PRATAP CHANDRA MEHTA v. STATE BAR COUNCIL OF M.P. & ORS.

A of policy. In the American Political Dictionary the right of recall is defined as, 'a provision enabling voters to remove an elected official from office before his or her term expired'. American Jurisprudence explains it thus, 'Recall is a proced·ure by which an elected officer may be B removed at any time during his term or after a specified time by vote of the people at an election called for such purpose by a specified number of citizens'. It was urged that 'recall gives dissatisfied electors the right to propose between elections that their representatives be removed c and replaced by another more in accordance with popular will' therefore the appellant could have been recalled by the same body, namely, the people who elected him. Urged Shri Sunil Gupta, learned counsel, that since, 'A referendum involves a decision by the electorate without the intermediary of representatives and, therefore, exhibits D form of direct democracy' the removal of the appellant by a vote of no-confidence by the Board which did not elect him was subversive of basic concept of democracy. Academically the submission appeared attractive but applied as a matter of law it appears to have little merit. E None of the political theorists, on whom reliance was placed, have gone to sugges~ that an elected representative can be recalled, only, by the persons or body that elected him. Recall expresses the idea that a "public officer is indeed a 'servant of the people' and can therefore be dismissed by them". In modern political set up direct popular check by recall of elected representative has been universally acknowledged in any civilised system. Efficacy of such a device can hardly admit of any doubt. But how it should be initiated, what should be the procedure, who should exercise it within ambit of constitutionally permissible limits falls in the domain of legislative power. 'Under a constitutional provision authorizing municipalities of a certain population to frame a charter for their own government consistent with and ·.,.· H subject to the Constitution and laws of the State, and a

PRATAP CHANDRA MEHTA v. STATE BAR COUNCIL1005 OF M.P. & ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.)

statutory provision that in certain municipalities the Mayor A and members of the municipal council shall be elected at the time, in the manner, and for the term prescribed in the charter, a municipal corporation has authority to enact a recall provision'. Therefore, the validity or otherwise of a no-confidence motion for removal of a President, would B have to be examined on applicability of statutory provision and not on political phjlosophy. The Municipality Act provides in detail the provisions for election of President, his qualification, resignation, removal etc. Constitutional validity of these provisions was not challenged, and rightly, c as they do not militate, either, against the concept of democracy or the method of electing or removing the representatives. The recall of an elected representative therefore, so long it is in accordance with law cannot be assailed on abstract notions of democracy. D

7. Value of 'historical evolution' of a provision or 'reference to what preceded the enactment'-as an external aid to understand and appreciate the meaning of a provision, its ambit or expanse has been judicially recognised and textually recommended. But this aid to construe any E • provision which is 'extremely hazardous' should be resorted to, only, if any doubt arises ·about the scope of the section or it is found to be 'sufficiently difficult and ambiguous to justify the construction of its evaluation in the statute book as a proper and logical course and secondly the object of the instant enquiry' should be 'to ascertain the true meaning of that part of the section which remains as it was and which there is no ground for thinking the substitution of a new proviso was intended to alter'. But 'considerations stemming from legislative history must not, however, override the plain words of a statute'. Neither Section 47-A nor 87-A on plain reading suffer from such defect as may necessitate ascertaining their intent and purpose from the earlier sections as they stood. That shall be clear when relevant part of the sections are extracted. H

1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2011] 11 S.C.R.

A But even otherwise there appears no merit in the submission and for that purpose it appears appropriate to narrate, in brief, the history of these sections. When Act 2 of 1916 was enacted it provided for election of Chairman of the Board by a special resolution passed by the B members under Section 43(1) of the Act. Sub-section (2) provided for ex-officio nomination by the Government of the Chairman in some municipalities. Section 48 empowered the Government to remove a Chairman after hearing and giving reasons. It did not contain any provision for removal c of a Chairman by a vote of no-confidence. Ten years later Act 2 of 1926 brought about a very significant change in the Act by introducing Section 47-A and conferring power of removal of Chairman, other than ex-officio, by the members of the Board by expressing a vote of no- confidence against him. Section 48, too, was amended D and a Chairman who failed to resign after a vote of no- confidence was liable to be removed, by the State Government. Thus it was as far back as 1926 that removal of the Chairman by elected representative found its way in the Act. In 1933 by Act No. 9 another important Section E 87-A was added providing for tabling of no-confidence motion against the Chairman. In 1942 Section 47-A was omitted as the provision for resigning by the Chairman was provided for in Section 87-A itself. And hearing of the Chairman by State Government under Section 48 before removal in consequence of vote of no-confidence was deleted. Act 7 of 1949 introduced major changes in Sections 43 and 47-A, of the Act. Section 43 was substituted altogether and, it for the first time, provided for election of the Chairman simultaneously with members of the Board by the electorate directly. Section 47-A which had been omitted by Act 13 of 1942 was reintroduced and a Chairman against whom a vote of no-confidence was passed was required to resign. In the alternative he was permitted to recommend to State Government that the H Board itself may be dissolved. And if the State

PRATAP CHANDRA MEHTA v. STATE BAR COUNCIL1007 OF M.P. & ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

Government agreed with the President then it was the A Board which was to go.· The intention apparently was to keep a check on the power of Board, too, while taking action against the Chairman as if it was found that exercise of power by the Board was arbitrary and President was being removed for extraneous reasons then the B Government could interfere and direct dissolution of the Board itself. Both the sections were amended once again in 1955 and by Act 1 the election of Chairman, known now as President, by the members of the Board was reintroduced, as, 'The experience of the working of the c Boards since their constitution at the last general elections has generally been one of continuing conflict between Presidents elected by the popular vote on the one hand and the members on the other. This has greatly prejudiced the normal working of the Boards'. Section 47-A of the Act 0 was substituted completely and it is in this shape that the section stands today. Section 43.(1) was amended, once again, by Act 47 of 1976 and election of President by electorate was revived. In 1982 another change was made in this section by Act 17 and election of President by the members of Board was confined to municipalities other than a city declared as such under Section 3 having a population of less than one lakh inhabitants. Sub-section (2) provided for election of President of Board of such a City Municipality by the electorate directly. From 1982 onwards, therefore, the direct election of President by the electorate is confined to smaller Municipalities.

10. Even the strained construction of the proviso does not result in coming to the conclusion that there was a legislative omission of not providing for removal, by vote of no-confidence of a President elected by the electors. Merely because the proviso to Section 47-A prevents a Board from holding election of the President in those cases where he had ma~e_..-representation to the Government to supersede __.,,,/ the Board, it cannot be H

1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 11 S.C.R.

A stretched to mean that sub-section (a) of Section 47-A cannot apply to a President elected under Section 43(2). The proviso is intended as check to prevent the Board from taking any step which may render the represent;:ition made by the President infructuous as if the Government accepts B the representation then it is the Board under sub-section (3) which stands dissolved and not the President. That situation may not arise in election of a President under Section 43(2) as election of President by electors cannot take place immediately, therefore, there is no danger c involved, of putting at naught the representation made by the President to State Government, as is in the case of Section 43(1). The proviso cannot be so construed as to nullify the operation of Section 47 2DA to a President elected by electorate. A proviso or an exception is incapable of controlling the operation of principal clause. D Result of such construction would lead to absurdity as if Section 47-A is held not to apply to President elected under Section 43(2) he will not be liable to resign even though a vote of no-confidence has been passed against him under Section 87-A and it has been communicated to him. Merely because the proviso cannot apply to one of the situations that may arise cannot be reason to hold that Section 47-A(1)(a) did not apply to President elected by the electorate. 'If the language of the enacted part of the statute does not contain provision which are said to occur on it, you cannot derive those provisions by implication from a proviso'. Proviso could be used for adopting a construction as suggested either when there was some doubt about the scope of the section or there would have been at least some reasonable doubt about accepting one or the other construction as became necessary in Jennings v. Kelly on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for appellant.

38Copy pinpoint38. 'Election' is an expression of wide connotation which embraces the whole procedure of election and is not confined

PRATAP CHANDRA MEHTA v. STATE BAR COUNCIL1009 OF M.P. & ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

to final result thereof. Rejection or acceptance of nomination paper is included in this term. This Court, in the case of N.P. Ponnuswami v. returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency [AIR (39) 1952 SC 64) held that the word 'election' has been used in Part XV of the Constitution in a broad sense, that is to say, to connote the entire procedure to be followed to return a B candidate to the legislature and even the expression 'conduct of elections' in Article 324 specifically points to this wide meaning and the meaning which can be read consistently into other provisions occurring in the Constitution. In this case, the election process as contemplated under the relevant laws is that c the members of a State Bar Council are elected by the electorate of advocates on the rolls of the State Bar Council from amongst the electorate itself. The elected members then elect a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and the Treasurer of the State Bar Council as well as constitute various committees for 0 carrying out different purposes under the provisions _of the Advocates Act.

39~ In other words, the body which elects the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of a State Bar Council always consists of members elected to that Council. T.fte. democratic prinCiples E would require that a person who attains the position of a Chairman or Vice-Chairman, as the case may be, could be removed by the same electorate or smaller body which elected them to that position by taking recourse to a 'no confidence motion' and in accordance with the Rules. The body that elects F a person to. su6h a position would and ought to have the right to oust him/her from that post, in the event the majority members of the body do not support the said person at that time. Even if, for the sake of argument, it is taken that this may not be generally true, the provisions of Rule 122-A of the M.P. Rules G make it clear, beyond doubt, that a 'no confidence motion' can be brought against the elected Chairman provided the conditions stated in the said Rules are satisfied. As already noticed, the thrust of the challenge to the vir~ of Rule 122-A is primarily that Section 15 of the Advocates Act does not H

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A. contemplate the framing of such a Rule by the State Bar Councils. Rule 122-A is stated to be ultra vires Section 15 of the Advocates Act and, it is argued, that the introduction of such provision suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. Section 15 of the Advocates Act empowers the State Bar Councils to frame Rules to carry out the purposes of this Chapter. 'This Chapter' obviously means Chapter II of the Act. Let us examine what Chapter II contains. Section 3 requires the constitution of the State Bar Councils. Section 3(3) contemplates that there shall be a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman of each State Bar c Council elected by the State Bar Council in such manner as may be prescribed. As already noticed above, another important provision is Section 6 of the Act, which details the functions to be performed by the State Bar Councils. lhter a/ia, the functions to be performed by the State Bar Councils include, under Sections 6(1)(d), to safeguard the rights, privileges and 0 interests of the advocates on its roll. Under Section 6(1 )(g), the function of the Bar Council is to provide for the election of its members and under Sections 6(1)(h) and 6(1)(i), the State Bar Council has to perform all other functions conferred on it by or under this Act and to do all other things necessary for E discharging the aforesaid functions. In our view, Sections 6(1 )(h) and 6(1)(i) have to be read and interpreted conjointly. We see no reason why the expression 'manner of election of its members' in Section 6( 1)(g) should be given a restricted meaning, particularly in light of Sections 6(1 )(h) and 6(1 )(i). The F responsibility of the State Bar Councils to perform functions as per the legislative mandate contained in Section 6 of the Act is of a very wide connotation and scope. No purpose would be achieved by giving it a restricted meaning or by a strict interpretation. The State Bar Council has to be given wide jurisdiction to frame rules so as to perform its functions diligently and perfectly and to do all things necessary for discharging its functions under the Act. The term of office of the members of the State Bar Council is also prescribed under Chapter II, which shall be five years from the date of publication of the result of the election. On failure to provide for election, the Bar Council

PRATAP CHANDRA MEHTA v. STATE BAR COUNCIL1011 -OF M.P. & ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

of India has to constitute a special committee to do so instead. A Section 15(2) then provides that without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers, rules may be framed to provide for the preparation of electoral rolls and the manner in which the result shall be published. In terms of Section 15(2)(c), the manner of the election of the Chairman and the Vice- B Chairman of the Bar .council and appointment of authorities which would decide any electoral disputes is provided. The expression 'manner of election of the Chairman' again is an expression which needs to be construed in its wide connotation. The rules so framed by the State Bar Council shall become c effective only when approved by the Bar Council of India in terms of Section 15(3) of the Advocates Act.

40Copy pinpoint40. The power of the State Bar Council to frame rules under Section 15 of the Advocates Act as a delegate of the Bar Council of India has to be construed along with the other D . provisions of the Advocates Act, keeping in mind the object sought to be achieved by this Act. In this regard, greater emphasis is to be attached to the statutory provisions and to the other purposes stated by the legislature under the provisions of Chapter II of the Advocates Act. This is an Act which has been enacted with the object of preparing a common roll of advocates, integrating the profession into one single class of legal practitioners, providing uniformity in classification and creating autonomous Bar Councils in each State and one for !he whole of India. The functioning of the State Bar Council is to be carried out by an elected body of members and by the office-bearers who have, in turn, been elected by these elected members of the said Council. The legislative intent derived with the above stated objects of the Act should be achieved and there should be complete and free democratic functioning in G !-he State and All India Bar Councils. The power to frame rules has to be given a wider scope, rather than a restrictive approach so as to render the legislative object achievable. The functions to be performed by the Bar Councils and the manner in which these functions are to be performed suggest that H

1012 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 11 S.C.R.

A democratic standards both in the election process and in performance of all its functions and standards of profesS'ional conduct which need to be adhered to. In other words, the interpretation furthering the object and purposes of the Act has to be preferred in comparison to an interpretation which would B frustrate the same and endanger the democratic principles guiding the governance and conduct of the State Bar Councils. The provisions of the Advocates Act are a source of power for the State Bar Council to frame rules and it will not be in consonance with the principles of law to give that power a strict c interpretation, unless restricted in scope by specific language. This is particularly so when the provisions delegating such power are of generic nature, such as Section 15(1) of the Act, which requires the Bar Councils to frame rules to 'carry out the purposes of this Chapter' and Section 15(2), which further uses generic terms and expressly states that the Bar Council is empowered to frame rules 'iri particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers'. If one reads the provisions..of clauses (a), (c), (g), (h) and (i) of Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act, then, it is clear that framing of rules - thereunder would guide and control the conduct or business of the State Bar Councils and ensure maintenance of the standards of democratic governance in the said Councils. Since the office bearers like the Chairman and the Vice- Chairman are elected by a representative body i.e. by the advocates who are the elected members of the Council, on the basis of the confidence bestowed by the advocates/electorate in the elected members, there seems to be no reason why that very elected body cannot move a 'no confidence motion' against such office bearers, particularly, when the rules so permit. G

41Copy pinpoint41. The Bar Council of India, as already noticed, has also framed rules and permitted moving of 'no confidence motion' against its ChairmanNice~Chairman subject to compliance of the conditions stated therein. Similarly, Rule 122-A of the M.P. H Rules con~emplates the removal of a ChairmanNice-Chairman

PRATAP CHANDRA MEHTA v. STATE BAR COUNCIL 1013

OF M.P. & ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

by a motion of no confidence, passed by a specific majority of the members and subject to satisfaction of the conditions stated therein. This provision, thus, can neither be termed as vesting arbitrary powers in the elected body, nor can it be said to be suffering from the vice of excessive delegation. The power delegated to the elected body is within the framework of the principal Act, i.e., Section 15, read with the other provisions, of the Advocates Act. In terms of Rule 120 of the M.P. Rules, a person can be elected as ChairmanNice-Chairman only by majority and in case there is a tie, the election shall be decided by drawing of lots. Under Rule 118 of the M.P. Rules a c ChairmanNice-Chairman has to be elected from amongst its members for two years. In other words, the term of office of the ChairmanNice-Chairman is controlled by the fact that he has to be elected to that particular office. The removal contemplated under Rule 122-A is not founded on a disciplinary action but is 0 merely a 'no confidence motion'. It is only the loss of confidence simpliciter i.e. the majority of the members considering, in their wisdom, that the elected ChairmanNice-Chairman should not be permitted to continue to hold that office, which is the very basis for such removal. One must remember that Rules 118 to 122-B all come within Chapter XVIII of the M.P. Rules and, as E such, have to be examined collectively. But for this Chapter, it cannot be even anticipated as to who and how the offiee of the ChairmanNice-Chairman of the State Bar Council shall be appointed. F

42Copy pinpoint42. Now, let us examine some judgments to substantiate what we have aforestated. In the case ·of General Officer Commanding-in-Chief v. Subhash Chandra Yadav [(1988) 2 SCC 351], this Court stated the principle that the rules framed under the provisions of a statute form part of the statute, i.e., G the rules have statutory force. But a rule can have the effect of a statutory provision provided it satisfies two conditions: (1) it must conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is framed; and (2) it must also come within the scope and purview H

1014 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 11 S.C.R.

A of the rule making power of the statutory authority framing the rule.

43Copy pinpoint43. In the case of Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of H.P. [(2000) 3 sec 40], this Court noticed that it is very common for the legislature to provide general rule making power to carry 8 out the purposes of the Act. When such a power is given, it may be permissible to find out the object of the enactment and then see if the rules framed thereunder satisfy this test of functionality. This test will determine if the rule falls foul of such general power conferred on the delegatee. If the rule making C power is expressed in usual general form, then it has to be seen if the rules made are protected by the limits prescribed by the parent Act. Still in the case of Global Energy Ltd. v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission [(2009) 15 SCC 570), this Court was concerned with the validity of clauses (b) and (f) of D Regulation 6-A of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Procedure, Terms and Conditions for Grant of Trading Licence and other Related Matters) Regulations, 2004 and dealing with this aspect, the Cot1rt expressed the view that in some cases guidelines could be assumed, by necessary E implication, as already laid down and, while relying upon the case of Kunj Behari Lal BiJtail (supra), the Court held as under:

"26. We may, in this connection refer to a decision of this Court in Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of H.P.1 wherein F a three-Judge Bench of this Court held as under: (SCC p. 47, para 14)

"14. We are also of the opinion that a delegated power to legislate by making rules 'for carrying out the purposes of the Act' is a general delegation without laying G down any guidelines; it cannot be so exercised as to bring into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions of the Act itself."

H 27. The power of the regulation-making authority, thus, must

PRATAP CHANDRA MEHTA v. STATE BAR COUNCIL1015 OF M.P. & ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

be interpreted keeping in view the provisions of the Act. A The Act is silent as regards conditions for grant of licence. It does not lay down any pre-qualifications therefor. Provisions for imposition of general conditions of licence or conditions laying down the pre-qualifications therefor and/or the conditions/qualifications for grant or revocation B of licence, in absence of such a clear provision may be held to be laying down guidelines by necessary implication providing for conditions/qualifications for grant of licence also."

44Copy pinpoint44. The above enunciated principles clearly .show that the c language of the statute has to be examined before giving a provision an extensive meaning. The Court would be justified in giving the provision a purposive construction to perpetuate the object of the Act, while ensuring that such rules framed are within the field circumscribed by the parent Act. It is also clear D that it may not always be absolutely necessary to spell out guidelines for delegated legislation, when discretion is vested ·in such delegatee bodies. In such cases, the language of the rule framed as well as the purpose sought to be achieved, would be the relevant factors to be considered by the Court. In E the present case, the minimum guidelines of secrecy and fairness in election have been provided in Part IX of the Rules, which have been framed in exercise of the supervisory powers under Sections 49(1 )(a), 49(1 )(i) and 49(1 )0) of the Advocates Act. Further, clause (5) of this Part even extends to the State F Bar Councils the power to independently resolve all election disputes through tribunals constituted for this purpose. Therefore, the powers delegated have an in-built element of guidance that the ChairmanNice-Chairman will be appointed and regulated by the majority members of the State Bar Council. G Their conduct, and the conduct of the State Bar Council as a whole, is to be maintained in consonance with democratic principles and keeping the high professional standards of advocates in mind. Thus, it is not a power which falls beyond the purview and scope of Section 15 of the Advocates Act read H

1016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 11 S.C.R.

A in conjunction with other provisions, particularly Chapter II and also keeping in view the object of the Act.

45Copy pinpoint45. Purposive construction, to a large extent, would help to resolve the controversy raised in the present case. The B purpose of the Advocates Act is the democratic and harmonious functioning of the State Bar Councils, to achieve the object and purposes of the Act. We are unable to see how the provisions of Rule 122-A fall foul of the ambit and scope of Section .,15 of the Advocates Act and, for that matter, any other provisions of that Act. On the contrary, they are in line with the scheme of the parent Act.

46Copy pinpoint46. Having dealt with the primary aspect of this case, now we would consider the contention that the recall of the ChairmanNice-Chairman, by a smaller and distinct body of members of the State Bar Council, does not fall within the purview of the authority of the delegatee Council, under Section 15(2)(c) of the Advocates Act, i.e. to legislate on 'the manner of election'. Even on this ground, according to the appellants, the provisions of Rule 122-A are unsustainable. We find no merit in this contention as well as it has no substance. The election to the post of ChairmanNice-Chairman of the State Bar Council is not by the larger body, i.e., the advocates enrolled on the rolls of the State Bar Council, but is by a distinct body, i.e. elected members of the State Bar Council. Once they elect the ChairmanNice-Chairman of the State Bar Council as per the scheme of Rules 118 to 123, then all actions taken by such body would have to be accepted by all concerned as correct, if they are within the domain of the rules governing such body. We do not consider it necessary to deliberate on this issue in any greater detail. Suffice it to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Mohan Lal Tripathi (supra), where the Court was concerned with an elected candidate, who, in terms of the statute, was elected by a larger electorate and was recalled by smaller representative body rather than by the electorate itself. Similar arguments were raised that the recall was violative of H

PRATAP CHANDRA MEHTA v. STATE BAR COUNCIL1017 OF M.P. & ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

the spirit and purpose of the election and was arbitrary, A irrational and violative of the democratic norms. These arguments were rejected by the Court, after detailed deliberation and examining the fields of democratic norms. We have already referred in paragraph 37 of this judgment, the relevant parts of the said discussion. B

47Copy pinpoint47. Similarly, in the case of Ram Beti v. District Panchyat Raj Adhikari ((1998) 1 SCC 680], the Court was dealing with a situation where a Pradhan of the Panchayat was removed by the Gram Panchayat, a smaller body, instead of removal by C the Gram Sabha which had elected him. They questioned the validity of Section 14 of the U.P. Panchayati Raj, Act, 1947. The Court, while rejecting the contentions, as are even being raised before us in the present case, held as under:

"6 .... It is no doubt true that under Section 11 (1) of the Act D provision is made for holding of two general meetings of the Gram Sabha in each year as well as for requisitioning of a meeting by one-fifth of the members. But the legislature, in its wisdom, thought it proper that the matter of removal of a Pradhan, instead of being considered at E the meeting of the Gram Sabha, should be considered by the members of the Gram Panchayat. The considerations which weighed with this Court for upholding the validity of sub-section (2) of Section 87-A of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 relating to the removal of the President of a F Municipal Board in Mohan Lal Tripathi are, in our opinion, also applicable to the removal of the Pradhan of the Gram Sabha. Although under Section 14 of the Act the power of removal of a Pradhan is conferred on the members of the Gram Panchayat, which is a smaller body than the Gram G Sabha, but the members of the Gram Pancyhayat, having been elected by the members of the Gram Sabha, represent the same electorate which has elected the Pradhan. The.removal of a Pradhan by two-third members of the Gram Sabha through their representatives. Just as H

1018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 11 S.C.R.

A the Municipal Board is visualized as a body entrusted with the responsibility to keep a watch on the President, whether elected by it or by the electorate, so also the Gram Panchayat is visualized as a body entrusted with the responsibility to keep a watch on the Pradhan who is not B elected by it and is elected by the members of the Gram Sabha. An arbitrary functioning of a Pradhan is disregard of the statute or his acting contrary to the interests of the electorate could be known to the members of the Gram Panchayat only and, in the circumstances, it is but proper c that the members of the Gram Panchayat are empowered to take action for removal of the Pradhan, if necessary. It is no doubt true that in Section 11 of the Act provision is made for holding two general meetings of the Gram Sabha in each year and for requisitioning of a meeting of the Gram Sabha by one-fifth of its members. But, at the same time, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the number of members of the Gram Sabha is also fairly large. It would range from one thousand to more than three thousand. Elections to public offices even at village level give rise to sharp polarization of the electorate on caste or communal basis. The possibility of disturbance of law and order in a meeting of the Gram Sabha called for considering a motion for removal of the Pradhan cannot be excluded. Moreover, there cannot also be due deliberation of a serious matter as no-confidence motion by a very large body of persons. While amending Section 14 of the Act so as to confer the power to remove the Pradhan of a Gram Sabha on the members of the Gram Panchayat the legislature must have taken into consideration the prevailing social environment. Moreover, by way of safeguard against any arbitrary exercise of the power of removal it is necessary that the motion must be passed by a majority of /wo-thirds of the members present and voting. ·

H 7. For the reasons aforementioned we are unable to hold

PRATAP CHANDRA MEHTA v. STATE BAR COUNCIL 1019

OF M.P. & ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

that Section 14 of the Act, insofar as it empowers the members of the Gram Panchayat to remove the Pradhan of a Gram Sabha by. moving a motion of no confidence, is unconstitutional and void being violative of the concept of democracy or is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution." B

48Copy pinpoint48. For the reasons aforestated, as well as the reasons recorded in the above reproduced judgments, which, with respect, we adopt, we have no hesitation in rejecting this contention of the appellants. c · 49. The next argument that was raised on behalf of the appellants is that, in view of Rule 15 of Chapter V of the M.P. Rules, the State Bar Council is debarred from re-considering the same matter for a period of three months, and as such, the decision passing 'no confidence motion' is vitiated because of o the limitation contained in the said Rule. Rule 15 of Chapter V reads as under:

"No matter once decided shall be reconsidered for a period of three months unless the Council by a two-third majority of the members present, so permits." E

50Copy pinpoint50. Though the language of the above Rule clearly shows that no matter once decided shall be reconsidered for a period of three months but clearly makes an exception that wherever 2/3rd majority of the members present of the State Bar Council F permits, this bar will not operate. In other wqrds, there is no absolute bar and the Rule makes out an exception when the matters could be reconsidered. But that is not the situation in the present case. The first pre-requisite under this rule is that matter should be 'once decided', and then alone, the bar of re- G .consideration would operate; that too depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. 'Once decided' obviously means the matter should be concluded or finally decided in contradistinction of being 'kept pending' or 'deferred'. H

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A Therefore, we must now examine, whether the matter in relation to 'no confidence motion' had been finally decided at any point of time before the date on which the 'no confidence motion' is stated to have been passed. This also we are proceeding to consider on the assumption that the matter related to 'no confidence motion', for the sake of arguments, would be covered under Rule 15 of the M.P. Rules.

51Copy pinpoint51. After issuance of a notice in accordance with the M.P. Rules, admittedly, the 15th Meeting of the General Body of the State Bar Council was held on 27th March, 2011 at Jabalpur, C during which two requisitions were made: one, relating to a 'no confidence motion' against the ChairmanNice-Chairman, and second, that there should be re-election of the Committees. In the minutes, it was also stated that the Chairman/Vice- Chairman had offered their resignation subject to withdrawal D of 'no confidence motion'. There were discussions on this matter and it was resolved that the agenda of the meeting would be circulated on the same day itself, by post, to all the members of the State Bar Council, whether present at the meeting or not and the next meeting would be held on 16th E April, 2011 at Jabalpur. These notices were issued and as decided the meeting was held on 16th April, 2011. During the course of the meeting on 16th April 2011, some of the members left the meeting, the Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh presided over the continuation of the meeting and the 'no confidence motion' was passed on the same day. Of course, there is some dispute with regard to the recording of the minutes of this meeting. We have already reproduced the minutes which were recorded by the respective parties. We are not very inclined to rely upon the minutes produced by the appellants, inasmuch as they are not signed by all the members present and voting. Even if, for the sake of arguments, we take that the minutes produced by the appellants are correct, then it must follow that both the meetings took place on 16th April, 2011. However, it is obvious from the record that in the 15th meeting of the General Body held on 27th March, 2011, no final decision

PRATAP CHANDRA MEHTA v. STATE BAR COUNCIL1021 OF M.P. & ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

had been taken and it was decided to circulate the minutes and other papers of the meeting to all members.

52Copy pinpoint52. Another ancillary argument to the above is that by virtue of the bar under Rule 15 of the M.P. Rules, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman were elected to their respective posts in B February 2011 and, as such, the election itself was a 'decision' which was incapable of being reconsidered and revised in the meetings of March and April, 2011. According to the appellants, the limitation contained in Rule 15 of the M.P. Rules shall vitiate the decision of passing a 'no confidence motion'. This argument is also misconceived in law and on the facts of the present case. Election is not a 'decision' as contemplated under Rule 15 of the M.P. Rules. It is not a matter on which the State Bar Council decides, as firstly, this matter falls within the discretion of individual advocates on the rolls of the State Bar Council to elect the representative members of the said Councils, and secondly it falls within the discretion of such elected representatives to elect a person as ChairmanNice-Chairman. It is not a 'decision' which relates to the matters as contemplated under the M.P. Rules. Passing of a 'no confidence motion' in law, therefore, cannot be termed as reconsideration of the decision taken.

53Copy pinpoint53. Once the Council is constituted in terms of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, then it has to take decisions in the role of a Council in relation to variou.s matters, including rejecting .or passing a 'no confidence motion'. This is even clear from the case-of Ram Beti (supra} wherein it was held that the smaller representative body is better equipped to make a recall decision and it has more information in its hands, to make such a recall decision. The decision is, therefore, substantially different in character from the election decision. A statutory bar may exist in this respect, in some cases, but in its absence, the Court cannot infer or imply a time bar on challenging the results of election as a feature of common law or general democratic principles. H

1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 11 S.C.R.

54Copy pinpoint54. Thus, the bar contemplated under Rule 15 of the M.P. Rules does not operate, on merits, when applied to the facts of the present case. Thus, we have no hesitation in rejecting this contention, raised by the appellants.

55Copy pinpoint55. It is also the contention of the appellants that the group supporting the Chairman/Vice-Chairman of the State Bar Council, in the meeting dated 16th April, 2011, had raised the issue that 'no confidence motion' and reconstitution of the committee could not be considered in view of the bar contained in Rule 15 of the M.P. Rules, in the form of 'a point of order' C against the requisition asked for by the other group. Firstly, we have already rejected the contention of the appellants that the matters were discussed and concluded, either through the February 2011 elections or in the 15th Meeting of the Council dated 27th March, 2011, as, according to the minutes, the D meeting had only been deferred for issuance of appropriate agenda and requisition notice to a!l the members present or not present. Treating it as a valid point of order, the Chairman had accepted the same and then he along with some members, had walked out of the meeting. E

56Copy pinpoint56. As indicated above, the meeting then was presided over by the Advocate General, Madhya Pradesh, whereafter the 'no confidence motion' was passed. We are unable to accept the approach adopted by the ChairmanNice-Chairman as, on the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, it ex facie was untenable and without any basis. It was the duty of the ChairmanNice-Chairman to face the 'no confidence motion', as they were elected office bearers and if they had lost the confidence of majority group which elected them to this post and a 'no confidence motion' had been moved against them in terms of Rule 122-A, they were expected to face the consequences thereof. This, alone, would have served the ends of democratic governance and proper functioning of the State Bar Council. Therefore, in our considered view, even on this issue, the appellants cannot succeed. · H

PRATAP CHANDRA MEHTA v. STATE BAR COUNCIL 1023

OF M.P. & ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

57Copy pinpoint57. Then it is contended that removal from an office is punitive. It being punitive, there has to be a just cause and adherence to the principles of natural justice by granting hearing before the removal from office is given effect to. To clarify, it is submitted that removal from an elected office, even in face of a valid rule, would have to meet these twin requirements of just cause and hearing, before a person can be removed from office. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, while relying upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Bar Council of Delhi v. Bar Council of India [AIR 1975 Del 200], contended that by application of the C General Clauses Act, 1897 even in absence of any specific provision, the right of persons to elect a ChairmanNice- Chairman would include the right to undo the same by moving a 'no confidence motion'.

58Copy pinpoint58. It needs to be noticed at the very threshold of consideration of this submission that 'no confidence motion' cannot be equated in law to removal relatable to a disciplinary action or as a censure. It is stricto senso not removal from office, but a removal resulting from loss of confidence. It is relatable to no confidence and is not removal relatable to the conduct or improper behaviour of the elected person. Even the concept of 'term' under the Rules, is referable to and is controlled by a super-imposed limitation of no confidence. This tenure cannot be compared to a statutory tenure as is commonly understood in the service jurisprudence. The distinction between removal by way of 'no confidence motion' and removal as a result of disciplinary action or censure is quite well accepted in law. They are incapable of being inter-changed in their application and must essentially operate in separate fields. The Court has always prioritized harmonious functioning of the G State Bar Council. In the case of Afjal Imam v. State of Bihar and others, [JT 2011 (5) 19], the recall of a Mayor and the re- election of a different Mayor in his place has been held to implicitly shorten the term of the appointees of the previous H

1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 11 S.C.R.

A Mayor, if such is in the interest of smooth functioning of the body.

59Copy pinpoint59. Noticing this distinction, a Bench of this Court in the case of Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot [(1974) 2 sec 706], while dealing with the question whether grounds for removal must necessarily be specified when 8 passing a motion of no confidence, noticed the differe11ce between 'no confidence motion' and a censure motion and described the same as follows:

"19 ..... lt does not, however, follow therefrom that the ground c must also be specified when a motion of no confidence is actually passed against a President. It is pertinent in this context to observe that there is a difference between a motion of no confidence and a censure motion. While it is necessary in the case of a censure motion to set out the ground or charge on which it is based, a motion of no confidence need not set out a ground or charge. A vote of censure presupposes that the persons censured have been guilty of some impropriety or lapse by act or omission and it is because of that lapse or impropriety that they are being censured. It may, therefore, become necessary to specify the impropriety or lapse while moving a vote of censure. No such consideration arises when a motion of no confidence is moved. Although a ground may be mentioned when passing a motion of no confidence, the existence of a ground is not a prerequisite of a motion of no confidence. There is no legal bar to the passing of a motion of no confidence against an authority in the absence of any charge of impropriety or lapse on the part of that authority. The essential connotation of a no- confidence motion is that the party against whom such motion is passed has ceased to enjoy the confidence of the requisite majority of members. We may in the above context refer to page 591 of Practise and Procedure of Parliament, Second Ed. by Kaul and Shakdher wherein it is observed as under: H

PRATAP CHANDRA MEHTA v. STATE BAR COUNCIL1025 OF M.P. & ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

"A no-confidence motion in the Council of Ministers is distinct from a censure motion. Whereas, a censure motion must set out the grounds or charge on which it is based and is moved for the specific purpose of censuring the Government for certain policies and actions, a motion of no confidence need not set out any grounds on which it is based. Even when grounds are mentioned in the notice and read .out in the House, they do not form part of the no- confidence motion."

60Copy pinpoint60. Still, in another case, titled B.P. Singhal v. Union of India & Anr. [JT 2010 (5) SC 640], the Court, while dealing with the doctrine of pleasure in relation to the term of the office of the Governor, for a tenure of 5 years, noticed that Article 156(1) of the Constitution dispenses with the need to assign reasons or the need to give notice in the event of removal. But the need to act fairly and reasonably still cannot be dispensed with. D Exception was carved out against acting in a manner which is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. In face of the above enunciated principles, we are of the considered view that the concept of just cause and right of hearing, the features of common law, are not applicable to the elected offices where a E person is so elected by majority in accordance with statutory rules. It would also have hardly any application to moving of a 'no confidence motion' in so far as these are controlled by specific provisions and are not arbitrary or unreasonable. There is nothing in Rule 122-A of the M.P. Rules that requires adherence to these two concepts when a motion of no confidence is moved against a sitting Chairman/Vice- Chairman. Of course, it does not imply that the action can be arbitrary or capricious and absolutely contrary to the spirit of the Rule. There is no dispute in the facts of the present case that majority of the members had pas·sed the 'no confidence motion' in the 16th Meeting of the State Bar Council on 16th April, 2011. We are not able to accept the view taken by the High Court of Delhi in the case of Bar Council of Delhi (supra) H

1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 11 S.C.R.

A in saying that solely with the aid of General Clauses Act, the power to elect would deem to include power to remove by a motion of no confidence, particularly, with reference to the facts and circumstances of this case. The power to requisition a 'no confidence motion' and pass the same, in terms of Rule 122- 8 A of the M.P. Rules, is clear from the bare reading of the Rule, as relatable to loss of faith and confidence by the elected body in the elected office bearer. We have already discussed in some detail and concluded that Rule 122-A of the M.P. Rules is not ultra vires the provisions of the Advocates Act, including c Section 15. When the law so permits, there is no right for that office bearer to stay in office after the passing of the 'no confidence motion' and, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is clearly established that the appellants had lost the confidence of the majority of the elected members and thus the Resolution dated 16th April, 2011 cannot be faulted 0 with.

61Copy pinpoint61. Before concluding the judgment we would proceed to record our conclusions and answer the three questions posed at the outset of the judgment as follows: E Answers to:

Question No. 1

We hold that the provisions of Rules 121 and 122-A (in F particular) of the M.P. Rules are not ultra vires of the provisions, including the provisions of Section 15, of the Advocates Act. These rules also do not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation.

G Question No. 2

In view of our answer to Question No. 1, there is no need for us to specifically answer this question.

PRATAP CHANDRA MEHTA v. STATE BAR COUNCIL 1027

OF M.P. & ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

Question No. 3 A

In view of the language of Section 15(3) of the Advocates Act and the factual matrix afore-noticed by us, it is clear that the amended rules of the M.P. Rules had received the approval .of the Bar Council of India, particularly Rule 122-A. The Rules B would not be invalidated for want of issuance of any notification, as it is not the requirement in terms of Section 15(3) of the Advocates Act and in any case would be a curable irregularity at best.

For the reasons afore-stated, we dismiss these appeals. C

,N.J. Appeals dismissed.