MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS.

514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A Vedic learning and practices, including Darshan, Agam Tantra, ltihas, Puranas and Upvedas. 'Darshan' means a proper reading of one's own self and the environment. Agam Tantra is oriental research, which includes history and geography. ltihas, Puranas as the very words suggest, relates to history. Upvedas are part of Vedas. The section as it originally stood 8 stated that the University can provide education in all branches of Vedic learning and practices, which also mentioned Gyan- Vigyan, as well as promotion and development of the study of Sanskrit as the University may from time to time determine. It C also mentioned that the University can make provision for ,__ research and for the advancement and dissemination of knowledge.

71Copy pinpoint71. According to Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, the learned senior counsel for the appellant, the words "and" preceding the D expression "Gyan-Vigyan", "the promotion and development of study of Sanskrit", "as well as for the advancement and dissemination of knowledge", have to be read disjunctively and not conjunctively with the first part of the provision viz., "providing for instruction in all branches of Vedic learning". E

72Copy pinpoint72. As against the above submission, Ms. Makhija the learned counsel for the State would contend that having regard to the manner in which the provision has been couched, it will have to be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. A..,

73Copy pinpoint73. Both the learned counsel referred to the Preamble in support of their submissions. When we refer to the Preamble of the 1995 Act, we find that it has been stated that "an Act to establish and incorporate a University in the State of Madhya Pradesh and to provide for education and prosecution of G research in Vedic learnings and practices and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto." Here again, while Mr.Nageshwar Rao the learned senior counsel would contend that the expression "and" used clearly distinguish each set of expression, according to the learned counsel for the State, H the same will have to be read conjunctively.

MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 515 STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.] - y A

74Copy pinpoint74. Having considered the various submissions and the analysis made based on detailed circumstances leading to the intricacies of Vedas, the field it covers, as noted by the Division Bench, as well as the concept of education, which has been explained by very many learned and prominent persons to whom we have made detailed references to in the earlier part B of our judgment, we are of the considered view that education is the base for every other subject to be taught in the process of learning. Therefore, establishment of the University as the Preamble goes to state was to provide for education in the forefront. It will be appropriate to hold that such a provision for c education in so far as the appellant University was concerned, should concentrate and focus in the prosecution of research in Vedic learning and practices and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. While holding so, it will have to be stated in uncontroverted terms that merely because such specific reference was made to prosecution of research in Vedic learnings, it could be held that the imparting of education in the appellant University should be restricted to the said subject alone and not in any other subject.

75Copy pinpoint75. In our considered view, such a narrow interpretation would be doing violence to the very basic concept of education, and would create a serious restrain on the University, where, ~A imparting of education is the primary objective and dealing with any specific subject may be for enabling any one to acquire special knowledge on such subjects. In other words, any such restrictive interpretation would go against the basic tenets of the concept of education, which no Court can venture to state.

76Copy pinpoint76. In this context, we must state that if such a narrow ' ~ interpretation is sought to be placed, it would even create an embargo in the prosecution of research in Vedic learning and practices. In this context, as has been widely considered and referred to by the Division Bench, which we have also noted, in a precise form in the earlier part of the judgment, we find that Vedas has not left any subject untouched. The Division Bench H

516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 13 S.C.R.

A has noted in paragraphs 20 and 30 the various fields, which ~ -. have been dealt with and associated in Vedas. The Division Bench has gone to the extent of saying that some scientists have seen the atomic dance in the deity of 'Natraj'. It has also been noted that mathematic formulae are much more concise B and precise in Vedas. It is said that Vedic learning is concerned with human anatomy and physiology. It was further found that there were enough materials in Vedas, which pertains to seed production, crop production, sericulture, health care, management, beauty culture, marketing and accounting. In fact, c according to the Maharshi, who was the man behind the establishment of the appellant University, in order to develop the limitless inner potential of students and teachers, the only solution is education and to achieve that end, according to him, ancient Vedic sciences have to be revived and the knowledge for systematic unfolding the range of human consciousness. In . 0 fact, this knowledge was stated to be Maharshi technology of the unified field, which included Transcendental Meditation and Transcendental Meditation Siddhi Programmes. It is also stated that Transcendental Meditation is learnt by more than three million people worldwide and implemented in public and private educational institutions in more than 20 countries through Universities, colleges, schools and educational institutions. Therefore, considering the very purport and intent of the Maharshi, who relentlessly fought for the establishment of the appellant University for nearly four decades and ultimately achieved the said objective for establishing the University, it can never be held that his sole purport was only to spread vedic learning and nothing else ..Therefore, in that view when we examine the respective submissions of the learned counsel we find force in the submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellant when he contended that by virtue of the amendment, the un-amended Section 4(1) will become meaningless and that the very purport of establishing the appellant University would become a futile exercise, if it were to restrict its courses only to mere Vedic learning, without providing scope for learning all other incidental and ancillary

llAAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VlSHWAVIDYALAYA v. 517 STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.] subjects dealt with by Vedas viz., all other worldly subjects such as, Project Management, Finance Management, Crop Management, Human Resource Management, mathematics and other sciences for which fundamental basic provisions have been prescribed in Vedas and practices including, Darshan, Agam Tantra, ltihas, Puranas and Upvedas. B

77Copy pinpoint77. It will have to be stated that the expression Gyan- Vigyan was specifically mentioned in Section 4(1), not merely to make a scientific study of what is contained in Vedas, as even such a study may not fulfill the purpose for which the University was created. When we think aloud as to what would happen if a scientific study exclusively about Vedas is made, we wonder whether for that purpose a creation of a University would have been necessitated. On the other hand, it is the other way around, in as much as Vedas contains very many scientific subjects such as, mathematics, study about atoms, human anatomy and physiology and other formulae. At this juncture, the inclusion of the expression "Gyan-Vigyan", will have to be understood to have been inserted with a view to study modern science and technology as it exists and study the same in consonance with the basic principles contained in Vedas and puranas. In fact, such an approach, while reading the provisions in our considered opinion, would be the proper way of reading the said provisions and not as contended by the learned counsel for the State that the study of Gyan-Vigyan should be exclusively for the purpose of understanding Vedas and Vedic F principles. We have earlier explained what is "Gyan Vigyan" by making reference to an Article "From Newton to Nirvana: Science, Vigyan and Gyan" by Dr.Subash Sharma, Dean of . ;, Indian Business Academy, Noida. Based on the said Article, we have noted that Gyan Vigyan is nothing but a systematic G study of science through senses by applying one's mind with absolute consciousness. If it is the meaning to be attributed ,to the expression "Gyan Vigyan", it will have to be held that the said expression used in Section 4(1) cannot be restricted to a mere study on Vedas and its practices. Such a narrow H

518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 13 S.C.R.

A interpretation will be doing violence to the whole concept of "!'- Gyan Vigyan, which as explained by Dr. Subash Sharma, is the combination of human senses, mind and consciousness, which should be applied to every aspect of human life, which would include all other academic subjects viz., science, mathematics, B philosophy, management, etc.

78Copy pinpoint78. In this context, when we refer to the expression "promotion and development of the study of Sanskrit as the University may from time to time determine", we find that even ).. indisputably the said provision for the study of Sanskrit is totally c unconnected to the learning of Vedas and its allied subjects, .... )

except that the scripts of Vedas may be in Sanskrit. For that purpose, there need not necessarily be a specific provision to the effect that there should be promotion and development of the study of Sanskrit. Therefore, apart from Vedic learning and D its practices, the establishment of the appellant University was ~ for the purpose of providing education in the field of science and technology, intensive learning of Sanskrit and provision for ~ research in every other field for the advancement and disbursement of knowledge. E

79Copy pinpoint79. We are of the considered opinion that only such an interpretation to the un-amended Section 4(1) would be the only way of interpretation that can be accorded to the said provision. Once, we steer clear of the interpretation of the said provision ;. ~ in the above said manner, we find that the amendment, which F ' was introduced by Act 5 of 2000, was clearly intended to purposely do away with its original intendment and thereby, restrict the scope of activities of the appellant University to the learning of Vedas and its practices and nothing else. The restriction so created by introducing the amendment was self- G destructive and thereby, the original object and purpose of f/.- - establishing the appellant University was done away with. In this context, the framing of the Ordinance 15, which provided for the study on various courses in the appellant University was consciously approved by the State Government without any H

MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 519 STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.] ""'.6--'f inhibition. A perusal of the co.urse contents in the Ordinance A discloses that there were as many as 49 courses connected with Vedic learning and practices and about 33 courses on other subjects. By introducing the amendment under Act 5 of 2000 and thereby, insisting that imparting of education in the appellant University can be restricted only to Vedic learning and B that the science and technology should also be only for the purpose of learning Vedas.and its practices, will have to be ;/.. stated unhesitatingly as creating a formidable restriction on the right to education, which is a guaranteed Constitutional right and

- thereby, clearly violating Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Equally, the addition of the expression "in the above fields and in these fields may ......... " while deleting the expression c

"dissemination of knowledge", in our considered opinion, drastically interfered with the right to education sought to be advanced by the University by its creation originally under the -.f D 1995 Act, which restriction now sought to be imposed can never be held to be a reasonable restriction, nor can it be held to have any rationale, while creating such a restriction by way of an amendment to Section 4(1 ).

80Copy pinpoint80. Having regard to our fundamental approach to the issue raised in this appeal and our conclusion as stated above, we are convinced thatthe arguments based on the Legislative • J... competence also pales into insignificance. Even without addressing the said question, we have in as much found that by virtue of the amendment introduced to Section 4(1), an embargo has been clearly created in one's right to seek for education, which is a Constitutionally protected Fundamental Right. Therefore, there was a clear violation of Articles 14 and .., 21 of the Constitution and consequently, such a provision by ~ way of an amendment cannot stand the scrutiny of the Court of G Law. To support our conclusion, we wish to refer to the following decisions rendered by this Court, right from Mohini Jain case, viz.,

(i) Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan H v. Union of India- (2012) 6 SCC 1

520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A (ii) Bhartiya Seva Samaj Trust v. Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel - (2012) 9 SCC 310 ' •' (iii) State of T.N. v. K. Shyam Sunder (2011) 8 SCC 737 B (iv) Satimbla Sharma v. St. Paul's Sr. Sec. School c2011) 13 sec 160

(v) Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India - (2008) 6 sec 1; c wherein, this Court has consistently held that Right to Education is a Fundamental Right. Thus, our conclusion is fortified by the various judgments of this Court, wherein, it has been held that imparting of education is a Fundamental Right, in as much as, we have held that the establishment of the D appellant University was mainly for the purpose of imparting education, while promotion of Vedic learning is one of the primary objectives of the University. Any attempt on the part of the State to interfere with the said main object viz., imparting of education, would amount to an infringement of the E Fundamental Right guaranteed under the Constitution. Consequently, the amendment, which was introduced under the 1995 Act to Section 4(1) and also the insertion of the proviso, has to be held ultra-vires. ).. ...

81Copy pinpoint81. Having arrived at the above conclusion, when we examine the stand of the State, at the very outset, we are not persuaded to accede to the submission of the learned counsel that the amendment was only by way of a clarification of the existing provision. In fact, the Division Bench also proceeded G on the footing that 'dissemination of knowledge' as it originally existed, did not empower the University to provide education to other courses other than Vedas and its practices. With great respect to the Division Bench, we are of the view that such an approach was directly in conflict with the basic principle of the H Constitutionally protected Fundamental Right, the Right to

MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 521 STATE OF M.P [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.] -·'1, Education and consequently the said line of reasoning of the A Division Bench and the submissions on that basis cannot also be countenanced.

82Copy pinpoint82. In fact, in this context, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent State reported in (1987) 4 B SCC 671 (Osmania University Teachers' Association Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another), rather than supporting the respondent State can be usefully applied to state that "dissemination of knowledge" in every respect would apply to any subject and cannot be restricted to any particular subject. In paragraph 30 of the said decision, while concluding as to c the role of the University Grants Commission in the matter of academic education, it has been stated as under:

" ... Dissemination of learning with search for new • knowledge with disci11,/ine all round must be D ~ maintained at all costs. It is hoped that University Grants Commission will duly discharge its responsibility to the Nation and play an increasing role to bring about the needed transformation in the academic life of the University." (Emphasis added) E

83Copy pinpoint83. The above sentence amply establishes that dissemination of learning is for acquisition of knowledge in .. J... every kind of discipline and that such a perception should be maintained at all cost. We therefore, hold that "dissemination of knowledge" as it originally stood in Section 4(1), which was F deleted by way of the Amendment Act 5 of 2000, caused havoc by restricting the scope of acquisition of knowledge to be gathered by an individual from the facilities made available in the appellant University. We make it clear that it can never be -~ G ..j. held that the said expression used in the un-amended Section 4(1) can be held to have a limited application for acquisition of knowledge on Vedas alone and not in other fields.

84Copy pinpoint84. As far as the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent based on the expression used in the Preamble was H

522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 13 S.C.R.

A concerned, at the very outset, it will have to be held that the -y' - Preamble cannot control the scope of the applicability of the Act. If the provision contained in the main Act are clear and without any ambiguity and the purpose of the Legislation can be thereby duly understood without any effort, there is no B necessity to even look into the Preamble for that purpose.

85Copy pinpoint85. In fact, the Division Bench itself has made reference to a decision of this Court in Union of India Vs. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. and others etc., reported in AIR 2001 SC 724. The extent to which a Preamble of an Act c can be referred to or relied upon has been succinctly stated as under:

" ... The preamble of an Act, no doubt can also be read along with other provisions of the Act to find out the meaning of the words in enacting provision to decide ""- whether they are clear or ambiguous but the preamble ~ in itself not being an enacting provision is not of the same weight as an aid to construction of a Section of the Act as are other relevant enacting words to be found elsewhere in the Act. The utility of the preamble diminishes on a conclusion as to clarity of enacting provisions. It is, therefore, said that the 11.reamble is not to influence the meaning_ otherwise ascribable to the enacting f;!,arls unless there is a comf;!.elling_ reason J.... F for it. If in an Act the preamble is general or brief statement of the main purpose, it may well be of little value .... We cannot, therefore, start with the preamble for construing the provisions of an Act, though we could be justified in resorting to it nay we will be required to do so if we find that the language used by Parliament is ... G ambiguous or is too general though in point of fact ..;.._ ' Parliament intended that it should have a limited application .... " (Emphasis added)

86Copy pinpoint86. The above statement of law makes the position abundantly clear that it is the statutory provision, which will have

MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 523 STATE OF M.P [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.] ""'\ ,--''f to be read and analyzed for the purpose of understanding the scope .and purport for which the Legislation was intended and j the brief statement contained in the Preamble will be of very ( little value. That apart, we have noted in the earlier part of the judgment as to how even a reading of the Preamble shows the importance attached to imparting of education in the appellant B University, as has been highlighted in the forefront while making a mention about the other aspects of providing scope for research oriented education on Vedas and its practices by the appellant University.

- 87. In the light of our above discussions, we hold that the submission of the learned counsel for the State by making a detailed reference to the Preamble is of no assistance to the c

respondents. For the very same reason, the arguments of the learned counsel that any course to be conducted in the appellant University should be Vedic centric cannot also be D --+ countenanced. On the other hand, as held by this Court in Osmania University case, "dissemination of knowledge" as originally incorporated in the un-amended Section 4(1} alone would serve the purpose of effective functioning of the appellant University in imparting and spreading knowledge on every other E field available, apart from providing intensive educational curriculum in Vedic learning and its practices. i J-

88Copy pinpoint88. In the light of our above conclusion, the deletion of the said expression will have to be held to be an arbitrary action F l of the respondent State and thereby, violating equality in law ' and equal protection of law as enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution, in as much as all other Universities, which were being controlled and administered by the State by the 1973 Act, " ~ enjoy the freedom of setting up any course with the approval G of the University Grants Commission, the appellant alone would be deprived of such a right and liberty by restricting the scope of imparting education in any field other than Vedas and its practices.

89Copy pinpoint89. As far as the decision relied upon by the learned H

524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A counsel for the State for the proposition that the word "and" in y--.' the Preamble, as well as in Section 4 will have to be read conjunctively viz., the decision reported in (1987) 3 sec 279 (Utkal Contractors and Joiners Pvt. Ltd. and Ors Vs. State of \ Orissa and others), in the light of our conclusions based on the B context in which the 1995 Act was brought into force and the reading of Section 4(1) in the said context, the expression "and" used in the said Section will have to be necessarily read disjunctively. We do not find any scope to apply the said decision to the facts of this case. c 90. As far as the decision reported in 1987 (1) SCC 424 (Reserve Bank of India Vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., and Others), we find the following paragraph as more relevant in order to appreciate the present - controversy with which we are concerned; paragraph 33 reads as under:

33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture. context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the ' context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute- maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, ' clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be H

MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 525 STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.] ·-Y construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so A that every word has a place and everything is in its place .... "

(Emphasis added)

91Copy pinpoint91. Reading the said paragraph and having analyzed the B 1995 Act on the whole along with the Preamble, the various definition clauses, Section 4(1) and the sub-clauses (ii) to (xxviii) and the provision providing for enacting the Statutes and Ordinances, we have to hold that the expression "and" used in Section 4(1) will have to be read disjunctively and not C conjunctively. In this context, we wish to rely on the decision rendered by this Court in Prof. Yashpal and another (supra), wherein, it has been held in paragraph 17 as under:

"17. In Constitutional Law of India by Seervai, the learned 0 --+ author has said in para 2. 12 (3rd Edn.) that the golden rule of interpretation is that words should be read in their ordinarv. natural and grammatical meaning subject to the rider that in construing words in a Constitution conferring legislative power the most E liberal construction should be put upon the words so that thev mav have effect in their widest amplitude. This is subject to certain exceptions and a restricted 1 .i meaning may be given to words if it is necessary to prevent a conflict between two exclusive entries." (Emphasis added) F

92Copy pinpoint92. Besides the above two decisions, which discuss about the methodology of interpretation of a Statute, we also refer to the following decisions rendered by this Court in lshwar Singh ' -'" Bindra (supra), wherein in para 11 it has been held as under: G

"11 ........ It would be much more appropriate in the context to read it disconjunctively. In Stroud's Judiciql Dictionary, 3rd Edn. it is stated at p. 135 that "and" has generally a cumulative sense, requiring the fulfillment of all the H

526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 13 S.C.R.

A conditions that it joins together, and herein it is the antithesis of or. Sometimes, however, even in such a connection, it is, by force of a contexts, read as "or". Similarly in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes. 11th Edn .. it has been accepted that "to carry out the intention of the legislature it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions 'or' and 'and' one for the other". "(Emphasis added)

93Copy pinpoint93. We may also refer to para 4 of the decision rendered by this Court in (1987) 3 SCC 208 (Joint Director of Mines and Safety Vs. T & N Stone Quarries (P) Ltd.,) :

"4. According to the plain meaning, the exclusionary clause in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act read with the two provisos beneath clauses (a) and (b), the word D "and" at the end of para (b) of sub-clause (ii) of the proviso to clause (a) of Section 3(1) must in the context in which it appears, be construed as "or"; and if so construed, the existence of any one of the three conditions stipulated in paras (a), (b) and (c) would at E once attract the proviso to clauses (a) and (b) of sub- section (1) of Section 3 and thereby make the mine subject to the provisions of the Act. The High Court overlooked the fact that the use of the negative language in each of the three clauses implied that the word "and" used at the end of clause (b) had to be read disjunctively. F That construction of ours is in keeping with the legislative intent manifested by the scheme of the Act which is primarily meant for ensuring the safety of workmen employed in the mines." G (Emphasis added)

94Copy pinpoint94. Applying the ratio as laid down in the above mentioned decisions, we are convinced that our above conclusion is fully supported by the said principles and therefore, we are not inclined to hold that the expression "and" used in the Preamble,

MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 527 STATE OF M.P [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.] ,-y as well as in Section 4 should be read conjunctively as contended by the learned counsel for the State. On the other hand, in the context in which the said expression is used, it will have to be read as "or" creating a disjunctive reading of the provision. B

95Copy pinpoint95. In this context it will be worthwhile to refer to what Scrutton, L.J. has stated in the celebrated decision reported in Green Vs. Premier Glynrhonwy State Co. (1928) 1 KB 561, "You do sometimes read 'or' as 'and' in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are obliged because 'or' does not generally mean 'and' and 'and' does not generally mean 'or' ". And as c pointed out by Lord Halsbury the reading of 'or' as 'and' is not to be resorted to, 'unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done'. [refer Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Vs. Henderson Bros., (1888) 13 AC 595 at pg.603 (HL)]. In fact in the case on hand D ~ we have found that though the expression 'and' has been used, prior to the expression 'promotion and development of the study of Sanskrit.. .. .' and again prior to the set of expression 'for the advancement' and again prior to the set of expression 'dissemination of knowledge', the context in which the E Legislation was brought into force and reading the said section

.). along with the Preamble and other sub clauses of Section 4, the expression 'and' has to be read disjunctively and not conjunctively. Therefore, even applying the principle laid down by Lord Scrutton and Lord Halsbury, we are fortified by our conclusion that in the case on hand the expression 'dissemination of knowledge', as well as 'promotion and development of the study of Sanskrit' and 'to make provision for research', were all expressions which have been used disjunctively and not conjunctively with the words Vedic learning and practice.

96Copy pinpoint96. The decision relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the appellant reported in HansofiDevi (supra}, para 9 also supports the above proposition of law. Para 9 of the said decision reads as under: H

528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 13 S.C.R.

A "9. Before we embark upon an inquiry as to what would y- be the co"ect interpretation of Section 28-A, we think it appropriate to bear in mind certain basic principles of interpretation of a statute. The rule stated by Tindal, C.J. in Sussex Peerage case s'fill holds the field. The B aforesaid rule is to the effect: (ER p. 1057)

"If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words c themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver.•

It is no doubt true that if on going through the plain meaning of the language of statutes, it leads to D anomalies. injustices and absurdities, then the court mav look into the purpose for which the statute has been brought and would trv to give a meaning, which would adhere to the purpose of the statute: .... ."

97Copy pinpoint97. The above said proposition of law laid down by this Court fully supports the claim of the appellant.

98Copy pinpoint98. With this, when we come to the other submission of the learned counsel for the appellant relating to the challenge .k. • made to the proviso added to Section 4., the proviso which has. F been added is to the effect that no courses should be conducted and no centers should be established or run without the prior approval of the State Government. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant before the Division Bench, as well as before us was that the creation of courses, as well as the G centers are governed by the provisions of 1995 Act and such --;. activities of the appellant University can at best be regulated only by the University Grants Commission, by virtue of the statutory prescription under Section 12 of the University Grants Commission Act, read along with Entry 66 of List-I of the H

MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYPJJl..YA v. 529 STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.] -y~

' Constitution and that the State Legislature has no competence A to deal with the said issue.

99Copy pinpoint99. While dealing with the above contention, the Division Bench after making a detailed reference to various Entries commencing from Entries 63 to 66 of List-I, as well as Entry B 25 of List-Ill and also Section 12 of the Universities Grants Commission Act, 1956 ultimately held that having regard to the __j, inclusion of the appellant University in the list of Universities maintained by the Commission under Section 2(f) of the 1956 Act, as reflected in Annexure P-5, dated 24.08.1988, the existence of Ordinance 15, which came into being in c accordance with law that once the University Grants Commission Act is in force, the running of the courses and -I determination thereof, has to be controlled by the University """' Grants Commission. The proviso stipulating that no course ~ should be conducted and no centers should be established and run without the prior approval of the State Government. The restriction is so far as it related to conduct of courses is concerned, the same was beyond the Legislative competence of the State Legislature. So holding thus, the Division Bench declared that the proviso so far as it related to the aspect that no course should be conducted and run without the prior approval of the State, was ultra vires and beyond the Legislative i j. competence of the State Legislature.

100Copy pinpoint100. This Court in Prof Yashpal and another (supra) held in paragraphs 28, 33 and 34 as under:

"28. Though incorporation of a university as a legislative head is a State subject (Entry 32 List II) but basically a university is an institution for higher education and " research. Entry 66 of List I is coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions. There can thus be a clash between the powers of the State and that of the Union. The interplay of various entries in this regard in the three lists of the H

5:30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 13 S.C.R.

A Seventh Schedule and the real import of Entry 66 of List I have been examined in several decisions of this Court. In Gujarat University v. Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar a decision by a Constitution Bench rendered prior to the Forty-second Amendment when Entry 11 of List II was in B existence, it was held that Items 63 to 66 of List I are carved out of the subject of education and in respect of these items the power to legislate is vested exclusively in Parliament. The use of the expression "subject to" in Item 11 of List II of the Seventh Schedule clearly c indicates that the legislation in respect of excluded matters cannot be undertaken by the State Legislatures. In AIR para 23, the Court held as under: (SCR pp. 137- 38)

"Power of the State to legislate in respect of education including universities must to the extent to which it is entrusted to the Union Parliament, whether such power is exercised or not, be deemed to be restricted. If a subject of legislation is covered by Items 63 to 66 even if it otherwise falls within the larger field of 'education including universities' power to legislate on that subject must lie with Parliament. ... Item 11 of List II and Item 66 of List I must be harmoniously construed. The two entries undoubtedly overlap: but to the extent of overlapping. the power conferred by Item 66 List I F must prevail over the power of the State under Item 11 of List II. It is manifest that the excluded heads deal primarily with education in institutions of national or special importance and institutions of higher education including research, sciences, technology and vocational ·~ - G training of labour."

33. The consistent and settled view of this Court, therefore. is that in spite of incorporation of universities as a legislative head being in the State

MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 53~ STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.) --y List, the whole gamut of the universitY.. which will iaclude teaching. gualit'I.. of education being im11.arted, curriculum, standard of examination and evaluation and also research activitr.. being carried on will no~ come within the 11.urview of the State Legislature on account of a s11.ecific entr'/.. on coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical education being in the Union List for which Parliament ~ alone is com11.etent. It is the responsibility of Parliament to ensure that proper standards are maintained in c institutions for higher education or research throughout the country and also uniformity in standards is maintained.

34. In order to achieve the aforesaid purpose, Parliament has enacted the University Grants Commission Act. First D c+ para of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (for short "the UGC Act'J is illustrative and consequently it is being reproduced below: E ''The Constitution of India vests Parliament with exclusive authority in regard to 'coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research ;. j. and scientific and technical institutions'. It is obvious that neither coordination nor determination of standards is possible unless the Central Government has some voice in the determination of standards of teaching and examination in universities, both old and new. It is also necessary to ensure that the available resources are - -"t utilised to the best possible effect. The problem has become more acute recently on account of the tendency to multiply universities. The need for a properly constituted Commission for determining and a/locating to universities funds made available by the Central Government has also become more urgent on this "C"""n' Cl rc:m"'h""';"' VVU It. " {'-11 /J ICh.:>I..;> added) H

532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

101Copy pinpoint101. In yet another decision, this Court has held in para 7 of the decision reported in R. Chitralekha (supra) as follows:

"7. . .. This and similar other passages indicate that if the law made by the State by virlue of entry 11 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution makes B impossible or difficult the exercise of the legisiative power of the Parliament under the entry "Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions" reserved to the Union, the State law may be c bad. This cannot obviously be decided on speculative and hypothetical reasoning. If the impact of the State law providing for such standards on entry 66 of List I is so heavy or devastating as to wipe out or appreciably abridge the central field, it may be struck down. But that is a D question of fact to be ascertained in each case .... t--

102Copy pinpoint102. While considering the submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellant, it will be worthwhile to make a reference to Section 12 of the University Grants Commission E Act, 1956 wherein while describing the functions of the University Grants Commission, it has been stipulated that it is the general duty of the Commission to take, in consultation with the Universities or other bodies concerned, all such steps as it ~ • may think fit for the promotion and co-ordination of University F education and for the determination and maintenance of standards of teaching, examination and research in Universities, and for the purpose of performing its functions under this Act, the Commission may hold certain enquiry and do certain other activities. In fact, the Division Bench while holding that conduct of courses come exclusively within the "/'< - G realm of control of the University Grants Commission, apparently relied upon the said provision.

103Copy pinpoint103. In fact the Division Bench has made a specific reference to the expression used in the said Section, while H ultimately holding that it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of ..

MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 533 STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.] ---...,,. the University Grants Commission i.e., the running of the A Courses. The Division Bench has held to the effect "we have no hesitation in our mind that once the University Grants Commission Act is in force, the running of the courses and determination thereof has to be controlled by the University Grants Commission". The said sets of expressions have been B more or less borrowed from the expression used in Section 12 itself.

.... 104. When we examine the ultimate conclusion of the Division Bench that such a control by the University Grants Commission will not extend to the running of the centers, we c are of the considered view that what all may apply to conduct of courses, should equally apply to the running of centers as well. In this context, it will be worthwhile to make a further reference to the stipulation contained in Section 12 of the University Grants Commission Act, which makes the position D -+ clear. Under Section 12, the general duty of the Commission to take in consultation with the Universities or other bodies is concerned, is all such steps as it may think fit for the promotion and co-ordination of University education and for the determination and maintenance of standards of teaching, examination and research in Universities. It also further stipulates that such a decision should be taken by the University

> . Grants Commission for the purpose of the Universities to perform its functions under the Act. The Division Bench itself has noted that the running of the courses and determination thereof, can be controlled only by the University Grants Commission by virtue of the operation of Section 12. If it is for the University Grants Commission to take a decision in

- consultation with the Universities, such steps as it thinks fit for ..., the promotion and co-ordination of Universities education, then it will have to be held that, that it should include, apart from the course content, the manner in which education is imparted viz., the process of teaching, while at the same time ensuring the standard of such teaching is maintained by deciding as to whether such teaching process can be allowed to be imparted H

534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A in places other than the University campus viz., in the centers _,,., - or other colleges.

105Copy pinpoint105. In our considered opinion, Section 12 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 would encompass B apart from determining the course contents with reference to which the standard of teaching and its maintenance is to be monitored by the University Grants Commissi'on, would also include the infrastructure that may be made available, either in the University or in other campuses, such as the centers, in ,.. order to ensure that such standard of education, teaching and c examination, as well as research are maintained without any fall in standrard. Therefore, while upholding the conclusion of the Division Bench that it is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature to stipulate any restriction, as regards the conduct of the courses by getting the approval of the State 0 Government, in the same breath, such lack of competence would equally apply to the running of the centers as well. +--

106Copy pinpoint106. In Dr. Preeti Srivastava (supra) while dealing with the scope of Entry 66 of List-I vis-a-vis Entry 25 of List-111, this Court E considered on what basis the standard of education in an institution can be analyzed. In paragraph 36, it has been held as under:

"36 ..... Standards of education in an institution or college ~ . depend on various factors. Some of these are: F (1) The caliber of the teaching ·staff; (2) A proper syllabus • designed to achieve a high level of education in the given span of time; (3) The student-teacher ratio; (4) The ratio between the students and the hospital beds available to each student; (5) The caliber of the students admitted to the institution; (6) Equipment and laboratory -,.. - facilities, or hospital facilities for training in the case of medical colleges; (7) Adequate accommodation for the college and the attached hospital; and (8) The standard of examinations held including the manner in which the

MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 535 STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.] - ..,.. papers are set and examined and the clinical performance is judged."

107Copy pinpoint107. The above statement of law on Entry 66 of List-I vis- a-vis Entry 25 of List-Ill throws much light on this issue. For instance, in the case of the appellant, while it has got its own infrastructure facilities for imparting education on various courses spelt out in Ordinance 15, which has opened up centers in various places falling within its jurisdiction viz. the ~ State of Madhya Pradesh for imparting education on the very same courses specified in Ordinance 15. If we apply the principle spelt out in paragraph 36 of the above decision, where c the standard for examining the standard on education of an University, the various factors culled out in the said paragraph can be held to be the factors to be considered. In the same line of reasoning, it will have to be held that the various centers created by the appellant University, would also fall as one of D -:f the items along with the eight items spelt out in the said paragraph.

108Copy pinpoint108. In the light of the said reasoning also, it will have to be held that the running of centers by the appellant University E would fall within the exclusive realm of Entry 66 of List - I, which would in turn be governed by Section 12 of the University Grants Commission Act and consequently the State Government to > ~ that extent should be held to lack the necessary legislative competence to meddle with such centers set up by the appellant F University.

109Copy pinpoint109. We therefore, hold that the entire proviso to Section 4(1) has to be held to be ultra-vi res. The contention of the ..., -1' learned counsel for the appellant therefore, merits acceptance and the contention to the contrary made by the learned counsel G for the State stands rejected.

110Copy pinpoint110. It is also necessary to note, as well as mention that after the University was established for its initial establishment and for running the institution, according to the appellant, more H

536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 13 S.C.R.

_,,.--- A than Rs.12 crores were spent by way of an investment and that nearly Rs.60 crores have been spent for running the University and its various centers throughout the State of Madhya Pradesh. The recurring expenditure was stated to be Rs.11 crores. Therefore, when the appellant University has proceeded to B establish its institution for the purpose of imparting education by making huge investments, a major part of which would have definitely come by way of fees collected from the students who had joined the institution aspiring for improving their educational career, in our considered opinion, it is the responsibility of the c State to ensure that such high expectation of the students who joined the appellant university is not impaired and that for whatever expenses incurred by the students, appropriate returns should be provided to them by way of imparting education in the respective fields which, they choose to associate themselves by getting themselves admitted in the appellant University. 0 Therefore, on this ground as well, it will have to be held that such expectations of the students, as well as their parents cannot be dealt with so very lightly by the State, while considering for any change to be brought about in the Constitution and functioning of the appellant University. It can therefore be validly held that such expectations of the students and their parents, as well as that e>f the appellant University, can validly be held to be a legitimate expectation and considering the challenge made to the amendment introduced on various grounds raised at the instance of the appellant, the legitimate expectation of the appellant University, as well as the student community, would also equally support the contentions of the appellant University, while challenging the amendments in particular the amendment introduced to Section 4(1), as well as the addition of a proviso to the said Section. G

111Copy pinpoint111. One other relevant factor )Nhich is also to be kept in mind is the establishment of the appellant University at the repeated persuasion of Maharshi Mahesh Yogi was definitely to provide full-fledged education on Vedas and the various intricate subjects, which are found in Vedas, as well as its

MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 537 STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.] .... ·:-y- practices, lthihas, Puranas etc. In fact, there can be no two opinion that such an institution with such a laudable objective for imparting education in different fields based on the teachings in Vedas, was very rare and it is said that the appellant University is stated to be an unique University created and established by the founders of the said institution headed by B Maharshi Mahesh Yogi. Therefore, when such a premium University, which is stated to be only one of its kind in the whole of the Country was successfully established based on the 1995 .>( Act, in our considered opinion, such a well established institution should be allowed to survive by enabling the said c University to conduct courses as has been planned by it and introduced under Ordinance 15 and thereby, make the appellant University a viable one. Such an approach alone, in our considered view, ensure the successful existence and continued running of the University in the further years and thereby, benefit very many aspirants from among the younger generation who wish to learn more and more about very many subjects by understanding such subjects based on the teachings that are found and established in Vedic learnings, its practices, lthihas and Puranas etc. Therefore, on this ground as well, in our considered opinion, any attempt made from any quarters, which would disrupt the rqnning of the appellant University, will only amount to interfering with its various ,. ).... Constitutional rights and fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. Therefore, when such interference is brought to the notice of this Court, the Court has to necessarily come to the rescue of the appellant University by saving it from any such onslaught being made on its continued existence. We, therefore, find force in the submission of the learned senior , . _,, counsel for the appellant while attacking the amended Section 4(1) and its proviso, by which the appellant University was deprived of its valuable right to hold very many programmes in the conduct of the course enumerated in its Ordinance 15, which consequently resulted in violation of its Constitutional, as well as Fundamental Rights in the running of its educational institutions. H

538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

112Copy pinpoint112. With this, we come to the last part of the submission made on behalf of the appellant, which related to the amendment to Section 9(2) of the 1995 Act. Under the un- • amended provision, after the first Chancellor viz., Maharshi Mahesh Yogi, the Board of Management was empowered to B appoint the Chancellor from among the persons of eminence and renowned scholar of Vedic education who can hold office for a term of five years and who would be eligible for reappointment. Under the amended Section 9(2), it was stipulated that after the first Chancellor, the Board of c Management should prepare and submit a panel of three persons to the State Government and out of the panel, one person should be appointed as Chancellor by the Board of Management, after obtaining the approval of the State Government. As far as the period of holding office was concerned, there was no change in its terms. The Division 0 Bench while considering the said amendment introduced under Act 5 of 2000, has held that even after the amendment, the Management had the power of recommendation and they can recommend a person of eminence and renowned scholar of E Vedic education and even if the ultimate appointment is to be made with the approval of the State Government, since any such appointment can be only from the panel prepared by the Board of management, such a stipulation contained in the amendment does not in any way impinge upon any right, much less the Constitutional Right or Fundamental Right of the appellant University.

113Copy pinpoint113. Having bestowed our serious consideration to the above conclusion of the Division Bench, we do not find anything wrong with the said conclusion. We also hold that the said provision does not in any way offend Article 14 of the 't- ' Constitution, nor does it affect the autonomy of the appellant University. Apart from the above challenges, no other submission relating to the other amended provisions were seriously argued before us. H

MAHARSHI MAHESH YOGI VEDIC VISHWAVIDYALAYA v. 539 STATE OF M.P. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.)

114Copy pinpoint114. In the light of our above conclusion, this appeal is partly allowed. We hold that the amended Section 4(1) under Act 5 of 2000 inclusive of the introduction of proviso to the said Section is ultra-vires of the Constitution and the same is liable to be set aside. In other respects, the judgment of the Division Bench stands confirmed. The application for intervention considered, no merits, the same is dismissed.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal partly allowed.