UNION OF INDIA & ANR. v. TARSEM SINGH & ORS.

A to be understood to mean that the rate of compensation may not vary or must be uniform in all cases. We need not investigate this question further as it does not arise here although we are clear in our minds that under given circumstances differentiation even in the scale of compensation may comfortably comport with Article

B 14. No such circumstances are present here nor pressed. Indeed, the State, realising the force of this facet of discrimination, offered, expiratory fashion, both before the High Court and before us, to pay 15%, solatium to obliterate the hostile distinction.

22. The core question now arises. What is the effect even if we read a discrimination design in Section 34? Is plastic surgery permissible or demolition of the section inevitable? Assuming that there is an untenable discrimination in the matter of compensation does the whole of Section 34 have to be liquidated or several portions voided? In our opinion, scuttling the section, the course the High Court has chosen, should be the last step. The court uses its writ power with a constructive design, an affirmative slant and a sustaining bent. Even when by compulsions of inseverability, a destructive stroke becomes necessary the court minimises the injury by an intelligent containment. Law keeps alive and “operation pull down” is de mode. Viewed from this perspective, so far as we are able to see, the only discriminatory factor as between Section 34 of the Act and Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act vis-à-vis quantification of compensation is the nonpayment of solatium in the former case because of the provision in Section 34(1) that Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act shall have no application. Thus, to achieve the virtue of equality and to eliminate the vice of inequality what is needed is the obliteration of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act from Section 34(1) of the Town Planning Act. The whole of Section 34(1) does not have to be struck down. Once we exclude the discriminatory and, therefore, void part in Section 34(1) of the Act, equality is restored. G The owner will then be entitled to the same compensation, including solatium, that he may be eligible for under the Land Acquisition Act. What is rendered void by Article 13 is only “to the extent of the contravention” of Article 14. The lancet of the court may remove the offending words and restore to constitutional health H the rest of the provision.

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23. We hold that the exclusion of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition A Act from Section 34 of the Act is unconstitutional but it is severable and we sever it. The necessary consequence is that Section 34(1) will be read omitting the words “and Section 25”. What follows then? Section 32 obligates the State to act under the Land Acquisition Act but we have struck down that part which excludes B Section 25, of the Land Acquisition Act and so, the “modification” no longer covers Section 25. It continues to apply to the acquisition of property under the Town Planning Act. Section 34(2) provides for compensation exactly like Section 25(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and in the light of what we have just decided Section 25(2) will also apply and “in addition to the market value of the land as above provided, the court shall in every case award a sum of fifteen per centum on such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition”.

34. One more judgment needs to be referred to, namely, Girnar Traders (3) vs State of Maharashtra (2011) 3 SCC 1, which was relied upon by Shri Divan to argue that, like Chapter VII of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, the amendment to the National Highways Act is a complete self-contained code and must, therefore, be followed on its own terms. This judgment dealt with whether Section 11-A introduced by the 1984 amendment to the Land Acquisition Act E could be said to apply to acquisitions made under the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act. The answer to this question was that Section 11-A could not be so applied as the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act referred to the Land Acquisition Act as legislation by way of incorporation and not legislation by way of reference. In the present case, the Land F Acquisition Act, by virtue of Section 3J of the National Highways Act, does not apply at all. The controversy in the present case does not, in any manner, involve whether the Land Acquisition Act applies by way of incorporation or reference. This case is also, therefore, wholly distinguishable. Further, the ‘self-contained code’ argument based on this judgment cannot be used as a discriminatory tool to deny benefits G available to landowners merely because land has to be acquired under a different Act, as has been held in Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra).

35. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Union of India and NHAI, has stated that under Section H

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A 3G(2) of the National Highways Act, where the right of user or any right in the nature of an easement on land is acquired under the Act, there shall be paid to the owner and any other person whose right is so affected, an amount calculated at 10% of the amount that is determined as payable by the order of the competent authority. According to the learned Senior Advocate, this amount is not payable under the Land Acquisition Act, B 1894, and that this being the case, it is clear that what is given by way of compensation under the National Highways Act being more than what is given under the Land Acquisition Act in certain respects, the Scheme of the Acts, therefore, being different, the non-giving of solatium and interest under the National Highways Act is justified. Even otherwise, C persons should not be given compensation under Section 3G(2) as a matter of course, but would have to submit proof that a right of easement or a right of user has been acquired for which compensation ought to be paid. Shri Amit Sibal, learned Senior Advocate, on the other hand, has argued, referring to Sections 3(b), 9 and 31(1) of the Land Acquisition Act that easementary rights are compensated even under the Land D Acquisition Act and in point of fact the sum of 10% payable under Section 3G(2) of the National Highways Act is really in the nature of a cap beyond which no further compensation can be granted. Even otherwise, according to the learned Senior Advocate, granting of compensation under Section 3G(2) would have no bearing on interest and solatium that is payable under the Land Acquisition Act and not under the National E Highways Act.

36. Section 3G(2) makes it clear that rights of user and rights in the nature of easement being valuable property rights, compensation must be payable therefor. It is obvious that there is no double payment to the owner on this score as the owner and/or any other person has to prove that a right in the nature of an easement has also been taken away. Obviously, the right of user being subsumed in acquisition of ownership, the owner cannot get a double benefit on this score. The right of user is, therefore, referable only to persons other than the owner, who may have tenancy rights, and other rights of license on land which is acquired under the National Highways Act.

37. Insofar as easementary rights under the Land Acquisition Act are concerned, three Sections are relevant and need to be quoted: “3. Definitions.— In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context,— H xxx xxx

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(b) the expression “person interested” includes all persons A claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land; xxx xxx B

9. Notice to persons interested.— (1) The Collector shall then cause public notice to be given at convenient places on or near the land to be taken, stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land, and that claims to compensation for all interests in such land may be made to him. C

(2) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land so needed, and shall require all persons interested in the land to appear personally or by agent before the Collector at a time and place therein mentioned (such time not being earlier than fifteen days D after the date of publication of the notice), and to state the nature of their respective interests in the land and the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation for such interests, and their objections (if any) to the measurements made under section

8. The Collector may in any case require such statement to be made in writing and signed by the party or his agent. E (3) The Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect on the occupier (if any) of such land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein, or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, as reside or have agents authorised to receive service on their behalf, within the revenue district in which the land is F situate. (4) In case any person so interested resides elsewhere, and has no such agent the notice shall be sent to him by post in a letter addressed to him at his last known residence, address or place of business and registered under sections 28 and 29 of the Indian G Post Office Act, 1898 (6 of 1898). xxx xxx

31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court.— (1) On making an award under section 11, the Collector shall tender H

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A payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section. xxx xxx” B A reading of these Sections shows that a person who is interested in an easement affecting land can claim compensation therefor under the aforesaid provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Under both the Land Acquisition Act and the National Highways Act, such claims have to be proved in accordance with law, the difference being that under the C Land Acquisition Act actuals are payable, whereas under the National Highways Act, a fixed amount of 10% of the amount determined by the competent authority is payable. It is, therefore, wholly incorrect to state that extra amounts are payable to the owner under the National Highways Act, which are not so payable under the Land Acquisition Act. Also, D both Acts contemplate payment of compensation to persons whose easementary rights have been affected by the acquisition. In any event, this contention cannot possibly answer non-payment of solatium and interest under the National Highways Act, which has been dealt with in extenso in this judgment.

38. It is worthy of note that even in acquisitions that take place under the National Highways Act and the 1952 Act, the notification of 2015 under the new Acquisition Act of 2013 makes solatium and interest payable in cases covered by both Acts. In fact, with effect from 1 st January, 2015, an Amendment Ordinance No.9 of 2014 was promulgated F amending the 2013 Act. Section 10 of the said amendment Ordinance states as follows: “10. In the principal Act, in section 105,- (i) for sub-section (3), the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely:- G “(3) The provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement in accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructure amenities in accordance with the Third Schedule shall apply to the enactments relating to land H

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acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule with effect from A 1st January, 2015.”; (ii) sub-section (4) shall be omitted.” It is only when this Ordinance lapsed that the notification dated 28th August, 2015 was then made under Section 113 of the 2013 Act. B This notification is important and states as follows: “MINISTRY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT ORDER New Delhi, the 28th August, 2015 C S.O. 2368(E).— Whereas, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013) (hereinafter referred to as the RFCTLARR Act) came into effect from 1st January, 2014; And whereas, sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the RFCLTARR D Act provided for issuing of notification to make the provisions of the Act relating to the determination of the compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement applicable to cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act; And whereas, the notification envisaged under sub-section (3) E of Section 105 of RFCTLARR Act was not issued, and the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014 (9 of 2014) was promulgated on 31st December, 2014, thereby, inter-alia, amending Section 105 of the RFCTLARR Act to extend the provisions of the Act relating to the determination of the compensation and F rehabilitation and resettlement to cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act; And whereas, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015) was promulgated on 3rd April, 2015 to give continuity to the provisions of the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, G 2014; And whereas, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) was promulgated on 30th May, 2015 to give continuity to the provisions of the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015); H

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A And whereas, the replacement Bill relating to the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015) was referred to the Joint Committee of the Houses for examination and report and the same is pending with the Joint Committee; As whereas, as per the provisions of article 123 of the B Constitution, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) shall lapse on the 31st day of August, 2015 and thereby placing the land owners at the disadvantageous position, resulting in denial of benefits of enhanced compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement to the cases of land acquisition under the 13 Acts specified in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR C Act as extended to the land owners under the said Ordinance; And whereas, the Central Government considers it necessary to extend the benefits available to the land owners under the RFCTLARR Act to similarly placed land owners whose lands are acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth D Schedule; and accordingly the Central Government keeping in view the aforesaid difficulties has decided to extend the beneficial advantage to the land owners and uniformly apply the beneficial provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, relating to the determination of compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement as were made applicable to cases of land acquisition under the said enactments in the interest of the land owners; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub- section (1) of Section 113 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), the Central Government hereby makes the following Order to remove the aforesaid difficulties, namely;-

1. (1) This Order may be called the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2015. (2) It shall come into force with effect from the 1st day of G September, 2015.

2. The provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement H

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in accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructure A amenities in accordance with the Third Schedule shall apply to all cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act. [F.No. 13011/01/2014-LRD] B K. P. KRISHNAN, Addl. Secy.” It is thus clear that the Ordinance as well as the notification have applied the principle contained in Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra), as the Central Government has considered it necessary to extend the benefits available to landowners generally under the 2013 Act to similarly placed landowners whose lands are acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule, the National Highways Act being one of the aforesaid enactments. This being the case, it is clear that the Government has itself accepted that the principle of Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra) would apply to acquisitions which take place under the National Highways Act, and that solatium and interest would be payable under the 2013 Act to persons whose lands are acquired for the purpose of National Highways as they are similarly placed to those landowners whose lands have been acquired for other public purposes under the 2013 Act. This being the case, it is clear that even the Government is of the view that it is not possible to discriminate between landowners covered by the 2013 Act and landowners covered by the National Highways Act, when it comes to compensation to be paid for lands acquired under either of the enactments. The judgments delivered under the 1952 Act as well as the Defence of India Act, 1971, may, therefore, require a re-look in the light of this development. 1 In any case, as has been pointed out hereinabove, the case of Chajju Ram F (supra), has been referred to a larger Bench. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that the view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court is correct, whereas the view of the Rajasthan High Court is not correct.

39. We were also referred to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court reported as Lalita vs Union of India G AIR 2003 Karnataka 165, as well as a judgment of the Division Bench 1 The Defence of India Act, 1971, was a temporary statute which remained in force only during the period of operation of a proclamation of emergency and for a period of six months thereafter – vide Section 1(3) of the Act. As this Act has since expired, it is not included in the Fourth Schedule of the 2013 Act. H

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A of the Madras High Court in T. Chakrapani vs Union of India, both of which distinguished the Requisition Act cases and relied upon Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra) in order to reach the same conclusion as the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Both these judgments are also correct.

40. One more argument was raised by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents, which is that nothing survives in these mattes in view of orders passed by this Court in Union of India v. T. Chakrapani – the Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court having come before this Court. This order is quoted by us in full : C “In view of the statement made by Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned Solicitor General of India on an earlier date of the hearing that solatium in terms of the impugned order of the High Court would be granted for the instant acquisitions made under the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956, no subsisting issue remains in the present appeals as also in the special leave petition. The D appeals as also the special leave petition are accordingly closed. The respondents – writ petitioners be paid solatium as due in terms of the impugned order(s) along with interest thereon.” We were also referred to an order in Sunita Mehra v. Union of India (2016) SCC OnLine 1128, in which this Court held : E “6. The only point agitated before us by the learned Solicitor General is that in paragraph 23 of the impugned judgment of the High Court, it has been held that land-owners would “henceforth” be entitled to solatium and interest as envisaged by the provisions of Sections 23 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In the F ultimate paragraph of the impugned judgment it has, however, been mentioned that in respect of all acquisitions made under the National Highways Act, 1956, solatium and interest in terms similar to those contained in Sections 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 will have to be paid.

G 7. Learned Solicitor General has pointed out that there is an apparent inconsistency in the judgment, which needs to be clarified. It has also been submitted by the learned Solicitor General that the order of the High Court should be clarified to mean that the issue of grant of interest and solatium should not be allowed to be reopened without any restriction or reference to time. Learned H

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Solicitor General has particularly submitted that to understand the A order of the High Court in any other manner would not only seriously burden the public exchequer but would also amount to overlooking the delay that may have occurred on the part of the land-owner(s) in approaching the Court and may open floodgates for en masse litigation on the issue. B

8. We have considered the submissions advanced. In Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 457, this Court, though in a different context, had restricted the operation of the judgment of this Court in Sunder v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 211 and had granted the benefit of interest on solatium only in respect of pending proceedings. We are of the view that a similar course should be adopted in the present case also. Accordingly, it is directed that the award of solatium and interest on solatium should be made effective only to proceedings pending on the date of the High Court order in Golden Iron & Steel Forgins v. Union of India i.e. 28.03.2008. Concluded cases should not be opened. As for future proceedings, the position would be covered by the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (came into force on 01.01.2014), which Act has been made applicable to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956 by virtue of notification/order issued under the provisions of the Act of 2013.” E

41. There is no doubt that the learned Solicitor General, in the aforesaid two orders, has conceded the issue raised in these cases. This assumes importance in view of the plea of Shri Divan that the impugned judgments should be set aside on the ground that when the arbitral awards did not provide for solatium or interest, no Section 34 petition having been filed by the landowners on this score, the Division Bench judgments that are impugned before us ought not to have allowed solatium and/or interest. Ordinarily, we would have acceded to this plea, but given the fact that the Government itself is of the view that solatium and interest should be granted even in cases that arise between 1997 and 2015, in the interest of justice we decline to interfere with such orders, given our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. We therefore declare that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating to solatium and interest contained in Section 23(1A) and (2) and interest payable in terms of section 28 proviso will apply to acquisitions H

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A made under the National Highways Act. Consequently, the provision of Section 3J is, to this extent, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, declared to be unconstitutional. Accordingly, Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 9599/2019 is dismissed.

42. Coming to the individual appeals in the case, Shri Mukul Rohatgi B has raised essentially 11 grounds, which, according to him, require the Court’s attention. We will deal with each of these grounds seriatim hereinbelow: Ground 1: That the acquired land was treated as commercial land, ignoring Section 143 of The Punjab Regional and Town C Planning and Development Act, 1995, due to which construction is restricted upto 50m on either side of the National Highway. SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No. 15472/2019; SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15442-15443/2019; SLP (C) No. 15488/2019; SLP (C) No. D 15444-15445/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No.15479/2019; SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15485/2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/2019; SLP (C) No. 15466/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No. 15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 15448/2019; SLP (C) No. 21690/2019; SLP E (C) No. 14491/2019; SLP (C) No. 21662/2019; SLP (C) No. 21696/2019; SLP (C) No. 21657/2019; SLP (C) No. 21664/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 21666/2019; SLP (C) No. 21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21673/2019; SLP (C) No. 21663/2019; SLP (C) No. 21695/2019; SLP (C) No. 21692/2019; SLP (C) No. 21693/2019; SLP (C) No. 9602/ F 2019; SLP (C) No. 9600/2019; SLP (C) No. 21687/2019; SLP (C) No. 21689/2019; SLP (C) No. 9604/2019; SLP (C) No. 10210/2019 In these matters, this ground has been raised and argued sometimes at the Section 34 stage, sometimes at the Section 37 stage, and G sometimes at both stages. The burden to prove that the land in question is within 50m of the National Highway, and that it does not have commercial potentiality, is on the NHAI but, on facts, has never been discharged. This being the case in all these appeals, they stand dismissed. H

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SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No. 15471/2019; SLP A (C) No. 15450/2019; SLP (C) No. 21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21683/2019 In these matters, this ground has not been taken or argued in the Section 34 petition. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. B Ground 2: That the arbitrator conducted the spot visit five years after the Section 3A notification was issued, based on which compensation was determined. SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No. 15472/2019; SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. C 15442-15443/2019; SLP (C) No. 15488/2019; SLP (C) No. 15444-15445/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No. 15479/2019; SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15485/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/2019; SLP (C) No. 15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No. 15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No. 15471/2019; SLP (C) No. D 15448/2019; SLP (C) No. 15450/2019; SLP (C) No. 21690/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 15486/2019; SLP (C) No. 14491/2019; SLP (C) No. 21662/2019; SLP (C) No. 21696/2019; SLP (C) No. 21657/2019; SLP (C) No. 21664/2019; SLP (C) No. 21666/2019; SLP (C) No. 21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21682/ E 2019; SLP (C) No. 21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21673/2019; SLP (C) No. 21663/2019; SLP (C) No. 21695/2019; SLP (C) No. 21691/2019; SLP (C) No. 21692/2019; SLP (C) No. 21693/2019; SLP (C) No. 10210/ 2019 F In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in the Section 34 petitions filed in these cases. Further, assessment, in any case, of the land in question, relates to the date of the original notification. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. Ground 3:That exemplars of faraway villages in other districts G were relied upon to enhance compensation. SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No. 15472/2019; SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15442-15443/2019; SLP (C) No. 15488/2019; SLP (C) No. H

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A 15444-15445/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No. 15479/2019; SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15485/ 2019; SLP (C) No.15474/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No. 15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No.15471/2019; SLP (C) No. 15448/2019; SLP (C) No. 15450/2019; SLP (C) No. 21690/2019; SLP (C) No. 15486/ B 2019; SLP (C) No. 14491/2019; SLP (C) No. 21662/2019; SLP (C) No. 21696/2019; SLP (C) No. 21657/2019; SLP (C) No. 21664/2019; SLP (C) No. 21666/2019; SLP (C) No. 21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21682/2019; SLP (C) No. 21675/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21673/2019; C SLP (C) No. 21663/2019; SLP (C) No. 21695/2019; SLP (C) No. 21691/2019; SLP (C) No. 21692/2019; SLP (C) No. 21693/2019; SLP (C) No. 9602/2019; SLP (C) No. 9600/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 21687/2019; SLP (C) No. 21683/2019; SLP (C) No. 21689/2019; SLP (C) No. 9604/2019; SLP (C) No. 10210/2019 D In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. Ground 4: That the Arbitrator relied upon the Collector Rate of E the year 2011-13/ 2012-13. SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15472/2019; SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15488/2019; SLP (C) No. 15444-15445/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No. 15479/2019; SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/ F 2019; SLP (C) No. 15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No. 15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 15450/2019; SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No. 15486/2019; SLP (C) No. 21696/2019; SLP (C) No. 21664/2019; SLP (C) No. 21671/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 21682/2019; SLP (C) No. 21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21695/2019; SLP G (C) No. 21693/2019; SLP (C) No. 9604/2019; SLP (C) No. 15485/2019; In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. H

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SLP (C) No. 15471/2019 A In this matter, this ground has been taken up in the Section 34 petition, however, the High Court has rightly dismissed this appeal in terms of the Punjab & Haryana High Court order dated 15.02.17, in FAO No. 6522 of 2016, titled ‘Mangal Dass vs. Govt. of India’, wherein compensation of Rs. 7,00,000 per marla, which B was calculated based on the collector rate of 2011, was held to be not justified, and was reduced to Rs. 4,50,000 per marla. Therefore, this appeal also stands dismissed. Ground 5: That compensation on account of loss of structure was awarded. C SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15444-15445/2019; SLP (C) No. 15485/2019; In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. D SLP (C) No. 15472/2019 In this matter, this ground has not been taken in the Section 37 appeal. Therefore, this appeal also stands dismissed. SLP (C) No. 15478/2019 E In this matter, this ground has been taken up in the Section 34 petition, and the High Court, noting that the landowner gave up his claim on loss of structure awarded at the rate of Rs. 50,000 by the Arbitrator, held that no further adjudication is necessary on this point. Therefore, no interference is required, and this appeal F also stands dismissed. SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No. 15479/2019; SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/2019; SLP (C) No. 15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; G SLP (C) No. 15471/2019; SLP (C) No. 15448/2019; SLP (C) No. 15450/2019; SLP (C) No. 21690/2019; SLP (C) No. 15486/2019; SLP (C) No. 21662/2019; SLP (C) No. 21691/ 2019

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A In these matters, though this ground has been argued in the Section 34 petition, as this ground is factual, no patent illegality arises. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. Ground 6: That compensation for shifting expenseswas granted SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15477/2019 B In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. SLP (C) No. 15442-15443/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; C SLP (C) No. 15479/2019; SLP (C) No. 21662/2019 In these matters, though this ground has been argued in the Section 34 petition, as this ground is factual, no patent illegality arises. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. Ground 7: That arbitration costs were awarded D SLP (C) No. 15442-15443/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/2019; SLP (C) No. 14491/2019; SLP (C) No. 21657/2019; SLP (C) No. 9600/2019; SLP (C) No. 10210/2019; SLP (C) No. 15466/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 21690/2019; SLP (C) No. 21662/2019; E SLP (C) No. 21691/2019 In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any of in the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. SLP (C) No. 15479/2019; SLP (C) No. 21682/2019; SLP F (C) No. 9602/2019; SLP (C) No. 21687/2019; SLP (C) No. 21683/2019; SLP (C) No. 9604/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 15448/2019; SLP (C) No. 15450/2019 In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any of the Section 37 appeals. Therefore, these appeals also stand G dismissed. SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21673/2019; SLP (C) No. 15485/2019; SLP (C) No. 15447/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 21692/2019 H

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[R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

In these matters, this ground has not been taken up in any of the A Special Leave Petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. Ground 8: That compensation was awarded based on post- notification sale deed SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15444-15445/2019; SLP (C) No. 14491/2019; SLP (C) No. 21664/2019; SLP B (C) No. 21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21663/2019; SLP (C) No. 21695/2019; SLP (C) No. 21693/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 9602/2019; SLP (C) No. 9600/2019; SLP (C) No. 21687/2019; SLP (C) No. 21683/2019; SLP (C) No. 21689/2019; SLP (C) No. 9604/2019; SLP (C) No. 21696/ C 2019; SLP (C) No. 21666/2019 In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. Ground 9: That compensation was awarded based on sale deeds D of smaller plots of land SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 21666/2019; SLP (C) No. 21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21663/2019; SLP (C) No. 9602/2019; SLP (C) No. 21687/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 21683/2019; SLP (C) No. 21689/2019; E SLP (C) No. 9604/2019; SLP (C) No. 21696/2019 In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. F Ground 10: That compensation on account of severance of land was awarded SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15479/2019; SLP (C) No. 15471/2019 In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in G any of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. SLP (C) No. 10210/2019 In this matter, this ground has not been taken in the Special Leave Petitions. Therefore, this appeal stands dismissed. H

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A SLP (C) No. 15485/2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/2019; SLP (C) No. 15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 15486/2019; SLP (C) No. 21691/2019 In these matters, though this ground has been taken in the Section 34 petition, no patent illegality arises. Therefore, these appeals B stand dismissed. Ground 11: That compensation on account of loss of business was awarded SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No. 21675/2019

C In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/2019; SLP (C) No. 15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No. D 15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No. 15471/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 15450/2019; SLP (C) No. 21690/2019; SLP (C) No. 21691/2019; SLP (C) No. 21692/2019 In these matters, though this ground has been argued in the Section 34 petition, no patent illegality arises. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed. E

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals disposed of.