SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. SIDDHA MATH & ORS.

A It is only the first part of the proviso which is in contravention of the Temple Act, 1955. lfthat part of the proviso continues to be given effect, Sections 5 and 30 of the Temple Act, 1955, by which the estates of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri are vested in the Temple Committee will lose their meaning. By striking B down Section 2(oo) proviso to that extent, both the provisions will be able to operate.

In Commercial Tax Officer v. Binani Cements Ltd. 16

this Court held as under: c "It is well established that when a general law and a special law dealing with some aspect dealt with by the general law are in question, the rule adopted and applied is one of harmonious construction whereby the D general law. to the extent dealt with by the special law. is impliedly repealed. This principle finds its origins in the latin maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant, i.e., general law yields to special law should they operate in the same field on same subject." E (emphasis laid by this Court)

In J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. 17, a three judge bench of this Court held as under: F "9 ....We reach the same result by applying another well known rule of construction that general provisions yield to special provisions. The learned Attorney-General seemed to suggest that while this rule of construction is G applicable to resolve the conflict between the general provision in one Act and the special provision in another Act, the rule cannot apply in resolving a conflict between general and special provisions in the same legislative " (2014 J a sec 31.9 H 17 (1961) 3 SCR 185

SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 91 SI DOHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

instrument. This suggestion does not find support in either principle or authority. The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and Judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier direction should have effect. In Pretty v. Solly (quoted in Craies on Statute Law C at p.m. 206, 5tti Edn.) Romilly, M.R., mentioned the rule thus: The rule is. that whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute and the latter. taken in its most comprehensive sense. would o overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply. The rule has been applied as between different E provisions of the same statute in numerous cases some of which only need be mentioned: De Winton v. Brecon, Churchill v. Crease, United States v. Chase and Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co. F

10. Applying this rule of construction that in cases of conflict between a specific provision and a general provision the specific provision prevails over the general provision and the general provision applies only to such cases which are not covered by the special provision, G we must hold that Clause 5(a) has no application in a case where the special provisions of Clause 23 are applicable."

(emphasis laid by this Court) H

92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2015) 15 S.C.R.

A It becomes clear from a perusal of the above mentioned two judgments of this Court that while provisions of different statutes must be harmoniously constructed as far as possible, in cases where it is not possible, the Court needs to examine as to which provision must be given effect to. B

24. In the case in hand, the first part of the proviso of Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 cannot be allowed to sustain. Clearly, the intention of the legislature could not have· been to render virtually the entire Temple Act, enacted on the C specific subject, meaningless, by way of enacting a proviso to Section 2(oo)ofthe OEAAct, 1951 as an amendment in 1974, which is the general legislation in the instant case. Section 2(oo)of the OEAAct, 1951, thus, to that extent requires to be struck down so that both the OEA Act, 1951 as well as the D Temple Act, 1955 can be given due effect in their respective field of operation. In exercise of the powers conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court can pass any order as may be "necessary for doing complete justice" in a case before it. In the instant case, great injustice will be caused to the appellant Temple ifthe rights conferred upon it by the Temple Act are allowed to be taken away by operation of the proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEAAct. Therefore, we have to strike down the proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEAAct and also quash the notification dated 18.03.1974 in so far as it relates to the property of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri.

25. Further, it is a settled principle of law that once a property is vested by an Act of legislature, to achieve the laudable object, the same cannot be divested by the enactment of any subsequent general law and vest such property under such law. Similarly, if in the instant case, we were to accept the contentions advanced by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Math, then Sections 5 and 33 of the Temple Act, 1955 will be rendered useless and nugatory

SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 93 SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

and thereby the laudable object and intendment of the Temple A Act will be defeated and the interest of the public at large will be affected. Thus, the notification dated 18.03.1974 issued by the State Government under Section 3-A of the OEAAct, 1951, whereby the estate of Lord Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, · Puri vested in the State Government (in terms of Point (ii) of B the notification), is liable to be quashed to that extent. As a consequence, the order dated 30.09.1981 passed by the OEA Tahsildar, who falls within the inclusive definition of Collector in terms of Section 2 (d) of the OEAAct, 1951, settling the . land in favour of the Mahantas of various Maths as Marfatdars C of the Shri Jagannath Mohaprabhu Bije, Puri is in violation of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955 and is thus, liable to be set aside.

Answer to Point No. 2 D

26. We will now examine whether even according to the provisions of the OEAAct, 1951, the respondent Math had the right to file an application for settlement of the suit lands in terms of Sections 6 and 7 of the OEA Act, 1951 . There are E certain provisions of the OEA Act, 1951 which need to be appreciated at this stage.

Section 2(hh) of the OEA Act, 1951 defines an intermediary interest as follows: F "'Intermediary interest' means an estate or any rights or interest therein held or owned by or vested in an Intermediary and any reference to 'estate' in this Act shall be construed as including a reference to 'Intermediary Interest' also" G

Section 8-A provides for filing of claims under Section 6,7 and 8 of the OEAAct, 1951 which reads as under: · "8-A. Filing of claims under Section 6, 7 and 8 and dispute relating thereto-(1) The Intermediary shall file H

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A his claim in the prescribed manners for settlement of fair and equitable rent in respect of lands and building which are deemed to be settled with him under Section 6 or Section 7 before the Collector within 6 (six) months from the date of vesting." B

27. Mr. M .L. Varma, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Math contends that Section 2(oo)of the OEAAct, 1951 was amended in the year 1974, in terms of which all estates belonging to the temple of Lord Jagannath c were deemed to be trust estates. Thus, the same vested in the State Government after notification of 18.03.1974. Thus, the provisions of Section 8A of the OEAAct, 1951 come into play, and accordingly an intermediary had the right to file its claim before the Collector within six months. The learned senior D counsel contends that the lands of the respondent Math were recorded in the Record of Rights, and the Tahsildar issued an inquiry report which stated that the said respondents were in possession of the lands. The lands were accordingly settled in favour of the respondent Math vide order dated 30.09.1981. E The learned senior counsel further contends that the application filed by the appellant Temple Committee under Section 8-A, in which an order dated 30.11.1992 settling the lands in their favour was passed was liable to be set aside, as the respondent Math herein was not a party to the same. It is further contended that the order was liable to be set aside, as the lands already settled by way of order dated 12.01.1982 in favour of the respondent Math, could not be re-settled as the same were not available for the Collector to do so in view of the earlier order, referred to supra.

28. Mr. Shibasis Mishra, the learned counsel appearing oh behalf of the State of Odisha, the appellant in Civil Appeal No.142 of 2010 contends that after the decision of this Court in the case of Lord Jagannath referred to supra, the State H

SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITIEE v. 95 SIDDHAMATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

Government vide notifications dated 18.04.1989 and A 20.11.1990, extended the time period for filing of claims in respect of estates of Lord Jagannath. On 20.11.1990, the Temple Committee lodged its claim recording the estates of Lord Jagannath in favour of Shri Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Puri, Marfat through Shri Jagannath Temple Managing B Committee by filing Claim Case No. 68 of 1990. On. · 30.11.1992, the order was passed by the OEA Collector recording the properties in favour of the Temple Committee.

29. We cannot accept the contentions advanced by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Math. The Form 'H' sabmitted in terms of the OEAAct, 1951 in Claim Case No. 58 of 1975 reveals that while Column 9 "{Whether with respect to the lands in possession of the applicant or his temporary lessee or mortagagee on the date of vesting]" is marked as 'Self Possession', and Column 11 "{If in the possession of a temporary lessee or mortgagee give full details of the lessee or mortgagee ......]" has been left blank. Therefore, the claim of the respondent Math and the basis of its claim is not stated in the claim petition. In the absence of the same, its claim as intermediary to prefer claim under Sections 5, 6, 7, 8 of the OEA Act, 1951 before the Tahsildar is wholly untenable in law. Further, the order dated 12.01.1982, passed in. OEA Claim Case No. 58 of 1975 filed by the respondent Math to settle the lands in their favour has been passed by the Tahsildar, Puri. Section 8-A of the Act clearly provides that the claims have to be filed before the Collector. Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Tahsildar contends that the definition of Collector in the OEAAct, 1951 is an inclusive one, and therefore he had the authority to determine the rights of the respondent. We cannot agree with this legal contention advanced by the learned senior counsel. The proceedings under Section 8-A, OEAAct, 1951 are quasi judicial in nature. H

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' A The Orissa High Court in the case of Bharat Bihari Mishra v. State of Orissa 18, has held as under:

"All the above provisions of the Act and the Rules go to indicate that the proceeding under Section 8-A(1) is quasi judicial in nature. The procedure for conduct of the proceeding has been provided in the Act and the different Rules as noted above."

30. It is well settled in law that a quasi judicial function cannot be delegated and therefore, the inclusive reading of the definition of Collector under Section 2(d) of the OEAAct, 1951 to also include Tahsildar can be applied only as far as it pertains to the discharge of administrative powers of the Collector. In reference to the role of the Tahsildar under the D OEAAct, 1951, this Court has held that the Tahsildar performs an administrative function and not a quasi judicial one. In the case of Basanti Kumar Sahu v. State of Orissa 19 a three judge bench of this Court has held as under:

"If it had been an order made on the quasi-judicial side, the High Court would have held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction under Section 38-B and there would have been no occas'ion to interfere with the order. The High Court justified the Board's order to the extent it annulled the Tahsildar's order dated 17-12-1977 but interfered with it solely on the ground that the Board. had no jurisdiction since the Tahsildar's order was not a quasi- judicial order. In other words, according to the High Court, the Tahsildar's orderwas an administrative order. If that be so; one fails to understand why the matter should be remitted to the Tahsildar once again to take an administrative decision? The order of the High Court is, therefore, unsustainable." 18 2012 (II) OLR 968 H 1 • (1998) 8 sec 722

SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 97 SIDDHAMATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

31. Since the Tahsildar performs only an administrative function under the OEA Act, 1951 and not a quasi judicial function, thus, he was not competent to pass the order of settlement of claim either under Section 6 or 7 or 8 of the OEA Act, 1951. For the reasons stated in answer to Point No.1 above, vesting of the suit lands in favour of the Math is bad in law. Further, as we have already held supra that once the land already vested in the Temple Committee under Sections 5 and 33 of the Temple Act, 1955 which is a special enactment to deal with the properties endowed to the appellant Temple Committee, the same could not have been divested by applying the provisions of the OEAAct, 1951 by way of an amendment to the Act by insertion of Sections 2(oo) and 3A in the OEA Act, 1951, as the operation of the said Act and the Temple Act, 1955 are in different fields and the objects and intendment 0 of the abovementioned two Acts are entirely different. A constitution bench of this Court in the case of Calcutta Gas Company Ltd. v. State of West Benga/20 held that in case of a conflict or overlap between different entries, the rufe of harmonious construction must be applied to give effect to all the entries. This Court held as under:

"8 ....... Before construing the said entries is would be useful to notice some of the well settled rules of interpretation laid down by the Federal Court and this Court in the matter of constructing the entries. The power to legislate is given to the appropriate Legislatures by · Article 246 of the Constitution. The entries in the three Lists are only legislative heads or fields of legislation; they demarcate the area over which the appropriate G Legislatures can operate. It is also well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries. But some of the entries in the different List or in the same List may overlap and sometimes may · 20 AIR 1962 SC 1044 H

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A also appear to be in direct conflict with each other. It is then the duty of this Court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between them. When the question arose about reconciling entry 45 of List I, duties of excise, and entry 18 of List II, taxes on the sale of goods, of B Government of India Act, 1935, Gwyer, C.J., in In re The Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938, observed:

"A grant of the power in general terms, standing by C itself, would no doubt be construed in the wider sense; but it may be qualified by other express provisions in the same enactment, by the implication of the context, and even by considerations arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the Act." D The learned Chief Justice proceeded to state :

"....... :... an endeavour must be made to solve it, as the Judicial Committee have said by having recourse to the context and scheme of the Act, and a reconciliation E attempted between two apparently conflicting jurisdictions by reading the two entries together and by interpreting, and, where necessary, modifying the language of the one by that of the other. ff indeed such F a reconciliation should prove impossible, then, and only then, will the non-obstante clause operate and the federal power prevail."

The Federal Court in that case held that the entry "taxes on the sale of goods" was not covered by the entry G "duties of excise" and in coming to that conclusion, the learned Chief Justice observed :

"Here are two separate enactments, each in one aspect conferring the power to impose a tax upon H

SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 99 SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

goods; and it would accord with sound principles of construction to take the more general power, that which extends to the whole of India, as subject to an exception created by the particular power, that which extends to the provinced only. It is not perhaps strictly accurate to speak of the provincial power as being excepted out of the federal power, for the two are independent of one another and exist side by side. But the underlying principle in the two cases must be the same, that a general power ought not to be so construed as to make a nullity of a particular power conferred by the same Act and operating in the same field,when by reading the former in a more restricted sense effect can be given to the latter in its ordinary and natural meaning." D The rule of construction adopted by that decision for the purpose of harmonizing the two apparently conflicting entries in the two Lists would equally apply to an apparent conflict between two entries in the same List. Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was, held in State of E Bqmbay v. Narothamdas Jethabai, that the words "administration of justice" and "constitution and organization of all courts" in item one of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, F must be understood in a restricted sense excluding from their scope "jurisdiction and powers of courts" specifically dealt with in item 2 of List II. In the words of the learned Judge, if such a construction.was not given "the wider construction of entry 1 would deprive entry 2 G of all its content and reduce it to useless lumber." This rule of construction has not been dissented from in any of the subsequent decisions of this Court. It may, therefore. be taken as a well settled rule of construction that every attempt should be made to harmonize the H

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A apparently conflicting entries not only of different Lists but also of the same List and to reject that construction which will rob one of the entries of its entire content and make it nugatory."

B (emphasis laid by this Court)

In the light of the reasons assigned by us in answer to Point No.1 and held in favour of the Temple, there was no need for the Temple Committee to file claim proceedings under Section C 8-A of the OEAAct, 1951, in respect of its own lands which were already vested in it under Section 5 of the Temple Act,

1955. The suit lands vest in the Temple Committee itself. Thus, in view of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, the settlement of the suit lands in favour of the respondent Math cannot be sustained, as it is bad in law.

Answer to Point No. 3

32. In view ofthe findings and reasons recorded on Point Nos.1 and 2 in favour of the appellant Temple Committee, the impugned judgment and order dated 07.07.2009 passed in Original Jurisdiction Case No. 2421 of 2000 by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack is liable to be set aside and accordingly, we set aside the same.

33. Since we have categorically recorded the finding both on facts and in law while answering Point No. 1 in favour of the appellant Temple Committee holding that the provisions of the OEAAct, 1951 have no application to the lands of the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri, there is no need for us to pass an G order in favour of the Temple under the OEAAct, 1951 as the suit lands were already vested in favour of the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri by virtue of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955.

SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 101 SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

34. For the foregoing reasons, we pass the following order:-

i) C.A. Nos.7729 of 2009, 7730 of 2009, 142 of 2010, 221 of 2010, 2981 of 2010, 3414 of 2010,3415 of 2010 and 3446 of 2010 are allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 07 .07 .2009 passed in Original Jurisdiction Case No. 2421 of 2000 by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack is hereby set aside. ii) We strike down the first part of the proviso of Section 2(oo) of the OEAAct, 1951, which pertains to the c properties of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri. iii) The notification dated 18.03.1974 issued by the State Government under Section 3Aofthe OEAAct, 1951 in so far as point No. (ii) is concerned, is also quashed by this Court, to the extent, it applies to the lands and estate of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri. iv) We make it very clear that the striking down of the first part of the proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEAAct, 1951 as mentioned above and quashing of the notification referred to supra will be prospective and this judgment shall not be applicable to the settled claim of the claimants hitherto under the provisions of the OEAAct of 1951 in so far as the lands of the Lord F Jagannath Temple at Puri are concerned. v) In view of the disposal of appeals above-mentioned in favour of the Temple Managing Committee, C.A. Nos. @SLP (C) Nos. 9167-9168 of 2010 (filed by Sri Raghab Das Math) and C.A. No. 9627 of 2010 (filed G by Bauli Matha) are hereby dismissed.

v.i) No costs are awarded in these proceedings.

Nidhi Jain Appeals disposed of. H