DR. SUHAS H. POPHALE v. ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ITS ESTATE OFFICER
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LTD. AND ITS ESTATE OFFICER [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
control of rent, (ii) repairs of certain premises, (iii) eviction, (iv) A encouraging the construction of new houses by assuring fair return of investment by the landlord, and (v) matters connected with the purposes mentioned above. In that matter, the Court was concerned with the issue of fixation of standard rent and restoration and maintenance of essential supplies and services B by the landlord. It was held that these two subjects were not covered under the Public Premises Act, and intact were covered under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. Operative para 99(c) of the judgment therefore specifically held as follows:- c "99 (c) The provisions of the Maharashtra Rent control Act, 1999 shall govern the relationship between the public undertakings and their occupants to the extent this Act covers the other aspects of the relationship between the landlord and tenants, not covered under the D Public Premises Act, 1971."
4747. A judgment of a bench of three Judges of this Court in Mis Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. L. I. C reported in (1980) 4 sec 435 was relied upon by Mr. Raval. In this matter E also a plea was raised on behalf of the appellant tenant for 1 being covered under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 which came to be repelled. Mr. Raval stressed upon the observations in Para 5 of the judgment to the effect that Section 2(g) merely requires occupation of any public premises to initiate the action. F Mr. Nariman on the other hand pointed out that in the earlier part of the very paragraph the Court had observed, although after referring to the provision of Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery), Act 1959 that if the entry into possession had taken place prior to the passing of the act, G then obviously the occupant would not be an unauthorized occupant. That apart, Mr. Nariman submitted that the judgment was essentially on the second part of Section 2(g) defining . 'unauthorised occupation'. It is, however, material to note that in that case the premises were owned by LIC from 19.7.1958, H
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A i.e. prior to the Delhi Rent Control Act becoming applicable from 9.2.1959. Besides, the issue of protection under a welfare legislation being available to the tenant prior to the premises becoming public premises, and the issue of retrospectivity was not under consideration before the Court. The observations of B the Court in that matter will have to be understood in that context.
4848. As far as the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises is concerned, undoubtedly it is covered under the Public Premises Act, but it is so covered from 16.9.1958, C or from the later date when the concerned premises become public premises by virtue of the concerned premises vesting into a Government company or a corporation like LIC or the Nationalised Banks or the General Insurance Companies like the respondent no.1. Thus there are two categories of occupants of these public corporations who get excluded from the coverage of the Act itself. Firstly, those who. are in occupation since prior to 16.9.1958, i.e. prior to the Act becoming applicable, are clearly outside the coverage of the Act. Secondly, those who come in occupation, thereafter, but prior to the date of the concerned premises belonging to a Government Corporation or a Company, and are covered under a protective provision of the State Rent Act, like the appellant herein, also get excluded. Until such date, the Bombay Rent Act and its successor Maharashtra Rent Control F Act will continue to govern the relationship between the occupants of such premises on the one hand, and such. government companies and corporations on the other. Hence, with respect to such occupants it will not be open to such companies or corporations to issue notices, and to proceed against such occupants under the Public Premises Act, and such proceedings will be void and illegal. Similarly, it v:ill be open for such occupants of these premises to seek declaration of their status, and other rights such as transmission of the tenancy to the legal heirs etc. under the Bombay Rent Act or its successor Maharashtra Rent Control Act, and also to seek
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LTD. AND ITS ESTATE OFFICER [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
protective reliefs in the nature of injunctions against unjustified A actions or orders of eviction if so passed, by approaching the forum provided under the State Act which alone will have the jurisdiction to entertain such proceedings.
4949. Learned senior counsel for the respondents Mr. Raval B submitted that the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing had clarified the legal position with respect to the relationship between the Public Premises Act and the Rent Control Act. However, as noted above, the issue concerning retrospective application of the Public Premises Act C was not placed for the consideration of the Court, and naturally it has not beEm gone into it. It was submitted by Mr. Raval that for maintenance of judicial discipline this bench ought to refer the issue involved in the present matter to a bench of three Judges, and thereafter that bench should refer it to a bench of five Judges. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Pradip Chandra Parija Vs. Pramod Chandra reported in 2002 (1) SCC 1 in this behalf. He also referred to a judgment of this Court in Sundarjas Kanya/a/ Bhatija Vs. Collector, Thane, Maharashtra and Ors. reported in 1989 (3) SCC 396 and particularly paragraph 18 thereof for that purpose. What is however, material to note is that this paragraph also permits discretion to be exercised when there is no declared position in law. The Bombay Rent Act exempted from its application only the premises belonging to the government or a local authority. The premises belonging to the Government F Companies or Statutory Corporations were however covered under the Bombay Rent Act. This position was altered from 16.9.1958 when the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupation) Act, 1958 came in force which applied thereafter to the Government Companies and Statutory Corporations, and G that position has been reiterated under the Public Premises Act of 1971 which replaced the 1958 Act. Under these Acts of 1958 and 1971, the Premises belonging to the Government Companies or Statutory Corporations are declared to be Public Premises. Thus, the Parliament took away these premises from H
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A the coverage of the Bombay Rent Act under Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India. This was, however, in the matter of the subjects covered under the Public Premises Act, viz. eviction of unauthorised occupan'ts and recovery of arrears of rent etc. as stated above. Thereafter, if the State Legislature wanted to B cover these subjects viz. a viz. the premises of the Government Companies and Public Corporations under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, it had to specifically state that notwithstanding anything in the Public Premises Act of 1971, the Government Companies and Public Corporations would be c covered under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. If that was so done, and if the President was to give assent to such a legislation, then the Government Companies and Public Corporation would have continued to be covered under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 in view of the provision of - Article 254(2). That has not happened. Thus, the Government 0 Companies and Public Corporations are taken out of the coverage of the Bombay Rent Act, and they are covered under Public Premises Act, 1971, though from the date specified therein i.e. 16.9.1958. After that date, the Government E Companies and Public Corporations will be entitled to claim the application of the Public Premises Act, 1971 (and not of the Bombay Rent Act or its successor Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999), but from the date on which premises belong to these companies or corporations and with respect to the subjects specified under the Public Premises Act. In that also the public companies and corporations ar€ expected to follow the earlier mentioned guidelines.
5050. We have not for a moment taken any position different from the propositions in Ashoka Marketing. We are infact in agreement therewith, and we are not accepting the submission of Mr. Nariman, that only contractual tenancies were sought to be covered under that judgment, and not statutory tenancies. Tenancies of both kinds will be covered by that judgment, and they will be covered under the Public Premises Act for the subjects specified therein. The only issue is with effect from
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LTD. AND ITS ESTATE OFFICER [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
which date. That aspect was not canvassed at all before the A Constitution Bench, and that is the only aspect which is being clarified by this judgment. We are only clarifying that the application of the Public Premises Act will be only from 16.9.1958, or from such later date when concerned premises become Public Premises on the concerned landlord becoming B a Government Company or Public Corporation. When the law laid down by the different Benches of this Court including by the Constitution Benches on retrospectivity is so clear, and so are the provisions of the Public Premises Act, there is no _occasion for this Court to take any other view. When this c judgment is only clarifying and advancing the proposition laid . down in Ashoka Marketing, there is no reason for us to accept the objections raised by Mr. Raval, that the issues raised in this matter should not be decided by this bench but ought to be referred to a larger bench. D
5151. In this context we may note that since the issue of retrospective application of the Public Premises Act, to tenancies entered into before 16.9.1958, or before the property in question becoming a public premises, was neither · canvassed nor considered by the bench in Ashoka Marketing E (supra), the decision doe§not, in any way, prevent this Bench from clarifying. the law· regarding the same. This follows from the judgment of the Supreme Court. in State of Haryana Vs. Ranbir @ Rana reported in (2006) 5 SCC 167 wherein it was held that a decision, it is well-settled, is an authority for what it F decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. The following observations of this court from paragraph 39 of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Mis. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. reported in AIR1993 SC 43 are also pertinent: G "The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court. A decision of this Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and H
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A while applying the decision to a later case, the coutts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of this Coult and not to pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced from the context of the questions under consideration by this Court, to i B support their reasonings.
(emphasis supplied)
It is clear from a reading of the very first paragraph of Ashoka Marketing that the question before it was 'whether the provisions of the Public Premises Act would ove~ride the provisions of the Rent Control Act in relation to premises which fall within the ambit of both the enactments.' The Court answered this in the affirmative, and we respectfully agree with the same. However, Ashoka Marketing (supra) can not be said to be an authority on the retrospective application of the Public Premises Act, or where the premises fall within the ambit of only one act, as that issue was not before the Court.
5252. For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal and set-aside the impugned judgment and order dated E 7.6.2010 rendered by the High Court of Bombay in Writ Petition No. 2473 of 1996. The said Writ Petition shall stand allowed, and the judgment and order dated 17 .1.1996 passed by the City Civil Court, Mumbai, as well as the eviction order dated -28.5.1993 passed by the respondent No. 2 against the appellant will stand set aside. The proceedings for eviction from premises, and for recovery of rent and damages initiated by the first respondent against the appellant under the Public Premises Act, 1971, are held to be bad in law, and shall therefore stand dismissed. We however, make it clear, that in case the respondents intend to take any steps for that purpose, it will be open to them to resort to the remedy available under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, provided they make out a case therefor. The parties will bear their own costs.
H R.P. Appeal allowed.
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