CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI AND ORS. v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA AND ORS.

BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

before the date of admission, the caste certificates ofthe candidates might have been invalidated on verification by the Scrutiny Committee. There may be cases where the admissions may be in pursuance of interim orders granted by courts subject to final decision, making it clear that the candidate will not be entitled to claim any equities by reason of the admission. The benefit extended in Mi/ind [(2001) 1 sec 4 : 2001 sec (L&S) 1111 and Vishwanatha Pillai [(2004) 2 SCC I 05 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 350) cannot obviously be extended uniformly to all such cases. Each case may have to be considered on its own merits. Further what has precedential value is the ratio decidendi of the decision and not the direction issued while moulding the relief in exercise of power under Article 142 on the special facts and circumstances of a case. We are therefore of the view that Mili11d [(2001) l SCC 4: 2001 SCC (L&S) ll7] and Vislnva11atha Pillai [(2004) 2 SCC 105: 2004 SCC (L&S) 350] cannot be considered as laying down a proposition that 0 in every case where a candidate's caste claim is rejected by a Caste Verification Committee, the candidate should invariably be permitted to retain the benefit of the admission and the consequential degree, irrespective of the facts." (Id at p. 654) (emphasis supplied) In the case at hand, though the Scrutiny Committee had rejected the claim of the appellant even prior to his admission to the professional degree course in engineering. the High Court had directed by an interim order the grant of provisional admission. This Court observed that since the admission to an engineering course had been obtained nearly 13 years earlier and the candidate had already secured a degree, h~ should be permitted to retain the benefit of the degree subject to the condition that he would not claim any further benefit as a member of a Scheduled Tribe and any expenditure incurred in terms of an exemption from the foe or a grant of scholarship. would be recovered. The following decisions ofthis Court, the act of obtaining a benefit reserved for designated castes, tribes and classes by an individual who does not belong to the designated community. on the basis of a false caste claim has been held to constitute an egregious violation, even a fraud on the Constitution :

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A i. In Anjan Kumar Vs. Union of India & Orsw this court held that: .. 14 ... A person not belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled tribes claiming himself to be a member of such caste by procuring a bogus caste certificate is a fraud under the B Constitutiop oflndia. The impact of procuring fake/bogus caste certificate ahd obtaining appointment/admission from the reserved quota will h;1ve far-reaching grave consequences. The meritorious reserved candidate may be deprived of reserved category for whom the post is reserved. The reserved post will go into the hand of non-deserving candidate and in such cases it would be c violative of the mandate of Articles !1 and £1 of the Constitution ofindia." ii. In Stat,c of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing Parmar & Anr", this court observed thus:

0 "'23. The makers of the Constitution laid emphasis on equality amongst citizens. The Constitution oflndia provides for protective discrimination and reservation so as to enable the disadvantaged group to come on the same platform as that of the forward community. If and when a person takes an undue advantage of the said beneficent provision of the Constitution by obtaining the benefits of reservation and other benefits provided under the Presidential Order although he is not entitled thereto, he not only plays a fraud on the society but in effect and substance plays a fr-dud on the Constitution. When. therefore, a certificate is granted to a person who is not otherwise entitled thereto, it is entirely incorrect to contend that the State shall be helpless spectator in the matter." iii. Similar observations are co11tai11ed i11 the judgment of this court in Regio11(1( M"""ger, Ce11fr(I( B"nk Vs. M"dhulika G11r11 Prasad Dahir11 : G "13 .. .It would suffice to state that except in a few decisions, where the admission/appointment was not cancelled because of peculiar factual matrix obtaining therein, the consensus ofjudicial

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BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD. J.]

opinion is that equity, sympathy or generosity has no place where the original appointment rests on a false caste certificate. A person who enters the service by producing a false caste certificate and obtains appointment for the post meant for a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or OBC, as the case may be, deprives a genuine candidate falling in either of the said categories, of appointment to that post, docs not deserve any sympathy or indulgence of this Court. He who comes to the Court with a claim based on falsity and deception cannot plead equity nor the Court would be j ustificd to exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour. .... "

26Copy pinpoint26. We may now advert to a line of precedent, upon which reliance has been placed by the private party claimants, to indicate the circumstances in which recourse has been taken by this Court to its jurisdiction under Article 142. Sandip Subhash Paratc Vs. State of Maharashtra'·'. is a decision ofa Bench of two Judges of this Court. The claim of the appellant to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe formed the basis of his admission to the B.E. degree course at the University of D Pune. The claim was invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee. In a writ petition challenging the order of the Scrutiny Committee the appellant had the benefit of an interim order. Eventually the Writ Petition was allowed and the proceedings were remanded to the Scrutiny Committee. The Scrutiny Committee on remand rejected the claim against which another writ petition was filed. Though no interim relief was granted in E the writ petition the appellant was allowed to continue with his studies and he completed engineering studies in 2004. Both the Writ Petition and the Review Petition before the High Court were dismissed. On these facts. the bench of two j udgcs held that prima fircie the case of the appellant indicated that he was under a bona fide belief that Koshti- F Halbns were members of a Scheduled Tribe particularly since he had obtained admi.ssion prior to the decision in Milind (supra). Hence in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 the Bench observed that it did not find any lack of bona tides on his part. The decision then holds that: G "15 ... We, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, arc not inclined to go into the question as regards purported commission of fraud by the appellant, particularly, when the University admitted him without any demur whatsoever. We are " ( 20061 7 sec so 1 H

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A doing so having regard to the doctrine of proportionality. The appellant has suffered a lot. He might not be entirely responsible therefor. l;le might have been under a bona fide belief .hat he comes within the purview of notified category. We, therefore, a/beir with much reluctance accept the fervent and impassionate plan made by the learned counsel appearing for the B appellant that he be allowed to obtain the degree. The same shall, however, be subject to payment of Rs 1 lakh in favour of the State of Maharashtra so as to recompense the State to some extent th¢ amount spent on him for imparting education as a reserved category candidate." (Id at p. 507) c 27. In Central Warehousing Corporation Vs. Jagdishkumar Vithalrno Panjankar 14 , decided on 16 January 2007. a Bench of two Judges of this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 protected the services of the respondent who had worked from 1984 on the strength of a claim to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe though it D was found that he was a Koshti. A similar protection has been granted in State of Maharashtra Vs. Om Raj 15 by a Bench of two Judges where admission, or as the case may be, appointment to a service was obtained on the basis of a claim to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe though the individuals concerned were found to be Koshti. The decision dealt with a batch of cases which were held to be covered by Milind. E

28Copy pinpoint28. The long tenure of an employee was pressed in aid in a judgment of a Bench of two Judges of this Court in Raju Ramsing Vasavc Vs. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar" as a ground for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. In that case the first respondent was, on the strength of a Scheduled Tribe certificate ofAugust F 1987, employed in the State Pollution Control Board and his status as a member of a Scheduled Tribe was confirmed in a decision of the High Court in August 1988. The Scrutiny Committee, however, invalidated the claim of the respondent to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. However. the High Court held that its earlier decision of August 1988 G had attained finality and that.the status of the first respondent could not be questioned again. This Court by its judgment held that when an advantage is obtained by a person in violation of the constitutional scheme

"C. A .No. 233 of 2007 "(2007l t 4 sec 488 ,. (2008l 9 sec 54 H

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BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.)

a constitutional fraud is committed. The earlier decision of the High A Court which was rendered without a factual foundation was held not to operate as res judicata. However, since the Bombay High Court had allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent in 1988 and he had continued in service since long, recourse was taken to the jurisdiction under Article 142, to protect his service albeit on the basis that he belongs B to the general category. The benefit of the protection of service was again granted by a Bench of two judges in Punjab National Bank Vs. Vilas Govindrao Bokade 17 • A similar protection has been extended in Vijaykumar Vs. State of Maharashtra", Damodhar Vs. Secretary, Industrial, Energy & Labour Department", Raiwad Manojkumar Nivruttirno Vs. State of Maharashtra 20 and Dattu Namdev Thakur c Vs. State of Maharashtra".

29Copy pinpoint29. A decision rendered by this Court in 2012 in the case of Kavita Vasant Sohmke Vs. State of Maharashtra" involved a situation where the appellant applied for the post of a teacher in a high school which was reserved for a Scheduled Tribe claiming to be a Halba. She D was appointed on probation in August 1995 and was confirmed in service. The proceeding before the Scrutiny Committee revealed that the appellant was a Koshti by caste and not a Halba as a result of which the caste certificate was cancelled. This led to the termination of the services of the appellant on 23 February 2008. The School Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant on 28 September 2008 and the writ petition before the High Court resulted in an order of rejection. This Court held that the Scrutiny Committee had not found that the caste certificate was false, fabricated or manipulated or that the Scrutiny Committee found any fraud, fabrication or misrepresentation. In the circumstances, this Court directed that the services of the appellant be protected but that she would not be entitled to any further benefits on the basis of the caste certificate cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee: "22. Applying the above to the case at hand we do not see any reason to hold that the appellant had fabricated or falsified G "(2008) 14 sec 545 "c2010) 14 sec 489 "(2010) 15 sec 537 '"l2011J 9 sec 798 " r201 ZJ 1 sec 549 "(2012)8SCC430 H

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A the particulars of being a Scheduled Tribe only with a view to obtain an undeserved benefit in the matter of appointment as a teacher. There is, therefore, no reason why the benefit of protection against ouster should not be extended to her subject to the usual condition that the appellant shall not be ousted from service and shall be reinstated if already ousted. but she B would not be entitled to any further benefit on the basis of the certificate ,which she has obtained and which was I 0 years after its issue cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee." (Id. at p. 440) (emphasis supplied) This decision of two lcamcdjudges docs not indicate that the provisions c of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 were noticed.

30Copy pinpoint30. The issue was revisited in another decision of two judges in Shafini Gajananrao Dalal Vs. New English High Schoof Association23 • The appellant obtained a certificate of belonging to the Halba Scheduled Tribe in July 1974. On the strength ofa claim that the D Gadwal Koshti caste (to which she belonged) had consanguinity to the Halba Scheduled Tribe, she was appointed as an Assistant Teacher and was confirmed in 1984. She was promoted as a Head Mistress in 1994. The Scrntiny Committee in August 2003 held that the caste certificate obtained by the appellant was invalid. A learned Single Judge of the E High C()urt granted protection in service on the strength of a G.R. dated 15 June 1995. Thereafter protracted litigation ensued which eventually resulted in a Single Judge of the High Court setting aside the order of reinstatement passed by the School Tribunal. This order was confirmed in appeal by a Division Bench of the High Coutt. Summarising the position which emerged from earlier decisions of two judges, this Court has held that: "7.¹. If any person has fraudulently claimed to belong to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and has thereby obtained employment, he would be disentitled from continuing in employment. The rigour of this conclusion has been diluted only in instances where the coutt is confronted with the case of students who have already completed their studies or are on the verge of doing so, towards whom sympathy is understandably extended.

'' (2013) 16 sec s26 H

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BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

7.². Where there is some confusion concerning the eligibility to the benefits flowing from Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe status, such as issuance of relevant certificates to persons claiming · to be "Koshtis" or "Halba-Koshtis" under the broadband of "Halbas'', protection of employment will be available with the rider that these persons will thereafter be adjusted in the geneml category thereby rendering them ineligible to further benefits in the category of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe as the case may be. 7.³. This benefit accrues from the decision of this Court inter alia in Raju Ramsing Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar ((2008) 9 SCC 54: (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 802) which was rendered under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. C Realising the likely confusion in the minds of even honest persons the Resolutions/Legislation passed by the State Governments should spare some succour to this section of persons. This can be best. illustrated by the fact that it was in Mi/ind [State of Maharashtra v. Mi/ind, (2001) 1 SCC 4: 2001 SCC (t&S) 117] D that the Constitution Bench clarified that "Koshtis" or "Halba- Koshtis" were not entitled to claim benefits as Scheduled Tribes and it was the "Halbas" alone who were so entitled. A perusal of the judgment in Vilas[Pwyab National Bank v. Vilas, (2008) 14 SCC 545 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 143] by Sirpurkar, J., as well as Solunke [Kavita Solunke v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) E 8 SCC 430 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 609) makes it clear that this protection is available by virtue of the decisions of this Court; it is not exclusively or necessarily predicated on any Resolution or Legislation of the State Legislature." (Id. at pgs. 533-534) The High Comt in that case had while rejecting the claim of the appellant F relied upon the decision of three Judges in Dattatray (supra). However, this Court held that the decision in Dattatray cannot be construed to have overruled earlier decisions of two Judges. In that context this Court has held that : "8. Areadingofthe impugnedjudgment [Shalini v. New English G High School Assn., LPA No. 527 of 2009, order dated 25-11- 2009 (Born)) requires us to clarify an important aspect of the doctrine of precedence. Dattatray [Union of India v. Dattatray,

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A (2008) 4 SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] is the only three- Judge Bench decision, and therefore indisputably holds pre- eminence. However, by that time several decisions had already been rendered by two-Judge Benches some of which have already been discussed above. It was within the competence of Dattatray [Union ol lndia v. Dattatray, (2008) 4 SCC 612 : B (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] Bench to overrule the other two-Judge Benches. Despite the fact that it has not done so the per incuriam principle would not apply to the decision because it was a larger Bench. However, no presumption can be drawn that the Da11atray [Union of India v. Dattatray, (2008) 4 SCC 612 : c (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] three-Judge Bench decision was of the opinion that the earlier two-J udgc Bench decisions had articulated an incorrect interpretation of the law. That being so. the two- Judge Bench views may still be relied upon so long as the ratio of Dallatray [Union of India v. Dattatray, (2008) 4 SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] is not directly in conflict with their ratios. D It is therefore imperative to distil the ratio of Da11a1ray [Union of India v. Da11a1ray, (2008) 4 SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] , which we have already discussed in some detail. We need only reiterate therefore that the three-Judge Bench was perceptibly incensed with the falsity of the claim of the employee to Scheduled E Caste/Scheduled Tribe status. That was not a case where a legitimate claim of consanguinity to a "Halba-Koshti", "Koshti" or "Gadwal Koshti'', etc. had been made, which was at the inception point considered to be eligible to beneficial treatment admissible to Scheduled Tribes, later to be reversed by the Constitution Bench decision in Mi/ind [State of F Maharashtra v. Mi/ind, (2001) I SCC 4: 2001 SCC (L&S) 117) and declared to be the entitlement ofHalbas only." (Id. at p. 534) In the view of this Court, Section l 0 of the Act cancels any benefit which may have been derived by a person on the basis of a false caste certificate. Explaining the ambit of the provision, the Court has held that: G "11 ..... Whilst "Caste Certificate" has been defined in Section 2(a) of the 2000 Act, "False Caste Certificate" has not been dealt with in the Definitions clause. There is always an element of deceitfulness, in order to derive unfair or undeserved benefit whenever a false statement or representation or stand is adopted H

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by the person concerned. An innocent statement which later A transpires to be incorrect may be seen as false in general sense would normally not attract punitive or detrimental consequences on the person making it, as it is one made by error. An untruth coupled with a dishonest intent however requires legal retribution. It appears to us that Section I 0 applies in Dalla/ray [Union of B India v. Dattatray, (2008) 4 SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] mould only." (Id. at p. 536) The above extract indicates that this Court has in Shalini imported a requirement of dishonest intent, before the withdrawal of benefits mandated by Section l 0 of the State legislation can take effect. Since there was no falsity in the claim of the appellant, the Court held c that Section l 0 would not apply to her case. The appellant was accordingly reinstated without any back-wages subject to the condition that she would not be entitled to any further promotion as a Scheduled Tribe candidate.

31Copy pinpoint31. In R. Unnikrishnan Vs. V. K. Mahanudcvan 24 the D respondent applied for the grant of a Scheduled Caste certificate on the basis that he was a Thandan which was a notified Scheduled Caste. The Tahsi ldar found that the respondent did not belong to the Scheduled Caste in question. In the course of writ proceedings, the High Court directed the Tahsildar to issue a caste certificate following which the respondent was appointed as an Assistant Executive Engineer in a Special E Recruitment Drive for Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe candidates. Subsequently, following the decision ofa Full Bench of the Kcrala High Co mt. the caste certificate of the respondent came under scrutiny and it was found that the respondent actually belonged to the Ezhuva community which fell in the OBC category. The respondent challenged the enquiry proceedings in a Writ Petition. The High Court quashed the enquiry. The F D.ivision Bench of the High Court in appeal directed a fresh enquiry into the caste status of the respondent. A fresh enquiry resulted in the finding that ihe claim of the respondent to belong to a Scheduled Caste was invalid. Following the order of the High Court the State Government held that the respondent did not belong to a Scheduled Caste but belonged G to a community which was designated as an OBC and if any benefits have been obtained on a wrongful basis, they would be recovered. Both the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court and in appeal the Division Bench held that the caste status of the respondent had already "(2014)4 SCC434 H

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A attained finality and could not be reopened. This Court observed that in Palghat Jilla Thandan Samndhaya Samrakshna Smithi Vs. State of Kerala25 , it had held that the Thandan community being listed in the Scheduled Castes Order 1950, it was not open to the State to embark upon an enquiry whether a section ofEzhuva/ Thiyya which was called Thandan in the Malabar area was excluded from the benefits of the B Order. This Court noted that by an amendment of2007 to the Constitution Scheduled Castes Order, Ezhuvas and Thiyyas in the erstwhile Cochin and Malabar areas are no longer Scheduled Castes with effect from 30 August 2007 and would no longer be entitled to be treated as a Scheduled Caste nor will the benefits ofrescrvation be admissible. However, after c adverting to the decisions in Milind, Kavita Solunke and Sandeep Pa rate this Court held that: "41. In the instant case there is no evidence oflack of bona fides by the respondent. The protection available under the decision of Mi/ind case [State of Maharashtra v. Mi/ind, (2001) l SCC D 4: 2001 SCC (L&S) 117] could, therefore, be admissible even to the respondent. It follows that even if on a true and correct construction of the expression "Thandan" appearing in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 2007 did not include "Ezhuvas" and "Thiyyas" 1cr\9wn as "Thandan" and assuming that the two were different at all relevant points of time, the fact that the position was not clear till the Amendment Act of2007 made a clear distinction between the two, would entitle all those appointed to serve the State up to the date the amending Act came into force, to continue in service." (Id. at pgs. 453-453)

32Copy pinpoint32. We may also at this stage advert to a judgment of two learned judges of this Court in B. ff. Khawas Vs. Union of India". In that case, the appellant was appointed as a Chemical Engineer Grade-I in the Customs and Central Excise Department in June 1995 against a vacancy reserved for a Scheduled Tribe. The letter of appointment provided that the appointment was provisional and subject to verification of the caste certificate. His services were terminated in 2004 following a decision of the Scrutiny Committee that he belonged to the Koshti which is not a Scheduled Tribe in the State ofMaharashtra. The appellant submitted a representation on the receipt of the order of the Scrutiny "(1994J 1sec359 "(2016) 8 SCC715 H

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Committee claiming that he had not furnished false information and the A caste certificate was obtained by him bona fide on the basis of the school record. The appellant also claimed that the issue as to whether the Koshti caste is a part of the Halba Scheduled Tribe was the subject matter of intense debate until it was resolved on 28 November 2000 by the Constitution Bench in Milind (supra). Eventually he moved the Central B Administrative Tribunal which directed that the appointment of the appellant which was made prior to the decision in Milind (supra) should be protected. When the decision of the Tribunal was assailed, the Division Bench of the High Court relied on the decision in Dattatray (supra) and restored the order of termination dated 8 June 2004. In appeal before this Court, it was urged that the decision of the Constitution Bench in c Milind (supra) protected all appointments which had become final. This Court observed that in paragraph 38 of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Milind it has been made clear that "the admissions and appointments that have become final, shall remain unaffected by this judgment". The appointment of the appellant as ChcmicalEnginccrGrade- D I was, it was held, provisional and subject to the verification of his caste claim. It was not treated as being final by the department till the order of termination was issued. Since the appointment was made on a provisional basis subject to the verification of the caste certificate it was held that the appellant was not entitled to the protection of his service. Both the earlier decisions in Ka vita Sohmkc and in Shalini were distinguished E on the ground that in the former the appointment had attained finality and could not be disturbed while in the subsequent decision also, the appointment as an Assistant Teacher had attained finality and she had been confirmed in service. Similarly in Unnikrishnan the Court was held to be dealing with a matter where the caste claim was already a F subject matter of challenge before the Court and had been upheld. In this background, this Court in Khawas held as follows : "14. In none of the cases pressed into service by the appellant, the appointment, as in this case, was on provisional basis and subject to verification of caste certificate through proper channel. It necessarily follows that the principle expounded in the three G decisions referred to above, can have no application to the case on hand. Indubitably, ifthe argument of the appellant was accepted, it would inevitably mean that alt appointments made before 28- 11-2000 must be protected even though it had not become final. H

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33Copy pinpoint33. In R?mcsh Suresh Kamble v. State of Maharashtra''. a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Mr Justice RM Lodha (as the learned Chief Justice then was), Mr Justice SA Bobde (as the learned Judge then was) and Mr Justice SB Deshmukh considered F the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 200 I. particularly Sections 7( I) and I 0(1) in the context of the electoral disqualification ofa Councillor elected under the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act following the invalidation of the caste certificate. After adverting to the decision of an earlier Full Bench in Sujit Vasant Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra", G the Full Bench held thus : "24 ....The inquiry under section 7(1) of Maharashtra Act No. XXIII of2001 by the Caste Scrutiny Committee is focussed on the correctness of the Caste Certificate obtained by such person "(2007) I Mh. L.J 423 H "(2004) 3 Mh. L J 1109

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from the Competent Authority. The, Caste Certificate is issued A by the Competent Authority on the application made by the concerned person disclosing certain information. If the Caste Certificate is cancelled by the Caste Scrutiny Committee, it obviously means that the Caste Cerlificatc has been obtained by that person from the Competent B Authority on incorrect facts or erroneous representation. It is not necessary that such claim or declaration must involve turpitude of mind. There may not be any deliberateness in it. The failure on the part of the candidate to establish his caste claim before the Scrutiny Committee and the declaration that the Certificate obtained from the C Competent Authority is invalid and thereby cancelled leads to necessary inference that such person made a false claim of his caste belonging to the reserved category to which he did not belong and, thus, incurring disqualification w1der section 16(1C)(a)." (Id atp. 438) (emphasis supplied) D Again, in the view of the Full Bench:

"26. A candidate who sets up a claim as belonging to a particular caste by making an application to the Competent Authority and obtains the Caste Certificate based on such claim and information and contests the election of the Councillor from the reserved seat and gets elected and if, ultimately, the Scrutiny Committee upon inquiring into the correctness of such certificate declares such certificate invalid and cancels the same, it is obvious that such Caste Certificate has been obtained by that person on the basis of the declaration or information or claim which was not correct or true and upon invalidation and cancellation of the Caste Certificate by the Scrutiny Committee, such person incurs disqualification automatically. There is no escape from it." (Id. at p. 438)

Another Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ganesh Rambhau Khalale Vs. State of Maharashtra" held that the directions which were issued by the Constitution Bench of this Court in paragraph 38 of its decision in Milind were in exercise of the power conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution.

"(2009) 2 Mh. L,J. 788 H

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34Copy pinpoint34. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court m Priyanka Omprakash Panwar Vs. State of Maharashtra'" has construed the provisions of Section 10 of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 200 I in holding thus: "3 .... The balance between the equitable consideration of protecting tbe interest of a student who has pursued his education B and the public interest in protecting the reserved categories against the usw-pation of their constitutional entitlements by imposters has now been qrnde by the State Legislatw-e .... The Legisjature has expressly stipulated that a degree or diploma obtained on the basis of a caste claim which is in validated shall stand cancelled. In the c face of an express legislative provision, this Colli"! shall not be justified in exercising its equitable jurisdiction. Considerations of equity that guide the Court in constitutional adjudication under Article 226 of the Constitution must be in accordance with the law enacted by the Legislature .... Stringent provisions have been made to protect the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other D reserved categories. To dilute those provisions by importing equitable considerations for a candidate who has usurped benefits would be to defeat the law. The legislation was in this case conceived in the interests of protecting the constitutional scheme of reservations from usurpation by those who are not entitled." E (Id. at p. 848) This decision has been followed in a subsequent decision in A1mrva Ashok Gokhale Vs. State of Maharashtra".

35Copy pinpoint35. In Arun Vishwanath Sonone Vs. State of Maharashtra'', two questions were referred for decision to a Full Ben~h of the Bombay F HighCow-t: "I. Whether the relief of protection of service after invalidation of the caste claim can be granted by the High Colli"! on the basis of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kavita Solunke v. State of Maharashtra and other, 2012(5) Mh. L.J. (S.C) 921 = G 2012 (8) sec 430 ?...

H "(2015) I Mh L.J. 457

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case where the same relief has been earlier refused by the High A Cowt'!" (Id at p. 465)" The Full Bench has held that a caste certificate whether issued prior to or after the coming into force of Maharashtra Act XXIII of200 I is valid subject to verification and the grant of a validity certificate by the Scrutiny Committee. The Full Bench has taken the view that Section I 0 of the B State Act regarding the withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a false caste certificate operates with effect from 18 October 200 I. Section I 0, in the view of the High Court is "essentially penal in nature" and shall have no effect on the benefits secured or an appointment obtained prior to Jhe coming into force of the enactment. Hence, the view of the High Court is that : C "27 .... The consequences of discharge from employment or withdrawal of benefits secured or obtained by producing a false caste certificate shall not operate in respect of benefits or appointments obtained or secured prior to coming into force of the said Act." (Id. at p. 475) D The full Bench has taken the view that the observations of this~ourt in Sbalini Gajananrao Dalal Vs. New English High School Association" impliedly overruled the earlier judgments of the Full Benches of the High Court in Sujit Vasant Patil and Ganesh Rambhau Khalalc (supra). In the view of the Full Bench an innocent statement made by error should not in the absence of an element of deceitfulness operate to deprive a candidate of the benefits obtained on the foundation of a false certificate. The Full Bench held, following decision of this Court in Kavita Solunkc , that : "From the decision of the Apex Court in Ka vita Solunke's case, it can be gathered that the protection granted in Milind's case would not be available where any fraud or any fabrication or any misrepresentation is made with a view to obtain an undeserved benefit in the matterof appointment. lfthere is no accusation that the certificate was false, fabricated or manipulated by concealment or otherwise, the refusal of benefit flowing from the decision in G Milind's case may not be justified." The judgment of the Full Bench also holds that the directions· which were issued by the Constitution Bench in Milind are in two parts - the "r201J) 16 sec 526 H

328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] II S.C.R.

A first bcmg to save the admission and degree secured while the other is of a general nature invoking the doctrine of prospective overruling to save admissions and appointments that have become final. Hence, according to the Putt Bench, the ratio of the earlier Full Bench judgment in Ganesh Ramhhau Khalalc holding that the clarificatory directions in :vtilind were referable to Article 142 would run contrary to the B decisions in Kavi$a Solunkc and Shalini and would cease to be a binding precedent. Consequently, the first question which was referred to the Full Bench has been answered in the affirmative by holding that the relief of the protection of services after the invalidation ofa caste claim can be granted by the High Court on the basis of the decisions of this c Court in Ka vita Solunkc and Shalini. G Submissions

36Copy pinpoint36. Jn the present batch of cases, the almost uniform facet is that the claim to belong to a reserved category has been rejected upon scrutiny.

37Copy pinpoint37. On behalf of the persons whose caste or tribe claims have been rejected, the following submissions have been urged: i. The issue with regard to caste certificates granted prior to 28 November 2000 is not res integra in view of the dictum laid down in paragraph 38 of the judgment of this Court in Milind. The decision in E Milind gave a positive direction to the effect that appointments that had become final on or before 28 November 2000 (the date when the judgment was delivered) shall remain unaffected. The Constitution Bench dealt with appointments as welt as admissions to educational institutions. Following the decision in Milind this Court disposed of several cases relating to Halba-Koshti and did not disturb appointments which had been made prior to 28 November 2000. The directions in lVIilind are based on the doctrine of prospective overruling; ii. No issue was joined before the High Court to the effect that the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIJI of 200 I arc retrospective and would interdict admissions or appointments made prior to the enforcement of the Act. In any case such a stand would be contrary to the binding circulars issued by the State Government; and iii. Maharashtra Act XXIII of2001 is not retrospective in operation. The statute being of a penal nature, it cannot be construed to be retrospective since that would render it violative of Article 20(!) of the H

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FC! v. JAGDISH 329 BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Constitution. The Act was notified on 17 October 200 I with effect from A 18 October 200 I which is the relevant date under Section I (2). iv. While Section 7 empowers the Scrutiny Committee to cancel any certificate which has been obtained before or after the commencement of the Act, the expression "before or after the commencement of this Act" is absent in Sections I 0 and 11. Consequently, B though Section 7 may be retroactive in operation, Sections I 0 and I I which relate to the withdrawal of benefits ard in regard to penal offences arc prospective. Besides the above submissions it has also been urged that in so far as Halba-Koshtis arc concerned : c i. Though in Entry 19 of the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950 only" Halba-Halbi" has been recognised as a Scheduled Tribe, until the decision of the Constitution Bench in Milind, Halba - Koshtis were "socially and officially" recognized and accepted as a sub-tribe ofHalba-Halbi. This may have been as a result of the judicial pronouncement made by the High Court from 1956 or the circulars issued by the State Government; D ii. It was on 28 November 2000 that the Constitution Bench in Milind held that Halba - Koshtis do not fall within the purview ofEntry 19 of the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950. Hence, it cannot be said that a caste ce1tificate issued at any time prior to 28 November 2000 in favour of a citizen who was a Halba Koshti was false or a fraud and it can only E be held that such a person ceased to be recognized as Halba-Halbi Scheduled Tribe; iii. Section I I of Maharashtra Act XXlll of2001 which is in the nature of a penal provision will not be applicable to caste certificates which were issued prior to 18 October 200 I; F iv. On 15 January 1995, a government resolution was issued by the Government of Maharashtra that appointments made prior to that date against reserved posts would remain protected even if the caste/ tribe claim of the appointee was invalidated or found to be false; v. Where an appointment in service has been acquired by practicing G fraud or deceit such an appointment is no appointment in law and in such a situation Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted. This position will not be applicable to claimants of the Halba - Kosh tis caste to whom caste certificates were issued and appointments were made prior to 28 November 2000; and H

330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] I I S.C.R.

A vi. On IOAugust 2010, the Union Government in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Depaitment of Personnel and Training issued an office memorandum to the effect that persons belonging to the Halba, Balbi I Koshti castes who got appointment against a vacancy reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on the basis of certificates issued by the COllllpetent authority and whose appointments have been B rendered final prior to 28 November 2000 shall not be affected. vii. On 21 C>ctober 2015, the State of Maharashtra issued a circular directing that employees who have been appointed against posts reserved for Scheduled Tribes in governnmnt services between 15 January 1995 and. 17 October 200 I, whose claims have been invalidated, shall not be c disbanded/terminated until further orders. In view of this circular, the State Government is estopped from challenging the Full Bench decision of the High Court in A run Sononc. H PART II : Analysis D · 38. Having put together the body of material on the subject, including the precedents and legislation governing the area, the stage for analysis is now reached. That is what this j udgmcnt now seeks to embark upon.

39Copy pinpoint39. The backdrop for the decision in Madhuri Patil (supra) was E provided by the significant scale on which benefits were secured by imposters by passing themselves off as members of castes, tribes and classes for whom reservations have been earmarked pursuant to constitutional provisions. By its directions which this Court issued on 2 September 1994 provision was made for the constitution of committees for verification of claims belonging to a designated caste, tribe or class. F This Court explained the modalities to be followed by the Scrutiny Committees and the manner in which action would be taken if a claim was found to be false. The directions which were issued by this Court envisaged that upon a claim being found to be false or spurious : (i) the Caste Scrutiny Committee should pass an order cancelling G and confiscating the certificate; (ii) the cancellation of the certificate should be communicated to the educational institution where the candidate has been admitted or to the appointing authority where the candidate is employed;

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 331

BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] ll S.C.R.

A so causes detriment to a genuine candidate who actually belongs 10 the reserved category who is deprived of the seat. For that matter a detriment is caused to the entire class of persons for whom reservations are intended. the members of which are excluded as a result ofan admission granted to an imposter who docs not belong to the class. The withdrawal of benefits. either in terms of the revocation of employment or the B termination of an admission was hence a necessary corollary of the invalidation of the claim on the basis of which the appointment or admission was obtained. The withdrawal of the benefit was not based on mens rea or the intent underlying the assertion of a false claim. In the case of a criminal prosecution, intent would be necessary. On the other c hand, the withdrawal of civil benefits flowed as a logical result of the invalidation of a claim to belong to a group or category for whom the reservation is intended. This was the position under the regime which prevailed following the decision in Madhuri Patil.

40Copy pinpoint40. The Constitution Bench of this Court which decided Milind D (supra) was on a reference whether it is permissible to hold an enquiry and let in evidence to decide or declare that any tribe or tribal community or a part or group within the tribe or community is included in the general name. even though it is not so specifically mentioned in the entry contained in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. The Constitution Bench held that it was not permissible either to hold an enquiry or to allow evidence 10 decide that though a tribe (or its sub group) is not specifically included in the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950 it must, nonetheless. be treated or deemed to be included in the general name. The view of this Court is that an entry in the Order has to be read as it stands. However, the Constitution Bench in paragraph 38 of its decision, having due regard to the circumstances of the individual cases before the Court, protected the degree obtained by the candidate concerned. This Court also provided that having regard to the passage of time including interim orders which were passed, the admissions and appointments that have become final would remain unaffected by the judgment. The observations in paragraph 38 of the decision of the Constitution Bench G have been construed in at least the following judgments of this Court as directions referable to Article 142 of the Constitution: (i) Bank of India Vs. Avinash D.Mandivikar"';

"(2005) 7 sec 690 at para 10 I-I

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 333

BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(ii) Additional General Manager- Human Resource, Bharat A Heavy Electricals Ltd. Vs. Suresh Ramkrishna Burde"; (iii) Union oflndia Vs. Dattatray, S/o. Namdeo Mcndhckar36 ;and (iv) Yogcsh Ramchandra Naikwadi Vs. State of Maharashtra". B

41Copy pinpoint41. Since the decision of the Bench of three judges in R. Vishwanatha Pillai Vs. State ofKcrala (supra) the position oflaw which has been laid down by this Court is that where an appointment to a post or admission to an educational institution is made against a vacancy which is reserved for a Scheduled Caste or Tribe or a socially and C educationally backward class. the invalidation of the claim ofthe candidate would result in the appointment or, as the case may be, the admission being void and non est. This principle has been followed by another judgment of three Judges in Dattatray (supra). The same position has been propounded by a two judge bench in Bank of India Vs. Avinash D Mandivikar (supra). The formal termination of an employment or the withdrawal of admission is a necessary consequence which flows out of the invalidation of the caste or tribe claim. The only exception to this principle consists of those cases where, in exercise ofthe power conferred by Article 142, the Court considered it appropriate and proper to protect the admission which was granted or, as the case may be, the appointment to the post.

42Copy pinpoint42. In Ka vita Sohmkc (supra) the appellant had been appointed on the strength of a claim to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe in AugLL~t 1995. After the tribe claim was verified by the Scrutiny Committee it was found that the appellant was in fact a Koshti and not a member of the Halba Scheduled Tribe following which an order of termination was issued. The sole ground on which the termination was challenged and which was accepted by the bench of two judges was that since the appointment of the appellant had attained finality, it could not have been set aside on the ground that the appellant did not belong to a Scheduled G Tribe. Maharashtra Act XXlll of 200 I was evidently not placed before the court in Kavita Solunkc (supra) and has not been noticed. Upon

"(2007) 5 sec 336 at paras 7-9 and 13 ·"' (2008) 4 sec 612 at paras 5-7 "(2008) 5 sec 652 at paras 5 & 6 H

334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] l l S.C.R.

A the enactment of the Act, the invalidation of a caste certificate by the Scrutiny Committee would as a statutory mandate result in the withdrawal of the benefits which had accrued on the strength of the claim and where a candidate had been appointed to a reserved post, termination would follow the finding that the candidate did not belong to the category for whom the post WflS reserved. If the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIII B of 200 I were to be considered by the bench of two judges, it would be apparent that under the provisions of Section 7 the Scrutiny Committee is empowered tQ verify a caste certificate whether issued before or after the commencement of the Act and if it comes to the conclusion that the caste certificate is fals·c and is obtained fraudulently it is c empowered to order its cancellation and confiscation. Section I0 provides for the withdrawal of benefits secured when a caste certificate is concerned for its falsity. Falsity is adjudicated upon when an order of cancellation is passed under Section 7. Once a caste certificate is cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee under Section 7, the individual affected by the order has a remedy to challenge its cancellation before 0 the High Court under Article 226. lfthe challenge fails or if the challenge is given up, and the only relief sought is of the protection of service, or of the admission to the course, the gmnt of such protective relief simpliciter would be impermissible. The withdrawal of the benefit under Section 10 follows an order of cancellation under Section 7. Once the conditions E for cancellation are fulfilled and an order of cancellation is passed under Section 7 withdrawal of all benefits which have accrued on the basis of the claim (which stands invalidated) cannot be opposed on a theory that there was an absence of dishonest intent.

43Copy pinpoint43. The rationale which weighed with the Bench of two Judges F which decided Kavita Solunke (supra) was that if the Halba Koshti had been treated as Halba even before the appellant had joined the service and ifthe only ground for ouster was the law declared in Milind (supra), there was no reason why protection against ouster to appointees whose applications had become final be not also extended to the appellant. Placing reliance on the decision in Kavita Sohmkc (supra) another G Bench of two Judges of this Court in Shalini (supm) propounded a test of dishonest intent for the grant or denial of protection to persons whose caste claims had been invalidated. The view of the Court emerges from the following extract contained in para 9 of the decision which reads thus: H

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 335

BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

"9. It is not the intent of law to punish an innocent person and subject him to extremely harsh treatment. That is why this Court has devised and consistently followed that taxation statutes, which almost always work to the pecuniary detriment of the assessee, must be interpreted in favour of the assessee. Therefore, as we see it, on one bank of the Rubicon are the cases of dishonest and mendacious persons who have deliberatc)y claimed consanguinity with the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, etc. whereas on the other bank are those marooned persons who honestly and correctly claimed to belong to a particular Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe but were later on found by the relevant authority not to fall within the particular group envisaged for protected treatment. In the former group, persons would justifiably deserve the immediate cessation of all benefits, including termination of services. In the latter, after the removal of the nebulousness and uncertainty, while the services or benefits already enjoyed would not be negated, they would be disentitled to claim any further or continuing benefit on the predication of belonging to the 'said Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe." {Id. at pgs. 534-535) The above observations must be read together with those in paragraph 11 (extracted earlier) where the Court held that a dishonest intent requires legal retribution. In Shalini (supra) the.Court noticed the provisions of Section 10 ofMaharashtraAct XXIII of2001 (which the earlier decision in Kavita Solunkc (supra) had not noticed) but nonetheless held that in order to attract the provisions of Section 10 a dishonest intent for the purpose of claiming a benefit reserved for the Scheduled Castes or Tribes or a designated backward class is necessary. The expression "false" contained in Section I 0 of the Maharashtra Act XXIII of200 I is construed to necessarily require the presence of mens rea·or a dishonest intent.

44Copy pinpoint44. The object and purpose underlying the enactment of the state legislation is to regulate the issuance of caste certificates and to deal with instances which had come to light where persons who did not belong to the Scheduled Castes or Tribes or reserved categories were seeking appointments or admissirns to the detriment of genuine candidates, The basic purpose and rationale for the legislation is to secure the just entitlements oflegitimate claimants. The judgment in Shalini (supra) is with respect in error in imputing the requirement of a dishonest intent intothe provisions of Section I 0. Sections 7 and 10 have to be construed H

336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] ll S.C.R.

A in harmony. Section 7 provides for the cancellation of a caste certificate where before or after commencement of the Act, a person who does not belong to a reserved category has obtained a false caste ce11ificate and the Scrutiny Committee, after enquiry. is of the opinion that the certificate was obtained fraudulently. These requirements have to be fulfilled before tj1e ce11ificate is cancelled. The falsity of the caste B certificate and the opinion of the Scrutiny Committee of its being fraudulently obtained form the basis ofa cancellation under Section 7. Section I 0 presc11bes that a person who docs not belong to a reserved category and secures admission or obtains appointment against a reserved post by producing a false caste certificate shall upon its cancellation by c the Scrutiny Committee be debarred from the institution or as the case may be discharged from employment and the benefits derived shall be withdrawn. Sub-section (2) provided for the recovery of all financial benefits while sub-section (3) provides for the cancellation of a degree, diploma or educational qualification. Sub-section (4) provides for disqualification from electoral office. The falsity of the cc11ificate is the basis of an order under Section 7. Section 10 provides the consequence. The challenge to an order of the Scrutiny Committee (invalidating a caste or tribe certificate) may fail or succeeds. If the challenge before the High Court succeeds, no question of the consequence under Section 10 arises. If the challenge fails, the consequence under Section I 0 follows the finding in the orderundcr Section 7 that the certificate is false. Similarly, if the orderunder Section 7 is not challenged. or ifthe challenge is given up, there is no occasion to protect the benefits secured on the basis of a certificate which is invalidated. The expression ~'false" must be construed in contra-distinction to that which is true, genuine or authentic. Falsity in this sense means the setting up of a claim to belong to a reserved category. F

45Copy pinpoint45. Section 10. it must be noted. provides for the withdrawal of civil benefits which have accrued to an individual on the strength of a claim to belong to a reserved category, when the claim upon due enquiry and verification is invalidated. Section 10. as its marginal note indicates, provides for the withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a false G caste certificate. Section 11 provides for offences and penalties. The invalidation of a caste certificate may result in two consequences : (i) immediate cancellation or withdrawal of the benefits received by the candidate on the basis of a false caste certificate; (ii) prosecution of a claimant who procw-es a certificate which is found to be false by the H Scrutiny Committee. The intent of a candidate may be of relevance only

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 337

BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

ifthere is a prosecution for a criminal offence. However, where a civil consequence of withdrawing the benefits which have accrued on the basis of a false caste claim is in issue, it would be contrary to the legislative intent to import the requirement of a dishonest intent. In importing such a requirement, the bench of two Judges in Shalini (supra) has, with great respect, fallen into error. The judgment in Shalini (supra) must, therefore, be held not to lay down the correct principle. In the very nature of things it would be casting an impossible burden to delve into the mental processes of an applicant for a caste certificate. As the provisions of the Act indicate. a person, who claims to belong to a reserved category and who seeks the benefit of an appointment to a reserved post or ofadmission to an educational institution against a reserved seat c or any other benefit provided by the provisions of Article 15(4), has to apply for the grant of a caste certificate. The burden of proof that he or she belongs to such a caste, tribe or class lies with the claimant. The legislature has legitimately assumed that a person who seeks a caste certificate must surely be aware of the caste, tribe or class to which he D or she belongs and must establish the claim. If the claim to belong to the reserved category is found to be untrue, the caste certificate has to be cancelled on the ground that it has been obtained falsely. The grant of the benefit to the candidate is fraudulent because the candidate has obtained a benefit reserved exclusively for a specified caste, tribe or class to which he or she is not entitled. The decision in Shalini (supra) E would result in serious consequences and would eviscerate the statutory provision. The interpretation which has been placed on the provisions of Section I 0 by the judgment in Shalini (supra) is evidently incorrect.

46Copy pinpoint46. Service under the Union and the States, or for that matter under the instrumentalities of the State subserves a public purpose. These F services arc instruments of governance. Where the State embarks upon public employment, it is under the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 to follow the principle of equal opportunity. Affirmative action in our Constitution is part of the quest for substantive equality. Available resources and the opportunities provided in the form of public employment are in contemporary times short of demands and needs. Hence the G procedure for selection, and the prescription of eligibility criteria has a significant public element in enabling the State to make a choice amongst competing claims. The selection of ineligible persons is a manifestation of a systemic failure and has a deleterious effect on good governance. H

338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] l I S.C.R.

A Firstly, selection ofa person who is not eligible allows someone who is ineligible to gain access to scarce public resources. Secondly, the rights of eligible persons are violated since a person who is not eligible for the post is selected. Thirdly, an illegality is perpetrated by bestowing benefits upon an imposter undeservingly. These effects upon good governance find a similar echp when a person who does not belong to a reserved B category passes of as a member of that category and obtains admission to an educational lnstitution. Those for whom the Constitution has made special provisions are as a result ousted when an imposter who does not belong to a reserved category is selected. The fraud on the constitution precisely lies in this. Such a consequence must be avoided and stringent c steps be taken by the Court to ensure that unjust claims of imposters are not protected in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. The nation cannot live on a lie. Courts play a vital institutional role in preserving the rule oflaw. The judicial process should not be allowed to be utilised to protect the unscrupulous and to preserve the benefits which have accrued to an imposter on the specious plea of equity. Once the legislature has stepped in, by enacting Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001, the power under Article 142 should not be exercised to defeat legislative prescription. The Constitution Bench in Milind spoke on 28 November 2000. The state law has been enforced from 18 October 200 I. Judicial directions must be consistent with law. Several decisions of two judge benches noticed earlier, failed to take note of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001. The directions which were issued under Article 142 were on the erroneous inarticulate premise that the area was unregulated by statute. Shalini noted the statute but misconstrued it.

47Copy pinpoint47. Cooley's Treatise on Constitutional Limitations" places the matter succinctly in the following terms : "An officer dejure is one who, possessing the legal qualifications, has been lawfully chosen to the office in question, and has fulfilled any conditions precedent to the performance of its duties. By being thus chosen and observing the precedent conditions, such a G person becomes of right entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the office, and the public, in whose interest the office is created, is entitled ofright to have him perform its duties. Ifhe is excluded from it, the exclusion is both a public offence and a private injury."

"g• Ed. Vo!.² pages! 355-1358 H

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 339

BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

In a recent judgment of this Court in Anurag Kumar Singh Vs. State A ofUttarakhand39, it has been held that judicial discretion can be exercised only when there are two or more possible lawful solutions. Courts cannot give a direction contrary to a statute in the purported exercise ofjudicial discretion. The power under Article 142 of the Constitution is one which is wielded with circumspection and not in a manner which would defeat B statutory intent, purpose and language. Aharon Barak in his book titled "Judicial Discretion ( 1989)" states thus: "16 ...... Discretion assumes the freedom to choose among several lawful alternatives. Therefore, discretion does not exist when there is but one lawful option. In this situation, the Judge is required to select that option and has no freedom of choice. No discretion is c involved in the choice between a lawful act and an unlawful act. The Judge rriust choose the lawful act, and he is precluded from choosing the unlawful act. Discretion, on the other hand, assumes the lack of an obligation to choose one particular possibility among several." (Id at p. 430) D

48Copy pinpoint48. The Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High CoUit in Arun Sonune (supra) has essentially construed the judgments in Kavita Solunke (supra) and in Shalini (supra) as having impliedly overruled the earlier Full Bench judgments in Ganesh Rambhau Khalalc and Ramesh Kamblc. In view of the conclusion which we have arrived at E in regard to the earlier decisions rendered by the two Judge Benches in Kavita Solunke (supra) and Shalini (supra), we are unable to subscribe to the view expressed by the Full Bench in Arun Sonone (supra). The judgment of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Arun Sonone (supra) holds that F (i) mere invalidation of the caste claim by the Scrutiny Committee would not entail the consequences of withdrawal of benefits or discharge from employment or cancellation of appointments that have become final prior to the decision in Milind (supra) on 28 November 2000; (ii) the benefit of protection in service upon invalidation of the G caste claim is available not only to persons belonging to Kosh ti and Halba Koshti but is also available to persons belonging to the special backward category on the same terms. The High Court has even gone to the extelrt

"(2016) 9 sec 426 H

340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] ll S.C.R.

A of holding that the decision in Milind (supra) was in the nature of prospective overruling of the law which was laid down by the Bombay High Court. The above view of the Bombay High Court is clearly unsustainable. Neither the judgment in Milind (supra) nor any of the judgments of this Court which have construed it have held that Milind (supra) was an e)\ercise in prospective overruling. The High Court was B in error in holding so. The decision of the Full Bench in Arun Sononc (supra) is unsustijinable. The Full Bench had evidently failed to notice that cases where the protection was granted by this Court following the invalidation ofa caste claim was in exercise of the power conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution, depending upon the facts and c circumstances of each case. The jurisdiction under Article 142 is clearly not available to the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226. The High Court erred in arrogating that jurisdiction to itself.

49Copy pinpoint49. We do not find any merit in the submission which has been urged on behalf of the persons whose castes/ tribes claims have been invalidated that Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 cannot apply to admissions or appointments which were made prior to the date on which the Act came into force.

50Copy pinpoint50. The submission based on retrospectivity overlooks certain crucial links in the analysis. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. However, the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Equally the rule against retrospective construction is not applicable to a statute merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing40 • Maharashtra Act XXIII of2001 provides in Section 1 (2) that it shall come into force on such dates as the State Government may, by notification in the oftieial gazette, appoint upon receiving assent of the President. The Act was notified to come into force by a government notification dated 17 October G 2001 with effect from 18 October 200 I. Prior to the enforcement of the Act, the regime which held the field was in terms of the directions that were issued by this Court in its judgment dated 2 September 1994 in Madhuri Patil. The directions which were issued by this Court comprehended: H ·t 11 c; P Singh, On the Interpretation of Statutes -4 Edition pages 580. 583

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 341

BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

i. Applica~ions for the grant of caste certificates being made to a A notified officer; ii. Submission of an affidavit together with relevant particulars in support of the application; iii. Submission of an application for verification of the caste certificate before a Scrutiny Committee well in advance of seeking B admission to an educational institution or appointment to a post ; iv. Grant of provisional admission or a provisional appointment where the verification by the Scrutiny Committee was likely to take ti~c; c v. Constitution of Scrutiny Committees for verification of caste certificates; vi. Constitution ofVigilance Cells for the purpose ofinvestigating the social status of the candidate and affinity with the tribal group; vii. Modalities to be followed for revoking caste certificates when the claim for social status was found to be not genuine, doubtful, spurious or falsely or wrongly claimed; · viii. Passing of an order of cancellation and confiscation of the caste certificate if the claim was found to be false; ix. Prosecution of the candidate or, as the case may be, the parent or the guardian who had made a false claim; x. Cancellation of the admission granted or the appointment made where the caste certificate is invalidated and debarment of the candidate from further studies or to continue in a post. F

51Copy pinpoint51. The regime which obtained since 2 September 1994 under the directions in Madhuri Patil was granted a statutory status by the enactment of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001. Section 7 provides for the cancellation and confiscation of a false caste certificate whether it was issued before or after the commencement of the Act. The expression "before or after the commencement of this Act" indicates that the Scrutiny G Committee constituted under Section 6 is empowered to cancel a caste certificate whether it was issued prior to 18 October 200 I or thereafter. Section I 0 which provides for the withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a false caste certificate which is withdrawn is essentially a H

342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] ll S.C.R.

A consequence of the cancellation of the caste certificate. Where a candidate has secured admission to an educational institution on the basis that he or she belongs to a designated reserved category and it is found upon investigation that the claim to belong to that category is false, admission to the institution necessarily falls with the invalidation of the caste certificate. Admission being founded on a claim to belong to a B specified caste, tnibe or class, it is rendered void upon the claim being found to be untrue. The same must hold in the case ofan appointment to a post. Therefore. the absence of the words "before or after the commencement of this Act" in Section l 0 makes no substantive difference because a withdrawal of benefit is an event which flows naturally and c as a plain consequence of the invalidation of the claim. Moreover, as we have seen even prior to the enactment of the state legislation, the benefit which was secured on the basis of a caste claim was liable to be withdrawn upon its invalidation. The Act has hence neither affected vested rights nor has it imposed new burdens. The Act does not impair existing obligations in Sections 7 and I 0. D However, an analysis of the provisions of Section 11 demonstrates that the provision creates offences and provides for penalties. Under Section I I (I) (a) the off¢nce consists of obtaining a false caste certificate (by furnishing false information). filing a false statement or document or by any fraudulent means. Under Section 11 (J)(b) the offence consists in securing a benefit exclusively reserved for designated castes, tribes or classes by a pers9n who does not belong to that category in terms of i. Appointment; ii. Admission in an educational institution against a reserved seat; or iii. Election to a local authority or cooperative society against an office which is reserved for that category.

52Copy pinpoint52. The provisions of Section I I ( 1) must be read and construed in a prospective sense having regard to the guarantee contained in Article G 20 (I) of the Constitution. The offence having been created by Maharashtra Act XXIII of 200 I, the Act which constitutes the offence must relate to a period after the date of the enforcement of the Act. In terms of the penal provisions of Section l I, the statute in so far as it creates offences and provides for penalties must hence be construed prospectively.

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 343

BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

53Copy pinpoint53. Administrative circulars and government resolutions are subservient to legislative mandate and cannot be contrary either to constitutional norms or statutory principles. Where a candidate has obtained an appointment to a post on the solemn basis that he or she belongs to a designated caste, tribe or class for whom the post is meant and it is fow1d upon verification by the Scrutiny Committee that the claim is false, the services of such an individual cannot be protected by taking recourse to administrative circulars or resolutions. Protection of claims of a usurper is an act of deviance to the constitutional scheme as well as to statutory mandate. No government resolution or circular can override constitutional Or statutory nOrnlS. The principle that government is bound by its own circulars is well-settled but it cannot apply in a situation c such as present. Protecting the services of a candidate who is found not to belong to the community or tribe for whom the reservation is intended substantially encroaches upon legal rights of genuine members of the reserved communities whose just entitlements are negated by the grant of a scat to an ineligible person. In such a situation where the rights of genuine members of reserved groups or communities are liable to be affected detrimentally, government circulars or resolutions cannot operate \o their detriment.

54Copy pinpoint54. One of the considerations which is placed in store before the court particularly when an admission to an educational institution is sought to be cancelled upon the invalidation of a caste or tribe claim is that the student h.as substantially progressed in the course of studies and a cancellation of admission would result in prejudice not only to the student but to the system as well. When the student has completed the degree or diploma, a submission against its withdrawal is urged afortiorari. In our view; the state legislature has made a statutory decision amongst competing claims, based on a public policy perspective which the court must respect. The argument that there is a loss of productive societal resources when an educational qualification is withdrawn ora student is compelled to leave the course of studies (when he or she is found not to belong to the caste or tribe on the basis of which admission to a reserved seat was pbtained) carmot possibly outweigh or nullify the legislative G , mandate contained in Section I 0 of the state legislation. When a candidate is found to have' put forth a false claim of belonging to a designated caste, tribe or class for whom a benefit is reserved, it would be a negation of the rule oflaw to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 142 to protect H

344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 11 S.C.R.

A that individual. Societal good lies in ensuring probity. That is the only manner in which the sanctity of the system can be preserved. The legal system cannot be seen as an avenue to support those who make untrue claims to belong to a caste or tribe or socially and educationally backward class. These benefits arc provided only to designated castes, tribes or classes in accordance with the constitutional scheme and cannot be B usurped by those who do not belong to them. The credibility not merely of the legal system but also of the judicial process will be eroded if such claims arc protcotcd in exercise of the constitutional power conferred by Article 142 despite the state law.

55Copy pinpoint55. This aspect has been considered in a recent j udgmcnt rendered c by one of us in Nidhi Kaim and Another V. State o(Madhva Pradesh Ami Others'' , wherein, speaking for a Bench of three Judges, in a case of systemic fraud in relation to medical admissions in the State of Madhya Pradesh. It was observed as follows : "92 ... We are of the considered view that conferring rights or benefits on the appellants, who had consciously participated in a well thought out, and meticulously orchestrated plan, to circumvent well laid down norms, for gaining admission to the MBBS course, would amount to espousing the cause of "the unfair". It would seem like allowing a thief to retain the stolen property. It would seem as if the Cou1i was not supportive of the cause of those who had adopted and followed rightful means. Such a course would cause people to question the credibility of the justice-delivery system itself. The exercise ofjurisdiction in the manner suggested on behalf of the appellants would surely depict the Court's support in fa vow· of the sacrilegious. It would also compromise the integrity of the academic community. We are of the view that in the name of doing complete justice it is not possible for this Court to support the vitiated actions of the appellants through which they gained admission to the Ml3BS course." Explaining the matter further, this Court held that : G "99 ..... Besides the consideration recorded by us in the foregoing paragraphs, we may confess, that we felt persuaded for taking the view that we have, for a very important reason - national character. There is a saying-when wealth is lost, nothing is "(2017) 4 sec 1 H

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lost; when health is lost, something is lost; but when character is lost, everything is lost. ..... The issue in hand has an infinitely vast dimension. Ifwe were to keep in mind immediate social or societal gains. the perspective of consideration would be different. The submission canvassed needs to be considered in the proper perspective. We shall venture to drive home the point by an illustration. We may well not have won our freedom, if freedom fighters had not languished in jails ... and if valuable lives had not been sacrificed. Depending on the situation, even civil liberty or life itself, may be too trivial a sacrifice. when national interest is involved. It all depends on the desired goal. The Preamble of the Indian Constitution rests on the foundation of governance on the touchstone of justice. The basic c fundamental right of equality before law and equal protection of the laws is extended to citizens and non-citizens alike through Article 14 of the Constitution on the fountainhead of fairness. The actions of the appellants are founded on unacceptable behaviow·. and in complete breach of the Rule of Law. Their actions constitute acts of deceit invading into D a righteous social order. National character, in our considered view, cannot be sacrificed for benefits-individual or societal. Ifwe desire to build a nation on the touchstone of ethics and character and if ow· determined goal is to build a nation where only the Rule of Law prevails, then we cannot accept the claim of the appellants for the suggested societal gains. Viewed in the aforesaid perspective, we have no difficulty whatsoever E in concluding in favour of the Rule of Law. Such being the position, it is not possible for us to extend to the appellants any benefit under Article 142 of the Constitution." We are in respectful agreement with the above principle and statement of the legal position. F

56Copy pinpoint56. Medical education is what middle-class parents across the length and breadth of the county aspire for their children (whether this will continue to be so in future is a moot question). There is intense competition for a limited number of under-graduate, post-graduate and super-speciality seats. This can furnish no justification for recow·se to G unfair means including adopting a false claim to belong to the reserved category. The fault - lines of our system, be it in education, health or law, are that its lethargy and indolence furnish incentives for the few who choose to break the rules to gain an unfair advantage. In such a H

346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) ll S.C.R.

A situation, the court as a vital institution of democratic governance must be firm in sending out a principled message that there is no incentive other than for behaviour compliant with rules and deviance will meet severe reprimands of the law. I Conclusion

57Copy pinpoint57. For these reasons, we hold and declare that i. The directions which were issued by the Constitution Bench of this Court in panigraph 38 of the decision in Milind were in pursuance of the powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution;

c ii. Since the decision of this Court in Madhuri Patil which was rendered on 2 September 1994, the regime which held the field in pursuance of those directions envisaged a detailed procedure for (a) the issuance of caste certificates; (b) scrutiny and verification of caste and tribe claims by Scrutiny Committees to be constituted by the State Government: (c) the procedure for the conduct of investigation into the authenticity of the claim; ( d) Cancellation and confiscation of the caste certificate where the claim is found to be false or not genuine; (e) Withdrawal of benefits in terms of the termination of an appointment, cancellation ofan admission to an educational institution or disqualification from an electoral office obtained on the basis that the candidate belongs to a reserved category; and (f) Prosecution for a criminal offence; iii. The decisions of this Court in R. Vishwanatha Pillai and in Datta tray which were rendered by benches of three Judges laid down the principle of law that where a benefit is secured by an individual - such as an appointment to a post or admission to an educational institution - on the basis that the candidate belongs to a reserved category for which the benefit is reserved, the invalidation of the caste or tribe claim upon verification would result in the appointment or, as the case may be, the admission being rendered void or non est. iv. The exception to the above doctrine was in those cases where this Court exercised its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to render complete justice; v. By Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 there is a legislative codification of the broad principles enunciated in Madhuri Patil. The legislation provides a statutory framework for regulating the issuance of caste certificates (Section 4); constitution of Scrutiny Committees for H

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 347

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verification of claims (Section 6); submission of applications for A verification of caste certificates (Section 6(2) and 6(3); cancellation of caste certificates (Section 7); burden of proof (Section 8); withdrawal of benefits obtained upon the invalidation of the claim (Section 10); and initiation of prosecution (Section J l), amongst other things; vi. The power conferred by Section 7 upon. the Scrutiny Committee B to verify a claim is both in respect of caste certificates issued prior to and subsequent to the enforcement of the Act on 18 October 200 J. Finality does not attach to a caste certificate (or to the claim to receive benefits) where the claim of the individual to belong to a reserved caste, tribe or class is yet to be verified by the Scrutiny Committee; c vii. Withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a caste claim which has been found to be false and is invalidated is a necessary consequence which flows from the invalidation of the caste claim and no issue ofretrospcctivity would arise; viii. The decisions in Ka vita Solunkc and Shalini of two learned D Judges are overruled. Shalini in so far as it stipulates a requirement ofa dishonest intent for the application of the provision of Section 10 is, with respect, erroneous and docs not reflect the correct position in law; ix. Mens rea is an ingredient of the penal provisions contained in Section 11. Section 11 is prospective and would apply in those situations E where the act constituting the offence has taken place after the.date of its enforcement; x. The judgment of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in A run Sononc is manifestly erroneous and is overruled; and xi. Though the power of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution is a constitutional power vested in the court for rendering complete justice and is a power which is couched in wide terms, the exercise of the jurisdiction must have due regard to legislative mandate, where a law such as Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 holds the field.

58Copy pinpoint58. We will, now in the light of the reasons indicated above, proceed to dispose of the individual cases in the following terms: I Chairman and Managing Director FCI Vs. Jagdish Balaram Bahira42 :

42 C. A. No.8928 of2015 H

348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) l l S.C.R.

A On 6 December 1984, Food Corporation of India offered appointment to the respondent on the post of Messenger- Depot which was reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on the basis of a caste certificate dated 28August 1978 issued by the Executive Magistrate, Panvel, stating that the applicant was a Hindu Mahadev Kohli and hence belonged to a Scheduled Tribe. Upon a declaration submitted by the respondent he B was appointed to the post on 8 January 1985 in the Scheduled Tribe quota. The resp011dcnt received promotional benefits in the post of Dusting Operator ( 13 August 1990), Senior Dusting Operator (30 December 2000), Picker (I December 2003) and Senior Picker (20 December 2005). The caste certificate submitted by the respondent was invalidated by c the Scrutiny Committee, Konkan Division, Thane. The claim of the respondent to belong to the Mahadco Koli Scheduled Tribe was found not to be established and the certificate was accordingly invalidated and cancelled. Following this his services were terminated on 4 October 2013. D The respondent instituted writ proceedings before the Bombay High Court to challenge the order of the Scrutiny Committee and his termination from service. By a judgment dated 4 April 2014 the High Court noted thaHhe respondent was seeking only protection ofhis services and was willing to give up the claim of belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. By its judgment, the High Court accepted the contention of the respondent and held that he was entitled to protection of services with continuity while the mam1gemcnt would be at liberty to withdraw such benefits as were granted after 28 September 2000. The employer moved a Special Leave Petition and in pursuance of an interim order dated JI August 2014, the respondent was reinstated in service and was granted further promotions. Eventually upon his superannuation on 31August2015 the respondent was granted his terminal benefits including gratuity, arrears of wage revision, medical reimbursement. leave encashmcnt, contributory provident fund and productivity linked incentive. During the pendcncy of the litigation, the respondent is retired from service and has even been paid his terminal dues. Hence, at this stage, all that can be observed is that no claim by a member ofMahdeo Koli, Scheduled Caste shall be made or entertained on behalf of the respondent or any member of his family on the strength of the caste certificate which has been invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee. No

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 349

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further benefits of any nature whatsoever would be admissible to the A respondent on the basis of his claim which has been invalidated. However, in the peculiar facts. we are not inclined to order recovery has to be made from the respondent. The Civil Appeal is disposed ot:

2. Shri Shivaji Shikshan Sanstha & Anr. Vs. Raju Laxman Gadckar & Ors. 43 B and 3 State of Maharashtra Vs. Raju Laxman Gadckar & Ors44 : In September 1981, Raju Laxman Gadekar obtained a caste certificate that he belonged to the Halba Scheduled Tribe in Mahara~htra. C On the strength of the caste certificate, he was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in a post reserved for a Scheduled Tribe in Shri Shivaji High- School, Dongaon on 24 June 1989. On 2 March 2005, he filled up an application in Fo1m E and submitted an affidavit in Form F through his employer to the Scrutiny Committee, which was invalidated on 20 February 2008. Since the claim that he belonged to a Scheduled Tribe D was invalidated, his services were terminated by the employer on 26 February 2008. The challenge to the order of termination failed before the School Tribunal. The writ petition challenging the orclerofthe Scrutiny Committee was dismissed on 7 August 2009. The order of the School Tribunal was challenged in a separate Writ Petition which was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 16 October 2009 and the employee was directed to be reinstated. In an appeal by the employer, the Division Bench set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge on 17 April 20 lO and dismissed the writ petition. A Special Leave Petition filed by the employee under Article 136 of the Constitution was dismissed by this Coult as not pressed on 1 October 2010. Thereafter the respondent filed a writ petition praying for his reinstatement and protection of his service. By the judgment dated 5/8/9/I 0 July 2013 the High Comt held that the employee was entitled to the protection of his services. Froni the narration of the facts it is clear that the Writ Petition filed by the employee challenging the order of the Scrutiny Committee G was dismissL'd on 7 August 2009 and it has been held that he docs not belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. The caste certificate which was obtained by the respondent has been demonstrated to be a false caste "(Civil Appeal No. 91 SS of 20\S) "(Civil Appeal No. 91S7 of2015) H

350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 11 S.C.R.

A certificate. The challenge to the order of termination also attained finality since the Special Leave Petition against the judgment of the High Court was dismissed as not pressed. In the circumstances, the High Court has clearly erred in allowing protection of service to the employee. Such a direction is also contra1y to the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXl!I of 200 l. The appoin1tment secured by the respondent on the basis of a false B caste claim was required to be withdrawn in terms ofprovisions of Section l 0. There has been a complete misuse of the process by the Respondent. We, therefore, allow the Civil Appeals and set aside the judgments and orders of the High C our! dated l 0 April 2013 and 5/8/9/ J 0 July 20 l³. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. c 4 Stak of Maharashtra Vs. Ku. Chham D/o.Hcmraj Nimjc & Ors. 45 : Chhaya Nimje obtained a caste certificate on 20 July 1991 from the Executive Magistrate. Narkhcd to the effect that she belongs to the D Halba Scheduled Tribe. On the basis of the caste certificate she obtained appointment as an Assistant Teacher on 24 December 1996 in Bhimrao Bapu Dcshmukh Adarsh Vidyalaya. On 9 March she filled up an application informE together with an affidavit in Form Funder Ruic 11 of the Maharashtra ST (Regulation of!ssuance & Verification of) Caste Certificate Rules, 2003. The Vigilance Cell submitted a report showing that her records were of the Koshti community. Before the Scrutiny Committee could decide her claim she approached the High Court in a writ petition see~ing protection of service. The High Court disposed of the writ petition on 30 January 2013, on the statement of the employer that her services will not be terminated unless the caste certificate is invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee. She again filed a Writ Petition F before the High Court seeking protection of her services. The respondent has no right to claim protection of her services. The respondent has misused the process oflaw by filing successive writ petitions to pre-empt un adjudication by the Scrutiny Committee and then confining the claim only to the protection of her services. G For the reasons which arc indicated in the body of the judgment and for the above reasons, the Civil Appeal is allowed and impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. No other submission is urged. ';(Civil Appeal No.9160 of2015) H

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGD!SH 351 BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. A 5 State of Maharashtra & Anr. Vs. Mrs.Arundhati Surcsh Nimnvc & Anr.46 : The respondent was appointed as a Lecturer on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 20 March 1997 on the basis of a caste certificate dated 18 May 1995 stating that she belongs to the Halba B Scheduled Tribe. The Scrutiny Committee has invalidated the caste certificate and directed it to be confiscated. The High Court by its order dated 26 November 2012 has confirmed the order ofinvalidation but has granted protection of service. By a subsequent order the High Court has ordered the State to consider rcvision/refixation of pay scales. c For the reasons indicated by this court while disposing of Civil Appeal Nos.9155 and 9157of2015 and for those contained in the body of the judgment, the Civil Appeals arc allowed. The impugned judgments and orders of the High Court arc set aside. No other submission is urged. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. D 6 Mnhatma Fulc Krishi Vidyapccth Vs.. Nagnath Baburao Mnngrule & Ors.47 : The respondent was appointed as an Agricultural Assistant on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 22 July 1996 on the basis of a caste certificate dated 3 February 1991 stating that he belongs to the E Mahadco Kali tribe. On 26 August 2011 the respondent submitted his caste certificate and oti)er documents for verification of the caste claim, which were forwarded to the Scrutiny Committee. In the meantime the appellant initiated a departmentul enquiry against the respondent and terminated the services of the respondent by its order dated 18 December 20 l 2. Subsequently the Scrutiny Committee invalidated the caste claim of the respondent by its order dated 3 October 2013. The High Court by its order dated 4 April 2014 has confirmed the order of invalidation but has granted protection of service. For the reasons indicated in the body of the judgment and those indicated while allowing Civil Appeal Nos.9155 and 9157of2015, the G Civil Appeal shall stand allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Com¹ is set aside insofar as it protects the services of the respondent. "\Civil Appeal Nos .. 9203-04 of 2015) "(Civil Appeal No.8926 of2015) H

352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] ll S.C.R.

A There shall be no order as to costs. 7 Suresh Slo.Dewaji Vairagadc Vs. The Controller General, Indian Bureau of Mines. Indira Bhavan. Civil Lines, Nagpur & r\nr.4tt... :

The appellant was appointed as an Assistant Store Keeper on a B post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 14 November 1988 on the strength of a caste certificate dated 14 January 1985 slating that he bdongs to the H~lba Schedule Tribe. The Scrutiny Committee by its order dated 30 August 2005 invalidated the caste claim of the appellant. Subsequently the respondent terminated the services of the appellant in c pursuance of the proviso to Sub Ruic 1 of Ruic 5 of the Central Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965. Being aggrieved. the appellant filed a writ petition which was dismissed by the High Com¹ by its order dated 3 August 2009. Having due regard for the reasons contained in the body of this D judgment, we find no error in the judgment of the High Court. The Civil Appeal shall stand dismissed. No other submission is urged. There shall be no order as to costs. 8 Rajcndra S/o. Ramaji Mahisbadwc Vs. The Joint Commissioner and Vice-Chairman Scheduled Tribe, Caste E Ccrtificak Scrutinv Committee & Anr" : The appellant was appointed as a trainee technician in Air India on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 6 August 1997 on the basis of a caste certificate dated 9 August 1988 stating that he belongs to the Halba Schedule Tribe. Thereafter the appointment of the appellant F was confirmed on 1 March 1999. The second respondent sought a clarification from Tehsildar, Nagpur to ascertain whether the caste certificate is genuine or not. The Tchsildar by a letter dated 17 October 2008 stated that the name of the appellant is not borne in the records. Accordingly the second respondent terminated the services of the appellant by an order dated 3 November 2009. The Scrutiny Committee G by its order dated 5 October 2012 invalidated the caste claim of the appellant.

"I Civil Appeal No.1918 of 20 I0) "tCiviJ Appeal No. 9154 of2015) H

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 353

BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]