VIDEOCON INTERNATIONAL LTD. v. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA

29. Having concluded, that the remedy of second H

58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 3 S.C.R.

A appeal vested in the respondent has not been preserved, in the same format as it was available to the respondent, at the time of initiation of the lis between the parties; and also having concluded, that the scope of the appellate remedy has been diminished by the amendment, we are satisfied in holding, that amendment to Section 15Z of the SEBI Act adversely affected the respondent, of a vested substantive appellate right, as was available to the respondent, at the commencement of the lis or dispute between the rival parties. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusion, based on the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, as also, by the learned counsel for the respondent, it is inevitable to conclude, that the appellate remedy available to the respondent prior to the amendment of Section 15Z of the SEBI Act, must 0 continue to be available to the respondent, despite the amendment. We accordingly hold, that all the appeals preferred by the Board, befpre the High Court, were maintainable in law.

30. Having recorded our conclusion, as has been noticed in the foregoing paragraph, it is apparent, that insofar as the vesting of the second appellate remedy is concerned, neither the date of filing of the second appeal, nor the date of hearing thereof, is of any relevance. Legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal, are steps in a singular proceeding. All these steps are deemingly connected by an intrinsic unity, which are treated as one singular proceeding. Therefore, the relevant date when the appellate remedy (including the second appellate remedy) becomes vested in the parties to the lis, is the date when the dispute/lis is initiated. Insofar as the present controversy is concerned, it is not a matter of dispute, that the Securities Appellate Tribunal had passed the impugned order (which was assailed by the Board), well before

VIDEOtON INTERNATIONAL LTD. v. SEBI 59

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)

29.10.2002. This singular fact itself, would lead to the conclusion, that the lis between the parties, out of which the second appellate remedy was availed of by the Board before the High Court, came to be initiated well before the amendment to Section 15Z by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Amendment) Act, 2002. Undisputedly, the unamended Section 15Z of the SEBI Act, constituted the appellate package and the forum of appeal, for the part_ies herein. It is, therefore, not possible for us to accept, the contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant, premised on the date of filing or hearing c of the appeal, preferred by the Board, before the High Court. We accordingly re!terate the position expressed above, that all the appeals preferred by the Board, before the High Court, were maintainable in law. D

31. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, that in the absence of a saving clause, the periding proceedings (and the jurisdiction of the High Court), cannot be deemed to have been saved. It is not possible for us to accept the instant contention. In the judgment rendered by this Court in Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Limited case (supra), it was held, that the general principle was, that a law which brought about a change in the forum, would not affect pending actions, unless the intention to the contrary was clearly shown. Since the amending provision herein, does not so envisage, it has to be concluded,. that the pending appeals (before the amendment of Section 15Z) would not be affected in any manner. Accordingly, for the same reasons as have been expressed in the above judgment (relevant extracts whereof have been reproduced above), we are of the view, that the instant contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant is wholly misconceived. Furthermore, the instant contention is wholly unacceptable H

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A in view of the mandate contained in Section 6(c) and (e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. While interpreting the aforesaid provisions this Court has held, that the. amendment of a statute, which is not retrospective in operation, does not affect pending proceedings, except where the amending provision expressly or by necessary intendment provides otherwise. Pending proceedings are to continue as if the unamended provision is still in force. This Court has clearly concluded, that when a lis commences, all rights and obligations of the parties get crystallized on that date, and the mandate of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, simply ensures, that pending proceedings under the unamended provision remain unaffected. Herein also, therefore, our conclusion is the same as has already been rendered by us, in the foregoing paragraphs. 0

32. Having conclude;d in the manner expressed in the foregoing paragraphs, it is not necessary for us to examine the main contention, advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant, namely, that the amendment to E Section 15Z of the SEBI Act, contemplates a mere change of forum of the second appellate remedy. Despite the aforesaid, we consider it just and appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, to delve on the F above subject as well. In dealing with the submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant, on the subject of forum, we will fictionally presume, that the amendment to Section 15Z by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Amendment) Act, G ,2002 had no effect on the second appellate remedy made available to the parties, an.d further that, the above amendment merely alters the forum of the second appeal, from the High Court (under the unamended provision), to the Supreme Court (consequent upon the amendment). On H ·the above assumption, learned counsel for the appellant

VIDEOCON INTERNATIONAL LTD. v. SEBI 61

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

had placed reliance on, the decisions rendered by this Court A in Maria Cristina De Souza Sodder, Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd. cases (supra) to contend, that the law relating to forum being procedural in nature, an amendment which altered the forum, would apply retrospectively. Whilst the correctness of the aforesaid B contention cannot be doubted, it is essential to clarify, that the same is not an absolute rule. In this behalf, reference may be made to the judgments r12lied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, and more importantly to the judgment rendered in Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa C case (supra), wherein it has been explained, that an amendment of forum would not necessarily be an issue of procedure. It was concluded in the above judgment, that where the question is of change of forum, it ceased to be D a question of procedure, and becomes substantive and vested, if proceedings stand initiated before the earlier prescribed forum· (prior to the amendment having taken effect). This Court qlearly declared in the above judgment, that if the appellate remedy had been availed of (before the forum expressed in the unamended provision) before the amendment, the same would constitute a vested right. However, if the same has not been availed of, and the forum of the appellate remedy is altered by an amendment, the change in the forum, would constitute a procedural amendment, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. Consequently even in the facts and circumstances of the present case, all such appeals as had been filed by the Board, prior to 29.10.2002, would have to be accepted as vested, and must be adjudicated accordingly.

33. The conclusion recorded by us in the foregoing paragraph emerges even from the mandate contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The legal H

62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 3 S.C.R.

A contours emerging out of Section 6 aforementioned, have already been recorded by us, and need not be repeated.

34. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find n·o · merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. B It is, however, necessary for us to record,· that the impugned a order was passed with reference to number of appeals, which were preferred by the Board, as against a common order passed by the Securities Appellate Tribunal. In the . impugned order, some of the appeals preferred by the C Board were held as maintainable before the High Court, whilst a different view was expressed with reference to the appeals preferred by the Board after 29.10.2002. We have concluded, that all appeals preferred by the respondent herein, before the High Court, were maintainable. In D exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct, that the instant order passed by us would govern all cases which were disposed of by the High Court through the impugned order dated 13.10.2003. E

35. Disposed of accordingly.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal disposed of.