BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 4097 of 2010 etc.}

MAY 5, 2010 B

30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.

p. 31 Copy page pinpoint

32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE · 33 DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY necessary to evolve tailor-made schemes to suit particular A acquisitiorl to make it smooth, speedy, litigation free and beneficial to all concerned - Acquisition should be for the benefit of society and improve the city and not to benefit the development authority - Need for the Law Commission and the Parliament to revisit the Land Acquisition Act - Land B Acquisition Act, 1894. Interpretation of Statutes - Vague and ambiguous provision - An interpretation that would avoid absurd results should be adopted - When the object orpolicy of a statute can be ascertained, imprecision in its language not to be C allowed in the way of adopting a reasonable construction which avoids absurdities and incongruities and carries out the object or policy - A court cannot supply a real casus omis'sus I nor can it interpret a statute to create a casus omissus when there is really none. D Doctrines: Doctrine of casus omissus - Applicability of. Doctrine of Pith and Substance - Applicability of. E Civic Agencies· - 'Municipal Corporation' and 'Development Authority' - Difference between - Discussed. Writ petitions were filed challenging the acquisition of land by Bangalore Development Authority (BOA) under Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (BOA f Act). The same were allowed by Single Judge of High Court quashing the entire acquisition. Writ appeals were allowed by Division Bench of High Court. Hence the present appeals. The questions which arose for consideration in the G present appeals were: (i) Whether the BOA Act, in so far as it provides for compulsory acquisition of property, is still-born and ineffective as it did not receive the assent of the President, as required by Article 31 (3) of the Constitution of India. (ii) Whether the provisions of the H

34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.

A BOA Act, in particular Section 15 r/w Section 2(c) dealing with the power of BOA to draw up schemes for development for Bangalore Metropolitan Area became inoperative, void or was impliedly repealed, by virtue of Parts IX and IX(A) of the Constitution inserted by the 73rd B and 74th Amendments to the Constitution. (iii) Whether the sixteen villages where the lands have been acquired, fall outside the Bangalore Metropolitan Area as defined in Section 2(c) of the BOA Act and therefore, the Bangalore Development Authority has no territorial c jurisdiction to make development schemes or acquire lands in those villages. (iv) Whether the amondment to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 requiring the final declaration to be issued within one year from the date of publication of the preliminary notification is 0 applicable to the acquisitions under the BOA Act; and whether the declaration u/s. 19(1) of BOA Act, having been issued after the expiry of one year from the date of the preliminary notification u/s. 17(1) and (3) of BOA Act, is invalid. (v) Whether the provisions of Sections 4, 5A, 6 of E Land Acquisition Act, would be applicable in regard to acquisitions under the BOA Act and whether non- compliance with those provisions, vitiate the acquisition proceedings (vi) Whether the development scheme and the acquisitions are invalid for non-compliance with the procedure prescribed u/ss. 15 to 19 of the BOA Act in F regard to: (a) absence of specificity and discrepancy in extent of land to be acquired; (b) failure to furnish material particulars to the Government as required u/s. 18(1) r/w Section 16 of the BOA Act; and (c) absence of valid sanction by the Government, u/s. 18(3) of the BOA Act. G (vii) Whether the deletion of 1089 Ac~s 12 Guntas from the proposed acquisition, while proceeding with the acquisition of similar contiguous lands of appellants amounted to hostile discrimination and therefore the lands of appellants also required to be withdrawn from H acquisition.

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 35

36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.

A thereof clearly provides that the acquisition will be regulated by the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 so far as they are applicable. Thus the principles on which the compensation is to be determined and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined 8 set out in the Land Acquisition Act become applicable to acquisitions underI BOA Act. Thus there is no violation of Article 31(2). Article 31(3) merely provides that no law providing for acquisition shall have effect unless such law has received the assent of the President. Article 31 (3) C does not specify any fundamental right, but relates to the procedure for making a law providing for acquisition. It does not nullify any law, but postpones the enforcement of a law relating to acquisition, until it receives the assent of the President. There is therefore no violation of Part Ill of the Constitution that can lead to any part of the BOA 0 Act being treated as a nullity. The effect of Article 31(3) was that enforcement of the provisions relating to acquisition was not possible/permissible till the assent of the President was received. Therefore, once the requirement of assent disappeared, the provisions E relating to acquisition became enforceable. [Para 11] [76- A-H; 77-A] M.P. V. Sundararamier and Co. v. 'The State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. AIR 1958 SC 468, followed F Munithimmaiah v. State of Kamataka 2002 (4) SCC 326, relied on Mahendra Lal Jain v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1963 Supp (1) SCR 912, referred to G Question (ii) - Re : Invalidity with reference to Parts IX and IX-A of the Constitution : 2.1. Part IX-A of the Constitution seeks to strengthen the democratic political governance at grass-root level in H .urban areas by providing constitutional status to

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 37

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Municipalities, and by laying down minimum uniform norms and by ensuring regular and fair conduct of elections. When Part IXA came into force, the provisions of the existing laws relating to municipalities which were inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of Part IX- A would have ceased to apply. To provide continuity for some time and an opportunity to the concerned State Governments to bring the respective enactments relating to municipalities in consonance with the provisions of Part IX-A in the meanwhile, Article 243ZF was inserted. The object was not to invalidate any law relating to city improvement trusts or development authorities which operate with reference to specific and specialised field of planned development of cities by forming layouts and making available plots/houses/apartments to the members of the public. [Para 21] [94-H; 95-A-C] o 2.2. The benefit of Article 243ZF is available only in regard to laws relating to 'municipalities'. Thus Article 243ZF has no relevance to test the validity of the BOA Act or any provision thereof. If BOA Act or any provision thereof is found to be inconsistent with the provisions of E Part IXA, such inconsistent provision will be invalid even from 1.6.1993, and the benefit of continuance for a period of one year permitted under Article 243ZF will not be available to such a provision of law, as BOA Act is not a law relating to Municipalities. [Para 20] [94-A-O] F 2.3. The object and functions of a Municipal Corporations are completely different from the object and purpose of a development authority like BOA. BOA is not a municipality. Therefore, it cannot be said that mere G existence of Municipal Corporations Act, duly amended to bring it in conformity with Part IX-A of the Constitution, will nullify or render redundant, the BOA Act. [Para 23] [97-G-H] 2.4. The declaration of metropolitan area by the H

38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.

A Governor, as provided in clause (c) of Article 243P is specifically with reference to the law relating to municipalities. The Bangalore Metropolitan Area as defined in the Bangalore Development Authority Act is only for the purpose of development i.e. development by B way of building or engineering operations in or over or under land. Therefore neither the provision defining 'metropolitan area' in Article 243P(c) nor the provision for constitution of a Metropolitan Planning Committee for preparing a draft development plan for such metropolitan c area Linder Article 243ZE has any relevance or bearing to the Bangalore Metropolitan Area with reference to which BOA has been constituted. [Para 24) [98-D-G] 2.5. The area in which the BOA Act operates is totally different from the areas in which Part IX A of the D Constitution and Municipal Corporation Act which relate to local self-government operate. The development plan to be drawn for a metropolitan area, by a Metropolitan Planning Committee should not be confused with a development scheme to be drawn by a development authority like BOA for a metropolitan area. Insofar as Bangalore is concerned, the Bangalore Metropolitan Area as defined in Section 2(c) of the BOA Act is the area comprising the City of Bangalore p.s defined in the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporatipn Act, 1949, the area where the city of Bangalore lmprdvernent Act, 1945 was immediately before the commencenient of the BOA Act in force, and such other areas adjacent to the aforesaid, as the Government may from time to time by notification specify. On the other hand, the Bangalore Metropolitan G Area, referred to in Section 503-B of Municipal Corporation Act is an area to be specified by the Governor by public notification under Article 243P(c) of the Constitution of India. In fact the Governor had not even specified the Bangalore Metropolitan Area for the H . purpose of Municipal Corporation Act. Neither the

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 39

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Bangalore Metropolitan Area nor a Metropolitan Planning A Committee is in existence under the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act. In these circumstances, it is not correct to say that the BOA Act, is no longer in force and that BOA has no jurisdiction or authority to draw up a development scheme to form layouts and acquir~ land to form lay outs in pursuance of any development scheme for Bangalore Metropolitan Area. [Para 25] [99-H; 100-A- B; 102-B-C] 2.6. While it is true that BOA is not an elected body like the municipality, it has several elected representatives as members. The members of the BOA represent different interests and groups, technical persons and elected representatives. Further, no development scheme can be finalised or put into effect without the sanction of the State Government which in turn has to take note of any representation by the Bangalore Municipal Corporation in regard to the development scheme. Therefore, the mere fact that BOA is not wholly elected body as in the case of a Municipal Corporation will make no difference. The membership pattern is more suited to fulfil the requirements of a specialist agency executing development schemes. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the provisions of BOA Act become inoperative, on Parts IX and IX-A of the Constitution coming into force. [Para 27] [100--G; F 101-E-G] Question (iii) - Re : BOA lacking territorial jurisdiction to draw up the development scheme: 3.1. It is not correct to say that Bangalore G Development Authority does not have territorial jurisdiction to form any development scheme in regard to the 16 villages which are the subject matter of the final declaration. [Para 41] [110-D] 3.2. Section 15 empowers the BOA to draw up H

40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2010] 6 S.C.R.

A de'telopment schemes or additional development schemes for the development of the Bangalore Metropolitan Area. Bangalore Metropolitan Area is defined in Section 2(c). The areas in which the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 was in force immediately before B the commencement of BOA Act was the City of Bangalore and other areas adjoining the city specified by the State Government from time to time by notification (vide Section 1(2) of the said Act). [Para 29) (102-E-G] 3.3. The State Government issued a notification dated C 1.11.1965, u/s. 4A (1) of the 'Town Planning Act' declaring the area comprising the City of Bangalore and other areas (218 villages) enumerated in Schedule I thereto to be the 'Local Planning Area' for the purposes of the said Act to be called as the Bangalore City Planning Area and the D limits of the said planning area were as described in Schedule II thereto. All the 16 villages in which the lands were acquired-for scheme in question fell within the said Bangalore City Planning Area (that is within the 'other areas' described in the I Schedule). The Government of E Karnataka issued another notification dated 13.3.1984 declaring that the area comprising 325 peripheral villages around Bangalore as indicated in Schedule I to be Local Planning Area for the environs of Bangalore and the limits of the said planning area shall be as indicated in F Schedule II thereto. Schedule II to the notification dated 13.3.1984 gave the boundaries of the entire local planning area of Bangalore which included not only 325 villages which were added by the said notification but the original planning area described and declared in the notification dated 1.11.1965. Thereafter, the Government of Karnataka issued a notification dated 6.4.1984 amalgamating the 'Local Planning Area of Bangalore' declared under notification dated 1.11.1965 anCI the 'Local Planning Area' declared for the environs of Bangalore by notification dated 13.3.1984. The Government of Karnataka issued a

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 41

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY notification dated 1.3.1988 in exercise of the power u/s. A 2(c) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 specifying the villages, indicated in I Schedule and within the boundaries indicated in II Schedule to the notification dated 13.3.1984, to be the areas for the purpose of the said clause. [Paras 30, 31, 32 and 33] [102-H; 103-A-H; B 104-A-C] 3.4. The notification dated 1.3.1988 would show that the clear intention of the State Government was to declare the entire area declared under the notification dated 1.11.1965 and the notification dated 13.3.1984, C together as the Bangalore Metropolitan· Area. The notification dated 1.3.1988 clearly states that the entire area situated within the boundaries indicated in Schedule II to the notification dated 13.3.1984 was the area for the purpose of Section 2(c) of BOA Act. There is no dispute D /that the boundaries indicated in Schedule II to the notification dated 13.3.1984 would include not only the villages enumerated in I Schedule to the notification dated 13.3.1984 but also the area that was declared as planning area under the notification dated 1.11.1965. This is because the areas declared JJnder notification dated 1.11.1965 are the core area (Bangalore City) and the area surrounding the core area that is 218 villages forming the first concentric circle; and the area declared under the notification dated 13.3.1984 (32-5 villages) surrounding the area declared under the notification dated 1.11.1965 forms the second concentric circle. Therefore, the boundaries of the lands declared under the notification dated 13.3.1984, would also include the lands which are declared under the notification dated 1.11.1965 and therefore, the 16 villages which are the subject matter of the impugned acquisition, are part of the Bangalore Metropolitan Area. [Para 34] [104-G-H; 105-A-C] 3.5. It cannot be said that the note at the end of II Schedule to the notification dated 13.3.1984 excluded the H

42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.

A Bangalore city planning area declared under the notification dated 1.11.1965. As the planning area that was being declared under the notification dated 13.3.1984, was in addition to the area that was declared under the notification dated 1.11.1965, it was made clear in the note B at the end of the notification dated 13.3.1984 that the area declared under the notification dated 1.11.1965 is to be excluded. The purpose of the note was not to exclude the area declared under the notification dated 1.11.1965 from the local planning area. The intention was to specify what c was being added, to the local planning area declared under the notification dated 1.11.1965. But in the notification dated 1.3.1988, what is declared as the Bangalore Metropolitan Area is the area that is within the boundaries indicated in schedule II to the notification dated 13.3.1984, which is the area notified on 1.11.1965 0 as also the area notified on 13.3.1984. The note in the notification dated 13.3.1984 was only a note for the purposes of the notification dated 13.3.1984 and did not form part of the notification dated 1.3.1988. There is therefore no doubt that the in.tention of the State E Government was to include the entire area within the boundaries described in Schedule II, that is the area declared under two notifications dated 1.11.1965 and 13.3.1984, as the Bangalore Metropolitan Area. [Para 35] [105-D-H; 106-A-B] F 3.6. It is true that the wording of the notification is clumsy and ambiguous. When there is vagueness and ambiguity, an interpretation that would avoid absurd results should be adopted. The interpretation put forth by G the appellants, if accepted would mean the outer centric circle of Bangalore which consists of only the peripheral villages would be the Bangalore Metropolitan Area and neither the Bangalore city nor the 218 villages immediately adjoining and surrounding the Bangalore H city would form part of Bangalore Metropolitan Area. This

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 43

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY is absurd and will be in direct violation of Section 2(c) of A BOA Act which states that Bangalore City and the areas surrounding it where City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 was in force, will form part of Bangalore Metropolitan Area. [Para 37] [106-0-H] 8 3.7. The doctrine of casus omissus is a general rule that the court may not by construction insert words or phrases in a statute or supply a casus omissus by giving force and effect to the language of the statute when applied to a subject about which nothing whatever is said, and which, to all appearances, was not in the mind of the legislature at the time of the enactment of law. But the position will be different where the language is ambiguous and an intelligible interpretation would require addition of words particularly when the intention of the State Government is clear and evident and it is reiterated by the State Government and the BOA. When the object or policy of a statute can be ascertained, imprecision in its language should not be readily allowed in the way of adopting a reasonable construction which avoids absurdities and incongruities and carries out the object or policy. A court cannot supply a real casus omissus, nor can it interpret a statute to create a casus omissus when there is really none. [Para 39] [107-G-H; 108-A-O] Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray v. Justice 8. Lentin and Ors. F 1988 (4) SCC 419; S. R. Bommai and Ors. v. UOI and Ors. 1994 (3) SCC 1; Padma Sunder Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu 2002 (3) sec 533, referred to American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series Vol. 73; Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G. P. Singh 2008 G Edition - Page 65, referred to. 3.8. Section 2(c) of BOA Act makes it clear that the city of Bangalore as defined in the Municipal Corporation Act is part of Bangalore Metropolitan Area. It also makes it clear that the areas where the city of Bangalore H

44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.

A Improvement Act, 1945 was in force, is also part of Bangalore Metropolitan Area. It contemplates other areas adjacent to the aforesaid areas being specified as part of Bangalore Metropolitan Area by a notification. Therefore, clearly, the area that is contemplated for being specified B in a notification u/s. 2(c) is "other areas adjacent" to the areas specifically referred to in Section 2(c). But it is seen from the notification dated 1.3.1988 that it does not purport to specify the "such other areas adjacent" to the areas specifically referred to in section 2(c), but purports c to specify the Bangalore Metropolitan Area itself as it states that it is specifying the "areas for the purpose of the said clause". If the notification specifies the entire Bangalore Metropolitan Area, the interpretation put forth by the appellants that only the villages included in Schedule I to the notification dated 13.3.1984 would be the Bangalore Metropolitan Area, would result In an absurd situation. The notification dated 1.3.1988 made It clear that the Bangalore Metropolitan Area would be the area within the boundaries Indicated in II Schedule to the notification dated 13.3.1984. It would mean that the three areas, namely, the central core area, the adjoining 218 villages constituting the first concentric circle area and the next adjoining 325 villages forming the second concentric circle are all included within the Bangalore Metropolitan Area. What ls already specifically included by Section 2(c) of BOA Act cannot obviously be excluded by notification dated 1.3.1988 while purporting to specify the additional areas adjoining to the areas which were already enumerated. Therefore, the proper way of reading the notification dated 1.3.1988 is to read it as specifying G 325 villages which are described in the First Schedule to the notification dated 13.3.1984 to be added to the existing met:nnolitan area and clarifying that the entire areas within the boundaries of Second Schedule to the notification dated 13.3.1984 would constitute the H

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 45

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Bangalore Metropolitan Area. [Para 40) (108-G-H; 109-A- A H; 110-A-C] Question (iv) - Re : Invalidity of final declaration with reference to time limit in Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act: B

4. BOA Act contains provisions relating to acquisition of properties, up to the stage of publication of final declaration. BOA Act does not contain the subsequent provisions relating to completion of the acquisition, that is issue of notices, enquiry and award, vesting of land, payment of compensation,· principles relating to determination of compensation etc. Section 36 of BOA Act does not make the Land Acquisition Act applicable in its entirety, but states that the acquisition under BOA Act, shall be regulated by_ the provisions, so o far as they are applicable, of Land Acquisition Act. Therefore it follows that where there are already provisions in the BOA Act regulating certain aspects or stages of acquisition or the proceedings relating thereto, the corresponding provisions of LA Act will not apply to the acquisitions under the BOA Act. Only those provisions of LA Act, relating to the ~tages of acquisition, for which there is no provision in the BOA Act, are applied to the acquisitions under the BOA Act. The BOA Act contains specific provisions relating to preliminary notification and final declaration. In factthe procedure up to final declaration under BOA Act is different from the procedure under the Land Acquisitio11 Act relating to acquisition proceedings up to the stage of final notification. Therefore, having regard to the Scheme for acquisition u/ss. 15 to 19 of the BDA Act and the limited application of Land Acquisition Act in terms of Section 36 of BOA Act, the provisions of Sections 4 to 6 of Land Acquisition Act will not apply to the acquisitions under the BOA Act. If Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act is not made applicable, the question of amendment to Section H

46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.

A 6 of Land Acquisition Act providing a time limit for issue of final declaration, will also not apply. The final declaration dated 23.2.2004 does not suffer from any infirmity on account of the same having been published a few days beyond one year from the date of publication B of the preliminary notification u/ss. 17 (1) and (3) of the BOA Act. [Para 43 & 44] (111-C-H; 112-A; G-H; 113-A] Munithimmaiah vs. State of Karnataka 2002 (4) SCC 326, relied on c Question (v) - Re: Applicability of Sections 4, 5A & 6 of Land Acquisition Act: 5.1. It is not correct to say that the BOA Act has to yield to Land Acquisition Act and consequently, tile provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Land Acquisition Act D will be applicable and have to be complied with fo1· acquisitions under the BOA Act. [Para 51] [119-E] 5.2. The assumption by the appellant that Chapter Ill of the BOA Act relating to development schemes does not provide for acquisition, is erroneous. Sections 15 to 19 of the BOA Act contemplate drawing-up of a development scheme or additional development scheme for the Bangalore Metropolitan Area, containing the particulars set down in Section 16 of the said Act, which includes the details of the lands to be acquired for execution of the scheme. Section 36 of BOA Act provides that the "acquisition of land under this Act", shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as they are applicable of the Land Acquisition Act. In view of the categorical reference in Section 36 of the BOA Act, to acquisitions under that Act, there cannot be any doubt that the acquisitions for BOA is not under the Land Acquisition Act, but under the BOA Act itself. It is also clear from Section 36 that Land Acquisition Act, in its entirety, is not applicable to the acquisition under the BOA Ace, but only such of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for

BON DU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 47

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY which a corresponding provision is not found in the BOA A Act, will apply to acquisitions under the BOA Act. In view of Sections 17 to 19 of the BOA Act, the corresponding provisions - Sections 4 to 6 of the Land Acquisition Act will not apply to acquisitions under the BOA Act. [Para 47] [114-E-F; 115-E-G] B 5.3. The question of repugnancy arises only when both the legislatures are competent to legislate in the same field, that is, when both the Union and State laws relate to a subject in List Ill of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Article 254 has no application except where the two laws relate to subjects in List Ill. But if the law made by the State Legislature, covered by an Entry in the State List, incidentally touches upon any of the matters in the Concurrent List, it is well~settled that it will not be considered to be repugnant to an existing Central law with respect to such a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List. In such cases of overlapping between mutually exclusive lists, the doctrine of pith and substance would apply. Article 254(1) will have no application if the State law in pith and substance relates to a matter in List II, even if it may incidentally trench upon some item in List Ill. Where the law covered by an Entry in the State List made by the State Legislature contains a provision which direi:tly and substantially relates to a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List and is repugnant to the provisions of any existing law with respect to that matter in the Concurrent List, then the repugnant provision in the State List may be void unless it can co-exist and operate without repugnancy to the provisions of the existing law. The BOA Act is an Act to provide for the establishment of a development authority to facilitate and ensure planned growth and development of the City of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto, and that acquisition of any lands, for such development, is merely incidental to the main object of the Act, that is H

48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R

A development of Bangalore Metropolitan area. In pith and substance, the BOA Act is one which squarely falls under Entry 5 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and is not a law for acquisition of land like the Land Acquisition Act, traceable to Entry 42 of List Ill of the Seventh Schedule, B the field in respect of which is already occupied by the Central Act, as amended from time to time. If at all, BOA Act, so far as acquisitfon of land for its developmental activities is concerned, in substance and effect will constitute a special law providing for acquisition for the C special purposes of BOA and the same will not be considered to be a part of the Land Acquisition Act. The appellant have erroneously assumed that BOA Act is a law referable to Entry 42 of List Ill, while it is a law referable to Entry 5 of List II. Hence the question of repugnancy and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 0 prevailing over Section 19 of BOA Act would not at all arise. [Para 49] [116-F-H; 117-A-H; 118-A] Mis. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals vs. State of Bihar - 1983 (4) SCC 45; Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia AIR 1947 PC 72; E: Lakhi Narayan v. Province of Bihar AIR 1950 FC 59, relied on. Munithimmaiah v. State of Karnataka 2002 (4) SCC 326, referred to. F 5.4. The assumption that a final declaration u/s. 19 has to be preceded by an inquiry, similar to what is contemplated u/s. 5A of Land Acquisition Act, is without any basis. The scheme of BOA Act also contemplates consideration of objections but does not require any personal hearing or inquiry. While the scheme for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act and the BOA Act contemplates notice to the landholders/persons interested, the procedure thereafter is markedly different. Therefore, it is impermissible to import the requirement of Section 5A of Land Acqusition Act in regard to

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 49

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY acquisitions under the BOA Act. [Para 50] [118-B, F-G; A 119-D] Question (vi) - Re : Non-compliance with Sections 15 to 19 of the BOA Act: (a) Absence of Specifying and Discrepancy in extract: B 6.1. The mere fact that there were some modifications from time to time between the date when the initial proposal was mooted till the issue of the notification u/s. 17(1) and (3) or that some lands were omitted/deleted in the declaration u/s. 19(1) will not affect the validity of the C scheme. The changes and modifications are intact contemplated in the process of making the scheme u/ss. 15 to 19 of BOA Act. [Para 56] [123-B-D] (b) Non-furnishing of material particulars to the o Government for the purpose of sanction: 6.2. It cannot be said that the material required for seeking sanction had not been furnished by the BOA to the Government. Section 18 is clear about the material to be furnished by the BOA for seeking sanction of the E scheme. On examining the records of the BOA and the Government, the Division Bench recorded a finding that all the required particulars had been furnished so that the Government can apply its mind. In fact, the notings show that in response to the further information sought by the F Government, the Authority furnished the required information. The project map was not one of the documents that had to be furnished by the BOA while seeking sanction of the scheme. In fact the scheme report had been submitted on 5.2.2004 itself and that had been G made available to the Government. The Government had stated therein that whatever particulars that were required to be furnished, had been furnished and they were satisfied that the scheme required to be sanctioned. It is H

50 .SUPREME COURT REPORTS (20'10] 6 S.C.R.

A only thereafter that sanction was granted. [Para 60) [126- D-H; 127-A-B] (c) Absence of valid sanction by the Government: 6.3. In the instant case, the matter (relating to B sanction u/ss. 18(3) of BOA Act) was placed befo.re the Chief Minister who also happened to be the Ministt:lr-in- Charge on 20.2.2004. He granted the approval subject to ratification by the Cabinet. In view of the subsequent ratification by the Cabinet there is nothing irregular in the c procedure adopted. The delay in ratification was on account of the dissolution of the House. [Para 62) [129- F-H] 6.4. It cannot be said that the sanction is void. Rule 12 requires that the matter should ordinarily be D considered at a meeting of the Cabinet. This itself shows that there can be exceptional circumstances where it will not be possible to place it before the Cabinet. The approval granted by the Chief Minister, subject to the ratification of the Cabinet was treated by the Urban E Development Department as approval for the sanction u/ s. 18(3) and a Government order was made in the name of the Governor granting sanction u/s. 18(3) of the BOA Act. The State Government also issued a final declaration u/s. 19(1) of BOA Act. It is thus evident that the State F Government proceeded on the basis that the order of approval of the Chief Minister for the sanction, was sufficient for grant of sanction. Even if it is to be assumed that such approval was irregular as it was made subject to ratification, as the ratification was subsequently made, G the challenge for want of proper approval of the Cabinet for the sanction cannot be accepted. (Para 63) (130-A-D] Question (vii) : Re : Discrimination, malafides and arbitrariness : .

H 7.1. The State Government granted sanction for

BONDU RAMASV'!AMY v. BANGALORE 51 DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY acquisition of 2750 acres after noting that 589 acres 12 A guntas was excluded from the proposed extent of 3339 acres 12 guntas, after considering the representations received in pursuance of notices issued u/s. 17(5~of BOA Act. But when the cases came up before the High Court and this court, the categorical case of BOA is that the total B area notified u/s. 17(1) and (3) of the BOA Act, was 3839 acres 12 guntas and that the area deleted/excluded was 1089 acres 12 guntas. How the preliminary notification extent ar1::1a increased by 500 acres and how the area deleted also increased exactly by 500 acres is not c properly explained and ic; virtually a mystery. [Para 64] [131-0-F] 7.2. The BOA does not seriously dispute the fact that there were some amount of arbitrariness and discrimination in the matter of inclusions and exclusions. D Apart from that the BOA has not come up with true and correct position. The break up of deletions and the reasons for such deletions have not been disclosed. The extent of deletion without explanation has jumped froi:n 589.12 acres to 1089.12 acres. The BOA has not chosen E to explain the exact extent of the Government land involved. Even the map produced showing the 2750 acres of acquired land and 1089 acres 12 guntas of deleted area contains several discrepancies. [Para 69, 70] [134- C-F] F 7.3. The acquisition was for planned development of the city and to avoid haphazard growth. But when the layout plan is examined with reference to the preliminary notification and final declaration, several startling facts emerge. Pick and choose method was adopted with G reference to two villages. Haphazard and arbitrary exclusions are in several other villages also, though not to the extent in the above-mentioned two villages. [Para 72, 73) [135-G-H; 136-A, G] H

52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 6 S.C.R.

A 7.4. The object of establishing a deve.lopment authority is to provide fo.r orderly and planned development so that the haphazard growth of a city is checked. Large tracts of lands running into hundreds of acres are acquired to have integrated layouts. [Para 74) 1::3 [138-B; 139-A] 7.5. If authorities like BOA notify 3000 acres of land for development and then delete from the proposed acquisition several pockets which aggregate to about 1000 to 1500 acres, then the result is obvious. There will be no integrated development at all. What was intended to be a uniform, contiguous and continuous layout of 3000 acres will get split into small pockets which are not connected with the other pockets or will be intersected by own illegal pockets of private colonies thereby perpetuating what was intended to be prevented, that is haphazard growth without proper infrastructure. [Para 75) [140-B-C] 7.6. The deletion from proposed acquisition should be only with regard to areas which are already well developed in a planned manner. Sporadic small unauthorised constructions in unauthorised colonies/ layouts, are not to be deleted as the very purpose of acquisition for planned development is to avoid such unauthorised development. If hardship is the reason for such deletion, the appropriate course is to give preference to the land/plot owners in making allotments and help them to resettle and not to continue the illegal and haphazard pockets merely on the ground that some temporary structure or a dilapidated structure existed therein. A development authority should either provide orderly development or should stay away from development. The power of deletion and withdrawal unless exercised with responsibility and fairly and reasonably, will play havoc with orderly development, will add to haphazard and irregular growth and create

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 53

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY discontent among sections of society who were not fortunate to have their lands deleted. [Paras 76 and 77] [141-C-G] 7.7. Single Judge as also the Division Bench of High Court have concurrently found that BOA had indulged in 8 pick and choose deletions and acquisitions. They have found discrimination and irregularities, both in initial omission of certain lands and in deleting of some lands . which were notified. They have also recorded a finding that having regard to the nature of deletions, the required lands do not form a continuous or contiguous area and C acquisition of small extents of land surrounded by large chunks of un-acquired lands and lands which have been omitted from acquisition would make the development of acquired pockets exceedingly difficult. [Para 78] [142-0- E] D 7.8. The Division Bench was of the view that quashing of the entire acquisition may not be the remedy. It, therefore, decided to salvage t~e situation by issuing a series of directions, whereby the land owners were permitted to apply for· deletion of their lands also from acquisition on the ground that (a) the lands were situated within green belt area; (b) the lani,s were totally built up; (c) the lands had buildings constructed by charitable, educational and/or religious institutions; (d) the lands were used for nurseries; (e) lands where running factories had been set up; and (f) lands were similar to the adjoining lands which were not notified for acquisition. The Court directed that if the BOA comes to the conclusion that the lands of applicants were released are similar to those which have been excluded from acquisition their lands should also be deleted from acquisition. [Para 79] [142-F-H; 143-A] 7.9. The fact that an Authority has extended favours illegally in the case of several persons cannot be a H

54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.

A ground for courts to issue a mandamus directing repetition thereof, by applying the principle of equality. Article 14 guarantees equality before law and not equality in subverting law nor equality in securing illegal benefits. But courts cannot be silent bystanders If acquisition s process is used by officers of the Authority with ulterior or malafide motives. [Para 81) [146-D-F] Chandigarh Admn. and Anr. v. Jagjit Singh and Anr. 1995 (1) SCC 745; Gurshanan Singh and Ors. v. New Delhi Municipal Committee and Ors. 1996 (2) SCC 459; State of C Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann 1997 (3) SCC 321, relied on 7.10. A land owner is not entitled to seek deletion of his land from acquisition, merely on the ground that lands of some others have been deleted. He should make out 0 a justifiable cause for deleting his land from acquisition. If the Rules/Scheme/Policy provides for deletion of certain categories of land and if the petitioner falls under those categories, he will be entitled to relief. But if under the Rules or Scheme or policy for deletion, his land is not eligible for deletion, his land cannot be deleted merely on the ground that some other land similarly situated had been deleted (even though that land also did not fall under any category eligible to be deleted), as that would amount to enforcing negative equality. But where large extents of land of ot~ers are indiscriminately and arbitrarily deleted, then the court may grant relief, if on account of such deletions, the development scheme for that ar"!•' has become inexecutable or has resulted in abandonment of the scheme. Alternatively, if a common factor can be identified in respect of other lands which were deleted, and if the petitioner's land also has that common factor, relief can be granted on the ground that the Authority had adopted the common factor as the criterion in the case of others and therefore adopting the same yardstick, the land of petitioners also should be deleted. These principles may be kept in view while

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 55

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY implementing direction of the Judgment of the Division A Bench of the High Court. [Para 82] [148-G-H; 149-A-D] 7.11. Frequent complaints and grievances in regard to the following areas, with reference to the prevailing system of acquisitions governed by Land Acquisition Act, 1894, requires the urgent attention of the State 8 Governments and development authorities: (i) absence of proper or adequate survey and planning before embarking upon acquisition; (ii) indiscriminate use of emergency provisions in Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act; (iii)notification of areas far larger than C . what is actually required, for acquisition, and then making , arbitrary deletions and withdrawals from the acquisitions; (iv)offer of very low amount as compensation by Land Acquisition Collectors, necessitating references to court in almost all cases; (v) inordinate delay in payment of D compensation; and (vi) absence of any rehabilitatory measures. [Para 84] [152-C-GJ Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Mahaboob 2009 (3) SCALE 263, referred to. E 7 .12. There are several avenues for providing rehabilitation and economic security to land-losers. They can be by way of offering employment, allotment of alternative lands, providing housing or house plots, providing safe investment opportunities for the compensation amount to generate a stable income, or providing a permanent regular income by way of , annuities. The nature of benefits to the landlosers can ) vary depending upon the nature of the acquisition. For 1 this limited purpose, the acquisitions can be conveniently divided into three broad categories: (i) Acquisitions for the benefit of the general public or in national interest; (ii) Acquisitions for economic. development and industrial growth; and (iii) Acquisitions for planned development of urban areas. [Para 85] [153-B-F] H

56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.

A 7.13. Acquisitions of the first kind, does not normally create any resistance or hostility. But in acquisitions of the second kind, where the beneficiaries of acquisition are industries, business houses or private sector companies and in acquisitions of the third kind where the B beneficiaries are private individuals, there is a general feeling among the land-losers that their lands are taken away, to benefit other classes of people; that their lands are given to others for exploitation or enjoyment, while they are denied their land and their source of livelihood. c When this grievance and resentment remains unaddressed, it leads to unrest and agitations. The solution is to make the land-losers also the beneficiaries of acquisition so that the land-losers do not feel alienated but welcome the acquisition. [Para 86] [154-A-D] D 7.14. It is necessary to evolve tailor-made schemes to suit particular acquisitions, so that they will be smooth, speedy, litigation free and beneficial to all concerned. Proper planning, adequate counselling, and timely mediation with different groups of land-losers, should be resorted. [Para 87] [154-E-F] 7.15. In acquisitions of the first kind the State should however ensure that the landloser gets reasonable compensation promptly at the time of dispossession, so that he can make alternative arrangements for his rehabilitation and survival. Where the acquisition is for industrial or business houses the State should act as a benevolent trustee and safeguard the interests of the landlosers. The Land Acquisition Collectors should also become Grievance Settlement Authorities. The various alternatives including providing employment, providing equity participation, providing annuity benefits ensuring a regular income for life, providing rehabilitation in the form of housing or new businesses, should be considered and "Nhichever is 'ound feasible or suitable should be made an integral process of the scheme of

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 57

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY such acquisitions. Where the acquisition is of the third kind, the land-losers can be given a share in the development itself, by making available a reasonable portion of the developed land to the land-loser so that he can either use it personally or dispose of a part and retain a part or put it to other beneficial use. [Para 87] [154-G- B H; 155-A, D; 155-E-G] ,·

7.16. There is also a ·need for' the Law Commission and the Parliament to revisit the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which is more than a century old. There is also a need to remind Development Authorities that they exist C to serve the people and not vice versa. Any development scheme should be to benefit the society and improve the city, and not to benefit the Development Authority. [Para 88) [156-E-H] D, 7.17. Where arbitrary and unexplained deletions and . exclusions from acquisition, of large extents of notified lands, render the acquisitions meaningless, or totally unworkable, the court will have no alternative but to quash the entire acquisition. But where many land-losers have accepted the acquisition and received the compensation, and where possession of considerable portions of acquired lands has already been taken, and development activities have been carried out by laying plots and even making provisional or actual allotments, those factors have to be taken note of, while granting relief. The Division Bench has made an effort to protect the interests of all parties, on the facts and circumstances, by issuing detailed directions. But implementation of these directions may lead to further litigations and complications. To salvage the acquisition and to avoid hard~hips to BOA and its allottees and to avoid prolonged further round litigations emanating from the directions of the High Court, a more equitable way would be to uphold the decision of the Division Bench, but subject BDA's actions to certain corrective measures H

58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.

A by requiring it to re-examine certain aspects and provide an option to the landlosers to secure some additional benefit, as an incentive to accept the acquisition. A direction to provide an option to the land-losers to seek allotment of developed plots in lieu of compensation or s to provide for preferential allotment of some plots at the prevailing market price in addition to compensation will meet the ends of justice. Such directions will not be in conflict with the BOA (Allotment of sites) Rules, as they are intended to save the acquisitions. [Para 90) [157-G- C H; 158-A-O] Conclusion: 8.1. In regard to the acquisition of lands in two villages, BOA is directed to re-consider the objections to 0 the acquisitions having regard to the fact that large areas were not initially notified for acquisition, and more than 50% of whatever that was proposed for acquisition was also subsequently deleted from acquisition. BOA has to consider whether in view of deletions to a large extent, whether development with respect to the balance of the acquired lands has become illogical and impractical, and if so, whether the balance area also should be deleted from acquisition. If BOA proposes to continue the acquisition, it shall file a report within four months before the High Court so that consequential orders could be passed. [Para 91) [158-G-H; 159-A-B] 8.2. In regard to villages where there are several very small pockets of acquired lands surrounded by lands which were not acquired or which were deleted from the proposed acquisition, BOA may consider whether such small pockets should also be deleted if they are not suitable for forming self contained layouts. The acquisition thereof cannot be justified on the ground that these small islands of acquired land, could be used as a H stand alone park or playground in regard to a layout

BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 59

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY formed in different unconnected lands in other villages. A Similar isolated pockets in other villages should also be dealt with in a similar manner. [Para 91) [159-C-E] 8.3. BOA shall give an option to each writ petitioner whose land has been acquired for the layout in question to accept allotment of 15% (fifteen percent) of the land B acquired from him, by way of developed plots, in lieu of compensation (any fractions in ex_cessof 15% may be charged prevailing rates of allotment) or (b) in. cases where the extent of land acquired exceeds half an acre, to claim in addition to compensation (without prejudice c to seek reference if he is not satisfied with the quantum), allotment of a plot measuring 30' x 40' for every half acre of land acquired at the prevailing allotment price. [Para 91) [159-E-H; 160-A] D Case Law Reference: 2002 (4) sec 326 Relied on. Paras 9, 44 AIR 1958 SC 468 Followed Para 10 1963 Supp (1) SCR 912 Referred to. Para 11 E 1988 (4) sec 419 Referred to. Para 39 1994 (3) sec 1 Referred to. Para 39 2002 (3) sec 533 Referred to. Para 39 ·F 2002 (4) sec 326 Referred to. Para 49 1983 (4) sec 45 Relied on. Para 49 AIR 1947 PC 72 Relied on. Para 49 AIR 1950 FC 59 Relied on. Para 49 G 1995 (1) sec 745 Relied on. Para 80 1996 (2) sec 459 Relied on. Para 80 1997 (3) sec 321 Relied on. Para 80 H

60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.

A 2009 (3) SCALE 263 Referred to. Para 83 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4097 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 25.112005 of the High B Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in W.A. Nos. 2625 of 2005, 2626 & 2721 of2005 alongwith W.P. Nos. 11365 & 14771 of 2005. With c Civil Appeal Nos. 4133, 4098, 4099, 4100, 4101, 4102, 4103, 4104,4105,4106,4107,4108,4109,4110,4111,4112,4113, 4114,4115,4116,4117,4118,4119,4120,4121,4122,4123, 4124, 4125, 4126, 4127, 4128, 4129, 4130, 4131, 4132 & 4179-80 of 2010, SLP ..... (CC/No. 5682 of 2006) D Dushyant A. Dave, V.N. Lakshmi Naraina, K.K. Venugopal, Altaf Ahmed, P. Viswanatha Shetty, P.R. Ramesesh, Kiran Suri, Subramani, S.J. Smith, Girish Ananthamurthy, P.P. Singh, R.S. Hegde, Chandra Prakash, Rahul Tyagi, Savitri Pandy, Roy Abraham, Seema Jain, E Himinder Lal, S.N. Bhat, N.P.S. Panwar, D.P. Chaturvedi, D.Pavanesh, Satya Mitra, Joseph Pookkatt, Prashant Kumar, · Pooja Dhar, Atrayee Majumdar, Nikhil Majithia, Saurabh Suman Sinha, Dileep Tandon, Shailesh Madiyal, Raka Bijoy Phookan, Hrishikesh Baruah, Arjun Bobde, Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi F Agrawala, E.C. Agrawala, Gaurav Goel, S.S. Shamshery, · Pramod Kumar (for Dr. Kailash Chand),· N.D.R. Ramchandra Rao, Vaijayanthi Girish, T.V. Ratnam, K. Subba Rao, P.S. Dinesh Kumar, Naresh Kaushik, Lalita Kaushik, B.S. Methaila, Arnita Kalkal, Parag Goyal, Satish D., Kh. Nobin Singh, Nataraj G R., Rajesh Mahale, Radhananda, Raghavendra S. Srivatsa, Rajesh Mahale, K.N. Manjunath, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, K.H. Soma Shekar, Prakash Kumar Singh, Priya Kasyap, Nikhil Nayyar, Ankit Singhal, Vivekananda, V.N. Raghupathy, G.V. Chandrashekar (for Anjana Chandrashekar), R.B. Phookan, H (for J.S. Bhatia), S. Balaji, S. Sainivasan, Madhusmita Bora,

80NDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 61 DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY S.R. Sharma, M:A. Chinnasamy, K. Krishna Kumar, B.B. A Chauhan, Sanjay Parikh, M.Qamaruddin, M. Qumaruddin (for Ambar Qamaruddin), S.K. Kulkarni, Anukur S. Kulkarni, Nirnimesh Dube, M. Gireesh Kumar, S.J. Aristotle, Vijay Kumar, Sanjay R.Hegde; Anil K. Mishra, Vikrant Yadav, Rajesh Srivastava; Krishnan Venugopal, Shashi Kiran Shetty, Sharan B Dev Singh Thakur, Pradeep Kr. Bakshi for the appearing patties.