JAGDISH PRASAD SHARMA ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

62. As against the above, certain writ petitions have been filed in the Patna High Court which rejected the contention of the Petitioners and dismissed the writ petitions on the ground F that the Comm;ssion had not taken any conscious decision with regard to teachers and staff, except for those which were Centrally-funded. Subsequently, however, since in its 452nd meeting the Commission took a conscious decision and recommended that the Report of the Pay Review Committee G recommending the enhancement of age of superannuation from 62 to 65 years be made applicable throughout the country, fresh writ petitions were filed in the Patna High Court, including CWJC No.2330 of 2009, filed by the Appellants herein. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions upon holding H that once the Commission had recommended that the age of

JAGDISH PRASAD SHARMA v STATE OF BIHAR 741

[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.] superannuation be accepted as 65 years, the State A Governments had no discretion but to enhance the age of superannuation in line with the recommendations made by the Commission. The Division Bench subsequently reversed the finding of the learned Single Judge, resulting in these Special Leave Petitions (now Appeals). B

63. Learned Standing Counsel for the State of Bihar, Mr. Gopal Singh, had in his submissions reiterated the views of the High Court, i.e., that on mere communication, the revision of the pay of teachers and increase in the age of superannuation c would not automatically become effective and that, in any event, the right to alter the terms and conditions of service of the State universities and colleges were within the domain of the State Government and till such time as it decided to adopt the same, the same would have no application to the teachers and staff 0 of the different educational institutions in the State.

64. We are inclined to agree with such submission mainly because of the fact that in the amended provisions of Section 67(a) it has been categorically stated that the age of superannuation of non-teaching employees would be 62 years and, in no case, should the period of service of such non- teach ing employees be extended beyond 62 years. A difference had been made in regard to the teaching faculty whose services could be extended up to 65 years in the manner laid down in the University Statutes. There is no ambiguity that the final decision to enhance the age of superannuation of teachers within a particular State would be that of the State itself. The right of the Commission to frame Regulations having the force of law is admitted. However, the State Governments are also entitled to legislate with matters relating to education under Entry 25 of List Ill. So long as the State legislation did not encroach upon the jurisdiction of Parliament, the State legislation would obviously have primacy over any other law. If there was any legislation enacted by the Central Government

742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 11 S.C.R.

A under Entry 25 List Ill, both would have to be treated on a par with each other. In the absence of any such legislation by the Central Government under Entry 25 List Ill, the Regulation framed by way of delegated legislation has to yield to the plenary jurisdiction of the State Government under Entry 25 of B List Ill.

65. We are then faced with the situation where a composite scheme has been framed by the UGC, whereby the Commission agreed to bear 80% of the expenses incurred by c the State if such scheme was to be accepted, subject to the condition that the remaining 20% of the expense would be met by the State and that on and from 1st April, 2010, the State Government would take over the entire burden and would also have enhanced the age of superannuation of teachers and other staff from 62 to 65 years. There being no compulsion to 0 accept and/or adopt the said scheme, the States are free to decide as to whether the scheme would be adopted by them or not. In our view, there can be no automatic application of the recommendations made by the Commission, without any conscious decision being taken by the State in this regard, on account of the financial implications and other consequences attached to such a decision. The case of those Petitioners who have claimed that they should be given the benefit of the scheme dehors the responsibility attached thereto, must, therefore, fail.

66. However, within this class of institutions there is a separate group where the State Governments themselves have taken a decision to adopt the scheme. In such cases, the consequences envisaged in the scheme itself would automatically follow.

67. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court in all these matters in the light of the various submissions made on behalf of the respective parties. The several Appeals,

JAGDISH PRASAD SHARMA v STATE OF BIHAR 743

[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.] Writ Petitions and the Transferred Case, which involve the same questions as consid.ered in this batch of cases, are all {!ismissed. However, the Appeals filed by the State of Uttarakhand and Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 6724, 13747 and 14676 of 2012 are allowed. As far as the Transfer Petition Nos. 1062-1068 OF 2012 are concerned, the same are allowed and the Transferred Cases are dismissed. The Contempt Petitions are disposed of by virtue of this judgment. However, persons who have continued to work on the basis of the interim orders passed by this Court or any other Court, shall not be denied the benefit of service during the said c period. The Appeals and Petitions having been dismissed, both the State Authorities and the Central Authorities will be at liberty to work out their remedies in accordance with law.

68. Having regard to the nature of the facts involved in D these case, parties shall bear their own costs.

K.K.T. Matters disposed of.