STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS.

p. 542

A and appropriate to deal with and decide such sensitive issues once and fo~ all by a Jaw made by Parliament."

48. Thereafter, the Court referred to clause (c) of Section 2 of the 1956 Act that defines "water dispute" and Section 3 which provides for complaints by the State Governments as to water dispute. Commenting B on the same, the Court , expressed:- "41. Bare reading of the above provisions leaves no room for doubt that they are very wide. Section 3 deals with situations not only where a water dispute has actually arisen between one State and another State, but also where such dispute is "likely to arise". c Moreover, it applies not only to those cases in which interest of the State has been prejudicially affected, but also embraces within its sweep interest of any of the inhabitants thereof which has been affected or is likely to be affected. To us, therefore, it is abundantly clear that such a dispute is covered by Article 262 of the Constitution and should be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Act 33 of 1956 and it cannot be challenged in any court including this Court. x x x x x

46. Ultimately, what is contemplated by the Act is to look into, to protect and to safeguard interests of tl'e State as also of its subjects and citizens. Precisely for that reason, Section 3 has been worded widely. It provides for constitution of a tribunal for adjudication by the Central ,Government on a dispute raised or complaint made by any State that interest of the State or any of the inhabitants thereof has been prejudicially affected or is likely to be affected. In our considered opinion, therefore; the present petition under Article 32 is not maintainable. x x x x x

52. From the relevant provisions of the Constitution, Act 33 of 1956 and the decisions referred to hereinabove, there is no doubt in our mind that the present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution is not maintainable." The aforesaid decision, as is limpid, has been delivered in the context of a writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution, by way of publi9 interest litigation and the !is as the court perceived was squarely covered by the connotative expanse of"water dispute".

p. 543

[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

49, In the State of Himachal Pradesh (supra) the Court was A dealing with the maintainability of a suit under Article 131 of the Constitution. One of the issue that was framed by the Court was whether the suit was maintainable under Article 131. Dealing with the said issue, the Court referred to the authority in State of Karnataka v. State of A.P. (supra) and State of Haryana (supra) and opined that when a contention is raised that a suit filed under Article 131 of the Constitution B is barred under Article 262(2) of the Constitution read with Section 11 of the 1956 Act, what is necessary to be found out is whether the assertions made in the plaint and the relief sought for, by any stretch of imagination, can be held to constitute a water dispute so as to oust the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 131 of the Constitution. Thereafter the Court C proceeded to hold that from the assertions made in the entire plaint as well as the reliefs claimed therein by the plaintiff, the dispute did not relate to inter-State river water issue or the use thereof, and actually relate to sharing of power generated in the Bhakra-Nangal and the Beas Projects and such a dispute did not attract the law was not barred under D clause (2) of Article 262 of the Constitution read with Section 11 of the 1956 Act. Thus~ the emphasis was.laid on the nature of the dispute in . the context of exercise of original jurisdiction.

50. The crux of the matter is whether the interpretation placed by this Court on the aforesaid decisions lays down the ratio that Article 262 read with Section 11 of the 1956Actousts the jurisdiction.. ofArticle 136 E of the Constitution. On an anxious perusal and studied scrutiny of the aforesaid authorities, we find that what has been ousted is the jurisdiction of this Court to take cognizance of any dispute or complaint with respect to the use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in, any inter State river or river valley. The. Constitution Bench in bi Re: Cauvery Water F Dispute Tribunal (supra) has opined that this Court cannot take cognizance of the original complaint or dispute relating to what has been mentioned in Article 262. Article 262(2) empowers the Parliament, by law, to provide that neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall exercisejurisdiction in respect of any such dispute or complaint as is referred to in clause (I). Thus, the legislation is relatable to the disputes G which have been referred to in Article 262(1 ).'In this. regard, we may refer to Section 2(c) of the 1956 Act that defines "water dispute". It reads as follows:- "2.(c) 'water dispute' to mean any dispute or difference between two or more State Governments with respect to- H

p. 544

A (i) the use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in, any inter- State river or river valley; or (ii) the interpretation of the terms of any agreement relating to the use, distribution or control of such waters or the implementation of such agreement; or B (iii) the levy ofany water rate in contravention of the prohibition contained in Section 7."

51. Se«:tion 3 deals with complaints by State Governments as to water disputes. Jt provides that:-

c "3. Complaints by State Governments as to water disputes.- If it appears to the Government of any State that a water dispute with the Goverg,ment of another State has arisen or is likely to arise by reasonofthe fact that the interests of the State, or of any of the inhabitants thereof, in the waters of an inter-State river or river valley have been, or are likely to be, affected prejudicially by- (a) any executive action or legislation taken or passed, or proposed to be taken or passed, by the other State; or (b) the failure of the other State or any authority therein to exercise any of their powers with respect to the use, distribution or control of such waters; or (c) the failure of the other State to implement the terms of any agreement relating to the use, distribution or control of such waters, the State Government may, in such form and manner as may be prescribed, request the Central Government to refer the water dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication."

52. Section 5 provides for adjudication of water disputes. Section 11 stipulates that neither the Supreme Court nor any other Court shall have or exercise jurisdiction in respect of any water dispute which may be referred to a tribunal under the 1956 Act. The tribunal is constituted · when a request is made under Section 3 from any State Government in respect ofany water dispute. Section 4 of the 1956 Act provides thatthe Central Government shall constitute a Water Disputes Tribunal if it is of the opinion that the water dispute cannot be settled by negotiations. The 1956 Act, as we perceive, is in consonance with Article 262 which H

STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. . 545 [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

empowers the Parliament to provide that neither the Supreme Court nor A any other court shall exercise jurisdiction in respect of any such dispute or complaint but the same has to pertain to Article 262( I).

53. Thus, the bar on the jurisdiction of this Court has to be in accord with the language employed in Article 262( I). Section 11 bars the jurisdiction of this Court pertaining to original dispute or complaint. B The submission of Mr. Rohatgi is that dispute or complaint as mentioned in Article 262 and Section 11 of the 1956Act not only covers the dispute before the tribunal but also encompasses any appeal by special leave because it still has the characteristics of a dispute. On a first blush, the aforesaid submission may look attractive but on a keener scrutiny, we are disposed to think, it does not deserve acceptance. The language C 1 used in Article 262(1) and Section 11 relate to a water dispute or complaint. It pert.ains to a dispute or a complaint at the pre-adjudicatory stage. A complaint by the State Government is in a different realm altogether. It is meant to invite the attention of the Central Governmen( pertaining to the fact that a water dispute had arisen or is likely to arise D and it needs to be addressed by constituting a tribunal. Once a water dispute is adjudicated, it is extremely difficult to put it in the compartment of" any water dispute". After the adjudication, one of the States or both the States may have a grievance bot a contention cannot be advanced by them or by the Union oflndia that the controversy is still at the stage of dispute that has been intended to be covered either under Article E 262(1) of the Constitution or under the scheme of the 1956 Act and, therefore, the ju'risdiction of this Court stands excluded. Needless to emphasise, it has to pertain to the original dispute or original complaint and that is why, the Constitution bench in In Re: Cauvery Water Dispute Tribunal (supra) had held that this Court cannot take cognizance ofan original dispute or complaint. The Constitution Bench analyzing the scheme of the 1956 Act has opined that the tribunal had the jurisdiction to grant interim relief.It has also been categorically ruled that thJs Court cannot take cognizance of original dispute. The majority in State 'of Tamil Nadu v. Staie of Karnataka and Ors. witli p-tiion Territory of Pondicherry v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (supra) has opined that this Court has jurisdiction to decide the parameters, scope, authority and jurisdiction of the tribunal. It has been further held that it is the judiciary i.e. the courts alone that have the function of determining authoritatively the meaning of a statutory enactment and to lay down the frontiers of . jurisdiction ofany body br tribunal constituted under tM statute. H

p. 545 — page break not located

p. 546

54. At this stage, we may also refer to the scope of certain aspects which have been highlighted by Mr. Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing for the State ofKarnataka. According to him, the protective, preclusive or ouster clauses are to be construed strictly. He has relied on the classic text ofAdministrative Law by Sir William Wade (9'h Edn.) wherein it has been said that " ... first it must be stressed that there is a B presumption against any restriction of the supervisory powers of the court". He has also relied upon case of R. v. Medic"{ Appe"l Tribun"l ex p"rte Gilmore3c wherein Denning LJ said that "l find it very well settled that the remedy by certiorari is never to be taken away by any statute except by the most clear and explicit words." Lord Reid in the c Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compens"tion Commission 33 has recalled that:- "It is a well established principle thata provision ousting the ordinary jurisdiction of the court must be construed strictly - meaning, I think that, if such a provision is reasonably capable of having two meanings, that meaning shall be taken which preserves the ordinary jurisdiction of the court". 55, Having stated about the aspect pertaining to the approach of the Court with regard to interpret the ouster provisions, we may profitably refer, being commended, to certain authorities as to how the Court has perceived its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. ~6. In Durg" Slwnkar Me/tf(l (supra), it has been held thus:- "It is now well settled by the majority decision of this Court in the case Of Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. 34that the expression F "Tribunal" as used in article 136 does not mean the same thing as "Court" but includes, within its ambit, all adjudicating bodies, provided they are constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions. The only Courts or Tribunals, which are expressly G exempted from the purview of article 136, are those which are est!lblished by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces as laid down in clause (2) of the article. It is well known that an appeal is a creature of statute and there can be no inherent right 32 ( 1957) 1 QB 574 [at 583] 33 (1969) 2 AC 147 [at 170C-D] H " 1950 SCR 459

p. 547

fDIPAK MISRA, J.l

of appeal from any judgment or determination unless an appeal is expressly provided for by the law itself. The powers given by article 13 6 of the Constitution however are in the nature of special or residuary powers which are exercisable outside the purview of ordinary law, in cases where the needs of justice demand interference by the Supreme Court of the land. The article itself is worded in the widest terms possible. It vests in the Supreme Court a plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing appeals, by granting of special leave, against any kind of judgment or order made by a Court or Tribunal in any cause or matter and the powers could be exercised in spite of the specific provisions for appeal contained in the Constitution or other laws. The C Constitution for the best of reasons did not choose to fetter or circumscribe the powers exercisable under this article in any way." fEmphasis addedl And again:- D "In the first place article 136 is a constitutional provision which no Parliamentary legislation can limit or take away. In the second place the provision being one, which overrides ordinary laws, no presumption can arise from words and expressions declaring an adjudication of a particular Tribunal to be final and conclusive, E that there was an intention to exclude the exercise of the special powers. As has been said already, the non obstante clause in article 329 prohibits challenge to an election either to Parliament or any State Legislature, eltcept in the manner laid down in clause (2) of the article. But there is no prohibition of the exercise of its powers by the Supreme Court in proper cases under article 136 of the F Constitution against the decision or determination of an Election Tribunal which like all other judicial, tribunals comes within the purview of the article. It is certainly desirable that the decisions on matters of disputed election should, as soon as possible, become final and conclusive so that the constitution of the Legislature o may be distinctly and speedily known. But the powers under article 136 are exercisable only under exceptional circumstances. The article does not create any general right of appeal from decisions ofall Tribunals." Though the context is different, we have referred to the said H

p. 548

A authority to appreciate the width and plentitude of power under Article 136 of the Constitution. That apart, the said authority supports the view that framers of the Constitution have not chosen to circumscribe the powers exercisable under this Article. We are conscious of the fact that the context was different, but it is obligatory on the part of this Court to B see whether any bar is created under the original Constitution and if so, to what extent.

57. In this regard, Mr. Nariman ha's also referred to Associated Cement Companies Ltd. (supra), especially, the concurring opinion of Bachawat, J., who has articulated thus:-

c "The great purpose of Art. 136 is the recognition of the basic principle that one Court having supreme judicial power in the Republic will have appellate power over all Courts and adjudicating authorities vested with the judicial powers of the State throughol\t the territory of India barring those constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. In this background, the basic test of a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136 is that it is an adjudicating authority (other than a Court) vested with the judicial powers of the State."

58. In Jose Da Costa (supra), it has been opined that Article 136 vests in this Court plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing appeals by granting special leave against any kind ofjudgment or order made by a court or tribunal in any case or matter and the power cannot be taken away expressly or impliedly by any ordinary legislation.

59. In Arunacltalam v. P.S.R. Sadltanantliam (supra), it has been ruled that Art. 136 of the Constitution invests the Supreme Court F with a plentitude of plenary, appellate power over all Courts and tribunals in India. Thereafter, the Court has stated that:- " Appellate power vested in the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution is not to be confused with ordinary appellate power exercised by appellate courts and Appellate Tribunals under G specific statutes. As we said earlier, it is a plenary power, 'exercisable outside the purview of ordinary law' to meet the pressing demands of justice (vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh). Article 136 of the Constitution neither confers on anyone the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court nor inhibits anyone from invoking the Court's H

p. 549

[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

jurisdiction. The power is vested in the Supreme Court but the A right to invoke the Court's jurisdiction is vested in no one. The exercise of the power of the Supreme Court is not circumscribed by any limitation as to who may invoke it."

60. In P.S.R. Sadhanantlwm v. Arunaclta/am (supra) this Court (speaking through Justice Krishna Iyer) held that:- B " .... Article 136 is a special jurisdiction. It is residuary power; it is extraordinary in its amplitude, its limit, when it chases injustice, is the sky itself. This Court functionally fulfils itself by reaching out to injustice wherever it is and this power is largely derived in the common run of cases from Article 136. Is if merely a power in c the court to be exercised in any manner it fancies? Is there no procedural limitation in the manner of exercise and the occasion for exercise? Is there no duty to act fairly while hearing a case under Article 136, either in the matter of grant of leave or, after such grant, in the final disposal of the appeal? We have hardly any doubt that here is a procedure necessarily implicit in the power vested in the summit court. It must be remembered that Article 136 confers jurisdiction on the highest court. The founding fathers unarguably intended in the very terms of Article 136 that it shall be exercised by the highest judges of the land with scrupulous adherence to judicial principles well established by precedents in our jurisprudence."

61. In Pras/1ant Ramacltandra Desltpantk(supra), Sahai, J. speaking for the Court has observed that remedy under Article 136 is a constitutional right and it cannot be taken away by legislation much less by invoking the principle of election or estoppels, because the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 136 is an extraordinary jurisdiction which empowers this Court to grant leave to appeal from any judgment, decree or determination in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal and the scope of this Article has been settled in numerous decisions. It is not hedged with any restriction or any exception as is normally found in the provisions conferringjurisdiction. G

62. Learned senior counsel has also commended us to Maltendra Saree Emporium (II) '(supra) and U. Sree (supra) and to a recent Constitution Bench decision in Matltai v. George35 , wherein the Court has opined that no effort should be made to restrict the powers of this "(2016) 1sec100 H

p. 550

A Court under Article 136 because while exercising its power under Art. 136 of the Constitution oflndia, this Court can, after considering facts of the case to be decided, very well use its discretion.

63. In this context, we may profitably refer to Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Biliar36 • After referring to the earlier authorities, B the Court culled out certain principles which would invite exercise of power of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution oflndia. They are as follows:- "(i) The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are very wide but in criminal appeals this Court does not interfere c with the concurrent findings of fact save in exceptional circumstances. (ii) It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings of fact given by the High Court, ifthe High Court has acted perversely or otherwise improperly. D (iii) It is open to this Court to invoke the power under Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances as and when a question of law of general public importance arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court. (iv) When the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell short of the test of reliability and acceptability and as such it is highly unsafe to act upon it. (v) Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles ofnatural justice, errors ofrecord and misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record." We have referred to the aforesaid authorities solely for the purpose of accentuating the nature ofjurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 136. G

64. Having stated about the extent of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and upon taking note of the precedents pertaining to sphere of Article 262 read with Section 11 of the 1956 Act, we may state that what is excluded under the Constitution is the dispute or complaint. The term 'dispute', as has been held in H "(2005) 6 sec 211

p. 551

fDIPAK MISRA, J.l

Gujarat State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. P.R. A Mankad and Ors.37, means a controversy having both positive and negative aspects. In Canara Bank and Ors. v. National Thermal Power Corporation andAnr. 38 , the term 'dispute' has been interpreted to mean that there is a postulation of an assertion of a claim by one party and denial by the other. The term 'dispute' maybe given a broad meaning B or a narrow meaning and the 1956 Act gives it a broad meaning, as has been held by this Court.

65. In this context, the term 'adjudication' becomes extremely significant. In Black' Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p. 42 "adjudication" is defined as:- c "Adjudication.- The legal process of resolving a dispute. The formal giving or pronouncing a judgment or decree in a court proceeding; also the judgment or decision given. The entry of a decree by a court in respect to the parties in a case. lt impTies a hearing by a court, after notice, of legal evidence on the factual issue(s) involved." D

66. The purpose of referring to the aforesaid definition is to arrive at the conclusion that once a water dispute, as defined under Article 262(1) read with provisions of the 1956 Act is adjudicated by the tribunal, it loses the nature of dispute. A person aggrieved can always have his remedy invoking the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of E India. We have no a: scintilla of doubt in our mind that the founding fathers did not want the award or the final order passed by the tribunal to remain immune from challenge. That is neither the express language of Article 262(1) nor it impliedly so states. Thus, the contention of the Union oflndia with regard to maintainability of the appeal by special F leave under Article 136 of the Constitution oflndia on this score stands repelled.

67. The second limb of submission of Mr. Rohatgi as regards the maintainability pertains to the language employed under Section 6(2) of the 1956 Act, which reads as follows:- G "6(2) The decision of the Tribunal, after its publication in the Official Gazette by the Central Government under sub-section (1), shall have the same force. as an order or decree of the Supreme Court." " l 1979) 3 sec 123 ,. (2001) 1sec43 . H

p. 552

A 68. Relying 'on Section 6(2), which was introduced by way of Amendment Act 2002 (Act No. 14 of 2002) that came into force from 6.8.2002, it is submitted by Mr. Rohatgi thatthe jurisdiction of this Court is ousted as it cannot sit over in appeal on its own decree. The said submission is seriously resisted by Mr. Nariman and Mr. Naphade, learned senior counsel contending that the said provision, if it is to be interpreted B to exclude the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, it has to be supported by a constitutional amendment adding at the end of Article 136(2) the words "or to any determination of any tribunal constituted under the law made by Parliament under Article 262(2)" and, in such a situation, in all possibility such an amendment to the Constitution may be c ultra vires affecting the power ofjudicial review which is a part of basic feature of the Constitution. Learned senior counsel for the respondent has drawn a distinction between the confennent and the exclusion of the power of the Supreme Court oflndiaby the original Constitution and any exclusion by the constitutional amendment. Be that as it may, the D said aspect need not be adverted to, as we are only required to interpret Section 6(2) as it exists today on the statute book. The said provision has been inserted to provide teeth to the decision of the tribunal after its publication in the official gazette by the Central Government and this has been done keeping in view the Sarkaria Commission's Report on Centre-State relations (1980). The relevant extract of the Sarkaria E Commission's Report reads as follows:- , "17.4.19 The Act was amended in 1980 and Se·ction 6A was inserted. This section provides for framing a scheme for giving effect to a Tribunal's award. The scheme, inter alia provides for the establishment of the authority, its term of office and other condition of service, etc. but the mere creation of such an agency will not be able to ensure implementation of a Tribunal's award. Any agency set up under Section 6A cannot really function without the cooperation of the States concerned. Further, to make a Tribunal's award binding and effectively enforceable, it should have the same force and sanction behind it as n order or decree of the Supreme Court. We recommend that the Act should be suitably amended forth is purpose. 17.6.05 - The Inter- State Water Disputes Act, 1956 should be amended so that a Tribunal's Award has the same force and sanction behind it as an order or decree of the Supreme Court to make a Tribunal's a~rd really binding."

p. 553

rDIPAK MISRA, J.l

69. The Report of the Commission as the language would suggest, A was to make the final decision of the tribunal binding on both the States and once it is treated as a decree of this Court, then it has the binding effect. It was suggested to make the award effectively enforceable. The language employed in Section 6(2) suggests thatthe decision of the tribunal shall have the same force as the order or decree of this Court. B There is a distinction between having the same force as an order or decree of this Court and passing of a decree by this Court after due adjudication. The Parliament has intentionally used the words from which it can be construed that a legal fiction is meant to serve the purpose for which the fiction has been created and not intended to travel beyond it. The purpose is to have the binding effect of the tribunal's award and the c effectiveness of enforceability. Thus, it has to be narrowly construed regard being had to the purpose it is meant to serve.

70. In this context, we may usefully refer to the Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edition by G.P. Singh. The learned author has expressed thus:- D "In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created 39, and after ascertaining this, the Court is to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction40 • But in so construing the fiction it is E not be extended beyond the purpose for which is created41 , or beyond the language of the section by which it is created•~. It cannot also be extended by importing another fiction 43 • The principles stated above are 'well-settled:.44 A legal fiction may also be interpreted narrowly to make the statute workable. 45 · F

71. In Aneeta Hada v. God/allier Travels and Tours46, a three- Judge Bench has ruled thus:- "37. In State of T.N. v. Arooran Sugars Ltd. 4- the Constitution 39 AIR I 953 SC 333, AIR I 953 SC 244 0 • (1951) 2 All ER 587,AIR 1959 SC 352 G 41 AIR 1955 SC 661, AIR 1963 SC 1448 42 AIR 966 SC 719, AIR 1997 SC 208 43 AIR 1966 SC 870 " AIR 2004 SC 3666 "AIR 2005 SC 34 "(2012) 5 sec 661 "(1997) 1 sec 326 H

p. 554

A Bench, while dealing with the deeming provision in a statute, ruled that the role of a provision in a statute creating legal fiction is well settled. Reference was made to Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar'8 , J.K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills Ltd. v. Union of India' 9 , M Venugopal v. LIC50 and Harish Tandon v. ADM, Allahabad51 and eventually, it was held that when a B statute creates a legal fiction saying that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and truth has not been done, the Court has to examine and ascertain as to for what purpose and between which persons such a statutory fiction is to be resorted to and thereafter, the courts have to give full effect to such a c statutory fiction and it has to be carried to its logical conclusion.

38. From the aforesaid pronouncements, the principle that can be culled out is that it is the bounden duty of the court to ascertain for what purpose the lega'I fiction has been created. It is also the duty of the court to imagine the fiction with all real consequences and D instances unless prohibited from doing so. That apart, the use of the term "deemed" has to be read in its context and further, the fullest logical purpose and import are to be understood. It is because in modern legislation, the term "deemed" has been used for manifold purposes. The object of the legislature has to be kept in mind." E

72. In Hari Ram (supra), the Court has held that in interpreting the provision creating a legal fiction, the court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created and after ascertaining the same, the court is to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries for giving effect to the fiction. F

73. In this regard, reference to the authority in Nandkislwre Ganesh Joshi v. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Kalyan and Dombivali and Ors. 52 would be apposite. It has been held that a legal fiction has to be applied having regard to the legislative intent and a restrictive meaning can be attributed to make the statute workable. G

74. This Court in De/Iii Ciolli and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. 48 AIR 1961 SC 838 "I 987 Supp. sec 350 '" (I 994 )2 sec 323 "(1995) 1sec537 H "(2014) 11 SC'-'417

p. 555

[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

State of Rajasthan; 3 held that what can be deemed to exist under a A legal fiction are facts and not legal consequences which do not flow from the law as it stands.

75. In this context, fruitful advertence may be made to a passage from Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. ;.i wherein Subba Rao, CJ speaking for the Bench has opined:- B " ... the fundamental rule of interpretation is the same whether one construes the provisions of the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, namely, that the court will have to find out the expressed intention from the words of the Constitution or the Act, as the case may be." c

76. When we apply the aforesaid principles of statutory interpretation to understand the legislative intendment of Section 6(2) it ·is clear as crystal that the Parliament did not intend to create any kind of embargo on the jurisdiction of this Court. The said provision was inserted to give the binding effect .to the award passed by ~he tribunal. The fiction has been created for that limited purpose. Section 11 of the 1956 Act, as stated earlier, bars the jurisdiction of the courts and needless to say, that is in consonance with tlie language employed in Article 262 of the Constitution. The Founding Fathers had not conferred the power on this Court to entertain an original suit or complaint and that is luminescent from the language employed in Article 131 of the Constitution and from the series of pronouncements of this Court. Be it clearly stated that Section 6 cannot be interpreted in an absolute mechanical manner and the words "same force as on order or decision" cannot be treated as a decree for the purpose for excluding the jurisdiction of this Court. To elaborate, it cannot be a decree as if this Court has adjudicated the matter and decree is passed. The Parliament has intended that the Same shall be executed or abided as if it is a decree of this Court. It is to be borne in mind that a provision should not be interpreted to give a different colour which has a technical design rather than serving the object of the legislation. The exposition of the principles oflaw relating to fiction, the intendment Of the legislature and the ultimate purpose and effect of the provision compel us to repel the submissions raised on behalf of the Union of India that Section 6(2) bars the jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Article 136. " l 1996) 2 sec 449 "AIR 1966 SC 1987 H

p. 556

A 77. We would like .to clarify one aspect. Learned senior counsel appearing for the State ofKamataka as well as the State of Tamil Nadu have commended us to various authorities which we have already referred to in the context ofArticle 136 of the Constitution, but the purpose behind the said delineation is to show the broad canvas of the· aforesaid constitutional provision in the context of maintainability ofthe civil appeals. B How the final order passed By the tribunal would be adjudged within the parameters of the said constitutional provision has to be debated when we finally address the controversy pertaining to the subject matter of the Civil Appeals.

78. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we express the opinion that C the Civil Appeals are maintainable. Let the Appeals be listed at 3 p.m. on I5.12.2016forfurtherorders.

79. Interim order passed on 18.10.2016 to ~ontinue. Nidhi Jain Matter adjourned.