M. SIDDIQ (D) THR. LRS. v. MAHANT SURESH DAS AND OTHERS ETC.

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A “Defendants further claim that the property in suit was not in exclusive possession of Muslims right from 1858. It is further submitted that in view of the possession of Hindus from 1858 and onwards which is evident from Ext. 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 27 and 31, the outer Courtyard was exclusively in possession of Hindus and the inner Courtyard was not exclusively in possession of Muslims B but also in joint possession of Hindus and Muslims till 1934. Muslims were dispossessed from the inner Courtyard also in 1934 and plaintiffs admit that Muslims were dispossessed on 22/ 23December 1949 from the inner Courtyard. Thus, on the basis of Islamic tenets the Muslims claim that the property shall be construed as a Mosque. In this reference the controversy has already been set at rest by the Privy Council in the decision of Masjid Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 PC 116. The aforesaid view has been approved in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union Of India, 1994 (6) SCC 360, Para 70 of the ruling is relevant which reads as under……” [Printed volume of the judgment at page Nos. 3061] “Sri Jain has relied upon para 78 of Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and others v. Union of India and others 1994(6) SCC 360, which is reproduced as under : “While offer of prayer or worship is are religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and move reverentially.” G Sri H.S. Jain, Advocate has further argued that since birth place of Lord Ram was considered as a place of worship which was integral part of religious practice of Hindu from times immemorial. It is deity and it stands on a different footing and have to be treated reverentially. Sri Jain has further urged that in view of the H

M. SIDDIQ (D) THR. LRS. v. MAHANT SURESH DAS AND 261 OTHERS ETC. [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

constitutional mandate as provided under Article 25 of the A Constitution this place which was all the time being worshipped has be treated by this Court as a place of worship because of the belief of the Hindu based on religious book and religious practice to be birth place of Lord Ram as the temple was constructed in the 12th century. It is expedient to say that prior to 12th century B there is evidence that earlier temples were also constructed at the site. Thus, according to Sri H.S. Jain, Advocate there is overwhelming evidence to establish the site of Ram Janambhumi and the Court has to recognize the same. Thus, the suit of the plaintiffs which causes hindrance for worship of Hindu is liable to be dismissed on this count as no relief can be granted under Section C 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, now Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.” [Printed volume of the judgment at page Nos. 3392] “LORD RAM AS THE AVATAR OF VISHNU HAVING BEEN D BORN AT AYODHYA AT THE JANMASTHAN IS ADMITTEDLY THE CORE PART OF HINDU BELIEF AND FAITH WHICH IS IN EXISTENCE AND PRACTICED FOR THE LAST THOUSANDS OF YEARS. THE HINDU SCRIPTURES ALSOS SANCTIFY IT. ARTICLE 25 OF THE E CONSTITUTION BEING A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT ENSUES ITS PRESERVATION AND NO RELIEF CAN BE TAKEN BY THE COURT WHICH SEEKS TO RESTRICT OR ALTOGETHER EXTINGUISH THIS RIGHT. The fact that Ram Janambhumi is an integral part of Hindu Religion F and the right to worship there is a fundamental right of the Hindu religion and can be enforced through a suit can be clearly made out through a number of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.” [Printed volume of the judgment at page Nos. 3429] G “THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT OF HINDUS TO WORSHIP RAM LALA AT THE JANMASTHAN BECAME CONCRETISED BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION CAME INTO BEING AND THE SAME REQUIRES TO BE PROTECTED. H

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A It is well-known that the Constitution of India was enacted, i.e. given to ourselves, w.e.f. 26th January, 1950. Before it, the right of Hindus to worship was duly sanctified and recognized by judicial orders. In fact, the Supreme Court records in the Ismail Faruqui case B above the contention in paragraph 1.2 of the White Paper of the Government of India as recorded in Paragraph 9, Page 380, of the said judgment. It reads as follows: “Interim orders in these civil suits restrained the parties from removing the idols or interfering with their worship. In effect, therefore, from December 1949 till 6.12.1992 the structure had not been used as a mosque.” C It is further very significant to note that the Muslims for the first time, after 1949, assert their right howsoever unsustainable, only in 18th December, 1961. Therefore, the right of the Hindus to worship at the Rama Janma D Bhumi, continuing since times immemorial as an integral part of their religious right and faith was also sanctified by judicial orders from 1949 continuously. This right has concretised and remains an integral part of Hindu religion and has to be protected.” [Printed volume of the judgment at page Nos. 3439]

24. Similarly, in the judgment rendered by Justice Sudhir Agarwal, Ismail Faruqui has been quoted at page No. 2015 in the printed volume of the judgment, which is as under: “3501. Sri Prasad argued that belief of Hindus that Lord Ram as incarnation of Vishnu having born at Ayodhya forms an integral part of Hindu religion which cannot be denied to be practised, observed and performed by them and refers to Commissioner of Police & others v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta& another, (2004) 12 SCC 770 (para 9) and Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi (supra). In order to show what constitutes public order under Article 25 of the Constitution, he also placed reliance on Dalbir Singh & others v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1106 (para 8).

3502. Next he submits that applying the doctrine of Eminent Domain, the place in dispute, having special significance for H

M. SIDDIQ (D) THR. LRS. v. MAHANT SURESH DAS AND 263 OTHERS ETC. [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

Hindus, cannot be touched at all either by any particular person or A even by State and the provisions of even acquisition would not apply to it though with respect to the alleged mosque, it has been already held and observed by the Apex Court that the disputed building could not be shown to be of any special significance to Muslims. He refers to Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and others v. Union B of India & others, (1994) 6 SCC 360 (para 65, 72, 75 and 96); Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji Anand prasadji Maharaj and others v. State of Gujarat & others, (1975) 1 SCC 11. The relief sought by the plaintiff (Suit-4) is barred by Section 34 Specific Reliefs Act, 1963 and reliance is placed on Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and C others v. Lakshmi Narain and others, (1976) 2 SCC 58 (para 20 and 27); American Express Bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Steel Co. and others, (1993) 2 SCC 199(para 22).”

25. After considering Ismail Faruqui, Justice Sudhir Agarwal in paragraphs 2722 to 2725 has opined as under: D “2722. The Fourth angle: It is a deity which has filed the present suit for enforcement of its rights. The religious endowment in the case in hand so far as Hindus are concerned, as they have pleaded in general, is a place of a peculiar and unique significance for them and there cannot be any other place like this. In case this E place is allowed to extinguish/extinct by application of a provision of statutes, may be of limitation or otherwise, the fundamental right of practicing religion shall stand denied to the Hindus permanently since the very endowment or the place of religion will disappear for all times to come and this kind of place cannot be created elsewhere. F

2723. In Ismail Farooqui (supra), Supreme Court has considered the plea of validity of acquisition of land under Land Acquisition Act that once a waqf of mosque is created, the property vests in almighty and it always remain a waqf hence such a property cannot be acquired. While negativing this plea, the Apex Court said that G a plea in regard to general religious purposes cannot be said to be an integral part of religion which will deprive the worshippers of the right of worship at any other place and therefore, such a property can be acquired by the State. However, the position would be otherwise if the religious property would have been of special H

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A significance and cannot be one of several such kind of properties. It will be useful to reproduce the relevant observation in this regard: “78. It appears from various decisions rendered by this Court, referred later, that subject to the protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, places of religious worship like B mosques, churches, temples etc. can be acquired under the State’s sovereign power of acquisition. Such acquisition per se does not violate either Article 25 or Article 26 of the Constitution. The decisions relating to taking over of the management have no bearing on the sovereign power of the State to acquire property.” C “82. While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places D of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially.”

2724. The above observations show if the religious endowment is of such nature, which is of specific significance or peculiar in nature, could not have been found elsewhere, the acquisition of such property by the Government will have the effect of depriving the worshippers their right of worship under Article 25 of the Constitution and such an acquisition even under the statutory provision, cannot be permitted. We find sufficient justification to extend this plea to the statute of limitation also, inasmuch as, if the statute pertaining to acquisition cannot be extended to a religious place of special significance which may have the effect of destroying the right of worship at a particular place altogether, otherwise the provision will be ultra vires, the same would apply to the statute of limitation also and that be so, it has to be read that the statute of limitation to this extent may not be availed where the debutter’s property is of such a nature that it may have the effect of extinction of the very right of worship on that place which is of peculiar nature and specific significance. This will be infringing the fundamental right under Article 25 of the Constitution.

M. SIDDIQ (D) THR. LRS. v. MAHANT SURESH DAS AND 265 OTHERS ETC. [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

2725. In fact this reason could have been available to the plaintiffs A (Suit-4) also had it been shown by them that the mosque in question for them was a place of special significance but this has already been observed by the Apex Court in respect to this particular mosque that like others it is one of the several mosques and by acquisition of the place it will not have the effect of depriving such fundamental right of Muslims. It is always open to them to offer prayer at any other place like they could have done here but Hindus are not placed on similar footing. According to Hindus, this is a place of birth of lord Rama and that be so, there cannot be any other place for which such belief persists since time immemorial. Once this land is allowed to be lost due to the acts of persons other than Hindus, the very right of this Section of people, as protected by Article 25, shall stand destroyed. This is another reason for not attracting the provisions of limitation in the present case.”

26. Similarly, Justice D.V. Sharma has stated thus: D “A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT EVEN BY EXERCISING THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAN CANNOT EXERCISE THE POWER OF ACQUISITION OF LAND OR PROPERTY WHICH EXTINGUISHES THE CORE OF THE FAITH OR THE PLACE OR THE INSTITUTION WHICH IS HELD TO E BE SACRED. What clearly follows is that a sovereign Government cannot extinguish the core of the Hindu religion which is the Ram Janambhumi, let alone the same be extinguished through a suit, by transferring the same to some other party in this case the plaintiff F thereby ensuring that the said fundamental right to worship at the Ram Janambhumi is extinguished forever. RELEVANT CASE LAW… (b) Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and Others v. Union of India & Others, 1994 (6) SCC Para 76, Page 416 – Acharya Maharajshri G Narendra Prasadji Anand Prasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat, (1976) 2 SCR 317 at pages 327-328: (AIR 1974 SC 2098 at p. 2103), has held : “One thing is, however, clear that Article 26 guarantees inter alia the right to own and acquire movable and immovable H

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A property for managing religious affairs. This right, however, cannot take away the right of the State to compulsorily acquire property ......If, on the other hand, acquisition of property of a religious denomination by the State can be proved to be such as to destroy or completely negative its right to own and acquire movable and immovable property for even the survival of a B religious institution the question may have to be examined in a different light.” Para 82 - A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of religion of Islam and Namaz by Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in the open. Accordingly, its acquisition is not prohibited by the provisions in the Constitution of India. Obviously, the acquisition of any religious place is to be made only in unusual and extraordinary situations for a larger national purpose. Keeping in view that such acquisition should not result in extinction of the right to practice the religion if the significance of that place be such. Note (i) Ram Janmasthan in Ayodhya where Ram Lala is Virajman is a place of religious significance as described in the above judgment. If the sovereign authority, under the power of eminent domain, cannot acquire it, can a plea at the instance of plaintiffs who are private persons in Suit No. 4 be entertained, upholding of which would lead to denial of such sacred place altogether to the Hindus. Note (ii) At page 413, Para 65 of Ismail Faruqui – No argument made about a mosque of special significance which forms an essential part of Islam. Hence, no question raised about Baburi Mosque as integral to Islam and it has not been raised in the plaint here or evidence laid or any contention ever made that the said mosque was of any significance to the practice of Islam as a religion…….”

G [Printed volume of the judgment at page Nos.3438-3439] “FINDINGS ….. Hon’ble Apex Court upheld the validity of provisions of Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya, 1993 in Dr. Ismail Faruqui case (supra) and held that the Central Government can acquire any place of worship. At para- 78 Apex Court held H

M. SIDDIQ (D) THR. LRS. v. MAHANT SURESH DAS AND 267 OTHERS ETC. [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

that the place of birth has a particular significance for Hindus and it should be treated on different footing, which reads as under:- “78. While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially.” C On behalf of Hindus it is urged that the plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief claimed and as such the relief is barred by the provisions of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 which is at par with Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act,1963 on the ground that they have superior fundamental rights. Contentions of Hindus are as under: D

“The Hindus have superior fundamental right than the Muslims under articles 25 & 26 of the Constitution of India for the reasons that performing customary rituals and offering service worship to the lord of universe to acquire merit and to get salvation as such it is integral part of Hindu Dharma & religion in view whereof it is humbly submitted that the instant suit is liable to be dismissed with exemplary cost: …

2. In M. Ismail Faruqui (Dr.) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Right to Practise, Profess and Propagate Religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution does not extend to the Right of Worship at any and every place of worship so that any hindrance to worship at a particular place per se may infringe the religious freedom guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. The protection under Articles 25 and 26 is to religious practice which forms integral part of practice of that religion. While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an H

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A essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion having particular significance of that religion to make it an essential or integral part of the religion stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially. Relying on said judgment it is submitted that Sri Ramjanamsthan has particular significance for the Hinduism as visiting and performing customary B rites confer merit and gives salvation it is firm belief of the Hindus based on their sacred Divine Holy Scriptures which belief neither can be scrutinized by any Court of Law nor can be challenged by the persons having no faith in Hinduism as this is conscience of the Hindus having special protection under Article 25 of the C Constitution of India. Relevant paragraph 77 and 78 of the said judgment read as follows:

77. It may be noticed that Article 25 does not contain any reference to property unlike Article 26 of the Constitution. The right to practise, profess and propagate religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution does not necessarily include the right to acquire or own or possess property. Similarly this right does not extend to the right of worship at any and every place of worship so that any hindrance to worship at a particular place per se may infringe the religious freedom guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is to religious practice which forms an essential and integral part of the religion. A practice may be a religious practice but not an essential and integral part of practice of that religion.

78. While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially.

3. In M. Ismail Faruqui (Dr.) v. Union of India (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a mosque is not an essential H

M. SIDDIQ (D) THR. LRS. v. MAHANT SURESH DAS AND 269 OTHERS ETC. [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

part of the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz (prayer) by A Muslims can be offered any where even in open. The Right to Worship is not at any and every place so long as it can be practised effectively, unless the Right to Worship at a particular place is itself an integral part of that right. Relying on said ratio of law it is submitted that without offering prayer at Sri Ramjanamsthan B described as Babri mosque in the plaint it can be practised somewhere else but offering prayer instead of Sri Ramjanamsthan at any other place cannot be practised because the merit which is obtained by worshiping at the birth place of Sri Ram cannot be obtained by doing so at other places and it will be contrary to the holy Divine Sacred Scripture of the Hindus and will cause extinction of a most sacred shrine of the Hindus. Relevant paragraph Nos. 80 to 87 of the said judgment read as follows:

80. It has been contended that a mosque enjoys a particular position in Muslim Law and once a mosque is established and prayers are offered in such a mosque, the same remains for all time to come a property of Allah and the same never reverts back to the donor or founder of the mosque and any person professing Islamic faith can offer prayer in such a mosque and even if the structure is demolished, the place remains the same where the namaz can be offered. As indicated hereinbefore, in British India, no such protection was given to a mosque and the mosque was subjected to the provisions of statute of limitation thereby extinguishing the right of Muslims to offer prayers in a particular mosque lost by adverse possession over that property.

81. Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act comprehends the categories of properties known to Indian Law. Article 367 of the Constitution adopts this secular concept of property for purposes of our Constitution. A temple, church or mosque etc. are essentially immovable properties and subject to protection under Articles 25 and 26. Every immovable property is liable to be acquired. Viewed in the proper perspective, a mosque does not enjoy any additional protection which is not available to religious places of worship of other religions.

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A 82. The correct position may be summarised thus. Under the Mahomedan Law applicable in India, title to a mosque can be lost by adverse possession (See Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law, 19th Edn., by M. Hidayatullah — Section 217; and Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara. If that is the position in law, there can be no reason to hold that a mosque B has a unique or special status, higher than that of the places of worship of other religions in secular India to make it immune from acquisition by exercise of the sovereign or prerogative power of the State. A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz (prayer) by Muslims C can be offered anywhere, even in open. Accordingly, its acquisition is not prohibited by the provisions in the Constitution of India. Irrespective of the status of a mosque in an Islamic country for the purpose of immunity from acquisition by the State in exercise of the sovereign power, its status and immunity from acquisition in the secular ethos of India under the D Constitution is the same and equal to that of the places of worship of the other religions, namely, church, temple etc. It is neither more nor less than that of the places of worship of the other religions. Obviously, the acquisition of any religious place is to be made only in unusual and extraordinary situations for a E larger national purpose keeping in view that such acquisition should not result in extinction of the right to practise the religion, if the significance of that place be such. Subject to this condition, the power of acquisition is available for a mosque like any other place of worship of any religion. The right to worship is not at any and every place, so long as it can be practised F effectively, unless the right to worship at a particular place is itself an integral part of that right…..” [Printed volume of the judgment at page Nos.3454-3458]

G 27. Hence, it is clear that the questionable observations in Ismail Faruqui have certainly permeated the impugned judgment. Thus, the impugned judgment can be claimed to be both expressly and inherently affected by the questionable observations made in Ismail Faruqui. Further, Ismail Faruqui prima facie leads a different approach regarding the application of essential and/or integral test which also needs to be H

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resolved as a matter of constitutional significance. In my view, Ismail A Faruqui needs to be brought in line with the authoritative pronouncements in Shirur Mutt and other decisions referred to in paragraphs 14 to 18 and 20 of this judgment.

28. The importance and seriousness of the matter can be better understood by the observations made by Justice S.U. Khan in the B impugned judgment itself, in the following words:- “Here is a small piece of land (1500 square yards) where angels fear to tread. It is full of innumerable land mines. We are required to clear it. Some very sane elements advised us not to attempt that. We do not propose to rush in like fools lest we are blown. C However, we have to take risk. It is said that the greatest risk in life is not daring to take risk when occasion for the same arises. Once angels were made to bow before Man. Sometimes he has to justify the said honour. This is one of those occasions. We have succeeded or failed? No one can be a judge in his own D cause. Accordingly, herein follows the judgment for which the entire country is waiting with bated breath.”

29. It is relevant here to state that by an order dated 26.3.2018 a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Sameena Begum v. Union of India E & Ors. [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 222 of 2018] has referred the matter relating to polygamy including Nikah Halala; Nikha Mutah; and Nikah Misya to a Constitution Bench. The order of reference in the said case reads as under: “It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that the challenge in these writ petitions pertains to the prevalent practice of polygamy including Nikah Halala; Nikah Mutah; and Nikah Misyar as they are unconstitutional. Various grounds have been urged in support of the stand as to how these practices, which come within the domain of personal law, are not immune from judicial review under the Constitution. It is urged by them that the majority opinion of the Constitution Bench in the case of Shayara Bano etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. (2017) 9 SCC 1 has not dealt with these aspects. They have drawn our attention to various paragraphs of the judgment to buttress the point that the said issues H

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A have not been really addressed as there has been no delineation on these aspects. On a perusal of the judgment, we find the submission of the learned counsel for the parties/petitioners is correct that these concepts have not been decided by the Constitution Bench. B xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx At this juncture, a submission has been advanced at the C Bar that keeping in view the importance of the issue, the matter should be placed before the Constitution Bench. Accepting the said submission, it is directed that the matter be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of appropriate Constitution Bench for dwelling D upon the issues which may arise for consideration from the writ petitions.” (Emphasis supplied)

30. Moreover, a two-Judge Bench of this Court on 6.7.2018 in Jyoti Jagran Mandal v. NDMC & Anr. [Civil Appeal No. 5820 of E 2018] has referred the matter in relation to the policy decision permitting Ram Leela and Puja once in a year in public parks to a Constitution Bench holding as under: “Application seeking exemption from filing certified copy of the impugned order is allowed. F Appeal admitted. The order of the National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi has rejected an application made by the appellant to have what is known as “Mata-ki-Chowki” in a public park. The appellant has expressly relied upon earlier orders, including a policy decision, G which permits Ram Leela and Puja to be allowed once in a year in such public parks. The appeal raises a question of great constitutional importance as to whether such activities can be allowed in state owned premises in view of our Constitution being H

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secular in nature. The Hon’ble Chief Justice is, therefore, requested to constitute an appropriate Bench to hear the aforesaid matter.” (Emphasis supplied)

31. In Sunita Tiwari v. Union of India & Ors. {Writ Petition (Civil) No. 286 of 2017} a Three-Judge Bench of this Court was considering the question relating to banning the practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) or Khatna or Female Circumcision (FC) or Khafd. It was submitted by the senior counsel appearing for the contesting respondent that the matter should be referred to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement because the practice is an essential and integral practice of the religious sect. Learned Attorney General for India also submitted that it deserves to be referred to a larger Bench. By Order dated 24.09.2018, the matter was referred to a larger Bench, the relevant portion of which is as under: “Regard being had to the nature of the case, the impact on the religious sect and many other concomitant factors, we think it apposite not to frame questions which shall be addressed to by the larger Bench. We also think it appropriate that the larger Bench may consider the issue in its entirety from all perspectives. E In view of the aforesaid, we are of the view that the matter should be placed before a larger Bench. The Registry is directed to place the papers of the instant matter before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for obtaining appropriate directions in this regard.” (Emphasis supplied) F

32. Considering the Constitutional importance and significance of the issues involved, the following need to be referred to a larger Bench: (a) Whether in the light of Shirur Mutt and other aforementioned cases, an essential practice can be decided without a detailed examination of the beliefs, tenets and practice of the faith in G question? (b) Whether the test for determining the essential practice is both essentiality and integrality?

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A (c) Does Article 25, only protect belief and practices of particular significance of a faith or all practices regarded by the faith as essential? (d) Do Articles 15, 25 and 26 (read with Article 14) allow the comparative significance of faiths to be undertaken?

B 33. The Registry is directed to place this matter before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

Devika Gujral Directions for further listing