K.l PLANTATION PVT. LTD. & ANR v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

[2011] 13 (ADDL) S.C.R. 636

A (Civil Appeal No. 6520 of 2003)

AUGUST 9, 2011 B

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A Acquisition Act. though primarily falls under Entry 18 List JI incidentally also deals with the acquisition of paintings, artefacts and other valuable belongings of Roerichs' and, hence, the Act partly falls under Entry 42 List Ill as well - Since the dominant purpose of the Act was to preserve and B protect Roerichs' Estate as part of agrarian reforms, the inclusion of ancillary measures would not throw the Jaw out of the protection of Article 31A(1)(a) - On the other hand, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is an Act which fell exclusively under Entry 42 List Ill and enacted for the purpose of c acquisition of land needed for public purposes for companies and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on account of such acquisition, which is substantially and materially different from the Acquisition Act whose dominant purpose is to preserve and protect "estate" governed by Art.31A(a) read with Art.31A(2)(a)(iii) of the Constitution - 0 Therefore, no assent of the President was required under Article 254(2) of the Constitution to sustain the impugned Acquisition Act, which falls under Article 31 A(1 )(a) of the Constitution - Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 31A and E 254(2) - Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

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A applied by the constitutional courts 111 rarest of rare cases, and can undo laws which are tyrannical, violate the basic structure of the Indian Constitution, and the cherished norms of law and justice

Dr. Svetoslav Roerich, a Russia born internationally 8 acclaimed painter and artist, and his wife Mrs. Devika Rani Roerich owned an Estate in Bangalore covering 470.19 acres, out of which 100 acres were granted to them by the State Government of Karnataka in the year 1954 for Linaloe cultivation. When the Karnataka Land C Reforms Act, 1961 came into force, they filed declarations under Section 66 of the Act before the Land Tribunal stating that they had no surplus lands to surrender to the State since the entire area held by them had been used for the cultivation of Linaloe which was D exempted under Section 107(1)(vi) of the Land Reforms Act. Consequently, the Land Tribunal vide order dated 15.03.82 dropped the proceedings .instituted under the Act against them holding that the land used for cultivation of Linaloe did not attract the provisions of the Land E Reforms Act.

Dr. Roerich and Mrs. Devika Rani had no issue and allegedly some persons associated with the couple, who had an eye on their properties, including the land used for linaloe cultivation, valuable paintings, jewellery, artefacts etc., began to create documents to grab those properties. The Chief Secretary of the State of Karnataka noticing the above facts and circumstances convened a meeting in the presence of the Director of Archaeology to take effective and proper steps to preserve the paintings, artefacts and other valuables. For that purpose, they met Smt. Devika Rani and Dr. Roerich and a letter was handed over to Dr. Roerich on behalf of the State Government expressing the Government's willingness to purchase the paintings and other valuables so as to set H

K.T. PLANTATION PVT LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 641 KARNATAKA up a Roerich Gallery. The State Cabinet also discussed about the desirability of acquiring the landed properties of Roerichs and also for setting up an Art Gallery-cum- Museum, in public interest. Initially the State issued an ordinance, namely, the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition and Transfer) Ordinance 1992, which was sent for the approval of the President of India. In the meanwhile Roerich couple passed away and the ordinance was returned to make-sufficient amendments. After necessary amendments ordinance of 1995 was issued. The ordinance was returned by the Government c I of India informing that it had no objection to introduce legislation as a bill and hence the same with requisite amendments was placed before the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council. The Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act, 1996 was 0 then passed and subsequently got the assent of the President on 15.11.96 and was brought into force on 21.11.1996.

Meanwhile, the Deputy Commissioner of the District had reported that Roerichs had owned 470.19 acres of E land, out of which they had raised Linaloe cultivation to the extent of 356.15 acres and the remaining extent of 114.04 acres was agricultural land; that as per the ceiling provisions of the Land Reforms Act they were entitled to hold an extent of 54 acres of agricultural land and as . F such, the excess of 60.04 acres ought to have been surrendered by them to the Government. The view of the Law Department was sought for in that respect and the Law Department stated that the earlier order dated 15.03.82 of the Land Tribunal be re-opened and action G under Section 67(1) be initiated for resumption of the excess land. The Deputy Commissioner was requested to issue suitable instructions to the Tahsildar to place the matter before the Land Tribunal, for review of the earlier order dated 15.03.82 by invoking the provisions of H

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A Section 122A of the Land Reforms Act. The Deputy Commissioner had further reported that Dr. Roerich had sold an extent of 137.33 acres of land on 23.3.1991 to the first appellant-company 'KTP'; but request for mutation in respect of those lands had been declined by the local B officers and the lands stood in the name of late Dr. Roerich in the Record of Rights.

The Commissioner and Secretary to the Government, Revenue Department taking note of the said facts sought the legal opinion of the Department of Law and C Parliamentary Affairs as to whether valuable lands held by the late Roerichs could be resumed by the State before lands changed hands, by withdrawing the exemption given to the lands used for Linaloe cultivation. The Department of Law and Parliamentary Affairs opined D that the exemption given under Section 107 of the Land Reforms Act, 1961 can be withdrawn by the Government by issuing a notification as per Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act and consequently tht. Commissioner a_nd Secretary to the government proposed to issue a E notification to that effect for which approval of the Cabinet was sought for. The Cabinet accorded sanction in its meeting and the State Government issued notification Notification No. RD 217 LRA 93 dated 8th March, 1994 in exercise of powers conferred by Section F · 110 of the Land Reforms Act, withdrawing the exemption granted for the lands used for cultivation of Linaloe under clause (vi) of Sub-section 1 of Section 107 of the Act. Notification was published in the Government Gazette on 11.03.1994. G The Assistant Commissioner thereafter issued a notice to the first appellant-company 'KTP' to show cause why 137 .33 acres of land be not forfeited to the Government. H

KT PLANTATION PVT LTD. & ANR v STATE OF 643 KARNATAKA The first appellant-company, through its Managing A Director, filed a Writ Petition before the High Court challenging the constitutional validity of the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich (Acquisition and Transfer) Act, 1996, Section 110 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, the notification dated 08.03.1994 issued thereunder and also B sought other consequential reliefs. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court upholding the validity of the Acquisition Act as well as Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act and the notification issued thereunder except in relation to the inclusion of certain members in c the Board of Directors constituted undet the Acquisition Act.

Aggrieved, the first appellant-company inter alia raised the following contentions before this Court under three major heads:- D

(a) Legal validity of Section 110 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, the Notification No. RD 217 LRA 93 dated 8th March, 1994 issued by the State Government thereunder: E

It was contended that the first appellant-Company had purchased the lands from Roerich couple when those lands stood exempted from the provisions of the Land Reforms Act by virtue of Section 107(1)(vi) of the Land F Reforms Act; that the State Government could not, in exercise of its powers under Section 110 of the Act, issue notification dated 08.03.94 to withdraw the exemption granted by the Legislature which was essentially a legislative policy; that Section 110 gives unfettered and unguided power to the Executive to take away the G exemption granted by the Legislature and hence that Section is void for excessive delegation of legislative powers on the State Government; that the respondent State did not follow the procedure laid down ·in Seation H

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A 140 of the Act; that laying of notification under Section 140 is not a mere laying but is coupled with a negative/ affirmative resolution of the Legislature; the failure to lay the notification is an illegality which cannot be cured; that though the Land Reforms Act was placed in the 9th B Schedule which saves its provisions from the challenge of Articles 14, 19 and 31, a challenge to a provision of the Act for excessive delegation of legislative power is still available and the Land Reforms Act cannot be protected by Article 318. c (b) Constitutional validity of Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act, 1996:

It was contended that the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act, 1996 does not contain any provision for protection of agrarian reforms and hence not protected by the provisions of Article 31A and hence not saved from challenges on the ground of violation of Artic: 0 s 14 and 19 of the Constitution; that management and protection of land used for linaloe cultivation and the preservation of artefacts, paintings etc. are not part of agrarian reforms; that the said Act, a State Legislation, is ex-facie repugnant to the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, a Central Legislation and hence void under Article 254(1) due to want of Presidential assent; and that the procedure and the principle for the acquisition of land as well as determination of compensation, etc., under both the Acts are contrary to each other and hence the said Act can be saved only if Presidential assent is obtained under Article G 254(2) of the constitution.

(c) Claim for enhanced compensation and scope and content of Article 300A of the Constitution:

It was. contended that the Roerich and Devika Rani H

K.T. PLANTATION PVT LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 645 KARNATAKA Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act, 1996 does not provide for any principle or guidelines for the fixation of the compensation amount and the amount fixed is illt. .ory, compared to the value of the property taken away from the first appellant-company in exercise of the powers of eminent domain; that the inherent powers of public purpose and eminent domain are embodied in Article 300A, and Entry 42 List Ill, "Acquisition and Requisitioning of Property" which necessarily connotes that the acquisition and requisitioning of property will be for a public use and for compensation, as it is the c legislative head for eminent domain; that the twin requirements of public purpose and compensation though seen omitted from Article 300A, but when a person is deprived of his property, those limitations are implied in Article 300A as well as Entry 42 List Ill and a D Constitutional Court can always examine the validity of the statute on those grounds; and that the action depriving a person of just and fair compensation is also amenable to judicial review under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, which is the quintessence of the rule of law, otherwise the Constitution would be conferring arbitrary and unbridled powers on the Legislature, to deprive a person of his property.

One 'M' too had filed a writ petition before the High Court claiming rights over some of the articles belonging to Roerichs' couple on the strength of a will. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court holding that the articles claimed by the company 'KTP' stood vested in the State in view of the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich (Acquisition and Transfer) Act, 1996. Against that judgment, 'M' filed a separate appeal before this Court. 'M' and others had also challenged the constitutional validity of the said Acquisition Act by filing Writ Petitions · before the High Court, which too wer~ dismissed. I H

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A Aggrieved by the same, they filed another set of civil Appeals before this Court.

The following questions therefore came up for consideration before th.is Court:

(3) Whether on true interpretation of Article 300A of the Constitution, the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich (Acquisition and Transfer) Act, 1996, is violative of the said Article in so far as no specific compensation prescribed for the acquisition of land for Linaloe plantation, and, after deduction of liabilities and payment of compensation for the artefacts, no balance may and/ or is likely to exist for payment of such compensation, as a result of which, whether the Act really is expropriatory in nature;

G (4) Whether on true interpretation of Article 300A of the Constitution, the said Act is violative of Article 300A as the said Article is not, by itself, a source of Legislative power, but such power of the State Legislature being traceable only to Entry 42 of List Ill of Schedule VII to the H

K.T. PLANTATION PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 64 7 KARNATAKA

Constitution viz., "Acquisition and Requisition of A Property", which topic excludes expropriation and confiscation of property and

(5) If Article 300A of the Constitution is construed as providing for deprivation of property without any 8 compensation at all, or illusory compensation, and hence providing for expropriation and confiscation of property, whether the said Article would violate the rule of law and would be an arbitrary and unconscionable violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, thus violating the basic C structure of the Constitution.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

1.1. The Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 was enacted by the Karnataka State Legislature to have a E uniform law relating to land reforms in the State of Karnataka, relating to agrarian relations, conferment of ownership on tenants, ceiling on land holdings etc. Section 798(1) of the Land Reforms Act prohibits holding of agricultural land by certain persons which says that F with effect on and from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act (Act 1/74) w.e.f. 1.3.1974, no person other than a person cultivating land personally shall be entitled to hold land; and that it shall not be lawful for, a company inter a/ia to hold 'any land'. The first appellant being a G company was prohibited from holding any agricultural land after the commencement of the Act. If the company was holding any land with Linaloe cultivation on the date of the commencement of the Act, the same would have vested in the State Government under Section 798(3) of H

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A the Act and an amount as specified in Section 72 would have been paid. [Paras 28, 30, 31] [685-F-G; 686-B-C; 687- B-C]

1.2. Chapter VIII of the Land Reforms Act deals with exemption provisions. The power to withdraw the 8 exemption in respect of the plantations, has not been conferred on the State Government, but evidently retained by the Legislature. Legislative policy is clearly discernible from the provision of the Statute itself, that, whenever the Legislature wanted to confer the power to withdraw the exemption to the State Government it has done so, otherwise it has retained the power to itself. [Para 38] [690-F-H]

1.3. Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act empowers the State Government to withdraw the exemption granted to any land referred to in Sections 107 and 108. Section 107 itself has been made "subject to" Section 110 of the Act. The words 'subject to' conveys the idea of a provision yielding place to another provision or other provisions to which it is made subject. Since Section 107 is made subject to Section 110, the former section conveys the idea of yielding to the provision to which it is made subject that is Section 110 which is the will of legislature. [Para 39] [691-A-B-D] F 1.4. The Legislature's apathy in granting exemption for lands used for cultivation of Linaloe is discernible from the language used in sub-section (2) of Section 107, which says that no person shall after the commencement of the Amendment Act acquire in any manner for the cultivation of Linaloe, land of an extent which together with the land cultivated by Linaloe, if any, already held by him exceeds ten units. Legislature, therefore, as matter of policy, wanted to give only a conditional exemption for lands used for Linaloe cultivation and the policy was to empower the State Government to withdraw the same

K.T. PLANTATION PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 649 KARNATAKA especially when the law is that no person can claim exemption as a matter of right. The legislative will was to make Section 107 subject to Section 110 and not the will of the delegate, hence, overriding effect has to be given to Section 110. Further, the Land Reforms Act including Section 110 was placed in IXth Schedule in the year 1965 B and, hence, immune from challenge in a court of law. [Para 40] [691-H; 692-A-C]

1.5. Dr. Roerich and Mrs. Devika had got only the conditional exemption from the provisions of the Land C Reforms Act for the lands used for Linaloe cultivation and, hence, they also would have lost ownershi.p and possession of the lands once the exemption had been withdrawn and the land would have vested in the State. The land was purchased by the Company with that statutory condition from Roerichs and, hence, was bound by that condition. The contention that Section 110 is void due to excessive delegation of legislative powers, is rejected. [Para 41) [692-D-E]

1.6. The State Government issued the notification dated 8.3.1994 in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act which was published in the official gazette on 11.3.94. 1.9. The facts would indicate that, in the instant case, the notification has not been laid before the Legislature, but looking at the language of Section 140 of the Act, it has not affected the validity or the effect of the notification. [Paras 44, 47] [693-C; 694-B-C]

1.7. Following is the procedure generally followed when an order or notification is laid before the G Legislature:-

(1) Laying which requires no further procedure;

(2) Laying allied with the affirmative procedure; and H

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A (3) Laying allied with negative procedure.

The object of requirement of laying provided in enabling Acts is to subject th'e subordinate law making authority to the vigilance and control of the Legislature. B The degree of control the Legislature wants can be noticed on the language used in such laying clause. [Para 46] [693-F-H; 694-A]

1.8. Section 140 of the Act does not require the State Legislature to give its approval for bringing into effect the notification, but a positive act by the Legislature has been contemplated in Section 140 to make the notification effective, that does not mean that failure to lay the notification has affected the legal validity, its effect or the action taken precedent to that notification. Non-laying of the notification dated 08.03.1994 before the State Legislature has not affected its validity or the action taken precedent to that notificatior •. This Court now, vide its' order dated 24.02.2011, has directed the State Government to place the notification before both the E Houses of the State Legislature. Therefore, the defect, if any, of not placing the notification has been cured. [Para 50] [695-H; 696-A-C]

1.9. Section 80 of the Land Reforms Act prohibits transfer of any land to non-agriculturalist. Section F 80(1 )(iv), states that it shall not be lawful to sell, gift, exchange or lease of any land, in favour of a person, who is disentitled under Section 79·8, to acquire or hold any •... land. The expression "land" has been defined under Section 2(18) which is all comprehensive and takes in agricultural lands, that is land which is used or capable of being used for agriculture, but for the exemption granted under Section 107(1)(vi) lands used for the cultivation of linaloe would have fallen under Section 2(18). But, so far the company is concerned, the prohibition was total and complete since Section 79-8

KT PLANTATION PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 651 KARNATAKA states that it would not be lawful for a company to hold A "any land'', with effect and from the date of the commencement of the amending Act. The Company, therefore, could not have held the land used for the · cultivation of Linaloe on the date of the commencement of the Act. Further on withdrawal of exemption vide notification dated 08.03.94 the Company was disentitled to hold the land belonging to Roerichs' since the same would be governed by the provisions of the Land Reforms Act. [Para 51] [696-D-G]

1.10. There is no force in the contention that opportunity of hearing is a pre-condition for exercising powers under Section 110 of the Act. No such requirement has been provided under Section 107 or Section 110. When the exemption was granted to Roerichs' no hearing was afforded so also when the exemption was withdrawn by the delegate. It is trite law that exemption cannot be claimed as a matter of right so also its withdrawal, especially when the same is done through a legislative action. Delegated legislation which is a legislation in character, cannot be questioned on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice, especially in the absence of any such statutory requirement. Legislature or· its delegate is also not legally obliged to give any reasons for its action while discharging its legislative function. [Para 52] [696-H; 697- F A-CJ

1.11. The challenge on the validity of Section 110 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act as well as the notification dt.8.3.1994 is repelled and it is held that the land used for. G linaloe cultivation would be governed by the provisions of the Land Reforms Act which is protected under Article 318 of the Constitution having been included in the IXth Schedule. [Para 53] [697-E]

In re: The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, the Ajmer-Merwara H

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A (Extension of Laws) Act. 1947. Part C States (Laws) Act 1950 (1951) 2 SCR 747; Bhatnagars & Co. Ltd. v. Umon of India AIR 1957 SC 478: 1957 SCR 701; Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and Anr. v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and Others (1984) 4 SCC 27; B Mohmedalli and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1964 SC 980: 1963 Suppl. SCR 993; Bnj Sunder Kapoor v. I Additional District Judge and Ors. (1989) 1 SCC 561: 1988 (3) Suppl. SCR 558; Punjab Sikn Regular Motor Service. Moudhapara, Raipur v. Regional Transport Authority & C Another AIR 1966 SC 1318: 1966 SCR 221; Joginder Singh & Others v. Deputy Custodian-General of Evacuee Property & Others AIR 1967 SC 145: 1962 SCR 738; Bharat Hari Singhania & Others v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax (Central) & Others (1994) Supp. 3 SCC 46; Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State D of TN. & Another (2004) 3 SCC 1: 2004 (1) SCR 306; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. M A Rasheed & Others (2004) 4 SCC 460: 2004 (3) SCR 799; So :th India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivendrum & Another AIR 1964 SC 207: 1964 SCR 280; Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad v. Trustees of H.E.H. E Nizam's Family (Remainder Wealth Trust), Hyderabad (1977) 3 SCC 362: 1977 (3) SCR 735; Chandavarkar Sita Raina Rao v. Asha/ala S. Guram (1986) 4 SCC 447: 1986 (3) SCR 866; B.K. Srinivasan and Ors. v. State of Kamataka and Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 658: 1987 (1) SCR 1054; Jan Mohammad F Noor Mohammad Bagban v. State of Gujarat and Anr. AIR 1966 SC 385: 1966 SCR 505; Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. & Others v. State of Haryana (1979) 2 SCC 196: 1979 (1) SCR 1070; Quarry Owners' Association v. State of Bihar & Others . (2000) 8 SCC 655: 2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 211; State of G Punjab v. Teha/ Singh and Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 7: 2002 (1) SCR 27; West Bengal Electricity Regulatory Commission v. CESC Ltd. etc. etc. (2002) 8 SCC 715; Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. v. Promoters and Builders Association and Anr. (2004) 10 SCC 796: 2004 (2) Suppl. SCR 207; H

KT PLANl.\TION PVT. LTD. & ANR v STATE OF 653 KARNATAKA B1/1ar State Electricity Board v. Pulak Enterprises and Ors. A (2009) 5 sec 641 - referred to

Rajnarain Singh v. The Chairman, Patna Admnistration Committee. Patna& Another AIR 1954 SC 569: 1955 SCR 290; Vasantlal Maganbha1 San1anwala v. State of Bombay B and Ors. AIR 1961 SC 4: 1961 SCR 341; Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi & Another v. Union of. India & Others (1960) 2 SCR 671; Baku/ Cashew Co. and Ors. v. Sa/es Tax Officer, Qui/on and Anr. (1986) 2 SCC 365: 1986 (1) SCR 610; Income Tax Officer, Alleppy v. M.C. C Pon noose and Ors. (1969) 2 SCC 351: 1970 (1) SCR 678; Regional Transport Officer, Chittoor and Ors. v. Associated Transport Madras (P) Ltd. and Ors. (1980) 4 SCC 597: 1981 (1) SCR 627; Ca0nanore Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Cochin and Ors. (1969) 3 SCC 112: 1970 (2) SCR 830; Hukam Chand etc. v. D Union of India (UO/) and Ors. (1972) 2 SCC 601: 1973 (1) seR 896; H.S. Srinivasa Raghavachar and Ors. v. State of Kamataka and Ors. (1987) 2 sec 692: 1987 (2) SCR 1189; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Bir/a Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi and Another AIR 1968 SC 1232: 1968 E SeR 251; Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India & Others. (1983) 4 SCC 166: 1983 (3) SCR 438; Premium Granites and Anr. v. State of Tamilnadu and Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 691: 1994 (1) SCR 579; Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Trivandrum and Anr. v. Kunjabmu and Ors. (1980) F 1 $CC 340: 1980 (2) SCR 260; Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. and Another v. Union of India and Others (1990) 3 sec 223: 1990 (1) SCR 909; Union of India and Anotherv. Cynamide India Ltd. and Another Etc. (1987) 2 SCC 720: 1987 (2) SCR 841; H.S.S.K. Niyami & Another v. Union of India & Another G (1990) 4 sec 516: 1990 (3) SCR 862; Laxmi Khandsari and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1981) 2 SCC 600: 1981 (3) SCR 92; J. K. Industries & Another v. Union of India & Others (2007) 13 SCC 673: 2007 (12) SCR 136; Balmadies H

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A Plantations Ltd. & Others v. State of Tamil Nadu (1972) 2 SCC 133: 1973 (1) SCR 258; Deputy Commissioner and Collector, Kamrup & Ors. v. Durga Nath Sharma (1968) 1 SCR 561; Reliance Energy Limited & Anr. v. Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors. (2007) 8 B SCC 1: 2007 (9) SCR 853; Gram Panchayat of VIiiage Jamalpur v. Ma/winder Singh & Others (1985) 3 SCC 661: 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 28; Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. & Another v. National Textil::; Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd. & Others (2002) 8 SCC 182: 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 555; c Engineering Kamgar Union v. Electro Steels Castings Ltd. and Another (2004) 6 SCC 36: 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 301; Bhuwalka Steel Industries Ltd. v. Bombay Iron and Steel Labour Board and Another (2010) 2 SCC 273: 2009 (16) SCR 618; P.N. Krishnan Lal & others vs. C?ovt. of Kera/a & D Another (1995) Suppl. (2) SCC 187: 1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 526; Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. vs. Bangalore Development Authority and Ors. (2011) 3 sec 139: 2011 (1) SCR 453; E. P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu & Another (1974) 4 SCR 3; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India & Others (1979) 3 SCC 489: 1979 (3) SCR 1014; E Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy, represented by its Partner Kasturi Lal, Jammu & Others v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Another (1980) 4 SCC 1: 1980 (3) SCR 1338; Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. v. Union of India & Another (1962) Supp (2) SCR 1; State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1964) 1 SCR 371; F Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability v. Union of India & Others (1991) 4 SCC 699; D.C. Wadhwa & Others v. State of Bihar & Others (1987) 1 SCC 378: 1987 (1) SCR 798; Glanrock Estate Private Limited. v. State of Tamil Nadu (4010) 10 SCC 96: 2010 (12) SCR 597 and Dwarakadas Shrinivas G (1954) 1 SCR 674 - cited.

Black Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, at p.1278 - referred to.

KT PLANTATION PVT. LTD. & ANR v. STATE OF 655 KARNATAKA Constitutional validity of the Roerich and Devika Rani A Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act, 1996 - Plea of repuqnancy

2.1. The contention that the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act, 1996 is 8 invalid due to repugnancy is rejected. [Para 68] [705-C]

2.2. The plea of repugnancy can be urged only if both the legislations fall under the Concurrent List. Under Article 254 of the Constitution, a State law passed in respect of a subject matter comprised in List Ill would be invalid if its provisions are repugnant to a law passed on the same subject by Parliament and that too only if both the laws cannot exist together. The question of repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution arises when the provisions of both laws are fully inconsistent or are absolutely irreconcilable and it is impossible without disturbing the other, or conflicting results are produced, when both the statutes covering the same field are applied to a given set of facts. Repugnancy between the two statutes would arise if there is a direct conflict between the two provisions and the law made by the Parliament and the law made by ·the State Legislature occupies the same filed. [Para 65] [703-C-F]

2.3. When the repugnancy between the Central and State Legislations is pleaded one has to first examine whether the two legislations cover or relate to the same subject matter. The test for determining the same is to find out the dominant intention of the two legislations and if the dominant intention of the two legislations is different, they cover different subject matter then merely because the two legislations refer to some allied or cognate subjects, they do not cover the same field. A provision in one legislation to give effect to its dominant purpose may incidentally be on the same subject as covered by the provision of the other legislation, but H

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A such partial coverage of the same area in a different context and to achieve a different purpose does not bring about the repugnancy which is intended to be covered by Article 254(2). In other words, both the legislations must be substantially on the same subject to attract Article 254. [Para 66] [703-H; 704-A-D]

2.4. The Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act, 1996, as rightly contended by the State, primarily falls under Entry 18 List II, since the dominant intention of the legislature was to preserve and protect Roerichs' Estate covered by the provisions of the Land Reforms Act, on the State Government withdrawing the exemption in respect of the land used for linaloe cultivation. The Acquisition Act, though primarily falls under Entry 18 List II incidentally also deals with the acquisition of paintings, artefacts and other valuable belongings of Roerichs' and, hence, the Act partly falls under Entry 42 List Ill as well. Since the dominant purpose of the Act was to preserve and protect Roerichs' Estate as part of agrarian reforms, the inclusion of ancillary measures would not throw the law out of the protection of Article 31 A(1 )(a). On the other hand, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is an act which fell exclusively under Entry 42 List Ill and enacted for the purpose of acquisition of land need·ed for public purposes for companies and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on account of such acquisition, which is substantially and materially different from the impugned Act whose dominant purpose is to preserve and protect "estate" governed by Art.31A(a) G read with Art.31A(2)(a)(iii) of the Constitution. Therefore, no assent of the President was required under Article 254(2) of the Constitution to sustain the impugned Act, which falls under Article 31A(1)(a) of the Constitution. [Paras 67, 68] [704-F-H; 705-A-C] H

K.T. PLANTATION PVT. LTD. & ANR. v STATE OF 657 KAR NATAKA 2.5. The the Constitution (17th Amendment) Act, 1964 A extended the scope of the expression "estate" in Art.31A(a) as to protect all legislations on agrarian reforms and the expression "estate" was given a wider meaning so as to bring within its scope lands in respect of which provisions are normally made in land reforms B enactments. Art.31A(2)(a)(iii) brings in any land held or let for the purpose of agriculture or for purpose ancillary thereto, including waste or vacant land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of buildings and other structure occupied by the cultivators of land etc. [Para 69] [705-D- c E] 2.6. The concept of agrarian reform is a complex and dynamic one promoting wider interests than conventional reorganisation of the land system or distribution of land, which is intended to realise the social function of the land and includes various other proposals of agrarian reforms. Any provision for promotion of agriculture or agricultural population is an agrarian reform, which term is wider than land reforms. A law for the acquisition of an estate etc. does not lose the protection of Article 31 A(1) merely because ancillary provisions are included in such law. [Para 70] [705-F-H; 706-A-B]

2.7. The Acquisition Act was enacted in public interest, to preserve and protect the land used for the linaloe cultivation and its tree growth as part of agrarian reforms which is its dominant purpose. Proposal to preserve the paintings, artefacts, carvings and other valuables and to establish an Art-Gallery-cum-Museum G are merely ancillary to the main purpose. The dominant purpose of the Act is to protect and preserve the land used for Linaloe cultivation, a part of agrarian reforms. The Act is, therefore, saved by the provisions of Art.31A(1 )(a). [Para 71] [706-C] H

658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL) S.C.R.

A 2.8. The Roerich's estate falls within the expression "estate" under clause (2) of Article 31A of the Constitution and the Act has obtained the assent of the President, hence, is protected from the challenge under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. [Para 72] (706-E] B Deep Chand v. State of U.P. & Others AIR 1959 SC 648: 1959 Suppl. SCR 8; Prem Nath Kaul v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1959 SC 749:(1959) Supp. (2) SCR 270; Ukha Ko/he v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 1531: 1964 SCR C 926; Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh v. State of U.P & Another (1973) 1 SCC 261: 1973 (2) SCR 1073; T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe & Another (1983) 1 SCC 177: 1983 (1) SCR 905; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 45: 1983 (3) SCR 130; Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra & Another (1985) 1 SCC 479: 1985 (2) SCR D 224; Vijay Kumar Sharma & Others v. State of Kamataka & Others (1990) 2 SCC 562: 1990 (1) SCR 614; Municipal Council Palai v. T. J. Joseph (1964) 2 SCR 87; Ch. Tika Ramji v. State of U.P. 1956 SCR 393; State of Kamataka v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy (1977) 4 SCC 471: 1978 (1) SCR E 641; M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India & Another (1979) 3 SCC 431: 1979 (3) SCR 254; State of Kera/a v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Limited (1993) 2 SCC 713; Kunjukutty Sahib v. State of Kera/a & Another (1972) 2 SCC 364: 1973 (1) SCR 326; Mahan! Sankarshan F Ramanuja Das Goswami etc., etc. v. State of Orissa &Another (1962) 3 SCR 250 - referred to.

Validity of the Acquisition Act on the touchstone of Article 300A of the Constitution - Claim for enhanced compensation - Concept of eminent domain - Public purpose.

3.1. Right to life, liberty and property were once considered to be inalienable rights under the Indian Constitution, each one of these rights was considered to be inextricably bound to the other and none would exist

KT PLANTATION PVT LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 659 KARNATAKA without the other. Of late, right to property parted company with the other two rights under the Indian Constitution and took the position of a statutory right. [Para 82) [709-G-H]

3.2. Eminent thinkers like Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf, 8 John Locke, Rousseau and William Blackstone had expressed their own views on the ri_ght to property. Lockean rhetoric of property as a natural and absolute right but conventional in civil society has, its roots in Aristotle and Aquinas, for Grotius and Pufendorf property was both natural and conventional. Pufendrof, like Grotius, never recognised that the rights of property on its owners are absolute but involve definite social responsibilities, and also held the view that the private property was not established merely for the purpose "allowing a man to avoid using it in the service of others, and to brood in solitude over his hoard or riches." Like Grotius, Pufendorf recognised that those in extreme need may have a right to the property of others. For Rousseau, property was a conventional civil right and not a natural right and private property right was subordinate to the public interest, but Rousseau insisted that it would never be in the public interest to violate them. With the emergence of modern written constitutions in the late eighteenth ce.ntury and thereafter, the right to property was enshrined as a fundamental constitutional right in many of the Constitutions in the world and India was not an exception. Blackstone declared that so great is the regime of the law for private property that it will not authorise the land violation if it - no, not even for the general good of the whole· community. Writings of the above mentioned political philosophers had also its influence on Indian Constitution as well. [Para 83) [710· C-G]

3.3. Hugo Grotius is credited with the invention of the H

660 SUPREME COURT RE:.PORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL) S.C.R.

A term "eminent domain" Uus or dominium eminens) which implies that public rights always overlap with private rights to property, and in the case of public utility, public rights take precedence. Grotius sets two conditions on the exercise of the power of eminent domain: the first B requisite is public advantage and then compensation from the public funds be made, if possible, to the one who has lost his right. Application of the above principle varies from countries to countries. Germany, America and Australian Constitutions bar uncompensated takings. c Canada's constitution, however, does not contain the equivalent of the taking clause, and eminent domain is solely a matter of statute law, the same is the situation in United Kingdom which does not have a written constitution as also now in India after the 44th Constitutional Amendment. [Para 84] [710-H; 711-A-C] 0 3.4. Eminent domain is distinguishable alike from the police power, by which restrictions are imposed on private property in the public interest, e.g. in connection with health, sanitation, zoning regulation, urban planning and so on from the power of taxation, by which the owner of private property is compelled to contribute a portion of it for the public purposes and from the war-power, involving the destruction of private property in the course of military operations. The police power fetters rights of property while eminent domain takes them away. Power of taxation does not necessarily involve a taking of specific property for public purposes, though analogous to eminent domain as regards the purposes to which the contribution of the taxpayer is to be applied. Further, G there are several significant differences between regulatory exercises of the police powers and eminent domain of deprivation of property. Regulation does not acquire or appropriate the property for the State, which appropriation does and regulation is imposed severally H and individually, while expropriation applies to an

K.T. PLANTATION PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 661 KARNATAKA individual or a group of owners of properties. [Para 90] A [712-G-H; 713-A]

3.5. The Forty Fourth Amendment Act, 1978 inserted in Part XII of the Constitution, a new chapter: "Chapter IV - Right to Property and inserted Article 300A. Article 8 300A proclaims that no person can be deprived of his property save by authority of law, meaning thereby that a person cannot be deprived of his property merely by an executive fiat, without any specific legal authority or without the support of law made by a competent legislature. The expression 'Property' in Art.300A C confined not to land alone, it includes intangibles like copyrights and other intellectual property and embraces every possible interest recognised by law. [Paras 105, 11 OJ [718-H; 719-A; 721-B-C] D 3.6. Principles of eminent domain, as such, is not seen incorporated in Article 300A. Looking at the history of the various constitutional amendments, judicial pronouncements and the statement of objects and reasons contained in the 44th Amendment Bill which led E to the 44th Amendment Act there is no doubt that the intention of the Parliament was to do away with the fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of the property. [Paras 115, 116] [723-G-H; 724-E]

3.7. Deprivation of property within the meaning of F Art.300A, generally speaking, must take place for public purpose or public interest. The concept of eminent domain which applies when a person is deprived of his property postulates that the purpose must be primarily public and not primarily of private interest and merely G incidentally beneficial to the public. Any law, which deprives a person of his private property for private interest, will be unlawful and unfair and undermines the rule of law and can be subjected to judicial review. The concept of public purpose has been given fairly H

662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A expansive meaning which has to be justified upon the purpose and object of statute and the policy of the legislation. Public purpose is, therefore, a condition precedent, for invoking Article 300A. [Para 117] [724-G-H; 725·A·B] B 3.8. The requirement of public purpose is invariably the rule for depriving a person of his property, violation of which is amenable to judicial review. After the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, the constitutional obligation to pay compensation to a person who is deprived of his C property primarily depends upon the terms of the statute and the legislative policy. Article 300A, however, does not prohibit the payment of just compensation when a person is deprived of his property. [Para 118] [725-C-F]

D 3.9. Entry 42 List Ill, Schedule VII of the Constitution has used the words "acquisition" and "requisitioning". Right to claim compensation cannot be read into the legislative Entry 42 List Ill. Requirement of public purpose, for deprivation of a person of his property under E Article 300A, is a pre-condition, but no compensation or nil compensation or its illusiveness has to be justified by the state on judicially justiciable standards. The right to claim compensation or the obligation to pay, though not expressly included in Article 300A, it can be inferred in F that Article and it is for the State to justify its stand on justifiable grounds which may depend upon the legislative policy, object and purpose of the statute and host of other factors. [Paras 119, 121] [725-G-H; 727·8· D] G 3.10. While enacting Article 300A Parliament has only borrowed Article 31(1) [the "Rule of law" doctrine] and not Article 31 (2) [which had embodied the doctrine of Eminent Domain]. Article 300A enables the State to put restrictions on the right to property by law. That law has to be reasonable. It must comply with other provisions

K.T PLANTATION PVT LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 663 KARNATAKA of the Constitution. The limitation or restriction should not be arbitrary or excessive or what is beyond what is required in public interest. The limitation or restriction must not be disproportionate to the situation or excessive. The legislation providing for deprivation of property under Article 300A must be "just, fair and reasonable" as understood in terms of Articles 14, 19(1 )(g), 26(b), 301, etc. Thus in each case, courts will have to examine the scheme of the impugned Act, its object, purpose as also the question whether payment of nil compensation or nominal compensation would c make the impugned law unjust, unfair or unreasonable in terms of other provisions of the Constitution as indicated above. There is a difference between "no" compensation and "nil" compensation. A law seeking to acquire private property for public purpose cannot say 0 that "no compensation shall be paid". However, there could be a law awarding "nil" compensation in cases where the State undertakes to discharge the liabilities charged on the property under acquisition and onus is on the government to establish validity of such law. In the latter case, the court in exercise of judicial review will E test such a law keeping in mind the above parameters. [Para 122] [727-E-H; 728-A-C]

3.11. Right to property no more remains an overarching guarantee in our Constitution. Article 300A, F unlike Articles 31A(1) and 31C, has not made the legislation depriving a person of his property immune from challenge on the ground of violation of Article 14 or Article 21 of the Constitution. [Paras 123, 125] [728-0-E; 729-0] G

3.12. Acquisition of property for a public purpose may meet with lot of contingencies, like deprivation of livelihood, leading to violation of Art.21, but that per se is not a ground to strike down a statute or its provisions. Plea of unreasonableness, arbitrariness, proportionality, H

664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL) S.C.R

A etc. always raises an element of subjectivity on which a court cannot strike down a statute or a statutory provision, especially when the right to property is no more a fundamental right. Otherwise the court will be substituting its wisdom to that of the legislature, which is impermissible in our constitutional democracy. [Paras 128, 130] [730-G-H; 732-A-C]

3.13. On facts as well as on law, the impugned Act got the assent of the President as required under the proviso to Article 31A(1 ), hence, was immune from challenge on the ground of arbitrariness, unreasonableness under Article 14 of the Constitution. [Para 133] [733-F]

3.14. Statutes are many which though deprives a D person of his property, have the protection of Article 30(1A), Article 31A, 318, 31C and hence immune from challenge under Article 19 or Article 14. On deletion of Article 19(1 (f) the available grounds of challenge are Article 14, the basic structure and the rule of law, apart from the ground of legislative competence. [Para 134] [733-G-H]

3.15. The Acquisition Act has not been included in the IXth Schedule but since the Act is protected by Article 31A, it is immune from the challenge on the ground of violation of Article 14. Rule of law as a concept finds no place in our Constitution, but has been characterized as a basic feature of our Constitution which cannot be abrogated or destroyed even by the Parliament and in fact binds the Parliament. Rule of law affirms parliament's G supremacy while at the same time denying it sovereignty over the Constitution. [Paras 135, 136] [734-C-E]

3.16. Rule of law can be traced back to Aristotle and has been championed by Roman jurists; medieval natural H law thinkers; Enlightenment philosophers such as

1 K.T. PLANTATION PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 665 I KARNATAKA Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Dicey etc. Rule A of law has also been accepted as the basic principle of Canadian Constitution order. The Canadian Constitution and Courts have considered the rule of law as one of the "basic structural imperatives" of the Constitution. Courts in Canada have exclusively rejected the notion that only B "provisions" of the Constitution can be used to strike down legislation and comes down squarely in favour of the proposition that the rule of law binds legislatures as well as governments. [Paras 137, 139] [734-F-G; 736-D]

3.17. Rule of law as a principle contains no explicit c substantive c:.:riponent like eminent domain but has many shades and colours. Violation of principle of natural justice may undermine rule of law resulting in arbitrariness, unreasonableness etc., but such violations may not undermine rule of law so as to invalidate a D statute. But once the Court finds, a Statute, undermines the rule of law which has the status of a constitutional principle like the basic structure, the above grounds are also available and not vice versa. Rule of law as a principle, is not an absolute means of achieving the equality, human rights, justice, freedom and even democracy and it all depends upon the nature of the legislation and the seriousness of the violation. Rule of law as ,an overarching principle can be applied by the constitutional courts, in rarest of rare cases, and can undo laws which are tyrannical, violate the basic structure of our Constitution, and our cherished norms of law and justice. One of the fundamental principles of a democratic society inherent in all the provisions of the Constitution is that any interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possession should be lawful. [Paras 140, 141] [736-E-H; 737-A-B] 3.18. Let the message, therefore, be loud and clear, that rule of law exists in this country even when one H

666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R

A interprets a statute, which has the blessings of Article 300A. Deprivation of property may also cause serious concern in the area of foreign investment, especially in the context of International Law and international investment agreements. Whenever, a foreign investor B operates within the territory of a host country the investor and its properties are subject to the legislative control of the host country, along with the international treaties or agreements. Even, if the foreign investor has no fundamental right, let them know, that the rule of law c prevails in this country. [Para 142] [737-D-E]

4. The reference is therefore answered as follows: (a) Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act and the notification dated 8.3.94 are valid, and there is no excessive delegation of legislative power on the State Government; D (b) Non-laying of the notification dt.8.3.94 under Section 140 of the Land Reforms Act before the State Legislature is a curable defect and it will not affect the validity of the notification or action taken thereunder; (c) The Acquisition Act is protected by Article 31 A of the E Constitution after having obtained the assent of the President and hence immune from challenge under Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution; (d) There is no repugnancy between the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Roerich and Devika Rani F Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act, 1996, and hence no assent of the President is warranted under Article 254(2) of the Constitution; (e) Public purpose is a pre-condition for deprivation of a person from his property under Article 300A and the right to claim G compensation is also inbuilt in that Article and when a person is deprived of his property the State has to justify both the grounds which may depend on scheme of the statute, legislative policy, object and purpose of the legislature and other related factors and (f) Statute, H

K.T. PLANTATION PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 667 KARNATAKA depriving a person of his property is, therefore, amenable A to judicial review. [Para 143] [737-F-H; 738·A·D]

5. The notified authority under the Acquisition Act is accordingly directed to disburse the amount of compensation fixed by the Act to the legitimate claimants 8 in accordance with law, which will depend upon the outcome of the pending litigations between the parties. Further, it is also ordered that the land acquired be utilized only for the purpose for which it was acquired. [Para 144] [738·D·E] c State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Ors. (1952) 1 SCR 889; State of West Bengal v. Bella Banerjee & Others AIR 1954 SC 170: 1954 SCR 558; State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose AIR 1954 SC 92: 1954 SCR 587; Kavalappara Kottarathil D Kochuni & Others v. State of Madras & Others (1960) 3 SCR 887; P. Vajrave/u Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras and Another (1965) 1 SCR 614; Union of India v. Metal Corporation of India Ltd. & Another AIR 1967 SC 637: 1967 SCR 255; State of Gujarat v. Shanti/a/ Mangaldas & E Others (1969) 1 SCC 509: 1969 (3) SCR 341; Rustom Cowasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 2 SCC 298: 1971 (1) SCR 512; J.C. Go/aknath and Others v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643: 1967 SCR 762; His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kera/a & F Another (1973) 4 SCC 225; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) Supp. SCC 1; Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar & Others v. State of Gujarat & Another (1995) Supp. 1 SC 596: 1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 807;

State of W B. & Others v. Vishnunarayan & Associates G (P) Ltd & Another (2002) 4 sec 134: 2002 (2) SCR 557; State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. (1959) SCR 379; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 45: 1983 (3) SCR 130; State of West Bengal H

668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL) S.C.R.

A & Another v. Kesoram Industries Ltd & Others AIR 2005 SC 1646: 2004 (1) SCR 564; l.R. Coelho(Dead) by LRs. v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1: 2007 (1) SCR 706; Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v. State of Kera/a & Another AIR 1961 SC 552: 1961 SCR 77; Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of B UP. & Others (1980) 3 sec 719: 1980 (3) SCR 1159; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Another 1978 (1) SCC 248: 1978 (2) SCR 621; State of Maharashtra & Another v. Basantibai Mohan/al Khetan & Others (1986) 2 SCC 516: 1986 (1)-SCR 70; State of A.P. & Others v. Mcdowell & Co. c & Others (1996) 3 SCC 709: 1996 (3) SCR 721; Union of India & Another v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463: 1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 549; Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI & Others (2005) 2 SCC 317; Khoday Distilleries Ltd & Others v. State of Karnataka & Others (1996) 10 SCC 304: 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 759; Ajay Hasia & Others v. Khalid Mujib 0 Sehravardi & Others (1981) 1 SCC 722: 1981 (2) SCR 79; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. & Others v. Union of India & Others (2004) 4 SCC 311: 2004 (3) SCR 982; Malpe Vishwanath Achraya & Others v. State of Maharashtra & Another (1998) 2 SCC 1: 1997 (6) Suppl. SCR 717 and Ashok Kumar E Thakur v. Union of India & Others (2008) 6 SCC 1: 2008 (4) SCR 1 - referred to

Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 US 229 (1984); Keio v. City of New London (545 US 469 (2005); In Reference F Re Manitoba Language Rights (1985) 1 SCR (Supreme Court of Canada) 721; Re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution (1981) 1 SCR (Supreme Court of Canada) 753; OPSEU v. Ontario (A.G.) (1987) 2 SCR (Supreme Court of Canada) 2 - referred to G Case Law Reference: (1951) 2 SCR 747 referred to Para 17,34 1955 SCR 290 cited Para 17

K.T. PLANTATION PVT Ll'D. & ANR. v. STATE OF 669 KARNATAKA 1961 SCR 341 cited Para 17 A (1960) 2 SCR 671 cited Para 17

1986 (1) SCR 610 cited Para 18

1970 (1) SCR 678 cited Para 18 B 1981 (1) SCR 627 cited Para 18

1970 (2) SCR 830 cited Para 18

1973 (1) SCR 896 cited Para 18

1987 (2) SCR 1189 cited Para 22 c 1968 SCR 251 cited Para25

1983 (3) SCR 438 cited Para 25

1994 (1) SCR 579 cited Para 25 D 1980 (2) SCR 260 cited Para 25

1990 (1) SCR 909 cited Para 26

1987 (2) SCR 841 cited Para 26 E 1990 (3) SCR 862 cited Para 26

1981 (3) SCR 92 cited Para 26

2007 (12) SCR 136 cited Para 26 F 1966 SCR 505 referred to Para 27, 48

(1984) 4 sec 21 referred to Para 34

1957 SCR 701 referred to Para 35 G 1963 Suppl. SCR 993 referred to Para 35

1988 (3) Suppl. SCR 558 referred to Para 37

1966 SCR 221 referred to Para 39

670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S C.R

E (2009) 5 sec 641 referred to Para 52 (1993) 2 sec 113 referred to Para 56 (1960) 3 SeR 887 referred to Para 56,58, 74,97 F (1965) 1 SeR 614 referred to Para 56,58, 79,99 1973 (1) SCR 258 cited Para 56 1972 (3) SCR 518 referred to Para 56 G 1970 (3) SeR 530 referred to Para 59 (1968) 1 SCR 561 . cited Para 59 2007 (9) SCR 853 cited Para 59 H

K.T. PLANTATION PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 671 KARNATAKA 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 28 cited Para 60 A

2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 555 cited Para 60

2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 301 cited Para 62

2009 (16) SCR 618 cited Para 62 B 1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 526 cited Para 63

2011 (1) SCR 453 cited Para 63

1959 Suppl. SCR 8 referred to Para 65 c (1959) Supp. (2) SCR 270 referred to Para 65

1964 SCR 926 referred to Para 65

1973 (2) SCR 1073 referred to Para 65

1983 (1) SCR 905 referred to Para 65 D

1983 (3) SCR 130 referred to Para 65,120 1985 (2) SCR 224 referred to Para 65 1990 (1) SCR 614 referred to Para 65 E 1973 (1) SCR 326 referred to Para 65 (1964) 2 SCR 87 referred to Para 66

1956 SCR 393 referred to Para 66 F 1978 (1) SCR 641 referred to Para 66

1979 (3) SCR 254 referred to Para 66

(1962) 3 SCR 250 referred to Para 70 G (1974) 4 SCR 3 cited Para 74

1978 (2) SCR 621 referred to Para 74

1979 (3) SCR 1014 cited Para 74 H

672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 1980 (3) SCR 1338 cited Para 74

(1962) Supp (2) SCR 1 cited Para 74

1961 SCR 77 referred to Para 74

(1952) 1 SCR 889 referred to Para 76, 79, 93 B (1964) 1 SCR 371 cited Para 76

(1991) 4 sec 699 cited Para 76

2007 (1) SCR 706 referred to Para 76 c 1987 (1) SCR 798 cited Para 76

2010 (12) SCR 597 cited Para 76

467 us 229 (1984) referred to Para 89

(545 us 469 (2005) referred to Para 89

E AIR 1954 SC 170 referred to Para 95,112

1954 SCR 587 referred to Para 95

1967 SCR 255 referred to Para 99

1971 (1) SCR 512 referred to Para 100 F 1967 SCR 762 referred to Para 101

1973 (4) sec 225 referred to Para 104

(1975) Supp. sec 1 referred to Para 104 G 1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 807 referred to Para 107

2002 (2) SCR 557 referred to Para 109

(1959) SCR 379 referred to Para 119 H

K.T. PLANTATION PVl LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 673 KARNATAKA

2004 (1) SCR 564 referred to Para 1:.!0 A

1980 (3) SCR 1159 referred to Para 126 1986 (1) SCR 70 referred to Para 127 1996 (3) SCR 721 referred to Para 128 B 1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 549 referred to Para 129 . (2005) 2 sec 317 referred to Para 131 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 759 referred to Para 131 c 1981 (2) SCR 79 referred to Para 131 2004 (3) SCR 982 referred to Para 131 1997 (6) Suppl. SCR 717 referred to Para 131 2008 (4 ) SCR 1 referred to Para 132 D

(1985) 1 SCR 721 referred to Para 137 (1981) 1 SCR 753 referred to Para 138 (1987) 2 SCR 2 referred to Para 138 E CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6520 of 2003.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.07.2002 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in W.P. No. F 32560 of 1996. WITH Civil Appeal Nos. 6521-6537 and 6538 of 2003.

T.R. Andhyarujina, D.A. Dave. K.N. Bhat and Basava G Prabhu S. Patil, Gurukrishna Kumar, S. Sukumar, S. Sukumaran, Anand Sukumar, Soumik Ghoshal, Akshat Hansaria, Bhupesh Kumar Pathak, Yashovardhan Roy, Meera Mathur, P.R. Ramesesh, S.K. Kulkarni, Ankur S. Kulkarni, Vijay H

674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Kumar, V.N. Raghupathy, B. Subramanya Prasad, Nikhil Majithia, Anand Sanjay M. Nuli and Ajay Kumar, M., for the appearing parties.