INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS IA N0.36 AND IA N0.44

Tools
Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
(year only)
Bench
DALVEER BHANDARI and H.L. DATTU
Citation
[2011] 9 S.C.R. 146
Whole judgment (for printing)

Source PDF (original scan)
Contains information from the Indian High Court / Supreme Court Judgments dataset, licensed under CC-BY-4.0

Judgment · Supreme Court of India · decided (year only) · Bench: DALVEER BHANDARI and H.L. DATTU

[2011] 9 S.C.R. 146

Machine-read from a scanned report. Check the printed page before citing. Report an error.

Headnote — Supreme Court Reports (editorial summary, not part of the judgment)

Catchwords

Abuse of process of law - Chemical industries causing damage to the ecology by throwing untreated toxic sludge in the open - Toxic substances percolated deep into the bowels } of earth polluting the acquifers and the sub-terrain supply of 0 water as also rendering the soil unfit for cultivation - Supreme Court by its judgment dated 13.2.1996 directing to close down the industrial units and attachment of their plants, machinery and all other immovable assets as also directing remediation at the cost of the polluters industrial units - By order dated 4.11.1997, the cost of remediation assessed to Rs.37.385 crores - Review and curative petitions dismissed - Several interim applications filed by the industrial units also dismissed - Again two I As filed by the industrial units-

Held

This is a classic example of abuse of the process of law and is indeed F a very serious matter concerning the sanctity and credibility of the judicial system in general and of the apex Court in particular - All the issues raised in the instant applications had already been argued and determined by an authoritative judgment of the Court - The applications have been filed to avoid liability to pay the amount for remediation and costs imposed by the Court on the 'polluter pays' principle - Permitting the parties to reopen the concluded judgment of the Court by filing repeated interlocutory applications is clearly an abuse of the process of law and would have far reaching H 146

Catchwords

Finality of judgment - Chemical industrial units causing damage to ecology - Judgment by Supreme Court directing closure- of industrial units and remediation at their cost - Review and curative petitions dismissed - Industrial units c keeping on filing interim applications - Judgment of the Court not complied with -

Held

It should be presumed that every proceeding has gone through infiltration several times before -<. the decision of the apex Court - The controversy between the parties must come to an end at some stage and the judgment of the apex Court must be permitted to acquire finality - Various cases of different jurisdictions discussed and exceptions indicated - A final judgment of the Court cannot be reopened by merely filing interlocutory applications where all possible legal remedies have been fully exhausted - In a E country governed by the rule of law, finality of the judgment is absolutely imperative and great sanctity is attached to the finality of the judgment. Permitting the parties to reopen the L concluded judgments of the Court by filing repeated interlocutory applications is clearly an abuse of the process of law and would have far reaching adverse impact on the administration of justice - The principles laid down in judgments of various cosurts summed up - Maxim, 'interest 4, republicae ut sit finis litium' - Explained - Environmental law. G UNJUST ENRICHMENT:

Catchwords

Unjust enrichment -Concept of - Discussed -

Held

Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another - In the instant case, by the judgment dated

Catchwords

RESTITUTION: E 'Unjust enrichment' and 'restitution' - Explained -

Held

The courts have wide powers to grant restitution, and more so where it relates to misuse or non-compliance with court orders - Even if no benefit had been retained or availed even then, to do justice, the debtor must pay the money - It is not only disgorging all the benefits but making the creditor whole, i.e., ordering restitution in full, and not dependent on what he might have made or benefited is what justice requires - The need for restitution in relation to court proceedings gives full jurisdiction to the court to pass appropriate orders that levelises - The court has only to levelise and not go further • into the realm of penalty which will be a separate area for consideration altogether - Environmental law. COMPOUND INTEREST: H Compound interest, keeping in view unjust enrichment

Catchwords

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 149 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. and restitution ~ Discussed - Chemical industries causing damage to ecology - Supreme Court directing remediation at the cost of polluter industries - On 4. 11. 1997 industries directed to pay Rs.37.385 crores as remediation cost- Non- compliance of the order -

Held

To do complete justice, prevent wrongs, remove incentive for wrongdoing or delay, and to implement in practical terms the concepts of Time Value of Money, restitution and unjust enrichment, or to simply leve/ise, interest has to be calculated on compound basis as it also takes into account the inflationary trends - Some of the statute law provide only for simple interest and not c compound interest - It is a matter of law reform which the Law Commission must take note of - Law Commission is suggested to consider and recommend necessary amendments in relevant laws - However, the power of the court to order compound interest by way of restitution is not 0 fettered in any way - the applicants are directed to pay Rs.37.385 crores along with compound interest@ 12% per annum from 4. 11. 199 7 till the amount is paid/recovered - Environmental law - Restitution - Unjust enrichment - Legislation ,... Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s.34. E COSTS:

Imposition of realistic costs and punitive costs -

Held

In consonance with the principle of equity, justice and good conscience, courts should ensure that legal process is not abused by litigants in any manner - It is the bounden duty of courts to ensure that dishonesty and any attempt to abuse the legal process must be effectively curbed and courts must ensure that there is no wrongful, unauthorised or unjust gain for anyone by the abuse of the process of court- Besides the realistic costs, courts wol.Jld be fully justified even imposing punitive costs where legal process has been abused.

Held

1.1. This is a very unusual and extraordinary c litigation where even after fifteen years of the final judgment of this Court delivered on 13.2.1996, the litigation has been deliberately kept alive by filing one _.. interlocutory application or the other in order to avoid compliance of the judgment. The said judgment of this D Court has not been permitted to acquire finality till date. This is a classic example how by abuse of the process of law even the final judgment of the apex court can be circumvented for more than a decade and a half. This is indeed a very serious matter concerning the sanctity and credibility of the judicial system in general and of the apex Court in particular. [p~ra 1] [170-D-F] IAs 36 and 44 -f 1.2. The applications are a serious attempt to discredit the NEERI report of 1996 once again. The sole object of filing of the application is to introduce before this Court recent reports prepared by experts at the behest of the applicant to demonstrate to the Court that before ... embarking upon remediation measures and for the said purposes putting the properties of the applicant to sale, the status and conditions of water, soil and environment in the area be reviewed with a view to realistically ascertain whether any measures for remediation are called for at all in the area and ifyes, then the nature and. H

Reporter's headnote (continued) and case details

p. 146

A IN B WRIT PETITION (C) No.967 OF 1989 JULY 18, 2011

C ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE:

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 147 -~ ..+,..,., UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ' ~ adverse impact on the administration of justice - The A applicants had adequate opportunity and were heard by the Court on a number of occasions - The applications being dev.oid of any merit are dismissed with costs of Rs. 1O lakhs .,, which would be utilised for carrying out remedial measures \ in the affected area - Environmental Law - 'Polluter pays' B principle - Costs.

p. 148

A- A 13.2.1996 Supreme Court fixed the liability of the polluter industries - It was on the lines of a preliminary decree - By order dated 4. 11. 1997 the Court accepting the ascertainment, fixed the amount at Rs. 37.385 crores - The liability to pay arose on 4.11.1997 - This was in the lines of a final decree B pursuant to a preliminary decree - Thus, the position of the polluter industrial units was of a Judgment-debtor' - The industrial units did not pay the amount but sought to postpone the payment and in the meantime utilised the said amount and thereby got themselves benefited - As a consequence, C State authorities were deprived of the use of that amount for taking remedial measures - It is settled principle that no one can take advantage of his own wrong - Whatever benefits a person has had or could have had by not complying with the judgment must be disgorged and paid to the judgment- D creditor and not allowed to be retained by the judgment-debtor - This is the bounden duty and obligation of the court - Environmental Law.

Writ Petition No.967 of 1989 was filed before the Supreme Court, stating that the chemical industries, namely, respondents no. 4 to 8 which were controlled by H

p. 150

A the same group, namely, Hindustan Agro Chemicals Limited (respondent no. 4) set up in village Bichhri, of district Udaipur in Rajashtan, had caused damage to the ecology of the village and the surrounding area inasmuch as the untreated toxic sludge had been thrown , s in the open in and around the complex by the said industrial units, and the toxic substances had percolated deep into the bowels of the earth polluting the aquifers and the sub-terrain supply of water rendering the water in the wells and the streams unfit for human c consumption. It had even become unfit for cattle to drink and for irrigating the land. The soil had become polluted and unfit for cultivation, which was the main source of livelihood for the villagers. The Court by its judgment dated 13.2.1996, directed closure of all the plants and factories of respondents no. 4 to 8 located in the village, 0 and attachment of their factories, plant, machinery and all other immovable assets; and ap_:.lying the 'polluter pays' principle, directed that the whole of the contaminated area be developed as a green belt at the expense of respondents no. 4 to 8. On the basis of the report of the E NEERI, the extent of contamination done by the plants of respondents 4 to 8 was evaluated; and, by order dated 4.11.1997 the industrial units were asked to pay Rs. 37 .385 crores towards the costs of remediation to the government. The review the curative petitions were F dismissed. However, the orders of the Court could not be implemented till date because respondent nos. 4 to 8 kept on filing interlocutory applications.

Footnotes

4 (HACL) filed the instant I.A.
36 G stating that as on date there was no pollution existing in the area, no remediation was required to be done in the area and, therefore, there was no necessity for the Court to sell its assets in order to carry out any remediation in the area. The applicant, in support of its case sought to introduce before the Court ·the opinions of various

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 151 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. experts engaged by it for the purpose. It was prayed that the Court may pass the consequential order directing forclosing the proceedings and to lift the attachment order dated 13.2.1996. By I.A. No~ 44 respondent no. 4, " prayed to seek an investigation into the reports of April, -i 1994 prepared by the NEERI, which was employed by the 8 ' R.S.P.C.B. to evaluate the extent of contamination done by the applicant's· plants in the village concerned.

Dismissing the I. As., the Court

p. 152

A the current cost of the same may be ascertained. According to the applicant, the report of NEERI relied upon by this Court was not the authentic report which was officially prepared. There is a serious attempt to reopen the entire case which stands fully concluded by the judgment of this Court delivered on 13.2.1996. It may be pertinent to mention that even the review and curative petitions have also been dismissed but the applicant did not comply with the orders passed by this Court. The report had been considered by this Court at length on its own merits and the observations of the Court on the report are contained in the judgment pronounced by it on 13.2.1996. [para 29-31, 42, 49 and 64] [196-B-G; 199-G; 211-G; 220-G-H; 221-A]

1.3. All issues raised in the applications have been argued and determined by an authoritative judgment of this Court in its judgment dated 13.2.1996. The applications have been filed to avoid liability to pay the amount for remediation and costs imposed by the Court on the settled legal principle, i.e. "polluter pays" principle. E The applicant is making an effort to avoid compliance of the order/judgment of this Court delivered fifteen years ago. The tendency must be effectively curbed. The applicant cannot be permitted to avoid compliance of the final order of this Court by abusing the legal process and F keep the litigation alive. The Court must discourage such tactics and ensure effective compliance of the Court's order. It is also the obligation and bounden duty of the court to pass such order where litigants are prevented from abusing the system. [para 47-48) [211-8-F] G 1.4. In its order dated 4.11.1997, this Court held that the remedial measures taken on the basis of the NEERI report shall be treated as final; and accepted the proposal submitted by the Government of India for the purpose of taking remedial measures by appointing National H

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 153 ....~ UNION OF INDIA & ORS. · Productivity Council as the Project Management A Consultant and held that the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India has rightly made a demand for Rs.37.385 crores. The applicants had adequate ·1 opportunity and were heard by the court at length on " number of occasions and only thereafter the writ petition B was disposed of. The applicants now want to reopen the case by filing. these interlocutory applications. [para 84 and 156] [227-G-H; 228-A-B; 257-B]

1.5. The applicants certainly cannot be provided an entry by back door method nor can the unsuccessful c litigants to be permitted to re-agitate and reargue their cases. The applicants have filed these applications merely to avoid compliance of the order of the court. The -( applicants have been successful in their endeavour and have not permitted the judgment delivered on 3.2.1996 to D acquire finality till date. It is strange that other respondents did not implement the final order of this. Court without there being any order or direction of this Court. These applications being devoid of any merit deserve to be dismissed with heavy costs. [para 157] E (257-D-E]

M. C. Mehta and Another v. Union of India and Others .f (O/eum Gas Leak Case) 1987 (1) SCR 819 = (1987) 1 SCC 395; Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra & Another 2002 (2) F SCR 1006 = (2002) 4 SCC 388; Indian Council for Enviro- Legal Action and others v. Union of India and Others 1996 (2) SCR 503 = (1996) 3 SCC 212; M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath and others 2000 (1) Suppl. SCR 389 = (2000) 6 SCC 213 · .. - referred to . G Minister for the environment and Heritage v. Greentree (No.3) [2004] FCA 1317, United States v. Hooker Chems and Plastics Corp., 722 F. Supp 960 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) - referred to. H

p. 154

A Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991111- referred to.

FINALITY OF JUDGMENT ,. 2.1. The maxim 'interest republicae ut sit finis litium' says that it is for the public good that there be an end of litigation after a long hierarchy of appeals. At some stage, , it is necessary to put a quietus. It is not rare that in an adversarial system, despite the judges of the highest Court doing their best, one or more parties may remain unsatisfied with the most correct decision. Opening door for a further appeal could be opening a flood gate which will cause more wrQngs in the society at large at the cost of rights. It should be presumed that every proceeding has gone th"rough infiltration several times before the decision of the apex Court. [para 114-115) [238-D·F] D 2.2. Departure from the normal principle that the court's judgment is final would be justified only when compelling and substantial circumstances make it necessary to do so. Such circumstances may be that a E material statutory provision was not drawn to the court's attention at the original hearing or a manifest wrong has been done. Reviewing of various cases of different jurisdictions lead to irresistible conclusion that though the judgments of the apex Court can also be reviewed or recalled but it must be done in extremely exceptional circumstances where there is gross violation of principles of natural justice. It is reiterated that the finality of the judgment of the apex.Court has great sanctity and unless there are extremely compelling or exceptional circumstances, the judgments of the apex Court should not be disturbed particularly in a case where review and curative petitions have already been dismissed. [para 118, 153 and 219) [239-D-E; 255-D-E; 278-C] Union of India & Another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by H L.Rs. 1989 (3) SCR 316 = (1989) 2 SCC 754; Mohd. Aslam

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. · 155 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. Union of India & Others 1996 (3) SCR 782 = (1996) 2 SCC A 749; Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Another v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 190 = (1996) 3 SCC 114; Gurbachan Singh & Another v. Union of India & Another 1996 (2) SCR 400 = (1996) 3 SCC ., 117; Babu Singh Bains and others v. Union of India and 8 ' Others 1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 120 = (1996) 6 SCC 565; P. Ashokan v. Union of India & Another 1998 (1) SCR 717 = (1998) 3 SCC 56; Ajit Kumar Barat v. Secretary, Indian Tea Association & Others (2001) 5 SCC 42; Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra and another 1966 SCR 744 =AIR 1967 SC 1; Mr. "X" v. Hospital "Z" (2000)9 SCC C 439; Triveniben v. State of Gujarat 1989 (1) SCR 509 = (1989) 1 SCC 678; Sumer v. State of U.P. 2005 (7) SCC 220 (2005) 7 SCC 220; Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT, Delhi & Others 2009 (14) SCR 507 = (2009) 10 sec 501; M. 0 Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka and others 2011 (2) SCR 435 = (2011) 3 sec 408 - relied on. J Regina v. Gough, [1993] 1A.C.646; Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal, (1852) 3 H.L. Cases 759; R v. Bow E Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) (1999) 2 W.L.R. 272; Regina (Edwards) v Environment Agency and others [2010] UKSC 57, The (U.K.) Supreme Court Rules, 2009, 2009 No. 1603 (L. 17); Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada [2003) 2 SCR 259; Taylor F Ventures Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Taylor 2005 BCCA 350; State Rail Authority of New South Wales v. Code/fa Constructions Propriety Limited (1982) 150 CLR. 29; Bailey v. Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529; DJL v. Central Authority (2000) 170 ALR 659; Lexcray Pty. Ltd. v. Northern Territory of Australia G 2003 NTCA 11; United States of America v. Ohio Power Company 353 US 98 (1957), 149; Raymond G. Cahill v. The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company 351 US 183; Re Transferred Civil Servants (Ireland) Compensation (1929) AC 242, 248-52; and State Rail H

156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 'S.C.R.

A Authority NSW v Code/fa Construction Pty Ltd (1982) HCA 51 . (1982) 150 CLR 29, Smith v NSW Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 252; and Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) HCA 6 : (1993) 176 CLR 300 - referred to. I B 2.3. However, a case stands on different footing where the aggrieved party filing a review or curative petition was not a party to the lis but the judgment adversely affected his interest or he was party to the lis was not served with notice of the proceedings and the C matter proceeded as if he had notice. [para 155) [255-G) State of M.P. v. Sugar Singh & Others 2010 (3) SCR 159 - relied on } 2.4. This Court has consistently taken the view that 0 the judgments delivered by this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution cannot be reopened in a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. In view of this legal position, a final judgment of this Court cannot be reopened by merely filing interlocutory applications where all possible legal remedies have been fully exhausted. In the facts of the instant case, it becomes abundantly clear that this Court delivered final judgment in this case way back in 1996. The said judgment has not been permitted to acquire finality because the respondent Nos. 4 to 8 had filed multiple interlocutory applications and has ensured non- compliance of the judgment of this Court. It may be pertinent to mention that even after dismissal of review and the curative petition on 18.7.2002, the applicants G (respondent Nos. 4 to 8) have been repeatedly filing one petition or the other in order to keep the litigation alive. It is indeed astonishing tha.t the orders of this Court have not been implemented till date. The applicants have made all possible efforts to avoid compliance of the judgment H

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION· v. 157 -<,,. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. of this Court. This is a clear case of abuse of process of A the court. [para 220] [278-D-F; 280-D-E]

2.5. The controversy between the parties must come to an end at some stage and the judgment of this Court 1, must be permitted to acquire finality. It would hardly be B 't proper to permit the parties to file application after application endlessly. In a country governed by the rule of law, finality of the judgment is absolutely imperative and great sanctity is attached to the finality of the judgment. Permitting the parties to reopen the concluded judgments of this Court by filing repeated interlocutory c applications is clearly an abuse of the process of law and would have far reaching adverse impact on the administration of justice. [para 115] [238-F-H; 239-A] -' Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. v. The Regional Assistant D Commissioner of Sa/es Tax, Jabalpur 1976 ( 3 ) SCR 99 = (1976) 4 SCC 124; Green View Tea & Industries v. Collector, Golaghat and Another (2002) 1 SCC 109; Mis Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi 1980 (2) SCR 650 =(1980) 2 sec 167 - relied on E 2.6. The principles laid down in the judgments of various courts, can be enumerated as follows:

·~ (i) The judgment of the apex Court has great sanctity and unless there are extremely compelling, F overriding and exceptional circumstances, the judgment of the apex Court should not be disturbed, particularly, in a case where review and curative petitions have already been dismissed .... G (ii) The exception to this general rule is where in the proceedings the judge concerned failed to disclose the connection with the subject matter or the parties giving scope of an apprehension of bias and the judgment adversely affected the petitioner. H

158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A (iii) The other exception to the rule is that the circumstances incorporated in the review or curative petition are such that they must inevitably shake public confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice if the judgment or order is allowed to stand. [para 221] [278-G-H; 279-A-C]

These categories are illustrative and not exhaustive but only in such extremely exceptional circumstances the order can be recalled in order to avoid irremedial injustice. [para 222] [279-C-D]

UNJUST l:NRICHMENT 3.1. 'Unjust enrichment' has been defined by the court as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of 0 another, or the retention of money or property of another ~ against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. A person is enriched if he has received a benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if retention of the benefit would be unjust. Unjust enrichment of a person E occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another. [para 171] [260- C-D]

Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition (Bryan A. Gamer) at page 1573;_"Justice, Courts and Delays" by Dr. Arun F Mohan - referred to. 3.2. By the judgment dated 13.02.1996 this court fixed the liability but did not fix any specific amount, which was ordered to be ascertained. It was on the lines of a G preliminary decree in a suit which determines the liability, .. but leaves the precise amount to be ascertained in further proceedings and upon the process of ascertainment being completed, a final decree for payment of the precise amount is passed. By judgment dated 4.11.1997 this Court, accepting the ascertainment,

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 159 .,... -\,. UNION OF INDIA & ORS . fixed the amount i.e. Rs.37.385 crores. The exact liability was quantified which the applicant- HACL was under an obligation to pay. The liability to pay arose on that particular date i.e. 4.11.1997. This was in the lines of a final ,. decree pursuant to a preliminary decree. On that • judgment being passed, the position of the applicant in B I.A. No.44 was that of 'judgment-debtor' and the applicant became liable to pay forthwith. (para 159-162] [257-F-H; 258-A-F]

3.3. Admittedly, the amount has not been paid. Instead, the applicants sought to postpone the payment c by raising various challenges in this Court and in the meantime 'utilised' that money, i.e., benefited. As a ~ consequence, the non-applicants (respondents-states herein) were 'deprived' of the use of that money for taking remedial measures. The challenge has now - D nearly 14 years later - been finally decided against them. It is settled principle of law that no one can take advantage of his own wrong. [para 163 and 165) [258-F- G; 259-0] E 3.4. Unless courts disgorge all benefits that a party availed by obstruction or delays or non-compliance, there will always be incentive for non compliance. i. Whatever benefits a person has had or could have had by not complying with the judgment must be disgorged and paid to the judgment creditor and not allowed to be retained by the judgment-debtor. This is the bounden duty and obligation of the court. In fact,· it has to be looked from the position of the creditor. Unless the • deprivation by reason of delay is fully restituted, the creditor as a beneficiary remains a loser to the extent of the un-restituted amount. [para 167-168) [259-F-G] Schockv. Nash, 732 A.2d 217, 232-33 (Delaware. 1999). USA); Fibrosa v. Fairbairn, [1942) 2 All ER 122; Nelson v. Larholt [1947) 2 All ER 751 - referred to. H

160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A 3.5. In order to neutralize any unjust enrichment and undeserved gain made by the litigants, while adjudicating, the courts must keep the following principles in view: (i) It is the bounden duty and obligation of the court to neutralize any unjust enrichment and B undeserved gain made by any party by invoking the jurisdiction of the court.

(ii) When a party applies and gets a stay or injunction from the court, it is always at the c risk and responsibility of the party applying. An order of stay cannot be presumed to be conferment of additional right upon the litigating party. (iii) Unscrupulous litigants be prevented from taking undue advantage by invoking jurisdiction of the Court. (iv) A person in wrongful possession should not only be removed from that place as early as possible but be compelled to pay for wrongful use of that premises fine, penalty and costs. Any leniency would seriously affect the credibility of the judicial system. , F (v) No litigant can derive benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a court of law. (vi) A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs. G (vii) Litigation should not be permitted to turn Into • a fruitful industry so that the unscrupulous litigants are encouraged to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. (viii) The institution of litigation cannot be permitted H

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 161 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. to confer any advantage on a party by delayed A action of courts. [para 223] [279-D-H; 280-A-D]

RESTITUTION

4.1. Unjust enrichment is basic to the subject of restitution, and is indeed approached as a fundamental 8 principle thereof. The terms 'unjust enrichment' and 'restitution' are usually linked together, and restitution is frequently based upon the theory of unjust enrichment. However, although unjust enrichment is often referred to or regarded as a ground for restitution, it is perhaps more accurate to regard it as a prerequisite, for, usually there can be no restitution without unjust enrichment. T h e terms 'unjust enrichment' and 'restitution' are like the two shades of green - one leaning towards yellow and the other towards blue. With restitution, so long as the deprivation of the other has not been fully compensated for, injustice to that extent remains. Which label is appropriate under which circumstances would depend on the facts of the particular case before the court. The courts have wide powers to grant restitution, and more so where it relates to misuse or non-compliance with court orders. [para 179 and 182] [262-F-G; 263-D]

South-Eastern Coalfields 2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 651 = 2003 (8) SCC 648; Sahakari Khand Udyog Manda/ Ltd vs F Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs 2005 (2 ) SCR 606 =(2005) 3 sec 738 - relied on American Jurisprudence 2d. Volume 66 Am Jur 2d - referred to. G 4.2. Restitution and unjust enrichment, along with an overlap, have to be viewed with reference to the two stages, i.e., pre-suit and post-suit. In the former case, it becomes a substantive law (or common law) right that the court will consider; but in the latter case, when the H

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A parties are before the court and any act/omission, or simply passage of time, results in deprivation of one, or unjust enrichment of the other, the jurisdiction of the court to levelise and do justice is independent and must be readily wielded, otherwise it will be allowing the B court's own process, along with time delay, to do injustice. For this second stage (post-suit), the need for restitution in relation to court proceedings, gives full jurisdiction to the court, to pass appropriate orders that levelise. Only the court has to levelise and not go further c into the realm of penalty which will be a separate area for consideration altogether. [para 183-184) (263-F-H; 264-A]

Bank of America Canada vs Mutual Trust Co. (2002) 2 SCR 601 = 2002 SCC 43 - referred to. > D Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metal/gesel/schaft Limited) v Her Majesty's Commissioners of Inland Revenue and = = Another [2007] UKHL 34 [2007] 3 WLR 354 [2008] 1 AC = 561 (2007) All ER (D) 294 - referred to.

E 4.3. The liability may also be understood in the form of recovery of a bank loan. If payment of an amount equivalent of what the ledger account in the bank on a clean loan would have shown as a debit balance today is not paid and something less than that is paid, that differential or shortfall is what there has been : (1) failure > F to restitute; (2) unfair gain by the non-complier; and (3) provided the incentive to obstruct or delay payment. Unless this differential is paid, justice has not been done to the creditor. It only encourages non-compliance and litigation. Even if no benefit had been retained or availed • G even then, to do justice, the debtor must pay the money. This is not only disgorging all the benefits but making the creditor whole i.e. ordering restitution in full and not dependent on what he might have made or benefitted is what justice requires. [para 188-190) 264-G-H; 265-A-C] H

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 163 · UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Grindlays Bank Limited vs Income Tax Officer, Calcutta A (1980) 2 SCC 191; Ram Krishna Verma and Others vs State of U.P. and Others 1992 (2) SCR 378 = (1992) 2 SCC Kavita Trehan vs Balsara Hygiene Products 1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 340 = (1994) 5 SCC 380; Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi 1 • Oretrans (P) Ltd. and Another 1999 (1) SCR 311 = (1999) 2 B sec 325 - relied on Padmawati vs Harijan Sewak Sangh - CM (Main) No.449 of 2002 decided by the Delhi high Court on 6.11.2008, approved . c Compound Interest

4.4. 'Compound interest' is 'interest paid on both the . principal and the previously accumulated interest.' It is a method of arriving at a figure which nears the 'Time Value o of Money'. Compound interest is a norm for all commercial transactions. [para 205-206) [271-E-F]

Alok Shanker Pandey vs Union of India & Others 2007 (2 ) SCR 737 = (2007) 3 sec 545 - relied on. E Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition (Bryan A. Garner) page 830;and 'The Principles of the Law of Restitution" (at pp26-27) by Graham Virgo - referred to. 4.5. To do complete justice, prevent wrongs, remove incentive for wrongdoing or delay, and to implement in practical terms .the concepts of Time Value of Money, restitution and unjust enrichment- or to simply levelise - a convenient approach is calculating interest. But here :.. interest has to be calculated on compound_ basis - and not simple - for the latter leaves much uncalled for benefits in the hands of the wrongdoer. [para 202) [270- G-H; 271-A] 4.6. Further, a related concept of. inflation is also to be kept in mind and the concept of compound interest H

164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A takes into account, by reason of prevailing rates, both these factors, i.e., use of the money and the inflationary trends, as the market forces and predictions work out. [para 203) [271-B] Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. and 8 Another 1999 (1) SCR 311 = (1999) 2 SCC 325; Ouseph Mathai and others v. M. Abdul Khadir 2001 (5) Suppl. SCR = 118 (2002) 1 SCC 319; South Eastern Coalfields Limited v. State of M.P. and others 2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 651 = C (2003) 8 SCC 648; Amarjeet Singh and others v. Devi Ratan and others 2009 (15) SCR 1010 = (2010) 1 SCC 417; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania and others 2010 (10) SCR 971 = (2010) 9 sec 437 - relied on. LEGAL POSITION UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL D PROCEDURE 4.7. One reason the law has not developed on this is because of the wording of s. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which still proceeds on the basis of simple interest. In fact, it is this difference which prompts E much of our commercial litigation because the debtor feels - calculates and assesses - that to cause litigation and then to contest with obstructions and delays will be beneficial because the court is empowered to allow only simple interest. A case for law reform on this is a separate , F issue. [para 191) [256-E-F] 4.8. Some. of our statute law provide only for simple interest and not compound interest. In those situations, the courts are helpless and it is a matter of law reform which the Law Commission must take note and more so, G because the serious effect it has on administration of justice. The Law Commission is requested to consider and recommend necessary amendments in relevant laws. However, the power of the court to order compound interest by way of restitution is not fettered in any way. H [para 204) [271-C-D]

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 165 UNION OF INDIA & ORS .. 4.9. In the point under consideration, which does not arise from a suit for recovery under the Code of Civil Procedure, the inherent powers of the Court and the prJnciples of justice and equity are each sufficient to enable an order directing payment of compound interest. The power to order compound interest as part of restitution cannot be disputed, otherwise there can never be restitution. [para 192) [265-G]

4.10. The Court in its order dated 04.11.1997 while accepting the report of the MOEF directed the applicant C ·- M/s Hindustan Agro Chemical Ltd. to pay a sum of Rs.37.385 crores towards the costs of remediation. The amount which ought to have been deposited way back in 1997 has yet not been deposited by keeping the litigation alive. This Court is clearly of the opinion that the applicant-industry concerned must deposit the amount 0 as directed by this Court by order dated 4.11.1997 with compound interest. The applicant-industry has deliberately not complied with the orders of this court since 4.11.1997. Thousands of villagers have been adversely affected because no effective remedial steps E have been taken so far. The applicant-industry has succeeded in their design in not complying with the court's order by keeping the litigation alive. Consequently, the applicant-industry is directed to pay Rs.37.385 crores along with compound interest@ 12% F per annum from 4.11.1997 till the amount is paid or recovered. [para 225· 227) [280-F-H; 281-A-C] Costs:

5.1. In consonance with the principle of equity, justice G and good con!!cience judges should ensure that the legal process is not abused by the litigants in any manner. The court should never permit a litigant to perpetuate illegality by abusing the legal process. It is the bounden duty of the court to ensure that dishonesty and any attempt to H

166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A abuse the legal process must be effectively curbed and the court must ensure that there is no wrongful, unauthorized or unjust gain for anyone by the abuse of the process of the court. One way to curb this tendency is to impose realistic costs, which the respondent or the B defendant has in fact incurred in order to defend himself in the legal proceedings. The courts would be fully justified even imposing punitive costs where legal process has been abused. No one should be permitted to use the judicial process for earning undeserved gains c or unjust profits. The court must effectively discourage fraudulent, unscrupulous and dishonest litigation.(para 216] (276-G-H; 277-A-B]

5.2. The court's constant endeavour must be to ensure that everyone gets just and fair treatment. The D court while rendering justice must adopt a pragmatic approach and in appropriate cases realistic costs and compensation be ordered in order to discourage dishonest litigation. The object and true meaning of the concept of restitution cannot be achieved or E accomplished unless the courts adopt a pragmatic approach in dealing with the cases. [para 217] [277-C-D]

Ramrameshwari Devi and Others v. Nirma/a Devi and Others 2011(6) Scale 677 - relied on. F 5.3. Even after final judgment of this Court, the litigation has been kept alive for almost 15 years. The respondents have been compelled to defend this litigation for all these years. Enormous court's time has been wasted for all these years. On consideration of the G totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, the applicant-industry is directed to pay costs of Rs.10 lakhs in both the Interlocutory Applications. The amount of costs would also be utilized for carrying out remedial measure in village Bichhri and surrounding areas in H Udaipur District of Rajasthan on the direction of the

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 167 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ·•-.. authorities concerned. [para 228-229) [281-D-F] A Case Law Reference: 1987 (1) SCR 819 referred to para 21 2002 (2) SCR 1006 referred to para 66 8 '~

1996 (2) SCR 503 referred to para 75 . 2000 (1) Suppl. SCR 389 referred to para 102 [2004) FCA 1317 referred to para 104 c 722 F. Supp 960 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) referred to para 106 .... 1976 (3) SCR 99 relied on para 116 ~

2002 (1) sec 109 relied on para 117 D

1980 (2) SCR 650 relied on para 118 1989 (3) SCR 316 relied on para 119 1996 (3) SCR 782 relied on para 120 E 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 190 ·relied on para 121 1996 (2) SCR 400 relied on para 122 1996 (6) Suppl. SCR,120 relied on para 123 F 1998 (1) SCR 717 relied on para 124 2001 (5) sec 42 relied on Para 125 1966 SCR 744 relied on para 125 G (2000)9 sec 439 relied on para 127 1989 (1) SCR 509 relied on para 128 2005 (7) sec 220 relied on para 130 H

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A 2009 (14) SCR 507 relied on para 131

2011 (2) SCR 435 relied on para 132

[1993] 1 A.C. 646 referred to para 136

(1852) 3 H.L. Cases 759 referred to para 136 B (No 2) (1999) 2 W.L.R. 272 referred to para 137

2010] UKSC 57 referred to para 139

2009 No. 1603 (L. 17) referred to para 139 c [2003] 2 SCR 259 referred to para 141

2005 BCCA 350 referred to para 141

(1982) 150 CLR 29 referred to para 144 ~

D (1971) 125 CLR 529 referred to para 145 (2000) 170 ALR 659 referred to para 146 2003 NTCA 11 referred to para 147

E 353 us 98 (1957) referred to para 148

351 us 183 referred to para 149

(1929) AC 242, 248-52 referred to para 151

(1982) HCA 51 referred to para 151 F (1992) 176 CLR 252 referred to para 151 (No 2) (1993) HCA 6 : (1993) 176 CLR 300 referred to para 152 G 2010 (3 ) SCR 159 relied on para 155 732 A.2d 217, 232-33 (Delaware. 1999). USA referred to para 172 H 1942} 2 All ER 122 referred to para 174

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 169 J.. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

[1947) 2 All ER 751 referred to para 175 1 A

· 2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 651 relied on para 180

2005 (2) SCR 606 relied on para 180 ; 2007) UKHL 34=[2007) 3 WLR 354=[2008] 1 AC 561 = ~ B [2007) All ER (D) 294 referred to para 184

[2002) 2 SCR 601 referred to para 186

1980 (2) SCR 765 relied on· para 193 ' c 1992 (2) SCR 378 relied on para 194

1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 340 relied on para 195 "" 1999 (1) SCR 311 relied on para 196 .... '11 CM (Main) No.449 of 2002 decided D by the Delhi High Court on 6.11.2008, approved para 197 2007 (2) SCR 737 relied on para 201 E 1999 (1) SCR 311 relied on para 208

2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 118 relied on para 209 ... 2003 (4 ) Suppl. SCR 651 relied on para 210 F 2009 (15) SCR 1010 relied on para 213

2010 (10 ) SCR 971 relied on para 214

2011 (6) Scale 677 relied on para 217 G CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : I.A. No. 36 & 44 . ., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 967 of 1989. H

170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

Gopal Subramanium, SG, Dr, Manish Singhvi, Shanti Bhushan, Vikas Singh, Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, M.C. Mehta, K.R. Rajasekaran Pillai, Prashant Bhushan, Rohit Kumar Singh, Amrita Narayan, Udita Singh, Satyakam, B.V. Bairam Das, K.B. 8 Rohtagi, Manoj Aggarwal, Aparna Rohatgi Jain, Mahesh Kasana, Devander Kr. Devesh, R. Gopalakrishnan, S.K. Dhingra, Milind Kumar (for Aruneshwar Gupta), T. Raja Shail Kumar Dwivedi, B. Vijayalkshmi Menon, Dinesh Mathur, C Saurabh Jain, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, D.S. Mahra for the appearing parties.

Judgment

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DALVEER BHANDARI, J. 1. This is a very unusual and 0 extraordinary litigation where even after fifteen years of the final judgment of this court (date of judgment 13th February, 1996) the litigation has been deliberately kept alive by filing one interlocutory application or the other in order to avoid compliance of the judgment. The said judgment of this Court E has not been permitted to acquire finality till date. This is a classic example how by abuse of the process of law even the final judgment of the apex court can be circumvented for more than a decade and a half. This is indeed a very serious matter concerning the sanctity and credibility of the judicial system in general and of the apex court in particular. ' F

22. An environmentalist organisation brought to light the sufferings and woes of people living in the vicinity of chemical industrial plants in India. This petition relates to the suffering of people of village Bichhri in Udaipur District of Rajasthan. In the G Writ Petition No.967 of 1989, it was demonstrated how the conditions of a peaceful, nice and small village of Rajasthan were dramatically changed after respondent no. 4 Hindustan Agro Chemicals Limited started producing certain chemicals like Oleum (concentrated form of sulphuric acid) and Single H Super Phosphate. Respondent numbers 4 to 8 are controlled

INQIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 171 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] ;<.. by the same group and they were known as chemical A industries. The entire chemical industrial complex is located within the limits of Bichhri village, Udaipur, Rajasthan. Pursuit ' ~ of profit of entrepreneurs has absolutely drained them of any feeling for fellow human beings living in that village. t B t 3. The basic facts of this case are taken from the judgment delivered in the Writ Petition No.967 of 1989. In the beginning of the judgment of this court delivered on February 13, 1996, it is observed as under:

"It highlights the disregard, nay, contempt for law and c lawful authorities on the part of some among the emerging breed of entrepreneurs, taking advantage, as they do, of the country's need for industrialisation and export earnings. • Pursuit of profit has absolutely drained them of any feeling ._ for fellow human beings - for that matter, for anything else . D And the law seems to have been helpless. Systemic defects? It is such instances which have led many people in this country to believe that disregard of law pays and that the consequences of such disregard will never be visited upon them -particularly, if they are men with means. E Strong words indeed - but nothing less would reflect the deep sense of hurt, the hearing of this case has instilled in us."

44. It seems that the court was prophetic when it made 4, F observation that at times men with means are successful in avoiding compliance of the orders of this court. This case is a classic illustration where even after decade and a half of the pronouncement of the judgment by this court based on the principle of 'polluter pays', till date the polluters (concerned .... G industries in this case) have taken no steps to ecologically restore the entire village and its surrounding areas or complied with the directions of this court at all. The orders of this court were not implemented by keeping the litigation alive by filing interlocutory and interim applications even after dismissal of the H

172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 9 S.C.R.

A writ petition, the review petition and the curative petition by this court.

55. In the impugned judgment, it is mentioned that because of the pernicious wastes emerging from the production of 'H' B acid, its manufacture is stated to have been banned in the western countries. But the need of 'H' acid continues in the West and that need is catered to by the industries like the Silver Chemicals and Jyoti Chemicals in this part of the world.

66. In the impugned judgment, it is also mentioned that since the toxic untreated waste waters were allowed to flow out freely and because the untreated toxic sludge was thrown in the open in and around the complex, the toxic substances have percolated deep into the bowels of the earth polluting the aquifers and the sub-terrain supply of water. The water in the wells and the streams has turned dark and dirty rendering it unfit for human consumption. It has become unfit for cattle to drink and for irrigating the land. The soil has become polluted rendering it unfit for cultivation, which is the main source of livelihood for the villagers. The resulting misery to the villagers needs no emphasis. It spreads disease, death and disaster in the village and the surrounding areas. This sudden degradation of earth and water had an echo in Parliament too and the concerned Minister said that action was being taken, but nothing meaningful was done on the spot. The villagers then rose in virtual revolt leading to the imposition of Section 144 • of the Criminal Procedure Code by the District Magistrate in the area and the closure of Silver Chemicals in January, 1989. It is averred by the respondents that both the units, Silver Chemicals and Jyoti Chemicals have stopped manufacturing G 'H' acid since January, 1989 and are closed. We may assume it to be so, yet the consequences of their action remain - the sludge, the long-lasting damage to earth, to underground water, to human beings, to cattle and the village economy.

77. The Rajasthan State Pollution Control Board (for short H

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 173 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] J.. "R.S.P.C.B.") in pursuance of the show cause notice filed a A counter affidavit and stated the following averments:

(a) Re.: Hindustan Agro Chemicals Limited (respondent for short) [R-4]: The unit obtained 'No- y Objection Certificate' from the R.S.P.C.B. for B I • manufacturing sulphuric acid and Aluminum sulphate. The Board granted clearance subject to certain conditions. Later 'No-Objection Certificate' was granted under the Water [Prevention and Control of Pollution] Act, 1974 [Water Act] and Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 [Air C Act], again subject to certain conditions. However, this unit changed its product without clearance from the Board. Instead of sulphuric acid, it started manufacturing Oleum and Single Super Phosphate [S.S.P.]. Accordingly, consent was refused to the D unit on February 16, 1987. Directions were also issued to close down the unit.

(b) Re.: Silver Chemicals [R-5]: This unit was promoted by the fourth respondent without obtaining E 'No-Objection Certificate' from the Board for the manufacture of 'H' acid. The waste water generated from the manufacture of 'H' acid is highly acidic and contains very high concentration of dissolved solids along with several dangerous pollutants. This unit was commissioned in February, 1988 without obtaining the prior consent of the Board and accordingly, notice of closure was served on April 30, 1988. On May 12, 1988, the unit applied for consent under Water and Air Acts which was refused. The Government was requested to issue directions for cutting off the electricity and water to this unit but no action was taken by the Government. The unit was found closed on the date of inspection, viz., October 2, 1989. H

174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

_i A (c) Re.: Rajasthan Multi Fertilizers [R-6]: This unit was installed without obtaining prior 'No-Objection Certificate' from the Board and without even applying for consent under Water and Air Acts. Notice was served on this unit on February 20,

B 1989. In reply thereto, the Board was informed that the unit was closed since last three years and that ..., electricity has also been cut off since February 12, 1988.

(d) Re.: Phosphates India [R-7]: This unit was also c established without obtaining prior 'No-Objection Certificate' from the Board nor did it apply for consent under the Water and Air Acts. When notice dated February 20, 1989 was served upon this unit,

D the Management replied that this unit was closed for a long time. .. (e) Re.: Jyoti Chemicals [R-8]: This unit applied for 'No-Objection Certificate' for producing ferric alum. 'No-Objection Certificate' was issued imposing E various conditions on April 8, 1988. The 'No- Objection Certificate' was withdrawn on May 30, 1988 on account of non-compliance with its conditions. The consent applied for under Water and Air Acts by this unit was also refused. F Subsequently, on February 9, 1989, the unit applied for fresh consent for manufacturing 'H' acid. The consent was refused on May 30, 1989. The Board has been keeping an eye upon this unit to ensure that it does not start the manufacture of 'H' acid. On G October 2, 1989, when the unit was inspected, it was found closed.

88. The Government of Rajasthan filed counter-affidavit on January 20, 1990. The Para 3 of the affidavit reads as under:- H "That the State Government is now aware of the pollution

f INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 175 -J,.. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] of under-ground water being caused by liquid effluents A from the firms arrayed as Respondent Nos. 4 to 8 in the writ petition. Therefore, the State Government has initiated action through the Pollution Control Board to check further r spread of pollution." I B

99. The State Government stated that the water in certain wells in Bichhri village and some other surrounding villages has become unfit for drinking for human beings and cattle, though in some other wells, the water remains unaffected.

1010. The Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government c of India (for short 'MOEF') in its counter affidavit filed on February 8, 1990 stated that M/s. Silver Chemicals was merely . granted a Letter of Intent but it never applied for conversion of ._ the Letter of Intent into industrial licence. Commencing production before obtaining industrial licence is an offence under Industries [Development and Regulation] Act, 1951. So far as M/s. Jyoti Chemicals is concerned, it is stated that it has not approached the Government at any time even for a Letter of Intent. The Government of India stated that in June, 1989, a study of the situation in Bichhri village and some other surrounding villages was conducted by the Centre for Science and Environment. A copy of their report was enclosed with the counter affidavit. The report states the consequences ~' emanating from the production of 'H' acid and the manner in which the resulting wastes were dealt with by Respondents F Nos. 4 to 8 thus:

"The effluents are very difficult to treat as many of the pollutants present are refractory in nature. Setting up such . highly polluting industry in a critical ground water area was essentially ill-conceived. The effluents seriously polluted the G nearby drain and overflowed into Udaisagar main canal, severely corroding its cement-concrete lined bed and banks. The polluted waters also seriously degraded some agricultural land and damaged standing crops. On being ordered to contain the effluents, the industry installed an H

176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 9 S.C.R.

A unlined holding pond within its premises and resorted to spraying the effluent on the nearby hill-slope. This only resulted in extensive seepage and percolation of the effluents into ground water and their spread down the aquifers. Currently about 60 wells appear to have been '1

B significantly polluted but every week a few new wells, down the aquifers start showing signs of pollution. This has created serious problems for water supply for domestic purposes, cattle-watering crop irrigation and other beneficial uses, and it has also caused human illness and c even death, degradation of land and damage to fruit, trees and other vegetation. There are serious apprehensions that the pollution and its harmful effects will spread further after the onset of the monsoon as the water percolating from the higher parts of the basin moves down carrying the .> pollutants lying on the slopes - in the holding pond and D those already underground."

1111. This court passed number of orders during the period 1989-1992.

1212. On February 17, 1992, this Court passed a fairly elaborate order observing that respondent nos. 5 to 8 are responsible for discharging the hazardous industrial wastes; that the manufacture of 'H' acid has given rise to huge quantities of iron sludge and gypsum sludge - approximately F 2268 MT of gypsum-based sludge and about 189 mt. of iron- based sludge; that while the other respondents blamed respondent no.9 as the main culprit but respondent no. 9 denied any responsibility, therefore, according to the Courts, the immediate concern was the appropriate remedial action. G The report of the R.S.P.C.B. presented a disturbing picture. It stated that the respondents have deliberately spread the hazardous material/sludge all over the place which has only heightened the problem of its removal and that they have failed to carry out the orders of this Court dated April 4, 1990. Accordingly, this Court directed the MOEF to depute its experts H

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 177 ..... UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] immediately to inspect the area to ascertain the existence and A extent of gypsum-based and iron-based sludge, to suggest the handling and disposal procedures and to prescribe a package for its transportation and safe storage. The cost of such storage .. and transportation was to be recovered from the concerned respondents. B

1313. Pursuant to the above order, a team of experts visited the area and submitted a report along with an affidavit dated March 30, 1992. The report presented a highly disturbing picture. It stated that the sludge was found inside a shed and also at four places outside the shed but within the premises of c the complex belonging to the respondents. It further stated that ( ~ the sludge has been mixed with soil and at many places it is covered with earth. A good amount of s!udg~· was said to be j.. lying exposed to sun and rain. D

1414. The report stated: "Above all, the extent of pollution in the ground water seems to the very great and the entire aquifer may be affected due to the pollution caused by the industry. The organic content of the sludge needs to be analysed to assess the percolation property of the contents from the sludge. It is also possible that the iron content in the sludge may be very high which may cause the reddish colouration. As the mother liquor produced during the process (with pH-1) was highly acidic in nature and was indiscriminately discharged on land "" by the unit, it is possible that this might have eroded soil and caused the extensive damage. It is also possible that the organic contents of the mother liquor would have gone into soil with water together with the reddish colour." The report also suggested the mode of disposal of sludge and measures for re-conditioning the soil. G

1515. In view of the above report, the Court made an order on April 6,. 1992 for entombing the sludge under the supervision of the officers of the MOEF. Regarding revamping of the soil, the Court observed that for this purpose, it might become necessary to stop or sus'pend the operation of all the units of H

178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A the respondent but that, the Court said, requires to be examined further.

1616. The work of entombment of sludge again faced several difficL•lties. While the respondents blamed the Government officers for the delay, the Government officials blamed the said 8 respondents of non-cooperation. Several Orders were passed by this Court in that behalf and ultimately, the work commenced.

Orders passed in 1993. filing of Writ Petition (C) No. 76 of 1994 by Respondent No. 4 and the orders passed C therein:

1717. With a view to find out the connection between the wastes and sludge resulting from the production of 'H' acid and the pollution in the underground water, the Court directed on 0 20th August, 1993 that samples should be taken of the entombed sludge and also of the water from the affected wells and sent for analysis. Environment experts of the MOEF were asked to find out whether the pollution in the well water was on account of the said sludge or not. Accordingly, analysis was conducted and the experts submitted the Report on November 1, 1993. Under the heading "Conclusion", the report stated:

5.0 Conclusion

5.1 On the basis of the observations and analysis results, it is concluded beyond doubt that the sludge inside the emoted pit is the contaminated one as evident from the number of parameters analysed.

5.2 The ground water is also contaminated due to discharge of H- acid plant effluent as well as H-acid sludge/ G contaminated soil leachiest as shown in the photographs and also supported by the results. The analysis result revealed good correlation between the colour of well water and H-acid content in it. The analysis results show high degree of impurities in sludge/soil and also in well water H

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 179 ~,;-- UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] which is a clear indication of contamination of soil and A ground water due to disposal of H-acid waste.

The report which is based upon their inspection of the area in September, 1993 revealed many other alarming features. It represents a commentary on the attitude and 8 actions of the respondents. In Para-2, under the heading . "Site Observations & Collection of Sludge/Contaminated Soil Samples", the following facts are stated:

2.1. The Central team, during inspection of the premises of M/s. HACL, observed that H-acid sludge (iron gypsum) C and contaminated soil are still lying at different places, as shown in Figure 1, within the industrial premises(Photograph 1) which are the left overs. The area, where the solar evaporation pond was existing with H-acid sludge dumped here and there, was observed to have D been leveled with borrowed soil (Photograph 2). It was difficult to ascertain whether the sludge had been removed before filling. However, there are visual evidences of contaminated soil in the area. - E 2.2 As reported by the R.S.P.C.B. representatives, about 720 tonnes out of the total contaminated soil and sludge scraped from the sludge dump sites is disposed of in six lined entombed pits covered by lime/flash niix, brick soling and concrete (Photographs were placed on record). The remaining scraped sludge and contaminated soil was lying F near the entombed pits for want of additional disposal fa9ility. However, during the visit, the left over sludge and contaminated soil could not be traced at site. Inspection of the surrounding area revealed that a huge heap of foreign soil of 5 metre height heap of foreign soil of 5 G metre height (Photograph was placed on record) covering a large area, as also indicated in Fig. I, was raised on the sloppy ground at the foot hill within the industry premises. The storm water run-off pathway over the area showed · indication of H-acid sludge leachate coming out of the H

180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A heap. Soil in.the area was sampled for analysis.

2.3 M/s. HACL has a number of other industrial units which are operating within the same premises without valid consents from the R.S.P.C.B. These plants are sulphuric B acid (H2S4), fertilizer (SSP) and vegetable oil extraction. 1 The effluents of these units are not properly treated and the untreated effluent particularly from the acid plant is passing through the sludge dump area playing havoc (Photograph was placed on record). The final effluent was collected at the outlet of the factory premises during c operation of these units, at the time of groundwater monitoring in September 1993, by the RSPCB. Its quality was observed to be highly acidic (pH : 1.08, Conductivity : 37, 100 mg/1, S4 : 21,000 mg/1, Fe : 392 mg/1, COD " : 167 mg/1) which was also revealed in the earlier visits -l

D of the Central teams. However, these units were not in operation during the present visit.

Under Para 4.2.1, the report stated inter alia:

The sludge samples from the surroundings of the (presently E nonexistent) solar evaporation and the contaminated soil due to seepage from the newly raised dump site also exhibited very high values of the above mentioned parameters. This revealed that the contaminated soil is buried under the new dump found by the team. F

25. So much for the waste disposal by the respondents and their continuing good conduct. To the same effect is the Report of the R.S.P.C.B. which is dated October 30, 1993. G

26. In view of the aforesaid Reports, all of which unanimously point out the consequences of the 'H' acid production, the manner in which the highly corrosive waste water (mother liquor) and the sludge resulting from the production of 'H' acid was disposed of and the continuing H

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 181 -;-. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] "' discharge of highly toxic effluents by the remaining units A even in the year 1993, the authorities [R.S.P.C.B.] passed orders closing down, in exercise of their powers .Under Section 33A of the Water Act, the operation of the Sulphuric Acid Plant and the solvent extraction plant r including oil refinery of the fourth respondent with B ' immediate effect. Orders were also passed directing disconnection of electricity supply to the said plants.

The fourth respondent filed Writ Petition (C) No. 76 of 1994 in this Court, under Article 32 of the Constitution, questioning the said Orders in January, 199.4. The main c grievance in this writ petition was that without even waiting for the petitioner's [Hindustan Agro Chemicals Limited] y reply to the show-cause notices, orders of closure and i. disconnection of electricity supply were passed and that this was done by the R.S.P.C.B. with a malafide intent to cause loss to the industry. It was also submitted that sudden closure of its plants is likely to result in disaster and, may be, an explosion and that this consideration was not taken into account while ordering the closure. In its Order dated March 7, 1994, this Court found some justification in the contention of the industry that the various counter-affidavits filed by the R.S.P.C.B. are self- contradictory. The Board was directed to adopt a ). constructive attitude in the matter. By another Order dated March 18, 1994, the R.S.P.C.B. was directed to examine the issue of grant of permission to re-start the industry or to permit any interim arrangement in that behalf. On April 8, 1994, a 'consent' order was passed whereunder the industry was directed to deposit a sum of Rupees sixty thousand with R.S.P.C.B. before April 11, 1994 and the G R.S.P.C.B. was directed to carry on the construction work of storage tank for storing and retaining ten days effluents from the Sulphuric Acid Plant. The construction of temporary tank was supposed to be an interim measure pending the construction of an E.T.P. on permanent basis. H

182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A The Order dated April 28, 1994 noted the Report of the R.S.P.C.B. stating that the construction of temporary tank was completed on April 26, 1994 under its supervision. The industry was directed to comply with such other requirements as may be pointed out by R.S.P.C.B. for B prevention and control of pollution and undertake any works required in that behalf forthwith. Thereafter, the matter went into a slumber until October 13, 1995.

NEER/ REPORT: c 27. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer to the Report submitted by NEERI on the subject of "Restoration of Environmental Quality of the affected area surrounding Village Bichhri due to past Waste Disposal Activities". This Report was submitted in April, 1994 and it states that )'

D it is based upon the study conducted by it during the period November, 1992 to February, 1994. Having regard to its technical competence and reputation as an expert body on the subject, we may be permitted to refer to its Report at some length: E

1818. The judgment also dealt with damaging of crops and fields. The finding of the Court was that the entire contaminated area comprising of 350 hectares of contaminated land and six abandoned dump sites outside the industrial premises has been found to be ecologically fragile due to reckless past F disposal activities practised by M/s. Silver Chemicals Ltd. and Mis. Jyoti Chemicals Ltd. Accordingly, it is suggested that the whole of the contaminated area be developed as a green belt at the expense of M/s. Hindustan Agrochemicals Ltd. during the monsoon of 1994. G

1919. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents-industries made the following submissions: (1) The respondents are private corporate bodies. They are not 'State' within the meaning of Article H

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 183 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] -! 12 of the Constitution. A writ petition under Article A 32 of the Constitution, therefore, does not lie against them.

(2) The RSPCB has been adopting a hostile attitude towards these respondents from the very beginning. r B ) The Reports submitted by it or obtained by it are, therefore, suspect. The respondents had no opportunity to test the veracity of the said Reports. If the matter had been fought out in a properly constituted suit, the respondents would have had an opportunity to cross-examine the experts to c establish that their Reports are defective and cannot be relied upon.;

(3) Long before the respondents came into existence, '1- Hindustan Zinc Limited was already in existence close to Bichhri village and has been discharging toxic untreated effluents in an unregulated manner. This had affected the water in the wells, streams and aquifers. This is borne out by the several Reports made long prior to 1987. Blaming the respondents for the said pollution 1s incorrect as a fact and unjustified.

(4) The respondents have been cooperating with this Court in all matters and carrying out its directions faithfully. The Report of the R.S.P.C.B. dated November 13, 1992 shows that the work of entombment of the sludge was almost over. The Report states that the entire sludge would be stored in the prescribed manner within the next two days. ,;. In view of this report, the subsequent Report of the G Central team, R.S.P.C.B. and NEERI cannot be accepted or relied upon. There are about 70 industries in India manufacturing 'H' acid. Only the units of the respondents have been picked upon by the Central and Sate authorities while taking no H

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A action against the other units. Even in the matter of disposal of sludge, the directions given for its disposal in the case of other units are not as stringent as have been prescribed in the case of respondents. The decision of the Gujarat High B Court in Pravinbhai Jashbhai Patel case shows that i j

the method of disposal prescribed there is different and less elaborate than the one prescribed in this case.

(5) The Reports submitted by the various so-called c expert committees that sludge is still lying around within and outside the respondents' complex and/ or that the toxic wastes from the Sulphuric Acid Plant are flowing through and leaching the sludge • and creating a highly dangerous situation is untrue J D and incorrect. The R.S.P.C.B. itself had constructed a temporary E.T.P. for the Sulphuric Acid Plant pursuant to the Orders of this Court made in Writ Petition (C) No. 76 of 1994. Subsequently, a permanent E.T.P. has also been constructed. There E is no question of untreated toxic discharges from this plant leaching with sludge. There is no sludge and there is no toxic discharge from the Sulphuric Acid Plant.

F (6) The case put forward by the R.S.P.C.B. that the respondents' units do not have the requisite permits/ consents required by the Water Act, Air Act and the Environment [Protection] Act is again unsustainable in law and incorrect as a fact. The respondents' units were established before the amendment of Section 25 of the Water Act and, therefore did not require any prior consent for their establishment.

(7) The proper solution to the present problem lies in ordering a comprehensive judicial enquiry by a

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 185 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] J sitting Judge of the High court to find out the causes of pollution in this village and also to recommend remedial measures and to estimate the loss suffered by the public as well as by the respondents. While the respondents are prepared to bear the t cost of repairing the damage, if any, caused by B t them, the R.S.P.C.B. and other authorities should be made to compensate for the huge losses suffered by the respondents on account of their illegal and obstructionist policy adopted towards them. c (8) The decision in Oleum Gas Leak. Case has been explained in the opinion of Justice Ranganath Misra, CJ., in the decision in Union Carbide ... Corporation etc. etc. v. Union of India etc. etc. AIR 'I 1992 SC 248. The law laid down in Oleum Gas leak D • ' Case is at variance with the established legal position in other Commonwealth countries.

2020. The Court dealt with the submissions of the respondents in great detail and did not find any merit in the E same.

2121. In the impugned judgment, the Court heavily relied on the observations of the Constitution Bench judgment in M. C. Mehta and Another v. Union of India and Others (1987) 1 ;" F SCC 395 popularly known as Oleum Gas Leak Case, wherein it was held thus:

"We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the G persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which it has undertaken. The H

186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise must be absolutely liable to B compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to 1 the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part. Since the persons harmed on account of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity carried on by c the enterprise would not be in a position to isolate the process of operation from the hazardous preparation of substance or any other related element that caused the harm the enterprise must be held strictly liable for causing such harm as a part of the social cost for carrying on the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity. If the enterprise is permitted to carry on an hazardous or inherently. dangerous activity for its profit, the law must presume that such permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any accident arising on account of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity as an appropriate item of its overhear"· Such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for private profit can be tolerated only on condition that the enterprise engaged in such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity indemnifies all those who suffer on account of the carrying on of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity regardless of whether it is carried on carefully or not.. ..We would therefore hold that where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting for example, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis- H a-vis the tortuous principle of strict liability under the rule

.. INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 187 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] ·~

in Ryland v. Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330. A

We would also like to point out that the measure of compensation in the kind of cases referred to in the preceding paragraph must be corelated to the magnitude t and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation ! B must have a deterrent effect. The larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the harm caused on account of an accident in the carrying on of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity by the enterprise." c

2222. This court in M. C. Mehta's case (supra) further observed as under:

31. We must also deal with one other question which was .. seriously debated before us and that question is as to what is the measure of liability of an enterprise which is engaged in an hazardous or inherently dangerous industry, if by reason of an accident occurring in such industry, persons die or are injured. Does the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher apply or is there any other principle on which the liability can be determined? The rule in Rylands v. Fletcherwas evolved in the year 1866 and it provides that a person who for his own p'urposes brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his peril and, if he fails to do so, is prima facie liable for the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. The liability under this rule is strict and it is no defence that the thing escaped without that person's wilful act, default or neglect or even that he had no knowledge of its existence. This rule laid down a -.i. G principle of liability that if a person who brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do harm and such thing escapes and does damage to another, he is liable to compensate for the damage caused. Of course, this rule applies only to non-natural user of the land and it does not apply to things naturally on the H

188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R

A land or where the escape is due to an act of God and an act of a stranger or the default of the person injured or where the thing which escapes is present by the consent of the person injured or in certain cases where there is statutory authority. Vide Halsbury Laws of England, Vol. 45 1 B para 1305. Considerable case law has developed in England as to what is natural and what is non-natural use of land and what are precisely the circumstances in which this rule may be displaced. But it is not necessary for us to consider these decisions laying down the parameters c of this rule because in a modern industrial society with highly developed scientific knowledge and technology where hazardous or inherently dangerous industries are necessary to carry out part of the developmental programme, this rule evolved in the 19th Century at a time • ,,. when all these developments of science and technology had not taken place cannot afford any guidance in evolving any standard of liability consistent with the constitutional norms and the needs of the present day economy and social structure. We need not feel inhibited by this rule which was evolved in this context of a totally different kind of economy. Law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society and keep abreast with the economic developments taking place in the country. As new situations arise the law has to be evolved in order to meet the challenge of such new situations. Law cannot afford to remain static. We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly industrialised economy. We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England i..- G or for the matter of that in any other foreign country. We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order. We are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes but we have to build up our own jurisprudence and we cannot countenance an argument that merely because the law in England does not recognise the rule

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 189 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] of strict and absolute liability in cases of hazardous or inherently dangerous activities or the rule as laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher as is developed in England recognises certain limitalions and exceptions. We in India must hold back our hands and not venture to evolve a new / principle of liability since English courts have not done so. B We have to develop our own law and if we find that it is necessary to construct a new principle of liability to deal with an unusual situation which has arisen and which is likely to arise in future on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries which are concomitant to c an industrial economy, there is no reason why we should hesitate to evolve such principle of liability merely because it has not been so done in England . ... .. 23. This Court applied the principle of Polluter pays and observed thus: / D

"The polluter pays principle demands that the financial costs of preventing or remedying damage caused by pollution should lie with the undertakings which cause the pollution, or produce the goods which cause the pollution. E Under the principle it is not the role of government to meet the costs involved in either prevention of such damage, or in carrying out remedial action, because the effect of this Would be to shift the financial burden of the pollution incident to the taxpayer. The 'polluter pays' principle was promoted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] during the 1970s when there was great public interest in environmental issues. During this time there were demands on government and other institutions to introduce policies and mechanisms for the protection of the environment and the public from the threats posed by pollution in a modern industrialised society. Since then there has been considerable discussion of the nature of the polluter pays principle, but the precise scope of the principle and its implications for H

190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A those involved in past, or potentially polluting activities have never been satisfactory agreed."

2424. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at length, this Court gave the following directions: B "1. The Central Government shall determine the amount • required for carrying out the remedial measures including the removal of sludge lying in and around the complex of Respondents 4 to 8, in the area affected in village Bichhri and other adjacent c villages, on account of the production of 'H' acid and the discharges from the Sulphuric Acid Plant of Respondents 4 to 8. Chapters-VI and Vil in NEERI Report [submitted in 1994] shall be deemed to be the show-cause notice issued by the Central D Government proposing the determination of the said amount. Within six weeks from this day, Respondents 4 to 8 shall submit their explanation, along with such material as they think appropriate in support of their case, to the Secretary, Ministry E of Environment and Forests, Government of India (for short, M.E.F.). The Secretary shall thereupon determine the amount in consultation with the experts of his Ministry within six weeks of the submission of the explanation by the said F Respondents. The orders passed by the Secretary, [M.E.F.] shall be communicated to Respondents 4 to 8- and all concerned - and shall also be placed before this Court. Subject to the Orders, if any, passed by this Court, the said amount shall G represent the amount which Respondents 4 to 8 are liable to pay to improve and restore the environment in the area. For the purpose of these proceedings, the Secretary, [M.E.F.] and Respondents 4 to 8 shall proceed on the assumption that the affected area is 350 ha, as indicated in the sketch at Page 178 H

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 191 ,. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] of NEERI Report. In case of failure of the said A respondents to pay the said amount, the same shall be recovered by the Central Government in accordance with law. The factories, plant,· machinery and all other immovable assets of ~ ! Respondents 4 to 8 are attached herewith. The B amount so determined and recovered shall be utilised by the M.E.F. for carrying out all necessary remedial measures to restore the soil, water sources and the environment in general of the affected area to its former state. c

2. On account of their continuous, persistent and insolent violations of law, their attempts to conceal the sludge, their discharge of toxic effluents from the .. Sulphuric Acid Plant which was allowed to flow through the sludge, and their non-implementation of the Orders of this Court - all of which are fully borne out by the expert committees' Reports and the findings recorded hereinabove - Respondents 4 to 8 have earned the dubious distinction of being characterised as "rogue industries". They have inflicted untold misery upon the poor, unsuspecting villagers, despoiling their land, their water sources and their entire environment - all in pursuance of their private profit. They have forfeited all claims for any consideration by this Court. Accordingly, we herewith order the closure of all the plants and factories of Respondents 4 to 8 located in Bichhri village. The R.S.P.C.B. is directed to seal all the factories/ units/plants of the said respondents forthwith. So far as the Sulphuric Acid Plant is concerned, it will be closed at the end of one week from today, within which period Respondent No. 4 shall wind down its operations so as to avoid risk of any untoward consequences, as asserted by Respondent No. 4 in Writ Petition (C) No. 76 of H

192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A 1994. It is the responsibility of Respondent No. 4 to take necessary steps in this behalf. The R.S.P.C.B. shall seal this unit too at the end of one week from today. The re-opening of these plants shall depend upon their compliance with the 1 B directions made and obtaining of all requisite permissions and consents from the relevant authorities. Respondents 4 to 8 can apply for directions in this behalf after such compliance.

3. So far as the claim for damages for the loss c suffered by the villagers in the affected area is concerned, it is open to them or any organisation on their behalf to institute suits in the appropriate ~ civil court. If they file the suit or suits in forma pauperis, the State of Rajasthan shall not oppose >

D their applications for leave to sue in forma pauperis.

4. The Central Government shall consider whether it would not be appropriate, in the light of the experience gained, that chemical industries are treated as a category apart. Since the chemical industries are the main culprits in the matter of polluting the environment, there is every need for scrutinising their establishment and functioning more rigorously. No distinction should be made in this behalf as between a large-scale industry and a small-scale industry or for that matter between a large-scale industry and a medium-scale industry. All chemical industries, whether big or small, should be allowed to be established only after taking into considerations all the environmental aspects and their functioning should be monitored closely to ensure that they do not pollute the environment around them. It appears that most of these industries are water-intensive industries. If so, the advisability of allowing the establishment of these H

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 193 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] industries in arid areas may also require A examination. Even the existing chemical industries may be subjected to such a study and if it is found on such scrutiny that it is necessary to take any steps in the interests of environment, appropriate directions in that behalf may be issued under B Section ~ and § of the Environment Act, the Central Government shall ensure that the directions given by it are implemented forthwith.

5. The Central Government and the R.S.P.C.B. shall file quarterly Reports before this Court with respect to the progress in the implementation of Directions 1 to 4 aforesaid.

6. The suggestion for establishment of environment courts is a commendable one. The experience shows that the prosecutions launched in ordinary criminal courts under the provisions of the Water Act, Air Act and Environment Act never reach their conclusion either because of the work-load in those courts or because there is no proper appreciation of the significance of the environment matters on the part of those in charge of conducting of those cases. Moreover, any orders passed by the authorities under Water and Air Acts and the Environment Act are immediately questioned by the industries in courts. Those proceedings take years and years to reach conclusion. Very often, interim orders are granted meanwhile which effectively disable the authorities from ensuring the implementation of their orders. All this points to the need for creating environment courts which alone should be empowered to deal with all matters, civil and.criminal, relating to environment. These courts should be manned by legally trained persons/ . judicial officers and should be ~llowed to adopt H

194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A summary procedures. This issue, no doubt, requires to be studied and examined indepth from all angles before taking any action.

7. The Central Government may also consider the B advisability of strengthening the environment protection machinery both at the Center and the States and provide them more teeth. The heads of several units and agencies should be made personally accountable for any lapses and/or negligence on the part of their units and agencies. c The idea of an environmental audit by specialist bodies created on a permanent basis with power to inspect, check and take necessary action not only against erring industries but also against erring officers may be considered. The idea of an environmental audit conducted periodically and certified annually, by specialists in the field, duly recognised, can also be considered. The ultimate idea is to integrate and balance the concern for environment with the need for industrialisation and technological progress."

2525. The orders of this Court have not been implemented till date because by filing of number of interlocutory applications the respondent nos.4 to 8 have kept the litigation alive. These F respondents have been successful in avoiding compliance of the judgment of this Court for more than fifteen years. ORDER IN CONTEMPT PETITION

2626. The original record of Writ Petition No. 967 of 1989 G shows that the R.S.P.C.B. has filed a report of the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute, for short 'NEERI' in this Court on 6.1.1996. It is on this report that reliance was placed by the Court while disposing off the said writ petition. If 1he report which was submitted in this Court by the R.S.P.C.B. H was different from the final report which was submitted by NEERI

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 195 !' UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] to the said Board, then it may have been possible to contend A that the R.S.P.C.B. and its officers were guilty of fabrication. The affidavit of Mr. S.N. Kaul, Acting Director of NEERI clearly shows that what was filed in this Court was the copy of the final report dated 16.5.1994 which has been prepared by the i NEERI. In other words, the NEERI itself states that the report • B filed in this Court by the Board was a copy of the final report and that there was no fabrication made therein by the Board or any of its officials.

2727. It appears that the two scientists had inspected the report in the office of the NEER! and then observed that there c has been a fabrication carried out by the Pollution Control Board. From what has been stated hereinabove, the charge of ... fabrication is clearly unfounded. It is possible that these two ~ scientists may have seen the draft report which would be with NEERI but the original report when prepared would be one which was, ultimately, submitted to the sponsoring agency, namely, the R.S.P.C.8., and it is only a copy of the same which ,• could have been retained by NEERI. Be that as it may, it is clear that what has been filed in this Court as being the final report of the NEERI was the copy of the final report which was received by it. There is no basis for contending that any of the respondents have been guilty of fabrication. The whole application to our mind is devoid of any merit. The contempt petition was dismissed with costs. F IA N0.36 IN WRIT PETITION (Cl No.967 OF 1989

2828. This Interlocutory Application has been filed on behalf of M/s Hindustan Agro Chemical Ltd. (for short "HACL") whose -' industrial units situated in Udaipur were directed to be closed down by this Court on the premise that the said units had G caused pollution in village Bichhri. This Court while directing for closure of the industrial units of HACL vide its order dated 13.2.1996 had further held that the units be not permitted to run until they deposit the remediation costs for restoring the environment in the area. The Court accordingly directed for the H

196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 9 S.C.R.

A attachment of the properties of HACL.

2929. There is a serious attempt to reopen the entire concluded case which stands fully concluded by the judgment of this Court delivered on 13th February, 1996. It may be B pertinent to mention that even the review and curative petitions have also been dismissed. By this application, the applicant has also made an attempt to introduce before this Court the opinion of various experts, such as, Dr. M.S. Govil, Mr. S.K. Gupta, Dr. P.S. Bhatt and Ms. Smita Jain who visited the Bichhri village at the instance of the applicant in the year 2004 C to provide a different picture regarding the conditions of water and soil in the area. These experts submitted reports to demonstrate that now hardly any remediation measures are required in Bichhri village or adjoining areas.

3030. The applicant in this application is seeking a declaration that as of now there is no pollution existing in the area which may have been caused by HACL and accordingly there is no necessity for this Court to sell the assets of HACL in order to carry out any remediation in the area. This E application also is a serious attempt to discredit the NEERI report of 1996 once again.

3131. The sole object of filing of the present application is to introduce before this Court recent reports prepared by experts at the behest of the applicant to demonstrate to the F Court that before embarking upon remediation measures and for the said purposes putting the properties of the applicant to sell, the status and conditions of water, soil and environment in the area as at present be reviewed with a view to realistically ascertain whether any measures for remediation are called for at all in the area and if yes, then the nature and the current cost of the same may be ascertained.

3232. The applicant submitted that the report of the NEERI which was the basis for the earlier orders of this Court does not specify the nature of remediation measures which were

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 197 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] considered necessary. The report merely indicates a lump sum amount without giving its break up as being a rough estimate of amount considered by them necessary for carrying out remediation measures. ji 33. It is stated in the application that the Secretary, MOEF B after issuing notices to the parties called for the expert opinion of Water and Power Consultancy (WAPCO) and of Engineers India Limited (Ell), both these institutions were established by the Government of India. Both these institutions wrote to the Secretary that the data available was not sufficient to determine the cost of remediation, if any. The Secretary, who under the c directions of the Court was directed to determine the amount . within six weeks was left with no alternative but to simply affirm the lump sum amount determined by the NEERI. ~

3434. It is stated that now almost fifteen years have passed since the final judgment of this Court and the situation in the area needs to be inspected again to find out as to whether any remediation is necessary or whether with passage of time nature on its own has taken care of the pollution iri the area and because of the same no further "remediation is required to be done in the area. This submission is being made without prejudice to the right of the applicant to contend that the applicant had not caused any pollution in the area but the ---". applicant for the limited purpose of this application is ready to assume for the sake of arguments that the applicant had caused pollution in the area and that the nature in the last so many years has taken care of the pollution and on that basis there is no pollution existing in the area at present. ..... 35. One of the issues that came up for consideration before this Court was the liability of the Union of India to take remediation measures in the area even if the applicant were not to pay the remediation costs as determined by the Secretary, MOEF. In these proceedings the counsel on behalf of the applicant made a suggestion to the Court that a fresh team be sent to the units of the applicant to find out whether H

198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A there is still any pollution existing in the area and also whether any remediation as of today is required to be done or not. It was suggested during the course of hearing that the remediation cost being sought to be recovered from the applicant is not some kind of a decree in which the applicant B is a judgment debtor but is merely a cost which the applicant is being made liable to pay on the "Polluter Pays" principle and there is no necessity of payment if there is no pollution existing: Till date there is no working out as to how the cost of remediation has been worked out by NEERI which had been c affirmed by the Secretary, MOEF and which had been further affirmed by this Court.

3636. According to the applicant, on the basis of the reports of some experts it is quite evident that there is no pollution in and around the factory premises of the applicant and D accordingly there is no need for any remediation to be done in the area and the factory of the aoplicant is required to be handed over to the applicant forthwith so that the applicant may take proper steps to re-start the factory and generate resources to meet the liabilities of the financial institutions and banks. E

3737. It is further prayed that if this Court for any reason doubts the opinion of the experts placed by the applicant in any manner, then this Court may appoint any reputed experU experts to visit the area and to submit a detailed report to this F Court relating to the pollution existing in the area as of now. In other words, the effort is to reopen the concluded case and that also after the review and the curative petitions have been dismissed by this Court.

3838. There are two main prayers in this application, the first prayer is that no remediation is required to be done in and around the industrial units of the applicant on the basis of the four reports placed by the applicant along with this application or on the basis of the report submitted by the experUexperts appointed by this Court; and secondly, that the Court may pass consequential order directing for closing of these proceedings

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v. 199 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] ii' and thus lift the attachment order dated 13.2.1996. A

3939. Reply Affidavits to the Interlocutory Application have been filed by the Union of India and other respondents. In the reply affidavits of the respondents it is mentioned that on i 13.2.1996 this Court directed closure of the units of the f B applicant for the reason that the said industries had caused environmental pollution in and around the areas where applicant's units are located. This Court had further directed that the units of the applicant would be permitted to operate only after depositing necessary costs for taking measures to restore the environment of the areas. The judgment of this Court was c based upon a report dated 5.4.1994 of the NEERI which was filed by the R.S.P.C.B. on 6.1.1996. - -t

Report an error in this judgment →

Contains information from the Indian High Court / Supreme Court Judgments dataset, licensed under CC-BY-4.0