BANGALORE CITY COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS

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(Civil Appeal Nos. 7425-7426 of 2002)

FEBRUARY 02, 2012 B

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A crores - Said amount was charged by Estate Agent.for manipulating the State Apparatus for facilitating the acquisition of land and sanction of layout etc. without any obstruction - Thus, such agreement is violative of s. 23 of the 1872 Act - However, the member of the society who had B already constructed their houses on the land allotted to them allowed to negotiate with. the State for purchase of their land at the prevailing market price to the rightful land owners - Contract Act, 1872.

BANGALORE CITY COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. 297 v. STATE OF KARNATAKA for a public purpose and the exercise undertaken by the State A Government was vitiated due to the influence of the extraneous considerations.

Doctrines - Doctrine of prospective overruling - Invocation of - Acquisition of land by State Government for the benefit of appellant-Cooperative Housing Society G quashed by the High Court on the ground of violaUon of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the manipulations made for the acquisition of land - Plea of the appellant that the doctrine of prospective overruling be invoked since crores of rupees spent for formation of layouts, 17191 plots allotted H

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There was unprecedented increase in the population of Bangalore City. Since it was not possible for the C Bangalore Development Authority to meet the demand of developed residential sites, the State Government decided to encourage formation of private layouts by the house building co-operative societies. The guidelines for the approval of private layouts were revised. The D appellant-Co-operative Housing Societies filed representation to the State Government for the acquisition of land for formation of a layout for its members. The appellant entered into an agreement with the Estate Agent 'RE' who promised to secure the E acquisition of land on payment of the specific amount. The State Level Co-ordination Committee (SLCC) considered the case of the appellant and declared that it was eligible for the acquisition of 208 acres 18 guntas land.- The State Government directed the Deputy F Commissioner, Bangalore to initiate acquisition proceedings of 207 acres 29 guntas land at place 'V' and 'R' for the appellant by issuing notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act. Thereafter, the appellant entered into an agreement with the State Government. The Deputy G Commissioner, Bangalore issued notification under Section· 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the acquisition of the land including the land comprised in Survey Nos. 49 and 50/1 belonging to respondent No. 3 and Survey Nos. 7/1 and 8/1 belonging to the prede.cessor of 'PR' and others. The land owners-

BANGALORE CITY COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. 299 v. STATE OF KARNATAKA respondent No. 3 and 'PR' and others filed objections against the proposed acquisition of their land. Thereafter, the Special Land Acquisition Officer issued declaration under Section 6(1) and the same was published. During the currency of the acquisition proceedings, an inquiry was conducted into the membership of the appellant and s other societies and it was found that they had admitted ineligible persons as their members. Subsequently, the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore passed an award and determined market value of the acquired land. The award was approved by the State Government. c However, before the possession of the acquired land could be taken, the State Government withdrew the acquisition proceedings in respect of land comprised in Survey No. 50/2. Respondent No. 3 made a representation for withdrawal of the acquisition of Survey No. 49 but no 0 final decision was taken. After eighteen months of the passing of the award, the State Government issued Notification under Section 16(2) in respect of various parcels of lands including Survey No. 49. The Special Land Acquisition Officer handed over the possession of 150 acres 9% guntas of land at place 'V' and 'R' to the appellant-Society. However, the entire exercise showing taking over of possession of the respondents' land and transfer thereof to the appellant was only on papers and physical possession continued with them. Respondent No. 3 challenged the acquisition of her land comprised in Survey No. 49 by filing a writ petition. Appellant also filed a writ petition questioning the legality of notification issued under Section 48(1 ). The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by respondent No. 3 on the ground of 2% years' delay between the issue of the declaration under Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act and filing of the writ petition. The writ petition of the appellant was dismissed holding that the State Government has absolute power to withdraw the acquisition before the possession of the acquired land can be taken. 'PR" and H

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A others also filed challenged the acquisition proceedings but the same was allowed. Respondent No. 3 challenged the order of the Single Judge in Writ Appeal. The appellant, the State Government and the Special Land Acquisition Officer also filed writ appeal. The Division 8 Benches of the High Court quashed the acquisition of lands by the State Government for the benefit of the appellant on the grounds of violation of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the manipulations made by the appellant through the Estate Agent for acquiring the land. Therefore, the appellants filed the instant appeals.

Dis~issing the appeals, the Court·

:2 1 In the writ petition respondent no. 3 spell out the reasons for her seeking interventi.on of the High Court. The said averments were not controverted by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Notwithstanding this, the Single Judge refused to accept the explanation given by respondent No. 3 that she was hopeful that after having withdrawn the acquisition in respect of one parcel of land, i.e., Survey No. 50/2, the State Government would accept her prayer for withdrawal of the acquisition in respect of Survey No. 49 as well. Unfortunately, the Single Judge altogether ignored the fact that soon after the issue of the H

BANGALORE CITY COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. 301 v. STATE OF KARNATAKA declaration under Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act and notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the said Act, the writ petitioner received letter that she should make herself available for inspection of the land and the then Land Acquisition Officer in_spected the site and felt satisfied that the same could be deleted because it was an orchard and was at the end of the area proposed to be acquired. The Single Judge also omitted to consider that the notices were issued to respondent No.3 informing her about the proposed inspection of the site; that she made a complaint to the Revenue Secretary that no one had come for inspection; that yet another notice was received by respondent No.3 for inspection would be held on 14.5.1990 but the concerned officer did not turn up; that letters were sent by the Revenue Department to Special Deputy Commissioner, Ban'galore requiring him to submit report in the matter of withdrawal of acquisition; and in writ petition, she had disclosed the cause for her filing the writ petition after the long delay. Non- consideration of these vital tac.ts and documents by the Single Judge resulted in miscarriage of justice. The Division Bench did not commit any error by holding that respondent No.3 was not guilty of laches. [Para 12] [347- H; 348-A-H]

Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi (1969) 1 SCC 110 - relied on. F

Ajodhya Bhagat v. State of Bihar (1974) 2 SCC 501; State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan (1976) 2 SCC 895: 1976 (1) SCR 369; Pt. Girdharan Prasad Missir v. State of Bihar (1980) 2 sec 83; Hari Singh v. state of U.P. (1984) 2 sec 624: G 1984 (3) SCR 417; Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd. (1996) 11 SCC 501 1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 551; Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur v. Bheru Lal (2002) 7 SCC 712: 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 512; Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of H

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A Rajasthan (2008) 4 SCC 695: 2008 (2 ) SCR 521; Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transport Insurance Company (1971) 1 SCC 785; C.K. Prahalada v. State of Karnataka (2008) 15 SCC 577: 2008 (7) SCR 852 - . referred to. B 2.1 All the co-operative societies have been classified into two categories. The first category consists of the co- operative societies in which not less than 51% of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government or any State Government or partly by the Central C Government and partly by one or more _State Governments. The second category consists of the co- operative societies other than those falling within the definiti.on of the expression 'corporation owned or controlled by the State' [Section 3(cc)]. The definition of the term 'company' contained in Section 3(e) takes within its fold a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 other than a government company referred to in clause (cc), a society registered under the Societies Registration Act or under any corresponding law framed by the State legislature, other than a society referred to in clause (cc) and a co-operative society defined as such in any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State, other than a co-operative society referred to in clause (cc). The F definition of the expression 'public purpose' contained in Section 3(f) is inclusive. As per clause (vi) of the definition, the expression 'public purpose' includes the provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by G Government or by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a Local Authority, or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or any corresponding law in force in a State or a co-operative society as defined

BANGALORE CITY COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. 303 v. STATE OF KARNATAKA in any law. relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State. To put it differently, the acquisition of land for carrying out any education, housing, health or slum clearance scheme by a registered society or a co-operative society can be regarded as an acquisition for public purpose only if the scheme has been approved by the appropriate Government before initiation of the acquisition proceedings. If the acquisition . of land for a co-operative society, which is covered by the definition of the term 'company' is for any purppse other than public purpose as defined in· Section 3(f), then the c provisions of Part VII would be attracted and mandate thereof would have to be complied with. [Para 19] [357- C-H; 358-A-C]

2.2 In the writ petition, respondent no. 3 averred that "the acquisition of any land under the Act for the benefit of the 2nd respondent would not be for a public purpose and would have to be in accordance with the provisions contained in Part VII .of the Act. In any case, even if the acquisition is for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme of the 2nd respondent, the same shall be with the prior approval of the appropriate Government. The appellant neither controverted the said averments nor produced any document before the High Court to show that it had prepared a housing scheme and the same had been approved by the State Government before the issue of notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court rightly held that the acquisition was not for a public purpose as defined in Section 3(f)(vi) of the 1894 Act. The submission that the G Division Bench of the High Court committed an error by recording a finding on the issue of violation of Section 3(f)(vi) of the 1894 Act because respondent No. 3 had not raised any such pl.ea in the writ petition, cannot be accepted. [Para 20] [358-C-G] H

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A 2.3 A close and careful reading of the documents- representation dated 7.12.1984 made by the Executive Director of the appellant to the Minister of Revenue, Government of Karnataka, letter dated 21.5.1988 sent by the State Government to Deputy Commissioner, B Bangalore to issue notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act and agreement dated 7.8.1988 entered into between the Executive Director of the appellant and. the State Government, reveals that altho.ugh, in the representation made by him to the Revenue Minister, the c Executive Director of the appellant did make a mention that the object of the society is to provide house sites to its members who belong to working class and other backward. class people belonging to weaker class of society and the members are poor and siteless people, there was not even a whisper about any housing scheme. 0 The direction issued by the State Government to Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore to issue the preliminary notification for an extent of 207 acres 29 guntas land also does not speak of any housing scheme. The agreement·· E entered into between the appellant through its Executive Director and the State Government does not contain any· inkling about the housing scheme framed by the appellant. It merely mentions about the proposed formation of sites and construction of houses for the members of the appellant and payment of cost for the acquired land. The agreement also speaks of an inquiry having been got made by the State Government in conformity with the provisions of the 1894 Act and the grant of consent for the acquisition of land for the benefit of society's members. The agreement then goes on to say that the appellant shall pay to the Government the entire costs of the acquisition of land and expenses. Paragraph 2 of the conditions incorporated in the agreement speaks of transfer of land to the society as to vest in the company. Clause 9(a) of the agreement did provide for token contribution of Rs.100 by the Deputy

BANGALORE CITY COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. 305 v. STATE OF KARNATAKA Commissioner/Special Deputy Commissioner towards the compensation to be determined by the Assistant Commissioner/Special Land Acquisition Officer, but that is not relatable to any housing scheme framed by the appellant. It is, thus, evident that the appellant had not framed any housing scheme and obtained its approval before the issue of notification under Section 4(1) of the· Act. [Para 21] [359-A-H; 360-A]

2.4 Although, the appellant may not have been required to frame a scheme in strict conformity with the provisions of the 1976 Act and the Karnataka Housing C Board Act, but it was bound to frame scheme disclosing the total number of members eligible for allotment of sites, the requirement of land including the size of the plots and broad indication of the mode and manner of development of the land as a layout. The State Government could then apply mind whether or not the housing scheme framed by the appellant should be approved. However, the appellant did not produce any evidence before the High Court to show that it had framed a housing scheme and the same was approved by the State Government before the issue of notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act. Even before this Court, no material was produced to show that, in fact, such a scheme had been framed and approved by the State Government. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court rightly referred to F Section 3(f)(vi) and held that in the absence of a housing scheme having been framed by the appellant, the acquisition of land belonging to respondent No. 3 was not for a public purpose as defined in Section 3(f)(vi). [Para 23] [361-8-E] G

2.5 In the instant case, no housing scheme was framed by the appellant which is sine qua non for treating the acquisition of land for a co-operative society as an acquisition for public purpose within the meaning of H

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A Section 3(f). Not only this, the appellant executed agreement dated 21.2.1988 for facilitating the acquisition of land in lieu of payment of a sum of rupees more than 5 crores. The Estate Agent engaged by the appellant had promised that it would get the notifications issued under B Sections 4(1) and 6(1) within four months and three months respectively. The huge amount which the appellant had agreed to pay to the Estate Agent had no co-relation with the services provided by it. Rather, the amount· was charged by the Estate Agent for C manipulating the State apparatus and facilitating the acquisition of land and sanction of layout etc. without any obstruction. Such an agreement is clearly violative of Section 23 of the Contract Act. [Para 29] [371-G-H; 371- ·B] D 2.6 None of the orders and judgments referred to, could be relied upon for holding that even though the appellant had not framed any housing scheme, the acquisition in question should be deemed to have been made for a public purpose as defined in Section 3(f)(vi) E simply because in the representation made by him to the Revenue Minister of the State, the Executive Director of the appellant had indicated that the land would be used for providing sites to poor and people belonging to backward class and on receipt of the recommendations F of SLCC the State Ciovernment had directed Special Deputy Commissioner to issue notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act and that too by ignoring the ratio of the judgments of three Judge Benches in *1st and **2nd H.M. T. cases and the judgment of two Judge Bench in G *** Vyalikawa/ House Building Cooperative Society's case. In the instant case,. whereby the Estate Agent agreed to ensure the acquisition of land within a specified time frame subject to payment of huge money and the fact that agreement entered into between the society and the H Government was in the nature of an agreement

BANGALORE CITY COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. 307 v. STATE OF KARNATAKA contemplated by Part VII. While in *1st H:M. T. 's case, the amount paid to 'SR' Constructions was rupees one crore, in the instant case, the appellant had agreed to pay more than rupees five crores for facilitating issue of Notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) and sanction of the layouts and plans by the BOA within a period of less than one year. The High Court did not commit any error by relying upon the judgment in *1st H.M. T case for declaring that the acquisition was not for a public purpose. [Para 32] [378-F-H; 379-G-H; 380-A]

*H. M. T. House Building Cooperative Society v. Syed C Khader and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 677: 1995 (2) SCR 200; **H.M. T.House Building Co-operative Society v. M. Venkataswamappa (1995) 3 SCC 128; ***Vyalikawal House Building. Co-operative Society v. V. Chandrappa (2007) 9 sec 304 - relied on. D

Mis. Tulasidas Khimji v. Their Workmen (1963) 1 SCR 675; Third Income-tax Officer, Mangalore v. M. Damodar Bhat (1969) 2 SCR 29; Ram Sarup v. Land Acquisition Officer (1973) 2 SCC 56; Sockieting Tea Co. (P) Ltd. v. Under Secy. E to the Govt. of Assam (1973) 3 SCC 729; Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana (1988) 4 SCC 534: 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 10; Umashanker Pandey v. B.K. Uppal (1991) 2 SCC 408; Mis. Jindal Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana 1991 Supp (2) SCC 587; D.S. Parvathamma v. A. Srinivasan (2003) 4 SCC F . 705: 2003 (3) SCR 197; Shipping Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Machado Bros. (2004) 11 SCC 168: 2004 (3) SCR 584; J.P. Srivastava & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd.; (2005) 1 SCC 172: 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 648; Shakti Tubes Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2009) 7 SCC 673: 2009 (10) SCR 739; G Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha v. Narayanamma (2003) 1 SCC 228: 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 97; The State of Punjab and Ors. (1963) 2 SCR 774; Pratibha Nema v. State of M.P. (2003) 10 SCC 626; Narayana Reddy v. State of Karnataka ILR 1991 (3) KAR 2248; Narayana Raju v. State of Karnataka ILR 1989 KAR 376; Narayana Raju v. State of H

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A Karnataka ILR 1989 KAR 406; State of Gujarat v. Chaturbhai Narsibhai AIR 1975 SC 629: 1975 (3) SCR 284; General Government Servants Co-operative Housing Society Limited v. Kedar Nath (1981) 2 SCC 352 :1981 (3) SCR 46; Mis. Fomento Resorts and Hotels Limited v. Gustavo Ranato Da B . Cruz Pinto AIR 1985 SC 736: 1985 (2) SCR 937; Rattan Chand Hira Chand v. Askar Nawaz Jung JT 1991 (1) SC 433: 1991 (1) SCR 327; Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha v. Narayanamma (2003) 1 SCC 228: 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 97; Subramani v Union of India ILR 1995 Kar C 3139 - referred to.

3. The appellant's challenge to the judgment in the case of respondent No. 3 that even if there was no express approval by the State Government to the acquisition of land, the approval would be deemed to have been granted because the State Government had contributed Rs.100 towards the acquisition of land; and that the decision of the State Government to execute an agreement with the appellant should be construed as its approval of the proposal made for the acquisition of land, lacks merit. The agreement was signed by the Executive Director of the appellant and the State Government in compliance of Section 41, which finds place in Part VII of the 1894 Act. Therefore, a nominal contribution of Rs.100 by the Special Deputy Commissioner cannot be construed as the State Government's implicit approval of the housing scheme which had never been prepared. [Para 33] [381-8-E]

Smt. Somavanti and Ors. v. The State of Punjab and Ors. G (1963) 2 SCR 774; Pratibha Nema v. State of M.P. (2003) 10 SCC 626: 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 890 - Distinguished.

4. The ground of challenge that in view of the provisions contained in Sections 17, 18 and 19 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1884 and Sections 4, 9 and 10 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, the Division Bench

BANGALORE CITY COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. 309 v. STATE OF KARNATAKA did not have the jurisdiction to decide the appeal by relying upon the judgment in *1st H.M. T. case because that was not the ground on which the Single Judge had quashed the acquisition proceedings; that if the Division Bench was of the view that the order of the Single Judge should be sustained on a new ground by relying upon the judgment of this Court in *1st H.M. T. case, then it should have remitted the matter to the Single Judge for fresh disposal of the writ petition, is rejected since the Division Bench had decided the writ appeal preferred by the appellant by relying upon the judgment in *1st H.M. T. c case because the counsel appearing for the parties had agreed for that course. It is nobody's case that the advocate who appeared on behalf of the appellant had not made a request that instead of remanding the case to the Single Bench, the Division Bench should hear the 0 parties on merits and dispose of the matter. Therefore, it is not open for the appellant to make a grievance that the Division Bench had acted in violation of the provisions of the Mysore High Court Act, 1884 and the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. [Paras 35, 36, 37) [382-F-H; 383-C- E G-H]

5.1 The appellant's challenge to the finding recorded by the Division Bench that respondent No. 3 had not been given opportunity of hearing under Section 5A is well-founded. From the proceedings of the Special Land F Acquisition Officer it is found that son of respondent no. 3 had appeared along with his Advocate and after hearing him along with other objectors, the concerned officers submitted report to the State Government. However, this error in the impugned judgment of the Division Bench is G not sufficient for nullifying the conclusion that the acquisition of land was not for a public purpose and that the exercise undertaken by the State Government was vitiated due to the influence of the extraneous considerations. The appellant's challenge to the judgment H

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A in 'PR's case on the ground that no evidence had been produced by the writ petitioner to show that the Estate Agent had indulged in malpractices is rejected in view of the conclusion recorded in relation to the case of respondent No.3. [Para 38) [384-A-D] 8 5.2 The appellant criticized the decision of the State Government to entertain the representation made by respondent No. 3 for withdrawal of the notification, and submitted that notification under Section 48 could not C have been issued without hearing t'1e beneficiary, i.e., the appellant. This argument appears to have substance, but it is not necessary to examine the same in detail because the appellant's challenge to notification dated 3.9.1991, vide which the acquisition of land comprised in Survey No. 50/2 was withdrawn, was negatived by the Single D Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and the appellant is not shown to have challenged the judgment of the Division Bench and insofar as notification dated 25.6'.1999 is concerned, the State Government had withdrawn the same on 15.11.1999. [Para 39] [384-E-H] E Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1998) 4 SCC 387; State Government House/ess Harijan Employees' Association v. State of Karnataka (2001) 1 SCC 610 - referred to. F 6.1 The submission of the appellant that they have already spent Rs. 18. 73 crores for formation of the layouts and 1791 plots were allotted to the members, out of which, 200 have already constructed their houses; they pointed out that 50% of the land was given to the G BOA for providing civil amenities and 16154 sq. ft. was given to Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation, and as such it is a fit case for invoking the doctrine of prospective overruling so that those who have already constructed houses may not suffer incalculable harm, can·not be accepted. [Paras 40 and 41] [385-A-C]

BANGALORE CITY COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. 311 v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 6.2 The instant case is not a fit case for invoking the doctrine of prospective overruling because that would result in conferring legitimacy to the influence of money power over the rule of law, which is the edifice of our Constitution. The Estate Agent, namely, 'RE' with whom the appellant had entered into an agreement dated B 21.2.1988 had played crucial role in the acquisition of land. The tenor of that agreement does not leave any manner of doubt that the Estate Agent has charged huge money from the appellant for getting the notifications issued under Sections 4(1) a1_1d 6(1) of the 1894 Act and c sanction of layout plan by the BOA. The respondents could not have produced any direct evidence that the Estate Agent had paid money for facilitating the acquisition of land but it is not too difficult for any person of reasonable prudence to presume that the appellant had parted with crores of rupees knowing fully well that a substantial portion thereof would be used by the Estate Agent for manipuJating the State apparatus. Therefore, there is no any justification to invoke the doctrine of prospective overruling and legitimize what was found by the Division Bench of the High Court to be ex-facie illegal. [Paras 40, 41] [385-G-H; 386-B-E]

ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 576; Abhey Ram v. Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 421: 1997 (3) SCR 931; Baburam v. C.C. Jacob (1999) 3 F SCC 362; Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd. v. State of U.P. (2001) 5 SCC 519: 2001 (3) SCR 33; Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N. (2002) 3 SCC 533: 2002 (2) SCR 383; Sarwan Kumar v. Madan Lal Aggarwal (~003) 4 SCC 147: 2003 (1) SCR 918; Girias Investment Private Limited v. State of G Karnataka (2008) 7 SCC 53; G. Mal/ikarjunappa v. Shamanur Shivashankarappa; (2001) 4 SCC 428; Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh (2006) 1 SCC 75: 2005 (5) Suppl. SCR 157; /. C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643: (1967) 2 SCR 762 - referred to. H

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A 7. Keeping in view the fact that some of the members of the appellant may have built their houses on the sites allotted to them, liberty is given to the appellant to negotiate with the respondents for purchase of their land at the. prevailing market price and hope that the B landowners would, notwithstanding the judgments of the High Court and this Court, agree to accept the market price so that those who have built the houses may not suffer. At the same time, it is made clear that the appellant must return the vacant land to the respondents c irrespective of the fact that it may have carved out the sites and allotted the same to its members. This must be done within the stipulated period and during that period the appellant shall not change the present status of the vacant area/sites. The members of the appellant who may have been allotted the. sites shall also not change the D present status/character of the land. [Para 43] [387-B-D] Case Law Reference: ILR 1995 KAR 3139 Referred to Para 5.4 E (1971) 1 sec 785 Referred to Para 7.2 2008 (7) SCR 852 Referred to Para 7.2 (1969) 1 sec 110 Relied on Paras

F (1974) 2 sec 501 Referred to Para 13 1976 (1) SCR 369 Referred to Para 13 (1980) 2 sec 83 Referred to Para 13 1984 (3) SCR 417 Referred to Para 13 G 1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 551 Referred to Para 13 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 512 Referred to Para 13 2008 (2) SCR 521 Referred to Para13 H

BANGALORE CITY COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. 313 v. STATE OF KARNATAKA (1963) 1 SCR 675 Referred to Para 14 A (1969) 2 SCR 29 Referred to Para 14 (1973) 2 sec 56 Referred to Para 14 (1973) 3 sec 129 Referred to Para 14 B 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 10 Referred to Para 14 (1991) 2 sec 408 · Referred to Para 14 1991 Supp (2) sec 587 Referred to Para 14 2003 (3) SCR 197 Referred to Para 14 c 2004 (3) SCR 584 Referred to Para 14 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 648 Referred to Para 14 2009 (10) SCR 739 Referred to Para 14 D 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 97 Referred to Para 15 ILR 1991 (3) KAR 2248 Referred to Para 24 ILR 1989 KAR 376 Referred to Para 24 E ILR 1989 KAR 406 Referred to Para 21 1975 (3) SCR 284 Referred to Para 24 1981 (3) SCR 46 Referred to Para 24 F 1985 (2) SCR 937 Referred to Para 24 1991 (1) SCR 327 Referred to Para 25 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 97 Referred to Para 30 1995 (2) SCR 200 Para 32 G Relied on (1995) 3 sec 128 Relied o·n Para 32 (2001) 9 sec 304 Referred to Para32 (1963) 2 SCR 774 Distinguished Para 33 H

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A 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 890 Distinguished Para 33 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 576 Referred to Para 40 1997 (3) SCR 931 Referred to Para 40

B (1999) 3 sec 362 Referred to Para 40 2001 (3) SCR 33 Referred to Para 40 2002 (2) SCR 383 Referred to Para 40 2003 (1) SCR 918 Referred to Para 40 c (2008) 1 sec 53 Referred to Para 40 (2001) 4 sec 428 Referred to Para 40 2005 (5) Suppl. SCR 157 Referred to Para 40 D (1967) 2 SCR 762 Referred to Para 41 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 7245-7426 of 2002.

From the Judgment & Order dated 16.3.1998 & 9. 7.1999 E of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Appeal No. 9913 of 1996 & Civil Petition No. 366 of 1998.

WITH

F C.A. No. 774-778 of 2005

Dushyant Dave, P. Vishwanatha Shetty, Shashi Kiran Shetty, M. Sreenivasa, Bramjeet Mishra, Yatish Mohan, Haripriya Padmanabhan, E.G. Vidya Sagar, V. Mohana for the Appellant. G P.P. Rao; R.S. Hegde, Chandra Prakash, Amit Wadhwa, AS. Bhasme, P.P .. Singh, Sanjay R. Hegde, A. Rohen Singh, Ramesh K. Mishra, Ramesh S. Jadhav, Vikrant Yadav for the Respondent. H

BANGALORE CITY COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. 315 v. STATE OF KARNATAKA