ANITA INTERNATIONAL v. TUNGABADRA SUGAR WORKS MAZDOOR SANGH - AND OTHERS

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MAZDOOR SANGH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

Liquidator can prefer an appeal before DRT. As he was prosecuting A the lis in all genuineness before the Company Court and defending the order before the Division Bench, we grant him four weeks' time to file an appeal after following the due procedure. On such an appeal being preferred, DRT shall deal with the appeal in accordance with law. DRT is directed to decide the appeal within 8 a period of two months after offering an opportunity of hearing to all concerned. Till the appeal is disposed of, the interim order passed by this Court shall remain in force. We hasten to clarify that we have not expressed anything on the merits of the case." (emphasis supplied)

25Copy pinpoint25. Reliance was then placed on Order XXI Rule 54 of the Code c of Civil Procedure, which is extracted hereunder: "54. Attachment of immovable property.- {I) Where the property is immovable, the attachment shall be made by an Order prohibiting the judgment debtor from transferring or charging the property in any way, and all persons from taking any benefit from such transfer or charge. (I )A The Order shall also require the judgment debtor to attend court on a specified date to take notice of the date to be fixed for settltng the terms of the proclamation of sale. (2) The Order shall be proclaimed at some place on or adjacent to such property by beat of drum or other customary mode, and a copy of the Order shall be affixed on a conspicuous part of the property and then upon a conspicuous part of the court house, and also, where the property is land paying revenue to the government, in the office of the Collector of the District in which the land is situate and, where the property is land situate in village, also in the office of the Gram Panchayat, if any, havingjurisdiction over that village." To support the contention advanced at the hands ofleamed senior counsel representing the respondents, reliance was placed on Jehal Tanti G v. Nageshwar Singh9 • The following observations recorded therein, are of relevance: "JO. The nature and effect ofan alienation made in violation ofan order of injunction was considered in Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla ---- (2013) 14 sec 689 9 H

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A v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. and the following propositions were laid down: "16. According to this section, if an objection is raised to the jurisdiction of the court at the hearing of an application for grant of, or for vacating, interim relief, the court should determine that B issue in the first instance as a preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the relief already granted. An application raising objection to the jurisdiction to the court is directed to be heard with all expedition. Sub-rule (2), however, says that the command in sub-rule (I) does not preclude the com1 from granting such interim relief as it may consider necessary pending the decision c on the question ofjurisdiction. In our opinion, the provision merely states the obvious. It makes explicit what is implicit in law. Just because an objection to the jurisdiction is raised, the court does not become helpless forthwith-nor does it become incompetent to grant the interim relief. It can. At the same time, it should also decide the objection to jurisdiction at the earliest possible moment. This is the general principle and this is what Section 9·A reiterates. Take this very case. The plaintiff asked for temporary injunction. An addnterim injunction was granted. Then the defendants came forward objecting to the grant of injunction and also raising an objection to the jurisdiction of the court. The court overruled the objection as to jurisdiction and made the interim injunction absolute. The defendants filed an appeal against the decision on the question ofjurisdiction. While that appeal was pending, several other interim orders were passed both by the civil court as well as by the High Court. Ultimately, no doubt, the High Court has found that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit but all this took about six years. Can it be said that orders passed by the civil ·court and the High Court during this period of six years were all non est and that it is open to the defendants to flout them merrily. without fear of any· consequence. Admittedly, this could not be done until the High Court's decision on the question of jurisdiction. G The question is whether the said decision of the High Court means that no person can be punished for flouting or disobeying the interim/interlocutory orders while they were in force i.e. for violatipns and disobedience committed prior to the decision of the High Court on the question ofjurisdiction. Holding that by virtue H

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MAZDOOR SANGH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

of the said decision of the High Court (on the guestion of A jurisdiction), no one can be punished thereafter for disobedience or violation of the interim orders committed prior to the said decision of the High Court, would indeed be subversive of the rule oflaw and would seriously erode the dignity and the authority of the courts. We must repeat that this is not even a case where B a suit was filed in the wrong court knowingly or only with a view to snatch an interim order. As pointed out hereinabove, the suit was filed in the civil court bona fide. We are of the opinion that in such a case the defendants cannot escape the conseguences of their disobedience and violation of the interim injunction committed by them prior to the High Court's decision on the guestion of c jurisdiction.

28. The correct principle, therefore, is the one recognised and reiterated in Section 9-A-:-to wit, where an objection to jurisdiction ofa civil court is raised to entertain a suit and to pass any interim orders therein, the Court should decide the question ofjurisdiction in the first instance butthat does not mean that pending the decision on the question ofjurisdiction, the Court has no jurisdiction to pass interim orders as may be called for in the facts and circumstances of the case. A mere objection to jurisdiction does not instantly disable the court from passing any interim orders. It can yet pass appropriate orders. At the same time, it should also decide the guestion of jurisdiction at the earliest possible time. The interim orders so passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and effective till the court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. These interim orders undoubtedly come to an end with the decision that this Court had no jurisdiction. It is open to the court to modify these orders while holding that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit. .... " (emphasis supplied)

26Copy pinpoint26. It was the emphatic contention of learned counsel for the respondents, that the sole purpose for requiring the Official Liquidator to participate in the proceedings before the ORT, was to keep the interest of the creditors before the Company Court (where winding up proceedings had been initiated by other creditors), secure. The interest of the creditors before the Company Court could be secure, only ifthe sale of the properties of the company under winding up was made by H

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A conforming to the crystalised practices in getting the best price. Referring to the conclusions drawn in the impugned order, it was submitted, that the auction sale conducted by the Recovery Officer was farcical, as it was, with the sole object of extending benefits to the appellant -Anita International. It was therefore asserted, that the Division Bench of the High Court was fully justified in setting aside the order passed by the B learned Single Judge.

27Copy pinpoint27. Mr. P. Chidambaram, learned senior counsel in rejoinder and in response to the three contentions advanced at the hands of the respondents, invited this Court's attention to Sections 18, 19 and 34 of the RDB Act. The same are extracted hereunder: c "18. Bar of Jurisdiction.--On and from the appointed day, no court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, and a High Court exercisingjurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to tne matters specified in section 17. D Provided that any proceedings in relation to the recovery of debts due to any multi-State co-operative bank pending before the date of commencement of the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment)Act, 2012 under the Multi- State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 (39 of 2002) shall be continued and nothing contained in this section shall, after such commencement, apply to such proceedings. 19.Application to the Tribunal.-(!) Where a bank or a financial institution has to recover any debt from any person, it may make an application to the Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction- (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of making the application, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or G (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of making the application, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (c)the cause ofaction, wholly or in part, arises: H

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MAZDOOR SANGH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

Provided that the bank or financial institution may, with the A permission of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, on an application made by it, withdraw the application, whether made before or after the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act, 2004 for the purpose of taking action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and 8 Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), if no such action had been taken earlier under that Act: Provided further that any application made under the first proviso for seeking permission from the Debts Recovery Tribunal to withdraw the application made under sub section (I) shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within thirty c days from the date of such application: Provided also that in case the Debts Recovery Tribunal refuses to grant permission for withdrawal of the application filed under this sub section, it shall pass such orders after recording the reasons therefor. D

(I A) Every bank being, multi~State co-operative bank referred to in sub-clause (vi) of clause (d) of section 2, may, at its option, opt to initiate proceedings under the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 (39 of 2002) to recover debts, whether due before or after the date of commencement of the Enforcement of the E Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act, 2012 from any person instead of making an application under this Chapter. (I B) In case, a bank being, multi-State co-operative bank referred to in sub-clause (vi) ofclause (d) of section 2 has filed an application under this Chapter and subsequently opts to withdraw the application forthe purpose ofinitiating proceeding under the Multi- State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 (39 of 2002) to recover debts, it may do so with the permission of the Tribunal and every such application seeking permission from the Tribunal to withdraw the application made under sub-section (IA) shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within thirty days from the date of such application: Provided that in casethe Tribunal refuses to grant permission for withdrawal of the application filed under this sub-section, it shall H

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A pass such orders after recording the reasons therefor. (2) Where a bank or a financial institution, which has to recover its debt from any person, has filed an application to the Tribunal under sub-section (I) and against the same person another bank or financial institution also has a claim to recover its debt, then, B the later bank or financial institution may join the applicant bank or financial institution at any stage of the proceedings, before the final order is passed, by making an application to that Tribunal. (3) Every application under sub-section (I) or sub-section (2) shall be in such form and accompanied by such documents or other c evidence and by such fee as may be prescribed: Provided that the fee may be prescribed having regard to the amount of debt to be recovered: Provided further that nothing contained in this sub-section relating to fee shall apply to cases transferred to the Tribunal under sub- D section (I) of section 31. (3A) If any application filed before thi!Tribunal for recovery of any debt is settled prior to the commencement of the hearing before that Tribunal or at any stage of the proceedings before the final order is passed, the applicant may be granted refund of the E fees paid by him at such rates as may be prescribed. (4) On receipt of the application under sub-section (I) or sub- section (2), the Tribunal shall issue summons requiring the defendant to show cause within thirty days of the service of summons as to why the relief prayed for should not be granted. F (5) The defendant shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of service of summons, present a written statement of this defence: Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, the Presiding Officer may, in G exceptional cases and in special circumstances to be recorded in writing, allow not more than two extensions to the defendant to file the written statement. (SA) After hearing of the application has commenced, it shall be continued from day-to-day until the hearing is concluded: H

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MAZDOOR SANGH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

Provided that the Tribunal may grant adjournments if sufficient cause is shown, but no such adjournment shall be granted more than three times to a party and where there are three or more parties, the total number of such adjournments shall not exceed six: Provided further that, the Presiding Officer may grant such adjournments on imposing such costs as may be considered necessary. (6) Where the defendant claims to set-off against the applicant's demand any ascertained sum of money legally recoverable by him from such applicant, the defendant may, at the first hearing of. c the application, but not a.!terwards unless pennitted by the Tribunal, present a written statement containing the particulars of the debt sought to be set-off. (7) The written statement shall have the same effect as a plaint in a cross-suit so as to enable the Tribunal to pass a final order in o respect both of the original claim and of the set-off. (8) A defendant in an application may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under sub-section (6), set up, by way ofcounter- claim againstthe claim ofthe applicant, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the applicant either before or after the filing of the application but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not. (9) A counter-claim under sub-section (8) shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the Tribunal to pass a final order on the same application, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim. (I 0) The applicant shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period as may be fixed by the Tribunal. ( 11) Where the defendant sets up a counter-claim and the applicant contends that the claim the~eby raised ought not to be disposed of by way of counter-claim but in an independent action, the applicant may, at any time before issues are settled in relation to the H

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A counter-claim, apply to the Tribunal for an order that such counter- claim may be excluded, and the Tribunal may, on the hearing of such application, make such order as it thinks fit. (12) The Tribunal may make an interim order(whether by way of injunction or stay or attachment) against the defendant to debar . B him from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with, or disposing of, any property and assets belonging to him without the prior permission of the Tribunal. (13)(A) Where, at any stage of the proceedings, the Tribunal is satisfied, by affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant, with intent c to obstruct or delay or frustrate the execution of any order for the recovery of debt that may be passed against him, - (i) is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property; or (ii) is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; or D (iii) is likely to cause any damage or mischief to the property or affect its value by misuse or creating third party interest, the Tribunal may direct the defendant, within a time to be fixed by it, either to furnish security, in such sum as may be specified in the order, to produce and place at the disposal of the Tribunal, when required, the said property or the value of the same, or such portion thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the certificate for the recovery of debt, or to appear and show cause why he shou Id not (urnish security. (8) Where the defendant fails to show cause why he should not furnish security, or fails to furnish the security required, within the time fixed by the Tribunal, the Tribunal may order the attachment of the whole or such portion of the properties claimed by the applicant as the properties secured in his favororotherwise owned by the defendant as appears sufficient to satisfy any certificate for the recovery of debt. (14) The applicant shall, unless theTribunal otherwise directs, specify the property required to be attached and the estimated value thereof. (IS) The Tribunal may also in the order direct the conditional H

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MAZDOOR SANGH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)

attachment of the whole or any portion of the property specified A under sub-section (14 ). ( 16) If an order of attachment is made without complying with the pro-visions of sub-section ( 13), such attachment shall be void. (17) In the case of disobedience of an order made by the Tribunal under sub-sections (12), (13) and (18) or breach of any of the 8 tenns on which the order was made, the Tribunal may order the properties of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Tribunal directs his release. c (18) Where it appears to the Tribunal to be just and convenient, the Tribunal may, by order,- (a) appoint a receiver of any property, whether before or after grant of certificate for recovery of debt; D (b) remove any person from the possessionor custody of the property; (c) commit the same to the possession, custody or management of the receiver; (d) confer upon the receiver all such powers, as to bringing and defending suits in the courts or filing and defending application before the Tribunal and for the realization, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits, and the execution of documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the Tribunal thinks fit; and (e) appoint a Commissioner for preparation of an inventory of the properties of the defendant or for the sale thereof. (19) Where a certificate of recovery is issued against a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (I of 1956) the Tribunal may order the sale proceeds of such company to be distributed among its secured creditors in accordance with.the provisions of section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 and to pay the surplus, if any, to the company. H

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A (20) The Tribunal may, after giving the applicant and the defendant an opportunity of being heard, pass such interim or final order, including the order for payment of interest from the date on or before which payment of the amount is found due up to the date ofrealization or actual payment, on the application as it thinks fit to meet the ends of justice. B (20A) Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the claint of the applicant has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant has repaid or agreed to repay the claim of the applicant, the Tribunal shall pass orders recording c such agreement, compromise or satisfaction of the claim. (21) The Tribunal shall send a copy of every order passed by it to the applicant and the defendant. ' (22)· The Presiding Officer shall issue a certificate under his signature on the basis of the order of the Tribunal to the Recovery Officer for recovery of the amount of debt specified in the certificate. '· (23) Where the Tribunal, which has issued a certificate of recovery, is satisfied that the property is situated within the local limits of the jurisdiction of two or more Tribunals, it may send the copies of the certificate of recovery for execution to such other Tribunals where the property is situated: Provided that in a case where the Tribunal to which the certificate ofrecovery is sent for execution finds that it has no jurisdiction to comply with the certificate ofrecovery, it shall return the same to the Tribunal which has issued it. (24) The application made to the Tribunal under sub-section (I) or sub-section (2) shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavor shall be made by it to dispose of the application finally within.one hundred and eighty days from the date ofreceipt of the application. (25) The Tribunal may make such orders and give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justic~. H xxx xxx xxx

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MAZDOOR SANGH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)

34. Act to ha~e over-riding effect.-( I) Save as provided under sub-section (2), the provisions of thi.s Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in f\)rce or in any instrument having effect ,by virtue nf any law other i:han this Act. (2) The provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948 ( 15 of 1948), the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (63 ofl951), the UnitTrustoflndiaAct, 1963 (52of1963), the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India Act, 1984 (62of1984), the Sick Injustrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (I of 1986) and the Small Industries c Development Bank of India Act, 1989 (39 of 1989)." Based on the aforesaid provisions, it was asserted, that the provisions of the ROB Act envisaged a complete ouster of the Company Court, and that neither the Company Court nor any other Court, could have exercised j1,1risdiction vested in the ROB A,ct. It was submitted, that the Official Liquidator has no participatory role. under the ROB Act. The Official Liquidator has jurisdictional c.ontrol, over the assets of a company under winding up, under the Companies Act. In this behalf, learned seniOr counsel for the appellant, placed reliance on Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan 10, and pointed out to the following observations recorded therein: "6. The answer to these contentions must depend on what the position in law is when a court .entertains a suit or an appeal over which it has no jurisdiction, and what the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is on that position. It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity. and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon. even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction. whether it is pecuniary or territorial. or ,_ whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action. strikes a· at the veiy authority of the court to pass any decree. and such a defect cannot be cyred even by consent of parties, Ifthe questiop now underoonsideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt 1 '' 1955 (I) SCR 117 H

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A that the District Court of Monghyr was coram non judice, and that its judgment and decree would be nullities. The question is what is the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on this position." (emphasis supplied) B Reliance was also placed on Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University 11 , and the Court's attention was drawn to the following observations: "20. de Smith, Woolf and Jowell in their treatise Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th Edn., para 5-044, have summarised the concept of void and voidable as follows: c "Behind the simple dichotomy of void and voidable acts (invalid and valid until declared to be invalid) lurk terminological and conceptual problems of excruciating complexity. The problems arose from the premise that if an act, order or decision is ultra vires in the sense of outside jurisdiction, it was said to be invalid, D or null and void. If it is intra vires it was, of course, valid. If it is flawed by an error perpetrated within the area of authority or jurisdiction, it was usually said to be voidable; that is, valid till set aside on appeal or in the past quashed by certiorari for error of law on the face of the record."

21. Clive Lewis in his work Judicial Remedies in Public Law at p. E 131 has explained the expressions "void and voidable" as follows: "A challenge to the validity of an act may be by direct action or by way of collateral or indirect challenge. A direct action is one where the principal purpose of the action is to establish the invalidity. This will usually be by way of an application for judicial review or F by use of any statutory mechanism for appeal or review. Collateral challenges arise when the invalidity is raised in the course of some other proceedings, the purpose of which is notto establish invalidity but where questions of validity become relevant." Thereupon, reference was made to Jagmittar Sain Bhagat v. G 1 Director, Health Services, Haryana ~. In order to canvass the proposition, that jurisdiction of courts/forums cannot be conferred by consent of · parties, or acquiescence or waiver. Reliance in this behalf was placed on the following conclusions drawn by this Court: 11 <2001 >6 sec 534 H 1 ~ <2013) 10 sec 136

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MAZDOOR SANGH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

"9. Indisputably, it is a settled legal proposition that conferment of A jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior court, and ifthe court passes a decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to nullity as the matter goes to the root of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The. B finding of a court or tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/ inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. Similarly, if a court/tribunal inherently lacks jurisdiction, acquiescence of party equally should not be permitted to perpetrate and perpetuate defeating of the legislative animation. The court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute. In such eventuality c the doctrine of waiver also does not apply. (Vide United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Workmen AIR 1951 SC 230; Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan AIR 1978 SC 22; Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios (1981) 1 SCC 523; and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar(l 9?9).3 SCC 722.) D

10. In Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (1990) 1 SCC 193, this Court, after placing reliance on a large number of its earlier judgments particularly in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke (1976) I SCC 496; Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan AIR 1954 SC 340; and Chandrika Mi sir v. Bhaiya . Lal AIR 1973 SC 2391 held, that a decree without jurisdiction is a E nullity. It is a coram non judice; when a special statute gives a right and also provides for a forum for adjudication of rights, remedy has to be sought only under the provisions of that Act and the common law court has no jurisdiction; where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in specified manner. F "performance cannot be forced in any other manner".

11. The law does not permit any court/tribunal/authority/forum to usurp jurisdiction on any ground whatsoever, in case, such an authority does not have jurisdiction on the subject-matter. For the reason that it is not an objection as to the place of suing; "it is an G objection going to the nullity of the orderon the ground of want of jurisdiction". Thus. for assumption of jurisdiction by a court or a tribunal. existence of jurisdictional fact is a condition precedent. But once such jurisdictional fact is found to exist, the court or tribunal has power to decide on the adjudicatory facts or facts in H

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A issue. (Vide Setrucherla Ramabhadraraju v. Maharaja of Jeypore AIR 1919 PC 150; State of Gujarat v. Rajesh Kumar Chimanlal Barot AIR 1996 SC 2664; Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. D.L.F. Universal Ltd. AIR 2005 SC 4446; and Carona Ltd. v. Parvathy Swaminathan & Sons AIR 2008 SC 187)." (emphasis supplied) · B

28Copy pinpoint28. Whilst supplementing the above contentions, Mr. S. Ganesh, ·learned senior counsel pointed out, that in the present controversy, the State Bank of Mysore had preferred an application b~fore the Company , Court under Section 446(1) of the Coll)panies Act. It was asserted, that the order passed by the High Court was an order in personam, and as c such, the aforesaid order dated 10.3 .2000 could not be considered as binding on the,DRT, or for that matter, on the Recovery Officer of the ORT. For the above proposition, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the Andhra Bank case3, and drew the attention of this Court to the following conclusions recorded therein: D "31. Section 446 of the Companies Act indisputably confers a wide power upon the Company Judge, but such a power can be exercised only upon consideration of the respective contentions of the parties raised in a suit or a proceei:ling or any claim made by or against the company. Aquestion of determining the priorities would also fall for consideration ifthe parties claiming the same are before the court. Section 446 of the Companies Act ipso facto confers no power upon the Court to pass interlocutory orders. The question as to whether the courts have inherent power to pass such orders, in our opinion, does not arise for consideration in this proceeding. Assuming such a power exists, it was imperative that the same should have been exercised on consideration of the factors laid down by this Court in M~rgan Stanley Mutual Fund v: Kartick Das (1994) 4 SCC 225. An unreasoned order does not subserve the doctrine of fair play. (See Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. CIT (2005) 2 SCC 329). . (emphasis supplied) G

29Copy pinpoint29. In order to make the final thrust, learned senior counsel representing the appellant submitted, that an auction sale of the nature, which is subject matter of consideration in the present controversy, was not liable to be set aside, merely on account of some trivial infirmities in the procedure adopted for the sale of the same. It was the submission H of learned counsel, that only a material irregularity would persuade a

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MAZDOOR SANGH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

Court to interfere with such sale proceedings conducted in furtherance A of statutory power conferred upon such authority. To support the above contention, reliance was placed by learned senior counsel firstly on the following observations in the decision rendered by this Court in Radhy Shyam v. Shyam Behari Singh". "7. There can be no doubt that an application underO. XXI, Rule B 90 to set aside an auction-sale concerns the rights of a person declared to be the purchaser. If the application is allowed, the sale is set aside and the purchaser is deprived of his right to have the sale confirmed by the Court under Rule 92. Such a right is a valuable right, in that, upon such confirmation the sale becomes absolute and the rights of ownership in the property so sold become c vested in him. A decision in such a proceeding, therefore, must be said to be one determining the right of the auction-purchaser to have the sale confirmed and made absolute and of the judgment- debtor conferred by Rule 90 to have it set aside and a resale ordered. In our view an order in a proceeding under Order XX!, D Rule 90, is a 'judgment' inasmuch as such a proceeding raises a controversy between the parties therein affecting their valuable rights and the order allowing the application certainly deprives the purchaser ofrights accrued to him as a result of the auction-sale. We, therefore, agree with the High Court that a letters patent appeal lay against the order of the learned single Judge.

8. Rule 90 of 0. XXI of the Code, as amended by the Allahabad High Court, inter alia provides that no sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity or even fraud unless upon the facts proved the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud. Mere proof of a material irregularity such as the one under Rule 69 and inadequacy of price realised in such a sale, in other words injury. is, therefore, not sufficient. What has to be established is that there was not only inadequacy of the price but that that inadequacy was caused by reason of the material irregularity or fraud. A connection has thus to be established between the inadequacy of the price and the material irregularity." (emphasis supplied) Additionally, reliance was placed on Navalkha and Sons v. Sri 13 AIR 1971SC2337 H

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A Ramanya Das 14 • And the Court's attention was drawn to the following observations: "7. In the present case the Division Bench has come to the conclusion that publicity was not as wide as originally proposed by the Commissioners in their affidavit. The publication was made B in four dailies namely The Hindu, Indian Express, the Hindustan Times and The Statesman. There was no publication in the Times offndia. Further out of the four newspapers in which publication was made only in two there were two insertions and in the remaining two there was only one insertion. This was contrary to what the Commissioners have promised in their affidavit dated c July 8, 1964. No doubt, other efforts were made for giving publicity but these efforts were not sufficient to attract more than one offer. When the case came for confirmation on December 24, 1964 there was an application by Babu Khan that the property was of much higher value and that fresh offers must be invited again with wider publicity. There is also the affidavit of the State Government dated August 29, 1963 in which the value of the property was shown as Rs.13,40,000/-. Besides, on that very day, one Gopaldas Darak had come before the Court with a higher offer showing his bona fides and earnestness by depositing more than one lakh of rupees. He came with the complaint that there was not sufficient publicity as to attract people from the north and that as soon as he came to know he gave his offer. In these circumstances the learned Single Judge was right in expressing his reluctance to confirm the offer of Navalkha & Sons. He therefore decided to have an open bid as between the appellant and Darak in the Court itself on that very day. The complaint of Padam Chand Agarwal is that the second step taken by the Single Judge of holding an auction without giving wide publicity was not justified in law. Rule 273 of the Companies (Court) Rules provides that all sales shall be made by public auction or by inviting sealed tenders or in such manner as the Judge may direct. It appears that on April 17, 1964 at the instance of the Official Liquidator and at the instance of a contributory the Court had approved of the terms and conditions of sale which provide calling of sealed tenders. On December 24, 1964 the learned Judge realised the inefficacy of this Course and decided to abandon the original H "(1969) 3 sec 537

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MAZDOOR SANGH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

procedure and put the properties to auction. But having made up A his mind to resort to auction the learned Judge confined the auction to only two persons namely the previous tenderer and the: fresh tenderer. The auction in question no doubt was conducted in a public place but it was not a public auction because it was not open to the ge~~ral public but was confined to two named persons. B Secondly it was not held after due publicity. It was held immediately after it was decided upon. It is, therefore, obvious that the sale in question was not a public sale which implies sale after giving notice to the public wherein every member of the public is at liberty to participate. No doubt, the device resorted to considerably raised the previous bid yet it was not an adequate price having regard to c the market value of the property to which reference has already been made. The denial of opportunity to purchase the property by persons who would have taken part in the auction bid but for want of notice is a serious matter. In our opinion the learned Judge having decided on December 24, 1964 that the property should be potto auction should have directed auction by public sale instead of confining it to two persons alone. Since there was want of publicity and there was lack of opportunity to the public to take part in the auction the acceptance of the highest bid by the learned Judge was not a sound exercise of discretion. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that confirmation was discretionary with the Court and the Division Bench ought not to have interfered with the discretion exercised by the Company Judge. It is true that the discretion exercised by the Judge ought not to be interfered with unless the Judge has gone wrong on principle. As already pointed out the learned Company Judge having decided to put the property to auction went wrong in not holding the auction as a F public auction after due publicity and this has resulted in prejudice to the Company and the creditors in that the auction did not fetch adequate price. The prejudice was inherent in the method adopted. The petition of Padam Chand Agarwal also suggests that want of publicity had resulted in prejudice. In these circumstances the G Company Judge ought not to have confirmed the bid of the appellant in the auction held on December 24, 1964. We are accordingly of opinion that the Division Bench was right in holding that the order of the Company Judge dated February 19, I 965 should be set aside and there should be fresh sale of the property H

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A either by calling sealed tenders or by auction in accordance with law. The tender will be called or the auction will take place with the minimum offer or with the starting bid often lakh rupees." (emphasis supplied)

30Copy pinpoint30. Based on the legal position declared by this Court in the above B judgments, it was asserted, that the validity of the auction sale held on 11.8.2005 and the confirmation thereof on 12.9.2005 was natural and normal in the facts and circumstances of this case. In order to restore the aforestated validity, it was submitted, that the impugned order passed by the High Court deserved to be set aside.

31Copy pinpoint31. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the complicated c sequence of facts projected before us, as also, the legal submissions advanced at the hands of learned counsel for the rival parties. We shall now endeavour to record our conclusions, with reference to the issues canvassed.

32Copy pinpoint32. In our considered view, the controversy projected for our 0 consideration falls in a narrow compass. It is apposite, to crystalise the dimensions of the dispute. Oeve Sugars Ltd. was ordered to be wound up on 16.4.1999 (in Company Petition No.170 of 1995). The Official Liquidator took possession of the assets of Oeve Sugars Ltd. situated at Harige on 28.9.1999. The State Bank of Mysore filed Company E Application Nos. 1251-1253 ofl 999, in thethen pending Company Petition No.170 of 1995. Through the above applications, the State Bank of Mysore sought leave of the Company Court in the High Court at Madras, to pursue the recovery proceedings before the ORT, Bangalore .. On 10.3.2000, the Company Court granted leave" ... subject to the condition t~at. .. no coercive steps are taken against the assets of the company F during or after the conclusion of the proceedings before the Tribunal. .. "

33Copy pinpoint33. After the ORT, Bangalore issued the recovery certificate dated 15.5.2002, the State Bank of Mysore filed Company Application No. 1300 of2003, with a prayer that the bank be permitted to seek execution of the recovery certificate. It is not a matter of dispute, that the Company G Court in the High Court at Madras, neither heard nor passed any order on the above application. The admitted position is, that the Registry of the High Court, at its own, returned the above Company Application No.1300 of2003, by recording an endorsement, that leave of the High Court was not necessary. The Recovery Officer thereafter proceeded H with the sale of the properties ofOeve Sugars Ltd.

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MAZDOOR SANGH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

34Copy pinpoint34. Tungabadra Sugar Works Mazdoor Sangha, the workers' union A ofDeve Sugars Ltd., objected to the execution of the recovery certificate by the Recovery Officer. The Official Liquidator, who was ordered to be impleaded in the recovery proceedings initiated by the State Bank of Mysore, vide order dated 10.3.2000 (passed by the Company Court in the High Court at Madras), also filed objections. All the above objections B were overruled by the Recovery Officer.

35Copy pinpoint35. The workers' union, then assailed the recovery proceedings, before the High Court of Karnataka, by fil irig Writ Petition No.3 7991 of

2004. Videocon International Ltd. and Tapti Machines Pvt. Ltd. also filed WritPetition No.26564 of2005, before the High Court ofKarnataka. In the above writ petitions, the petitioners assailed the sale proceedings c before the Recovery Officer. Based on a preliminarynbjection raised by the appellant-Anita International, the High Court ofKarnataka relegated the petitioners to their remedy under the ROB Act, by a common order dated 27.10 .2006. The above order was challenged through Writ Appeal Nos. 2050 and 2051 of2006 before the High Court ofKarnataka. The D writ appeals were dismissed on 23.2.2007.

36Copy pinpoint36. The workers' union thereafter preferred AOR No. I 5 of2006 and Videocon International Ltd. filed AOR No. I of2007. In both the above matters, a challenge .was raised to the order passed by the Recovery Officer dated 12.9.2005, whereby the sale of properties of E Deve Sugars Ltd. to Anita International, was con finned. ~

37Copy pinpoint37. It would be relevant to mention, that as against the reserve price of Rs. I 0 crores, Anita International - the appellant herein, made a bid of Rs. I 0.25 crores. The same was accepted by the Recovery Officer on I 1.8.2005, and confirmed on 12.9.2005. One N. Ponnusamy filed F Company Application Nos. 2740-2742 of 2007, before the Company Court in the High Court at Madras, wherein he.assailed the sale and confinnation orders dated 11.8.2005 and 12.9.2005. In the above applications, it was inter a/ia asserted, that the reserve price of Rs. I 0 crores was too low. The above company applications were dismissed on 3.3.2009. A challenge raised against the same, was also dismissed G by the High Court at Madras.

38Copy pinpoint38. The applications filed by the Official Liquidator and others were considered collectively (with Company Application Nos. 2740-2742 of 2007) and were rejected by a common order dated 3.3.2009, whereby all the applicants were relegated to their remedy of appeal under the H

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A RDB Act. A challenge raised to the above order dated 3.3.2009, by way ofan intra-court appeal, was allowed by the High Court, on 17.9.2009. It is this order, which is subject matter of challenge before this Court. Stated concisely, the High Court expressed the view, that the proceedings before the Recovery Officer, including the sale of the properties ofDeve Sugars Ltd. on 11.8.2005 and the confirmation thereof on 12.9.2005, B had been conducted in disregard of the order of the Company Court in the High Court at Madras, dated 10.3.2000 (in Company Application Nos. 1251-1253 of 1999). The sale and confirmation of the properties of Deve Sugars Ltd. in favour of Anita International were accordingly set aside. c 39. The principal debate raised before this Court, revolves around the cause and effect of the order dated I0.3.2000, passed by the Company Court in the High Court at Madras. According to learned counsel for the appellants, the above order dated 10.3 .2000 being wholly void and non est could not have any bearing on the proceedings conducted by the D Recovery Officer, including the sale of the properties of Deve Sugars Ltd. on 11.8.2005, and also, the confirmation thereof by the Recovery Officer on 12.9.2005. According to the respondents, who support the impugned order dated 17 .9.2009, the order dated 10.3 .2000 was valid, and had a binding effect. And because, the proceedings conducted by the Recovery Officer were in total disregard of the order dated 10.3.2000, it E was submitted, that the impugned order was well founded.

40Copy pinpoint40. In order to support their claim, it was submitted on behalf of the appellants, that jurisdiction in matters ofrecovery agitated by banks and financial institutions under the ROB Act, has been repeatedly expounded by this Court. The concerned Debts Recovery Tribunals, F before whom recovery proceedings are initiated, have exclusive jurisdiction in the matter. It was also pointed out, .that this Court has clearly declared, that even the jurisdiction ofRecovery Officers, in matters of execution of recovery certificates, was likewise exclusive. It was the pointed contention oflearned counsel for the appellants, that in matters G wherein banks and financial institutions approach a Debts Recovery Tribunal, which on due consideration issues a recovery certificate, the same can be executed only through a Recovery Officer. It was submitted, that a Company Court has no jurisdiction, in the matter. Learned counsel for the appellants, substantiated the above assertion on the basis of the decisions rendered by this Court in the Allahabad Bank 1, the M.V. H

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MAZDOOR SANGH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

Janardhan Reddy:, the Andhra Bank3, the Rajasthan State Financial A Corporation•, and the Official Liquidator, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand5 cases.

41Copy pinpoint41. According to learned counsel for the appellants, it was apparent, that the action of a Recovery Officer in conducting sale proceedings and ordering the confinnation thereof for executing a recovery certificate B fell squarely within his jurisdiction under the RDBAct. And his jurisdiction being exclusive, as declared by this Court could not be interfered with or set aside. It is in the above context, that it was also the pointed assertion of learned counsel representing the appellant, that the order passed by the Company Court in the High Court at Madras dated 10.3 .2000 was without jurisdiction. Learned counsel representing the appellant however c cautioned this Court, not to confuse the power of the Recovery Officer in executing recovery certificates (through sale of the debtor's properties), with the apportionment of the sale proceeds. It was urged, that the concern of the appellant-Anita International, was limited to the sale of the properties ofDeve Sugars Ltd., which it had purchased on 11.8.2005, D which was confinned by the Recovery Officer on 12.9.2005. It was submitted, that the appellant -Anita International has no concern with the distribution of the sale proceeds, and as such, the issue of distribution of the sale proceeds should not fall within the consideration of the present determination. E

42Copy pinpoint42. It is not possible for us to accept the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants. In this behalf, it would be relevant to mention, that in the M.V. Janardhan Reddy case:, the Company Court by an order dated 13.8.1999 required that its pennission should be obtained before the Recovery Officer finalized the sale. Thereafter, the Company Court by an order dated 25.3.2005, directed that sale by the Recovery F Officer, was subject to confirmation by the Company Court. In the above sequence of facts, this Court clearly held, that the condition imposed by the Company Court could not be violated by the Recovery Officer. It was concluded, that the sale made by the Recovery Officer in violation of the orders passed by the Company Court, was without the authority G of law, the same was accordingly set aside. The explanation tendered by learned senior counsel representing the appellants was, that even in the above judgment, this Court had not disturbed the exclusive jurisdiction of a Recovery Officer, in executing the recovery certificate. In our considered view, the above contention is immaterial to the issue under H

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A consideration. The issue under consideration is, whether or not, an order passed by the Company Court (in the present case, the order dated 10.3.2000) was binding on the Recovery Officer? Ana;·whether the proceedings conducted by the Recovery Officer, in violation of the above order, were sustainable in law? We have no hesitation irrconcluding, that fo the M.V. Janardhan ReQs!ycase~, an order passed by the Company B Court was held to be binding on the Recovery Officer. Based on exactly the same consideration, we are of the view, that the acceptance of the .bid of Anita International by the Recovery Officer on 11.8.2005, and the confirmation of the sale in its favour on 12.9.2005, were clearly impermissible, and therefore, deserve to be set aside. c 43. In addition to the above, reference may be made to the judgment · .;; rendered by this Court in the Official Liquidator, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand cases. In paragraph 36 of the above judgment (extracted in paragraph xxx 24 xxx hereinabove), this Court has taken due notice of the ·proposition, with reference to a case where an order, had been D passed by the Company Court. The proposition dealt with was in a situation where, the Company Court had imposed a condition on the ~ecovery Officer, that permission of the Company Court would be obtained, before the Recovery Officer conducted the sale and confirmation of the movable or immovable properties, ofthe debtor. It was held, that the order passed by the Company Court, was binding on the Recovery Officer. E In the above judgment it was concluded, that it was not open to the Recovery Officer to confirm the sale of the properties at his own, and such a sale and confirmation of movable or immovable properties made by the Recovery Officer, without the permission of the Company Court, were liable to be set aside. This Court while recording its above conclusion, also expressed, that the above issue had nothing to do with the proposition, whether an Official Liquidator can approach a Company Court, to seek the setting aside of the auction and the sale conduced by the Recovery Officer. It would be relevant to mention, that the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the appellants, were duly taken into consideration in the Official Liquidator, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand cases. In view of the above, we are of the considered view, that the pointed issue canvassed before us, at the hands of leamed counsel for the appellants, stands answered against the appellant in paragraph 36 ofthe above judgment. We endorse, and are obliged to follow, the view expressed by this Court, as noticed above. Accordingly, we find no merit in the first contention advanced at the hands ofleamed counsel for the appellants.

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MAZDOOR SANGH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

44Copy pinpoint44. Despite our above conclusion, it is imperative for us to notice, that A for recovery of a debt due to a bank or a financial institution, the concerned bank or financial institution, can legitimately initiate proceedings, by filing a winding up petition beforethe jurisdictional Company Court, or alternatively, intervene in a pending winding up petition. Since there is no bar restraining a bank or a financial institution from approaching a Company Court, by filing B a winding up petition, it is not possible to conclude, that the jurisdictional Company Court, is not possessed with the determinative authority/ competence to entertain a claim raised by such bank or financial institution. In view of the above, it is not possible for us to accept, as was suggested on behalf of the appellants, that the order passed by the Company Court in the High Court at Madras dated I0.3.2000, lacked the jurisdictional authority. c Since we have concluded that the Company Court which passed the order dated I0.3.2000 did not lack jurisdiction, we hereby hold, that in the facts of this case, the above order dated 10.3.2000 was neither invalid nor void.

45Copy pinpoint45. We are also of the ~onsidered view, as held by the Court in the Krishnadevi Malehand Kamathia case8, that it is not open either to parties D to a /is or to any third parties, to determine at their own, that an order passed by a Court is valid or void. A party to the /is or a third party, who considers an order passed by a Court as void or 11011 est, must approach a Court of competent jurisdiction, to have the said order set aside, on such grounds as may be available in law. However, till an order passed by a competent Court is set aside, as was also held by this Court in the E Official Liquidator, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand 5 and the Jehal Tanti 9 cases, the same would have the force of law, and any act/action carried out in violation thereof, would be liable to be set aside. We endorse the opinion expressed by this Court in the Jehal Tanti case9 • In the above case, an earlier order of a Court was found to be without jurisdiction after six years. In other words, an order passed by a Court having no jurisdiction, had subsisted for six years. This Court held, that the said order could not have been violated_ while it subsisted. And further, that the violation ofthe order, before it is set aside, is liable to entail punishment, for its disobedience. For us to conclude otherwise, may have disastrous consequences. In the above situation, every cantankerous and quarrelsome litigant would be entitled to canvass, that in his wisdom, the judicial order detrimental to his interests, was void, voidable, or patently erroneous. And based on such plea, to avoid or disregard or even disobey the same. This course can never be permitted. H

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46Copy pinpoint46. To be fair to learned counsel for the appel !ants, it needs to be noticed, that reliance was also placed on behalf of the appellants on the Kiran Singh 10, the Sadashiv Prasad Singh 6, and the Jagmittar Sain Bhagat 1 ~ cases, to contend, that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction was a nullity, and that, its invalidity could not be corrected, even by the consent of the concerned parties. We are of the considered B view, that the proposition debated and concluded in the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the appellants (referred to above) are of no relevance, to the conclusions drawn in the foregoing paragraph. In our determination hereinabove, we have not held, that a void order can be legitimized. What we have concluded in the foregoing paragraph is, that c while an order passed by a Court subsists, the same is liable to be complied with, till it is set aside. ·

47Copy pinpoint47. The submission canvassed at the hands oflearned counsel for the appellants, that the impugned sale dated 11.8.2005, and its confirmation on 12.9.2005, should not be interfered with on the ground of equity, as D the appellant had made the entire payment in 2005, and the Recovery Officer had ordered confirmation of the sale, as no objection had been raised against the same. We find it difficult to persuade ourselves to accept the above contention. In this behalf, one cannot lose sight of the factthat the Official Liquidator, as well as, the workers' union had raised objections before the Recovery Officer at the very initial stage. Even a E former Director ofDeve Sugars Ltd. - N. Ponnusamy raised a challenge to the proceedings before the Recovery Officer by asserting, that the reserve price of Rs. I 0 crores fixed for the property being put to auction, was too low. The fact, that in the process of sale of the properties of Deve Sugars Ltd. only two bids were received, has not been disputed. F It is also not disputed, that whilst one of the bidders was the appellant- Anita International, the other bidder was Synergy Steel Ltd. - a sister company of the appellant. In sum and substance therefore, there was only one bidder. For the above reasons, in addition to those recorded by the High Court (noticed in paragraph xxx 12 xxx, hereinabove), it is not possible for us to accept the claim of the appellant on the ground of G equity. Reliance placed by learned counsel on the judgments rendered by this Court, in support of the instant contention, is also unacceptable, as the factual position in the judgments relied upon, are inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. In view of the above, we find no merit in the contention advanced. H

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MAZOOOR SANGH [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

48Copy pinpoint48. Jt was also submitted on behalf of the appellants, that the sale A co11ducted by the Recovery Officer on I l.8.2005, and the order of confirmation thereof passed by the Recovery Officer on 12.9.2005, ought to have been assailed only in proceedings under Section 30 of the ROB Act. It was submitted, that since an efficacious alternative remedy was available to the parties, which had approached the Company Court in B the High Court at Madras, the interference at the hands of the High Court was neither just nor proper. The instant submission is wholly do::void of substance and deserves to be rejected. We are of the considered view, that there was sufficient justification for the parties to have approached the Company Court in the High Court at Madras, for the reason that they were seeking the enforcement of the order dated c 10.3.2000, passed by the Company Court itself. The sale made by the Recgvery Officer on 11.8.2005, and its confirmation on 12.9.2005, were in utter violation of the order dated I 0.3.2000, and therefore, the concerned parties were justified in approaching the High Court at Madras. In the above view of the matter, we find no merit in the instant contention as well. 0

49Copy pinpoint49. Last of all, we may advert to the contention, that the order dated 10.3.2000 passed by the Company Court in th~ High Court at Madras, while disposing of Company Application Nos. 1251-1253 of 1999, filed by the State Bank of Mysore, was not binding on the appellant. E Insofar as the instant contention is concerned, it was submitted, that the said order passed by the High Court was an order in personam, and as , such, the aforesaid order could not be considered as an order binding on the appellant before this Court. We find no merit in the instant contention, as well. In this beha_lf, it would be relevant to mention, that in the , application filed by the State Bank of Mysore, the prayer made was, that the State Bank of Mysore be permitted, leave to proceed with recovery proceedings before the ORT, Bangalore. By the order dated I 0.3.2000, the Company Court in the High Court at Madras, while granting leave, imposed two conditions. Firstly, the Official Liquidator would have to be impleaded by the bank in the recovery proceedings before the DRT, Bangalore. And secondly, no coercive steps would be taken against the assets of the company during or after the conclusion of the proceedings before the Tribunal. It is not possible for us to accept, that the aforesaid order passed by the High Court was an order in personam. We are of the view, that the above order had a clear and binding effect on the H

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A proceedings permitted to be initiated before the DRT, Bangalore, and further, that it was equally binding on the Recovery Officer. And . accordingly, in our view, the same would also be binding on those claiming through sale proceedings conducted by the Recovery Officer. In the above view of the matter, there can be no doubt, that the order dated I 0.3.2000 was also binding on the appellant before this Court. For the B above reasons, we find no merit even in the last contention advanced by learned counsel for the appellants.

50Copy pinpoint50. For all the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in the instant appeals. The same are accordingly dismissed. While affirming the impugned order passed by the High Court, we confirm the setting c aside of the sale made by the Recovery Officer in favour of the appellant -Anita International on 11.8.2005, and the confirmation thereof by the order of the Recovery Officer dated 12.9.2005. Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals dismissed.