of the term “personal information”. However, “personal information” has been defined under other statutory frameworks. These definitions obviously do not bind the interpretation of the RTI Act but are useful sources of guidance in understanding the amplitude of the expression. We must of course read them with a caveat because the context of usage is not the same. [Para 90] [610-A-B]

47. Thus, it emerges from the discussion that certain category of information such as medical information, details of personal relations, employee records and professional income can be classified as personal information. The question of whether such information must be disclosed has to be determined by the CPIO on a case to case basis, depending on the public interest demonstrated in favour of disclosure. [Para D 97] [618-F-G]

48. The right to information and the need for transparency in the case of elected officials is grounded in the democratic need to facilitate better decision making by the public. Transparency and the right to information directly contribute to the ability of citizens to monitor and make more informed decisions with respect to the conduct of elected officials. Where the misconduct of an elected representative is exposed to the public, citizens can choose not to vote for the person at the next poll. In this manner, the democratic process coupled with the right to information facilitates better administration and provides powerful incentives for good public decision making. In the case of judges, citizens do not possess a direct agency relationship. Therefore, the ‘public interest’ in disclosing information in regard to a judge cannot be sourced on the need for ensuring democratic accountability through better public decision making but must be located elsewhere. [Para 98] [618-H; 619-A-B]

49. In common law countries, public interest has always been understood to operate as an interest independent to that of the State. Public interest operates equally against the State as it does against non-State actors. This is of significance in the context of the RTI Act as the right to information seeks to bring

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 455 AGARWAL about disclosure of information previously held exclusively by the State. Public interest therefore operates as a standalone viewpoint independent of whether the interest of the State favours disclosure or non- disclosure. At its core, the objective test for ‘public interest’ is far broader than democratic decision making and takes into consideration both shared conceptions of the common good in society at any given point and yet recognises that such conceptions are always the product of contestation and disagreement, necessitating a robust set of viewpoints to facilitate the self-fulfilment of the individual and the search for truth. [Para 99] [619-C-E]

50. The right to information is not solely premised on improving the quality of democratic decision making but also finds its roots in other bases of freedom of expression, including the self-fulfilment of the individual, the introduction of competing views into the ‘marketplace of ideas’ and the autonomy and dignity of the individual. Limiting the term ‘public interest’ to information that allows individuals to make better public choices with respect to public officials fails to take into consideration the powerful benefits that the dissemination of information held by public authorities may have on the development of discourse, private decision making and the nourishment of the individual. [Para 100] [620-C-D] E

51. Clause (j) of clause (1) of Section 8 requires the Information Officer to weigh the “public interest” in disclosure against the privacy harm. The disclosure of different documents in different circumstances will give rise to unique “public interest” factors in favour of disclosure. However, a few broad principles may be laid out as to how the phrase “public interest” is to be understood. Where factors fall within this interpretation “public interest” so interpreted, they are factors that weigh in favour of disclosure. The principles are as follows: (i) Public interest is not limited to information which directly promotes the democratic accountability of elected officials; (ii) There exists public interest in the disclosure of information where the information sought informs political debate, is educational or intellectual or serves artistic purposes; H

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A (iii) Where the information sought will promote public debate on political, economic or social issues, there exists a public interest in disclosure; (iv) Judges and Information Officers should not pass a value judgement on whether the speech in question furthers their own conception of societal good or interest for it to satisfy the test of public interest; (v) As an indicative list, information concerning the accountability of officials, public expenditure, the performance of public duties, the handling of complaints, the existence of any wrongdoing by a public official, inefficiency in public administration and unfairness in public administration all possess public interest value, their relative strength to be determined on a case by case basis; (vi) Where the disclosure of information would promote the aims and objectives of the RTI Act, there exists a “public interest” in disclosing such information; and (vii) The object and purpose of the RTI Act is the fulfilment of the positive obligation on the State to provide access to information under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and the existence of the restrictions on the disclosure of information does not restrict the meaning of “public interest” under the Act. [Para 107] [625-D-H; 626-A-D]

52. This Court has adverted to the substantive content of “personal information” and “public interest” as distinct factors to be considered by the Information Officer when arriving at a determination under clause (j) of clause (1) of Section 8. In the present case, the information sought by the respondent raises both considerations of “public interest” and “personal information”. The text of clause (j) requires the Information Officer to make a determination whether the “larger public interest justifies the disclosure” of personal information sought. The Information Officer must conduct balancing or weighing of interests in making a determination in favour of disclosure or non-disclosure. The Information Officer must be cognisant that any determination under clause (j) of clause (1) of Section 8 implicates the right to information and the right to privacy as H

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 457 AGARWAL constitutional rights. Reason forms the heart of the law and the A decision of the Information Officer must provide cogent and articulate reasons for the factors considered and conclusions arrived at in balancing the two interests. In answering the third referral question in its entirety, this Court would be remiss in not setting out the analytical approach to be applied by the B Information Officer in balancing the interests in disclosure with the countervailing privacy interests. [Para 108] [626-E-H]

53. The requirement to record reasons is a principle of natural justice and a check against the arbitrary exercise of power by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. In making a determination under clause (j) of clause (1) of Section 8 in a C given case, it would not be satisfactory if an Information Officer were merely to record that the privacy interest outweighed the public interest. Something more is required. By providing an analytical framework to address the two interests to be weighed and requiring the Information Officer record detailed reasons within this framework, the arbitrary exercise or discretion of the Information Officer is guarded against. [Para 108] [627-D-E]

54. Neither the right to information nor the right to privacy are absolute rights under the framework of the RTI Act. Where the right to information of an information applicant in requesting information touches upon the right to privacy of the person whose information is sought, the RTI Act calls upon the Information Officer to weigh the two interests and determine which is stronger. [Para 109] [627-G; 628-A-B]

55. Once the information sought has been identified as F “personal information” the Information Officer must identify the actual rights being claimed in the individual case. In setting out the substantive content of ‘public interest’ and ‘privacy’ various facets of these concepts have been set out. In any given case, the Information Officer must identify the precise interests weighing in favour of ‘public interest’ disclosure, and those G interests weighing in favour of ‘privacy’ and non- disclosure. The Information Officer must then examine the justifications for restricting each right and whether they are countenanced under the scheme of RTI Act and in law generally. The ground of confidentiality simpliciter is not a ground to restrict the right to H

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A information under the RTI Act or Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Lastly, the Information Officer must employ the principle of proportionality. As observed by Baroness Hale, both the right to privacy and the right to information are legitimate aims. In applying the principle of proportionality, the Information Officer must ensure that the abridgement of a right is not disproportionate to the legitimate aim sought to be achieved by enforcing the countervailing right. [Para 112] [630-E-H]

56. Take the example of where an information applicant sought the disclosure of how many leaves were taken by a public employee and the reasons for such leave. The need to ensure accountability of public employees is of clear public interest in favour of disclosure. The reasons for the leave may also include medical information with respect to the public employee, creating a clear privacy interest in favour of non-disclosure. It is insufficient to state that the privacy interest in medical records is extremely high and therefore the outcome should be blanket non-disclosure. The principle of proportionality may necessitate that the number of and reasons for the leaves be disclosed and the medical reasons for the leave be omitted. This would ensure that the interest in accountability is only abridged to the extent necessary to protect the legitimate aim of the privacy of the public employee. [Para 113] [631-A-C] Conclusion The information sought by the respondent pertains to (1) the correspondence and file notings relating to the elevation of three judges to the Supreme Court, (2) information relating to the declaration of assets made by judges pursuant to the 1997 resolution, and (3) the identity and nature of disciplinary proceedings instituted against the lawyer and judge named in the newspaper report. The third referral question requires this Court to determine whether the disclosure of the information sought is exempt under clause (j) of clause (1) of Section 8. In arriving at a determination on whether the information sought is exempt under clause (j), it is necessary to (i) determine whether the information sought is “personal information” and engages the right to privacy, (ii) identify, in the facts of the present case, the specific heads of public interest in favour of

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 459 AGARWAL disclosure and the specific privacy interests claimed, (iii) A determine the justifications for restricting such interests and (iv) apply the principle of proportionality to ensure that no right is abridged more than required to fulfil the legitimate aim of the countervailing right. The process under Section 11 of the RTI must be complied with where the information sought is ‘third party information’. The substantive content of the terms ‘personal information’ and ‘public interest’ have also been set out in the present judgement. [Para 115] [632-C-F]

57. The information sought in Civil Appeal No 2683 with respect to which judges of the Supreme Court have declared their assets does not constitute the “personal information” of the judges and does not engage the right to privacy. The contents of the declaration of assets would fall within the meaning of “personal information” and the test set out under clause (j) of clause (1) of Section 8 would be applicable along with the procedure under Section 11 of the RTI Act. In view of the above observations, Civil Appeal No. 2683 of 2010 is dismissed and the judgement of the Delhi High Court dated 12 January 2010 in LPA No 501 of 2009 is upheld. [Para 116] [632-G-H; 633-A]

58. Civil Appeals Nos 10044 and 1045 of 2010 are remanded to the CPIO, Supreme Court of India to be examined and a determination arrived at, after applying the principles set out in the present judgement. The information sought in these appeals falls within the meaning of ‘third party information’ and the procedure under Section 11 must be complied with in arriving at a determination. [Para 117] [633-B] F

59. If the content of the right and the enforcement of the statute are to possess a meaningful dimension in their application to the judiciary – as it must, certain steps are necessary. Foremost among them is that the basis for the selection and appointment of judges to the higher judiciary must be defined and placed in the public realm. This is not only in G terms of the procedure which is followed in making appointments but also in terms of the substantive norms which are adopted while making judicial appointments. There can be no denying the fact that there is a vital element of public interest in knowing about the norms which are taken into consideration in selecting H

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A candidates for higher judicial office and making judicial appointments. Knowledge is a powerful instrument which secures consistency in application and generates the confidence that is essential to the sanctity of the process of judicial appointments. This is essentially because the collegium system postulates that proposals for appointment of judges are initiated by the judges B themselves. Essential substantial norms in regard to judicial appointments include: (i) The basis on which performance of a member of the Bar is evaluated for the purpose of higher judicial office; C (ii) The criteria which are applied in determining whether a member of the Bar fulfils requirements in terms of: (iii) Experience as reflected in the quantum and nature of the practice; (iv) Domain specialization in areas which are geared to the evolving nature of litigation and the requirements of each court; (v) Income requirements, if any, having regard to the nature of the practice and the circumstances prevailing in the court or region concerned; (vi) The commitment demonstrated by a candidate under consideration to the development of the law in terms of written work, research and academic qualifications; and (vii) The social orientation of the candidate, defined in terms of the extent of pro bono or legal aid work; (viii) The need for promoting the role of the judiciary as an inclusive institution and its diversity in terms of gender, representation to minorities and the marginalised, orientation and other relevant factors. (ix) The present judgment does not seek to define what the standards for judicial appointments should be. However, what needs to be emphasised is that the substantive standards which are borne in mind must be formulated and placed in the public realm as a measure that would promote confidence in the appointments process. Due publicity to the norms which have been formulated and are applied would foster a degree of transparency and promote accountability in decision making at

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 461 AGARWAL all levels within the judiciary and the government. The norms may also spell out the criteria followed for assessing the judges of the district judiciary for higher judicial office. There is a vital public interest in disclosing the basis on which those with judicial experience are evaluated for elevation to higher judicial office particularly having regard to merit, integrity and judicial performance. Placing the criteria followed in making judicial appointments in the public domain will fulfil the purpose and mandate of Section 4 of the RTI Act, engender public confidence in the process and provides a safeguard against extraneous considerations entering into the process. [Para 117] [633-G-H; 634-A-H; 635-A-B] C S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [1982] 2 SCR 365 : (1981) Supp. SCC 87 ; L Chandra Kumar v Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 : [1997] 2 SCR 1186 ; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India (‘NJAC’), (2016) 5 SCC 1 : [2015] 13 D SCR 1 ; Union of India v Sankalchand Himatlal (1977) 4 SCC 193 : [1978] 1 SCR 423 ; CBSE v Aditya Bandopadhyay (2011) 8 SCC 497 : [2011] 11 SCR 1028 ; RBI v Jayantilal N Mistry (2016) 3 SCC 525 : [2015] 14 SCR 505 ; Arvind Kejriwal v Central Public Information Officer AIR 2012 Del 29 ; State E of Uttar Pradesh v Raj Narain (1975) 4 SCC 428 : [1975] 3 SCR 333 ; Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Limited v State of Kerala (2013) 16 SCC 82 : [2013] 14 SCR 475 ; K S Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569 ; Girish F Ramchandra Deshpande v Central Information Commissioner (2013) 1 SCC 212 : [2012] 8 SCR 1097 ; Subhash Chandra Agarwal v Registrar, Supreme Court of India (2018) 11 SCC 634 ; Secy., Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India v Cricket Assn. of Bengal (1995) 2 SCC 161 : [1995] 1 G SCR 1036 ; Bihar Public Service Commission v Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi (2012) 13 SCC 61 : [2012] 11 SCR 1032 ; S N Mukherjee v Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 495 : [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 126 - relied on. H

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A C Ravichandran Iyer v Justice A M Bhattacharjee (1995) 5 SCC 457 : [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 319 ; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn v Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 659 ; P V Sankara Kurup v Leelavathy Nambier (1994) 6 SCC 68 : [1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 660 ; R K Jain v Union B of India (2013) 14 SCC 794 : [2013] 5 SCR 411 ; Canara Bank v C S Shyam (2018) 11 SCC 426 : [2017] 7 SCR 741 – referred to. Hodgkinson v Simms [1994] 3 SCR. 377 ; Needle Industries (India) Ltd v Needle Industries Newey (India) C Holding Ltd (1981) 3 SCC 333 : [1981] 3 SCR 698 ; Dale & Carrington Invt (P) Lt v P K Prathaphan (2005) 1 SCC 212 : [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 334 ; Express Newspaper v Union of India [1959] SCR 12 ; Bennet Coleman v Union of India (1972) 2 SCC 788 ; D People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 399 – referred to. SEC v Chenery Corp 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1942) ; Australian Sec & Inv Comm’n v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 963 ; Worten v E Autoridade para as Condicoes de Trabalho C-342/12 dated 30 May 2013 ; Rechnungshof v Osterreichischer Rundfunk, Joined cases (C- 465/00), (C-138/01) and (C-139/01) dated 20 May 2003 ; National Media Limited v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (SCA) ; NM v Smith [2007] ZACC 6 ; Australian Broadcasting Corporation F v Lenah Game Meats 2001 HCA 63 ; Campbell v MGN Limited [2003] 1 All ER 224 ; HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHA Civ 1776 ; Campbell v MGN Limited [2004] UKHL 22 ; Campbell v MGM Limited [2004] UKHL 22 – referred G to. Case Law Reference [1982] SCR 365 referred to Para 7 [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 319 referred to Para 7 H [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 659 referred to Para 8

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 463 AGARWAL

[1997] 2 SCR 1186 relied on Para 38 A [2015] 13 SCR 1 relied on Para 40 [1978] 1 SCR 423 relied on Para 50 [2011] 11 SCR 1028 relied on Para 61 B [2015] 14 SCR 505 relied on Para 62 [1994] 3 SCR. 377 referred to Para 63 [1981] 3 SCR 698 referred to Para 65 [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 334 referred to Para 65 C [1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 660 referred to Para 65 AIR 2012 Del 29 relied on Para 79 [1959] SCR 12 referred to Para 81 (1972) 2 SCC 788 referred to Para 81 D [1975] 3 SCR 333 relied on Para 82 (2003) 4 SCC 399 referred to Para 82 [2013] 14 SCR 475 relied on Para 83 E [2017] 10 SCR 569 relied on Para 84 [2012] 8 SCR 1097 relied on Para 95 [2013] 5 SCR 411 referred to Para 96 [2017] 7 SCR 741 referred to Para 96 F (2018) 11 SCC 634 relied on Para 97 [1995] 1 SCR 1036 relied on Para 100 [2012] 11 SCR 1032 relied on Para 106 [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 126 relied on Para 108 G

PER N.V. RAMANA, J.

60. The purport of the Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act is to balance privacy with public interest. Under the provision a two steps test could be identified wherein the first step was: (i) H

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A whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (ii) whether on an ultimate balancing analysis, does privacy give way to freedom of expression? These two tests are very difficult to be kept separate analytically. [Para 35] [646-G-H] FIRST STEP

B 61. The first step for the adjudicating authority is to ascertain whether the information is private and whether the information relating the concerned party has a reasonable expectation of privacy. [Para 36] [647-A-B]

62. There are certain factors which needs to be considered C before concluding whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy of the person concerned. These non-exhaustive factors are;

1. The nature of information.

D 2. Impact on private life.

3. Improper conduct.

4. Criminality

5. Place where the activity occurred or the information was found. E

6. Attributes of claimants such as being a public figure, a minor etc and their reputation.

7. Absence of consent.

8. Circumstances and purposes for which the information came into the hands of the publishers.

9. Effect on the claimant.

10. Intrusion’s nature and purpose. These non-exhaustive factors are to be considered in order to come to a conclusion whether the information sought is private or does the persons have a reasonable expectations of privacy. In certain cases it may be concluded that there could be certain information which is inherently private and is presumptively protected under the privacy rights. These informations include gender, age and sexual preferences etc. H

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These instances need to be kept in mind while assessing the first requirement under the aforesaid test. [Para 37] [647-D-H; 648-A-B]

63. If the information is strictly covered under the aforesaid formulation, then the person is exempted from the right to information unless ‘the public interest test’ requires to trump the same. [Para 38] [648-C] SECOND STEP

64. Having ascertained whether the information is private or not, a judge is required to adopt a balancing test to note whether the public interest justifies discloser of such information under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. The term ‘larger public interest’ needs to be understood in light of the above discussion which points that a ‘balancing test’ needs to be incorporated to see the appropriateness of disclosure. There are certain basic principles which we need to keep in mind while balancing the rights which are relevant herein. [Para 39] [648-D]

65. That the right to information and right to privacy are at an equal footing. There is no requirement to take an a priori view that one right trumps other. Although there are American cases, which have taken the view that the freedom of speech and expression trumps all other rights in every case. However, E in India we cannot accord any such priority to the rights. [Para 40] [648-E-F]

66. The contextual balancing involves ‘proportionality test’. [K S Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1]. The test is to see whether the release of information would be necessary, F depends on the information seeker showing the ‘pressing social need’ or ‘compelling requirement for upholding the democratic values’. It can easily be concluded that the exemption of public interest as occurring under Section 8(1)(j) requires a balancing test. There is a need to distinguish two separate concepts i.e. G “interest of the public” and “something in the public interest.” Therefore, the material distinction between the aforesaid concepts concern those matters which affect political, moral and material welfare of the public need to be distinguished from those for public entertainment, curiosity or amusement. Under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act requires to hold that only the former is an H

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A exception to the exemption. Although it must noted that the majority opinion in K S Puttaswamy has held that the data privacy is part of the right to privacy, however, it also may be noted that the concept of data protection is still developing [refer Google Spain v. AEPD, C/131/12; Bavarian Lager v Commission, [2007] ECR II-4523]. As this Court is not concerned with the aforesaid aspects, this Court need not indulge any more than to state that there is an urgent requirement for integrating the principles of data protection into the right to information jurisprudence. [Para 41] [648-G-H; 649-A-B]

67. Coming to the aspect of transparency, judicial independence and the RTI Act, we need to note that there needs to be a balance between the three equally important concepts. The whole bulwark of preserving our Constitution, is trusted upon judiciary, when other branches have not been able to do so. As a shield, the judicial independence is the basis with which judiciary has maintained its trust reposed by the citizens. In light of the same, the judiciary needs to be protected from attempts to breach its independence. Such interference requires calibration of appropriate amount of transparency in consonance with judicial independence. [Para 42] [649-D-E]

E 68. It must be kept in the mind that the transparency cannot be allowed to run to its absolute, considering the fact that efficiency is equally important principle to be taken into fold. It may be noted that right to information should not be allowed to be used as a tool of surveillance to scuttle effective functioning of judiciary. While applying the second step the concerned F authority needs to balance these considerations as well. [Para 43] [649-F]

69. In line with the aforesaid discussion, we need to note that following non- exhaustive considerations needs to be considered while assessing the ‘public interest’ under Section G 8 of the RTI Act- a. Nature and content of the information b. Consequences of non-disclosure; dangers and benefits to public H c. Type of confidential obligation.

CPIO, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. SUBHASH CHANDRA 467 AGARWAL d. Beliefs of the confidant; reasonable suspicion A e . Party to whom information is disclosed f. Manner in which information acquired g. Public and private interests h. Freedom of expression and proportionality. B [Para 44] [649-G-H; 650-A-B] Election Commission of India v. Dr Subramaniam Swamy (1996) 4 SCC 104 : [1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 637 – relied on. C State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, (1975) 4 SCC 428 : [1975] 3 SCR 333 ; S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) Supp. (1) SCC 87 : [1982] SCR 365 ; Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Dilip Kumar & Ors. (2018) 9 SCC 40 ; K S Puttaswamy v. Union of D India (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR569 – referred to. University of New Castle upon Tyne v. Information Commissioner and British Union for Abolition of Vivisection, [2011] UKUT 185 ; Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk and Ors. C-465/00 ; Coco E v. Clark, [1968] FSR 415 ; Gartside v. Outram, (1856) 26 LJ Ch (NS) 113 ; Fraser v. Evans, [1969] 1 QB 349 ; Service v. Putterill, [1968] 1 QB 396 Beloff v. Pressdram, [1973] 1 All ER 24 ; Lion Laboratories v. Evans, [1985] QB 526 ; Her Majesty’s Attorney F General v. The Observer Ltd. & Ors., [1991] AC 109 ; Corrs Pavey Whiting and Byrne v. Collector of Customs, (1987) 14 FCR 434 ; Smith Kline and French Laboratories [Australia] Ltd. v. Department of Community Services and Health, (1990) 22 FCR 73 ; Woodward v. Hutchins, [1977] 1 WLR 760 ; Duchess G of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll, 1967 Ch 302 ; Murray v. Express Newspaper plc, [2009] Ch 481 ; Google Spain v. AEPD, C/131/12 ; Bavarian Lager v Commission, [2007] ECR II- 4523 – referred to. H

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A Case Law Reference [1996] 1Suppl. SCR 637 relied on Para 9 [1975] 3 SCR 333 referred to Para 19 [1982] SCR 365 referred to Para 19 B (2018) 9 SCC 40 referred to Para 23 [2017] 10 SCR 569 referred to Para 41 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2019. C From the judgment and Order dated 24.¹¹.2009 by the Hon’ble Central Information Commission, New Delhi, in Appeal No. CICWB/ A/2009/00529. With D C.A. Nos. 10045/2010, 2683/2010 K.K. Venugopal, AG, Tushar Mehta, SG, Saurabh Mishra, Devashish Bharuka, Ankur Talwar, G.S. Makker, B. Krishna Prasad for the Appellant. E A. Mariarputham, Adv. Gen., Sushil Kumar Jain, R. N. Venjrani, Pravin H. Parekh, Sr. Advs., Prashant Bhushan, Pranav Sachdeva, Ms. Neha Rathi, T. Sudhakar, Jatin Bhardwaj, V. N. Raghupathy, Sunil Kumar Verma, Sunil Fernandes, Sibo Sankar Mishra, Niranjan Sahu, Raja Chatterjee, Runa Bhuyan, Satish Kumar, Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, F Ms. Rachana Srivastava, Ms. Umme Salma, Puneet Jain, Ms. P.S. Chandralekha, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, S.K. Rajara for Naresh K. Sharma, M. P. Vinod, Kuldip Singh, Krishnanand Pandeya, Ms. C. K. Sucharita, Bharat Sangal, Ms. Aruna Mathur, Avneesh Arputham, Ms. Anuradha Arputham, Ms. Geetanjali for M/S. Arputham Aruna And Co. G Aniruddha P. Mayee, Chirag Jain, A. Selvin Raja, Charudatta Mahindrakar, Khatrshal Raj, Ms. Tanya Chaudhary for M/s. Parekh & Co., Yashvardhan, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Saksham Maheshwari, Ms. Sneha Kalita, Sanjai Kumar Pathak, Ms. Shashi Pathak, Arvind Kumar Tripathi, Advs. for the Respondent.

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