M/S. DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.

p. 191 Copy page pinpoint

(Civil Appeal No. 24 of 2009)

AUGUST 18, 2011 B

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss. 17(3A), 17(1), 17(4), 11 A, 6 and 5A - Acquisition of abadi land for planned development - Issuance of Notification uls. 4(1) rw s. 17(1) and 17(4) - Dispensation of provision of hearing uls. 5A - Publication of declaration u/s. 6 in the year 2002 and thereafter, the possession of the land was taken - Case of the land owners that possession of the land was taken without issuance of notification to them; that the award was not passed within two years of making the declaration uls. 17(1); arid they were not paid 80 per cent of the estimated compensation in terms of s. 17(3A) at the time of taking of possession - Writ petition seeking declaration that the said acquisition proceedings be declared void ab initio and the land be returned to the land owners with damages - Dismissal of writ petition - Issues arising before Supreme Court that when land is acquired in exercise of emergency powers u/s. 17 and have since vested in the State, would the acquisition proceeding lapse and land be transferred to the owners/persons interested in case of non-compliance of s. 11A; whether the provisions of s. 17(3A) are mandatory or directory and in either event, would non-compliance of s. 17(3A) invalidate or vitiate the entire acquisition proceedings, even where the land has vested in the State; whether the emergency provisions are to be construed strictly and the safeguards inbuilt ins. 17(3A) are construed as conditions precedent and mandatory for a valid exercise of emergency provisions; and whether the 191 H

p. 192 Copy page pinpoint

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 193 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. appellants alleged that they did not receive any notice under A Section 9(1) of the Act but the possession of the land was taken; that the Collector did not pass the award within two years of making the declaration under Section 17(1) as required by Section 11 A of the Act; and that they were not paid 80 per cent of the estimated compensation in terms of Section 17(3A) of B the Act at the time of taking of possession. The appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court seeking declaration that the acquisition proceedings, relating to the land of the appellant be declared void ab initio; and that the respondents be directed to return the land from the possession of the c Government to the owners and pay damages for use and occupation of the land. The respondents contented that they had deposited 80 per cent compensation in terms of Section 17(3A) of the Act with the authorities; that the land was not abadi land and had been acquired for planned development 0 of NO/DA and was in the physical possession of the said authority; and that the possession of the land had been taken on 4th February, 2003 and no right had survived in favour of the appellant. The High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the provisions of Section 11 A of the Act were not attracted to proceedings for acquisition taken by the Government under Section 17 of the Act. Therefore, the appellants filed the instant appeal.

The questions which arose for consideration in the instant appeal are when the Government, in exercise of its emergency powers under Section 17 of the Act acquires lands, which have since vested in the State, can such an acquisition proceeding lapse and consequently the land can be transferred to the owners/persons interested in the event of default by the State, in complying with the provisions of Section 11A of the Act; whether the provisions of Section 17(3A) of the Act are mandatory or directory and in either event, would non- compliance with Section 17(3A) have the effect of invalidating or vitiating the entire acquisition H

p. 194 Copy page pinpoint

A proceedings, even where the land has vested in the State in terms of Section 17(1) of the Act; whether with the invoking of the emergency provisions which have the effect of dispensing with the provision of hearing under Section SA of the Act, the Court is entitled to construe the B emergency provisions strictly and consider the safeguards inbuilt in Section 17(3A) as conditions precedent and mandatory for a valid exercise of emergency provisions; and whether having regard to the principle of reasonableness, the provisions of the said c Act are to be construed, a pre-constitutional law in consonance with reason and justice-the fundamental tenets of Article 14 and thus, arrive at a balanced interpretation of the interest of the State as against the rights of citizens or land owners. D Referring the matter to the larger bench, the Court

:1.1 Taking over a possession of land by invoking s. E 17(1) and s. 17(2) of the land Acquisition Act, 1894 and without complying with the requirement of Section 17(3A) of making payment, is clearly illegal and in clear violation of the statutory provision which automatically violates the constitutional guarantee under Article 300A of the Constitution. A passing observation to the contrary in * F Satendra Prasad Jain's case, must pass sub silentio being unnecessary in the facts of the case as otherwise such a finding is per incuriam, being in violation of the statute. A fortiorari the said finding cannot be sustained as a binding precedent. Therefore, the writ petition cannot be G dismissed in view of the decision in * Satendra Prasad Jain's case which was decided on totally different facts. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. [Paras 72 and 73] [257-F-G]

H *Satendra Prasad Jain and Ors. v. State of UP. and Ors.

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 195 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. AIR 1993 SC 2517: (1993) 4 SCC 369 - per incuriam. A

1.2 In all cases of emergency acquisition under Section 17, the requirement of payment under Section 17(3A) must be complied with as the provision of Section 17(1) and Section 17(2) cannot be worked out without 8 complying with requirement of payment under Section 17(3A) which is in the nature of condition precedent. If Section 17(3A) is not complied with, the vesting under Section 17(1) and Section 17(2) cannot take place. Therefore, emergency acquisition without complying with Section 17(3A) is.illegal. This is the plain intention of the C statute which must be strictly construed. Any other construction, would lead to diluting the Rule of Law. [Para 74) [257-G-H; 258-A-B]

2.1 The reason behind enacting Section 17 (3A) of the D Act is clear from the Statement of Object and Reasons. It is clear therefore, the provisions were incorporated in order to strike a balan~e between the rights of the State and those of the land owner. A clear legislative intent in · Section 17(3A) was thus, expressed that before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub- section (2) of Section 17, the Collector shall tender payment of 80% of the estimated compensation for such land to the persons interested and entitled thereto. This is the clear mandate of law. Reasonableness in law has to be its implicit content. When law gives a specific mandate on the State to tender the payment before taking possession under Section 17(1) and Section'17(2) by invoking the emergency powers, to hold that the taking' over of possession without complying with that mandate is legal is clearly to return a finding whjch is contrary to the express provision of the statute. Si.ich a finding is' certainly not on a reasonable interpretation of Sectio_n 17 (3A). [Para 43) [244-D-F] .: . · .1• • · i. 0 , ''f1~'&._'~ ,,I~~--·· R. C. Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248;· H

p. 196 Copy page pinpoint

A Maneka Gandfli v. Union of India & Anr. (1978) 1 SCC 248 - relied on.

Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur AIR 1989

SC 38; Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India AIR 1971 SC 530; Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) & Ors., v. State 8 of Tamil Nadu & others (2002) 3 SCC 533 - referred to.

Gerard v. Worth of Paris Ltd. 1936 (2) AER 905 - referred to.

c Jurisprudence by Salmond "12th Edn - referred to

2.2 The emergency provisions of the statute which empowers the State to acquire land by dispensing with the provisions of making an enquiry, is a drastic p.rovision. The provisions of the Act are expropriatory in nature and must be strictly construed. Section 17 of the Act seeks to authorize acquisition and taking over of possession without hearing the land owner. The right of hearing which is given under Sertion SA of the Act and which is taken away in view of the emergency acquisition is a very valuable right and is akin to a fundamental right. Therefore, when that right is taken away and the land is acquired by invoking the emergency provision of Section 17(3A) to hold that even the safeguards provided under Section 17(3A) are not mandatory and taking over of possession without complying with the provisions of Section 17 (3A) is not illegal, is to overlook the clear provisions of the Act and come to a finding which is contrary to the Act. [Para 44] [244-H; 245-A-D]

G Dev Sharan & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. JT 2011 (3) SC 102 - referred to. 2.3 Section 17(3A) is not an isolated provision. Section 17(3A) figures very prominently as part of the statutory mechanism in Section 17 of the Act which H

UELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 197 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. confers special powers in cases of urgency. Section 17 A has four sub-sections and all these sub-sections comprise a composite mechanism and are closely intertwined. Power under one sub-section cannot be exercised without complying with the conditions imposed by the other sub-section. It is thus, clear that B sub-section (3A) of Section 17 read with sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Act form a composite statutory scheme. The said scheme has been legislatively framed to balance the promotion of public purpose in acquisition with rights of the individual whose land is acquired. Thus, c the provision of s. 17(3A) cannot be viewed in isolation. It is an intrinsic and mandatory step in exercising special powers in cases of emergency. Sections 17(1) and 17(2) and 17(3A) must be read together. S~ction 17(1) and 17(2) cannot be worked out in isolation. [Paras 45, 47 and 48) 0 [245-E-F; 248-E-H] 2.4 A statute has to be read as a whole and in its c:.ontext. If the normal mode of vest_ing of acquired property under Section 16 of the Act is compared with the mode of vesting under emergency provisions of Section E 17 thereof, it would be discerned that under the Act the vesting of acquired property in the State presupposes compliance with two conditions. Under Section 16, first there has to be an award under Section 11 and then there has to be taking over of possession. Only thereupon the land shall vest absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances. However, in case of emergency acquisition, possession is taken before the making of an award. This is clear from Section 17(1) and Section 17(2). But the intention of the legislature is that even though the award is not made, payment mandated under Section 17(3A) must be made before possession is taken either under Section 17(1) and 17(2)..Therefore, the provision relating to payment under Section 17(3A) is a condition precedentto the vesting of land under Section 17(1) and H 17(2).

p. 198 Copy page pinpoint

A Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth & Anr. (1977) 4 sec 193 - referred to. Attorney General v. HRH Prince Earnest Augustus of Hanover (1957) 1 AER 49 - referred to. B 2.5 Judicial opinion is uniformly in favour of strict construction of an expropriatory law which admittedly Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is. The requirement of payment under Section 17(3A) is in the nature of condition precedent clamped by the statute before taking possession under emergency acquisition by the State. The vesting contemplated either under Section 17(1) or 17(2) of the Act is conditioned upon payment mandated under Section 17(3A). This is clear from the opening words of Section 17(3A) namely "before taking possession of any land either under sub-section (1) or (2), Collector shall ....... tender payment." Therefore, the eminent domain concept is subject to the said statutory .. condition and must be read subje~t to due process ·· concept introduced in the constitlltional law. If Section E 17(3A) is read consistently with the constitutional doctrine of due process as articulated in the expression 'authority of law' under Article 300A which constitutionally protects deprivation of a right to property, save by authority of law, the requirement of Section 17(3A) F constitutes the authority of law within the mean,ng of Article 300A. Therefore, in the context of the said statutory dispensation and constitutional provision, the debate whether the provision of Section 17(3A) is mandatory or directory does not present much difficulty. G Basically, the language used is 'shall' which primarily indicates mandatory compliance. That apart, in the context of the nature of statute which is admittedly expropriatory in character and the nature of the statutory requirement under Section 17(3A) which is clearly and undoubtedly a condition precedent to the taking over of possession in emergency acquisition, there can be no

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 199 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. doubt that the requirement under Section 17(3A) is mandatory. [Paras 54, 66 and 67) [250-G; 255-B-H]

Secretary of State for India v. Birendra Kishore Manikya ILR 44 Cal 328; Gujarat Electricity Board v Girdharlal Motilal And Anr AIR 1969 SC 267; Nazir Ahmad v King Emperor AIR B 1936 PC 253; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., v. Darius Shapur Chenai and. others (2005) 7 SCC 627; Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v Maddula Ratnavalli and Others (2007) 6 SCC 81; Ji/ubhai Nanbhai Khachar and others v State of Gujarat and Anr. 1995 Suppl (1) SCC 596 - referred C to.

Webb v. Manchester and Leeds Rail Co. (1339) 4 Myl & Cr.116; Parkdale Corporation v. West (1887) 12 App. Cas. 602, 614; A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27; Henry B. Stacey v The Vermont Central Raf/road Co. 27 Vt. D 39 - referred to.

The Law of Compensation for Land Acquired under Compulsory Powers by Cripps, Stevens and Sons, Ltd. 8th Edn.; A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations by Cooley E 'Volume II, (Eight Edn);; Words and Phrases permanent edition, Vol. 8. St. Paul, Minn, West Publishing Co., 1951, p 629; Bouvier's Law Dictionary, A Concise encyclopedia of the Law, Rawle's Third Revision, Vol. 1, Vernon Law Book Company, 1914, p 584; Wharton's Law Lexicon, 1976, F reprint, p 228 - referred to.

2.6 Section 17(3A) has been enacted for protecting the rights of deprived, land-loser in an emergency acquisition. The said provision is therefore, based on reason, justice and fairplay. Since the said provision has G been introduced by way of an amendment to balance the right of the State as against the interest of the land-loser, the State's power of eminent domain is ex!Jressly made subject to said. statutory provision as also ~he constitutional right to property protected under Article H

p. 200 Copy page pinpoint

A 300A. [Para 68] [256·A·B]

Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. (2007) 8 SCC 705 - referred to.

B 2.7 The expression 'law' which figures both in Article 21 and Article 300A must be given the same meaning. In both the cases the law would mean a validly enacted law. In order to be valid law it must be just, fair and reasonable having regard to the requirement of Article 14 and 21. This C is especially so, as 'law' in both the Articles 21 and 300A is meant to prevent deprivation of rights. Insofar as Article 21 is concerned, it is a Fundamental Right whereas in Article 300A it is a constitutional right which has been given a status of a basic human right. Therefore, Section D 17(3A) of the Act is a law which has been enacted to prevent deprivation of property rights guaranteed under Article 300 A. This provision of Section 17(3A) must therefore, be given a very broad interpretation to mean a law that givEis a fafr, just and reasonable protection of the E land-loser's constitutional right to property. Therefore, the provisions of Section 17(3A) read with Article 300A must be liberally construed. [Paras 69,70 and 71] [256-C· G] Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr. (1978) 1 SCC F 248 - relied on. Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India AIR 1971 SC 530 - referred to.

G 3. As regards the question of relief, the possession of the land has been taken and same has been handed over to the beneficiary on which construction had taken place and third party interests had arisen. It is very difficult to put the hands of the clock back now, despite the said declaration of law by the Court. In the special

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 201 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. facts of the case, compensation in respect of the land acquired as regards the appellants, cannot be decided on the basis of the date of notice under Section 4. The compensation has to be fixed with regard to the value of the appellant's land as on the date of filing of the writ · petition which was in March, 2006 before the High Court. B The Section 4 notification must be deemed to have been issued on March 1, 2006 and the compensation must be worked out on that basis. An award on that basis must be passed by the Collector within four months from date and the appellants are given liberty, if so advised, to c challenge the same in appropriate proceedings. As the respondent-acquiring authority has proceeded illegally in the matter, it shall pay costs of Rupees one lakh in favour of High Court Mediation Centre. The State is at liberty to recover the same from the erring officials. [Paras 75, 76) D [258-C-H]

Dorothy Lynch v. Household Finance Corporation 405

US 538: 31 L Ed. 2d 424 - referred to.

Democracy, Equality and Freedom by Justice K.K. E Mathew (1978) - referred to.

PER SWATANTER KUMAR, J:

1. The four legal questions as· framed are answered as follows: F

A. Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has no application to the acquisition proceedings conducted under the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. Once the acquired land has vested in the G Government in terms of Section 16 or 17(1) of the Act, possession of which has already been taken, such land is incapable of being re-vested or reverted to the owners/persons interested therein, for lack of any statutory provision for the same under the Act. H

p. 202 Copy page pinpoint

A B. The provisions of Section 17(3A) of the Act, on their bare reading, suggest that the said provision is mandatory but, as no consequences of default have been prescribed by the Legislature in that provision, thus, it would hardly be permissible for the Court to B read into the said provision any drastic consequences much less lapsing of entire acquisition proceedings. Default in complying with provisions of Section 17(3A) cannot result in invalidating or vitiating the entire acquisition c proceedings, particularly when the possession of the acquired land has been taken and it has vested in the Government free from all encumbrances.

C. Keeping in view the scheme of the Act, the provisions of Section 17 of the Act can be construed strictly but such interpretation must be coupled with the doctrine of literal and contextual interpretation, while ensuring that the object of the legislation is not defeated by such an interpretation. Strict compliance to the conditions contemplated under Section 17 of the Act should be given effect to but within the framework of the statute, without making any additions to the language of the section.

D. Once the righ.t to property ceases to be a F Fundamental Right after omission of Articles 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India, the addition of Articles 31A and 300A by the 44th Constitutional Amendment, 1978, cannot place the legal right to property at the same pedestal to that of a fundamental right falling under Chapter Ill of the Constitution. The provisions G of the Land Acquisition Act are not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The rights of the citizens and interest of the State can be balanced under the provisions of the Act, without any violation of the Constitutional mandate. [Para 82) [323-E-H; 324-A-G] H

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 203 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. '

2. The reasons for taking different view are as A · follows:

(i) The ratio decidendi of the judgment of this Court in the case of Satendra Prasad Jain is squarely applicable to the instant case, on facts and law. 8 Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. AIR = 1993 SC 2517 (1993) 4 SCC 369 - followed.

(ii) From the facts recorded, it is clear that within the prescribed period, the payments were deposited with c the State office of the Collector/co~petent authority and it was for the State to distribute the money in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is not only the scheme of the Act but also an established practice that the amounts are disbursed by the 0 Collector to the claimants and not directly by the beneficiary, for whose benefit the land had been acquired. The beneficiary had discharged its obligation by depositing, in fact, in excess of 80 per cent of due compensation with the competent authority. De hors the approach that one may adopt in regard to the interpretation of Section 17(3A), on facts the notification is incapable of being invalidated for non-compliance of the said Section.

(iii) The doctrine of strict construction does not per se mandate that its application excludes the simultaneous application of all other principles of interpretation. It is permissible in law to apply the rule of strict construction while reading the provisions of law contextually or even purposively. The golden rule of interpretation is the rule of plain language, while preferring the interpretation which furthers the cause of the Statute rather than that which defeats the objects or purposes of the Act. H

p. 204 Copy page pinpoint

A Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority & Ors. (2011) 3 SCC 139; Tika Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 689; Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal & Ors. 2011 (5) SCALE 173; Devinder Singh & Others v. State of Punjab and Others B (2008)1 SCC 728 - referred to.

(iv) The 44th Constitutional Amendment, on the one hand, omitted Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 while introducing Articles 31A and 300A to the Constitution of India on the other. Right to property was deleted c as a fundamental right in the Constitution. Thus, this right cannot be placed on equi terms, interpretatively or otherwise, to the pre-constitutional amendments. The right to eminent domain would operate on a different sphere, interpretation and effect, pre and post constitutional repealments of these Articles and Introduction of Article 300A of the Constitution. [Para 1] 3.1 It is clear that it may not be possible to lay down any straitjacket formula, which could unanimously be applied to all cases, irrespective of considering the facts, legislation in question, object of such legislation, intendment of the legislature and substance of the enactment. It will always depend upon all these factors. F Still, these precepts are not exhaustive and are merely indicative. There could be cases where the word 'shall' has been used to indicate the legislative intent that the provisions should be mandatory, but when examined in light of the scheme of the Act, language of the provisions, G legislative intendment and the objects sought to be achieved, such an interpretation may defeat the very purpose of the Act and, thus, such interpretation may not be acceptable in law and in public interest. Keeping in mind the language of the provision, the Court has to examine whether the provision is intended to regulate H

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 205 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. certain procedure or whether it vests private individuals A with certain rights and levies a corresponding duty on the officers concerned. The Court will still have to examine another aspect, even after holding that a particular provision is mandatory or directory, as the case may be, i.e., whether the effect or impact of such non-complianc~ B would invalidate or render the proceedings void ab initio or it would result in imposition of smaller penalties or in issuance of directions to further protect and safeguard the interests of the individual against the power of the State. The language of the statute, intention of the c legislature and other factors decide the results and impacts of non-compliance in the facts and circumstances of a given case, before the Court can declare a provision capable of such strict construction, to term it as absolutely mandatory or directory. [Para 27] D [278-D~H; 279-A-C]

May George v. Special Tehsildar and Ors. (2010) 13 SCC 98; Mis. Sainik Motors, Jodhpur & Others v. The State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 SC 1480; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation v. Darius Shapur Chennai and Ors. (2005) 7 SCC E 627 - referred to

Attorney General's Reference (No. 3 of 1999) (2001) 1 All ER 577; R. v. Jones, exp. Daunton 1963(1) WLR 270R. v. Bullock (1964)1 QB 481 - referred to. F

'Principles of Statutory Interpretation' by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edn, 2010 p 389; 'The Interpretation of Statutes' by Maxwell Chapter 12, 12th Edn.; 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation' by Justice G.P. Singh, 11th Edn, 2008; - 'Statutory Construction' by Crawford; Interpretation of Statutes' G by Maxwell 12th Edition by P. St. J. Langan - referred to.

3.2 Under the scheme of Section 17 of the Act, the Government can take possession of the property on the . expiration of 15 days from publication of notice mentioned · H

p. 206 Copy page pinpoint

A in Section 9(1) of the Act. The provisions of Section 5 of the Act, i.e., the right of the owner to file objection can be declared to be inapplicable. Besides these two significant distinctions, another important aspect that the land vests in the Government under Section 16 of the Act only after B the award is made and possession of the land is taken, while under Section 17(1 ), at the threshold of the acquisition itself, the land could vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. The possession of the acquired property has to be taken by the Collector c in terms of Sections 17(2) and 17(3) of the Act. [Para 28] [279-G-H; 280-A-B]

3.3 Section 17(3A) of the Act, was introduced by the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 for the purposes of safeguarding the interests of the claimants. Section D 17(3A) makes it obligatory on the part of the authority concerned to tender/pay 80 per .. ent of the compensation for the acquired land, as estimated by the Collector, to the persons interested and entitled thereto; unless prevented by any of the contingencies mentioned under Section E 31(2) of the Act. The use of the word 'shall' in Section 17(3A) indicates that the enactors of law desired that the procedure stated should be complied with by the authority concerned prior to takirtg of possession. Deposit of amount is the condition precedent to taking F of possession. The amount so deposited or paid in terms of Section 17(3A) of the Act will be taken into account for determining the amount of compensation required to be tendered under Section 31 of the Act and provides for the recovery of amounts if it exceeds the awarded amount. G Section 17(3A) unambiguously provides a complete mechanism of taking possession and the requirement of payment of 80 per cent of estimated compensation to the claimants. [Para 29] [281-E-H; 282-A-CJ 3.4 Section 17(3A) of the Act is completely silent on H

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 207 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. consequences of default in compliance of the provision. A . Where the Legislature has, in specific terms, provided for the extent of payment, mode of payment and even the difficulties which are likely to arise, i.e, where a person may not be entitled to receive the compensation or in any other eventuality such as where the compensation B cannot be paid for the reasons stated in Section 31(1) of the Act, there the Legislature in its wisdom has provided no contingencies and/or consequences of non-deposit of this money. This is in complete contradistinction to the provisions contained in Sections 6 and 11A of the Act. c Section 6 provides that no declaration shall be issued where the period specified in the first proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act has expired. Similarly, Section 11A of the Act provides that the acquisition proceedings shall lapse where the Collector fails to make an award within a period 0 of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Thus, the legislative intent is very clear. The legislature has provided for every contingency for tendering payment, while ·remaining 0 silent about consequences flowing from default under some other provisions. When the framers of law have not provided for any penal consequences for default in compliance to Section 17(3A), then it will be uncalled for to provide such consequences by judicial_ interpretation. While interpreting the provisions for compensation, the Court can provide such interpretation as would help to bridge the gaps left by the Legislature, if any, in implementation of the provisions of the Act. But it would hardly be permissible for the Court to ·introduce such consequences by way of judicial dicta, like requiring lapse of acquisition proceedings. This is not a matter covered by the principles of judicial interpretation. [Paras 30 and 31] [282-C-H; 283-A-D]

3.5 It is a well settled canon of statutory interpretation that the courts would neither add nor subtract from the H

208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011112 S.C.R.

A plain language of the statutory provision. In the instant case also, there is hardly any justification for the courts to take any contrary view. Once the land has vested in the State and there being no provision for re-vesting the land in the original owners under the provisions of the B Act, then it would be in consonance with the scheme of the Act and legislative intent to give an interpretation that would allow provisions of Section 17(1) to operate without undue impediment and keep the vesting of land in the State intact Otherwise, in some cases the purpose "' for which such lands were acquired might stand >J frustrated, while in other cases the purpose of acquisition might have already been achieved and, therefore, divesting State of its title and possession in the acquired land would be incapable of performance. Under J such circumstances, then, to interpret Section 17(3A) of the Act to be so mandatory in its absolute terms that the non-payment of money would result in vitiating or lapsing entire acquisition proceedings, can hardly be justified on the strength of any known principle of interpretation of statutes. It is a complete safeguard provided to the land owner inasmuch as the compensation stipulated under Section 17(3A) of the Act should be paid in terms of the provisions of the Act so that the owner is not made to suffer on both counts i.e. he is deprived of his land as well as compensation. It would be unfair for the authorities concerned not to pay the compensation as contemplated under the provisions of the Act. It would be just and fair to read into the provisions of the Section 17(3AJ as imposing an obligation on the part of the authorities concerned/the Collector to pay the compensation within the time specified under Section 17(3A). Of course, no specific time, within which the payment has to be made in terms of Section 17(1) has been stated in the provision. But, wherever specific limitations are not stated, the concept of 'reasonable time' H would become applicable. So, even if it is submitted that

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 209 STAtE OF U.P. & ANR. ' there is no specific time contemplated for payment/ A deposit of 80 per cent of the estimated compensation, even then the claimants would be entitled to receive the amount expeditiously and in any case within very reasonable time. If the authorities are permitted to take possession of the land without payment of the amounts B contemplated under Section 17(3A) of the Act, then it would certainly amount to abuse of power of eminent domain within its known legal limitations. The authorities should discern the distinction spelt out under Section 16 of the Act on the one hand and Section 17(1) read with c Section 17(3A) of the Act on the other. (Para 32). [283-E- H; 284-A-G] Banwari Lal & Sons Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. 1991 (1) DRJ (Suppl.) 317; Union of India & Ors. v. Krishan Lal Ameja & Ors. (2004) 8 SCC 453; Tika Ram & Ors. v. State · D of U.P. & Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 689; Satender Prasad Jain Pratap & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 3 SCC 1; Rajend~r Kishan Gupta v. Union;of India (2010) 9 SCC 46 - referred to. E 3.6 The provisions of Section 17(3A) of the Act are not mandatory. Such a conclusion can safely be arrived at, even for the reason that the Court would have to read into the provisions of Section 17(3A) consequences and a strict period of limitation within which amount should be deposited, which has not been provided by the Legislature itself in that section. The consequences and contingencies arising from non-compliance of the said provisions have not been stated in the Act. Once the land has vested in the Government, non-compliance with the obligation of payment of 80 per cent of estimated compensation would not render the possession taken under Section 17(1) as illegal. The land cannot be re- vested or reverted back to the claimants as no provisions under the Act so prescribe. Furthermore, if the H

210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A interpretation put forward by the appellants is accepted, it would completely frustrate the objects and purpose of the Act, rather than advancing the same. The expression 'shall' used in Section 17(3A) has to be understood in its correct perspective and is not to be construed as B suggestive of the provisions being absolutely mandatory in its application. Thus, the provisions of Section 17(3A) are not mandatory. They are directive provisions, though their compliance is necessary in terms of the Act. [Para 39) [290-G-H; 291-A-D] c 3.7 The obligation on the part of the Government or concerned authority to deposit the amount prior to taking possession under Section 17(1) should essentially be complied with. The amount of 80 % of the estimated compensation in terms of Section 17(3A) should be D deposited. Once the provisions of Sections 17(1) and 17(3A) is read conjunctively, it implies that the amounts are to be deposited within 15 days from the publication of the notice in terms of Section 9(1) of the Act and before taking of possession of the acquired land. The E Legislature has sufficiently indicated that the payment of the due 80 per cent of compensation should be made at the earliest and, particularly, before possession is taken. Non-compliance of the provisions of Section 17(3A) would not vitiate the acquisition proceedings, but depending on the facts of a given case, the payment should be made within the time indicated and in any case within a reasonable time, and the claimant should then be entitled to additional benefits for such non- compliance. The Court would fill a part of the gap which has remained unfilled by the Legislature. [Para 40)

3.8 Irrespective of whether the provision is held to be mandatory or directory, compliance with its substance is equally important. In either case, the authority entrusted with a duty is not absolved of its obligation to perform

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 211 STATE OF UP. & ANR. the specified duty or obligation in the manner stated in law. It is primarily the consequences which result from non-performance of duty, which are of significance in determining the impact of mandatory or directory nature of a provision. Normally, in both cases, some consequences should flow from non-performance. Even 9 if the provisions of Section 17(3A) are directory, the deposit of 80 per cent of estimated compensation within the period of limitation i.e. 15 days and prior to taking possession of the land, has to be made. There is no ambiguity in this requirement. Thus, it shall be the duty of the Court to fill the lacuna (i.e., the consequences of non-payment of compensation) to complete the chain of the legislative scheme contained in Section 17 of the Act. Having taken recourse to the emergency provisions and having taken possession of the land, the Government and its authorities cannot be permitted to defer the payment of the requisite amount, in terms of Section 17(3A) .ofthe Act, indefinitely or for an unduly long period. A responsibility is cast upon the authorities concerned to make· payments within time and not unduly cause inconvenience and harassment to persons interested in the compulsorily acquired land and who have been deprived of possessory benefits also. The provisions of Section 34 is to be read together with the provisions of Sections 17(1) and 17(3A) of the Act. They have to be construed harmoniously, keeping in mind the object sought to be achieved by a conjoint reading of these provisions. The expression 'before taking possession of the land' has,been used in Section 17 read with Section 17(3A) and in Section 34 as well. Once the Government has invoked the emergency provisions, it is pre- G supposed that the Government needs the land urgently and, in its wisdom, has decided that it is not in public interest to go through the normal procedure prescribed for acquisition and payment of compensation under Part H

212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A II of the Act. It requires immediate possession of the land for achievement of the purpose for which land was required. As the Government would take possession by depriving the land owners of some of their rights, as would have been available to them under normal 8 acquisition procedure, the Legislature has created special safeguards in their favour. Firstly, they would be given 15 days notice prior to taking of possession of the land (Section 9.(1) of the Act). Secondly, 80 per cent of the estimated compensation shall be paid to them in terms of Section 17(3A) of the Act, before the possession is taken. Thus, the Legislature has balanced the rights and obligations between the parties. Section 34, therefore, cannot be read so as to destroy the protections or safeguards provided to claimants/owners of the land under Section 17 of the Act. These provisions must be read harmoniously. These provisions should be construed so as to give benefit to the owners of the land against compulsory acquisition, rather than accepting an interpretation which would defeat the benefits intended by the Legislature. The Legislature was fully aware of the provisions of' Section 34 while introducing Section 17(3A) into the Act, as both the provisions were introduced by the same Amending Act of 1984. This clearly demonstrates the legislative intent that the protections specified under Section 17(1) would operate in their own field and the provisions of Section 34 would also apply in its own sphere. It would be unfair, if the Government takes possession of the property within 15 days of the notice issued under Section 9(1) (as is contemplated under Section 17(1) of the Act) and does not make payment of compensation for a long period, with no additional liability whatsoever. This is not the legislative intent that the Government would not be liable to pay higher rate of interest where it has taken possession of the land in exercise of its powers under Section 17 of the H

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 213 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. Act. It would be unfair if the liability to pay higher rate of A interest in terms of Section 34 would arise only after a period of one year from the date of possession even in cases of emergent acquisition. Such an interpretation may result in frustrating the balance sought to be created by the Legislature. [Para 41] [292-A-F; 293-C-H; 294-A-E] B

3.9 The statutory benefit contained in Section 34 of the Act should be made applicable to the provisions of Section 17(1) read with Section 17(3A) ir:i the manner that it would give the requisite benefit to the owners/claimants of the land rather than deprive them of both, their land and income, without any additional benefit despite non- compliance of the provisions of the Act. Thus, the owners/claimants should be entitled to receive, on the strength of these provisions and alike, the interest payable under the proviso to Section 34 i.e. interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum from the date of expiry of the period of 15 days as stated under Section 17(1) and from taking of possession of the land from the owners/ persons interested in the land till payment of compensation in terms of Section 17(3A) of the Act. E These conditions have to be satisfied cumulatively and not alternatively, to give rise to the liability to pay interest of 1.5 per cent from the date afore-stated. This approach which is adopted is restricted in application to the acquisitions made by the Government in exercise of its emergency powers under Section 17 of the Act. Section 34 would otherwise operate in its own sphere and only after the lapse of the period specified in the proviso. The conclusion is that non-compliance of provisions of Section 17(1) read with Section 17(3A) would not render the acquisition proceedings invalid or void ab initio in law however, liability to pay interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum would arise from the date and for the period afore-noticed. [Para 41 & 42] [294-E-H; 295-A-C] H

214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A 4.1 A bare reading of Section 11A shows that the Legislature places an obligation upon the Collector to make an award at the earliest. Wherever the award under Section 11 of the Act has not been made within two years from the date of publication of the declaration, the entire B proceedings for acquisition of land shall lapse. Explanation to Section 11A of the Act further excludes from this period, any period during which any action or proceeding, to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration, is stayed by an order of a Court which had c been in force. Exclusion of no other period is contemplated under this provision. Thus, a definite intention of the framers of law is clear that the award should be made at the earliest and, in any case, within a maximum period of two years from the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, if the acquisition proceedings are to 0 survive. The acquisition under the Act being compulsory acquisition, a safeguard or right has been provided to the private party against the State. Thus, the statute imposes a duty upon the State to act wit'1in time and also provides E for consequences that shall ensue in the event of default. These consequences. are of a very serious nature, whereby the entire acquisition proceedings shall stand lapsed. This would render the land free from acquisition or any restriction and title over the land would stand reverted to the owners/persons interested. [Para 44] · F 4.2 It is clear from the substance of the language and from the intention of the legislature that the right created in favour of the citizen and the duties imposed on the State should be construed strictly. Section 11A of the Act G provides for discharge of obligations within the specified time and there are serious consequences of such non- fulfillment. This would clearly lead to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 11A of the Act are capable of strict construction and are mandatory in their application. H [Para 45] [296-G-H; 297-A]

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 215 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. Mohan & Anr. v. State of Maharahtra (2007) 9 SCC 431; A Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. AIR 1993 SC 2517: (1993) 4 SCC 369; Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat (1991) 4 SCC 531 - Relied on. Awadh Bihari Yadav & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (1995) 8 6 SCC 31; P. Chinnanna & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors. (1994) 5 SCC 486; Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 424; Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal & Ors. 2011 (5) SCALE 173 - referred to c 4.3 Section 17(1) of the Act uses the expression 'though no such award has been made'. This clearly demonstrates that making of an award is not a sine qua non for issuance of a notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) of the Act or even taking possession in terms thereof. After publication of a notification under Section 4 read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, the authority is obliged only to publish a notice under Section 9(1) of the Act and comply with the provisions of Section 17(3A) before it can take possession within the stipulated period. Once possession of the land is taken, it shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. In other words, Section 17(4) itself is a permissible exception to the provisions of Section 11 of the Act and, therefore, the question of enforcing Section 11A against proceedings under F Section 17 would not arise. Under Section 16, the land shall vest in the Government free from all encumbrances only after the award is made and possession is taken. In contradistinction to this, under Section 17(1) the land shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all G encumbrances even when no award is made and possession thereof is taken in terms of Sections 17(1) and 17(3A) of the Act. The language of Section 17(1) is to be given its plain meaning, within the field of its operation. Once such possession is taken and the land is so vested, H

216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A the Act does not make any provision for re-vesting of land in the owners/persons interested. Reversion of title or possession of property acquired, which has vested in the Government or in the authority for whose benefit such lands are acquired, is unknown to the scheme of the Act. B To introduce such a concept by interpretative process would neither be permissible nor proper. [Para 53) [302- E-H; 303-A-D]

5.1 No award is required to be made before the provisions of Section 17(1) can be invoked. The amount C of 80 per cent of the estimated compensation deposited under Section 17(3A) of the Act is to be finally adjusted against the award made under Section 11 in terms of Section 17(38) of the Act. A cumulative reading of these provisions clearly suggests that provisions of Section D 11 A of the Act can hardly be applied to the acquisition under Section 17 of the Act. [Para 55] [304-C-E]

5.2 Section 48 empowers the Government to withdraw from the acquisition of the land of which possession has not been taken. Where the Government withdraws from such an acquisition, it is its duty to determine the amount of compensation for the damages suffered by the owners as a consequence of the notice or any other proceeding taken thereunder, which amounts have to be paid as per provisions of Part Ill. Section 48, thus, is a clear indication that the power of the Government to withdraw the acquisition is subject to the limitation stated under Section 48 itself. There is no ambiguity in the language of Section 48 of the Act to give it any other interpretation except that the Government is not vested with the power of withdrawing from the acquisition of any land, of which the possession has been taken. Where the award has been made and possession has been taken, the land vests in the Government in terms of Section 16 of the Act. On the H

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 217 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. contrary, the land vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances where award has not been made · and only possession as contemplated under Section 17(1) of the Act has been taken. If the Government has no power to withdraw from acquisition of any land, the possession of which has been taken, then by no stretch of imagination can it be held that the Government will have the power to withdraw from the acquisition of any land where the land has vested in the Government or the land has been subsequently transferred in favour of an authority for whose development activity the lands were c acquired. [Paras 55 and 56] [304-F-G; 305-C-F]

Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority & Ors. (2011) 3 SCC 139; Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. v. Avinash Sharma (1970) 2 SCC 149; Rajasthan Housing Board and Others v. Shri Kishan and D Others (1993) 2 SCC 84; Sanjeevanagar Medical & Health Employees' Cooperative Housing Society v. Mohd. Abdul Wahab and Others (1996) 3 SCC 600; Bangalore Development Authority and Others v. R. Hanumaiah and Others (2005) 12 SCC 508; National Thermal Power E Corporation Limited v. Mahesh Dutta and Others (2009) 8 SCC 339; UP. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman and Another v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow & Others'(1996) 3 sec 124 - referred to. F 5.3 The lands which have been acquired under the provisions of Section 17 of the Act are incapable of being reverted to the owners/persons interested. The Act does not make any such provision and, thus, the Court is denuded of any such power. The Court must exercise G its power within the framework of law, i.e., the provisions of the Act. In the case of an ordinary acquisition, if the land has vested in the State Government then neither the Government nor the court can take recourse to the provisions of Section 48(1) of the Act, there the question H

218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A of applying Section 11A of the Act to acquisition proceedings under Section 17 of the Act cannot arise, as it would tantamount to achieving something indirectly which would be impermissible to be achieved directly. Thus, Section 11A of the Act has no application to the s acquisition proceedings under the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. [Paras 64 and 65] [309-G-H; 310-A-B]

5.4 There is no dispute in the instant case that the provisions of Section 11A of the Act have not been complied with. Admittedly, the notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) was published on 17th April, 2002, declaration under Section 6 was made on 22nd August, 2002 and the possession of the property wa,s , taken on 4th February, 2003. The award was made on 9th June, 2008, much after the expiry of the prescribed period of two years under Section 11A of the Act. There being an admitted violation of the provisions of Section 11A of the Act, the natural consequence is that its rigours would be attracted. [Para 66] [310-C-E]

E 5.5 In both the cases, acquisitions in exercise of emergent powers under Section 17 of the Act and the acquisitions made otherwise, notification under Section 4(1) has to be published in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Notification under Section 4 is a F sine qua non for commencement of the acquisition proceedings. Where the lands are acquired in exercise of emergent powers of the State under Section 17 of the Act, a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is issued and the notification itself refers to the provisions of Section G 17(1) as well as Section 17(4) of the Act. A specific power is vested in the appropriate Government to declare that provisions of Section 5A would not be applicable to such acquisition. Therefore, there is no obligation upon the Collector/authority concerned to invite and decide upon H objections in terms of Section SA of the Act, prior to

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 219 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. publication of a declaration under Section 6 of the Act. A However, notice under Section 9(1) of the Act has to be published to completely and fully invoke the powers vested in the State for taking possession of the land, in terms of Section 17(1) of the Act. After the expiry of 15 days from such publication under Section 9(1 ), the B possession of the land can be validly taken by the Government, whereupon the land would vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. In other words, for proper computation of the specified period of 15 days, issuance of notification under Section 9(1) of the c Act would be necessary, but it cannot be held to be mandatory in its operation so as to render the execution proceedings invalid. [Paras 68, 69] [311-E; 313-A; 312-D- Hl Narender Jeet Singh v. State of U.P. (1970) 1 SCC 125; D May George - referred to.

5.6 Before the Government takes possession of the land in exercise of its powers under Section 17(1) of the Act, it has to comply with the requirements of Section E 17(3A) of the Act. The amount so paid, if falls short, and/ or is in excess of compensation actually due to the land owners, the same shall be determined and adjusted while making the final award under Section 11 of the Act. It is evident that both these acquisitions have distinct F schemes of acquisition. Section ~7 of the Actitself refers to some other provisions, like Sections 5A, 9, 11, and 31 of the Act. Wherever such reference was considered necessary by the Legislature, it has been so made. Thus, there is no occasion for the Court to read into Section 17, G the ianguage of Section 11 A of the Act which has not been provided by the Legislature; more so when doing so would destroy or frustrate the very object of the urgent acquisition. Marked distinction between the implementation of these two types of acquisition H

220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A schemes contained in the Act is clearly suggestive that these schemes operate in their respective fields without any contradiction. Thus, the Court would adopt an interpretation which would further such a cause, rather than the one which will go contra to the very scheme of the Act. Thus, it cannot be held that the provisions of Section 11A of the Act, despite being mandatory, would apply to the scheme of acquisition contained under Section 17 of the Act. [Para 70] [313-B-G]

6.1 Once the development activity has been completed in the entire sector, it would not be equitable to release the lands from acquisition. It is settled canon of equitable jurisdiction that the person who feels aggrieved by an action of the State should approach the Court without any unnecessary delay, particularly in cases such as the instant one. While the Notification under Section 4 read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act was issued on 14th April, 2002 and possession taken on 4th February, 2003 the writ petitions were filed four years subsequent to the issuance of the Notification E under Section 4. It was contended that the cause of action to challenge the acquisition proceedings arose only after the period of two years had lapsed from the date of issuance of the notification. Even if that be so, still there is an unexplained and undue delay of more than two F years in approaching the Court. This would itself disentitle the appellants to claim any equitable relief in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. [Para 72] [314-B-F]

G 6.2 It cannot be said that in every case of delay, per se, the Court would decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the party to the lis can otherwise be granted relief in accordance with law. This has to be decided keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a given case. [Para H 73] [314-G]

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 221 STATE OF U.P. & ANR.

6.3 Undisputedly in the intervening period of nearly ten years, the acquired areas have fully developed. During the course of hearing the award was finally made by the authorities on 9th June, 2008 and has been accepted by nearly 97 .6 per cent of the owners whose lands were acquired vide the said Notification. Nearly all land owners have accepted the award and permitted the development activity to be carried out. This conduct of the owners as a whole would again be a factor which would weigh against the grant of any relief to the appellants. Huge amounts of money and resources of the State, as well as c other bodies or persons have been invested on the development of this sector which is stated to be an industrial sector. It would be unjust and unfair to uproot such a developed sector on the plea raised by the appellants. There is no merit in the contentions of law 0 raised by the appellants. Even on equity, the appellants has no case. [Paras 74 and 75] [314-H; 315-A-C]

Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. L. Chandrasekaran (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. (2010) 2 SCC 786; AS. Naidu v. State of Tamil Nadu (2010) 2 SCC 801 - relied on. E

6.4 These authorities are instrumentalities of the State and the officers are empowered to exercise the power on behalf of the State~ Such exercise of power attains greater significance when it arises from the statutory provisions. F The level of expectation of timely and just performance of duty is higher, as compared to the cases where the power is executively exercised in discharge of its regular business. Thus, all administrative norms and principles of fair performance are applicable to them with equal G force, as they are to the Government department, if not with a greater rigour. [Para 77] [320-F-G] Centre for Public Interest Litigation and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. (2005) 8 SCC 202 - referred to. H

222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A 6.5 The doctrine of 'full faith and credit' applies to the acts done by the officers in the hierarchy of the State. There is a presumptive evidence of regularity in official acts, done or performed, and there should be faithful discharge of duties to elongate public purpose in B accordance with the procedure prescribed. Avoidance and delay in decision making process in Government hierarchy is a matter of growing concern. Sometimes delayed decisions can cause prejudice to the rights of the parties besides there being violation of the statutory c rule. [Para 79] [321-F-H] State of Bihar v. Subhash Singh (1997) 4 SCC 430; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Food Corporation of India (2004) 13 sec 53 - referred to.

D 6.6 The concept of public accountability and performance of functions takes in :ts ambit, proper and timely action in accordance with law. Public duty and public obligation both are essentials of good administration whether by the State or its instrumentalities. Principles of public trust and pubic · accountability are applicable to such officers/officials with all their rigour. Greater the power to decide, higher is the responsibility to be just and fair. The dimensions of administrative law permit judicial intervention in decisions, though of administrative nature, which are ex facie discriminatory. The adverse impact of lack of probity in discharge of public duties can result in varied defects, not only in the decision making process but in the final decision as well. Every officer in the hierarchy of the State, G by virtue of his being 'public officer' or 'public servant', is accountable for his decisions to the public as well as to the State. This concept of dual responsibility should be applied with its rigours in the larger public interest and for proper governance. [Paras 78 and 80] [321-C; 322-8- .H D]

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 223 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. 6.7 Repeated default on the part of the Government A Departments is causing undue inconvenience, harassment, hardship and ultimately resulting in the acquisition itself being inequitable against the land owners/persons interested therein. In the normal course and as per the requirements of the provisions of Section B 17(3A) read with Section 17(1 ), 80 per cent of the estimated compensation ought to have been paid to the owners of the land/persons interested, within that period prior to taking possession and/or, in any case, within a very limited and reasonable time. To do things within a c reasonable time is an obligation of the State, as is imposed by the Legislature itself and even otherwise as per the canons of proper governance, i.e., vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, which means the laws assist those who are vigilant, not those who sleep 0 over their rights. According to Respondent No.2, they had deposited 10 per cent of the estimated compensation prior to iss1:1ance of notification under Section 4, i.e., 17th April, 2002 and 70 per cent of the amount was deposited with the Government on 8/14th July, 2002 by a cheque. The amount deposited was nearly Rs. 6,66,00,000/· and odd. The amount was made available to the Government and its authorities for disbursement to the owner/ claimants prior to (or soon after) taking of the possession but still the claimants were deprived of their legitimate dues until passing of the award, without any justification or reason. It was also the duty of respondent No.2 to ensure that the payments were made to the claimants prior to taking of possession but, in any case, it was an unequivocal statutory obligation on the part of the State/ Collector to ensure that the payments were made to the claimants in terms of Section 17(1) read with Section 17(3A) prior to taking of possession. There is no justification, whatsoever, for the Government, for such an intentional default and the casual attitude of the concerned officers/officials in the State hierarchy that H

224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A despite deposit by the beneficiary, not to pay 80 per cent of the estimated compensation due to the claimants within the requisite time and not even within the reasonable time. It was breach of statutory and governance obligation of the State's officers/officials to B pay the amount to the claimants after more than five years. It is expected of the State officers not to forget that these are compulsory acquisitions in exercise of State's power of eminent domain and the legislative intent behind providing safeguards and some benefits against such c acquisition ought not to be frustrated by inaction and omissions on the part of the officers/officials. [Paras 76 and 81] [319-D-H; 320-A-D; 322-E-G]

7. To ensure the maintenance of balance between the might of the State on the one hand and the rights of land owners on the other, the following directions are issued:

(i) The Government/acquiring authority shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 15 per cent per· annum with reference to or alike the provisions of Section 34 of the Act, after the expiry of 15 days from issuance of Notification under Section 9(1) of the Act, and from the date on which the possession of the land is taken, till the amount of 80 per cent of the estimated compensation is paid to the claimants. The Government is also liable to pay interest as afore- indicated on the balance amount determined upon making of an award in accordance with Section 11 of the Act. G (ii) The Central Government and all the State Governments shall issue appropriate and uniform guidelines, to ensure that the land owners and the persons interested in the lands acquired by the State or its instrumentalities are not put to any undue harassment, hardship and inequity because of

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. · 225 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. inaction and omission on the. part of the acquiring authority, in cases of urgent acquisition, in exercise of its powers of eminent domain under Section 17 of the Act. The ~overnment should ensure timely action for. acquisition and payment of compensation in terms of Section 17(3A) of the Act. B

(iii) The concerned Government shall take appropriate disciplinary action against the erring officers/officials including making good the loss caused to the Government revenue on account of the liabilities towards interest or otherwise, because of such undue delay on the part of such officers/ officials;

(iv) The claimants would be entitled to the cost of ' 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) which shall be deposited at the first instance by the State . Government of Uttar Pradesh and then would be recovered from the sala_ries of the defaulting/erring officers/officials in accordance with law. [Para 83 and 84) [325-A-H; 326-A-E] E Case Law Reference: Per Ganguly, J. (1978) 1 sec 248 Referred to Para 24, 29,30, F 31, 43 405 us 538 Referred to Para 26 AIR 1950 SC 27 Referred to Para 29 (1970) 1 sec 248 Referred to Para 32, 43 G AIR 1989 SC 38 Referred to Para 38 1936 (2) AER 905 Referred to Para 39 AIR 1971 SC 530 Referred to Para 40 · H

226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A (2002) 3 sec 533 Referred to Para 41 AIR 1993 SC 2517 Per incuriam Para 43, 72 73. JT 2011 (3) SC 102 Referred to Para 44 (1957) 1 AER 49 Referred to Para 49 8 (1977) 4 sec 193 Referred to Para 51

(1839) 4 Myl & Cr.116 Referred to Para 54 ILR 44 Cal 328 Referred to Para 55 c (1887) 12 App. Cas. 602 Referred to Para 57

27 Vt. 39 Referred to Para 61 AIR 1969 SC 267 Referred to Para 64 D AIR 1936 PC 253 Referred to Para 64 (2005) 1 sec 627 Referred to Para 64 (2001) 6 sec 81 Referred to Para 64

E 1995 Suppl (1) sec 596 Referred to Para 65 (2001) 8 sec 105 Referred to Para 68 (1978) 1 sec 248 Relied on Para 69 AIR 1971 SC 530 Referred to Para 71 F Per Swatanter Kumar, J:

(1993) 4 sec 369 Referred to Para 1 (2011) 3 sec 139 Referred to Para 1 G (2009) 1o sec 689 Referred to Para 1 2011 (5) SCALE 173 Referred to Para 1 (2008) 1 sec 128 Referred to Para 13 H

DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. v. 227 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. (2010) 13 sec 98 Referred to Para 17 A 1963(1) WLR 270 Referred to Para 22 (1964) 1 QB 481 Referred to Para 22 AIR 1961 SC 1480 Referred to Para 23 B (2005) 1 sec 621 Referred to Para 26 1991 (1) DRJ (Suppl.) 317 Referred to Para 33 (2004) 8 sec 453 Referred to Para 34 c (2009) 10 sec 689 Referred to Para 35 ' (1996) 3 sec 1 Referred to Para 36 (201 O) 9 sec 46 Referred to Para 37 D c2001) 9 sec 431 Referred to Para 45 (1995) 6 sec 31 Referred to Para 47 (1994) 5 sec 486 Referred to Para 48 E (1996) 6 sec 424 Referred to Para 48 2011 (5) SCALE 173 Referred to Para 49 (1991) 4 sec 531 Referred to Para 50 F (2011) 3 sec 139 Referred to Para 54 (1970) 2 sec 149 Referred to Para 56 (1993) 2 sec 84 Referred to Para 57 (1996) 3 sec 600 Referred to Para 58 G (2005) 12 sec 5os Referred to Para 59 (2009) s sec 339 Referred to Para 60 (1996) 3 sec 124 Referred to Para 61 H

228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A (1970) 1 sec 125 Referred to Para 68

(2010) 2 sec 786 Referred to Para 74

(201 O) 2 sec 801 Referred to Para 74

(2005) 8 sec 202 Referred to Para 78 B (2004) 13 sec 53 Referred to Para 79

CIVIL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 24 of 2009. c From the Judgment & Order dated 28.08.2006 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabd in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22251 of 2006.

Sudhir Chadra, Arun K. Sinha, Siddhant Asthana, Rakesh o Singh, Sumit Sinha, Dharmesh Misra for the Appellants.

S.R. Singh, S.K. Dwivedi, Manoj K. Dwivedi, G.V. Venkateswara Rao, Ravindra Kumar for the Respondents.