NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR.

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Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
(year only)
Bench
J.M. PANCHAL, DEEPAK VERMA and DR. B.S. CHAUHAN
Citation
[2011] 6 S.C.R. 443
Whole judgment (for printing)

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Judgment · Supreme Court of India · decided (year only) · Bench: J.M. PANCHAL, DEEPAK VERMA and DR. B.S. CHAUHAN

[2011] 6 S.C.R. 443

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Headnote — Supreme Court Reports (editorial summary, not part of the judgment)

PLEADINGS: c Pleadings...,. Writ petition by Narmada Bachao Ando/an, as public interest litigation -

Held

A party has to plead its case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate the averrnents made in the petition and in case the pleadings are not complete, the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas - It cannot be said that the rules of procedural law do not apply in PIL - In the instant case, there were no pleadings before the High Court on the basis of which the writ petition could be entertained/decided - Thus, it was liable to be rejected at the threshold for the reason that the writ petition suffered for want of proper pleadings and material to substantiate the avermentslallegations contained therein - Besides, there was no explanation as to under what circumstances the High Court had been approached at such belated stage - In fact for redressal of any grievance regarding implementation of the Rehabilitation & Resettlement Policy, the oustees ought to have approached the Grievance Redressal Authority - High Court ought not to have examined any issue other than relating to rehabilitation i.e. implementation of the R & R Policy - Constitution of India, G 1950- Article 226 - Writ petition - Delay I Laches - Remedy - Alternate remedy - Public Interest Litigation.

Catchwords

A CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950: Articles 21 and 14 - Hydro Electric Projects - Omkareshwar Dam in the basin of river Narmada - Land acquisition and rehabilitation of oustees - Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy framed by state of Madhya Pradesh - B Providing for allotment of land and other benefits to oustees- Policy amended on 30. 7. 2003 providing that agricultural land would be offered to oustees 'as far as possible' - Expressions 'as far as possible' and 'rehabilitation' - Connotation of-

Held

The R & R Policy or amendment thereto in 2003, has not been under challenge. Relief not sought by the patty cannot be granted by the Court - However, in terms of the amendment dated 3. 7.2003, it is desirable for the authority concerned to ensure that as far as practicable persons who had been living and carrying on business or other activity on the land acquired, if they so desire, and are willing to •· purchase and comply with the rf-quirements be given a piece of land on the terms settled with due regard to the price at which land has been acquired from them - However, the State Government cannot be compelled to provide alternate accommodation to the oustees and it is for the authority concerned to consider the desirability and feasibility of providing alternative land considering the facts and circumstances of each case - In cerlain cases, the oustees are entitled to rehabilitation - Rehabilitation is meant only for those persons who have been rendered destitute because of a loss of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition - The definition of "displaced family" cannot be read in isolation, rather it requires to be considered taking into account the eligibility criteria for allotment of land in Clause (5) of the R & R Policy - To that extent, the judgment of the G High Courl is liable to be set aside - The direction given by the High Courl in paragraph 64 (i) of the judgment, is modified to the extent that the displaced families who have not withdrawn SRG benefits/ compensation voluntarily and submit applications for allotment of land before the Authority concerned, shall be entitled to the allotment of agricultural

Catchwords

Rehabilitation and resettlement - Oustees of Omkarshwar Dam -

Held

As regards the issue of land for land, it has to be decided taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances - These cases are to be decided giving strict adherence to the R & R Policy, as amended on 3. 7. 2003, further considering that special care is to be taken where persons are oppressed and uprooted so that they are better off - Mere payment of compensation to the oustees may not be enough - In case the oustee is not able to purchase the land just after getting the compensation, he may not be able to have the land at all - In the process of development, the State cannot be permitted to displace tribal people, a F vulnerable section of our society, suffering from poverty and ignorance, without taking appropriate remedial measures of rehabilitation - In regard to the amended provisions of the R & R Policy, the phrase "as far as possible" would come into play, in case an attempt is made to acquire/purchase lands and then to make allotment of land to oustees.

A - Hydro-electric projects - Omkareshwar Dam in the basin of river Narmada - Writ petition under public interest litigation filed by Narmada Bachao Ando/an stating that the tenure holders had already been dispossessed and land vested in the State -

Held

The 'rights' of the public interest litigant in a PIL are always subordinate to the 'interests' of those for whose 8 benefit the action is brought - The status of dominus litis could not be conferred unreflectively or for the asking, on a PIL petitioner as that would render the proceedings ·vulnerable to and susceptible of a new dimension which might, in conceivable cases be used by persons for personal ends resulting in prejudice to the public weal - The courts expect a public interest litigant to discharge high standards of responsibility - Negligent use or use for oblique motives is extraneous to the PIL process - A person seeking relief in public interest should approach the court of Equity, not only with clean hands but also with a clean mind, clean heart and clean objective - A petition containing misleading and inaccurate statement(s), if filed, to achieve an ulterior purpose, amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court - Further, a false statement made in the court or in the pleadings, intentionally to mislead the Court and obtain a favourable order, amounts to criminal contempt, as it tends to impede the administration of justice - In the instant case, the NBA has not acted with a sense of responsibility and so far succeeded in securing favourable orders by misleading the court - Such conduct cannot be approved - However, in a P/L, the Court has to strike a balance between the interests of the parties - The court has to take into consideration the pitiable condition of oustees, their poverty, inarticulateness, illiteracy, extent of backwardness, unawareness also - It is desirable that in future the court must view any presentation by the NBA with caution and care, insisting on proper pleadings, disclosure of full facts truly and fa:rly and in case it has any doubt, refuse to entertain the NBA - However, considering the interests of the oustees, it may be desirable

Catchwords

Reliance upon a judgment- Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy for oustees of Omkareshwar Dam - Term 'family'- Connotation of -

Held

Court should not place reliance upon a judgment without discussing how the factual situation fits in with a fact-situation of the decision on which reliance is placed, as it has to be ascertained by analysing all the material facts and the issues involved in the case and argued on both sides - A judgment may not be followed in a given case if it has some distinguishing features - A little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference to the precedential value of a decision - The NWDT Award did not provide for allotment of agricultural land to the major sons of such oustees - The Narmada Bachao Ando/an-/ has been decided with presumption that such a E 1 right had been conferred upon major sons by the NWDT Award and Narmada Bachao Ando/an-II has been decided following the said judgment and interpreting the definition of "family" contained in the R & R Policy - When the two earlier cases were being considered by the Court, it had not been brought to its notice that the NWDT Award did not provide for such an entitlement - The courts are not to perpetuate an illegality, rather it is the duty of the courts to rectify mistakes - In view of the principles of 'per incuriam', the "quotable in law" is avoided and ignored if it is rendered in ignorance of a G Statute or other binding authority - Direction given by the High Court to allot agricultural land to major sons of the oustees in Paragraph 64 (iii) of the impugned judgment is set aside - Principle of 'per inquiriam'- Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 14. H

Catchwords

Hydroelectric Project - Omkareshwar Dam - Rehabilitation of oustees - Landless labourers -

Held

As the landless labourers never had any land, they are not entitled to any compensation under the Act, thus, the question of 8 allotment of land to them would not arise - The R & R Policy itself provides that such persons are entitled to get the specified amount of Rs.49,3001- to buy productive employment creating assets etc., and such money can also be used for acquiring land.

Catchwords

s. 48 - Denotification of acquisition - Land in respect of which acquisition proceedings initiated not likely to submerge - Government abandoning the acquisition proceedings - The stand of the NBA was that tenure-holders were not in possession - On the direction of Supreme Court, the District Judge reported that tenure holders were in actual possession of the land - Expression 'taking possession of the land' - Explained - Law on the issue summarised -

Held

The State is entitled to abandon the land acquisition proceedings in exercise of its power uls 48 of the Act - However, it shall not apply to 167 dwelling units on the said land - Such persons whose dwelling units are acquired shall be entitled for the benefit of R & R Policy to the extent provided therein.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: F Government policy - Judicial review of, through public interest litigation-

Held

A public policy cannot be challenged through PIL where the State Government is competent to frame the policy - The wisdom and advisability of the policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless the policies are contrary to statutory or constitutional provisions or arbitrary or irrational or an abuse of power - In the instant case, it was not desirable for the High Court to make any comment on the competence of the State of amend the policy.

Interpretation of Rehabilitation and Resettlement policy framed by Government-

Held

The Court while interpreting the provisions of a Statute, can neither add nor subtract a word - The Court has to interpret a provision giving it a construction 8 agreeable to reason and justice to all parties concerned, avoiding injustice, irrationality and mischievous consequences - In the instant case, the directions of the High Court regarding land-for-land would lead to grave inequity, and thereby likely to cause undue enrichment of some categories of oustees - The High Court, therefore, fell into an error by proceeding to assume that a major son would be treated to be a separate family for the purpose of allotment of land also - Thus, the policy must be interpreted to the effect that the major sons of oustees will be entitled to all the benefits under the R & R Policy, except a/location of agricultural land - D Maxim: "a verbis legis non est recedendum". On construction of Omkareshwar Dam in the basin of river Narmada, 30 villages in State of Madhya Pradesh 1 were expected to submerge at the full reservoir level of E 196.6 meter. The State Government framed a rehabilitation and resettlement policy (R & R Policy) for the oustees of all the Narmada Projects. The policy provided for allotment of a minimum of two hectares of agricultural land; irrigational facilities at government cost; grant-in-aid for small and marginal farmers and SC/ST families, and to meet the entire cost of the allotted land. The policy was amended from time to time and by amendment dated 3.7.2003 it was provided that agricultural land would be offered to the oustees "as far as possible" and not to those who would make application in writing to receive compensation for their acquired land. The displaced persons were allegedly not offered the land under the R & R Policy, as amended on

Held

Reporter's headnote (continued) and case details

(20111 s s.-c.R. 443

(Civil Appeal Nos. 2082 of 2011) B MAY 11, 2011

p. 444

p. 445

MADHYA PRADESH land "as far as possible" in terms of the R & R Policy, and for A that purpose, the authorities must make some government or private land available for allotment to such oustees if they opt for such land and agree to ensure compliance with other terms and conditions stipulated therein - Maxims - "lex non cogit ad impossibilia" , "impossibilium nu/la obligatio est", 8 "impotentia excusat legem" and "nemo tenetur ad impossibilia".

Articles 300-A and 21 - Compensation for property acquired and rehabilitation - c Concepts of - Explained.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE:

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION:

Rights and obligations, and locus of public interest litigant H

p. 446

p. 447

MADHYA PRADESH that the court may appoint Amicus Curiae to present their A cause, if such a contingency arises - 'Jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem', Juri ex injuria non oritur' and 'suppressio veri and suggestio falsi'. 8 PRECEDENT:

p. 448

A LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894:

p. 449

MADHYA PRADESH

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES: A

3. 7.2003, rather compensation for their land was H

p. 450

A deposited in their accounts. When the decision was taken to raise the height of the dam, Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), flied a writ petition before the High Court seeking a number of reliefs. The High Court issued a large number of directions as interim measures including the B direction for allotment of land in lieu of the land acquired and to treat the major sons of the family as independent families for the purpose of allotment of agricultural land.

State of Madhya Pradesh and the Narmada Hydro C Electric Development Corporation filed CA Nos. 2115 and 2116 of 2011 contending that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition as it did not have material facts/particulars disclosing any cause of action to the writ petitioners even in the PIL; that not a single order passed by any statutory authority had been challenged and the writ petition was filed after inordinate delay without furnishing any explanation for the same; that Grievance Redressal Authority (GRA) had been constituted to consider grievances of the oustees and not a single oustee approached the GRA before filing of the writ petition; that the High Court erred in treating the major son of such an oustee as a separate family for the purpose of allotment of agricultural land, though he did not have any independent right to claim compensation for the land acquired; that land for allotment to such oustees was not available and the State authorities could not be asked to do an impossible task.

The State of Madhya Pradesh and the Narmada Hydro Development Corporation also filed C.A. Nos. G 2083-2012 of 2011 challenging the order of the High Court whereby it allowed the applications of the NBA and directed the State to rehabilitate the oustees so far as the land measuring 284.03 hectares in the five villages, namely, Dharadi, Nayapura, Guwadi, Kothmir, H Narsinghpura was concerned and not to withdraw the

p. 451

MADHYA PRADESH acquisition proceedings in respect of the. said area. A C.A. No. 2082 of 2011 was filed by the writ petitioner NBA claiming allotment of agricultural land to landless oustees and that the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal - award dated 12.12. 1979 (NWDT award) be made 8 applicable to the project of the Omkareshwar Dam and that the oustees of five villages, which were submerged, were entitled to allotment of land in lieu of land acquired inspite of the fact that the SRG had already been granted to them. ci Disposing of the appeals, the Court

C.A. Nos. 2015-2016 of 2011 D 1.1. It is a settl~d proposition of law that a party has to plead its case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate the averments made in the petition and in case the pleadings are not complete, the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas. It cannot be E said that the rules of procedural law do not apply in PIL. [Para 7 and 1OJ [481-D; 482-G-H] I

Bharat Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., 1988(2) Suppl. SCR 1050=AIR 1988 SC 2181; Larsen & Toubro Ltd. F & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., 1988 (2) SCR 339=AIR 1998 SC 1608; Mis Atul Castings Ltd. v. Bawa Gurvachan Singh, 2001 (3) SCR 124 =AIR 2001 SC 1684; Rajasthan Pradesh V.S. Sardarshahar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., 2010 (1) SCR 252 =AIR 2010 SC 2221; Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by L.Rs. v. Bishun Narain Inter-College & Ors., 1987 (2) SCR G 805 =AIR 1987 SC 1242; Kalyan Singh Chauhan v. C.P. Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127; Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendera v. State of U.P., 1988 Suppl.; SCR 690 =AIR 1988 SC 2187; A. Hamsaveni & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., 1994 (2) Suppl. SCR 404 =(1994) 6 SCC 51; Ashok H

p. 452

A Kumar Pandey it. State of West Bengal, AIR 2004 SC 280; Prabir Kumar Das v. State of Orissa & Ors., 2003 (5) Suppl. SCR 716 =(2005) 13 SCC 452; and A. Abdul Farook v. Municipal Council. Perambalur, 2009 (11) SCR 727 =(2009) 15 sec 351 - relied on. B 1.2. In the instant case, in the writ petition, an impression had been given that some drastic steps would be taken by the authorities which would cause great hardship to a large number of persons and urgent measures were required to be taken by the Court in order C to mitigate the sufferings of the people. However, the writ petition did not disclose the factum of how many persons had already vacated their houses and handed over the possession of their land. There was no material before the High Court to adjudicate upon the issues involved. D There were no pleadings before the High Court on the basis of which the writ petition could be entertained/ decided. Thus, it was liable to be rejected at the threshold for the reason that the writ petition suffered for want of proper pleadings and material !o substantiate the E averments/allegations contained therein. Even in the case of a PIL, such a course could not be available to the writ petitioners. [Para 12- 13) (483-E-G; 484-F]

1.3. The construction of the dam started in October F 2002 and was completed in October 2006. No objection had ever been raised by NBA at any stage. The Narmada Development Authority by order dated 28.3.2007 gave permission to National Hydraulic Development Corporation to raise the water level of the dam to 189 G meters upon showing that rehabilitation of oustees of 5 villages adversely affected at 189 meters, had already been completed. The writ petition was filed praying for restraining the appellants from closing the sluice gates of the dam contending that resettlement and rehabilitation H was not complete. There was no explanation as to under

p. 453

MADHYA PRADESH what circumstances the High Court had been A approached at such belated stage. In fact, for redressal of any grievance regarding implementation of the R & R Policy, the oustees ought to have approached the GRA. There is nothing on record to show how many oustees remained unsatisfied/aggrieved of the orders passed by B GRA till the fmng of the writ petition. Thus, the High Court ought not to have examined any issue other than relating to rehabilitation i.e. implementation of the R & R Policy. [para 14, 16 and 17] [484-G-H; 485-A-B; 486-0-E]

Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. Union of India & Ors., C 2000(4) Suppl. SCR 94 = (2000) 10 SCC 664; State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, 1995 (1) Suppl. SCR 492 =(1995) 4 SCC 683; and Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. Union of India & Ors., 2005 (2) SCR 840 =(2005) 4 SCC 32 -referred to. D 1.4. The R & R Policy or amendment thereto in 2003, has not been under challenge. Relief not sought by the party cannot be granted by the Court. It was not desirable for the High Court to make any comment on the competence of the State to amend the policy and the finding so recorded in Para 38 of the judgment cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, and thus is set aside. [Para 86] [524-8-C]

1.5. In view of the fact that neither the writ petitioner asked the High ·court to quash the amendment dated 3.7.2003, nor has the High Court suo motu quashed it, nor has the writ petitioner filed Special Leave Petition raising the said point, it is not permissible for this Court to deal with the issue. [Para 23] [488-C] G State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak & Anr., 1983(1) SCR 8=AIR 1982 SC 1249; Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd & Ors. v. P. Surya Bhagavan, AIR 2003 SC 2182; and Mount Carmel School Society v. ODA, 2007 (13) SCR 876 = (2008) 2 SCC 141 - referred to. H

p. 454

A 2.1. In terms of the amendment dated 3. 7.2003, it is desirable for the authority concerned to ensure that as far as practicable persons who had been living and carrying on business or other activity on the land acquired, if they so desire, and are willing to purchase and comply with any requirement of the authority or the local body, be given a piece of land on the terms settled with due regard to the price at which land has been acquired from them. However, the State Government cannot be compelled to provide alternate accommodation to the oustees and it is for the authority concerned to consider the desirability and feasibility of providing alternative land considering the facts and circumstances of each case. In certain cases, the oustees are entitled to rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is meant only for those persons who have been rendered destitute 0 because of a loss of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition. The authorities must explore the avenues of rehabilitation by way of employment, housing, investment opportunities, and identification of alternative lands. For people whose lives E and livelihoods are intrinsically connected to the land, the economic and cultural shift to a market economy can be traumatic. [Para 23 & 24] [488-C-H; 489-A-B]

State of UP. v. Smt. Pista Devi & Ors., AIR 1986 SC F 2025; Narpat Singh etc. etc. v. Jaipur Development Authority & Anr., 2002 (3) SCR 365=AIR 2002 SC 2036; Special Land Acquisition Officer, UK. Project v. Mahaboob & Anr., 2009 (2) SCR 881 =(2009) 14 SCC 54; Mahanadi Coal Fields Ltd. & Anr. v. Mathias Oram & Ors., 2010 (8) SCR 750 =JT (2010) G 7 SC 352; and Brij Mohan & Ors. v. Haryana Urban Development Authority & Anr., (2011) 2 SCC 29; Chameli Singh & Ors. v. State of UP. & Anr., 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 827 =AIR 1996 SC 1051; and Samatha v. State of A.P. & .Ors., 1997 (2) Suppl. SCR 305 = AIR 1997 SC 3297; H Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram & Ors., 2007 (2) SCR 980

p. 455

MADHYA PRADESH =(2007) 10 SCC 448; and Amarjit Singh & Ors. v. State of A Punjab & Ors. 2010 (12) SCR 163 = (2010) 10 SC 43 - relied on. Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., 1994(1) Suppl. SCR 807 =AIR 1995 SC 142 - referred to

2.2. From the judgments of this Court, it is evident that acquisition of land does not violate. any constitutional/fundamental right of the displaced persons. However, they are entitled to resettlement and rehabilitation as per the policy framed for the oustees of the concerned project. [Para 29] [4~1-G-H]

State of Kera/a & Anr. v. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties, Kera/a State Unit & Ors., (2009) 8 SCC 46 - relied on. D 2.3. It is a settled legal proposition that Government has the power and competence to change the policy on the basis of ground realities. A public policy cannot be challenged through PIL where the State Government is competent to frame the policy and there is no need for anyone to raise any grievance even i.f the policy is changed. The public policy can only be challenged where it offends some constitutional or stat1,1tory provisions. The court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the Government merely because it feels that another decision would have been fairer or more scientific or logical or wiser . .The wisdom and advisability of the policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless the· policies are contrary to statutory or constitutional provisions or arbitrary or irrational or an abuse of power. G [Para 34-35] [496-D-G] State of Punjab & Ors. v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga etc. etc. AIR 1998 SC 1703; Ram Singh Vijay Pal Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., 2007(5) SCR 1960 =(2007) 6 SCC 44; H

p. 456

A Villianur lyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India & Ors., 2009 (9) SCR 225 =(2009) 7 sec 561 - relied on.

2.4. In the instant case, the phrase 'as far as possible' inserted by the amendment dated 3.7.2003 provides for flexibility, clothing the authority concerned with powers 8 to meet special situations where the normal process of resolution cannot flow smoothly. The phrase can be interpreted as not being prohibitory in nature. The phrase simply means that the principles are to be observed unless it is not possible to follow the same in the particular circumstances of a case. The words rather, connote a discretion vested in the prescribed authority. It is thus discretion and not compulsion. Once the authority exercises its discretion, the court should not interfere with the discretion/decision unless it is found to be palpably arbitrary. The court has to consider and understand the scope of application of the doctrines of "lex non cogit ad impossibi/ia" (the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform); "impossibilium nu/la obligatio esf' (the law does not expect a party to do the impossible); and impotentia excusat /egem in the qualified sense that there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law or to forbear the prohibitory. These maxims are akin to the maxim of Roman Law nemo tenetur ad impossibilia (no one is bound to do an impossibility) which is derived from common sense and natural equity. [Para 36-38) (497-A-G] Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., 2005 (1) SCR = G 73 AIR 2005 SC 514; and High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Veena Verma & Anr., 2009 (1) SCR 795 = AIR 2009 SC 2938; Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad & Ors., 1999 (2) Suppl. SCR 754 =AIR 1999 SC 3558; Hira Tikkoo v. Union Territory, Chandigarh & Ors., 2004(1) Suppl. H SCR 65 =AIR 2004 SC 3648; and Haryana Urban

p. 457

MADHYA PRADESH Development Authority & Anr. v. Dr. Babeswar Kanhar & Anr., A 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 282 =AIR 2005 SC 1491; Gramin Sewa Sanstha v. State of M.P. & Ors., 1986 Supp SCC 578- referred to. ·

Footnotes

2 SCC 549; and N.D. Jayal & Anr. v. Union of India E & Ors., 2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 152 =AIR 2004 SC 867; Ezra v. Secretary of State for India, (1905)
32 Ind App 93; and Santosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corporation & Anr., 1986 (1) SCR 603 =AIR 1986 SC 1164 - referred to.

2.6. In the process of development, the State cannot be permitted to displace tribal people, a vulnerable section of our society, suffering from poverty and ignorance, without taking appropriate remedial measures of rehabilitation. The record of the case reveals that about 5~ 0/o of the oustees involved in these cases are members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Land had never been offered to any of these oustees. The amount of compensation as determined under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 had been deposited in their bank accounts. No attempt had ever been made by the State H

p. 458

A to either acquire or purchase land by agreement/ negotiation for resettlement of the oustees. Only 11 % of the oustees could purchase the land of their own without any assistance from the State authorities. [Para 47-48] [501-G-H; 502-A-B; 503-B-C] B 2.7. In regard to the amended provisions of the R & R Policy, the phrase "as far as possible" would come into play, in case an attempt is made to acquire/purchase lands and then to make allotment of land to oustees. The other added term i.e. giving the option to oustees to make application for acceptance of compensation and not c.laiming land for land acquired, remained inapplicable, as it is alleged that not a single oustee made such an application. None of the obligations on the part of the authorities as clearly stipulated by the R & R Policy had been fulfilled . .The Adhiniyam 1985 had not been made applicable in respect of the Omkareshwar Dam Project taking into account the past experience in other projects. The State authorities, ought to have assisted the oustees in purchasing the land of their choice from other agriculturists and met the difference of cost, if any, over and above the amount of compensation and the cost of land so purchased. While determining such issues, the State authorities could take into consideration the fact that the land should be not less than of the same quality and nature which the oustees were originally having with them. This exercise could have been done "pari pasu" which means "equably" or "ratably" to the construction I of the Dam and could have been completed much In advance of completion of the Dam to the Full Water Level. G [Para 48] [502-C-H; 503-A] 2.8. It has been stated that the State Government devised a scheme whereby the PAF is given substantial additional amount over and above the compensation for his land in order to enable him to purchase arable and H

p. 459

MADHYA PRADESH irrigable land at the location of his choice. This scheme has come to be known as SRG or Special Rehabilitation Package (SRP). The offer of SRG is over and above the Rehabilitation Policy. The relief granted by the appellants to the oustees as SRG is much more than the amount of compensation or amount entitled in R & R Policy as amended on 3.7.2003. In fact, to certain extent, it is in consonance with the provisions contained in Clause (5.4) of R & R Policy, wherein the State is un/ier an obligation to meet the gap of amount between the amount of compensation and the value of the land purchased by the c oustees. It has also been stated that all the oustees have voluntarily accepted SRG and withdrawn the amount and they stand fully satisfied. However, if an oustee feels aggrieved of what he has received, he may approach the GRA, and against the decision of GRA any aggrieved party may approach the High Court. [para 50-53] [504-C- D, G; 506-A-E] 3.1. The Court should not place reliance upon a judgment without discussing how the factual situation fits· in with a fact-situation of the decision on which reliance is placed, as it ha.s to be ascertained by analysing all the material facts and the issues involved in the case and argued on both sides. A judgment may not be followed in a given case if it has some distinguishing features. A little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference to the precedential value of a decision. [Para 59] [508-H; 509-A-B]

Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gumam Kaur, State of ·Kamataka & Ors. v. Gowramma & Ors., 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR G 929 =AIR 2008 SC 863; and State of Haryana & Anr. v. Dharam Singh & Ors. 2009 (1) SCR 979 - relied on. 3.2. Admittedly, the NWDT Award did not provide for allotment of agricultural land to the major sons of such oustees. Th~ States of Gujarat and Maharashtra had H

p. 460

A given concessions/relief over and above the said Award. Thus, the Narmada Bachao Andolan-1 has been decided with presumption that such a right had been conferred upon major sons by the NWDT Award and Narmada Bachao Andolan-11 has been decided following the said B judgment and interpreting the definition of "family" contained in the R & R Policy. When the two earlier cases were being considered by the Court, it had not been brought to its notice that the NWDT Award did not provide for such an entitlement. The courts are not to c perpetuate an illegality, rather it is the duty of the courts to rectify mistakes. In view of the principles of 'per incuriam', the "quotable in law" is avoided and ignored if it is rendered in ignorance of a Statute or other binding authority. [para 60,62 and 63] (510-E-F; 511-A; 509-E-F]

D India Cement Ltd. etc. etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu etc. etc., 1989 (1) Suppl. SCR 692 =AIR 1990 SC 85, State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. & Ors., 2004(1) SOR 564 = (2004) 10 SCC 201 Mam/eshwar Prasad & Anr. v. Kanhaiya Lal (D) by Lrs., 1975 (3) S~R 834 =AIR 1975 SC E 907; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 1 = AIR 1988 SC 1531; State of UP. & Anr. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. & Anr., 1991 (3) SCR 64 = (1991) 4 SCC 139; and Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2010 (15) SCR 201 = (2011) 1 SCC 694; Hotel Balaji F & Ors. etc. etc. v. State of A.P. & Ors. etc. etc., 1992(2) Suppl. SCR 182 =AIR 1993 SC 1048; Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of M.P. & Anr., 2004(3) Suppl. SCR 1006 = (2004) 7 SCC 558; and Mayuram Subramanian Srinivasan v. CBI, 2006(3) Suppl. SCR 48 =AIR 2006 SC 2449, Sanjiv Datta, Dy. Secy., G Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, 1995 (3) SCR 450 = (1995) 3 sec 619 - referred to.

3.3. Discrimination means an unjust, an unfair action in favour of one and against another. It involves an element of intentional and purposeful differentiation and H

p. 461

MADHYA PRADESH further an element of unfavourable bias; an unfair A ·classification. Discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution must be conscious and not accidental discrimination that arises from oversight which the State is ready to rectify. [para 67] [512-C-D] B Madhu Kishwar & Ors.v. State ofBihar & Ors., 1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 442 =AIR 1996 SC 1864; Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, 1952 SCR 435 =AIR 1952 SC 123; and Mis. Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Anr., 1989 (2) Suppl. SCR 731 =AIR 1990 SC 820, Vishundas Hundumal & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & C Ors., 1981 (3) SCR 234 =AIR 1981 SC 1636; and Eskayef Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1990(1) Suppl. SCR 442 =(1990) 4 sec 680 - referred to

3.4. The High Court while passing the order had given D a much wider interpretation to the R & R Policy making reference to the terms as "bigger family" and the "large land owning family". The Court while interpreting the provisions of a Statute, can neither add nor subtract a word. The legal maxim "a verbis legis non est E recedendum" means from the words of law, there must be no departure. [para 69] [512-G; 513-A-B]

S.P. Gupta & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1982 SC 149; P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries & Ors., AIR 1990 SC F 933; and Commissioner of Income Tax, Kera/a v. Tara Agencies, (2007) 6 SCC 429 - relied on

3.5. The Court has to interpret a provision giving it a construction agreeable to reason and justice to all parties concerned, avoiding injustice, irrationality and G mischievous consequences. The interpretation so made must not produce unworkable and impracticable results or cause unnecessary hardship, serious inconvenience or anomaly. The court also has to keep in mind the object of the legislation. [para 79] [516-F-G] H

p. 462

A Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, AIR 1994 SC 1775; Corporation Bank v. Saraswati Abharansala & Anr. 2008 916) SCR 340 =(2009) 1 SCC 540; and Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2009(15) SCR 265 = (2010) 1 SCC 135; Bihar State Council of Ayurvedic and s Unani Medicine v. State of Bihar, 2007 (11) SCR 824 = AIR 2008 SC 595; and Mahmadhusen Abdulrahim Kalota Shaikh v. Union of India, 2008 (14) SCR 889 = (2009) 2 SCC 1; Union of India v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., 2008 (8) SCR 315 = AIR 2008 SC 2286; Narashimaha Murthy v. C Susheelabai, 1996(1) Suppl. SCR 414 =AIR 1996 SC 1826; Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, 1958 SCR 1156 =AIR 1958 SC 353, Sheikh Gu/fan v. Sanat Kumar Ganguli, 1965 SCR 364 =AIR 1965 SC 1839 - referred to. D 3.6. In the instant case, the directions of the High Court regarding land-for-land would lead to grave inequity, and thereby likely to cause undue enrichment of some categories of oustees: a.) Sons of land owning class get better rights than their fathers; b) Sons of land E owning class get better rights than those of land less class; c) even though everybody loses same measure of land, some are not entitled to any land while for some it becomes an unimaginable bounty or proves to be bonanza. [para 81] [519-A-C] F 3.7. Compensation in the present context has to be understood in relation to right to property. The right of the oustee is protected only to a limited extent as enunciated in Article 300-A of the Constitution. The tenure holder is deprived of the property only to the extent of land actually owned and possessed by him. This Is, therefore, limited to the physical area of the property and this area cannot get expanded or reduced by any fictional definition of the word "family" when it comes to awarding compensation. Compensation is Awarded by authority of

p. 463

MADHYA PRADESH law under Article 300-A read with the relevant statutory law of'eompensatioh under any law made by the legislature and for the time being in force, only for the area acquired. RehabilitatiOn on the other hand, is restoration of the status of something lost, displaced or even otherwise a grant to secure a dignified mode of life to a person who has nothing to sustain himself. This concept, as against compensation and property under Article 300-A, brings within its fold the presence of the elements of Article 21 of the Constitution. Those who have been rendered destitute, have to be assured a permanent source of basic livelihood to sustain themselves. This becomes necessary for the State when it relates to the rehabilitation of the already depressed classes like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and marginal farmers in order to meet the.requirements of social justice. [Para 83) [520-F-H; 521- D A.-0.l 3.8. The benefit given to a major son was not within thtr;ferms of the Award. It was rather a concession given by the States who were parties to the NWDT Award after the Award was delivered during the course of subsequent negotiations, and, therefore, could not be a part of the Award. The previous decisions,* therefore, would not be a binding precedent for the purpose of the instant case as it was under some mistaken belief that the Award was understood to have extended the said benefit to major sons also. The High Court therefore, fell into an error by proceeding to assume that a major son would be treated to be a separate family for the purpose of allotment of land also. Thus, the policy must be interpreted to the effect that the major sons of oustees will be entitled to all the benefits under the R & R Policy, except allocation of agricultural land. The major son would, however, be entitled to his share in the area which is to be allotted to the tenure holder on rehabilitation in case he is entitled to such a share in the law applicable to the particular H

p. 464

A State. [Para 83-84 & 85) [521-E-G; 522-D-E & F-G]

Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. Union of India & Ors., 2000(4) Suppl. SCR 94 = (2000-) 10 SCC 664 and Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. Union of India & Ors., 2005 (2) SCR 840 B =(2005) 4 SCC 32 held per incuriam as regards benefit given in those cases to major son.

3.9. Each State has a right to frame the rehabilitation policy considering the extent of its resources and other priorities. One State is not bound if, in a similar situation, C the other State has accorded additional facilities even over and above the policy. The definition of "displaced family" cannot be read in isolation, rather it requires to be considered taking into account the eligibility criteria for allotment of land in Clause (5) of the R & R Policy. To D· that extent, the judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside. The direction given by the High Court in paragraph 64 (i) of the judgment, is modified to the extent that the displaced families who have not withdrawn SRG benefits/ compensation voluntarily and submit applications for allotment of land before the Authority concerned, shall be ehtitled to the allotment of agricultural land "as far as possible" in terms of the R & R Policy, and for that purpose, the appellants must make some government or private land available for allotment to such oustees if they opt for such land and agree to ensure compliance with other terms and conditions stipulated therein. [Para 85-86) [523-G-H; 524-A-D]

3.10. Directions given by the High Court to allot agricultural land to major sons of the oustees in G Paragraph 64 (iii) of the impugned judgment is set aside. [Para 86) [523-H; 524-A]

C.A. No.2082 of 2011

4.1. The Office Memorandum issued by the Ministry H

p. 465

MADHYA PRADESH of Forest and Environment dated 13.10.1993 granting A clearance for the·. Omkareshwar Dam Project with the · condition that the Rehabilitation Programme should be extended to landless labourers and the people affected due to canal by identifying and allocating suitable land as permissible. As the said condition imposed by the B Ministry of Forest and Environment while granting clearance is as stood qualified, and has been subject to any other law for the time being in force or the government policy etc., the landless labourers are not entitled to allotment of land. More. so, the R & R Policy c itself provides a particular mode of retaining 50% of the compensation amount and 50% to be recovered in 20 years. As the landless labourers never had any land, they are not entitled to any compensation under the Act 1894, thus, the question of allotment of land to them would not 0 arise. The R & R Policy itself provides that such persons are entitled to get the speqified amount of Rs.49,3001- to buy productive employment creating assets etc., and such money can also be used for acquiring land. [para 90 and 91] [525-H; 526-A-B & D-G] E Gurbax Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 1967 SC 502, Municipal Committee, Patiala v. Model Town Residents Association & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 2844 and Jagjit Cotton Textile Mills v. Chief Commercial Superintendent, N.R. & Ors., (1998) - relied on F

4.2. In the instant case, the Court is concerned with the rights and entitlements of the oustees of the 5 villages which have already been submerged. There are claims and counter claims in regard to voluntary acceptance of G compensation amount/SRG by the oustees of those 5 villages. The record does not contain sufficient material to adjudicate upon the factual aspects involved herein. The GRA is the best forum to decide the claims of such persons. However, in view of the settled legal proposition H

p. 466

A that no person should suffer from an act of the court and to ensure that the oustees of the 5 villages which have already been submerged, do not face hostile discrimination at the hands of the authorities, they shall be entitled to the relief to which the other oustees are e entitled in Civil Appeal Nos. 2115-2116 of 2011. [para 98, 100 and 101] [531-D; 532-B-C-D-F]

CA Nos. 2083-2012 of 2011:

In these appeals the question for consideration C before the Court was whether submergence temporarily for a very short period in the exceptional flood situation warrants acquisition of the land in dispute.

5.1. There are claims and counter claims regarding 0 "taking possession of the land". The High Court did not deal with the issue. Law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that no strait-jacket formula can be laid down for taking the possession of the land for the purpose of ss. 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. It would depend upon the facts of an individual case. In case the land is fallow and barren and does not have any structure or crop on it, symbolic possession may meet the requirement of law. However, this would not be the position in case crop is standing on the land or a kachha or pacca structure has been raised on such land. In that case, actual physical possession is required to be taken. There may be a case where the acquiring authority is in possession of the land, as the same has already been requisitioned under any law or the property is in possession of a tenant, in such a case symbolic possession qua the tenure holder would be sufficient. [para 114, 116 and 124] [539-F-G; 543-C-F] Ba/want Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1767 In State of T.N. & Anr. v. Mahalakshmi Ammal H & Ors., (1996) 7 SCC 269, Ba/mokand Khatri Educational &

p. 467

MADHYA PRADESH Industrial Trust, Amritsar v. State of Punjab & Ors., (1996) 4 A SCC 212, P.KKa/burqutv. State ofKamataka, (2005) 12 SCC 489, National Thermal Power Corporation v. Mahesh Datta & Ors., (2009) 8 SCC 339, Thakur Nirman Singh & Ors. v. Thakur Lal Rudra Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1926 PC 100; Smt. Sawarni v. lnder Kaur & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2823; R. V.E. B Venkata Cha/a Gounder v. Aru/mign Ciswesaraswamy & V Temple & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 4548; and Suman Verma v. Union of India & Ors., (2004) 12 SCC 57) - referred to.

5.2. In the instant case, in view of the fact that land in dispute is an agricultural land and has 167 dwelling C houses, law in fact requires taking over the actual physical possession. Respondent no. 1 has asserted that the tenure holders are not in possession of the said land. However, on the directions of this Court, the District and Sessions Judge, Indore has submitted a detailed report D · stating that the tenure holders are in actual physical possession of the acquired lands. This fact is further evident from the D.V.Ds. and C.Ds. of the videos, prepared during the time of inspection by District Judge, Indore. Thus none of the tenure holders, so far the land E in dispute is concerned, has been evicted/dispossessed. All the tenure holders are enjoying the land without any interference. [para 125-127 and 129) [543-G; 545-C; 546· G] F 5.3. In view of the serious controversy raised in these appeals, on the directions of this Court the CWC submitted its report dated 22.3.2011 to the effect that out of 284.03 hectare of the land in the five villages, 281.75 hectare falls between FRL and BWL, which will come G under temporary submergence due to back water effect. The remaining 2.28 hectare area will not come under submergence due to back water levels when water levels are up to BWL. Therefore, the agricultural land of these five villages is not to be acquired as it may only be under H

p. 468

A temporary submergence for a very short period, which occurs throughouf the country during floods in monsoon. [para 147, 148 and 159) [553-E-F; 561-B-C]

5.4. The State is, therefore, competent to exercise its 8 power u/s 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and, as such, is entitled to abandon the land acquisition proceedings. However, it shall not apply to 167 dwelling units on the said land. Such persons whose dwelling units are acquired shall be entitled for the benefit of R & R Policy to the extent provided therein. The State shall C establish roads etc. after raising the height of the Bandh as proposed by the Authorities. [para 130 and 160) [547 - B; 563-A-B]

6.1. It has been the case of the applicant/respondent D NBA that the tenure holders had already been physically dispossessed and land stood vested in the State. The I

Court has been entertaining this matter under the bona· fide belief that NBA was espousing the grievance of inarticulate and illiterate poor farrr, ""S, with all sincerity and thus, would not make any misleading statement. However, belief stands fully belied. In such a fact- situation, the NBA not having personal interest in the case, cannot claim to be dominus litis. Thus, it ought to have acted at every stage with full sense of responsibility and sincerity. [Para 131-132) [547-D, G-H; 548-B-C]

Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. Union of India & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 586; R. and M. Trust v. Koramangla Residents Vigilance Group & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 894). Mis Ho/icow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra & Ors., AIR 2008 G SC 913; and Sheela Barse v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 2211 - referred to. 6.2. The 'rights' of the public interest litigant in a PIL are always subordinate to the 'interests' of those for H whose benefit the action is brought. The status of

p. 469

MADHYA PRADESH dominus litis could not be conferred unreflectively or for A the asking, .on a PIL petitioner as that would render the proceedings "vulnerable to and susceptible of a new dimension which might, in conceivable cases be used by persons for personal ends resulting in prejudice to the public weal". [para 135) [549-B-C] B

6.3. The standard of expectation of civic responsibility required of a petitioner in a PIL is higher than that of ·an applicant who strives to realise personal ends. The courts expect a public interest litigant to discharge high standards of responsibility. Negligent use C or use for oblique motives is extraneous to the PIL process for were the litigant to act for other oblique considerations, the application will be rejected at the threshold. Measuring the 'seriousness' of the PIL petitioner and to see whether she/he is actually a D 'champion' of the cause of the individual or the group being represented, is the responsibility of the Court, to ensure that the party's procedural behaviour remains that of an adequate 'champion' of the public cause. [para 136] [549-D-F] E

The Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors., AIR 1993 SC .892; Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar, (2003) 6 SCC 1; and Kusum Lata v. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 6 SCC 180); State of Uttaranchal v. Ba/want Singh Chaufal and Ors., (2010) F 3 sec 402. - relied on 6.4. Therefore, while dealing with the PIL, the Court has to be vigilant and it must ensure that the forum of the Court be neither abused nor used to achieve an ~blique purpose. A person seeking relief in public interest should G approach the Court of Equity, not only with clean hands but also with a clean mind, clean heart and clean objective. Thus, he who seeks equity must do equity. The legal maxim "Jure naturae aequum est neminem cum a/terius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem", means H, I

470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011} 6 S.C.R.

A that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another. The judicial process should never become an instrument of oppression or abuse or means to subvert justice. A petition containing misleading and inaccurate statement(s), if filed, to B achieve an ulterior purpose, amounts. to an abuse of the process of the Court and such a litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly. Further, a false statement made in the Court or in the pleadings, intentionally to mislead the Court and obtain a favourable order, amounts to c criminal contempt, as it tends to impede the administration of justice. Thus, a litigant is bound to make "full and true disclosure of facts". The Court is not a forum to achieve an oblique purpose. [para 137-139 and 141] [550-B-G; 551-D]

D 6.5. Whenever the Court comes to the conclusion that the process of the Court is being abused, the Court would be justified in refusing to proceed further with the matter. This rule has been evolved out of need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusl ig the process of the E Court by deceiving it. However, the concealed fact must be material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed, it would have an effect on the merit of the case/order. The legal maxim ''iuri ex injuria non oritur" means that a right cannot arise out of wrong doing, and F it becomes applicable in a case like this. In such a case the person who suppresses the material facts from the court is guilty of suppressio veri and suggestio fa/si i.e. suppression or failure to disclose what a party is bound to disclose, which may amount to fraud. [para 140 &144] G [550-G-H; 551-A-B; 552-F-G]

The Ramjas Foundation & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 852; Noorduddin v. Dr. K.L. Anand, (1995) 1 SCC 242; Ramniklal N. Bhutta & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1236; Sabia Khan & Ors. v. State of U.P. H

p. 471

MADHYA PRADESH & Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 271; S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) A Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors., (2004) 7 SCC 166; and Union of India & Ors. v. Shantiranjan Sarkar, (2009) 3 SCC 90 - relied on

Naraindas v. Government of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., B AIR 1974 SC 1252; The Advocate General, State of Bihar v. Mis. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries & Anr., AIR 1980 SC 946; and Afzal & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1996) 7 SCC 397). K. 0. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited & Ors., (2008) 12 SCC 481 - referred to. c 6.6. In the instant case , the NBA has not acted with a sense of responsibility and so far succeeded in securing favourable orders by misleading the Court. Such conduct cannot be approved. However, in a PIL, the Court has to strike a balance between the interests of the parties. The Court has to take into consideration the pitiable condition of oustees, their poverty, inarticulateness, illiteracy; extent of backwardness, unawareness also. It is desirable that in future the Court must view any presentation by the NBA with caution and care, insisting on proper pleadings, disclosure of full facts truly and fairly and in case it has any doubt, refuse to entertain the NBA. However, considering the interests of the oustees, it may be desirable that the Court may appoint an Amicus Curiae to present their cause, if such F a contingency arises. [para 145) (552-G-H; 553-A-B] Case Law Reference: 1988(2) Suppl. SCR 1050Para 7 Relied on 1988 (2) SCR 339 . Para 7 Relied on G

2001 (3) SCR 124 Para 7 Relied on 2010 (7) SCR 252 Para 7 Relied on H

p. 472

A 1987 (2) SCR 805 Para 9 Relied on

1988 Suppl.; SCR 690 para 10 Relied on

1994 (2) Suppl. SCR 404 Para 11 Relied on

2003 (5) Suppl. SCR 716 Para 11 Relied on B 2009 (11) SCR 727 Para 11 Relied on

2000(4) Suppl. SCR 94 Para 14 Referred to

1995 (1) Suppl. SCR 492 Para 16-17 referred to c 2005 (2) SCR 840 Para 16-17 referred to

1983(1) SCR 8 Para 22 referred to

2007 (13) SCR 876 Para 22 referred to D . 2002 (3) SCR 365 Para 24 relied on 2009 (2) SCR 881 Para 24 relied on 2010 (8) SCR 750 Para 24 relied on

E 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 827 Para 24 relied on

1997 (2) Suppl. SCR 305 Para 25 relied on 2007 (2) SCR 980 Para 26 relied on

2010 (12) SCR 163 Para 26 relied on F 1994(1) Suppl. SCR 807 Para 26 relied to 2007(5) SCR 1060 Para 34 relied on 2009 (9) SCR 225 Para 34 relied on G 2005 (1) SCR 73 Para 36 relied on 2009 (1) SCR 795 Para 34 referred to 1999 (2) Suppl. SCR 754 Paras 38-39 Referred to H

p. 473

MADHYA PRADESH 2004(1) Suppl. SCR 65 Paras 38-39 Referred to A 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 282 Paras 38-39 Referred to

1995(2) SCR 260 Para 43 referred to

2003(3) Suppl. SCR 152 Para 43 referred to B 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 853 Para 44 referred to

1986 (1) SCR 603 Para 45 referred to

1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 929 Para 59 relied on c 2009 (1) SCR 979 Para 59 relied on

1989 (1) Suppl. SCR 692 Para 60 relied on

2004(1) SCR 564 Para 60 relied on

Para 60 relied on D 1975 (3) SCR 834 1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 1 Para 60 relied on

1991 (3) SCR 64 Para 60 relied on

2010 (15) SCR 201 Para 60 relied on E 1992(2) Suppl. SCR 182 Para 63 referred to

2006(3) Suppl. SCR 48 Para 63 relied on

1995(3) SCR 450 Para 63 relied on F 1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 442 Para 63 relied on

1952 SCR 435 Para 67 relied on

1989 (2) Suppl. SCR 731 Para 67 relied on G 1981 (3) SCR 234 Para 67 relied on 1990(1) Suppl. SCR 442 Para 67 relied on 1952 SCR 435 Para 67 relied on H

p. 474

A 1989 (2) Suppl. SCR 731 Para 67 relied on 1981 (3) SCR 234 Para 67 relied on 1990(1) Suppl. SCR 442 Para 67 relied on 1982 SCR 365 Para 72 relied on B 1990 (1) SCR 483 Para 72 relied on 2007(8) SCR 136 Para 72 relied on 2008 916) SCR 340 Para 72 relied on c 2009(15) SCR 265 Para 72 relied on 2007 (11) SCR 824 Para 73 relied on 2008 (14) SCR 889 Para 73 relied on D 2008 (8) SCR 315 Para 74 relied on 1996(1) Suppl. SCR 414 Para 74 relied on 1958 SCR 1156 Para 74 relied on

E 1965 SCR 364 Para 74 relied on CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2082 of 2011.

From the Judgment & Order dated 21.2.2008 of the High F Court of Judicature of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in W.P. (C) No. 4457 of 2007.

WITH C.A. Nos. 2083-2097, 2098-2112, 2115 and 2116 of2011. G Sanjay Parikh, TVS Raghavendra Sreyas, Swapnil Verma, Nikhil Nayyar for the Appellant. P.S. Patwalia, Ravi Shankar Prasad, Sunny Choudhary, H Ajay Chauhan, C.D. Singh, Suparna Srivastava, Ran Swarup

p. 475

MADHYA PRADESH

Sharma, Ashok Bhan, D.S. Mehra for the Respondents. A

Judgment

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. B. S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. All these appeals relate to the establishment of the Omkareshwar Dam on the Narmada river in Madhya Pradesh. As these appeals are inter-connected and B have been filed against interim orders passed by the High Court in the same writ petition, they have been heard together and disposed of by a common judgment. However, for convenience Civil Appeal Nos. 2115-2116 of 2011 are dealt with first. c Civil Appeal Nos. 2115-2116 of 2011

22. These appeals have been preferred against the judgment and order dated 21.2.2008 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Petition No. 4457 of 0 2007, 'Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.', wherein the High Court as an interim measure, has issued directions, inter-a/ia, for allotment of agricultural land to the displaced persons in lieu of the land acquired for construction of the dam in terms of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy (hereinafter called as 'R & R Policy') as amended on 3. 7.2003. The High Court direction applied even to those oustees who had already withdrawn the compensation, if such oustees opt for such land and refund 50% of the compensation amount received by them. The balance cost of the ~Hotted land would be deposited by the allottees in 20 equal yearly installments as stipulated in clause (5.3) of the R & R Policy, and to treat a major son of the family whose land has been acquired as a separate family for the purpose of allotment of agricultural land. G

33. FACTUAL MATRIX :

Facts and circumstances giving rise to these cases are as follows:

p. 476

A (A) The Narmada river starts at Amarkantak. It flows through Madhya Pradesh for 1077 km, then forms a common boundary in Maharashtra for 74 km (35 km with MP and 39 km with Maharashtra) and then passes through Gujarat for 161 km before meeting the Arabian Sea after a total length of 1312 km. B The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal apportioned the water in the Narmada between Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra and Rajasthan, subject to review after 45 years.

(B) The State of Madhya Pradesh, conducted a survey in C 1955 for the establishment of hydro-power projects in the Narmada basin at different sites including Barwaha (Omkareshwar Project). In 1983, Narmada Valley Development (Irrigation) Department (hereinafter called NVD) was set up and further studies were conducted for the establishment of hydro- power projects. D (C) The Omkareshwar Dam - an intra-state project for generating 520 mega watts of power, which also involved the irrigation of 1.47 lakh hectares of agricultural land, was approved by the State Government, with an assessment that on the E completion of the project, 30 villages would be submerged at the full reservoir level i.e. 196.60 mtrs.

(D) The Government of Madhya Pradesh framed a rehabilitation and resettlement policy in 1985 (hereinafter called F 'R & R Policy') for the oustees of all the Narmada projects in the State. The said policy was amended from time to time as is evident from the R & R Policies dated: 9th June, 1987; 5th September, 1989; 7th June, 1991; and 27th August 1993.

The said policy provided for the allotment of a minimum of 2 hectares of agricultural land; irrigation facilities at government cost; grant-in-aid for small and marginal farmers and SC/ST families; and to meet the entire cost of the allotted land. The policy further provided that the allotment of agricultural land would be carried out much in advance, before dam construction reached crest level. The land required for allotment

p. 477

MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] would be procured in the common area from the farmers having A holdings of more than 4 hectares of land. The State authorities obtained environmental clearance for the Omkareshwar project from the Ministry of Environment and Forest on 13.10.1993. The Mtnistry of Welfare granted 8 clearance on 8.10.1993. The Planning Commission also granted clearance on condition of compliance with welfare and environmental clearances vide order dated 25.5.2001.

The Central Electricity Authority accorded techno-economic clearance under the provisions of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 C on 24.7.2001. The Government of India approved and granted financial concurrence from Public Investment Board of the Planning Commission for this project on 17.5.2002. Forest clearance was granted on 20.8.2004 under the provisions of Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 for the D: diversio.n of 5829 hectares of forest lands. Therefore, there had been various statutory and lion-statutory clearances from the authorities. (E) The R & R Policy further stood amended on 3.7.2003, E to the effect that agricultural land would be offered to the oustees "as far as possible"; and not to those who would make application in writing to receive compensation for their acquired land.

(F) Construction of the Omkareshwar dam began in 2002 F and stood completed in October, 2006. A large number of families had been uprooted on construction of the dam upto its 190 mtrs. height. For the dam site, a huge area of land had been acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called as 'Act 1894'). The displaced persons G were allegedly not offered the land under the R & R Policy, as amended on 3.7.2003, rather compensation for their land was deposited in their accounts. (G) Narmada Bachao Andolan, respondent No.1 H

p. 478

A (hereinafter referred to as 'NBA'), an action group, had been espousing the grievances of displaced persons by filing Public Interest litigations (hereinafter called 'PIL') before the High Court/further to this Court from time to time and a large number of orders had been passed by the courts to redress the B grievances of the oustees. When the decision was taken to raise the height of the dam, NBA filed writ petition No.4457 of 2007 before the High Court seeking a number of reliefs, inter- alia, to stop all eviction; directions for serving of life supplies such as drinking water and electricity; not to take any other c coercive measures, to stop closure of the radial gates of the Omkareshwar dam above crest level of EL 179.60 M; and to stop the blocking of the sluice gates below crest level, until all Project Affected Families (hereinafter called 'PAFs') were rehabilitated as per the R & R Policy. Further reliefs sought included the issuance of appropriate directions for an 0 assessment by the Grievance Reuressal Authority (hereinafter called 'GRA') for the Omkareshwar Project of the status of relief and rehabilitation of the oustees affected at Full Reservoir Level (hereinafter called 'FRL') and Back Water Level (hereinafter called 'BWL') within a stipulated period. E (H) During the pendency of the writ petition in pursuance of the orders passed by the High Court from time to time, a large number of reports/interim reports were furnished by the authorities concerned. The High Court after considering the said reports and submissions advanced on behalf of the parties passed the impugned judgment and order dated 21.2.2008. The High Court issued a large number of directions as interim measures, including the direction for allotment of land in lieu of land acquired and to treat the major sons of the family, as independent families for the purpose of allotment of agricultural land. Hence, these appeals.

44. S/Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad and P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants have submitted that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition H

p. 479

MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] as it did not have material facts/particulars disclosing any cause of action to the writ petitioners even in the PIL. Not a single order passed by any statutory authority had been challenged and the writ petition was filed after inordinate delay without furnishing any explanation for the same. The GRA had been constituted to consider individuals' grievances and not a single oustee approached the GRA before filing of the writ petition. The Court ought to have relegated the parties for redressal of their grievances to the GRA. An efficacious alternative remedy was available to the oustees. The High Court further committed c an error in issuing directions for allotment of land in lieu of land even in those cases where the oustees have voluntarily accepted the compensation amount; that such oustees would deposit 50% of the said amount and would be entitled to rulqtment of land. It is further submitted that the High Court erred in treatiqg the major son of such an oustee as a separate family 0 · for the purpose of allotment of agricultural land, though he did not have. any independent right to claim compensation for the land acquired. Land for allotment to such oustees is not available. The State authorities cannot be asked to do an impossible task. The State authorities have provided a package for their re-settlement and rehabilitation, giving all facilities and financial aid. Making the allotment of land mandatory in lieu of land acquired would force the State to displace other persons to settle such oustees, which is impermissible in law. In case each major son of such oustees is treated as a separate family, acquisition of his family land would prove to be a bonanza for such persons as the tenure holding of such a family would multiply several times and State would suffer irreparable losses. The State Government vide amendments of the Revenue Code, reduced the area of the grazing land, but the land so made available is not enough to meet the needs of such a large number of oustees. Cases decided by this Court, earlier on two occasions, have no - - bearing on the issue in these cases, as the true and correct facts could not be brought to the notice of this Court. Most of H

480 SUPREME COURT. REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R .

. A the .oustees had taken benefit of the Special .Rehabilitation Grant (hereinafter called as 'SRG') and withdrawn .the amount and surrendered the possession of their land. The SR.G amount · has been more than the compensation amount for acquisition of land. The High Court did not issue any direction in regard to the amount taken by the oustees as SRG, either to refund the same or for adjustment of the same. Therefore, directions issued by the High Court are liable to be set aside. The appeals deserve to be allowed.

55. On the contrary, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior counsel and Shri Sanjay Parekh, Advocate representing the oustees, have vehemently opposed the appeals contending that displacement of oustees without proper imple.mentation of the rehabilitation scheme is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In a matter of this nature where a very large number of·· D illiterate, inarticulate and poor people have suffered at the hands of the statutory authorities, no technical objections e.g. want of. proper pleadings or delay etc., .can be allowed to be 'raised. Statutory and non-statutory authorities have granted clearances for the Omkareshwar Dam Project on the Clear understanding that the State authorities would carry out and implement, in letter and spirit, all the terms and conditions of the R & R Policy: Therefore, it is not permissible for the State authorities to say that it would not strictly adhere to the terms incorporated therein. The appellant-State and its instrumentalities never made any serious attempt to acquire land for such oustees and the compensation amount has been deposited in rEi°spective accounts of the oustees. Not a single oustee had ever opted for compensation for land in lieu of land acquired: Amendment made in the R & R Polley vide order dated 3.7.2003 is ultra vires and illegal and is liable to be ignored for the reason that the R & R Policy had beeri approved by the State Government, though the amendment had not undergone the same process. If a major son of the family, whose land has been· acquired, is not treated as a 'separate family' for the purpose of allotment of land for land acquired, the definition of 'displaced family'

p. 481

MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] under clause 2(b) of the R & R Policy would be rendered . A nugatory. Therefore, such an interpretation is not permissible. This Court, while interpreting the other schemes in respect of · Narm.ada Projects itself has given effect to the said policy and directed for allotment of land for land acquired and upheld the entitlement of the major son of an oustee to an independent allotment of agricultural land. Denial of such a right would be discriminatory and thus violative of the equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Thus, the appeals lack merit and are liable to be dismissed.

66. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

PLEADINGS:

77. It is a settled proposition of law that a party has to plead its case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate the averments made in the petition and in case the pleadings are not complete the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas. In Bharat Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR E 1988 SC 2181, this Court has observed as under:-

"lh ot1r opinion, when a point, which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point. There is a distinction between a hearing under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, i.e. a plaint orwritten statement, the facts and no; the evidence are required to be pleaded. In a writ petition or in the counter affidavit, not H

482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011J 6 S.C.R.

A only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it." (Emphasis added)

88. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1608; Mis Atul Castings Ltd. v. Bawa Gurvachan 8 Singh, AIR 2001 SC 1684; and Rajasthan Pradesh V.S. Sardarshahar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 2221.

99. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the C court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question(s) in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is settled legal proposition that D "as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted." Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties.

The object and purpose of pleadings and issues is to ensure that the litigants come to trial with all issues clearly defined and to prevent cases being expanded or grounds being shifted during trial. If any factual or legal issue, despite having merit, has not been raised by the parties, the court should not decide the same as the opposite counsel does not have a fair opportunity to answer the line of reasoning adopted in that regard. Such a judgment may be violative of the principles of natural justice. (Vide: Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by L.Rs. v. Bishun Narain Inter-College & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1242; and Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. C.P. Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127).

1010. It cannot be said that the rules of procedural law do not apply in PIL. The caution is always added that every technicality in the procedural law is not available as a defence in such proceedings when a matter of grave public importance H is for consideration before the Court. (Vide: Rural Litigation

p. 483

MADHYA PRADESH [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.] and Entitlement Kendera v. State of U.P., AIR 1988 SC 2187). A

1111. Strict rules of pleading may not apply in PIL, however, there must be sufficient material in the petition on(the basis of which Court may proceed. The PIL litigant has to l~y a factual foundation for his averments on the basis of which such a 8 person claims the reliefs. Information furnished by him should not be vague and indefinite. Proper pleadings are necessary to meet the requirements of the principles of natural justice; Even in PIL, the litigant cannot approach the Court to havek fishing or roving enquiry. He cannot claim to have a chance 'to establish his claim. However, the technicalities of the rules of C pleading cannot be made applicable vigorously. Pleadings prepared by a layman must be construed generously as he lacks standard of accuracy and precision particularly when a legal wrong is caused to a determinate class. (Vide: A. Hamsaveni & Ors: v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (1994) 6 D SCC 51; Ashok K4mar Pandey v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2004 SC 280; Prt{pir Kumar Das v. State of Orissa & Ors., (2005) 13 SCC 152; and A. Abdul Farook v. Municipal Council, Perambalur, (2009) 15 SCC 351). E

1212. In the instant case, in the writ petition, an impression had been given, that some drastic steps would be taken by the authorities which would cause great hardship to a large number of persons. However, the writ petition did not disclose the factum of how many persons had already vacated their houses and handed over the possession of their land. It was contended that urgent measures were required to be taken by the Court in order to mitigate the sufferings of the people. In view of the fact that there was no material before the Court to adjudicate upon the issues involved therein, the High Court passed the order dated 30.3.2007 directing the GRA to submit the report on the rehabilitation work already done and still to be done; and to disclose the consequences of the closure of radial gates of the dam and blocking of the sluice gate of the dam on the people residing in the area which would be submerged. In H

p. 484

A pursuance of the said order, the GRA submitted the report dated 7.4.2007, explaining that a huge amount of several thousand crores of rupees had already been invested. The SRG had already been disbursed. Out of a total number of 4513 families to be adversely affected by the project, 2787 families B had already shifted and 1726 families remained there. An amount of Rs.9924 lacs had already been disbursed among the claimants and only a sum of Rs.589 lacs remained to be disbursed. The report further explained that land in lieu of land acquired would be allotted to oustees "as far as possible" and c as most of the oustees had accepted the compensation, it was not required on the part of the State to allot the land for land acquired. The other benefits of the R & R Policy had already been given. In fact, it is in view of this report, the High Court started examining the grievances of the oustees. Several reports were submitted by the GRA before the High Court from 0 time to time and whatever has been disclosed in those reports provided the basis for raising further queries and that, in fact, became part of pleadings of the case. In fact, the present appellants had been asked to lay factual foundation to adjudicate the issues raised by the wnt petitioners.

1313. In view of the above, it is evident that there were no pleadings before the High Court on the basis of which the writ petition could be entertained/decided. Thus, it was liable to be rejected at the threshold for the reason that the writ petition suffered for want of proper pleadings and material to substantiate the averments/allegations contained therein. Even in the case of a PIL, such a course could not be available to the writ petitioners.

G DELAY/LACHES:

1414. In the instant cases, the construction of the dam started in October 2002 and was completed in October 2006. No objection had ever been raised by NBA at any stage. The Narmada Development Authority vide order dated 28.3.2007 H

p. 485

MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] gave permission to National Hydraulic Development A Corporation to raise the water level of the dam to 189 meters upon showing that· rehabilitation of oustees of 5 villages adversely affected at 189 meters, had already been completed. The writ petition was filed praying for restraining the appellants from closing the sluice gates of the dam contending that B resettlement and rehabilitation was not complete. There was no explanation as to under what circumstances the Court had been approached at such belated stage.

1515. In Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. Union of India & Ors., (2000) 10 SCC 664, (hereinafter called as 'Narmada Bachao C Andolan-1'), this Court dealt with a similar issue of laches and observed that in spite of the fact that the clearance for construction of the dam was given in 1987, the same was challenged in 1994 on the ground that there was a lack of studies available regarding the environmental aspects and also because of seismicity. Thus, the clearance should not have been granted. The rehabilitation package was dissimilar and there had been no independent study or survey done before the decision to undertake the project was taken and construction started. This Court held that clearance and undertaking to construct the dam had been given and hundreds of crores of rupees had already been invested, before the writ petitioner had chosen to file the writ petition in 1994. Thus, the petitioner was guilty of laches in not approaching the court at an earlier point of time. The Court, however, observed as uncler: F

"When such projects are undertaken and hundreds of crores of public money is spent, any individual or organisations in the garb of PIL cannot be permitted to challenge the policy decision taken after a lapse of time. G It is against the national interest and contrary to the established principles of law that decisions to undertake developmental projects are permitted to be challenged after a number of years during which period public money has been spent in the execution of the project.. ......... . H

p. 486

A This Court has entertained this petition with a view to satisfy itself that there is proper implementation of the relief and rehabilitation measures ............. In short, it was only the concern of this Court for the protection of the fundamental rights of the oustees under Article 21 of the B Constitution of India which led to the entertaining of this petition. It is the relief and rehabilitation measures that this Court is really concerned with and the petition in regard to the other issues raised is highly belated." (Emphasis added) c In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683, this Court had taken a similar view.

1616. In fact for redressal of any grievance regarding · implementation of the R & R Policy, the oustees ought to have approached the GRA. There is nothing on record to show how many oustees remained unsatisfied/aggrieved of the orders passed by GRA till the filing of the writ petition.

1717. Thus, in view of the above, the High Court ought not to have examined any issue other than reiating to rehabilitation i.e. implementation of the R & R Policy.

ALTERNATIVE REMEDY:

1818. While dealing with a similar issue in Narmada Bachao F Ando/an v. Union of India & Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 32, (hereinafter called as 'Narmada Bachao Andolan-11'), this Court observed as under:

"Several contentions involving factual dispute had, we may notice, not been raised before GRA. GRA had been G constituted with a purpose, namely, that the matters relating to rehabilitation scheme must be addressed by it at the first instance. This Court cannot entertain applications raising grievances involving factual issues raised by the parties. GRA being headed by a former Chief Justice of H

p. 487

MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] the High Court would indisputably be entitled to adjudicate A upon such disputes. It is also expected that the parties should ordinarily abide by such decision. This Court may entertain an application only when extraordinary situation emerges." B

1919. Thus, in view of the above, the High Court ought to have directed the oustees to approach the GRA for redressal of their grievances and if any person was further aggrieved of the directions issued by the GRA, he could have approached the High Court after full fledged adjudication of the factual issues C by the GRA.

AMENDMENT OF R & R POLICY:

2020. There are claims and counter-claims on the issue as to whether the validity of the amendment of the R & R Policy o· was under challenge before the High Court. However, it is evident from the pleadings that the validity of the amendment dated 3. 7.2003 had been raised while filing the rejoinder affidavit. The rejoinder affidavit reveals that as the R & R Policy had been approved by the State Government and statutory and non-statutory clearances had been obtained on the basis of the R & R Policy, the amendment dated 3.7.2003 ought to have been brought for the approval of the authorities who had granted approval at initial stage. The amendment cannot be given effect to. The impugned judgment makes it explicit that the issue had been raised and only taken note of by the Court but not decided.

2121. The appellants have placed documents on record to show that amendment in issue had been duly approved by the Cabinet of the Ma~hya Pradesh government and suggestion has been made that amendment did not require approval of the authorities who had granted clearances. It has been opposed by the respondents.

2222. In case a plea is raised and not considered properly H

p. 488

/Aby the court the remedy available to the party is to file a review petition. (Vide: State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak & Anr., AIR 1982 SC 1249; Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd & Ors. v. P. Surya Bhagavan, AIR 2003 SC 2182; and Mount Carmel School Society v. DOA. (2008) 2 SCC 8 141).

2323. Be that as it may, in view of the fact that neither the writ petitioner asked the High Court to quash the said amendment dated 3. 7.2003, nor the court has suo motu quashed it, nor the writ petitioner has filed Special Leave C Petition raising the said point, it is not permissible for us to deal with the issue.

LAND ACQUISITION AND REHABILITATION: Article 21:

0 24. It is desirable for the authority concerned to ensure that as far as practicable persons who had been living and carrying on business or other activity on the land acquired, if they so desire, and are willing to purchase and comply with any requirement of the authority or the local body, be given a E piece of land on terms settled with due regard to the price at which land has been acquired from them. However, the State Government cannot be compelled to provide alternate accommodation to the oustees and it is for the authority concerned to consider the desirability and feasibility of providing alternative land considering the facts and circumstances of each case. In certain cases, the oustees are entitled to rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is meant only for those persons who have been rendered destitute because of a loss of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition. The authorities must explore the avenues of rehabilitation by way of employment, housing, investment opportunities, and Identification of alternative lands. "A blinkered vision of development, complete apathy towards those who are highly adversely affected by the development process and a cynical unconcern for the enforcement of the laws lead to a situation H

p. 489

MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

where the rights and benefits promised and guaranteed under A the Constitution hardly ever reach the most marginalised citizens." For people whose lives and livelihoods are intrinsically connected to the land, the economic and cultural shift to a market economy can be traumatic. B (Vide: State of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 2025; Narpat Singh etc. etc. v. Jaipur Development Authority & Anr., AIR 2002 SC 2036; Special Land Acquisition Officer, U.K. Project v. Mahaboob & Anr., (2009) 14 SCC 54; Mahanadi Coal Fields Ltd. & Anr. v. Mathias Oram & Ors., C JT (2010) 7 SC 352; and Brij Mohan & Ors. v. Haryana Urban Development Authority & Anr., (2011) 2 SCC 29).

2525. The Fundamental Right of the farmer to cultivation is a part of right to livelihood. "Agricultural land is the foundation for a sense of security and freedom from fear. Assured D possession is a lasting source for peace and prosperity." India being a predominantly agricultural society, there is a "strong linkage between the land and the person's status in the social system." However, in case of land acquisition, "the plea of deprivation of right to livelihood under Article 21 is E unsustainable." (Vide: Chameli Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 1051; and Samatha v. State of A.P. & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 3297).

2626. This Court has consistently held that Article 300-A is not only a constitutional right but also a human right. (Vide: F Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram & Ors., (2007) 10 SCC 448; and Amarjit Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2010) 10 SC 43).

2727. However, in Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar & Ors. v. State G of Gujarat & Anr., AIR 1995 SC 142, this Court held:

"Thus, it is clear that right to property under Article 300-A is not a basic feature or structure of the Constitution. It is only a constitutional right. ..... The principle of unfairness of H

p. 490

A the procedure attracting Article 21 does not apply to the acquisition or deprivation of property under Article 300-A giving effect to the directive principles ... ."

2828. This Court in Narmada Bachao Ando/an - I held as under: 8 "62. The displacement of the tribals and other persons would not per se result in the violation of their fundamental or other rights. The effect is to see that on their rehabilitation at new locations they are better off than what C they were. At the rehabilitation sites they will have more and better amenities than those they enjoyed in their tribal hamlets. The gradual assimilation in the mainstream of the society will lead to betterment and progress."

0 29. In State of Kera/a & Anr. v. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties, Kera/a State Unit & Ors., (2009) 8 SCC 46, this Court held as under: "102. Article 21 deals with right to life and liberty. Would it bring within its umbrage a right of tribals to be rehabilitated in their own habitat is the question?

103. If the answer is to be rendered in the affirmative, then, for no reason whatsoever even an inch of land belonging to a member of Scheduled Tribe can ever be acquired. Furthermore, a distinction must be borne between a right of rehabilitation required to be provided when the land of the members of the Scheduled Tribes are acquired vis-a-vis a prohibition imposed upon the State from doing so at all." G Thus, from the above referred to judgments, it is evident that acquisition of land does not violate any constitutional/ fundamental right of the displaced persons. However, they are entitled to resettlement and rehabilitation as per the policy framed for the oustees of the concerned project. H

p. 491

MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT: A

3030. The High Court after considering the submissions and examining the documents on record, so far as the issue of land in lieu of land acquired is concerned, came to the following conclusions: B (i) An area of 2508.14 hectares of agricultural land was required for allotment to the displaced families as per the R & R Policy for the Omkareshwar Project. Such land was proposed to be acquired from big cultivators having more than 4 hectares of land in the command area of the project under C Section 11 (4) of the Madhya Pradesh Pariyojana Ke Karan Visthapit Vyakti (Punahsthapan) Adhiniyam, 1985, (herein after called 'Adhiniyam 1985').

(ii) Vide order dated 4th March, 1998, the area of the D grazing land (required under the M.P. Land Revenue Code) was reduced from 10 per cent to 5 per cent in every village. Subsequently, vide order dated 19th September, 2002, area of grazing land was further reduced to 2 per cent so that some part of such land could be allotted to the oustees of the project. E (iii) No efforts had been made by the Government for allotment of land in lieu of land acquired to the displaced families under the R & R Policy as amended on 3.7.2003.

(iv) The State instrumentalities had not made any effort to purchase private lands, for allotment to oustees under the R & R Policy. On the contrary, the Government made available a huge area of land required for a Special Economic Zone by acquiring private land under the Act 1894 for settif'lg up of industries in the State of Madhya Pradesh. G (v) The submission of the State authorities that on account of scarcity of cultivable land in the State, it was impossible for the State Government to purchase private land for allotment, was not acceptable. H

492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011} 6 S.C.R.

A (vi) Only 11 per cent of the displaced families were able to purchase private agricultural land themselves without any aid or assistance of the State authorities.

(vii) None of the oustees has given option in writing to receive compensation in lieu of land acquired. 8 (viii) The State deposited the amount of compensation in the accounts of the oustees irrespective of whether they wanted land in lieu of land acquired.

c (ix) None of the protections/facilities provided for persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under the R & R Policy had been accorded. The District Collector did not make any verification in regard to their claim for land in lieu of land acquired as required under the R & R Policy. D (x) The Government had not made any attempt to provide any grant-in-aid to cover up the gap between the amount of compensation and the actual cost of land available for the purpose, particularly to all displaced Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes families. E (xi) The State authorities had hastily proceeded to complete the rehabilitation process and started the power project of the Omkareshwar Dam contrary to the assurances given under the said policy for Scheduled Castes and F Scheduled Tribes families, as none of such oustees was interested in receiving compensation for agricultural land. (xii) Grant-in-aid to cover up the difference of costs of the land purchased and amount of compensation was not paid to marginal farmers having upto 2 hectares of land, as provided in the R & R Policy.

3131. We have to examine whether any of the findings recorded by the High Court on the issue of entitlement for land in lieu of land acquired suffers from perversity and thus, H

p. 493

MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] warrants interference by this Court. A

3232. The relev~nt part of the R & R Policy, for the purpose of determination of first issue, reads as under:

(I) Principles for rehabilitation of displaced families: B

1. The aim of the State Government is that all displaced families as defined hereinafter would after their relocation and resettlement improve, or at least regain, their previous standard of living within a reasonable time. c xx xx xx

4. Special care would be taken of the families of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, marginal farmers and small farmers. D

xx xx xx

1. The displaced families would be encouraged and · assisted in purchase of lands from voluntary sellers of the E host villages.

II. - State Government Policy regarding rehabilitation and resettlement of families affected due to submerging in Narmada Projects: F

1. Definitions:

(1.1) Displaced person:

a. Any person who has been ordinarily residing or carrying on any trade or vocation for his livelihood or has been G cultivating land for at least one year before the date of publication of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in the area which is likely to be submerged permanently or temporarily due to project. H

p. 494

A xx xx xx

3. Allotment of Agricultural land:

xx xx xx B 3.2 (a) Every displaced family from whom more than 25 percent of its land holding is acquired in revenue villages or forest villages shall be entitled to and as far as possible will be allotted land to the extent of land acquired from it, subject to the provision of para 3.2(b) below. c (b) As far as possible, a minimum area of 2 hectares of land would be allotted to all the families whose lands would be acquired irrespective of whether Government land is offered or private land is purchased for allotment. Where more than 2 hec. of land is acquired from a family, it will D be allotted equal land as far as possible, subject to a ceiling of 8 hec. (Portion in italics was added vide amendment dated 3.7.2003)

xx xx xx E

5. Recovery of cost of allotted land:

(5.1) At least fifty per cent amount of compensation for the acquired land shall be retained as initial installment towards the payment of the cost of land to be allotted to the displaced family. However, if a displaced family does not wish to obtain land in lieu of the submerged land and wishes full payment of the amount of compensation, it can do so by submitting an application to this effect in writing to the concerned Land Acquisition Officer. In such cases displaced families will have no entitlement over allotment of land and shall be paid full amount of compensation in one installment. As option once exercised under this provision shall be final, no claim for allotment of land in lieu of the acquired land can be made H

p. 495

·MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] .· afterwards. (Portion in italics was added vide amendment A · dated 3.7.2003).

· If any displaced family belonging to the Scheduled Tribes, submits such an application, it will be essential to obtain orders of the Collector who will, after necessary enquiry, 8 certify that this will not adversely affect the interests of the displaced family. Such appJication of the Scheduled Tribes displaced families will be accepted only after the above said certification by the Collector.

(5.2) ............... .. c (5.3) There will be no recovery of this loan for the first 2 years. Thereafter, the loan would be recovered in 20 equal yearly installments.

(5.4) Grant-in-aid would be paid to cover up the gap between the amount of compensation and the cost of allotted land in the cases where the cost of allotted land is more than the amount of compensation. This grant would be payable to all displaced land owning Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe families and other families losing upto 2 hec. of land. For other families from whom more than 2 hec. and upto 8 hectares of land is acquired, grant-in-aid in addition to amount of compensation will be given by the Narmada Valley Development Authority on the rates prescribed therein. F

POLICY DECISIONS:

3333. In State of Punjab & Ors. v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga etc. etc., AIR 1998 SC 1703, this Court while examining the State policy fixing the rates for reimbursement of medical expenses G to the government servants held :

" •........ When Government forms its policy, it is based on a number of circumstances on facts, law including H.

p. 496

A constraints based on its resources. It is also based on expert opinion. It would be dangerous if court is asked to test the utility, beneficial effect of the policy or its appraisal based on facts set out on affidavits. The court would dissuade itself from entering into this realm which belongs B to the executive. It is within this matrix that it is to be seen whether the new policy violates Article 21 when it restricts reimbursement on account of its financial constraints.......... For every return there has to be investment. Investment needs resources and finances. So c even to protect this sacrosanct right finances are an inherent requirement. Harnessing such resources needs top priority ........ No State of any country can have unlimited resources to spend on any of its projects. That is why it only approves its projects to the extent it is feasible."

3434. The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the Government merely because it feels that another decision would have been fairer or more scientific or logical or wiser. The wisdom and advisability of the policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless the policies are E contrary to statutory or constitutional provisions or arbitrary or irrational or an abuse of power. (See: Ram Singh Vijay Pal Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2007) 6 SCC 44; Villianur /yarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India & Ors., (2009) 7 SCC 561; and State of Kera/a & Anr. v. Peoples' F Union for Civil Liberties, Kera/a State Unit & Ors., (Supra).

3535. Thus, it emerges to be a settled legal proposition that Government has the power and competence to change the policy on the basis of ground realities. A public policy cannot G be challenged through PIL where the State Government is competent to frame the policy and there is no need for anyone to raise any grievance even if the policy is changed. The public policy can only be challenged where it offends some constitutional or statutory provisions.

p. 497

MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] AS FAR AS POSSIBLE : A

3636. The aforesaid phras~ provides for flexibility, clothing the authority concerned with powers to meet special situations . where the normal process of resolution cannot flow smoothly. The aforesaid phrase can be interpreted as not being prohibitory in nature. The said wo.rds rather, connote a 8 discretion vested in the prescribed authority. It is thus discretion and not compulsion. There is no hard and fast rule in this regard · as these words give a discretion to the authority concerned. Once the authority exercises its discretion, the Court should not interfere with the said discretion/decision unless it is found to C be palpably arbitrary. (Vide: Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., AIR 2005 SC 514; and High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Veena Verma & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 2938).

3737. Thus, it is evident that this phrase simply means that o the principles are to be observed unless it is not possible to follow the same in the particular circumstances of a case.

DOCTRINE OF IMPOSSIBILITY:

3838. The Court has to consider and understand the scope E of application of the doctrines of "lex non cogit ad impossibilia" (the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform); "impossibi/ium nu/la obligatio est" (the law does not expect a party to do the impossible); and impotentia excusflt legem in the qualified sense that there is a necessary 1-0r F invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the la~ or to forbear the prohibitory.These maxims are akin to the maxim of Roman Law Nemo Tenetur ad lmpossibilia (no one is bound to do an impossibility) which is derived from common sense and natural equity and has been adopted and applied in law G . from time immemorial. Therefore, when it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like an act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse. (Vide: Chandra Kishore Jha H

p. 498

A v. Mahavir Prasad & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 3558; Hira Tikkoo v. Union Territory, Chandigarh & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 3648; and Haryqna Urban Development Authority & Anr. v. Dr. Babeswar Kanhar & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 1491).

3939. Thus, where the law creates a duty or charge, and the B party is disabled to perform it, without any fault on his part, and has no control over it, the law will in general excuse him. Even in such a circumstance, the statutory provision is not denuded of its mandatory character because of the supervening impossibility caused therein. c LAND FOR LAND:

4040. In Gramin Sewa Sanstha v. State of M.P. & Ors., 1986 Supp SCC 578, this Court held : "2. We are also informed that though land has been D earmarked by the State Government for re-settlement of the displaced tribals, such land is not available because it is already occupied by other persons who themselves will be uprooted if such land is acquired and made available for the tribals displaced on account of the Hasdeo E Bango Dam Project. If this is true, the remedy might be worse than the disease because in order to re-settle one set of displaced persons the State Government would be displacing another set of persons. We would, therefore direct the State Government to consider in the meanwhile as to whether the cultivable land at any other place or places can be made available for the tribals who are displaced on account of the present project." (Emphasis added)

4141. This Court in Narmada Bachao Ando/an-I, held as under: 58 .......... when the removal of the tribal population is necessary as an exceptional measure, they shall be provided with land of quality at least equal to that of the land previously occupied by them and they shall be fully

p. 499

MADHYA PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] compensated for any resulting loss or injury. The · A rehabilitation package contained in the Award of ·the Tribunal as improved further by the State of Gujarat and the other States prima facie shows that the land required to be allotted to the tribals is likely to be equal, if not better than what they had owned." (Emphasis added) B

4242. In State of Kera/a v. Peoples' Union for Civil Liberties {Supra), this Court held as under:

"121. We must also make it clear that while allotting land to the members of the Scheduled Tribes, the State cannot and must not allot them hilly or other types of lands which are not at all fit for agricultural purpose. The lands, which are to be allotted, must be similar in nature to the land possessed by the members of the Scheduled Tribes. If in the past, such allotments have been made, as has been contended before us by the learned counsel for the respondent, the State must allot them other lands which are fit for agricultural purposes. Such a process should be undertaken and completed as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of six months from date." E (Emphasis added)

4343. The issue has to be decided taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances. For deciding this issue, the terms and conditions incorporated in the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award (hereinafter called as 'NWDT Award') F cannot be taken into consideration for the simple reason that the Tribunal had been constituted under the provisions of Inter State Water Disputes Act, 1956 (hereinafter called Act 1956), and Award had been given in a case where several States, i.ef G the States of Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Maharashtra were involved. The said Award has no application in the instant cases nor can it be a Bench Mark. More so, in the Sardar Sarovar Project, land for land was mandatory. These cases are to be decided giving strict adherence to the R & R Policy, as amended on 3.7.2003, further considering that special care is H

p. 500

A to be taken where persons are oppressed and uprooted so that they are better off. Our Constitution requires removal of economic inequalities and provides for provision of facilities and opportunities for a decent standard of living and protection of economic interests of the weaker segments of the society B and in particular Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Every human being has a right to improve his standard of living. Ensuing people are better off is the principle of socio-economic justice which every State is under an obligation to fulfill, in view of the provisions contained in Articles 37, 38, 39(a), (b), (e), c (f), 41, 43, 46 and 47 of the Constitution of India. (Vide: Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pandu Barde & Anr. (1995) Suppl. 2 SCC 549; and N.D. Jayal & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 867).

4444. Mere payment of compensation to the oustees in such D a case may not be enough. In case the oustee is not able to purchase the land just after getting the compensation, he may not be able to have the land at all.

In K. Krishna Reddy & Ors. v. St:- 1 Dy. Collector, Land E Acqn. Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, AIR 1988 SC 2123, this Court expressed grave concern on the issue observing as un9er:

"....After all money is what money buys. What the claimants could have bought with the compensation in 1977 cannot do in 1988. Perhaps, not even half of it. It is a common experience that the purchasing power of rupee is dwindling - with rising inflation ..... The Indian agriculturists generally have no avocation. They totally depend upon land. If uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere. They are left high and dry. They have no savings to draw. They have nothing to fall back upon. They know no other work. They may even face starvation unless rehabilitated."(Emphasis added)

4545. It is a matter of common experience that the "person interested" gets the actual amount of compensation in reference

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